Strangers in the City:The Hulkou and Urban Citizenship in

China

PETER W. MACKENZIE

"Even as 171igr-an1ts hukou statuis excliides then firom1 many of theentitlements provided by the state, they also e?ijoy greater autonomy

firom1 state control than1 anyv other gr-ouip within Chin1ese society.

O n National Day (I October) 2001, China's government an-nounced that it would ease the restrictions of the hu]cou, or

houselholcd registration system, and that it planned to abolish thesystem witlhin five years. The hlukou, which binds Chinese peo-ple to their places of birth, may be reasonably described as thebroadest experiment in population control in human history. Itsabolition would indelibly affect the lives of hundreds of millionsof Chinese peasants vlvose exclusion from China's economicboom has led them to seek better opportunities in the cities.

The hukou, introduced during the first decade of the Peo-ple's Republic of Chinla, institutionalizes the denial of basicrights and services to China's so-called floating population of150 millioni rural-to-urban migrant laborers. Under the hukousystem, rural migrants in the cities are forbidden to own land,barred from the most promising jobs and unable to access thesubsidized education and medical care to whiclh urban residentsare entitled. Although the abundant and cheap labor providedby migrants has fueled the dizzyingly rapid growth of China'surban economy, these migrants remain adrift between the pov-erty of rural existence and the unattainable privileges of urbancitizenslhip. They are a class of strangers in the city, largely in-

Journ1al of lnternational Affrnirs, Fall 2002, vol. 56, no. 1. D The Trustees ofColumbia University in the City of New York.

Peter Mackenzie

visible to city planners and often disdained by permanent resi-dents. To integrate these outsiders into China's urban citizenrywithout unleashing new threats to stability is one of the greatestchallenges a new generation of Chinese leaders will face.

YEARS OF CONTROLBefore the implementation in 1953 of China's first five-yeareconomic plan, Chinese citizens were allowed to travel andchange their residence freely, provided they registered the movewith the Public Security Bureau.' This registration system wasused chiefly to monitor changes in population distribution, andthe state made little attempt to stem the movement of laborfrom the countryside to the city. With the development in theearly 1950s of labor-intensive heavy industries, 30 million rurallaborers poured into the cities to find employment, causingChina's urban population to leap from 10.64 percent of the totalin 1949 to 18.41 in 1959.2

In the mid-1950s, China's leaders, seeling to harness thispopulation flow and direct it toward key industrial targets, be-gan to explore more ambitious prerogatives for the registrationsystem. Social scientist Dorothy Solinger traces this develop-ment to the Marxist ideal among China's revolutionary genera-tion of "lock[ing] onto the land a potential underclass, ready tobe exploited to fulfill the new state's cherished project of indus-trialization." Rural people would form an "industrial reservearmy" that could be called up whenever needed for c6nstructionor industrial initiatives.3

In 1955, a State Council directive formulated a preliminaryhousehold registration system, including ornate procedures bywhich citizens would be required to apply for permission to mi-grate.4 However, enforcement mechanisms did not exist until1958, when a law passed by the National People's Congress for-bade anyone without a valid urban registration to buy food orgrain in the city.5 This law effectively would have cut off rural-to-urban migration had it not been passed in the same year thatChairman Mao Tse-tung inaugurated the Great Leap Forward, a

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massive push toward industrialization whose failure resulted inthe deaths by starvation of 30 million Chinese.'

In 1959 and 1960, to fuel the Great Leap's massive expan-sioIn of urban inclustry, residence restrictions were suspendedand state firms recruited 19 million rural workers.' When theGreat Leap failed, millions more fled to the cities to escape star-vation. Flowever, the cities were themselves battling food short-ages, anid the governimienlt sooIn became aware that it would notbe able to feecl suchi a large urban population. The urban prole-tariat on whiclh China based its socialist economy would have tobe protected while the peasants would have to fend for them-selves. Between 1961 and 1963, 50 million rural migrants weredeported from the cities to the countryside, and the h1ukou wentinlto full effect.8

