International Symposium onLogistics and Port Development
Universidad del Turabo
Gurabo, Puerto Rico, 7-9 May 2009
Strategies for Security of Maritime Domain
Panagiotis D. Scarlatos, Dr.-Eng.Chair & Professor – Department of Civil Engineering
Director – Center for Intermodal Transportation Safety & Security
Maritime Domain
"All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities,
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”
National Strategy for Maritime Security1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness
Effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain andidentifying threats as early and as distant from shores as possible.
2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration PlanIntegrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to interests
in the Maritime Domain.
3. Maritime Operational Threat Response PlanEstablishes roles and responsibilities, and facilitates coordinated government
response to threats against the Nation-State and its interests in the Maritime Domain.
4. International Outreach and Coordination StrategyProvides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken
with foreign governments and international organizations.
5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery PlanRecommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the
maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption.
6. Maritime Transportation System Security PlanImproves the national and international regulatory framework
regarding the Maritime Domain.
7. Maritime Commerce Security PlanEstablishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain.
8. Domestic Outreach PlanEngages non-Federal input to assist with the development
and implementation of maritime security policies.
Threats• Nation-State Threats
• Terrorist Threats
• Transnational Criminal and Piracy Threats
• Environmental Destruction
• Illegal Seaborne Immigration
Maritime Security Activities• Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Actions
• Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical Infrastructure
• Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery
• Safeguard the Ocean and Its Resources
Strategic Actions• Enhance International Cooperation
• Maximize Domain Awareness
• Embed Security into Commercial Practices
• Deploy Layered Security
• Assure Continuity of the Maritime Transportation System
1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
Effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the
United States.
Enhanced and innovative collection of intelligence, integration ofcorrelated open source information, and incorporation
of automated algorithms to assist human analytic efforts.
Information sharing, situational awareness, and collaborative planning through the national maritime Common Operating Picture (COP).
COP is a near-real time, dynamically manageable, network-centric virtual information grid shared by all U.S. Federal, state, and local agencies
with maritime interests and responsibilities.
MDA Goals
• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter and defeatthreats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible;
• Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the fullspectrum of maritime threats; and
• Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and theefficient flow of commerce.
MDA Objectives
• Persistently monitor in the global maritime domain:o Vessels and craft
o Cargoo Vessel crews and passengerso All identified areas of interest
• Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure.
• Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decisionmakers to facilitate effective understanding.
• Access, develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance.
2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration PlanUses existing capabilities to integrate all
available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain.
3. Maritime Operational Threat Response PlanFacilitates coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing
roles and responsibilities, which enable the government torespond quickly and decisively.
4. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy
Maritime DomainA Strategic Environment in a Globalized World
• Oceans cover 70% of the Earth’s surface.
• The world’s oceans and waterways offer all nation-states a network to their security and prosperity.
• There are more than 100,000 ocean-going ships and millions of workboats, fishing vessels and recreational vessels.
• More than 40% of the world’s merchant ships enter the U.S. harbors every year.
• Approximately 30,000 containers enter U.S. ports every day.
• Nearly 95% of all international commerce enters the U.S. through the nation’s 361 public and private ports.
• Over 80% of the world trade travels by water.
• U.S. has 98,000 miles of shoreline and 3.5 million square miles of water within the Exclusive Economic Zone.
• Two-thirds of the world’s population live within 240 miles of a seacoast.
IOCS Strategic Goals• A coordinated policy for US government maritime
security activities with foreign governments, international and regional organizations,
and the private sector.
• Enhanced outreach to foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners,
and the public abroad to solicit support for improved global maritime security.
5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP)
MIRP Overview• Recovery management procedures for the Government and designated representatives
(e.g., the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG)) to make decisions affecting national maritime recovery efforts.
• Provides recovery management procedures for those making decisions at theincident site and at non-incident sites that provide support.
• Based on the nature and circumstances of the incident, atransition in focus from homeland defense operations to recovery
management may occur.
• Initial post-incident decisions made by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
regarding short-term, targeted operational actions to help maintain flow of commerce through non-incident sites.
• Lists roles and responsibilities related to maritime transportation capabilitiesof federal, state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector.
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of the recovery plan, through an exerciseprogram that includes periodic validation of the concepts of this plan.
• Identification of follow-up steps and recommendations of continuous improvement of recovery management.
MIRP Objectives• Identify pre-designated key national government/industry stakeholders
immediately available to advise on matters pertaining to recovery from Incident of National Significance (INS)
affecting the Maritime Domain.
• Recommend national priorities for recovery of maritime transportation systemsafter a national Transportation Security Incident (TSI).
