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Toodifficulttomanage,toobigtoignore:
Partychoiceinmultipartypresidentialsystems*
Very,VeryPreliminaryVersion
CarlosPereira,SamuelPessoa,FredericoBertholiniandHelloanaMedeiros
Abstract:
Inconsensual(proportional)highlyfragmentedmultipartysettings,political
partieshavetwohistoricalchoicestomakeorpathwaystofollow:i)playinga
majoritarianrolebyofferingcrediblecandidatestotheheadoftheexecutive;orii)
playingthemedianlegislatorgame.Eachofthosechoiceswillhaveimportant
consequencesnotonlyforthepartysystembutalsoforthegovernment.The
purposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbymedianlegislatorparties
oncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparativeperspective.We
analyzeindepththeBraziliancasewherethePartidodoMovimentoDemocrático
Brasileiro(PMDB)hasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianlegislatorpartyin
Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe
right.BasedonanexpertsurveyinLatinAmerica,webuiltanindexofPmdbismo
andidentifiedthatthereisapositivecorrelationbetweenpartisanfragmentation
andmedianlegislatorparties.Inaddition,weinvestigatetheeffectofhavinga
medianlegislatorpartyinthegoverningcoalition.Wefoundthatitischeaperand
lessdifficultforthegovernmenttomanagethecoalitionhavingthemedian
legislativepartyonboard.*Thispreliminarypaperwaspreparedtobepresentedattheworkshop“InstitutionalDeterminants
ofLegislativeCoalitionManagement”thatwilltakeplaceinTelAviv,Israel,onNovember16-19.We
aregratefultoFGVappliedresearchprogramforfundingthisproject.WethankNataliaRezendefor
researchassistance.
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1)Introduction:
Coalitionalpresidentialismhasbecomeincreasinglycommoninthe
democraticworld:itisnowthemodalformofdemocraticgovernanceinLatin
America,andanalogousregimesexistinAfrica,Asia,andpost-communistEuropeas
well.Itisalreadyknownthatitisverycostlytogovernamultipartypresidential
coalitionwithtoomanyparties,ideologicallyheterogeneous,andwithoutsharing
proportionalpowerwiththem(Pereira,BerthiliniandRaile2015).
However,therole-playedbytheorganizationalprofileandstructureof
politicalpartiestothemanagementofapresidentialcoalitionhasbeenunder
investigated.Infact,theimpactofthepartychoice(playingamajoritarianversusa
medianlegislatorgame)oncoalitionmanagementofmultipartypresidential
regimeshasbeenundertheorized.Inthecomparativeliteratureandintheexisting
theoreticalmodels,coalitionalpresidentialismoccupiesavaguespacebetween
classicworksonU.S.presidentialism(whereone-partisangovernmentsarethe
norm)andonEuropeanparliamentarism(inwhichmultipartycabinetsareroutine,
butinwhichisthereisnodirectlyelectedexecutiveandthefunctioningof
governmentsisdistinctfrommultipartypresidentialism).
Doesithelporharm,forinstance,thepresident’scoalitiontorelyonthe
supportofalargepartner,whichhasampledistributioninthenationalterritoryof
thecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmanystatesandbyholdinga
substantialnumberofseatsinCongress?Atthesametime,thispoliticalallyhas
beenideologicallyamorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,has
playedtheroleofthemedianlegislator,andhasbeenfulfilledbymanyregional
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leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterestsandsurvival.Ontheone
hand,havingapartylikethisonboardmayhelpthepresidenttoachievea
confortablemajorityinCongress.Ontheotherhand,itcanmakethepresident
politicallyvulnerablebyfacingpotentialholdupproblemsandincreasing
difficultiesofgoverning.
InBrazil,forinstance,thecentristPartidodoMovimentoDemocrático
Brasileiro(PMDB)isthelargestpoliticalpartyinthecountryandhasparticipatedin
aboutallgoverningcoalitionregardlessoftheideologicalorientationofthe
government.ThePMDBhasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianvoterpartyin
Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe
right.Nevertheless,therearegrowingconcernsthatgoverningwithanallylikethe
PMDBhasgeneratedpredatorypoliciesandrentseekingbehaviors.
Mainwaringetal(2015)arguethatBrazilhasanespecialcombinationan
exceptionallyfragmentedpartysystemincongressandaconsistentdominanceof
thesametwopartiesovermany(six)presidentialelections.Theyclaimthatthis
specificcombination“isuniqueinthehistoryofpresidentialdemocracies.Inother
presidentialdemocracieswithhighlyfragmentedcongressionalpartysystems,no
setoftwopartieshasconsistentlydominatedpresidentialelections(…)The
differencesinthepartysystemacrosstheselevelsaresogreatthatitmakessenseto
distinguishbetweenthepresidentialandthecongressionalpartysystemsinBrazil.”
Thepurposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbypartieslikethe
PMDBoncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparative
perspective.Particularly,weaimatanalyzingtheconsequencesofhavingcoalition
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alliessimilartothePMDBonboard.Towhatextenttheexistenceofapoliticalparty,
withthecharacteristicsofthePMDB,isparticularfeatureoftheBrazilianpolitical
systemoritisacommonfeatureofothermultipartypresidentialregimes?Ifitisso,
isiteasierforthepresidenttomanageamajoritycoalitionwithafull-sizepartisan
allyorwithamyriadofsmallparties?Andhowabouttheideologicaldistanceof
thosecoalitionpartners?
Wearealsoconcernedinthispaperwiththedegreeofdifficultyapresident
facesifthegoverningcoalitionwouldhavetorelyonthesupportofamedian
legislatorpartyinordertogovern.Precisely,weaimatanalyzingtheeffectofthe
sizeofthemedianlegislatoronthecostanddifficultofgoverning.Ontheonehand,
trustingonthesupportofthemedianlegislatorcouldgenerateaconfortable
majorityfortheexecutive.Ontheotherhand,thepresidentcouldfaceholdup
problems.Sincetheliteratureisnotconclusiveabouttheeffectofpartysizein
coalitioncostsandnoformalmodelwasabletorespondsuchquestionin
generalizedterms,wewillseektoprovideanempiricalanswerfortheBrazilian
case.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Inthenextsessionwedevelopourtheory
arguingthatpoliticalpartiesinconsensualmultipartypresidentialregimeshave
twostrategicchoicestomake.Consensualsystemsarecharacterizedbyavarietyof
institutionalizedpoliticalpolesthatdividethepoliticalauthoritywithinthesystem,
thusgivingroomfortheemergenceoftwodifferentgamesthatpartieshaveto
choose:themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgame.Thefirstpartofthe
theoreticaldevelopmentsaccountsforthedifferencesbetweenthosetwogames,
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thusexplainingtheirfunctioningandspecificcharacteristics.Thesecondpart
accountsforthehistoricalconstraintsthatchoosingaspecifictrackmightimpose
onpoliticalparties,andthecostsandbenefitstheymightachieveiftheydecideto
switchtheirpoliticalstrategy.
Thehistoricalchoicespartiesmakeinthepastshapetheircontextual
environmentinthepresentandtheirprospectiveaspirationsforplayingeitherthe
majoritarianorthemedianlegislatorgame.Therefore,analyzingtheroleofPMDB
asthemedianlegislatorofrecentgovernmentsinBrazil,itiscrucialtounderstand
thehistoricaldevelopmentofthepartyinordertofullycomprehendhowtheparty’s
decisionsandtheirresultshaveshapeditspoliticalnature.Thusweprovidethis
historicalbackgroundhighlightingtheparty’searlydevelopmentinmilitaryregime
asamajoritarianplayeranditsswitchtothemedianlegislatorgameinrecentyears.
Thethirdsessionofthispaperanswersthefollowingquestion:isthePMDBa
particularitytoBrazilianpoliticalsystem?Weinvestigatethisempiricalquestionby
investigatingtheextenttowhichotherpartiesinLatinAmericanmultiparty
presidentialsystemsbearparticularsimilaritiesweidentifywiththePMDB,
featuresthatwehypothesizedthatalsocharacterizesmedianlegislatorplayersin
general.Wefoundthatmedianlegislatorparties’characteristicsaremorelikelyto
occurinfragmentedpartysystems,thusprovidingevidencefortheSartorian
theoreticalclaimthatinsystemswithcentrifugaltendenciesthecenterprovidesa
comfortzoneforpartymembersandgovernmentsinmultipartysystems.
Thelastsectionofthepaperprovidesempiricalevidenceforthecostsand
difficultiesthatgovernmentsfacewhileformingtheircoalitionwithmedian
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legislatorparties.Isitcheaperormoreexpensivetogovernwithmedianlegislators?
