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131503cv
Shermanv.TownofChester
In the
United States Court of AppealsFor the Second Circuit
AugustTerm,2013
No.131503cv
NANCYJ.SHERMAN,
PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
TOWNOFCHESTER,
DefendantAppellee.*
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.No.12cv647 EdgardoRamos,Judge.
ARGUED:MARCH18,2014
DECIDED:MAY16,2014
Before:STRAUB,
SACK,
and
LOHIER,
Circuit
Judges.
*TheClerkofCourtisdirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptionofthiscaseto
conformtothelistingofthepartiesshownabove.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
2
AppealfromanorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor
theSouthern
District
ofNew
York
(Edgardo
Ramos,
Judge)
granting
defendantTownofChestersmotiontodismissplaintiffStevenM.
Shermanscomplaint.
WeholdthatShermanstakingsclaimwasripeunder
WilliamsonCountyRegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankof
JohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985). Seekingafinaldecisionfromthe
TownwouldbefutilebecausetheTownusedunfairandrepetitive
procedurestoavoidafinaldecision. Additionally,thestate
proceduresprongofWilliamsonCountyissatisfiedbecausethe
Townremoved
the
case
from
state
court.
Sherman
also
adequately
allegedataking. Accordingly,weREVERSEthatpartoftheDistrict
CourtsdecisionthatdismissedShermanstakingsclaim.
WeVACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodismiss
Shermansfederalnontakingsclaimssolelyonripenessgrounds
andtodeclinetoexercisesupplementaljurisdictionoverShermans
stateclawclaims. Finally,weAFFIRMtheDistrictCourtsdecision
todismisscertainclaimsonthemerits.
MICHAELD.DIEDERICH,JR.StonyPoint,NY,for
NancyJ.Sherman.
ANTHONYCARDOSO(StevenC.Sternonbrief),
SokoloffSternLLP,CarlePlace,NY,forTownof
Chester
J.DavidBreemer,PacificLegalFoundation,
Sacramento,CA,
foramicuscuriaePacificLegal
Foundationinsupportofappellant.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
3
STRAUB,CircuitJudge:
Hungry
Joe
packed
up
his
bags
and
wrote
happy
letters
home.
Hehadflownthe25missionsrequiredtocompleteatourofduty.
ButthingswerenotsosimpleonCatch22sPianosaisland.Hesoon
discoveredthatColonelCathcarthadjustraisedthenumberof
missionsto30,forcingHungryJoetounpackhisbagsandrewrite
hishappyletters. Atthetime,Yossarianhadflown23missions.
TheColonellaterincreasedthenumberto35.When
Yossarianwasjustthreeawayfromthatmark,thenumberwas
increasedto40,andthento45.WhenYossarianhad44missions
underhis
belt,
the
Colonel
made
the
number
50.
And
later
55.
WhenYossarianreached51missions,heknewitwasnocause
tocelebrate: Hellraisethem,Yossarianunderstood.Heappealed
tosquadroncommanderMajorMajortobeexemptedfromflying
hisfourremainingmissions. EverytimeIgetcloseheraisesthem,
Yossariancomplained.MajorMajorresponded,Perhapshewont
thistime. ButofcourseYossarianwasright. ColonelCathcart
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
4
raisedthenumberto60,then65,then70,then80,withnoendin
sight.
PlaintiffStevenM.ShermanmusthavefeltalotlikeYossarian
inhisdecadeofdealingwithdefendantTownofChester. In2000,
Shermanappliedforsubdivisionapprovalwhilehewasinthe
processofbuyinganearly400acrepieceoflandfor$2.7million.
Thatapplicationmarkedthebeginningofhisjourneythroughthe
Townseverchanginglabyrinthofredtape. In2003,theTown
enactedanewzoningordinance,requiringShermantoredrafthis
proposeddevelopmentplan.Whenhecreatedarevisedproposalin
2004,theTownagainenactednewzoningregulations.Whenhe
createdanotherrevisedplanin2005,theTownchangeditszoning
lawsoncemore. Andagainin2006. Andagainin2007.
