Thinking the Unthinkable: The Limits of Traditional Crisis Management and the Necessity for New Approaches
Arjen Boin, Ph.D.School of Governance, Utrecht UniversityPublic Administration Institute, Louisiana State University
Outline
Introduction Future Shocks and Transboundary Crises The Challenges of Transboundary Crisis
Management Implications for Institutional Design
The New World of Crisis
Chernobyl, Kobe, Mad Cows, Canadian Ice Storms, Buenos Aires blackout, 9/11, SARS, Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, China Earthquake (2008); H1N1 flu epidemic; Financial crisis, BP oil spill, Icelandic Ash, Fukushima; EHEC
Defining Transboundary Crises We speak of a transboundary crisis when
the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems or critical infrastructures is acutely threatened and the causes of failure remain unclear.
Characteristics of TC
Transboundary crises• Pose an urgent threat to core values, critical
infrastructures• Bring deep uncertainty: Causes are not
clear, unpredictable trajectory• Cross geographic and functional boundaries• Challenge governmental structures: No
ownership• Generate periods of intense politicization• Play up tensions between public and private
Increased Frequency: Driving Trends
1) Changing threat agents2) Increased societal
vulnerability
Increased societal vulnerability Growing complexities and interdependencies
Heightened mobility
Changing societal and political climate
Urbanization
Concentration of assets
Changing Threat Agents
(Bio) Technology jumps New forms of terrorism Climate change Global power shifts
Paradoxes
While public leaders can do less to prevent crises, they are increasingly held responsible. But they often do not know what to do (or what the public expects of them).
Trends increase vulnerability of modern societies, while increasing crisis management capacity (more can be done than ever before).
In Summary:
Prevention is hard if not impossible New forms of adversity are likely Failure is not an option (politically,
socially and economically) Government is not geared towards
dealing with transboundary crises
What does that mean for crisis management?
Key analytical distinctions
Operational v. Strategic Routine Emergencies v. Unimaginable
Crises Localized v. Transboundary Threats
Critical constraints
The symbolic need for a command & control myth
The institutional vulnerability of modern mega-cities
The culture of the risk society The politics of crisis management
Challenges for Strategic Crisis Management Preparing in the face of indifference Making sense of crisis developments Managing large response networks Meaning making: What’s the story? Accountability: Restoring trust after
crisis
Task 1: Preparing for Crisis
The costs of permanent preparedness Planning vs flexibility The politics of preparedness
Task 2: Sense-making
The crucial question: How to recognize a crisis?
Answer: It’s surprisingly hard.
Why sense-making is hard
We lack the knowledge and tools to understand, map, and track TBCs
Information has to be shared across organizational, sectoral, and geographical boundaries
Psychological factors limit individual and group capacity to recognize and grasp Black Swans
Task 3: Managing large response networks Working with limited information Making critical decisions in authority
vacuum Communicating to a confused and
distrustful public Coordinating across borders
Task 4: Meaning-making
What’s the story? Reducing public and political uncertainty
Bush after 9/11 v. Bush after Katrina Core claim: it’s not about the true story,
it’s about the best communicated story It is hard to explain a TBC without
undermining the legitimacy of complex, interdependent systems
Task 5: Crisis termination
Crisis: It ain’t over till it’s over (Katrina) Operational termination v. political
closure Key lesson: political closure depends on
accountability dynamics How to organize accountability across
boundaries?
A Challenge of Design?
Rise of transboundary crises “Impossible” crisis management
challenges Bounded bureaucracies: not designed to
deal with crises, certainly not for the crises of the 21st century
What needs to be done?
Institutional Design Options
Building resilient societies Building transboundary crisis
management capacity:• Supranational• Inter-agency
The Promise of Resilience
Resilience: the magical solution Modernization undermines and
facilitates resilience Primary condition: trust (social capital)
Resilience: The Feasible OptionRapid recombination of available
resources by:
Citizens First-line responders Operational leaders
Requires reconceptualization of crisis leadership
Leadership for Resilience
Support and facilitate emerging resilience
Organize outside forces Explain what is happening Initiate long-term reconstruction
Bottom line: Immediate relief is not an option
Engineering resilience: A leadership responsibility Basic response mechanisms in place* Training potential responders (how to
think for themselves) Continuous exercising Planning as process Create mobile units media-style Prepare for long-term aftermath Create (international) expert network
Creating Dynamic Capacity
Shared cognition Surge capacity Networked coordination Formal boundary-spanning structures
1. Shared cognition
Detection/surveillance systems Analytical capacity Real-time communication Decision support systems
2. Transboundary Surge Capacity Professional first responders (who can
operate across boundaries) Supply chain management Fast-track procedures Integrated command center
3. Networked coordination
Shared language Known partners, mutual knowledge A culture of collaboration Mutual trust
National Incident Management System (NIMS) Builds on successes of ICS (developed
for and by the fire-fighting community) Offers a shared structure, professional
language, way of working Built around defined authority relations,
functional organization, modular approach
Rapidly institutionalized across the US (Katrina v. Gustav)
NIMS: Fit for TBCs?
Designed for local events, dealt with by local/regional response organizations
ICS has not been systematically evaluated (effectiveness remains unproven)
Military/uniformed character Unclear how ICS can be used during
TBCs such as epidemics, terrorist attacks or financial crises
4. Formal boundary-spanning structures Defining authority Rules for collaboration, sharing
resources Rules and mechanisms for up and down-
scaling Rules for initiation and termination
U.S. National Response Framework (2008)
Defines responsibilities, structures and procedures for large-scale disastersAll hazards approachStrategic perspective
US Response: Structures and Principles All disasters are local The state is the primary actor Feds can help, but only if the states want
it NRF prescribes procedures for
requesting help and scaling up Embrace of NIMS
NRF: Pros and Cons
Concerted effort to define responsibilities Formally sound Sound policy for training and practiceBut…- All difficult problems are placed at the
state level- Not always clear who is in charge- No attention for international dimension
of TBC
What does the EU have available? An unnoticed success story A wide variety of capacities
(mechanisms, venues, agencies)
Recent developments: The Solidarity Clause, Reorganization of Commission DGs (Internal Security, EEAS, strengthening of ECHO); Erasing of Internal-external divide
EU Advantages…
Wide range of competences Strong on civilian capacities Skilled at cooperation and coordination Trusted venues Single contact point Set to grow
EU Disadvantages…
Incomplete, fragmented competences Unclear political commitment; politics
will affect CM Leadership is a ‘hot potato’ Communication is difficult;
multiculturalism
In summary: Future design challenges More TBCs are likely Contemporary government structures
are ill suited Needed: TBCM capacity & enhanced
resilience Required: (Re)design of institutions
Thank you!