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Review: The Function of IntelligenceAuthor(s): Willmoore KendallSource: World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jul., 1949), pp. 542-552Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008837.
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THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
By WILLMOORE
KENDALL
ShermanKent, Strategic ntelligence, rinceton, rincetonUniversity
Press, 1949,pp. xiii, 40. $3.00.
STRATEGIC
NTELLIGENCE
can
be readvariously
s:
1) a general
ntroduction
o intelligence
ork
which, ay,
the director
f
almost
ny
section f Central
ntelligencemight
givea newrecruit o
read
on
his
first ay at the office; ) a
memorandum
rom
n
Old Hand
at
intelligence orkwho has
thoughtt all over-like the bird nPeterand theWolf, rom
safe
distance-and
has a
thing
r
two
to tell
those
of
his
col-
leagueswho have stayed n
in
Washington; nd 3) an attempt
by that
same
Old Hand to make sense-inter alia
for
himself
-out of
a
greatly xpanded
United
States
governmentctivity
in
which,
s
all
who
know
t
can
testify,
ense does not
leap
to
the
eye.
Because the
book is in
part
each of these
three
hings,
it is not
perfectlyatisfactory
s
any
one of
them.
But it
is
evi-
dently
not
offered
s
a
learned
treatise n
any
or
all
of them:
indeed, he gap in the existing iterature
n
the field
s
so great
that
one
can
hardly
be
surprised
t
Mr.
Kent's failure to
define
his
task
with
precision.
he
great
meritof
his
book
is
that
t provides body
of
descriptive
materialwhichwill
enable
serious
public
discussion o
begin
on the relation f
ntelligence
to
policy
n
a democratic
ystem.
ince it is American
olicy
on
which he future fthe freeworldseemsto depend, t is high
time
forthe
public
debate
to
commence.
Moreover,
Mr. Kent's book
is
one
from
which
nyone nter-
ested
n
the
relation, ast, present,
nd
future,
etween
United
States
foreign olicy
nd social
research,
an
learn
much-now
from
ts manifest
ontent;now,perhapsmoreoften romwhat
it
takes
for
granted,
what
t says between he ines, nd what t
might avesaidbut did not.Therefore,et us take a look at the
book n each of ts
three
apacities.
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THE
FUNCTION
OF INTELLIGENCE
543
I
The beginner
t an intelligence
gency an
getfrom
trategic
Intelligencen initiationnto theterminologyf theprofession
he is entering-a
picture f the
ntelligence
map in
Washington
(what
organizations
re
performing
ntelligence
unctions,
ow,
theoretically,
hey
mesh ogether,
tc.)
-and a provisional
rasp
of
some
of
the controversial
ssues
because of
which
the lines
on that
map
lie where hey ie
rather han
somewhere
lse.
He
can
learn
hat he
task
of
foreign
ntelligence
s thatof describ-
ing,
observing,
nd reporting
pon,
and speculating
s to the
futuref... phenomenanforeignands (p. 104), which eems
as
good
a
working
efinition
s he is
likely o
find f the task
actually
beingperformed
y certain
gencies.
He can, perhaps
best of all,
derive
from he
book
the
elements f
an
emergent
ethics
of
the
ntelligence
rofession-
sense of why
t is im-
portant
hat
the
ntelligence
unction houldbe well
performed,
a
realization hat
there re
some
compromises
with, ay,
ad-
ministrative onvenience, r entrenched gnorance) that he
and
his colleaguesmust,
n
the ongrun,
refuse o make,
nd an
insight
nto
certain differences
etweengovernment
esearch
and
academic
research
hat make
the
ethics
of the
latternot
strictlypplicable
o
theformer.
Mr. Kent
may,
to be
sure,
awaken
n
the
beginner
ome ex-
pectations
hat
are
doomedto
disappointment,
s,
for
xample,
when
he
assures
him
that an
intelligence
rganization
s
a
strange ndwonderfulollection fdevoted pecialistsmolded
into
a
vigorous
production
nit
(p.