Ontopoftheshiftingsandsofzoningregulations,theTown
erectedeven
more
hurdles.
Among
other
tactics,
the
Town
announcedamoratoriumondevelopment,replaceditsofficials,and
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
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requiredShermantoresubmitstudiesthathehadalready
completed.When
the
Town
insisted
that
Sherman
pay
$25,000
in
consultantsfeesbeforehecouldobtainahearing,hemighthave
thought,TheColonelwilljustraiseitagain. Andhewouldhave
beenright. Afterpayingthe$25,000,hewastoldheowedan
additional$40,000,andthathewouldalsohavetorespondtoa
lengthyquestionnaire.
Bythetimethislawsuitwasfiled,overtenyearshadpassed.
Inthattime,Shermanbecamefinanciallyexhaustedforcedto
spend$5.5millionontopoftheoriginal$2.7millionpurchase. The
DistrictCourt(EdgardoRamos,Judge)ruledthatShermansclaim
undertheTakingsClausewasnotripeunderWilliamsonCounty
RegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankofJohnsonCity,473
U.S.172(1985),becauseShermanhadnotreceivedafinaldecision
onhis
property
and
seeking
afinal
decision
would
not
be
futile.
The
courtreasonedthatwhileShermanmayhavetojumpthroughmore
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
6
hoopsinthefuture,hehadnotestablishedthathisapplication
woulddefinitely
be
denied
inthe
end.
To
Sherman,
this
must
have
soundedalotlike:Perhapshewontraisethenumberthistime.
Weconcludethatunderthesecircumstances,Shermanwas
notrequiredtoobtainafinaldecisionfromtheTown. Shermans
takingsclaimwasripeandadequatelyalleged. Accordingly,we
REVERSEthatpartoftheDistrictCourtsdecisionthatdismissed
thetakingsclaim,andweREMANDforfurtherproceedings
consistentwiththisopinion.
BACKGROUND
Theallegations
recited
below
are
taken
from
the
complaint,
andweassumetheyaretrueforthepurposesofthisappeal.
Thiscaseconcernsthedecadesworthofredtapeputinplace
bytheTownofChester,itsTownBoard,anditsPlanningBoard.
The
Town
Board
is
the
governing
body
of
the
Town,
and
the
PlanningBoardappearstogiveatleastpreliminaryapprovalto
developmentproposals.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
7
InMarchof2000,ShermanappliedtothePlanningBoardfor
subdivisionapproval
sothat
he
could
use
and
develop
MareBrook.
Theproposedprojectwouldinclude385unitsofhousingaswellas
anequestrianfacility,baseballfield,tenniscourts,clubhouse,on
siterestaurantandagolfcoursethatwovethroughtheproperty.
WhenShermancompletedhispurchaseofthepropertyin2001,it
wasalreadyzonedforresidentialuse. Butsoonthereafter,
Shermanstroublesbegan.
I. TheMoratoriumInJuly2001,theTownBoardannouncedthatitwasimposing
asix
month
moratorium
on
major
subdivision
approvals
retroactive
toMay1,2001. AtleasttwomembersoftheTownBoardexpressed
theviewthattheMoratoriumwasspecificallyaimedatPlaintiffs
MareBrookproject. Shermanwastheonlydeveloperaffectedeven
though
other
projects
were
similarly
situated.
Whenthesixmonthperiodexpired,themoratoriumwas
extended,whichsingularlyaffectedSherman. Duringthe
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
8
extension,Shermanappliedforaminorsubdivisionapprovalthat
waspermitted
under
the
moratorium.
However,
the
Town
still
refusedtoallowShermantopursuetheapplication.
ShermanbroughtsuitagainsttheTowninstatecourt,andasa
resultofthelawsuit,theTownendedthemoratorium,butnotuntil
January2003. Inotherwords,thesixmonthmoratoriumlastedover
ayearandahalf.
