THE NAVIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
ByDR M. VEGO; JMO DEPARTMENT,
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RI., USA
ROYAL HIGH INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE,BRUSSELS; 21 NOVEMBER 2011
“THE ONLY WAY TO PREDICT THE FUTURE IS TO HAVE POWER TO SHAPE THE FUTURE.”
“IN A TIME OF DRASTIC CHANGE IT IS THE LEARNERS WHO INHERIT THE FUTURE. THE LEARNED USUALLY FIND THEMSELVES EQUIPPED TO LIVE IN A WORLD THAT NO LONGER EXIST.”
ERIC HOFFER (1902-1983)
THE FUTURE GLOBAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM• CONTEMPORARY
POWERS UNITED STATES EUROPEAN UNION RUSSIAN
FEDERATION JAPAN• RISING POWERS PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (PRC) INDIA
• EMERGING POWERS BRAZIL IRAN TURKEY
CONTEMPORARY POWERS
• UNITED STATES• EUROPEAN UNION (EU)• RUSSIAN FEDERATION• JAPAN
RISING POWERS
• PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)
• INDIA
EMERGING POWERS
• BRAZIL
• IRAN
• TURKEY
PIVOTAL REGIONS
• GREATER MIDDLE EAST• SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA• KOREAN PENINSULA• THE POLAR AREA—THE
ARCTIC IN PARTICULAR.
MARITIME DOMAIN AND ITS DIMENSIONS
• PHYSICAL• POLITICAL• SOCIAL• DEMOGRAPHIC• ECONOMIC
• MILITARY• LEGAL• ENVIRONMENTAL• OTHER
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION
ECONOMIC DIMENSION
WORLD SEABORNE TRADE 1969-2010
Top 20 largest shipping flags (October 2010)
LEGAL DIMENSION
Source:DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), Strategic Trends Programme, global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040 (London: Ministry of Defence, 4th ed., 12 January 2010), p. 67.
Source: DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), Strategic Trends Programme, Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040 (London: Ministry of Defence, 4th ed., 12 January 2010), p. 63.
MILITARY DIMENSION
• SOME 150 NAVIES WORLDWIDE• RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE U.S.
NAVY• CHANGING NAVAL BALANCE IN
WESTERN PACIFIC• RISE OF PRC‘S NAVY (PLAN)• RISE OF THE INDIAN AND THE
BRAZILIAN NAVIES.
CHINESE NAVAL CHALLENGE
CHINESE EX-SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER VARYAG
PLAN‘S SOVREMENNY-CLASS MISSILE DESTROYER
PLAN‘S KILO-CLASS SSK
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT/WAR
• ATTEMPTS BY THE RISING POWERS TO IMPOSE THEIR POLITICAL/ECONOMIC INFLUENCE ON THE WEAKER NEIGHBOURS
• VIRULENT NATIONALISM• RELIGIOUS –BASED TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGIES • LAND/MARITIME BORDER DISPUTES• STRUGGLE TO CONTROL SCARCE WATER RESOURCES • COMPETITION OF MAJOR POWERS FOR RELIABLE SUPPLY OF
OIL/NATURAL GAS AND MINERALS• OVERPOPULATION
• GLOBAL WAR IS UNLIKELY BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE• POSSIBILITY OF A REGIONAL HIGH-INTENSITY CONVENTIOINAL
WAR EXISTS• FLASHPOINTS– KOREAN PENINSULA; TAIWAN STRAIT; SOUTH
CHINA SEA; PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF; EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
THREATS IN MARITIME DOMAIN
ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE NAVIES
ROUTINE ACTIVITIES
• ENFORCING MARITIME BORDER LAWS & CUSTOMS
• VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE• SEARCH & RESCUE• SALVAGE• ORDNANCE DISPOSAL• HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY• OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT SEA
• PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
• FISHERY PROTECTION• PROTECTION OF OFFSHORE
OIL/GAS INSTALLATIONS• PROTECTION OF SEABED MINERAL
DEPOSITS
PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE / DISASTER RELIEF (HA /DR)
• ASSISTANCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTERS
• EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
• GOODWILL ACTIVITIES• REFUGEE ASSISTANCE• EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
6 Jan 2005--US Navy personnel from the aircraft carrierUSS Abraham Lincoln load food, water,
and other supplies onto a US Navy Seahawk helicopter at Banda Aceh.