74) ;
but
it
was two
Old
Hands at
newspaper
work
whowrote
The Front
Page,
and
there
is no
doubt something
o be
said
for
nculcating
n
beginners
an
enthusiasm
hat
only
the
more romantic
f their
seniors
are
able to
maintain.
Speaking
as a man who has often
old
beginners
adly
what
Mr. Kent tells them
well,
the
present
writerwelcomes trategicntelligencen this one of its three
capacities,
nd
hopes
that
the
ntelligence
raternity
ill
make
good
use
of
t.
It
will
save
theP-8's
precious
ime,
nd will
con-
tribute
generously
o
the
professional
evelopment
f
their
junior
olleagues.
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544
WORLD POLITICS
II
Mr.
Kent
has lookedat the ntelligence
et-up
n Washington
and found
t, on balance,
good. Thus,
Strategic ntelligence
s
not thebook of a reformer ho takespen in hand to expose
and remedy
bad situation.
On the
contrary: t insists
hatthe
decision-maker
ho regularly ubstitutes
is
own udgment or
that of the
intelligence rm is,
tout
court, turning
is back
on thetwo nstruments
y whichwestern
man has,
sinceAris-
totle,
teadily nlarged
his horizonof knowledge-the
nstru-
ments
of reasonand
scientific
method p. 206).
It would be
quiteunfair, n theotherhand,to suggest hat Mr. Kentputs
himself orward
s a
defender
f the status
quo
in
intelligence
planning nd organization.
He shows
himself,
t
a
number
f
points
n his
argument, enuinely
ware that
the
existing
r-
rangements
eflect,
hall we
say,
something
ess than
the
best
thinking
f which he
nation
s
capable.
But he
has not
worked
out
in his
own mind
what
an
ideal set of intelligence rrange-
ments-the
ones he would set up
if
all
the
resistanceswere re-
moved-would be like, nd thushas no standard gainstwhich
to
measure
the
magnitude
f the
shortcomings
e
exposes.
n
any
case,
his book
is
not
characterized
y
a
persistent
illing-
ness
to
followthrough
n
adverse
criticism,
o
proceed
from
recognition
f
a basic defect o
such
questions
s:
How grave
s
this?
May
not our
defects
e so
grave
that in
so
faras it is
possible
o
court
national
disaster
bymismanaging
he intelli-
gencefunction,
e are
doing ust
that n
the United States?
Let us examinesome of theemphases hatmighthave led
him
o
ask such
questions:
1.
Mr. Kent
believes
hat
ntelligence
annot
do
its
ob unless
it
knows he
mindof
the
recipients
f
ts
reports,
nd
getsfrom
them
the
kind
of
guidance
that
any professional
man
needs
from is client
pp. 180-182).'
He
can
hardly void the conclu-
sion
that where
uch
guidance
s
not
forthcoming
he intelli-
gence ob is, in effect,otbeingdone. Is it forthcoming,hen,
in
those
areas of
national
policy
hat are of deepest oncern o
us?
The
uninitiated,
Mr.
Kent
replies,
will be
surprised
o
1
Curiously, owever,
e
reproduces
ithevident
pproval
a
passage
of Walter
Lippmann's
which
urges
the reverseof this
(p. 200).
Mr.
Kent's views on KiampfendeWissenschaft
(ibid.)
vary sharply
rom
hapter
o
chapter.
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THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
545
hear hat heelement
fguidance .
.
becomes
arer nd rarer
s
the ob of
intelligence
mounts
n
augustness
p.
182).
Does
it not then follow
that,
as
regards he great decisions
about
foreignolicy,t is highly robable hat (we use his language)
our
undertakings
ill
fail
and our
statesmen
lan
in
ignorance?
Evidently, ut Mr. Kent
does not
make the
nference.
2.