II. DraftEnvironmentalImpactStatementandtheFirstZoningChange
InOctober2003,thePlanningBoarddeemedcomplete
ShermansDraftEnvironmentalImpactStatement(DEIS). That
determinationestablishedthatShermansapplicationtotheTown
wassatisfactoryinformandcontent.
In2003,theTownBoardapprovedthefirstinaseriesof
changestoitszoningregulations.WhenShermanlearnedofthe
newrequirementsearlythenextyear,hewasassuredbytheTown
Planner,GarlingAssociates,thathecouldmeetallitsrequirements
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
9
withonlyamodestamountofadditionalworkandthathewould
soonobtain
preliminary
approval.
III. MoreChangestotheZoningRegulationsApproximatelyfivemonthslater,sometimeinlateMayto
earlyJune2004,Shermanfinishedrevisinghisplan. ButtheTown
hadalreadyamendeditszoningregulations. GarlingAssociates,
whichhelpedwritethenewregulations,didnottellShermanabout
thechangeseventhoughitwasadvisingShermanaboutcomplying
withthe2003regulations. Theseamendmentscreatedseveralnew
requirements,furtherdelayingSherman.
Ittook
him
approximately
eleven
months
toonce
again
revise
hisapplication. InMay2005fiveyearsafterhefirstsought
subdivisionapprovalhefinallymetwithsomesuccess. The
PlanningBoardapprovedtheMareBrookproposal. Butthissuccess
was
not
to
last.
The
Town
Board
refused
to
entertain
Shermans
application,despiteholdingmeetingsconcerninganother
development.
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10
Onemonthlater,theTownamendeditszoninglawforathird
timewithout
informing
Sherman
inadvance.
Sherman
revised
his
applicationagain,andinFebruary2006,theTownforthefourth
timechangeditszoninglawwithoutwarningSherman. Sherman
respondedbysubmittingyetanotherrevisedplan,thisoneinMarch
2007. Thatsamemonth,theTownchangeditszoningforthefifth
time,anditonceagaindidnotletShermanknowthesechanges
werecoming.
Fedup,ShermanfiledsuitinfederalcourtinMay2008,a
precursortothecasebeforeusnow.
IV. FurtherObstructionInNovemberandDecemberof2008,Shermanresubmittedhis
MareBrookapplicationandSupplementalDEIS. Bythispoint,over
eightyearshadpassedsinceShermanfirstappliedforsubdivision
approval.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
11
A. TheTownEngineerIn
January
2009,
the
Town
Engineer
gave
Sherman
a
list
of
correctionstothe2008SupplementalDEIS. Aspartofthatlist,the
TownEngineerdemandedfinaldesignsforwaterandsewerplants.
ButShermancouldnotsubmitthefinalwaterandsewerdesigns
untilotheraspectsoftheplanlikethenumberandlocationofthe
homeswerefinalized. That,inturn,requiredpreliminary
approval,whichistheverythinghewastryingtoobtainfromthe
TownEngineer.
Afewmonthslater,theTownappointedanewTown
Engineer.The
new
appointee
needed
time
toget
up
tospeed
on
MareBrook. TheTownbilledShermanfortheexpenseofhavingthe
newTownEngineerreviewtheentireMareBrookproject,even
thoughShermanalreadypaidforthefirstengineertoconductthat
same
review.
The
new
Town
Engineer
had
an
entirely
new
set
of
questions,concerns,anditemsforShermantoaddress. Despitethat,
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
12
fortwoyearsthenewTownEngineermaintainedhispredecessors
requirementregarding
sewer
and
water
plant
designs.
B. TheChairmanInSeptember2009,Shermansubmittedtwodifferentversions
ofhissubdivisionproposal. Bynow,theproposalshadbecome
muchmoreconventionalthanhisfirstapplication,andtheydidnot
includetherecreationalfacilitiesinitiallyenvisioned.