HOMELAND SECURITY• SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
(BMD)COMBATING TERRORISM• PORT SECURITY• PROTECTION OF CRITICAL
INSTALLATIONS/FACILITIES ON THE COAST• COUNTER NARCOTICS (DRUGS)• COUNTER ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION• COUNTER SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (WMD)• COMBATING PIRACY• COUNTER ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TREATIES
• COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM
• ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR’S RESOLUTIONS• COMBATING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY• ENSURING FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION/OVERFLIGHT• COMBATING ILLICIT ARMS TRADE• COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)• PREVENTING ILLICIT SMUGGLING OF HUMANS
COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM
COMBATING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY
COMBATING PROLIFERATIONOF WMD
PREVENTING ILLICITSMUGGLING OF HUMANS
ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT
SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY‘S FOREIGN POLICY
NAVAL POTENTIAL VS. NAVAL INFLUENCE
• COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY• COERCIVE (OR “GUNBOAT”) NAVAL
DIPLOMACY • CONFLICT PREVENTION• SETTLING MARITIME BORDER
DISPUTES
COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
• ROUTINE NAVAL PRESENCE• OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS• EXERCISES/MANEUVERS• PORT VISITS ROUTINE OPERATIONALDIPLOMATIC• SHOW OF FLAG
COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
• THREAT OF USING FORCE• SHOW OF FORCE• PREEMPTIVE DEPLOYMENT• NAVAL DEMONSTRATION• RAIDS• BOMBARDMENTS OF THE
COAST
EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES IN CONFLICT
PREVENTION
EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES IN SETTLING MARITIME
BORDER DISPUTES
SUPPORT OF MILITARY-/THEATER STRATEGY
• SEA-BASED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
• CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE• BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE• SECURITY COOPERATION
SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY OR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)
SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
• PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO)
• PEACE-ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS (PEO)
• EXPANDED PKO/PEO• PEACE-BUILDING (PB)• PEACE-MAKING
Employment of Naval Forces in Support of Peace Operations
Type ConflictPrevention
Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)
Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)
Peace Building (PB) Peace Making
Objectives Support of non-military actions aimed to prevent occurrence, escalation, conflict, and its resumption
•Monitoring / facilitating implementation of the agreement to cease hostilities•Support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term settlement
Use of military force or threat of its use to compel compliance with resolutions / sanctions designed to maintain / restore peace / order
Support of non-military efforts aimed to strengthen / rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid resumption of hostilities
Support of actions aimed to end a dispute and resolve the underlying causes that led to it
Legal Basis UN Charter, Chapter VI UN Charter, Chapter VII
Use of Force Only in self-defense Prepared for combat
Tasks •Provide early warning•Coastal surveillance / patrolling•Preventative Deployment•Sanctions / embargoes
•Coastal surveillance / patrolling•Harbor defense / protection•Escort of merchant shipping•Maritime intercept operations (MIO)•Protection of shore facilities / installations•Protection of offshore oil / gas facilities•Defensive mining•Mine countermeasures (MCM)•Monitor / enforce / EEZ•Sea search and rescue•Port visits•Providing neutral site for negotiations•Logistical support for friendly forces ashore
•Threat of use of maritime forces•Blockade•Shore bombardment•Amphibious landings•Raids• Logistical support for friendly forces ashore
•Supervise cease-fire or truce•Protection of humanitarian aid and delivery•Secure bases for friendly land forces•Support withdrawal of friendly land forces• Logistical support for friendly forces ashore
MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE(MTF) OF THE UN INTERIMFORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)
48 NM5,000 SQ NM
THE NAVIES AND HIGH-INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL WAR
NATURE OF WAR
• REFERS TO THOSE CONSTANT, UNIVERSAL, AND INHERENT QUALITIES THAT ULTIMATELY DEFINE WAR THROUGHOUT THE AGES
• THE NATURE OF WAR NEVER CHANGES—IT IS TIMELESS.