One of the things hat an
intelligence
gency
must
do
is
to
scrutinize,
nd
try o make
sense
of,
what
goes
on abroad
(p.
152). As
is
wellknown,United States
ntelligencegencies
make
use
for his
purpose
both of overt
techniques-that s,
unromantic
pen-and-above-board
bservation nd
research
(p. 4) -and covert r clandestine echniques ffact-gather-
ing.
Two
choices
which
any intelligence
gency
must make,
therefore,
re those
relating o,
first,
he
allocation
of
resources
between
hesetwo
types
of
collection, nd
secondly, he
de-
greeof autonomy
which he
clandestine peration
hall, out of
tender
egard
or
considerations f
security,
e
permitted
o
enjoy. ndeed,
hewholematter
f
clandestine
perationss
now
so
surrounded y
security
estrictions
s
to
make
even
thestate-
ment hat hey resurroundedy security estrictionsmatter
of
doubtful
egality;
and
the literature
f
the
subject
is
not
extensive.
All
the more nterest hereforettaches
o
Mr.
Kent's
state-
ment-and he is
pretty learly ooking
right
t
Washington
whenhe
makes
t-that
the clandestine
orce,
if
it
allows the
mechanisms
f
security
o cut t
off
rom
ome
of
the
most
sig-
nificantinesofguidance, ndsup destroyingits own reason
for
xistence
y collecting
he
wrong
nformation
nd
not
col-
lecting
he right
p. 167).
And the
interest ecomes ntense
when this statement s
placed
beside
the
further
tatement o
the
effect
hat:
This
kind
of
mis-collection
ould
be
far
ess
likely o
occur if
the
operationwere not
freeto steer
ts own
course
behind he
fogof
ts
own
security
egulations p.
168).2
This
tallies
precisely
with one
of
the
presentwriter's
major
criticismsfourpresentntelligencerrangements: hey nor-
mously xaggerate
he
mportance
f
covert
ollection, nd yet
permit
t
to
yield shockingly
mall
dividends.3
Now:
either
2
The italics re
mine.
3
If
you
were director f an
intelligence
gency
in
France,
and wished
to know
what
goes
on
in
the
United
States,
which would
you
do first:
take out
an
airmail
subscription
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546 WORLD POLITICS
the agencyneeds the extra nformationt can obtain through
clandestine perations fter t has exhausted he potentialities
of its overtcollection, r it does not. If it does not, t can
do
without ts clandestine peration ltogether; f t does, t must
be in
a
position o lay down-and enforce-directives o
the
men responsible or obtaining t. And if the Washington n-
telligence gencies are not
in
this position, hen Mr. Kent
is
tellingus something hat needs to be said to a much wider
audience
than
that which
s
likely o read his book, and some-
thing
whose
implications
need
to be pointed up much
more
sharply
han
he
has
pointed
hem
up.
The whole
question
of
covert ollection s, in the presentwriter's iew, one thatur-
gently requires nvestigation y
a
Congressionalcommittee
prepared o speak the anguageof egislative upremacy,nd
to
insistthat no democracy
an afford
o make
a
simple
and-
in
the short nd
middle
term t least-irrevocable
act
of faith
in the
men
called upon to perform
his
highly xplosive
func-
tion.
3.
Without
professional xperts, ays Mr. Kent, there s
no intelligence .
..
Theyare thesocial and natural scientists
and
the
military xperts
who
have
a
finger-tip
eel
for he
ways
of
research
nd
analysis,
who
are
masters
or
dedicatednovi-
tiates)
...
of
their
articular
racket f
earning,
nd
to whom
the
discovery
f new facts or new
relationships
s a
career
(p. 107).4Again
and
again, ndeed,
he
shows
his
awareness hat
the
quality
of
an
intelligence gency'spersonnel
s the
major
determinantf the qualityof its performance;nd if in the
passage just
cited
he
sidesteps
the
question,
whether he
in-
telligence
unction
s
today
in the hands of men like
those he
has described
if they
do
not
in
actual
departmental ractice
measure up
to
the
specifications
f this
paragraph,
. .