Wefoundthatalthoughmedianlegislatorpartiesreceivethebiggestshareof
governmentperks,therelativecostofaseatforthegovernmentissmallerthanthe
relativecostofsmallerparties.Inconclusion,weclaimthatthoughinfragmented
systemsthecentertendenciesbecomeamoresecurepointforpartiespositioning,
thusenhancingtheprobabilityofmedianlegislatorpartiestoemerge;the
underpaymentofitsmembersmightprovideincentivesfordispersion.A
preliminaryexplanationforsuchcontradictoryresultsisthuspresented.
2)Theory
Thegreatmajorityofthecomparativeliteratureonpoliticalpartieshasbeen
intellectuallyrootedinthehistoricallegacyofparliamentaryregimesintheWestern
Europe(Janda1993).Itbecameacommonwisdomtheideathatstrongand
institutionalizedpoliticalpartiesaresynonymofparliamentaryregimeandthatthe
studyofparliamentarypartiesisthestudyofpoliticalparties.SamuelsandShugart
(2010:7)arguethatthe“startingpointformuchresearchisnotinstitutional
structurebutrathersocialstructure,focusingonhowcultureandeconomic
cleavagestranslateintopartiesandpartySystem.”
However,itispossibletoidentifyasubstantialnumberofscholarsthatalso
haveextensivelyexploredpartypoliticsinpresidentialregimes:partysystemand
structure(CoxandShugart1995);partystrategicvotingandcoordination(Cox
1997;Ames1995);partyrepresentation(Samuels2000;MainwaringandShugart
1997;BarryAmes1994;Crisp1997);howpoliticalpartiesareaffectedbydifferent
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electoralsystems(Durverger1954;CareyandShugart1995);andonthe
relationshipbetweenseparationofpowerssystemandpoliticalpartiesthemselves
inthesensethatpresidentialconstitutionsencouragethedevelopmentof
presidentializedparties,whicharecharacterizedbythecombinationofweakand
nationalizedparties(SamuelsandShugart2010).
Nonethelesstheliteraturesofarhasignoredtheroleplayedbythe
majoritarianandconsensualcomponentsofapoliticalsystemonthepoliticalchoice
partiesmaketoplaythemedianlegislatorgame.Inthefollowingsectionweaimat
analyzingthetheoreticalspecificitiesthatmultipartypresidentialismimposeonthe
coalitionformationprocess,formulatinganinnovativetheorythathighlightsthe
problemsthatpartiesfacebothinthemajoritarianandintheproportionalsettings.
2.1)Dividedauthorityinmultipartypresidentialsystems:majoritarianandmedian
legislatorgames
Inamajoritarianinstitutionalsetting(singlememberpastthepost),ifthere
weretwopoliticalparties,themedianvotertheory,proposedbyAnthonyDowns,
predictsthatthosepartieswouldtendtowardtothecenteroftheideological
spectrumproducingcentristpoliticalpreferencesandpolicyresults.1Thatis,there
wouldhaveendogenoussurvivalincentivesinthemajoritarianelectoralsystemto
pushpartiestowardthepositionofthemedianvoterinordertowintheelection.A
partythatdoesmovetothemediancanalwaysdefeatthepartythatfailsto
1Onasingle-issuedimensionifitisassumedtatthepreferencesofvotersaresingle-picked,the
positionofthemedianvoteristheonlypolicythatispreferredtoallothersbyamajorityofvoters.
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convergenearlytothemedian.Thekeystageforthemajoritarianenvironmentis
thereforetheelectoralcompetition.
Onceelected,thesingle-partymajoritythatwasabletobetterlocateitselfat
themedianpreferencewouldformanidentifiableandresponsiblegovernmentthat
wouldbeessentiallyunconstrainedbyotherpartiesinthepolicymakingprocess.
Thatis,thewinnerpartywillsubsequentlydominatethepolicymakingprocessand
implementthepromisedpolicyplatformconsistenttothemedianvoterpreferences.
Theremainingpolicymakingroomfortheoppositioninthismajoritariangameis
minorandassuchtherewouldbeasmallchanceofpartisancooperationwiththe
government.
Revisitingthedownsianparadigm,Sartori(1976)stressesthatwhilethe
medianvotertheoremcanworkconsiderablywellforexplainingthefunctioningof
partysystemscomposedoffourpartiesorless,forsomemultipartysystems(with
morethanfiverelevantparties)Downs’theoreticalframeworkcannotprovidea
reliableexplanation.WhatSartoriearlyperceivedisthatDowns’theoryassumesa
centripetalforcedrivingparties’electoralcompetitionthatisabsentinsome
multipartysystems.Therefore,asanelectoralsystemthatpermitsmultipartism,
proportionalrepresentationcanchangethewaythecompetitivesystemsoperates,
affectingthestrategiesandfunctioningofpoliticalparties(Sartori,1976).
ProportionalRepresentationelectoralsystemsmightalsobeexpectedto
producecentristresultsifmorecentristpartieshavebetterbargainingpositions
thanmoreextremistparties,hencearemorelikelytogetintoandhaveinfluenceon
government(seeCox1997;HuberandPowell1994).Nevertheless,itisalso
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reasonabletoexpectthatinproportionalsystemspartiesdonotcompetewitheach
otheralongsideacontinuousideologicalspectrum.BecausethePRelectoralsystem
permitsamoreinclusiverepresentationoftheelectorates’diversity,partiescan
maximizetheirutilitybyfocusingonsubgroupsofvotersconsistentwiththeir
preferences.Therefore,thecompetitioninaPRsystemisdiscontinuousinthesense
thatitprovidesamaximizationareathatislimitedtotheparties’closest
competitors.
Therefore,thestrategiesandprofilepoliticalpartiesdecidetofollowandthe
partypoliticstheychoosetoimplementdifferunderdistinctinstitutional
environments.Someparties,forinstance,mayhistoricallyprioritizetofocustheir
actionsonexecutivepositionsandtoplayaprotagonistrolepursuingtheirpolicy
platformsandpoliticalagendas.Otherparties,however,mayprefertoadjusttheir
politicalambitionsbyplayingasupportingroleforthegovernmentinthelegislative
branchtryingtopositionitselfasthemedianlegislatorofthegoverningcoalition.
Weclaimthat,inamajoritariansystem,politicalpartieshavenochoiceother
thanplayingamedianvotergame.Thatis,themedianvoterstrategyandbehavior
ofpoliticalpartiesisendogenousinawinnertakesallsystemandbecomesthe
protagoniststrategyifthepartyambitiousistowintheelection.Ifsomeposition
otherthanthemedianisadopted,thanaminorityhasprevailedoveramajority.
Inaproportionalrepresentationsystem,however,partiesdohavedifferent
choicestomake.Theymayeitherplaythemajoritariangameorthemedian
legislatorgame.Therefore,inmultipartypresidentialsystemswehavetwo
dimensionsforparties(andvoteralike)tocompete:amajoritydimension,
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representedintheraceforthepresidency;andaproportionaldimensionofthe
competitivegame,inwhichpartieshavetomaximizetheirvotesinordertoobtaina
relevantnumberofseatsinsidetheCongress(StromandNyblade2007).Although
scholarshaveassumedthatvotersandpartypreferenceswouldnaturallyalignin
bothdimensions,thereisnoclearreasonforsuchalignmentinpresidential
multipartysystems.
Whileinthepresidentialracethemajoritarianrulesselectasinglemedian
voterpreference,inthelegislativeracetheproportionalrepresentationrulesselect
severaldifferentsub-medianpreferencesthatdifferentpartieswilltrytomaximize.
Itsismisleadingthereforetoassumethatinproportionalrepresentationapartyon
theleftisdirectlycompetingwithapartyontherightforvoter’spreferences.Onthe
contrary,differentpartiesontheleftarecompetingwitheachothertowinthe
representationofthisspecificsubgroup.Dependingonthedominanceand
centrality(Roozendaal1990;Jelnov2014,StomandNayblade2007)ofeachparty
aftertheelection,theywilltrytolocatethemselvesforthemedianlegislative
positionbetweenthegovernment’smajoritarianpreferenceandtheCongress’s
preference.Itisexpectedthatthepartythatsuccessfullymanagestooccupythe
medianlegislativepositionwillnotbeboundedbystrongcommitmentsinorderto
flexiblytonegotiatewithwhoeverwonthepresidentialelection,andlocateasthe
medianlegislatorinafragmentedenvironment.