• Recommend federal policies and procedures for recovery of national maritimetransportation after a security incident (and support recovery of critical local
and regional transportation systems).
• Describe a maritime infrastructure recovery exercise program consistent with the National Exercise Program.
• Procedures for coordinating among federal, state, local and private sector partners, and cooperation with foreign governments and
international entities, as appropriate.
Recovery Management Support by Non-TSI Sites
Recovery Management at the National TSI Site
6. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan
Maritime Transportation System Security (MTS Security)
A systems-oriented security regime built upon layers of protection and defense-in-depth
that effectively mitigates critical system security risks, while preserving the functionality and efficiency of the MTS.
Most effective security risk management strategies involving cooperation and participation of both
domestic and international stakeholders acting at strategic points in the system.
MTS Security Components• Risk Management
• Security Information Management
• International & National Regulatory Framework
• Stakeholder Responsibility & Coordination
• Credentialing
• Leverage Safety Frameworks
• Security Technology
• Security Training
Security Network for Key Elements of MTS
Ports and Port Facilities Vessels and Small Boats Infrastructure
Inherent Security Features Inherent Security Features Inherent Security FeaturesOwner/Operator Security Plans Owner/Operator Security Plans
Federal Agency Programs Federal Agency Programs Federal Agency Programs Oversight Oversight Oversight
Area Maritime Security Plans & National Maritime Security Plan
National Strategy for Maritime Security – MTS Security
7. Maritime Commerce Security Plan
Maritime Commerce Security Plan (MCSP)Maritime security has been important to the United States since its earliest days. The
importance of protecting the Maritime Domain was recognized by our Founding Fathers, who identified national defense, protecting the coast, and
detecting smuggling as among the first responsibilities of the new federal government. More than two hundred years later, maritime commerce security
remains critical to the national security and economic health of the United States.
Containerized cargo has made the maritime transportation process so efficient that transportation costs are no longer a significant barrier to international trade.
Low transportation costs combined with free trade agreements have created an explosive growth in global trade, raising our standard of living. This efficient
global supply chain now stretches from the far reaches ofthe planet directly into the heartland of America.
Maritime transportation of bulk, break-bulk and containerized cargo is the primary mechanism,and in many cases, the only feasible one, for moving goods and commodities around the world quickly and cheaply. The ships that ply the Maritime Domain are the primary
mode of transportation for world trade, carrying over 80% of world trade by volume, making the Security of the Maritime Domain critically important to the prosperity
and liberty of billions of people. Improving the security of this complex supply chain is critical for our national security.
MCSP Challenges
Vulnerability in not limited to seaport cities. MTS is the backbone of the intermodal supply chain.
The security plan must intercept threats well before they reach the country’s borders.
The threat assessment encompasses the totality of thetransportation process including
cargo, vessels, crew, ports of call and intermodal connections (trucks, railroads, pipelines and aircraft).
MCSP Framework
Accurate data.
Secure cargo.
Secure vessels/ports.
Secure transit.
International standards and compatible regulations
Risk Management Approach
MCSP Current Initiatives
Advanced Electronic Cargo Information.
Automated Targeting System.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment.
Container Security Initiative.
Megaports Initiative (specialized radiation detection equipment).
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Operation Safe Commerce.
8. Domestic Outreach Plan (DOP)
Create implementation plans for National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).
Maintain transparency and foster dialogue with stakeholders.
Comply with existing laws regulating government outreach.
Establish recommendations for follow-on interagency coordinating body.
DOP Audience• Congress
• Maritime media
• Non-governmental organizations/trade associations.
• Maritime industry/private sector.
• Vessel security officers/facility security officers.
• State/local government officials dealing with security .
• Emergency responders.
• Area maritime security committees/Coast Guard Captains of the Port.
• Defense/security industry (contractors, etc.)
• Presidential security advisory committees.
• Maritime labor unions.
• Interagency/intra-governmental.
