Download - The Contours of Elite Contestation in Iran Payam Mohseni, Ph.D Harvard University, Nov. 6, 2013
The Contours of Elite Contestation in Iran
Payam Mohseni, Ph.DHarvard University, Nov. 6, 2013.
Democratic Politics in an Islamic Theocracy
The rise of military dictatorship: Post-2009 election period
The success of sanctions: Following the 2013 presidential
victory of Hassan Rouhani
Two Dominant Discourses on Iran
A Military “Praetorian” State?
2005 and especially 2009 considered a coup staged by the Leader and IRGC (the Islamic Revolutionary Guards)
The increasing role of the IRGC (political, economic, social…)
The sidelining of reformists and even pragmatists, such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani. The narrowing of the regime’s base of power
Conclusion: elections do not matter; they do not play a significant role in regime politics there is no competition or uncertainty in the results; there are no meaningfully different candidates; state-society relations have fundamentally changed; the regime is neither a
republic nor Islamic
Crippling Sanctions?
Sanctions have hurt the interests of the elite and the population Economic “collapse” regime threat Popular discontent changing voter preferences
Concerted effort by regime to change course, image and behavior
Conclusion: Continue and/or increase sanctions to win concessions at the negotiation
table or bring the regime to its knees Implicitly, the military-led state path obstructed by the sanctions
Both views are simplistic and cannot capture the reality and complexity of Iranian politics.
A disregard for the inherent fluidity of the Iranian political scene due to an absence of party capacity.
Factionalism
A disregard for the checks-and-balances within the institutional framework of the political system
Iran as a hybrid regime
A hybrid regime is a political system that holds competitive elections for the executive and legislature without meeting the minimum definitional requirements of democracy.
They are not fully authoritarian because they have uncertain and competitive multiparty elections with turnover.
They are also not fully democratic because they violate a configuration of democratic principles, such as a poor civil liberties record and/or the existence of nondemocratic tutelary institutions.
The anomaly of “democratic” politics in an Islamic state
Iranian-Islamic discourse
The Islamic Republic Party (IRP)
The emergence of open factional competition
The dissolution of the IRP in 1987
An unintended consequence of the Islamic Revolution and constructing theocracy:
Under the banner of Islam, meaningful and significant policy differences came to the fore among the elite.
Difference on economic, socio-cultural, domestic, and foreign policies Factions
Classification of Iranian Political Factions
The Islamic Republic Party: 1979 - 1987
The Architecture of the Iranian political system
Multi-layered institutional design with numerous “veto players”
A veto player is an “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1995)
Checks-and-Balances
Leadership restraints: Power-sharing, cooptation
Prevents the monopolization of power by any one political group or faction
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
Majles (Parliament)
Guardian Council
EPA
Expediency Council
Dolat.ir
Council of Experts
Factional FluidityTactical Political Alliances
The Islamic Republic Party: 1979 - 1987
The Alliance of the Right: 1989 - 1996
The Alliance of the Republicans: 1997 - 2004
The Alliance of the Theocrats: 2005 - 2013
The Alliance of the Right? 2013 -
A complex and multi-faceted regime architecture creates a robust system of institutional checks-and-balances that attracts and coopts—rather than excludes—the input of an eclectic set of political elite over time.
Due to the weakness of institutionalized parties, a single group or faction cannot monopolize the political game. The political scene is fluid and volatile. Alliances constantly shift, and factions are always competing.
An absence of the institutional capacity to create military or closed dictatorship
Overarching Patterns
The Fragmentation of the Alliance of the Theocrats - 2008
Republican Right versus Theocratic Left - 2009
The Power Triangle – 2010 to July 2013 – Khamenei Shifts
The Alliance of the Right? 2013 -
Sanctions may have helped perpetuate the fragmentation of the theocratic alliance, particularly pushing the theocratic right towards the republican right.
However, the impact of sanctions on the Iranian political system should be seen from a dynamic context – meaning change of impact over time.
And the impact of sanctions should be clearly delineated within the Iranian factional scene – a disaggregation from the “regime” level to actual factional politics
Sanctions
The delicate position of Rouhani within this competitive and shifting factional scene
If Rouhani cannot deliver sanctions relief or economic benefits, there will be a new movement for elite reconfiguration
The theocratic right will begin to re-join and form a coalition with the theocratic left, undermining the tacit alliance forged by Rouhani
This may also weaken Rouhani’s political power and bargaining position domestically to incorporate the republican left
The Possible Future Impact of
Sanctions
Themes on Islam and Politics from the Iranian Experience
The root of legitimacy: divine or popular; divine will or popular will
The role of religio-political leaders
The content of “religious thought” – knowledge and science; policy
The contours of elite competition
Appendix
The Iranian Political System
Aliazimi, Wikipedia
2005 IRANIAN ELECTIONS
First Rounds of Elections:
7 Candidates Turnout ~64% (67% in 2001), despite boycott
Rafsanjani 21.13% Republican Right Pragmatist
Ahmadinejad 19.43% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)
Karroubi 17.24% Republican Left Reformist (traditional)
Ghalibaf 13.93% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)
Moeen 13.89% Republican Left Reformist (modern)
Larijani 5.83% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)
Mehralizadeh 4.38% Republican Left Reformist
3 Republican Left
2 Theocratic Right
1 Republican Right
1 Theocratic Left
2005 IRANIAN ELECTIONS
First Rounds of Elections:
7 Candidates
Rafsanjani 21.13% RR 21.13% Pragmatist 21.13%
Ahmadinejad 19.43 TR 19.76% Conservative 39.19%
Karroubi 17.24 RL 35.51% Reformist35.51%
Ghalibaf 13.93 TL 19.43%
Moeen 13.89
Larijani 5.83 Left 54.94% Theocratic39.19%
Mehralizadeh 4.38 Right 40.89% Republican 56.64%
2009 IRANIAN ELECTIONS
4 Candidates Turnout ~85%
Ahmadinejad 62.63% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)
Mousavi 33.75% Republican Left Reformist (modern)
Rezaee 1.73% Republican Right Pragmatist
Karroubi 0.85% Republican Left Reformist (traditional)
2013 IRANIAN ELECTIONS
6 Candidates Turnout ~73%
Rouhani 50.88% Republican Right Pragmatist
Ghalibaf 16.46% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)
Jalili 11.31% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)
Rezaee 10.55% Republican Right Pragmatist
Velayati 6.16% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)
Gharazi 1.22%
Republicans/Pragmatists 61.43%
Theocrats /Conservative 33.93%
Left 11.31%
Right 84%
Hybrid Regime Conceptualization
Leah Gilbert and Payam Mohseni. “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development, Sep. 2011, 46 (3): 270-97.
A Linear Conceptual Map of Political Regime Types
A Configurative Approach to Regime Classification (Juan Linz)
Configurative Regime Dimensions
Competitive Dimension
Tutelary Dimension
Civil Liberty Dimension
Non-Electoral Regimes (in 2006)
Electoral Regimes (in 2006)
A Configurative Model of Regimes in 2006