Whereasplayingthemajoritariangamemeanstoperformtheroleof
protagonistintheexecutivebranch,themedianlegislatorgamerepresentsto
performthe‘supportingactor’roleinthelegislativebranch.Weassumethatthe
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preferenceoftheelectorateisdistributedoverthosetwodimensions.Thus,while
voterscanhavesimilardistributionofpreferencesfortheexecutiveandforthe
legislative,especiallyinsystemswherethepartyidentificationwiththeelectorateis
weak,theremightbeincentivesfordisconnectionofvoters’preferencesbetween
theexecutiveandCongress.Itmeansthatthesamepartystrategycanbeawinnerin
theproportionalgameand,atthesametime,alooserstrategyforthemajoritarian
race,andvice-versa.Inotherwords,inmultipartypresidentialregimes,themedian
preferenceofthepresident’spartycouldbeverydistinctfromthemedian
preferenceinCongress,configuringthustheequivalentofadividedgovernmentina
classicpresidentialpluralitysystem,inwhichapartywouldholdthepresidencyand
itsoppositionwouldholdthemajorityinCongress.
Playing themajoritarian gamemeansmore than just a party presenting a
competitivecandidateforthepresidency.Itmeansthatapartyiswillingtopresent
aconsistentpolicyportfolioforvotersandwilingtomanageitsintrapartyconflicts,
coordinating cohesively over a single candidate’s platform in order to plausibly
competeforthenationalmedianvoterpreferences.Ontheotherhand, toplaythe
medianlegislatorgame,apartymustbeabletogatherenoughseatsfromasingleor
severaldiscontinuousmedianvoters, spreadoverdistinctelectoraldistrictsand–
once in office – to coordinate cohesively towards the center of the executive-
legislative distribution of preferences. Therefore, the nature of both competition
structures becomes inherently different, engendering almost contradictory
demands forpartyorganizationand linkages insideeither themajoritarianor the
medianlegislatorgame.
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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthepartychoiceforeitherthe
majoritarianormedianlegislatorgameishistoricallycontextualized,basedonthe
incentivesandconstraintsgeneratedbypastelectoralperformancesaswellason
payoffsobtainedbyeachparticularstrategy.
Furthermore,bothmajoritarianandmedianlegislatorstrategiesengender
costsandbenefits.Underthemajoritariangame,forinstance,partiesmightachieve
ahigherpayoffbyoccupyingthepresidency(SeeFigure1).Thisisparticularlytrue
inpoliticalenvironmentsinwhichpresidentsareconstitutionallypowerfuland
enjoygreatdiscretiononbudgetarypoliciesandotherpoliticalandbureaucratic
resources.Thus,oncesuccessisachievedinthepresidentialelection,itisverylikely
thatthispartywillkeepplayingthemajoritariangameaimingataccumulatingthe
highestpayoffgeneratedinthepoliticalsystem.
Figure1here
However,incaseoflosingthepresidentialelection,majoritarianpartieshave
tobereadytobearthecostsofplayingtheoppositiongameforawhile.Itmeansto
getpoorerandpowerlessbythetimethepartyplaystheoppositiongamebecause
thegreatmajorityofpoliticalandfinancialrentsgeneratedbythepoliticalmarket
willbemostlyallocatedtothewinnerandtoitsfaithfulpoliticalalliesinCongress.
Evengettingpoliticalandfinancialpoorer,losers,especiallysecondrunnersinclose
elections,mightprefertokeepplayingthemajoritariangameasoppositionifthey
believetheyhaverealchancesandcrediblecandidatestobecomewinnersinthe
nextelection.Theyalsomayconsideradjustingtheirambitionandplayingthe
medianlegislatorgame,especiallyiftheyhadapoorperformanceinthe
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presidentialelection.Inthatcase,theywillprobablytrytoplaywhatwecallthe
“embarrassedmedian”legislatorgame.Insuchcondition,theembarrassedmedian
willprobablyenjoyalessadvantageouspayoffintheshortrunthanifitwouldhad
playedthemedianlegislatorsincethebeginningratherthantooktheriskofplaying
themajoritarianrace.
Inadditiontothecostsassociatedtolosingapresidentialelection,parties
havealsototakeintoaccountthatchoosingtoparticipateinpresidentialraces
engendersinternalcoordinationcostsofdealingwithpartisanfactions,which
sometimesmightbeextremelycontroversialandcompetitive.Someofthose
factionsmaygetverydisappointedanddecidetoleavethepartyandtrytobettheir
ownchancesofbuildinganewparty,forinstance.
Positioningatthemedianlegislatorisnotcostlesseither.Themedianparty,
almostbydefinition,givesuptheprotagonistroleofthepresidencyina
proportionalrepresentationsystemandthegreatmajorityofthepoliticaland
financialbenefitsthatthistoppositionoffersandconcentrates.Ontheotherhand,
themedianpartycouldbeabletoextractsomerentscontrolledbytheexecutivein
exchangeforthemedianlegislatorpoliticalsupportinCongressintypicalporkfor
policygame(AlstonandMueller2006).Themedianlegislatorwouldbethe
equivalentofa“comfortzone”,achievinganintermediatepayoffbetweenthe
majoritarianwinnerandthemajoritarianloser.
PereiraandRenno(2013:76)claimsthatrunningforreelectionandplaying
themedianlegislatorgameisthesafestbetstrategybecausetheprobabilityof
winningishigherforthosewhoattemptreelectionthanforthoserunningforany
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otheroffice.Thekeyfortheelectoralsuccessoflegislatorsistohaveaccesstorents
controlledbytheexecutive.Thatis,playingthemedianlegislatorgameina
multipartypresidentialregimemaynotgeneratethehighestpayoff,butitwould
provideenoughresourcestosurviveandtokeepplayingthepoliticalgamewhile
waitingforawindowofopportunitytoswitchforthemorerewarding,though
riskier,majoritariantrack.
2.2)TheCostsofSwitchingPoliticalTracks
Themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorstrategicchoicesfunctionas
pathwaysortracksforpoliticalparties,whichdefinetheirspecificnature.Oncea
politicaltrackischosenandconsistentlyplayed,bothpartymembersandvoters
relyonthispathforfurtherinformationandpositioning.Nevertheless,choosinga
particulartrackcannotbeunderstoodasastraitjacket.Thatis,onceapartytakesa
particulartrackitcanchangeforadifferentone.However,changingpoliticaltracks
generatescostsofallsorts.Forinstance,apartythatonceplayedthemedian
legislatorroleanddecidedtochangethestrategytoplaythemajoritariangamewill
havetobeartheriskoflosingthemajoritarianelectionandgetasmallerpayoffthan
themedianlegislatorstrategyusedtoprovide.Similarly,ifapartyplayedthe
majoritariantrackandfaileditmayswitchtrackandstartplayingthemedian
legislatorgame.But,dependingonhowbitterandcompetitivethepresidential
campaignwas,itmighttakealongtimeforthemajoritarianlosertobuildbridgesof
cooperationwiththemajoritarianwinner.
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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthosecostsarenotthesameforall
partiesthough.Thecostsarealsoaffectedbytheprobabilityofbeatingthe
incumbentexecutive.Thehigherthethreattheformermedianlegislatorpartyposes
totheincumbentexecutive,thehighertheprobabilityofchangingthepoliticaltrack.
Inotherwords,ifapartyevaluatesthatitschanceofwinningtheelectionishigh,
thispartymaydecidetotaketherisk,consideringex-anteuncertaintyofplayingthe
majoritariangame.
However,ifthispartyrevealsitselfastrongcontenderanddoesperformwell
intheelectionbutnotenoughtobethewinner,therewouldprobablyhaveapointof
noreturnforthispartyinthemajoritariangame.Howcomeasecondrunnerupora
close3rdplaceinamajoritarianracewouldimmediatelyjointhewinningcoalition,
gatheringforceswiththeonesthattheyvociferouslydebatedduringthecampaign?
Itturnsoutthatifapartyposesacrediblethreattotheincumbent,anddecidesto
playthemajoritariangame,thereputationalcostofchangingtrackbacktothe
medianlegislatorbecomeunbearable.
Anotheraspectisthesizeofthepartyanditspositionontheideological
spectrum.Thepartythathasconsistentlyenjoyedalargeportionofseatsin
Congressisapotentialtrackswitcherbecauseitcanposeacontinuouscredible
threattotheincumbent,aslongasitspositioninthepoliticalspectrumcansupport
atrackswitch.Therefore,thesizeoftheparty,notonlyintermsofthenumberof
seatsinCongressbutalsoconcerningthenumberofgubernatorialandmayoral
positionsitholdsinthenationalterritory,seemstobeanecessaryconditionfor
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trackchanging.Itmaysignalareliablemeasureoftheparty’sautonomoussurvival
inthecaseitdecidestochallengetheincumbent.
