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John AdamsHistory
5-12-2008Graduate Historiography
The Prague Spring: Toward a Global Understanding
1968 was a monumental year. It was the year of the White Album, the
assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., the first manned orbit of the moon, the Tet
Offensive, and student uprisings that spanned from Mexico City to Paris. One of the
most significant events that marked 1968 was the Prague Spring. Directly after the
events of 1968 historians quickly began to argue about Prague Spring in terms reform or
revolution. It was an important question because the answer would determine the
western world’s perception of the east. This question quickly proved inadequate. A
question of reform or revolution did not speak to the Prague Spring’s importance in the
geopolitical reality. The historiography of the Prague Spring responded by formulating a
more global understanding. The historiography of the Prague Spring represents a
transformation in historical understanding toward the global.
The early historiography of the Prague Spring concerns an argument about
whether to consider it an event of reform or revolution. In The Intellectual Origins of the
Prague Spring: the Development of Reformist ideas in Czechoslovakia 1956-1967,
Vladmir Kusin argues in favor of considering the Prague Spring a reform movement. He
argues that the Prague Spring was a democratic and nationalistic movement that
developed domestically and gradually. In addition, the intelligentsia theoretically
developed the reform movement and gave it the objective of creating a new model of
socialism.
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Kusin begins his argument in 1956, stating that both Khrushchev’s de-
Stalinization and the suppressed revolutions in Hungry and Poland reverberated in the
Czechoslovak consciousness. Influenced by the suppressed revolutions and the de-
Stalinization, the Czechoslovaks engaged in a long and gradual process of reform. For
example, Kusin argues that the reform movement reached as far as the Czechoslovak
philosophical and artistic conception of man. The reformed idea of man was the
“ordinary man.”1 Kusin defines this man by what he was not: he was not a war hero, a
proletarian worker, a farmer, a unionist, or a party agent. He was simply an ordinary man
“with all his weak and strong points.”2 According to Kusin this type of reform ideology
seeped through the cracks of society and incorporated the legal system, the economy, the
historiography, the sciences, and the place of Kafka in the cultural consciousness. What
gradually developed were two independent strands of reform, one emanating from the
intelligentsia and one from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was only Dubcek, as a
moral and ethical Communist, who could represent a point of connection between the two
reform movements. For example, the intelligentsia called for an end of Communist
censorship of the press on moral grounds. A reform Communist of lesser ethics than
Dubcek could have simply ignored the intelligentsia and undertook Party reform with no
regard to their demands. Instead the intelligentsia appealed to Dubcek’s morality and
eventually united the reform movements into political action. The Prague Spring was a
unification of two reform movements under one nationally minded leader.
Kusin argues from an almost exclusively Czechoslovak source base, including
official documents, newspapers, and literary productions. By starting in 1956 and
1 Vladimir Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 59.2 Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring, 59.
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focusing on a multiplicity of topics, including law, economics, philosophy, politics, and
literature, Kusin creates a narrative that presents the rise of reform form bottom-up. He
creates an analogy between de-Stalinization and the release of a clamp. Once the clamp
is freed a unique Czechoslovak reform develops in its release. In this narrative Kusin’s
strongest argument is for the role the intelligentsia in the Czechoslovak consciousness.
He argues that throughout history, and in particular during the Hapsburg Monarchy,
Czechs and Slovaks rose to power, wealth, and prestige only through their roles as
educated bureaucrats, lawyers, scientist, and writers. When Czechs and Slovaks saw an
opportunity for political autonomy, the intelligentsia arose as the only class capable of
taking political action. After de-Stalinization the intelligentsia reasserted its role as a
political leading force and called for reform. For Kusin the role of the intelligentsia
stands as a uniquely Czechoslovak phenomenon and cannot be understated.
Kusin argued for the Prague Spring as a reform movement in 1971, five years
later, in 1976, H. Gordon Skilling challenged that argument. Skilling’s Czechoslovakia’s
Interrupted Revolution is a massive work that is considered “a classic” by many
historians to follow. Directly after praising Kusin and his argument, Skilling states, “in
my own opinion reform is too mild a term to describe accurately what was happening in
1968 and what was likely to happen thereafter.”3 Skilling adopts Kusin’s idea that there
was dual reform movement but criticizes Kusin for not drawing out the arguments
further. For example, Kusin writes, “this study is not concerned with the student
movement primarily because it had not in any significant way contributed to the
formation of reform theories.”4 In contrast Skilling argues that the intelligentsia and
3 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 834.4 Kusin, The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring, 138.