Soonaftersubmittingtheproposals,Shermandiscoveredthat
thePlanningBoardChairmanhadbeenreplaced. Thenew
Chairman,DonSerotta,wasopenlyhostiletowardsthe
MareBrookapplication
and
had
written
letters
tothe
Town
in2001
againsttheproject.
Forthreemonths,thePlanningBoardrefusedwithout
explanationtoputShermansproposalsontheagenda. Thenin
December
2009,
Serotta
explained
that
Sherman
needed
to
pay
$25,000inconsultantsfees. YetShermandidnotreceiveaninvoice
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
13
forthosefeesasrequiredbytheTownCodeforapproximatelytwo
months.
Serottahadotherdemandsaswell.Herequiredanadditional
clusterplan,whichwouldleadtoanotherreworkingofShermans
DEIS. Serottaalsoinsistedthatallroadsmustbetwentyfourfeet
wideinsteadofthirtyfeet. ThisrequiredShermantoredrawhis
planstorelocatecurbs,drainage,waterandsewermains,and
grading.
Later,SerottacanceledShermansappearanceatthePlanning
Boardsmonthlymeetinganddemanded$40,000morein
consultantsfees. ThePlanningBoardalsoinsistedthatSherman
respondtoaquestionnaire,whichrequiredShermantoprovide,
amongotherthings,anevaluationofatrafficintersectioninthe
TownofMonroe(locatedmilesaway)andthedetailsofawetlands
walkingtrail
crossing
that
did
not
cross
any
wetlands.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
14
Shermanwasalsorequiredtoanswerallinquiriesbylocal
residents.Some
answers
tothese
questions
needed
tobe
repeated
twentytofortytimesbecausethePlanningBoarddidnotpermit
himtoquoteapreviousanswer.
C. TheTownPlannerInSeptember2010,thePlanningBoardvotedtoaccept
ShermansDEISascomplete,sevenyearsafterhisoriginalDEISwas
deemedcompleteinOctober2003. Afewmonthslater,TedFink
replacedGarlingAssociatesastheTownPlanner. Finkrequestedan
additionalstudyregardingtrafficontheothersideoftown,even
thoughSherman
had
long
before
completed
that
study.
Fink
also
sentmonthlylistsofdemandstoSherman,whichincludeda
wetlandstudy,aconcertedspeciesstudy,andaconstraints
study. Thenewstudiesconcludedthattherewerenochangessince
those
same
studies
were
completed
in
2003.
Fink
also
required
ShermantoredotheDEISthathadjustbeendeemedcomplete.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
15
V. FinancialLossesandSubsequentDeathThe
Towns
machinations
to
prevent
the
development
of
MareBrookwerenotwithouttheircost. Betweentaxes,interest
charges,carryingcosts,andexpenses,Shermanspentapproximately
$5.5millionontopoftheoriginal$2.7purchaseprice. Asaresult,
Shermanbecamefinanciallyexhaustedtothepointoffacing
foreclosureandpossiblepersonalbankruptcy. Andwhilethecase
waspendingonappeal,Shermandied.NancyJ.Sherman,his
widow,wassubstitutedforhimonappealashispersonal
representative.2
VI. ProceduralHistoryAsalreadymentioned,in2008Shermanfiledsuitagainstthe
Townandotherdefendantsinfederalcourt.Hebroughtmanyof
thesameclaimsthatheraisestoday. TheTownmovedtodismiss,
arguingamongotherthingsthatShermanstakingsclaimwasnot
2NancyShermanwassubstitutedafterthebriefswerefiled. Forthisreason,and
forthesakeofsimplicity,wewillreferonlytoStevenShermanthroughoutthis
opinion.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
16
ripebecausehehadnotsoughtcompensationfromthestate.
Shermanvoluntarily
dismissed
the
case
and
then
filed
the
case
now
beforeusinstatecourt. TheTownremovedtofederalcourt,where
itonceagainmovedtodismissinpartonripenessgrounds.