Usuallyaforgottenaspectofpathdependence,theorganizationalstructure
ofpartiescanalsoaffecttheirabilitytoperformasuccessfulswitch.Asbefore
mentioned,themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgamescreateopposing
pressuresoveraparty’sorganizationstructure,requiringdifferentspecificrules
androutinizedpatternsoffunctioning.Thuswecanexpectthatthemoreaparty
choosestoplaysuccessivelyasinglegame,themoreitlosesitscapacitytoswitch
fromit.Therefore,althoughitcanextracthighersuccessrates,astronglyrooted
organizationstructure,veryspecializedinasinglestrategicgame,isalsohighly
vulnerabletodrasticchangesintheenvironment,sinceitsorganizational
specializationwouldmakeitlesslikelytoquicklychangeandadaptits
organizationalformat.
Thedegreeofpartisanfragmentationisanothercomponentforthepartisan
strategytofollowamedianlegislatortrack.Itisreasonabletoexpectthatthe
greaterthefragmentationofthepartysystemthehighertheincentivesforaparty
toplaythemedianlegislatorrole.
Additionally,asSartori(1976)haspointedout,fragmentedsystems-with
morethanfiveparties-engendera“competitivepatternthatisnolonger
centripetalbutcentrifugal”.Forhim,thecrucialelementisthatthecenterofthe
distributionbecomesaveryappealingpositioninwhichpartiesandvotersalike
compete,strugglingforexpansionandcontroloverpolicies.
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AlthoughSartorihasinsightfullyhighlightedthecentrifugalforcesthatdrive
multipartysystems,hehasmistakenlyattributedthistendencytothepresenceof
extremistsandanti-systemicparties.However,thiscomponentcannotexplain,for
instance,theclearexistenceofhyper-fragmentationtendenciesinmultiparty
presidentialregimes,liketheBrazilianpartysystem.
We,otherwisearguethatitisthepresenceofaninstitutionalenvironmentthat
consistentlyunder-rewardsthemedianlegislatorthatcouldberesponsibleforthe
centrifugalforcesthatgeneratesanincentive-structureforpartisanfragmentation.
Thatis,becausesmallpartiestendtobeover-rewardedbytheexecutive,fewparties
wouldhaveincentivestoplaythemedianlegislatorgamegiventhatthepresident
doesnottakeintoaccountthepoliticalpowerandinfluenceofmedianlegislatorparty
intheprocessofallocatingpoliticalandfinancialresourcestopoliticalallies.
Thiscreatesaparadoxicalsituationinwhichtheneedofamedianvoter
legislatorpartyisenhancedinfragmentedpoliticalsystems.Atthesametime,its’
relativelylowerextractionofrentspushesthedispersionevenfurther,byprizing
smallpoliticalcoalitionallies.Managingavarietyofsmallpartiesinthecoalition
mightgeneratesfurthercoordinationproblemsandincreasethecostsofgoverning
forthepresident.Moreover,becausethemedianlegislatorpartyisalargepartythat
positionitselfinthecenterofthepreferencedistribution,itcaneffectivelyswitchits
strategyinthefollowingelections,challengingtheincumbentinthemajoritarian
game.Therefore,thepresident’spartyhasincentivestoprotectitselffromfuture
threatsrepresentedbythemedianlegislatorparty,rewardingitrelativelyfewer
resourcesthantherestofcoalitionpartners.
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WhoisthisanimalcalledPMDB?
ShorthistoryofPMDB
Brazilianpoliticalinstitutionsareacomplexmixofconsensualrulesthatseek
toenhancerepresentativenessandmajoritarianrulesthatpursuegovernabilityand
accountabilityatsomeexpensetofairnessandrepresentation(Lijphart1999;
Powell2000).Electoralinstitutions,forexample,allowfortherepresentationof
diverseinterestsinthepoliticalgame,butareoftenblamedforencouraginglevels
offragmentationanddecentralizationthatcancomplicatethepolicy-making
process(Ames1995a,1995b).The1988Constitutionmaintainedseveralfeatures
fromtheearlierdemocraticperiod,suchasaPresident;proportionalrepresentation
(PR);anopenlistforthelegislativeelectoralsystem;afragmentedpartysystem;
federalism;andanindependentjudiciary.
Duringthe21yearsofmilitaryregime(1964-1985),however,thepolitical
processwasinsteadverymuchcentralized.Afterbeingunexpectedlydefeatedin
fivestatesinthegubernatorialelectionof1965,themilitarygovernmentdecidedto
extinguishthemultipartysystemandimpose,viatheunilateralact#2,thecreation
ofatwo-partysystem,withapoliticalparty,AliançaRenocadoraNacional(ARENA),
aggregatingthepoliticalinterestsofthegovernmentandtheasecondpolitical
party,MovimentoDemocráticoBrasileiro(MDB),representingtheopposition.
Althoughtheelectoralcompetitionwassomehowrestrictedunderthe
military,theMDBcontinuedtoplaytheelectoralgame,sinceitcouldbeevenworse
iftheydecidedtoabandonachannelfortheofficialopposition.Second,theparty
believedthat,whileelectionswereheld,itwaspossibletoovercomethemilitary
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dictatorshipbyerodingitspopularsupport–whichinfactprovedtobeasuccessful,
thoughprotracted,strategy.
WhiletheMDBdidnothaverealpowerinCongressintheearlyyearsof
militarydictatorship,andthusboycottedtheindirectpresidentialelections,inthe
late1970stheMDBbeganmobilizingnationalsupportandwasabletoelect(still
indirectly)thefirstcivilianpresidentin1984.Theyearof1974isconsideredthe
turningpointofMDB’shistoryfromaminorityoppositiontothemajorpartyinthe
house.Inadditiontothemorecombativelinethatopenedspaceforcommunity
leaders,otherfactorscontributedsignificantlytothegrowthofMDB:theoilcrisis
causedbytheendoftheeconomicmiracleandthecollapseofthearmedstruggle.
TheMDBdefinitelyassumedtheroleoffosteringpopulardissatisfactionatalllevels.
Itbecomesanoppositionfront.ThehelmsmaninthistornwasthedeputyUlysses
Guimarães.TheAuthenticGroupMDB,whichwasalreadymaturingtheideainthe
early70s,decidedtolaunchUlyssesasan“anti-candidate”inthepassageof
GarrastazuMedicigovernmenttoErnestoGeisel’s.Inhisanti-campaign,Ulysses
runsthecountry'scapitalspreachingopposition’sideas.
Despitethefactofaproportionalrepresentationsystem,theinstitutional
bipartisansettingimposedbytheauthoritarianregimerenegadedtothejust-born
MDBalong-termroleinthemajoritarianoppositiongame.Asanoppositiontothe
establishedregime,theMDBmanagedtocoordinateverydifferentfactions(from
socialistsandcommuniststoconservativeformersupportersofthemilitarycoup)
andtocreatestrongboundswiththelocalelitesandconstituencies,whichgavethe
20
partyacompetitiveadvantagewhenthemilitarypowererodedandtheprocessof
liberalizationbecamenon-reversible.
Asaconsequenceofastagnatedeconomyandamoreaggressivepolitical
campaign,intheBrazilian1974electionstheMDBtookalmostenoughseatstogain
amajority.TheMDBusedthecampaignstogaintheattentionoftheglobalmedia,
anddenouncethe"democratic"facadeoftheBraziliandictatorshipandMDBbegan
toscorelegislativegains.Moreover,inthe1974electiontheMDBwasabletoraise
issuesofsocialjusticeandcivilliberties.
MDB’spoliticalorganizationwascharacterizedsinceitsearlyphasebytwo
veryimportantcharacteristics.First,thenecessitytoexpandsupportforthe
oppositionalmovementledthepartytodevelopatop-downorganizational
structure,whichprovidedlocalandregionalpoliticalpenetration.BecauseMDBwas
createdbylegislatorsalreadyestablishedinCongressforcedtotheoppositionby
themilitarycoup,thepartyhadtodevelopconnectionswithregionalandlocal
politicalelitesinordertoopenandsustainsub-nationaloffices.
Second,astheonlypermittedpoliticalpartyintheopposition,theMDBhad
tocoordinateabroadsetofideologicaltracksthatrangedfromsocialistsand
communistspoliticians(thrownintoillegalitybythemilitary)topersonalistand
liberalleaderships,whichgavetheorganizationaveryindefiniteideologicalprofile.
Forinstance,PereiradeMelo(2013:93)demonstratesthatalthoughthemajorityof
MDB’smembersemergedfromformerreformistsandlaborparties,36%ofthe
legend’slegislatorscamefromconservativepoliticalparties.