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party were the impetus for reform but that “all social groups were eventually drawn into
the quickening currents of political action.”5 With all social groups moving toward
reform they would reinforce each other creating a cumulative effect that “would have
been the metamorphosis of the entire system.”6 Although Skilling is careful to qualify
the difference between reform and revolution his analysis of the Prague Spring
definitively labels it a revolution. Inherent in Skilling’s argument is an interpretation of
what would have happened. Although Skilling admits, “the future was in some degree
open”7 his conclusion that Prague Spring was a revolution is based on the assumption of
what would have happened assuming that the Soviets did not invade and “interrupt” that
revolution. His conclusion is convincing because of the thoroughness of his arguments.
Skilling is able to interweave a narrative of the many divergent attitudes and social
groups in order to show that up until the point of Soviet intervention Czechoslovakia was
on a path of radical and comprehensive reforms. Skilling argues that such a radical and
quick transformation can only be seen as a revolution.
Skilling’s source base and methodological approach are similar to Kusin’s but
more comprehensive. From outside Czechoslovakia he incorporates official documents
from Russia and other members of the Warsaw Pact and from inside Czechoslovakia he
looks at a larger array of social organizations and makes a distinction between Czechs
and Slovaks. The larger source base is necessary for his argument of interruption. At the
same time his structure is similar to Kusin’s. Skilling argues that the reform movement
turned revolution was a result a culmination of a bottom-up build of events started by de-
Stalinization. Although he disagrees with Kusin on the speed, severity,
5 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 834.6 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 835.7 Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, 835.
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comprehensiveness, and eventual objectives of the Prague Spring, they agree on its basic
causes and course of action.
The main point of contention between Kusin and Skilling is whether the Prague
Spring was a reform movement or a revolution. Both books were published in the
western press, Kusin’s at Cambridge and Skilling at Princeton. Whether or not to
consider the Prague Spring a reform or a revolution is an important question in the
context of the 1970s Cold War politics. In his last section of the book Skilling points to
the importance of Cold War through a question. He asks is the Prague Spring a “Model
for the future?” Skilling asks whether or not other communist countries can rally around
the Prague Spring as an inspirational model for future revolutionary independence. The
initial reaction he admits seems “discouraging” but at the same he calls for Czechs,
Slovaks, and other Eastern Europeans to view 1968 as a time of triumphant greatness of
their national communities against oppression. He argues that the Prague Spring should
encourage revolution in the future. Labeling the Prague Spring a revolution is not merely
about the relationship of Eastern European countries to Soviet Russia, but it is also about
the United States foreign policy. By labeling the Prague Spring a revolution rather than a
Communist reform, Skilling is calling for United States foreign policy to at least
problematize Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact and to consider
Czechoslovakia as a possible dissident ally under an oppressive thumb.
The debate of whether or not the Prague Spring was a reform movement or a
revolution quickly lost its significance as Czechoslovakia was “normalized” into the
Soviet block and as the Cold War continued. Although the question lost its relevance the
Prague Spring did not. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the history of the Prague Spring
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transformed from a primarily bottom-up domestic history of Czechoslovakia to a means
of understanding Soviet and Communist world politics.
Jiri Valenta in Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a
Decision marks a decided change in the direction of the historiography. The Prague
Spring is no longer about Czechoslovakia but rather it is about Soviet-Czechoslovak
relations and how an understanding of that relationship defines Soviet global politics. Jiri
Valenta attempts to define a paradigm of Soviet decision-making. He begins is argument
by rejecting the “Rational Policy Paradigm,” which argues that the Soviets could only
view Czechoslovakia’s reform movement as a rapprochement with West Germany, which
was untenable policy direction for the stability of the Warsaw Pact. Valenta rejects this
argument in favor of the “Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm.” The “Bureaucratic-Politics
Paradigm” rejects the “Rational Policy Paradigm” as too simplistic. Valenta argues that
the Soviet decision-making process was a “pulling and hauling” of various personalities,
committees, and structures run by bureaucrats with competing agendas. Ultimately
Valenta argues that the Soviets invaded because they needed Czechoslovakia to be
“normalized” before the Communist Party Congress on September 9, 1968 because if a
reformed Czechoslovak Communist Party entered the Party Congress they would be
validated and “much more difficult” to deal with.8 The Soviets concern with deadlines
and the Communist Party Congress indicates that the Soviet decision-making process was
not just a monolithic top-down mandate but rather a complicated pushing and pulling of
various agendas, concerns, and policies based on competing strands of information and
competing interpretations of that information. According to Valenta, the KGB were the
8 Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 157.