TheDistrictCourtdismissedsomeofShermansfederal
claimsonthemerits,andmostbecausetheywereunripe. While
acknowledgingitwasaclosecase,theDistrictCourtconcludedthat
Shermanhadfailedtoshowthatseekingafinaldecisionfromthe
Townwouldbefutile.
Shermantimelyappealed.
DISCUSSION
Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsordergrantingamotion
todismissunderRule12(b)(6),acceptingastrueallallegationsinthe
complaintanddrawingallreasonableinferencesinfavorofthe
nonmoving
party.
To
survive
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion
to
dismiss,
the
complaintmustincludeenoughfactstostateaclaimtoreliefthatis
plausibleonitsface. Aclaimwillhavefacialplausibilitywhenthe
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
17
plaintiffpleadsfactualcontentthatallowsthecourttodrawthe
reasonableinference
that
the
defendant
isliable
for
the
misconduct
alleged.Wilsonv.Dantas, F.3d,2014WL866507,at*2(2dCir.
Mar.6,2014)(internalcitationsandquotationmarksomitted).
AlthoughShermanbroughtnumerousfederalandstate
claims,themaindisputeonappealconcernsShermanstakings
claim,whichwasdismissedasunripeunderthefirstprongof
WilliamsonCountyRegionalPlanningCommissionv.HamiltonBankof
JohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985). TheDistrictCourtdismissedmost
oftheotherfederalclaimsforthesamereason,andsomeofthem,in
thealternative,forfailuretostateaclaim. Finally,theDistrictCourt
declinedtoexercisesupplementaljurisdictionoverShermansstate
lawclaims.3
3TheDistrictCourtalsodismissedShermansfreedomofreligionandrightto
associationclaimsasfrivolous. Shermanhasnotchallengedthatrulingon
appeal.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
18
I. TakingsClaimandWilliamsonCountyRipenessWe
evaluate
the
ripeness
of
a
takings
claim
under
the
two
prongtestestablishedbytheSupremeCourtinWilliamsonCounty.
Fortheclaimtoberipe,theplaintiffmustshowthat(1)thestate
regulatoryentityhasrenderedafinaldecisiononthematter,and
(2)theplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationbymeansofan
availablestateprocedure. Doughertyv.TownofN.HempsteadBd.of
ZoningAppeals,282F.3d83,88(2dCir.2002).
BecauseWilliamsonCountyisaprudentialratherthana
jurisdictionalrule,wemaydeterminethatinsomeinstances,the
ruleshould
not
apply
and
we
still
have
the
power
todecide
the
case. Sansottav.TownofNagsHead,724F.3d533,545(4thCir.
2013);seealsoHornev.DeptofAgric.,133S.Ct.2053,2062(2013)
(recognizingthatWilliamsonCountyisnot,strictlyspeaking,
jurisdictional);
Suitum
v.
Tahoe
Regl
Planning
Agency,
520
U.S.
725,
73334(1997)(describingtheWilliamsonCountyprongsastwo
independentprudentialhurdles).
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
19
A. TheFinalDecisionProngSherman
concedes
that
the
Town
has
not
reached
an
official
finaldecision.Hearguesinsteadthathedoesnotneedtomeetthis
requirementbecauseseekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutile.
[T]hefinalityrequirementisnotmechanicallyapplied. A
propertyowner,forexample,willbeexcusedfromobtainingafinal
decisionifpursuinganappealtoazoningboardofappealsor
seekingavariancewouldbefutile. Thatis,apropertyownerneed
notpursuesuchapplicationswhenazoningagencylacksdiscretion
tograntvariancesorhasduginitsheelsandmadeclearthatallsuch
applicationswill
be
denied.
Murphyv.NewMilfordZoningCommn,
402F.3d342,349(2dCir.2005).