21
Thetwo-partysystemlasteduntil1979,whenthemultipartysystemwas
reestablishedasamilitarygovernmentstrategyoftryingtoweakentheopposition
party,MDB,whichwasgrowingstronger.Priortothedeeprecessionofthatyear,
theadministrationrestoredthemultipartysystem.Themilitarysoft-linersrealized
thatthetwo-partysystemwasnolongercapableofpreservingthelegislative
majoritysupportingthemilitaryregime.Onthecontrary,itelectorallyconsolidated
theoppositionunderthebigpartisanMDBumbrellathatwasabouttowinnotonly
thecontrolofCongressbutalsostateassembliesandmanymunicipalgovernments
intheupcominggeneralelections,asaresultofatypicalmajoritarianwinner
strategy.
Toavoidthismassivedefeat,thealternativewastofragmenttheopposition
byreestablishingarestricted(noMarxistpartiesallowed)multipartysystemwith
theemergenceofseveralnewparties,especiallyonthecenterandontheleftofthe
ideologicalspectrum.Thisdecisionpleasedsegmentsoftheoppositionandfactions
thatwouldnolongerhavetosqueezeundertheMDBpartisanumbrella.This
militarystrategyofpreservingopen-listproportionalrepresentationwithout
restrictingthenumberofpoliticalpartiesprovedsuccessfulwiththecreationof
severalnewpoliticalparties,includingtheWorker’sParty(PT)foundedby
unionists,intellectuals,andmembersofthechurchundertheleadershipofLuis
InacioLuladaSilva.
TheMDBwasonthevergeofbecomingamasspoliticalpartywhenCongress
dissolveditin1979.Thepartypresident,DeputyUlyssesGuimarães,convincedthe
partyto"addaPtotheMDB"topreservethehard-foughtoppositionimage.In
22
January1985,thecoalitionbetweentheBrazilianDemocraticMovementParty
(PMDB)andthePartyoftheLiberalFront(PFL),knownastheDemocraticAlliance,
undertheleadershipofTancredoNeves,wasindirectlyelectedbyCongressasthe
firstcivilianpresidentinabout25years.Nevertheless,thejustelectedpresident
TancredoNevesdiedinthenighteveofhisinaugurationandthevice-president,
JoséSarneyfromthePFL,tookpowerasthenewpresident.
PerformanceofPMDBsincetheRe-Democratization
Thefirstciviliangovernmentaftertwenty-oneyearsofauthoritarianregime
tookplaceinBrazilundergreatdemandforpoliticalandsocialinclusion,andthe
PMDBwasthenaturalstrongholdofanemergingdemocracy.Inordertoobtain
politicalsupportforthenewgovernment,theDemocraticAlliance,underthe
leadershipofTancredoNevesandJoséSarneyrespectively,gotheavilyinvolvednot
onlyonreformingpoliticalissues,butalsostrongreformpromisesofsocialand
economicnature.
Thegeneralexpectationreliedmostlyonthepersonalabilityandleadership
ofTancredoNeves,whichwouldbeabletoovercomethestructuralweaknessofthe
democraticalliancecoalitionandguaranteetheimplementationoftheNew
Republicambitiousagendaofreform.Theformationofthecoalitionitselfdepended
largelyonthepersonalcredibilityandskillfulnegotiationsofTancredoNeves
himself.Infact,Tancredohadalreadyshownhisnegotiationabilitieswithinhisown
party,beatinghispartisanUlysses-whowasamajorpoliticalfigureduringthere-
democratization-torunasthepresidentialcandidateforthePMDBingeneral
23
elections.ThebrandnewPMDBhad40%oftheseatsinchamberin1982,with168
outof420seats.ThepartyhadthesameshareintheElectoralCollegein1985
presidentialelections(180of686seats)butTancredowasabletomanagea
tremendouswin,with70%ofthevotes.Theseelectoralresultsreinforcedthe
majoritariantrajectorythePMDBwouldtrailinthefollowingyears.
ThenewbornBrazilianpartysystemdidnothaveyetfelttheimpactof
electoralrulesovertime,solegislaturefragmentationwaslow.Therewasadefacto
two-partysystem(sincePMDBandPDScombinedfor92%oftheseats).Thus,likea
bigpartywoulddoinamajoritariansystem,theambitiontocontroltheexecutive,
atthatpoint,wasthemostviabletrackforthePMDB.Accordingtoourtheoretical
frameworkdiscussedearlier,inagivenstateoftheworld,majoritarianormedian
legislator,partieswillobservethenature(elections)todecideonwhichpaththey
willgo.ThePMDBfolloweditsinitialdestinyandgalvanizedtheopposingforcesto
dictatorshipunderTancredo’sumbrella.
Itisveryclearthatpoliticalopportunitystructuresshapeparty’semergence,
evolutionandstrategy(Strom1990),howevercriticaljuncturescanreshufflethe
expectationsinawaythatpartieswillhavetorethinktheirstrategies.Those
unexpectedfactsjointlyconformpartyevolutionaltogetherwiththepolitical
opportunitystructures.TheshockingdeathofTancredoNevesinthenighteveofhis
inaugurationgeneratedhugedisappointmentandraiseddoubtsaboutthecapacity
ofthenewciviliangovernmenttobeabletodeliversuchacomprehensiveagenda
undertheleadershipoftheVice-president,JoséSarney.Sarneywasapoliticalfigure
withaverydifferentprofileandprestige.Theextremelyprotractedprocessof
24
openingoftheBraziliandemocracyandthecircumstancesofanegotiatedtransition
withoutaclearrupturemadetheSarney’sgovernmentevenmoresuspicious.
Sarneyhadlongbeenidentifiedwiththerightwingparty,asheadoftheArena,and
supporterofthemilitarydictatorship.
Thelackofpoliticallegitimacyofthenewpresidentmadethetransitionto
thefirstciviliangovernmentvulnerabletoallkindsofpressureforimmediate
structuralchangesnotonlyoneconomicandpoliticalspheres,butalsoonsocial
policies.Sarneytriedtorespondtothosepressuresbyimprintingthelabel“Tudo
PeloSocial”(everythingforthesocialpolicy)asthetoppriorityofhis
administration.Therequisiteofacomprehensiveandinclusiveagendaofreform
couldbenoticedinthepoliticalmanifestoofTancredo-Sarney,called“commitment
tothenation,”whichenumeratedthemainpolicyconcernsoftheirelectoral
campaignonsocial,political,andeconomicpolicies.Theall-encompassingfeatureof
theinclusiveagendaoftheNewRepublicgeneratedtoomuchexpectationandsoon
revealedthelimitsthataheterogeneouscoalitionlikethatwithapolitically
vulnerablepresidentcoulddeliver.
Inordertodemonstratethegoodwillandthathisgovernmentwouldactina
democraticfashion,PresidentSarneydecidednottomakeuseofunilateraldevices,
suchasdecreeandurgencypowers,untilanewconstitutionwaswrittenand
approved.Congresscametooccupythepowervacuumleftbyapoliticallyfragile
president.Givenhisrelativelypoliticalweakness,Sarneyalsodecidedtokeepthe
cabinetchosenbyTancredoNeves.Thisdecisioncausedcontradictoryviewsof
25
whatpolicydirectionthegovernmentwaspursuing.Ontheonehand,the
governmenthadpromisedtoaddressthecountry’sdifficultsocialagenda.
TheMinisterofPlanning,JoãoSayad,whopressuredforaheterodox
economicpolicy,somehowsupportedthispolicydirection.Ontheotherhand,the
MinisterofFinance,FranciscoDorenelles,anephewofTancredoNeves,wasafiscal
conservativeandputforwardanorthodoxapproachthroughdomesticfiscaland
monetaryausterityestablishinga10percentcutinpublicspending,atwomonth
suspensionofallgovernmentbanklending,andone-yearfreezeofallpublicsector
hiring.
Aftertwenty-oneyearsofdictatorship,themajorityoftheCongress,
includingtheleaderofthePMDBUlyssesGuimarães,wasverydisappointedwith
suchpolicies.Theywantedtodemonstratetotheirconstituents,especiallypriorto
theNovember1986elections,thattheywereresponsivetovoters’expectationson
socialinclusion.AccordingtotheFolhadeSãoPaulo(January14,1986),only20
percentoflegislatorsdemonstratedsupporttotheSarney'sadministration,55.5
percentwerepoliticallyneutral,and24.5percentwereclearlyhostiletohim.
Brazil,despiteresurgenteconomicgrowthin1985,wasthenconfronting
annualinflationratesexceeding200percent.Dailylifewasinherentlyconstructed
aroundwaystominimizethereallossesinherentinsuchcircumstances.The
poorest,ofcourse,intheabsenceofinterestpayingbankdeposits,couldnotavoid
theinflationarytaxontheirmeagercashbalances.Inastruggletoimposehis
authorityandpoliticalleadership,SarneydecidedtoreplacetheMinisterofFinance
appointedbyTancredoNeves,FranciscoDornelles,byDilsonFunaro,anactive
26
businessmanoftheSãoPauloFederationofIndustry-FIESPwhofavoredgrowth
overfiscalausterityandusedtobeverycriticalofIMFdemandsforadjustments.