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primary advocates of the invasion and they manipulated the flow of information
accordingly, and as a result, its argument for intervention dominated the process.
Valenta’s purpose in arguing for “Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” is to change
the United States assumptions about Soviet foreign policy. The implications of the
“Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” are numerous and of great significance. First, it
implies that Brezhnev’s leadership may be viewed as a “consensus-orientated decision-
making process.”9 Second, the KGB is capable of providing disinformation for its own
agenda and as a result of foreign misdirection.10 Third, Dubcek is portrayed not as a hero
of Czechoslovakia, but rather as a “naïve” man of little foreign affairs experience.
Fourth, if the United States had reversed their hands-off policy and taken a
confrontational position “the invasion might not have come to pass.”11 Finally, as
Velenta admits in is section regarding new conclusions to the second addition, the book’s
argument is meant to inform western readers about Soviet decision-making in regards to
the invasion of Afghanistan (this book was published just weeks before the invasion
began). The Prague Spring stands as an example of the failure of Unites States foreign
policy to understand the Soviet decision-making process in terms of the “Bureaucratic-
Politics Paradigm,” a failure that Velenta implies should not be repeated in Afghanistan.
Valenta’s methodology is highly orientated around theory. His sources are almost
exclusively documents made public describing the political movements between the
Soviets and the Czechs, such as the Bratislava Conference. He admits a lack of sources
and complains that the inaccessibility of the Soviet archives greatly hampers his
arguments. The sources he has, he orientates around the “Bureaucratic-Politics
9 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 159.10 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 157.11 Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968, 158.
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Paradigm.” Despite his lack of sources his argument remains strong because the theory
seems aptly applied to Soviet structures. Both the actions of the Czechs and Soviets and
the sources he utilizes aptly fit within the paradigm. In terms of the historiography of the
Prague Spring, Valenta manufactures a shift in thought. The Prague Spring is no longer
about reform or revolution but rather takes a grander place in the global Soviet scheme.
Understanding the Prague Spring is about understanding Soviet global politics and the
elements of its unilateral application, whether to Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan.
Karen Dawisha in The Kremlin and the Prague Spring takes Jiri Valenta’s
arguments to the next logical step. She takes a step-by-step approach of analyzing the
chorology of the decisions made by individual Soviets. In effect she analyzes the
decision-making processes of the individual bureaucrats. To analyze the decisions she
applies a psychological model of crisis decision making developed by Charles Hermann
and Michael Brecher at the International Crisis Behavior Project (a research center at the
University of Maryland). The Hermann-Brecher model argues that as stress escalates the
decision-making process goes through stages that culminate into three psychological
characteristics that eventually control process. They are a greater propensity to rigidity, a
greater reliance on past experience rather then present information, and a focus on
immediate actions rather than long-term goals.12 For the Soviet leaders she identifies
three periods of decision-making: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. She argues that
during the crisis period “there was no indication that Soviet leaders wanted more
information or questioned the quality of the information they were receiving.”13 She later
softens this argument by stating that some leaders and possibly Brezhnev “may have
12 Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 342.13 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 356.
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remained receptive to new information.”14 In effect, Dawisha argues that the bureaucrats
entered a crisis mindset and based their decision on what they knew to be effective, that
is they based their decision to invade Czechoslovakia on events of Hungry in 1956.
Similar to Valenta, Dawisha sources are the select documents made public by
Soviets. In addition she conducted interviews of some participating Czechs and
incorporated United States documents that had previously been classified. Although
Dawisha’s application of the psychological profile to Soviet leaders is extremely suspect,
her book remains important for three reasons. First, it was well received and considered
by many to be a leap forward in the historiography the Prague Spring. Dawisha pushed
the models to truly investigate the behavior of the Soviets (which during the Cold War
was both important to understand and slightly mysterious). Second, Dawisha does
accurately represent the state and the course of to the historiography. The historiography
of the Prague Spring had transformed. The Prague Spring was a means of understanding
the Soviet global politic. Finally, the extent to which the Prague Spring had become an
element of the global politic becomes evident in her last chapter as she describes the
consequences of the invasion.