Additionally,[g]overnmentauthorities,ofcourse,maynot
burdenpropertybyimpositionofrepetitiveorunfairlanduse
procedures
in
order
to
avoid
a
final
decision.
Palazzolo
v.
Rhode
Island,533U.S.606,621(2001);seealsoMacDonald,Sommer&Fratesv.
YoloCnty.,477U.S.340,350n.7(1986)(Apropertyownerisof
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
20
coursenotrequiredtoresorttopiecemeallitigationorotherwise
unfairprocedures
inorder
toobtain
this
determination.).
Whilethesetwoexceptionstothefinalityrequirement
futilityandunfair/repetitiveproceduresaredistinctconcepts,in
thiscase,theanalysesforthetwoarethesame. Shermanarguesthat
seekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutilebecausetheTownused
andinalllikelihoodwillcontinuetouserepetitiveandunfair
proceduresinordertoavoidafinaldecision.
Thefinaldecisionrequirementfollowsfromtheprinciple
thatonlyaregulationthatgoestoofar,resultsinatakingunderthe
FifthAmendment. Suitum,520U.S.at734(internalcitations
omitted).Normally,[a]courtcannotdeterminewhethera
regulationhasgonetoofarunlessitknowshowfartheregulation
goes.MacDonald,477U.S.at348.However,inthiscase,Sherman
isnot
challenging
any
one
regulation.
Rather,
he
argues
that
the
repeatedzoningchangesandotherroadblockstheprocedurehe
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
21
hadtoendureconstitutedataking. SeeAppellantsBriefat27. A
finaldecision
isnot
necessary
toevaluate
whether
that
obstruction
itselfconstitutedataking.
InDelMonteDunesatMonterey,Ltd.v.CityofMonterey,the
NinthCircuitruledthatseekingafinaldecisionwouldbefutile
undersimilarcircumstances. 920F.2d1496,1506(9thCir.1990). In
thatcase,thepropertyownerssubmittedaproposaltodeveloptheir
propertywith344residentialunits. Id.at1502. Theplanwasdenied
bytheplanningcommission,andthecityplannersstatedthata
proposalwith264unitswouldbereceivedfavorably. Id.Whenthe
ownerssubmittedanew264unitplan,itwasdenied,andthecity
plannersthistimestatedthataproposalwith224unitswouldbe
receivedfavorably. Id.Whentheownerssubmittedanew224unit
plan,itwasdeniedaswell. Id. Thatdecisionwasappealedtothe
citycouncil,
which
referred
the
project
back
tothe
planning
commissionwitharequestthatitconsidera190unitplan. Id. The
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23
everytimeShermansubmittedorwasabouttosubmitaproposal
forMareBrook,
the
Town
changed
itszoning
regulations,
sending
Shermanbacktothedrawingboard. Itretroactivelyissuedasix
monthmoratoriumondevelopmentthatappearstohaveapplied
onlytoShermansproperty. Thatsixmonthmoratoriumwas
extendedforanotheryearuntilafterShermansuedtheTown. Town
officialsalsorepeatedlyaskedShermantoresubmitstudiesand
plansthathadalreadybeenapproved.
TheDistrictCourtadoptedanarrowerviewoffutilitythan
theNinthCircuits:thatwhiletheripenessdoctrinedoesnot
requirelitigantstoengageinfutilegesturessuchastojumpthrough
aseriesofhoops,thelastofwhichiscertaintobeobstructedbya
brickwall,thepresenceofthatbrickwallmustbeallbutcertainfor
thefutilityexceptiontoapply. Shermanv.TownofChester,No.12
Civ.647,
2013
WL
1148922,
at*9(S.D.N.Y.
Mar.
20,
2013)
(internal
alterationomitted). Applyingthatstandardtoourcase,thecourt
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ensuresthatacourtknowshowfararegulationgoesbeforeitis
askedtodetermine
whether
that
regulation
goes
too
far.
Inthis
case,wearenotdealingwithanyoneregulationbuttheTowns
decadeofobstruction. Afinaldecisionisnotnecessarytoevaluate
whetherthatobstructionwasitselfataking.