FunarohadalsoservedasthepresidentoftheNationalBankofEconomicandSocial
Development-BNDESinthefirstmonthsofSayney'sadministration.
SubsequenttotheintroductionoftheAustralPlaninArgentina,the
heterodoxPlanoCruzadowasenactedbydecreeattheendofFebruary1986.The
planquicklyachievedbothitseconomicandpoliticalobjectives:ittamedthe
inflation,ontheonehand,anditwasabletostopthebleedingofthepresidencyand
itsgoverningcoalition,ontheother.TheCruzadoplan,whichwasdesignedto
reducetheinflationviaacombinationofpriceandwagefreezes,boostedthe
presidentialpopularity,calmeddownthepoliticalcriticismsandreunifiedthe
DemocraticAlliance.However,theredistributionofincomecontainedintheprice
freezeledquicklytoanexplosivedemandforconsumergoodswhichoverheadthe
entireeconomy.Businesssectorreactedbyreducingthesupplyandintensifying
theirpoliticalpressure.
AfterthissuccessfulstartthePlansoondisappointed.Thepricefreezehadto
beshort-livedsothatpricescouldagainhelptoallocateresources.However,the
cominggeneralelectionofNovember,whichwasalsoscheduledtoelectlegislators
whowouldformtheConstituentAssembly,placedenormouspressurefor
postponingpricerealignment.ThepoliticalsuccessoftheCruzadoplanpaidoffby
generatingamassivevictoryforthePMDB,whichwonalltheelectoralracesfor
governor,exceptthestateofSergipe,andthemajorityoftheChamberofDeputies
(53percent)andintheSenate(63percent).Still,in1986,underthevergeofthe
27
neweconomicplan,thePMDBheldanunprecedentedmajorityincongress.Itwas
thefirstandtheonlyperiodinrecentdemocracythatasinglepartyhadthecontrol
oftheexecutiveandwasasinglemajoritypartyinlegislature.Itwasthelargest
electoralvictoryeverwonbyapoliticalpartyinaproportionalrepresentation
multipartysystem.ThisstorywearetellingiswelldecribedinFigure2.
Figure2here
Thenecessaryadjustmentswerepainfullyimplementedjustafterthe
electioninanabruptway,whichsuggestedaclearlyopportunisticelectoral
maneuverfromgovernmenttowinthegeneralelection.Theimpactofthe
adjustmentpackage,whichwasnamedCruzadoPlanII,upontheauthorityand
popularityofSarneywasverynegative.Thegeneralmoodofoptimismgeneratedby
theCruzadoplanIwastransformedindisillusionmentasvotersfelttheywere
cheatedwiththeCruzadoIIwhichhadbeendesignedbeforetheelectionbutmade
publiconlyafterwards.Sarney'spoliticalcapitalerodedquicklyandhewasno
longercapableofunifyinghisDemocraticAlliancecoalition.
In1989,thePMDBfinallygrantedUlyssesGuimarães-thecraftsmenof
transitiontodemocracy–aspottoruninpresidentialelections.Thefirstdirect
presidentialelectionsoccurredunderanowfragmentedlegislatureandtherewas
nottwo,rathertwenty-twoofficialcandidates.Amongthosecandidates,Collor,a
veryyoungnortheastpolitician,sellingliberalideasandrepresentingtheno-
politician(althoughmemberofalong-lastingoligarchy),andLula.Collorwonthe
28
election,LulawastherunnerupandUlysseshadmelancholic4.73%ofthevotes.
EventhoughthefigureofUlysseswasstillrespectful,thePMDBpaidthepriceof
Sarney’s(awful)administrationandthe1986‘electoralburglary’episodeof
unfreezingthepricesonedayafterthegeneralelections.
TheinaugurationofFernandoCollorgeneratedgreatexpectationandhope.
Populationbelievedthatthefirstcivilianlegitimatelyelectedpresidentafter29
yearscouldofferadefinitivesolutiontotheproblemofhyperinflation,toendemic
corruptionandtofulfillvoters'expectationsofeconomicdevelopment.Thispositive
expectationcanbecapturedbythehugepopularsupportCollorachieved(70
points)atthebeginningofhisadministration.
However,Collorseemedtointerpretthispopularsupportasafreeticketto
ridethepoliticalrollercoasterwithouttakingintoaccountthenecessityof
politicians'support.Collorpreferred,therefore,todevelopdirectconnectionwith
votersinsteadofmakinguseoftraditionalpoliticalinstitutionssuchasCongress,
politicalparties,orbuildingasustainablemajoritycoalition.
AlthoughCollorinitiallyenjoyedenormouspopularsupport,hewas
handicappedbyhislackoflegislativesupport.Hispoliticalpartyheldlessthan10
percentoftheseatsinCongress.Infact,Collordecidedtobuildapost-electoral
minoritylegislativecoalitionthatconsistedofonlythreepoliticalparties(PMDB,
PFL,andPRN).Collor’scoalitionbeganinMarch1990with245seatsonly,which
wasabout49percent.InOctoberofthesameyear,thePMDBdecidedtoleave
Collor'sgoverningcoalitionandthePDSwasincorporated.Hisnominalsupportin
Congressdroppedto29.6percent.InJanuary1992Collor'sownparty,PRN,was
29
extinguishedandhiscoalitionshrunkevenfurtherto26percentofseatsinthe
ChamberofDeputies.
Anewunexpectedevent,however,couldhavesignificantlychangethePMDB
history.InMay1992Collorwasaccusedbyhisyoungerbrother,PedroCollor,of
involvementinacorruptionschemeofinfluencepeddling.FederalPoliceand
Congressbeganindependentinvestigationssoonafter.OnAugust26,1992,thefinal
congressionalinquiryreportwasreleased;asaresultofthisreport,apetitionwas
presented,formallyaccusingPresidentCollorofhavingcommittedcrimesof
responsibility(theBrazilianequivalentof"highcrimesandmisdemeanors")
warrantingremovalfromofficepertheconstitutionalandlegalnormsregulating
impeachmentproceedings.Onthatformalpetition,impeachmentproceedingswere
initiatedintheChamberofDeputies,thelowerhouseofCongress.OnSeptember29,
1992,Collorwasimpeachedbyavoteof441forand38votesagainst.
OnOctober2,1992,PresidentCollorreceivedformalnoticefromthe
BrazilianSenatethattheChamberofDeputieshadacceptedthechargespresented
againsthimandthathewasnowadefendantinatrialofimpeachmentthatthe
Senatewouldconduct.PertheBrazilianConstitution,uponreceiptofthat
notification,Collor'spowersweresuspendedfor180days,andVicePresident
ItamarFrancobecameactingpresident.Facingalmostcertainconvictionand
removalfromofficebytheSenate,CollorresignedonDecember29,1992justasthe
trialwasunderway,inthelastdayoftheproceedings.
WithCollor’sremoval,hisvice-president,ItamarFranco,aquirkyand
relativelymarginalpoliticalfigure,succeededCollorinofficeinauguratinginakind
30
of“salvationgovernment.”WiththeexceptionoftheWorker'sParty(PT),that
preferrednottooccupyformalpositionsinthegovernment,allpoliticalpartiesthat
supportedCollor’simpeachmentdecidedtotakepartofFranco'sgoverning
coalition.Franco’sadministration,therefore,re-establishedthecoalition-based
presidentialism.Thisdecision,somehow,helpedtorebuildbridgesbetween
executiveandlegislativebranchesthathadbeenbrokenunderCollor's
administration.
Hereiswhenhistory,again,makethepresidencyfallintheleapsofthe
PMDB,inaveryerraticway.Franco,electedbythePRNwasnowaPMDBpartisan.
Onceagain,aPMDBpresidentwasincharge,onceagain,hewasnotdirectlyelected
andonceagainhewasfarfrombeingacentralfiguretotheparty.Evenwiththat
chance,thePMDBwasnotabletodevelopaviablecandidacyintheforthcoming
elections.Thepartydidnotgiveupthemajoritariangamehoweverandin1994the
candidatewasOrestesQuercia.The4.38shareofvotesobtainedbyQuerciawasa
symbolicendforlastpresidentialcandidatethePMDBhad.
Figure3here
ThePMDBstrategyofplayingthemedianlegislatorinsteadofinsistingin
havingacandidatewasnotadecisionmadefromthedaytonight,aswecansee.