The h/ukou comes in two varieties: agricultural and non-agricultural, distributed respectively to rural and urban citizens.In the Mao years, a non-agricultural lu](kou was issued to eachurban houselholcl, but in the countiyside only one registrationbooklet was issued to each cooperative, binding peasants notjust to their families but to entire rural social units.9 Citizens inMao's China were not allowed to change an agricultural 17ukouinlto a noni-agricultural one, except wheni given new official workassignmlents or ordered to move. Migration within Chinla duringthe I 960s and I 970s occurred primarily in response to recruit-menit by urbani labor departments for state-initiated projects."'In this period, the houselhold registration policy was rigidly en-forced, anld those who attempted to migrate without authoriza-tion were harassed by police, met with blockades and forciblydeported. ''

In 1977, a State Council document added further restric-tions, barring even rural inhabitants who married city-dwellersfrom movinig to cities and stipulating that the hukou be allo-cated to children according to their mothers' status, thus forbid-ding a chilcl witlh an agricultural hulkou from living witlh a city-registered father.'2

The h1ukou system met with remarkable success in the firsttwo decadles of its existence, virtually ending all spontaneous

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movement within the world's most populous country. This suc-cess should not be attributed solely to the legal power of the hu-]cou itself but rather to the strict system of rationing that com-plemented it. In Mao-era cities, basic staples such as grain, cot-ton, cooling oil, milk, sugar and meat could only be bought instate-run markets using rationing certificates, which were unat-tainable to those without a non-agricultural hulcou. 3̀ Further-more, nearly all urban employment was assigned by the statelabor bureau, which -was authorized to allocate jobs only to offi-cial city residents.'4 Urban residents' danwei, or work units, pro-vided all city housing. As a result, the only existence available toa rural migrant in a Chinese city was that of a homeless, unem-ployed beggar, a prospect that kcept most peasants in their placedespite their often-miserable existence in the countryside.

However, it was also the state's reliance on the denial of ne-cessities to enforce the hulcou that crippled the system's effec-tiveness when economic reforms were introduced. These reformsalso created intense pressures for peasant mobility into citiesand towns, leading inexorably to the hulcou's demise.

YEARS OF REFORM

Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, broad economic reformswere introduced, dismantling many of the mechanisms of stateplanning and social control that had existed under Mao. In1979, the communes that had dominated rural life since the1 950s were disbanded, and a "household contract responsibility"systerni was established, whereby farming was done at the house-hold rather than the collective level and farmers were allowed tokeep or sell a certain portion of their produce on the free mar-ket. With the commune system gone and incentives introducedfor farmers to produce and sell more, agricultural efficiency in-creased and the demand for labor dropped. At the same time,peasants were allowed to engage in other forms of economic ac-tivity, and township and village enterprises (TVEs) emerged,creating 57 million jobs between 1978 and 1986.'5

In the early 1990s, with harvests growing at an astoundingrate and China beginning to buy grain on the international mar-

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ket, the government decided that the food supply had stabilizedand did away with its system of rationing."6 In the cities, restric-tions forbidding private enterprise were loosened. Free marketsfor food and consumer goods once again emerged, and foreignbusinesses were encouraged to invest in Chiina. Furthermore,both state and noni-state enterprises were allowed to retain aportion of their earninlgs, creating an incentive system that ledto the rapid economic growth of China's coastal cities in the1980s and 1990s.

An unintended consequence of these reforms was that theyremlloved the h1ukSou system's most effective control devices.Suddenly, it was possible for peasants to enter the cities, findjobs and buy food on the free market. Two other trends wrouglhtfundamiienital chaniges on the lives of the Chinese peasantry.First, the rural labor supply increased from 1 80 million in 1 950to over 400 million in 1988. Second, soil deterioration, pollu-tion, loss of farmland to incdustry and desertification caused ar-able land to decrease dramiiatically. The net effect was that arableland per capita fell by more than 50 percent between 1949 and1992, when it stood at only 22 percent of the world average."More farmers were working less land, using techniques that re-quired less labor. As of the late 1990s, rural surplus laborerswere estimated to number about 200 million."8