B. StateProceduresProngUnderthesecondprongofWilliamsonCounty,aplaintiffs
claimisripeonlyiftheplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationby
meansofanavailablestateprocedure. Dougherty,282F.3dat88.
WhileWilliamsonCountypreventsaplaintifffrombringinghis
takingsclaim
infederal
court
before
first
seeking
compensation
from
thestate,itdoesnotprecludestatecourtsfromhearing
simultaneouslyaplaintiffsrequestforcompensationunderstate
lawandtheclaimthat,inthealternative,thedenialofcompensation
would
violate
the
[Takings
Clause
of
the]
Fifth
Amendment
of
the
FederalConstitution. SanRemoHotel,L.P.v.CityandCnty.ofS.F.,
545U.S.323,347(2005). Thisisbecause[r]eadingWilliamson
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
27
Countytoprecludeplaintiffsfromraisingsuchclaimsinthe
alternativewould
erroneously
interpret
[the
Supreme
Courts]
cases
asrequiringpropertyownerstoresorttopiecemeallitigationor
otherwiseunfairprocedures. Id.(quotingMacDonald,477U.S.at
350n.7).
ShermanfirstbroughtsuitagainsttheTowninfederalcourt
in2008. TheTownarguedthatthetakingsclaimwasunripeinpart
becauseShermanhadnotallegedthathesoughtandwasdeniedjust
compensationbyanavailablestateprocedure. Shermanvoluntarily
dismissedthecase,andfollowedSanRemobyfilinghisfederal
takingsclaimandhisstatelawclaimforcompensationinstatecourt.
TheTownthenremovedthecasefromstatecourttofederalcourt,
whereitarguedonceagainthatthetakingsclaimmustbedismissed
becauseitcanbeheardonlyinstatecourtunderWilliamsonCounty.
InSansotta
v.
Town
of
Nags
Head,
724
F.3d
533
(4th
Cir.
2013),
theFourthCircuitconcludedthatwhenthedefendantremovesa
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
28
takingsclaimtofederalcourt,thestateproceduresprongof
WilliamsonCountydoes
not
apply.
We
agree
with
that
courts
reasoningthatrefusingtoapplythestatelitigationrequirementin
thisinstanceensuresthatastateoritspoliticalsubdivisioncannot
manipulatelitigationtodenyaplaintiffaforumforhisclaim. Id.at
545.
TheremovalmaneuverpreventsShermanfromlitigatinghis
federaltakingsclaimuntilhefinisheslitigatinghisstatelawclaim
forcompensation. Inotherwords,itpreventsShermanfrom
pursuingbothclaimssimultaneously,nomatterwhatforumthey
arebroughtin. ThisrunsagainstSanRemo,whichallowsplaintiffs
todojustthat. Inotherwords,theremovaltacticcandeny[]a
plaintiffanyforumforhavinghisclaimheard,oratleastforcethe
plaintiffintothekindofpiecemeallitigationthat,underSanRemo,
cannotbe
required.
See
id.at547.
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
29
Weconcludethatwhenadefendantremovesatakingsclaim
fromstate
court
tofederal
court,
the
second
prong
ofWilliamson
Countyissatisfied. Shermanstakingsclaimisripe,andwemay
addressthemerits.
C. MeritsoftheTakingsClaimThelawrecognizestwospeciesoftakings:physicaltakings
andregulatorytakings. BuffaloTeachersFednv.Tobe,464F.3d362,
374(2dCir.2006). Thiscaseconcernsaregulatorytaking,which
occurswhenthegovernmentactsinaregulatorycapacity. Id.
Thegravamenofaregulatorytakingclaimisthatthestate
regulationgoes
too
far
and
inessence
effects
ataking.
Id.