Thisdecision,however,aspredictedbyourtheory,canbeaconsiderablycostlyone.
IntheparticularcaseofthePMDB,thetwoconsecutivedefeatsthepartyfacedin
thepresidentialelectionsof1989and1994werealsorelativedefeatsatthelocal
level.EventhoughthePMDBremainedtheoveralllocalwinner,itsmunicipality
31
shareconsistentlydecreasedinthenextlocalelections.Ontheotherhand,thePSDB
andthePTdramaticallyincreasedtheirnumbersofcontrolledmunicipalitiesinthis
period(Figure3).Obviously,notparticipatinginthegoverningcoalitionhasaneven
worseeffect,butgivingupthemajoritariangamemightbedangerous.The
DEM/PFLispayingthepriceofplayingbothgames,givingupasinglecandidacyand
beinganoppositionparty(Figure2).
Theelectoralevidenceofthosetwocyclesunveilsanoftenhiddencostof
playingthemajoritariangame.Usuallysmallpartieshavecandidatesinnational
electionsevenknowingthatavictoryisimplausible.Thosesmallpartiesdoasbest
astheycanintheelectionsinordertoextractbiggerrentsfromtheirsupportto
presidentialcoalitioninthefuture.Withbigpartieswhatsoeveritcanworkthe
otherwayaround.Theexpectedreturnforplayingthemajoritariangameinthecase
ofbigpartiesisrelativelyhigh,soamajordefeatinnationalelectionscanimplya
decreasedbargainpowerwithincoalitionandashrinkingshareofmunicipalitiesin
thefuture.
Thefirstanddecisivetrackchangeoccurredin1998,whenthepartydecided
nothavingacandidate.AtthattimethePMDBwasstillthebiggestpartyincongress
andbyfartheonewithmoremunicipalitiesunderitspoliticalcontrol.ThePMDB
wassatisfiedinplayingasupportingroleforthePSDBandPFL/DEMwhatsoever.
In2002thePMDBplayedthegameofthe‘embarrassedmedian’,theylostthe
vice-presidentelectionsbutafteronlyoneyearrapidlyjoinedthePTwinning
coalition.ThereaftertheirparticipationinPTcoalitionswasconsolidatedandthe
contractionwasstanched.
32
LookingforPMDB-likepartiesacrosstheworld:ThePMDBIndex
Inoursearchforapartywiththeaforementionedcharacteristicsofthe
PMDB,wedevelopedameasureofproximity.Wewerelookingforlargecoalition
partnerwithnoambitiontocontroltheexecutive,whichhasampledistributionin
thenationalterritoryofthecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmany
statesandbyholdingasubstantialnumberofseatsinCongress,ideologically
amorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,andwithmanyregional
leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterests.Ourobjectivewasto
accountforresemblancebetweenthePMDBandpartiesacrosstheworld.This
measurewasbasedoneightindicatorsconcerningeightdifferentpartyattribute
dimensions.Theseeightindicatorsweregivenvaluesfrom0to1,where0isthe
mostdistantfromthePMDBand1istheclosesttothePMDB.
Dataonpartieswasgatheredthroughaexpertsurvey,conductedwith74
specialistsonLatinAmericanpolitics.2Thespecialistswereabletochooseacountry
theywouldliketorespondandansweredfewquestionsconcerningpoliticalparties
inthatspecificcountry.WecomparedthentheiranswerstoaPMDBbenchmarkon
eachquestion,andappliedaformulatogenerateanindexgoingfrom0to1oneach
dimension.DimensionsD1toD4haveobservablebenchmarkvalues.Ondimensions
D5toD8,valuesforthePMDBweregivenbytheauthors(table1).
Table1Here
2ThefirstwaveofsurveysconsideredonlyLatinAmericancountries.Therewere37complete
responsesamongthe74.
33
Wedecidedtotakeintoconsiderationonlydatapointswiththreeormore
responsesandwherespecialistsconsistentlyagreedontheirevaluations,whichis,
thecoefficientofvariationontheaggregateresponseswaslowerthan50%.3Here
weplotonlythebest-fitforPMDBineachcountrywehavedatafor(Figure4).The
PDCinChileisbyfarthemostsimilarpartytothePMDBinLatinAmerica,followed
bythePRIinMexico.Allthepartiesconsideredtendtoplaythemedianrole,havea
nationaldistributionandacenterideology.Thedifferencesappearontheother
dimensionsandoneofthemhasthemostintriguingandstrikingresult:candidateto
executive.NoPMDB-likepartyinLatinAmericadecided,asthePMDBdid,togiveup
fromaleadingmajoritarianroleinpresidentialelections.Whatcouldexplainsucha
puzzle?Thefearofplayingthemajoritariangamewithanexpectedlowprobability
ofwinseemsapossiblereason.
Figure4here
Previoustheoreticaldevelopmentsinthispapermentionedaspacefor
PMDB-likepartiesinfragmentedenvironments.PlottingthePMDBIndexagainsta
fragmentationmeasure(liketheeffectivenumberofparties)amongLatinAmerican
countriescangiveusanideaofhowthistheoryholdsornot(Figure5).Thereisan
interestingcorrelationbetweenthePMDBIndexandtheleveloffragmentation.
CountrieswherethePMDB-likepartyhasthehighestvalueonthePMDBindexare
usuallythesamecountrieswheretheleveloffragmentationishigh.Although
censoreddatastilllimitouranalyticalstrength,thiscorrelationpartiallysupports
theideathatafragmentedenvironmentwouldgeneratesuchanimalslikethe
3Completeresultsannex.
34
PMDB.Causalityisstillaconcernwhatsoever.Eventhoughthereisaclear
theoreticalexplanationtosupportcausality,moresophisticatedempiricalstrategies
arewaitingtobedeveloped.
Figure5here
Twomainreasonsexplainwhysuchacorrelationissostrong.Thefirstoneis
relatedtotheneedofacooperationanchorunderover-fragmentedlegislatures.In
theabsenceofthisanchor,systemwouldbecomedysfunctional,soinorderto
defenditselfthesystemwouldgeneratesuchparties.Thesecondonehastodowith
Sartori(1976)predictionsforfragmentedsystemsencompassinga“centrifugal
competitivepattern”.Thecenterofthedistributionbecomesaveryappealing
positioninwhichpartiescompete,strugglingforexpansionandcontrolover
policies,themorefragmented,thebiggerthestruggle.
Theproblemnowis:howtofindacounterfactualforBrazil?Itmightbethe
casethatthesingularityofthePMDBhastodowithBrazilianpoliticalsystem
singularities.Inthissense,ourempiricalsearchforapartycanbeelusive.Wewill
neverfindit
PoliticalDifficultiesofmanagingthemedianlegislatorinthecoalition
Weassumethatthepresidentmaximizepoliticalsupportinthelegislature,
butwiththelowestpossiblecost.Therefore,thechiefexecutivemustdefinehow
manyandwhatpartieswilltakepartofhiscoalitionandthepowerandresources
willbesharedwithpartners.Basedonthesechoices,thecoalitionparticipants
35
achieveagreaterorlesserdegreeofsatisfactionthat,inturn,hasthepotentialto
generatehigherofsmallergovernabilitycost.
Animportantaspectofourmodelistounderstandhowthepresident,asthe
coalitionmanagerinafragmentedmultipartyenvironment,allocatesherpolitical
andmonetaryresourcestocoalitionpartnersinexchangeforpoliticalsupportin
Congress.Astrategicpresidentwhoisconcernedaboutpolicyoutcomesandabout
hervariousmanagementfunctionswillconsiderthesecostsinworkingtowardan
optimalstrategy.Onceelected,thepresidentfacesatleastthreeinterconnected
exogenousconstraints:(1)thelevelofpartyfragmentationinthelegislature;(2)the
sizeofthepresident’spartyrelativetothesizesofotherparties;and(3)the
ideologicaldistancesbetweenthepresident’spartyandtheotherpoliticalpartiesin
thelegislature.Workingwithinsuchconstraints,theexecutivemakesdecisions
aboutthesizeandideologicalheterogeneityofhiscoalitionandtheproportionality
ofrewardsofcabinetseatsandfinancialresources.
Raileetal.(2015)demonstratethatgoverningcostsincreasewithcabinet
disproportionality,ideologicalheterogeneity,andcoalitionsize.Specificallywith
regardtothislastcomponent,theyassumethatthegreaterthenumberofcoalition
allies,thehigherthegovernabilitycost.Thetheoreticalrationaleoftheirhypothesis
isthatpresidentswouldfacehighercoordinationproblemsmanagingacoalition
withalargernumberofparties;therefore,highercosts.