Meanwhile, in the cities, various pull factors were emerging.Rapidly expanding urban economies created millions of jobs,many of whlichi were in labor-intensive sectors such as manufac-turing and construction. The appearance of private enterprisesand foreign investmiienit, along with the increasing freedom ofurban workers to choose their own careers, led many urbanitesto pursue opportunities in promising new fields and to reject thelow-skilled, dirty and moniotonous jobs that were rapidly becom-ing available. Competitive firms, unable to fill their labor de-manid with urban workers, recognized the benefits of employingmigrant workers, who were willing to take jobs that their citycousins eschewed and to work for low pay and few benefits.

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A NATION OF MILLIONS AFLOATChanges in the rural and urban labor markets led to the emer-gence of a floating population of rural Chinese who poured intothe cities to look for work in the 1980s and 1990s. Estimates ofthe size of the floating population in the mid-1990s put it atabout 100 million, roughly equivalent to the population of Mex-ico.19 Recent estimates have been closer to 150 million.

Urban officials responsible for maintaining and enforcing thehukou system were overwhelmed by this tsunami of peasantsentering their jurisdictions, and their responses were inconsis-tent and in many cases ambivalent. Genuine concerns emergedthat the influx of migrants made China's cities more chaotic andless safe. According to the Ministry of Public Security, the crimerate in China increased by 6 percent during the 1990s, and seri-ous crimes increased by 18 percent. Shanghai's Municipal PoliceDepartment has reported that migrants commit more than 70percent of thefts in the city.20 However, urban officials under-stood that urban economic growth had become dependent onthese migrants. Political scientist Cheng Li quotes a Guangdongprovincial labor official as saying: "If the migrant workers arestopped, there would be at least a stagnation in the coastal areas.At worst, the economy of the coastal areas would collapse, caus-ing the national economy to collapse."'"

In addition, many urban officials have engaged in rent-seeling behavior with regard to migrant laborers. Numerous cit-ies and towns began to sell urban hulcou to rural laborers in theearly 1990s, ostensibly to raise money for infrastructure pro-jects. Sales of hulcou continued to proliferate through the 1990sdespite regulations against the practice introduced by the StateCouncil and the Ministry of Public Security in 1988 and 1992.It is estimated that by 1994, local governments nationwidereaped revenues of RMB25 billion (US$5.3 billion) and sold 3million hulcou.2 2 In the 1990s, Shanghai entered the luxury hu-lcou business, offering a special "blue seal" hulcou to any migrantwho invested over US$200,000 in Shanghai'or bought morethan 100 square meters of residential property.2 3

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Some urban departments, such as those of transportationand public security, were unable to talke advantage of such rent-seeking opportunities. These departments, overburdened by therapidly increasing urban population, persisted in calling forstricter enforcement of htukou regulations. In 1995, a Ministryof Public Security official warned, "If we let go completely, i.e.,give a green light to the free choice of employment, [to a] blindand disorclerly flow of population, and [to] free migration withinthe country, we will see notlhing but chaos."2 4

Througlhout the reform period migrants were periodicallyrouLnded tip and sent back to the countryside, although never onthe scale of the Mao years. During the recession of 1 990, citiessuch as Beijing and Tianjin expelled thousands of migrants.25 In1995, the Beijing government destroyed more than twenty mi-grant shantytowns.2" In 1 999, as the People's Republic of Chinaprepared to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of its founding,tens of thousanids of migrants were rounded up in major citiesand placed in detention centers or expelled to the countryside. 2 7

Despite these sporadic attempts to purge China's cities of mi-grants, most returned in a matter of days or weeks.