For Karen Dawisha the consequences of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
are global. She identifies three major areas of the global politic that were transformed by
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. First, the United States recognized Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe. This recognition allowed the Nixon administration to adopt the
“Sonnonfeldt Doctrine” which states that stability in Central Europe is in the United
States interest.15 Second, and related to “Sonnonfeldt Doctrine,” is that the invasion of
14 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 356.15 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 374.
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Czechoslovakia weakened Soviet-Chinese relations because the Chinese feared Soviet
interference on their northern boarders. As a result the Chinese sought rapprochement
with the Nixon administration. Therefore according to Dawisha, the United States and
Chinese rapprochement is a direct historical result of the Prague Spring. Finally, the
invasion of Czechoslovakia was overwhelming condemned by almost every international
Communist organization. In order to justify the invasion the Soviets produced the
“Brezhnev Doctrine.” The “Brezhnev Doctrine” states “the interest of maintaining
socialism in every country of the socialist commonwealth must take precedence over the
sovereignty of individual socialist states.”16 The two most immediate responses to
“Brezhnev Doctrine” were a Romanian national alert and an Albania break with Moscow
and turn to Peking. As the Soviets tightened their grip on Eastern Europe in the Prague
Spring, the rest of world Communism began to slip through their fingers.
Karen Dawisha and Jiri Valenta represent an important turn in the historiography
of the Prague Spring. For them the debate of reform or revolution was an outdated model
of thinking about the importance of the Prague Spring. Too many Cold War events had
occurred between the time that they wrote and the earlier historiographies of Kusin and
Skilling. In effect the Prague Spring comes to represent a moment, manifest in
Dawisha’s treatment the “Brezhnev” and “Sonnonfeldt” Doctrines, where historiography
accepts the divide of the world into two hegemonic superpowers. The acceptance of the
superpower paradigm made the domestic histories of the Prague Spring, such as the ones
written by Kusin and Skilling, irrelevant. The Prague Spring is important because of the
way it shaped the policies of Soviet Union, and concurrently, because of the Cold War,
16 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 376.
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those of the United States. As those foreign policies were global polices, the
historiography of the Prague Spring took on global interpretations.
As all the historiographies of the Cold War era admit their arguments are
hampered by a lack of source material. The Soviet and Czechoslovak achieves were
closed to the western academics. By 1997 when Kieran Williams wrote The Prague
Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968-1970 the Cold War had ended and
“thousands of previously classified documents” had become available.17 His main
purpose in writing is to apply these new documents to the historiography.
Armed with new and more comprehensive source material Williams goes directly
after solving the historiographical debates. Williams divides his book into two parts.
Part I considers theoretical applications and the placement of the new sources into the
debates. Part II acts as a narrative of the events supporting his arguments. Williams
divides Part I into three categories: “Liberalization,” “Intervention,” and
“Normalization.” In the sections “Liberalization” and “Intervention” Williams attempts
to solve the lasting historical debates and offers an opposing interpretation.
In the first section, “Liberalization,” Williams wastes no time to argue that the
events in Czechoslovakia “should not be studied in the same terms as revolution.”18 He
argues that new sources unilaterally support the interpretation of the Prague Spring as a
reform movement. Williams argues that Dubcek undertook a path of obtaining more
‘liberal freedoms’ for the Czechoslovak people. Once granted these freedoms society
pursued its own goals. Dubcek did not intend for society to pursue a more radical course
of reforms and when society did and when Moscow responded, Dubcek fumbled between
17 Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ix.18 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 3.
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trying to please the Czechoslovak people’s demands and Moscow’s call greater
censorship.
In the second section, “Intervention,” Williams attempts to answer the debate
concerning Soviet decision-making process. Williams does not discount Jiri Velenta’s
“Bureaucratic-Politics Paradigm” and admits that bureaucratic politics “existed in the
Brezhnev era.”19 At the same time Williams finds it an unsatisfactory model for
understanding the Soviet decision-making in 1968. Williams agrees that there was
bureaucratic pushing and pulling in Soviet structures but that ultimately the
“overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens” disapproved of the events of Czechoslovakia
and that the Soviet Politburo was “unanimous in their decision to invade.”20 The
“Bureaucratic-politics approach” successfully works as description for bureaucratic
process but its failure to incorporate information outside the bureaucracy makes it an
unsatisfactory method of understanding the decision. Williams also briefly criticizes
Karen Dawisha on the same grounds. Williams simply states that Dawisha sole focus on
the Soviet elites makes her explanation unsatisfactory.