However,itisalsoreasonabletoinferthatalargecoalitionally,especiallyif
itisthemedianlegislator,couldleadtomoregovernabilitycostsforthepresident.It
mightbecheapertobuyabunchofsmallpartiesratherthanalargeone.Thatis,the
36
presidentwouldfacehigherriskoffacingholdupproblemsfrombeingtoocloseor
toodependentonalargemedianpartner.Therefore,inordertoavoidthispotential
vulnerabilitythepresidentwouldprefertobuildanumericallyverylargecoalition.
Ontheotherhand,italsoreasonabletoinferthatsmallerpartiescould
extractahigherpremiumrelativetotheirsize.Theirinclusioninthecoalition
generallymeansthatpartyisnecessaryforthepresidentand,asaconsequence,
suchapartymightbeabletoextractdisproportionaterewards.Forthemanagerof
thecoalition,therefore,itmightbecheapertobuysmallpartiesintheretail(Varejo)
ratherthantobuythemedianlegislatorinthewholesale(atacado).Theexecutive
couldalsofellthreatenedbyastrongmedianlegislativepartnerthatwouldhavethe
capacitytochallengetheexecutivebyswitchingtothemajoritariantrackand
offeringapresidentialcandidateinthenearfuture.
Inordertoinitiallyaccessthestatusofthisrelation,weestimateabasic
correlationtest,consideringmonetarytransfers(individuallegislativeamendments
totheannualbudget)toparties,politicaltransfers(cabinetpositions)topartiesand
seatshare(thepercentageofseatsheldbyeachparty)inthechamberofdeputies.
Weoperationalizedbothmonetaryandpoliticaltransferswithregardtothesizeof
theparty.Thus,wehavebeenabletohaveaglimpseifpoliticalandfinancial
rewardswereproportionallydistributed.
Figure6here
Thecorrelationsaresignificant.However,whiletherelativeamountof
resourcesdirectlyspentbythepresidentintheformofporkincreaseswhenparty
sizealsoincreases,thecabinetsurplusobtainedbythepartiesdecreasewhenparty
37
sizeincreases.Therefore,itmightbethecasethatbiggermedianlegislatorparties
arecheapertobuyoutwithpoliticaltransfers,whilesmallerpartiesarecheaperto
buyoutwithmonetarytransfers,suggestingthusasubstituteeffectbetweenthose
twogoverningcurrencies(Raileetal2011).Inotherwords,thereareeconomiesof
scalewhenitcomestomonetarytransfersanddiseconomiesofscalewhenitcomes
topoliticaltransfers.
However,thestrengthofthoserelationsmatterandthenegativecorrelation
inthiscaseisfarmoreconsistent.Figure6showstherelationbetween“SeatShare”
intheChamberofDeputiesand“CoalitionSurplus”.CoalitionSurplusmeasuresifa
coalitionpartyisunderoroverrewardedbythepresident.4ThehighertheSurplus,
thegreaterapartywillbeoverrewardedvis-a-visitscontributiontothegoverning
coalition.
Lookingattheoverallpicture,thefirstnoticeablefactisthattherehasbeena
verystrongandnegativecorrelationbetweenSeatShareandCoalitionSurplusover
time.Thatis,thebiggertheparty,thelowertherelativepoliticalrewarditwill
receivebythepresident.ThedataforBrazilisfairlyconsistentandsuggeststhat
smallerpartiesextractahigherpremium.Wecanalsoinferthatthestrengthofthis
relationincreaseswhiletheSeatSharedecreases,observingthenarrowingofthe
confidenceinterval.
4TheCoalitionSurplusofpartyp(CSp)formulaisdefinedbyCSp=mp/jmj-sp/scwherespaccountsfor
thenumberofseatspartypholds,scaccountsfortheoverallnumberofseatsthecoalitioncholds,mp
isthenumberofministriesoccupiedbythepartypandjmjisthetotalnumberofavailablecabinet
positions.
38
Thiscorrelationresultlendssupportthehypothesisthatthepresidentwill
facehighergoverningcostsifshedecidestohaveacoalitionwithmanysmall
partiesratherthanrelyingonthesupportofabigmedianlegislator.
Thesecondaspecttohighlightisthatdifferentpresidentsindifferentterms
haddifferentstrategies.FewbigpartiestookpartofpresidentCardoso’scoalitions
mostofthetime.Ontheotherhand,manysmallpartiesformedLulaandRousseff’s
governingcoalitions.Asaconsequence,itisreasonabletoexpectthatPT
governmentstoaccountformorepressureonthedistributionofpoliticalgoods,
sincethosesmallpartiesmightexpecttoreceivemorerewardsinordertoachievea
surplus.
Conclusion
Tobewritten
39
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Figures
Figure1:PartisanChoicesonConsensual(Proportional)Systems
Nature(election)
Majoritarian
WinnerMajoritarian(winner)(10)
Loser
Majoritarian(Opposition)
(4)
EmbarrassedMedian(2)
MedianLegislator
Majoritarian
MedianLegislator
(6)
43
Figure2:Supportingroleparties(PMDBanPFL/DEM)performanceafterre-democratization,Brazil,1982-2015
44
Figure3:Leadingmajoritarianroleparties(PTandPSDB)performanceafterre-democratization,Brazil,1982-2015
45
Table1:PMDBIndexDimensionsDimension Question PMDB
D1 Coalitionparticipationfrequency
Howoftendoesthepartyparticipateinthegoverning(presidential)coalition?(0%to100%) 85%
D2 Ideology Howwouldyouplacethefollowingpartiesabouttheirideologicalposition?(1to10) 5.5
D3 CrediblecandidateInthelastfiveelections,hasthispartylaunchedanycrediblecandidatetothepresidencywithrealchancesofwinning?(0to5)
0
D4 Post-seatdifferential
UsuallyincoalitiongovernmentstheexecutivedistributecabinetsaccordingtothenumberofseatsthatpartiesholdintheCongress.Consideringthis,whatistherelationbetween[CabinetShare(%)-SeatShare(%)]ofthesespartieswhentakingpartingoverningcoalitions?(+100to-100)
-15
D5 Medianrole
Doesthepoliticalpartyplayamedianvoterole?Thatis,howwouldyouconsiderthepoliticalpartyintermsofavoidingextreme-leftorextreme-rightpolicydecisions?(0to6)
3
D6 Internalcohesion Towhatextentmembersofthosepoliticalpartieshavepresentedinternalpartycohesion?(1to10) 2
D7Abilitytopasslegislationorvetotheexecutive
Howdoyourankthepartiesconcerningtheability/powertovetoandpasslegislation(constrainingtheexecutive’spreferences)?(1to10)
9
D8 NationaldistributionConcerningthedistributionofvotersandsympathizers,wouldyouconsiderthepoliticalpartytobe?(1to10)
10
46
Figure4:ThePMDBIndex,LatinAmerica
47
Figure5:PMDBIndexandFragmentation,LatinAmericanParties
48
Figure6:PartyRewardsandSeatShare-BrazilianChamberofDeputies-1995
to2015
49
AnnexI
PMDBIndexvalues
country-
party
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
Bra-PMDB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Chi-PDC 0.94 0.99 0.50 0.69 1.00 0.63 0.80 0.94
Mex-PRI 1.00 0.98 0.22 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.80 0.97
Chi-PD 0.93 0.81 0.58 0.70 0.85 0.56 0.67 0.96
Arg-PJ 0.77 0.97 0.20 0.65 0.98 0.73 0.67 0.91
Arg-UCR 0.40 0.97 0.50 0.92 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.91
Chi-PS 0.93 0.78 0.40 0.84 0.80 0.51 0.66 0.93
Mex-PAN 0.86 0.72 0.39 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.70 0.73
Chi-RN 0.43 0.81 0.54 0.93 0.80 0.56 0.59 0.99
Arg-FPV 0.86 0.85 0.21 0.46 0.89 0.46 0.77 0.94
Uru-FA 0.53 0.80 0.07 0.78 0.89 0.52 0.86 0.93
Uru-PN 0.64 0.79 0.34 0.88 0.85 0.56 0.45 0.82
Uru-PC 0.69 0.76 0.47 0.88 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.62
Chi-UDI 0.43 0.68 0.52 0.94 0.68 0.40 0.59 1.00
Ven-AD 0.34 0.95 0.60 0.65 0.96 0.56 0.24 0.90
Ven-COPEI 0.25 0.91 0.60 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.24 0.66
Ven-PSUV 0.91 0.63 0.00 0.39 0.68 0.42 0.80 0.98
Mex-PRD 0.37 0.75 0.44 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.35 0.50
Ven-UNT 0.21 0.91 0.57 0.65 0.92 0.54 0.24 0.36