As the impossibility of fully enforcing the hiukou becameclear, Chinla's govern-ment eased some restrictions. In 1984, theState Council allowed peasants to move to 60,000 market towns(below the level of county seat) and receive a non-agriculturalh1ukou. This new htukou allowed them to find housing and startbusinesses in towni but required that they provide their owngrain rather than using the rationing system. Another landmarkreform occurred in 1985 with the issuance of a national Resi-dent Identificationi Card to all citizens above 1 6, which allowedChinlese citizens to identify and register themselves separatelyfrom any houselhold or collective.28

The same year, the Ministry of Public Security introduced"PProvisionial Regulations on the Management of Population Liv-ing Temporarily in the Cities," which allowed peasants whoworlked in the cities for three montlhs or more to obtain tempo-rary residence permits.2 1 In the late 1990s, the State Councilissued a series of regulations on the employment of temporary

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migrants in state-owned enterprises, even recommending in1988 that poor provinces export their labor. 0 The new regula-tions of the 1980s merely reflected the state's belated recogni-tion of an incontrovertible reality: that non-registered migrantlabor was becoming a permanent feature of the urban landscape.However, despite their less-restricted status, these migrants con-tinued to face violations of their basic rights.

TOGETHER BUT UNEQUALAlthough the "great wall" of the pre-reform years between urbanand rural China no longer exists, profound divisions remain. Ru-ral migrants do not face the same barriers to employment, foodand housing as before, but the removal of these barriers hasmerely provided them a second-class form of urban citizenship,allowing them no entitlement to housing, education, medicalcare or employment.

Migrants are not allowed to acquire property, build houses oreven occupy land in the cities and are only permitted to rentrooms from official residents or use those provided by a workunit.3 ' A 1995 survey of employed migrants in Shanghai foundthat about half of them rented rooms, one-quarter lived in dor-mitories, and one-fifth slept in shelters at their place of work.32

Many others were homeless, sleeping in alleys, vacant lots or thewaiting areas of train stations. Others set up illicit shantytownson the edges of cities, precarious dwellings that were frequentlytorn down by the police.33

Children whose mothers do not have an urban hulou are notentitled to a free public education. Migrants may pay the city toallow their children to attend school, but for most, this is not afeasible option. Tuition can cost hundreds of dollars per year,and many migrant parents make less than $100 a month.3 4 As aresult, while virtually 100 percent of city-born children age fiveto twelve were attending school in 1995, only 40 percent of mi-grant children were enrolled.3 5

As funding for China's urban health care system continues tobe linked to the official urban population level, the floatingpopulation lacks access to the cities' hospitals, doctors and

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pharmacies. One consequence is that many migrants are notimmunized against infectious diseases, so worksites and livingareas populated by migrants are susceptible to frequent epidem-ics. Only those fortunate enough to land jobs with state-ownedenterprises are likely to have any form of health coverage. 6

The migrants' lack of an urban hukou also places strict limitson the type of labor they may perform. As late as 1998, Beijing'smunicipal government issued regulations outlining 40 types ofprofessions that would be forbidden to hire migrants.3 7 As a re-sult, migrants are relegated to low-skilled, low-paying jobs thaturban workers no longer want.

Faced witlh limited job prospects as well as the denial of basicrights and services and with little chance of assistance or protec-tion from municipal governments, these second-class citizenshave had to fend for themselves. The ways in which they haveclone so say much about the limitations of the state in contem-porary China.

TI-lE VILLAGE Tl-AT WASN'r THEREZhejianig village is located in Fengtai district, far from the centerof Beijing. It is not really a village at all but rather a sub-city ofmore thani 100,000 migrants, mostly from Zhejiang province.3 8

Withinl Zhejiang village may be found Beijing's largest clothingmarket, where over US$600,000 changes hands every day inmore than 10,000 stalls. The village's household garment facto-ries, whichi had sales of RMB 1.5 billion (more than US$180 mil-lion) in 1995, are the main supply base of inexpensive clothesfor merchants in Beijing and the rest of northern China.39 In thevillage, one may also find hospitals and primary schools as wellas scores of dayuan ('big yard" residential compounds) thathouse tens of thousands of people, with their own water, elec-tricity, postal and sewage systems."