MARITIME TERRORIST RISKS & LIABILITY
Radiological or Nuclear DetonationSecure hazardous materials at their point of origin
Disruption of Port OperationFacilitate the restart of ports and container shipping system
Maritime TerrorismMaritime terrorism policies must not be motivated by
commonly perceived threats
Maritime CommerceNeed to recognize operating risks and investigate the extent of their own tort liability
Civil LiabilityAdmiralty jurisdiction over claims may preempt competing legal rules that
apply on land
Maritime CargoCommercial contracts should specifically consider and address terrorism risks
Tort LiabilityPolicy makers should carefully review the scope and rationale (pros & cons)
of third-party liability for terrorist attacks
High Profile Maritime Terrorism Incidents (1961-2009)
Hijacking of Santa Maria Cruise Ship (Portuguese and Spanish Rebels, 1961)
Use of Coaster Claudia to transport weapons (Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1973)
Hijacking of Achille Lauro Cruise Ship (Palestine Liberation Front, 1985)
Targeting of Cruise Ships on the Nile River (Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, 1992-94)
Hijacking of Turkish Passenger Ferry in Black Sea (Chechen Rebels, 1996)
Suicide Bombing of the USS Cole (Al Qaeda, 2000)
Suicide Bombing of the M/V Limburg (Al Qaeda, 2002)
Use of Karine A to transport weapons (Palestinian Authority, 2002)
Hijacking of the M/V Penrider Oil Tanker (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, 2003)
Use of the Abu Hassan Fishing Trawler to transport weapons (Lebaneze Hezbollah, 2004)
Attacks against the Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Oil Terminals (Jamaat al-Tawhid, 2004)
Bombing of the Phillipine Superferry 14 (Abu Sayyaf & Jemaah Islamiyah, 2004)
Suicide attack aginst the Port of Ashrod (Hamas & Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, 2004)
Multiple Hijackings of the Horn of Africa Sea (Somalia Pirates, 2006-09)
Potential Present Maritime Terrorism Acts
Use of a commercial container ship to smuggle chemical, biological, or radioactive materials for an unconventional attack carried out on land
or at a major commercial port.
Use of a “Trojan Horse” such as a fishing trawler, resupply ship, tug or similar innocuous-looking vessel to transport weapons.
Hijacking of a vessel as a fund-raising exercise to support a campaign of personal gain, political violence directed toward ethnic, ideological, religious, or separatist designs.
Scuttling a ship in a narrow Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) to block ordisrupt maritime traffic.
Hijacking of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier that is then detonated asa bomb or used as a collision weapon.
Use of a high-speed boat to attack an oil tanker or offshore energy platformto affect international oil trade or cause major pollution.
Directly targeting a cruise liner or passenger ferry to cause mass casualties bycontaminating the ship’s food supply, detonating an on-board or submersible
improvised explosive device (IED), or by ramming the vessel with afast-approach, small, attack craft.
MARITIME SAFETYINCIDENT ANALYSIS FACTORS
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTLabor-Management Relations
Less-Than-Adequate (LTA) CommunicationsLanguage Problem
Social and Cultural Barriers and Conflicts
SUPERVISIONLack of Coordination of TasksInadequate Work Preparation
Inadequate Briefing, InstructionLack of Resources
Supervisor Not In Touch
MANNINGLong Working Periods, Much OvertimeFrequent Change of Watch Schedule
Wrong Person AssignedToo High/Low Work Load
PERSONNELLack of Motivation
Lack of SkillLack of Knowledge
WORKPLACE CONDITIONSAnthropometric Factors/Dimensions
Lack of Information, Inadequately Presented Information
PHYSICAL STRESSNoise, Vibration
Sea Motion, AccelerationClimate, Temperature
INADEQUATE TOOLS AND EQUIPMENTRight Tools and Equipment Unavailable
LTA Assessment of Needs and RisksInadequate Tool or Aid
MAINTENANCEFailure Not to Detect During IMR
Lack of MaintenanceInadequate Maintenance
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONSToo Low Visibility for Observation
Traffic Density Hinders Vessel Control
EMERGENCY PREPARDNESSContingency Plans not Updated
Training IgnoredLacks Initiative to Deal with Emergencies
BUSINESS CLIMATEEconomic Conditions
Market Change
ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MANAGEMENTPolicy, Ethical Values
Focus on Liability and PunishmentCommunicate Policy
Set Standard by ExampleCompany Loyalty and Commitment
Response to Feedback from EmployeesVessel Undermanned
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENTPressure to Keep Schedule and CostsInadequate Procedures and Checklists
SE MANAGEMENTCritical System and Cargo Documentation
InspectionFollow-up on Non-Conformities
Incident Reporting, Analysis, ImprovementWork Instruction
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH MANAGEMENTInformation about Health RisksPersonal Protective Equipment
Health Control of PersonnelWorkspace Inspections
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENTHiring and Selection Policy
Inadequate Training ProgramSelection/Training of Officers
SYSTEM ACQUISITIONSubstandard ComponentsSubstandard Contractors
Control of Contractors
DESIGNDeviation from Standards/Specifications
Inappropriate RegulationsDesign Error
MAINTENANCE POLICYLack of Priority to Inspection/Maintenance/Repair (IMR)
Lack of Competent Repair Personnel
RISK ANALYSIS
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
“As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable” (ALARP) Principle
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
Hazard Identification
Risk Estimation (Possibly Fuzzy Set)
Risk Control Options
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Decision-Making