To counter these arguments Williams offers what he describes as an argument of
“images and interaction.” Williams argues that since 1945 Soviets had established a
cultural “code” of expected behavior from their client states. This “code” had developed
through years of interaction, through such cultural messages as show trials and the
rejection of long hair.21 Through this “code” the Soviets expected a doctrine of “political
love,” in which Soviets demanded “trust and sincerity.”22 Williams argues that in 1968
19 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 30.20 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 34.21 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 36.22 Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 36.
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Dubcek violated this “code.” Specifically, Dubcek’s government avoided meeting with
the Soviets, did not clearly ally themselves with the Soviet Communist Party, and
repeatedly promised to restore control in Czechoslovakia but never undertook any actions
to do so. By breaking the “code” Dubcek signaled to the Soviets that his intentions were
something other than reform. Williams concludes that although Dubcek only intended
reform, it was his bumbling between the demands of the Czechoslovak people and
Moscow the caused him to break the “code” and Soviets to retaliate through invasion.
Kieran Williams marks a shift in the historiography of the Prague Spring in two
respects. First, while writing in the post-Cold War era he is able to utilize a Soviet and
Czechoslovak source base. Access to a greater and more relevant source base allows him
to make the claim of improving upon the existing historical debates. Second, by talking
about foreign relations in terms of “codes,” Williams injects a cultural theory of history
into the relationship between two foreign states. Williams transforms the
historiographical understanding away form diplomatic foreign relations to an event of a
cultural relationship between two foreign states. This is an important historiographical
transformation. Williams takes the Prague Spring, what Valenta and Dawisha consider to
be a significant global political event, and transforms it into a cultural event. At same
time Williams does not consider it solely in terms of Czechoslovak culture, like Kusin
and Skilling, but rather as a culture event involving the relationship between two foreign
nations and cultures. Williams is methodical and exacting and the extent to which he is
able to make this transformation relies upon his sources and his portrait of Dubcek as a
character stuck between Czechoslovakian and Soviet “codified” language and political
demands.
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In 1968: The Year that Rocked the World Mark Kurlansky expands the
implications of Williams’ argument. Kurlansky seems to begin with the above two
premises: that the foreign relations of the hegemonic superpowers were global relations
and that these relations cannot be fully understood as solely diplomatic political
relationship. Kurlansky argues that a global cultural understanding is needed to better
understand the events of 1968. Kurlansky argues in favor expanding the idea of foreign
relations in terms of culture beyond Czechoslovakia and Russia and to include the whole
world.
In Kurlansky’s history the events of Prague Spring become one event in a global
series of events occurring throughout 1968. Kurlansky assigns special meaning to the
Prague Spring as a symbol of the relationship between the Soviet power structure and the
peoples it rules. Kurlansky sees the events of 1968 as a series of popular uprising of the
‘people’ against oppressive powers. He argues that each uprising is unique to its locality
but what makes 1968 special is the connection between all those localities via the global
information network and in particular television. For Kurlansky the events of 1968 are
all connected through the images that were broadcast around the world. Czechoslovakia
joins the revolutions of 1968, at least in part, because Dubcek ended Soviet censorship
and Czechoslovakia became inundated by a free and western press. Kurlansky builds an
image of the world based on cultural connectivity from bottom-up. He creates a narrative
of the ‘masses’ of people reacting against oppressive elite power structures connected by
television.
On the one hand Kurlansky’s argument is innovative and persuasive. He weaves
a tapestry, in which the events of 1968 form images interconnected by television as
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strands of yarn. The images of hippies and Vietnam broadcast the world and settle in
local consciences. For example, Kurlansky supplies a picture of Czechoslovak ‘hippies’
painted in flowers and marching down the street. On the other hand once pressed for
specific local effect, television as a source for Kurlansky falters. For example, the effects
of television or any cultural imagery on Dubcek’s interactions with Moscow are hard
pressed to find any collaborative documental sources and seem to be little more than a
narrative device employed by Kurlansky. The strands that Kurlansky uses to connect the
world seem to remain but a narrative of how the localities interpret those connections is
lacking. Much of Kurlansky problem regards source material. Although Kurlanksy uses
some primary source material he mostly scrounges from the secondary historiography. In
order to make a bottom-up argument Kurlansly would require primary source material
from a range of languages including Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Czech, which is
difficult to expect from one historian (and it is that true his arguments surrounding
America in 1968 are more tenable precisely because he offers more examples of
individuals’ cultural interpretations of the global events). Kurlansky’s argument that the
Prague Spring stands as one event in a global series of revolutions is a provocative in
theory but full of holes.