Hlowever, in most official senses, Zhejiang village does notexist. It is not an officially incorporated entity, virtually all of itsresidents lack an urban hUkou, its doctors and teachers are unli-censed and none of the services mentioned above come from thegovernment, wlhiclh has refused to provide them. Its migrant

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founders managed to get around the prohibition on migrant landownership by negotiating land-use contracts with local produc-tion teams.41

By 1995, the central and municipal governments had grownwary of the economic and social autonomy of Zhejiang villagefrom the state and ordered Fengtai district officials to demolishthe dayuan. The district government refused to comply, notwishing to disrupt a community that provided some 40 percentof Fengtai's revenues.4 2 Eventually, the city government tookmatters into its own hands, tearing down many of the dayuanand leaving countless people homeless. Within several months,however, most of those who had been expelled had returned torebuild.4 3

The experience of Zhejiang village shows that, even as mi-grants' hukou status excludes them from many of the entitle-ments provided by the state, they also enjoy greater autonomyfrom state control than any other group within Chinese society.Although it is the largest and most successful of its kind, Zheji-ang village is not unique. Other self-sustaining migrant enclavescan be found in most of China's largest cities. In these enclaves,there are no neighborhood associations, which normally performsurveillance of urban residents, and residents do not have dan-wei (work unit) to monitor their workplace behavior, allocatehousing and plan the timing of their marriages and pregnancies.The denial of full citizenship to migrants allows them an exis-tence largely independent of the state, and this empowermentmakes many in Beijing uneasy.

DEATH OF THE HUKOC?In October 2001, the Chinese government announced that mi-grants with stable employment and homes would be permittedto apply for urban hulkou in 20,000 towns and smaller cities.44

The government also indicated that it would seek to dismantlethe hulcou system altogether within five years. 45 Earlier in 2001,the State Planning Commission announced its intention to cre-ate an employment registration system, which would assign asocial security number, a personal salary account and a social

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security account to all Chinese citizens. Many observers see thisas a possible replacement for the hulcou as a means of keepingtrack of the population." By the end of 2001, the provinces ofJilin, Hunan, Guangdong and Fujian claimed to have in place a"unified urban-rural houselhold registration system" and to havedone away with the distinction between the agricultural andnon-agricultural h1ukou.47

Regardless of these encouraging announcements, reports ofthe h7ukou's death are probably somewhat exaggerated. Theprocess of dismantling the system will likely be difficult and willbe met with opposition every step of the way by powerful stake-holders, including: urban residents wary of having their entitle-ments diluted; local governments whose rent-seeking behaviorhas turned the Iiukoou into a lucrative commodity; public secu-rity personnel who fear the resulting influx of migrants willhamiiiper public order and even threaten to destabilize the gov-ernmllenit; and private business people whose exploitative laborpractices are facilitated by the hukou.

While state media report that the huukou reforms are beingeffectively implemiienited, some local governments have sought to-e-initerpret the new policy to suit their needs and concerns. InShijiazhuang, Hebei Province, for example, officials have stipu-lated a number of criteria for permanent residence, includingoutside investmiienit and educational and professional qualifica-tions." In addition, a Catch-22 has emerged in some citieswhereby migranits must be employed to qualify for permanentresidence, but businesses consider permanent residence a pre-requisite for employmiienit.

Furthermore, the government could not have picked a lessopportune time to execute this reform. China's economy has suf-fered a pronounced retrenchmenit in recent years and may beheading for recessioni. In addition, much of the state-owned en-terprise (SOE) sector is in critical condition. In April 2002,China's Vice-Minister of Labor announced that SOEs had laidoff 25.5 million workers since 1998 and predicted that the ranksof the urban unemployed could swell to 20 million within thenext four years.4' Additionally, upon entering the World Trade

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Organization, China will be required to slash agricultural subsi-dies and open the market to foreign competition, which is likelyto drive many farmers out of business, increasing the ranks ofsurplus rural laborers.