they
should ),
it
is not difficult
o collecthis
views
as
to
the
present
trend
n
this
regard:
Two
forcesof
disintegration
re
now
working
n concert n
themost
valuable
people.They
are
being
nudged romwithinbycivil ervice egulations] ndbeckoned
fromwithout.
heir oss
is
a
catastrophe
o federal
ntelligence
to the
New York
Times,
or send four
ex-Deuxieme-Bureau
men to
dispense largesse
in
Washington?
And
now
that
you
have answered
that
question
in the mannerthat
the
present
writer
xpected,
how sure are
you
that
you
would send the
four men at all?
4
The
italics re
mine.
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THE
FUNCTION
OF
INTELLIGENCE
547
work
(p.
147).5
But the
warning
s buried
n
a
technical
dis-
cussion
in
the
middle
of
the
book,
and has no
impact
upon
its
general
rgument.
4. Mr. Kent has otherminorquarrelswithpresentntelli-
gence
policy:
he
would
like
a
civilian
director
or
Central
n-
telligence
p.
100) ;
he
feels hat
CIA's
powers
f
nvestigation
vis-a-vis
departmental
ntelligence
re
inadequate
(p.
101);
he
believes
hat
Washington
would be well-advised
o rethink he
relation etween esearch
eople
n
the home
office
n the
one
hand,
and
field
taff,
ncluding
here overt
as
well
as
covert
collection,
n
theother
p.
165) ;
and
so
on.
The presentwriter elieves hat f all of Mr. Kent's reproofs
were
cted
upon,
nd
all
his
proposals
dopted,
he result
would
be
an improvement
n
UnitedStates
ntelligenceperations. ut
this
mprovement
ould,
ike
the infant
mentioned n
Marx's
famous
ootnote,
e
very
mall.
III
The most nstructiveassages nStrategic ntelligencere, nthepresentwriter's pinion, hose n which
Mr.
Kent reveals
what we
may
call the
general
theory
f
the
intelligence
unc-
tion
to
which
his
thinking
as
brought
im-plus
those
n
which
he
records,
ut on
his
theory
oes
not
identifys
such,recog-
nizably
pathological
aspects
of
existing
ntelligence
rrange-
ments.
They
are instructive
ecause Mr.
Kent's
state
of
mind
on
most of
the
problems
o which
uch a
theory
must
address
itself eflectso a remarkable egree hatofofficialWashington
as
the present
writer ame to
know t in
the
course
of his
own
tour
of
duty
s
an
intelligence
fficial.
nd,
so far
as
he knows,
this
s the first ime that that state
of
mind
has,
so
to
speak,
ventured
eyond
he
steel
curtain n
26th
Street
o
subject tself
to
criticism.When
approached
rom his
point
fview,
trategic
Intelligence
ecomes
a
book
that every
ocial
scientist
hould
lay in his
heart
and ponder.
Let
us notice
some of
the char-
acteristicsf his tate fmind:
5
And
he
says elsewhere hat if
we are looking
for the
encouraging
lement n
depart-
mental
ntelligence,
.e., the
departmentshat
have
realized the importance
f the
task,
shown
a
decent respect
for full
and accurate
knowledge,
nd employed
the right
kind
of
professional
eople, it is to
Labor,
Commerce,
nd Agriculture
thus,
one infers, ot
to
State and
Defense) that
wemustgo (p.
115).
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548
WORLD
POLITICS
1. It
is a state
of mindwhich
s-dangerously,
n this writ-
er's
view-dominated by an
essentially
wartime onception f
the ntelligence
unction.