Kurlanksy stands on the cusp of two important developments in methodology.
First, Kurlanksy writes form a World History theory. Patrick Manning, one of the
forefathers of World History, describes World History as, “a story of connections within
the global community…the source material ranges from individual family tales to
migrations of peoples.”23 1968: The Year that Rocked the World precisely fits this
definition. It is a book primarily concerned with the connectivity of a global culture and
23 Patrick Manning, Navigating World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3.
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in that story the source material ranges form individual stories, to political events, to
picture imagery. Kurlanksy’s application of this theory to the Prague Spring is derived
from the Cold War foreign relations historiography. As the Cold War ended and the
world settled into a new paradigm, the historiography of Prague Spring transformed from
interpreting the foreign relationships of hegemonic superpowers to understanding the
interconnectivity of a global community. Rather than a means of interpreting the division
of the world, Kurlansky turns the Prague Spring into an interpretation of the world as
connected. The second important development in historiography Kurlansky embodies is
the admittance of the historical “I.” Kurlanksy admits that he was of the 1968 generation
that “hated” the Vietnam War. He admits that he is not objective and claims that the
book is a result of his relationship with his personal history. The development is
important because as Kurlanksy admits his biases he informs the reader and thus allows
the reader a higher degree of textual penetration. By being directly informed of the
writer’s biases, the reader gains insight into his structural and narrative approach. The
effect of the historical “I” is that Kurlanksy places, himself, his book, and his text within
a specific historical context.
The historiography of the Prague Springs represents a move in historiography
toward a global understanding. The understanding of the Prague Spring transforms form
a local political/cultural event, to a world political event, and finally to a global cultural
event. This transformation parallels the political developments of the Cold War. The
parallel development is important because it implies that the historiography is culturally
contingent. This is significant when applied to the Prague Spring because it creates the
World History theory and the global interconnectivity paradigm as a result of the Cold
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War. The Cold War divided the world into relationships dependent upon the two
superpowers. Once the Cold War ended that idea of division was replaced by an idea of
connectivity. It created a paradigm that can be summarized by the cliché phrase “think
globally.” By understanding the Cold War origins of the global interconnectivity
paradigm, the historian understands the paradigm’s biases and becomes empowered to
utilize or not to utilize it more aptly.
The global interconnected paradigm has for the historian both advantages and
disadvantages that can be seen in the relationship between sources, narration, and theory.
One advantage is that the global paradigm allows for a more comprehensive narrative.
For example, Kurlansky builds a relationship between the Mexican Olympics, the Tet
Offensive, and the Prague Spring. The idea that the world is connected allows individual
stories to be bound in a more comprehensive narrative. On the negative side, such a
grandiose narrative limits the local understanding and often places a theoretical burden
upon the sources. For example, Kurlanksy use of television is a persuasive theory about
cultural interconnectivity that is compellingly narrated, but in the end his presentation
lacks sources. Part of Kurlanksy’s problem may be languages, but it may also be in part
the nature of television and mass media. It raises for historian two interesting questions:
what is the nature of global connectivity and how does the historian utilize the global
information network as a source? For example, on the one hand the historian can know
that millions watch television and are affected by it, but on the other hand the responses
of the masses to its imagery are more or less without sources. Kurlanksy solves this
problem through emphasizing narration. In effect, Kurlansky de-emphasizes textual
source analysis and emphasizes narration in order to build the connectivity that television
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creates. Ultimately these are question left to the historian and the purposes of his
argument, but it does raise an important question of how to utilize sources in relation to
narration and theory.
The importance of the historiography of the Prague Spring is how it represents the
shift in thought toward the global. I think most interesting aspect of the historiography
of the Prague Spring is that throughout the debates no one lost, rather the parameters of
the debate changed. It creates for the contemporary historian a multitude of perspectives
that is well summarized by a cliché phrase prevalent in my culture: “think locally not
globally.” It is a statement that seeks not to discount the interconnectivity of the global
community, but rather to place the emphasis on the local story within the global story.
This emphasis maintains the strength of the sources and then seeks to connect them
theoretically out, rather than the other way around. This understanding makes the Prague
Spring one event in the long list of events in 1968 that is significant both for its
uniqueness and local origins but also for its important repercussions in global world. It
creates for the historian a dance between the local sources and the global paradigm.
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