New migrants to the cities will find an extremely tight jobmarlket in which they w'ill compete with millions of laid-offworkers, whom local officials will be inclined to re-employ beforegiving jobs to migrants. No longer able to deny the privileges ofurban residency to migrants, many city governments that arealready running steep deficits will have to increase funding forservices such as education, health care and public security. Thetough spending choices that ensue may cause resentment amonglong-term city residents, and widespread unrest is a possible out-come.

Despite these unfavorable consequences, there will be posi-tive economic effects as well. The introduction of a free marketfor labor will allow companies with enormous growth potential,including those in the underdeveloped service industry, to hirecheap workers who were previously off-limits. New possibilitiesfor upward mobility will also unleash the creativity and entre-preneurship of many migrants. In addition, migrants who madetheir fortunes during the reform years, such as the garment fac-tory owners in Zhejiang village, will be free to buy property forthe first time, expand their businesses and make long-term in-vestments as they see fit, which should free up a great deal ofmuch-needed capital.

Nevertheless, merely doing away with the hukou system willnot be enough to cure the economic and social problems mani-fested by the floating population. In order to encourage bal-anced development, the government will also need to introducepolicies to reduce the income gap between the city and thecountryside, to limit urban sprawl and increase cities' capacity toabsorb migrants and to facilitate the mobility of investment tothe interior of the country.

Over the past decade, Chinese policymakers have formed aconsensus that the flow of migrants should be redirected towardsmaller towns and cities. Whereas China's coastal cities are be-

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coming so large as to be nearly unmanageable, thousands of

smaller cities and toWnls farther inland hold great possibilities for

expansioni. The government should enlarge these cities and ex-

pand affordable housing facilities to increase their ability to

handle large numbers of migrants. It should also introduce pow-

erful incentives for domestic and foreign enterprises to move

their operations inland. This cannot succeed, however, unless

Chinia improves its insufficient transportation infrastructure. As

of 1 998, Chinia's highiway system was only one-fifth the size of

India's, and the total capacity of all forms of transportation in

Chinia (roads, rail, air, water and pipeline) was less thani half that

of the US highway system alone circa 1938.50 Without the abil-

ity to transport goods efficiently between the interior and the

coast, few will invest in smaller inland cities. State investment in

Chinia's transportation infrastructure would not only reduce re-

gional inequality, it would also provide construction jobs for mil-

lions of surplus laborers and unemployed urbanites.Chinia should also attempt to counteract the major puslh fac-

tors that send peasants to the cities. Quality of life in the coun-

tryside is marred by a lack of promising economic opportunities

as wvell as the absence of higi-quality health care and education,not to mentioni the rampant corruption of local officials impos-

ing exorbitant taxes and fees. The government should supply

more capital and growth assistance to the TVEs and should seek

to increase the accountability of local governments by introduc-ing elections at the township and county levels, clamping down

on illegally imposed fees, reducing farmers' tax burden and es-

tablishinig more effective and independent anti-corruptionmechanisms.

The looming demise of the hukotu holds a great deal of un-

certainty withi regard to social stability. However, it also holds

possibilities for greater freedom of movement within China,

more versatile labor markets and even some modicum of equal-

ity for all Chinese citizens. If the incoming fourth generation ofChinese leaders can competently manage this transition, they

wvill have removed one of the largest remaining obstacles to

Chinia's continued growth and reform. X

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Notes

'Gabe T. Wang, China's Population: Problems, Thoughts and Policies (Brook-field, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999) p. 139.2 Wang Feng, "The Breakdown of a Great Wall: Recent Changes in theHousehold Registration System of China," in Floating Population and Migra-tion in China, ed. Thomas Scharping (Hamburg: Institut fur Asienkunde,1997) pp. 150-1.I Dorothy Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China (Berkeley: Univer-sity of California Press, 1999) p. 27.4 Ibid., pp. 43-44.5 Ibid., p. 44.'Judith Banister, "China: Internal and Regional Migration Trends," in FloatingPopulation and Migration in China, p. 72.7 Wang Feng, p. 152.8 Solinger, p. 41.9 Wang Feng, p. 151.1' IKam Wing Chan, "Internal Migration in China: A Dualistic Approach," inInternal and International Migration, eds. Frank N. Pieke and Hein Mallee(Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1999) p. 51." Bannister, p. 73.12 Wang Feng, p. 152.13 Cheng Li, "Surplus Rural Laborers and Internal Migration in China," in Mi-gration in China, ed. Borge Bakken (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of AsianStudies, 1998) p. 56.4 Wang Feng, p. 150.