Most of the men who
occupy he key
positions earned he ntelligence usinessduring hewar. They
seem to have
acquired a
trained ncapacity o put
aside, more
than
momentarily,
he intellectual
habits
appropriate o the
conduct
of
hostilities or preparation
or the
conduct of hos-
tilities)
gainst
n
actual
or potential
nemy, nd togiveto the
distinctivelyeacetime
unctions f a
governmentalntelligence
agency he
mportance hey
deserve.
This is not to imply hat
research
nto theconstituents
f power
hould apse in time of
peace, or that strategicntelligence s this stateofmindcon-
ceives
t
shouldbe
performed
ith ny less
loving are than n
the
past;
and it is
certainly
ot to
imply
hat the
possessors
f
this
state of
mind
are in
any sense
reluctant o place the in-
telligence
gencies
at
the
serviceof
the
quest
for
(or,
as
Mr.
Kent
likesto put t,the
trategy f)
peace. The point s, rather,
that the
very
use of
the term
strategic
s
opposed
to, say,
foreign olicy, o denote he
entire ask of
ntelligences itself
profoundlyignificant,nd thatthebig ob-the carving ut of
United States
destiny
n
the world as a
whole,
as
contrasted
to
the
conductof
United
States
policy
toward
a
congeries
f
nation-states-tends o
slip through
heir
ingers.
One illustration
f
this
to whichone
might oint
s
the
ease
with which
Mr. Kent
moves
from
definition f
the role
of
intelligence
which
presupposes
hat the
objectives
of
foreign
policyare given (p. 154), as, withrespect o the large ssues,
they
re
in
time
of
war,
and one that runs n
terms f
the
ob-
jective
and
impartial
exploration
f
competing
lternatives,
which
s
evidently
he
appropriate
efinition
n
peacetime
p.
201).
Another
llustration
s
his
willingness
o
acquiesce
in a
definition
fthatrole
which
egards
he
knowledge upon
which
we base our
high-level
ational
policy
toward he
other tates
of
the
world as
separable
nto
two
parts,namely,
hat
about
other tates nd that boutsomethingalled our own domestic
scene. Such
a
definition
uts
the
first
art
n the hands
of
a
distinct
roup
of officials hose
research
must
stop
short
t
the
three-mile
imit even when
the thread
they
are
following
runsright
cross
it,
and
yet
which
tells
itself t
is
using
the
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THE FUNCTION
OF INTELLIGENCE
549
scientific
method. This ends
you
up
with
ntelligence eports
that
never,
ever ake
cognizance
fUnited
States
policies
lter-
native o theone
actually
n
effect,uch
problems
eing
domes-
tic matters.)
It is
this
wartimeconceptionof
the
intelligence unction
which
eads to
a
regionalbreakdown
f the
ntelligence
unc-
tion,and deems
knowledge
f
the
outside world
as
additive-
in the
sense that if six
regional
divisionchiefs
are gathered
togethern thename
ofthe
world
ituation here
lso
is
wisdom
about the atter.
t is a
state
of
mind
characterizedy a
com-
pulsive
preoccupation
with
prediction,
iththe
elimination
f
surprise from oreign ffairs.The shadow of Pearl Harbor
is
projected
nto the mists
of
Bogota, and
intelligence
ooks
shamefaced
ver
ts failure
o
tell
Secretary
Marshall
the
day
and
hourat which
revolution
ill
break
out
n
Colombia.
The
course
of
events
s
conceivednot as
something ou try
to
in-
fluence
ut
as
a
tape
all
printed p
inside
a
machine;
and the
job of intelligence s
to
tell the
planners
how it
reads.
With
this
conception
f
ntelligence
ne does
not,
and,
on
the record
at least,cannotdistinguishetweenwhatwemaycall absolute
prediction
nd
contingent rediction.6
he
latter s
what the
government
eeds,
specially
n
peacetime.
2. It
is a
stateof mind dominated
y
an
essentially
ureau-
cratic
conception
f United States
government,
nd
of the
in-
telligence
roblem.