NATURE OF WAR AND ITS MAIN FEATURES:
• DOMINANT ROLE OF POLICY AND STRATEGY
• VIOLENCE• HOSTILITY/HATRED• BLOODSHED• SUFFERING• IRRATIONALITY
• UNPREDICTABILITY• UNCERTAINTY (“FOG
OF WAR”)• FRICTION• FEAR• DANGER• ACCIDENTS• CHANCE• LUCK
CHARACTER OF WAR
• CHARACTER OF WAR REFERS TO THOSE TRANSITORY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, AND ADAPTIVE FEATURES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS OF WARFARE THROUGHOUT HISTORY
• IN CONTRAST TO ITS NATURE, THE CHARACTER OF WAR IS EVER-CHANGING.
CHARACTER OF WAR AT SEA IS AFFECTED BY:
• DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
• DOMESTIC POLITICS• ECONOMIC CONDITIONS• DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES• IDEOLOGY• MEDIA/PUBLIC OPINION
• ADVANCES IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
• INFLUENCE OF NAVAL THEORETICIANS
• CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF WAR ON LAND
• INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ARMED CONFLICT
DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
• FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS (1792-1802) AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1803-1815)
• WORLD WAR I• WORLD WAR II• COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN
1991• THE RISE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (PRC).
INFLUENCE OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON NAVAL
WARFARE
CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVAL WARFARE
• ARE PRIMARILY DUE TO THE UNIQUENESS OF NAVAL PLATFORMS AND THEIR WEAPONS/SENSORS AND THE FEATURES OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY OPERATE.
• .
• THE OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE ARE PREDOMINANTLY PHYSICAL IN THEIR CONTENT
• OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSE (CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ’S VIEWS ON DEFENSE AND WAR AT SEA)
• CLAUSEWITZIAN CONCEPT OF POINT OF CULMINATION AND WAR AT SEA
• SEA IS COMMON TO ALL BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS
• AT SEA, THE INTERESTS OF THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS ARE INTERWOVEN
• THE SEA IS A “HIGHWAY”—IT BELONGS TO NO ONE
• PHYSICAL SPACE ON LAND IS USUALLY MORE LIMITED THAN AT SEA/OCEAN
• GROUND FORCES ARE MORE TIED TO A SPECIFIC PLACES THAN NAVAL FORCES ARE
• THEIR MOVEMENT IS GENERALLY SLOWER THAN THE MOVEMENT OF NAVAL FORCES
• THERE ARE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN ENSURING COVERTNESS OF MOVEMENT OF ONE`S NAVAL FORCES
• IT IS USUALLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE AT SEA THAN ON LAND
• NAVAL WARFARE TEND TO BE MORE DECISIVE
• GROUND FORCES ARE ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AND NAVAL FORCES ARE NOT
• NORMALLY, THE NAVIES EMPLOY ALL THE AVAILABLE FORCES (THE EXCEPTION CAN BE LARGE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS)
• NAVAL FORCES CANNOT BE QUICKLY RECONSTITUTED—IT TAKES VERY LONG TIME TO BUILD OR EVEN REPAIR AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER, LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT AND SUBMARINE.
ROLE OF THE NAVIES• WAR AT SEA IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF WAR AS
WHOLE; THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF WAR IS ON LAND—IT IS THERE WHERE THE HUMANS LIVE
• THERE WERE ONLY FEW EXAMPLES OF PURELY NAVAL WARS (ATHENS VS. SYRACUSE IN 413 BC; DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMADA IN 1588; THE FIRST ANGLO-DUTCH WAR IN 1652-1654)
• THE MAIN ROLE OF A NAVY IS TO CREATE PREREQUISITES FOR THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF FRIENDLY FORCES ON LAND.
OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE
OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE
01-GA-1021-1
OBJECTIVES
ESTABLISHING/MAINTAINING
AND EXPANDING
BASING/DEPLOYMENT
AREA CONTROL
STRONGER SIDE
SEA CONTROL
CHOKE POINTCONTROL
ESTABLISHING/MAINTAINING
AND EXPANDING
BASING/DEPLOYMENT
AREA CONTROL
SEA DENIAL
SCALEWEAKER SIDE
OPERATIONAL
STRATEGICOR
OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL
CHOKE POINTCONTROL DENIAL
DESTROYING/WEAKENING THE ENEMY’S/PRESERVING FRIENDLY MILITARY- ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AT SEA
RELATIVITY OF SEA CONTROL
PHYSICAL SPACE
OPEN OCEAN
PERIPHERAL (MARGINAL) SEAS
ENCLOSED SEAS
SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS
INSHORE WATERS
JMO-01-GA-0810-2
DURATION• PERMANENT CONTROL
• TEMPORARY CONTROL
DEGREE• ABSOLUTE CONTROL
(SEA MASTERY)
• LIMITED (“CONDITIONAL” OR “WORKING”) CONTROL
• DISPUTED (CONTESTED) CONTROL
PHYSICAL SCOPE• GENERAL CONTROL
• LOCAL CONTROL
• COMBINED GENERAL- LOCAL CONTROL
PHYSICAL MEDIUM• CONTROL OF THE
SURFACE
• CONTROL OF THE SUBSURFACE
• CONTROL OF THE AIR(SPACE)
LITT
OR
AL W
ATER
SN
ARR
OW
SEAS
STRUGGLE FOR INFORMATION SUPERIORITY/DENIAL
• WILL BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH STRUGGLE FOR SEA CONTROL/SEA DENIAL
• IT IS HIGHLY DYNAMIC• LIKE SEA CONTROL, CONTROL OF
CYBERSPACE WILL BE RARELY ABSOLUTE BUT GENERAL AND/LOCAL
• TEMPORARY RATHER THAN PERMANENT • IT WILL BE CONDUCTED DURING THE ENTIRE
WAR
THE FUTURE OF FUNDAMENTAL NAVAL WARFARE AREAS
• SURFACE WARFARE• SUBMARINE WARFARE• NAVAL AIR WARFARE• NAVAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE• MINE WARFARE (MIW)• ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW)• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (AW)• NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
IS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON THE OPPOSED SHORE STILL
A VIABLE OPTION?
I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations…will never occur again.
Gen. Omar Bradley
Chairman JCS 19 October 1949
• BUT WE HAVE TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT WHERE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY OR SENSIBLE TO LAUNCH ANOTHER MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AGAIN –ESPECIALLY AS ADVANCES IN ANTI-SHIP SYSTEMS KEEP PUSHING THE POTENTIAL LAUNCH POINT FURTHER FROM SHORE. ON A MORE BASIC LEVEL, IN THE 21ST CENTURY, WHAT KIND OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY DO WE REALLY NEED TO DEAL WITH THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIOS, AND THEN HOW MUCH?Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition : Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, Maryland, Monday, May 03, 2010
IS THERE A FUTURE FOR MARITIMETRADE WARFARE??
• ATTACK ON MARITIME TRADE• DEFENSE & PROTECTION OF
MARITIME TRADE
SHIPS IN PORTS/ANCHORAGESCARGO LOADING
/OFFLOADINGFACILITIES
ELEMENTS OF MARITIME TRADE
PPT-01-VEGO-64(JMP)041101
PORTS /ANCHORAGES
CARGO STORAGEFACILITIES
SHIPPING AT SEA
ROAD TRAFFICRAILROAD/ ROADJUNCTIONS
SHIP REPAIRFACILITIES
INTERNAL WATERWAY
TRAFFIC
RAILTRAFFIC
SHIPYARDS
ELEMENTS
IS CONVOYING STILL AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF
DEFENSE & PROTECTION OF MERCHANT/MILITARY
SHIPPING?
ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMAN FACTOR IN NAVAL
WARFARE
SCIENCE VS. ART OF NAVAL WARFARE
• THE CONDUCT OF NAVAL WARFARE IS AN ART NOT A SCIENCE
• STUDY OF NAVAL WARFARE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL THEORIES IS A SCIENCE
• THE APPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTNADING OF NAVAL WARFARE IS AN ART.
QUESTIONS?