15 Jean Oi, Rural China Talces Off (Berkeley: University of California Press,1999) p'. 1.16 Wang Feng, p. 160.7 Cheng Li, "200 Mouths Too Many: China's Surplus Rural Labor," TheChina Reader: The Reform Era, eds. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh(New York: Vintage, 1999) pp. 365-6.18 Li, "Surplus Rural Laborers," p. 31.19 Tim Oakes, "China's Market Reforms: Whose Human Rights Problem?" inChina Beyond the Headlines, eds. Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) p. 295.20 Jinhong Ding and Norman Stockman "The Floating Population and the In-tegration of the City Community," in Internal and International Migration,pp. 125-6.21 Cheng Li, "Surplus Rural Laborers, p. 57.22 Solinger, Contesting Citizenship, p. 90. Exchange rate used is US$1 toRMB5.87, the existing rate before an early-1994 RMB devaluation of US$1 toRMB8.7.2 3 Wang Feng, p. 161.

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"I Solinger, Contesting Citizenshil, p. 69.25 Ibid.

2f Li Zhang, "Tlhe Interplay of Gencder, Space, and Work in China's FloatingPopulation," in Re-Diruviving Bounclaries: Work, Households, and Gencler in

Clhina. eds. Barbara Entwisle and Gail I-lenderson (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2000) p. 180.27 Erik Eckcholimi, "As Beijing Plretties Up, Migrants Face Exptilsion," Neil, YorkTime.s, 1 8 April 1999, p. 6.

2 Wang Feing, pp. 156-8.Dorothy Soliniger, "Chinia's Floating Population," in Tle Paradox of China 's

Plost-Xao Reforms. ecs. Merle Goldman ancl Roderick, MacFarcluar (Cam-bridge, MA: -larvard University Press, 1999) p. 224.3" Ibil.Il Li Zhang, p. 185.32 Solinger, ''Clhinal's Floating Population," p. 234.5- Shai Oster, "China's Migrant Schools Skirt Law," Christian Science Moni-to'; 3 April 2000, P. 6.51 Erik Ecklholm, "For China's Rural Migrants, an Educational Wall," Newi,York Timen, 12 December 1999, P. Al.3 Solinger, Contesting Citi7enship, p. 266.

lb' Ibid., pp1 263-4.17 Jasper Becker, "Beijing's Plan to Expel Half the Floating Population NextYear Angers Righits Activists," Souith China Aloirning Post, I November 1998,

p. 6.3 Li Zhang, p 173.5 Xiang Biao, -'Zhejiang Village' in Beijing," in Internal and Internmational Mi-

4,'ration, p. 216.411 Ibid., P 230." Li Zhang, p. 185.-12 Oakes, p. 295.43 Li Zhang, P. 173.4' 1-lenlry Clhu, "China's Major Cities Withhiolcd the Welcome Mat for Villag-ers," Los An /eles Time.s 5 December 2001, P. Al 7.4$ Frank Chinig, "Market Econiomy Swveeping Awvay l-lukou System," BusinessTimes Sin ga;lpore, 30 October 200 I.46"Breaking the Shackles," South Chlina Morniing Post, 1 8 August 2001 , p. 15.47 Reninili Gongan 13, Bao, 16 January 2001148 Bcijint,q Qintqnian Bao, 25 February 2002.

4" Mark O'Neill, "Chinia Warns of 20 Million Urban Jobless," South China

Morniingt, Plost, 30 April 2002.5" Chenig Li, "Surplus Rural Laborers," pp. 58-9.

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TITLE: Strangers in the City: The Hukou and Urban Citizenshipin China

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