On
examining
Mr. Kent's
discussion
fthe
relation
between he
producers
nd
consumers
f intelli-
gence (pp. 180-206),one recognizes t once that he is con-
cerned not with the
relation
betweenhis
intelligence
xperts
and the
elected
officials
ho,
as
we
hope,
are
still
making
he
actual
decisions
bout our
foreign
olicy, ut with
the
relation
between
his
intelligence
xperts
nd
what
t is
now
fashionable
to call
the
policy planners.
The
issue
here
s
fundamental:
if
you
conceive
he
ntelligence
unctionn this
manner, ou are
excluding
rom ts
purview
what
this
writerwould call
its
most
crucialaspect-i.e., thatwhich oncerns hecommunicationo
6An
example
of
absolute
predictionwould
be: General
DeGaulle will
come to
power
this
day
six
months ;
or
Japan
will
attack Pearl
Harbor on
x-day at y-hour. The
con-
tingentprediction
would
read: The
following
actors,
which can
be
influenced n such
and
such a
fashion
by
action from
the
outside,
will
determine
whether,
nd
if so,
when,
General
DeGaulle
will
come to
power.
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550 WORLD POLITICS
the
politically esponsible aymen
of the
knowledgewhich,
o
use
Mr. Lippmann's happy phrase,
determines
he
pictures
they
have
in
theirheads of the world to
whichtheirdecisions
relate. The role of the intelligence gencies becomes,on this
showing, that of mere research assistants to
the
George
Kennans.
Mr. Kent
might eply o
this
criticism,
s
the presentwriter
has heard
many
of his former
olleaguesreply:
This
is
how it
in
factworks,
nd
it would be unrealistic
o discuss the in-
telligence
unction
n
any
otherterms.
No
doubt; but
if
so,
we do
not ellourselves hatours s a book aboutthe
knowledge
upon whichour nation'sforeign elations,n war and peace,
must rest
(p. vii).
For
the
state
of mind for
which
that
book
calls
is one which
xplicitly ecognizes
ow small
a
part of that
knowledge an or should
be
provided y
a
governmentperation
(i.e., how large
a
part of it
is
and should
be
provided y pro-
fessional
scholarship
under
non-governmentaluspices, and
how
arge part
of
t
is,
whethert should
be
or
not,provided-
howeverbadly-by journalists), and how importantt is to
relate ur
thinking
bout
that small
part
to our
thinking
bout
therest.
3.
It
is
a
state
of
mind characterized y a crassly em-
pirical onception f the research rocess n the social sciences.
This,
in
view
of
the profoundcommitment f our intelli-
gence agencies
to
what we
have
called the
regional break-
down
of their
problem,
s
not
surprising. or,
if
it
is
regional
unitsyou are building, nd it is social scientistspecialized o
specific
ountries nd
areas
you
wish
to
staff hem
with,what
you
end
up
with
s an
extremely ighpercentage
f
historians,
who
with he
best will
in the
worldcommunicate
o the
opera-
tion the
characteristic
ices
(and virtues)
of
their
kind of
re-
search.The
performance
fthe
ntelligence
unction
ccordingly
becomes
matter
f
somehow
keeping
ne's head
above water
in a tidal wave of documents,whose factual contentmust be
processed - i.e., in Mr. Kent's language, analyzed, eval-
uated, and
exploited
s
raw materialfor
hypotheses.
he
emphasis,
s
we have already noticed,
s
on prediction, hich
against
this
background
s
necessarily
nderstood
s
a
matter
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THE FUNCTION
OF
INTELLIGENCE
551
of
projecting
discernible
mpirical
trends into
an indefinite
future.
Here
also
the
ssue s
fundamental: n
intelligence peration
built upon a conception f the researchprocess n the social
sciences hat
assigns
due
weight
o
theory
s
it
is
understood
in economics
and sociology and,
increasingly ne hopes, in
politics,would
of
course
be
a
whollydifferentffair. t would
recruit
considerable ercentage
f its
personnel recisely or
its theoretical rainingand
accomplishments; t would free
them
from
he
tidal
wave of
documents;
t
would enable them
to work underconditions alculated to
encourage hought; t
would, above all, give them continuous and instantaneous
access
(e.g.,
by
international
elephone)
o
the
data that really
matter,
amely
he raw data
of
the
developing ituation
n
the
outsideworld.
The documents, aving
ome
from
broad,
are
as a
matter
f course
ut of
date.) This,
clearly,
s
not the place
to discuss
he
comparative
merits f
the two
conflictingoncep-
tions of
social
research,
nd
it is
not
intended o
suggest
hat
the intelligence unction hould be delivered ver entirely o
that
implied
n
the
foregoing
entences.The
point s, rather,
that current
lanning
nd
organization
n the
ntelligence
ield
ignores
ne
of the
wo
altogether.It is,
from
his
point
of
view,
highly ignificant
hatMr.
Kent,
for
ll
his
numerous
eferences
to the
social sciencesand social
scientists,
ever
employs
n
that
connection
hewords
heory
nd
theorist.)
4.
It
is
a
state
of
mind
characterized
y
an
uncritical p-
timism egardinghesupply ftheskillsuponwhich heeffec-
tive
performance
fthe
ntelligence
unction
epends.
Mr.
Kent,
quite rightly
n this reviewer's
pinion,
ooks
primarily
o
the
social
sciencesforthese
skills. Like
most
scholars
who
served
with
OSS
during
he
war,however,
e
tends o
envisage
he
olu-
tionof
the
ntelligence ersonnel roblem
n
terms
f
attracting
back
to Washington
he social science
scholars
who,
in
the
course
fthe
shake-up
fter
he
war,
ost
heart
nd turned heir
faceshomeward-i.e., in termsof a return o a GoldenAge
situated,
ike
Spain's,
in
the
past. Or,
to
put
the
same
thing
another
way,
he tendsto
assume
that
out there -in the uni-
versities,
n theresearch
nstitutes,r,
one
supposes, emporarily
unemployed-the
men
you
need exist
nd
await their all.
One
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WORLD POLITICS
finds n
him,and in the
ntelligence
raternityn Washington,
noneof
theanxieties hatwould
cause
mostresponsiblecholars
in the
fields ther han History
for
whichwe leave Mr. Kent,
as a professional istorian, ntirely ree to speak) to say to
him:
There could
be no more dangerous
rror.The
supplyof
skills you have in
mind is
hopelessly nadequate
and, failing
drastic
national ction-for
example, newManhattan
Project,
but thistime
n
the
social
sciences-to increase t, will
remain
hopelessly
nadequate
throughout hepredictable
uture. t is
inadequate in two senses: We
are, and
are likelyto remain,
unable
to
release
ny significant
umber
f men
to government
intelligence ithoutwreckinghe eaching rograms ponwhich
the
future upply of such men
must
depend;
and
we
have
grave
misgivings-the conomists erhaps
ess than
the restof
us,
but the economists
lso-about
the
ability
of our
sciences
to
supply
the
sort
of
knowledgewhich,
n
Mr.
Kent's
phrase,
our
highly laced
civilians
nd
militarymen must have.
It
is,
in
fine,
not a
state
of mind which
s
likely
o
produce
thebook all
of us have been
waiting
or
omeone o
write ince,twenty-sevenearsago,Mr. Lippmann'sPublic Opinionfirst
directedour
attention
o those
pictures
n
decision-makers'
heads-and to
the
possibility
f our
deliberately
nfluencing
their
ccuracy.
Nor is it a
stateof
mind
ikely
o
produce
ven
a
small
part
of
the
book thatwould deal
with he
government's
own high-level
oreign ositiventelligence. ut
the
publica-
tion of
Strategicntelligence
may
well
make
more
possible
he
writingf thesetwo other ritically eededworks.