Regulatorytakingsarefurthersubdividedintocategorical
andnoncategoricaltakings. HuntleighUSACorp.v.UnitedStates,
525F.3d1370,1378n.2(Fed.Cir.2008). Acategoricaltakingoccurs
in
the
extraordinary
circumstance
when
no
productive
or
economicallybeneficialuseoflandispermitted. TahoeSierraPres.
Council,Inc.v.TahoeReglPlanningAgency,535U.S.302,330(2002).
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Anythinglessthanacompleteeliminationofvalue,oratotalloss,
isanon
categorical
taking,
which
isanalyzed
under
the
framework
createdinPennCentralTransportationCo.v.NewYorkCity,438U.S.
104(1978). TahoeSierra,535U.S.at330(internalquotationmarks
omitted).
InTahoeSierra,theSupremeCourtadvisesthreetimesto
resistthetemptationtoadoptwhatamounttoperserulesfor
regulatorytakings. Id.at326;seealsoid.at321,342. Inthatcase,the
Courtaddressedwhethertemporarymoratoriaondevelopment
constitutedataking. Id.at321. Itconcludedthattheanswerwas
neitheryes,alwaysnorno,never. Id. TheCourttherefore
rejectedacategoricaltakinganalysisanddecidedthatissuewas
bestanalyzedwithinthePennCentralframework. Id.
WefollowtheSupremeCourtsguidancetoresistperserules.
Likethe
temporary
moratoria
atissue
inTahoe
Sierra,
evaluating
the
typeofobstructionatissuehereisnotsusceptibletoayesalwaysor
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31
nonevercategoricalapproach.WewillthereforeanalyzeShermans
takingsclaim
within
the
PennCentral
framework.
We
will
then
considertheTownsargumentthattheclaimistimebarred. And
becauseweconcludeunderthenoncategoricalmethodthat
ShermanhasstatedaclaimthattheTowneffectedataking,weneed
notdecidetheissueunderthecategoricalapproach.
1. NonCategoricalTakingandPennCentralThePennCentralanalysisofanoncategoricaltakingrequires
anintensiveadhocinquiryintothecircumstancesofeachparticular
case. BuffaloTeachersFedn,464F.3dat375. Weweighthree
factorstodetermine
whether
the
interference
with
property
rises
to
thelevelofataking:(1)theeconomicimpactoftheregulationonthe
claimant;(2)theextenttowhichtheregulationhasinterferedwith
distinctinvestmentbackedexpectations;and(3)thecharacterofthe
governmental
action.
Id.
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Shermansclaimpassesthistest.
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First,theTownsactionseffectivelypreventedShermanfrom
makingany
economic
use
ofhis
property.
New
studies
were
demandedaftertheywerealreadycompleted;newdeficienciesin
Shermansproposalswerefoundaftertheywerealreadyapproved;
newfeeswererequiredaftertheyhadalreadybeenpaid;andnew
regulationswerecreatedwhenShermancompliedwithwhathad
previouslybeenrequired. BecausetheTownkeptstringinghim
along,Shermancouldneverdevelophisproperty. TheTownwon
itswarofattrition.
Second,theTowninterferedwithShermansreasonable
investmentbackedexpectations,amatterofteninformedbythe
lawinforceintheStateinwhichthepropertyislocated.Ark.Game
&FishCommnv.UnitedStates,133S.Ct.511,522(2012).When
ShermanboughtMareBrook,itwasalreadyzonedforresidential
use.His
reasonable
expectation,
therefore,
was
that
hewould
begin
recoupingthatinvestmentafterareasonabletimetogettheTowns
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approvalonatleastsomeformofdevelopment.Hecouldnothave
expectedthe
Towns
decade
ofobstruction
that
pushed
him
tothe
brinkofbankruptcy.
Thethirdfactorthecharacterofthegovernmentactionis
themostelusive. SeeJohnD.Echeverria,MakingSenseofPenn
Central,23UCLAJ.ENVTL.L.&POLY171,18699(2005)(outlining
ninepossibledefinitionsofcharacter);ThomasW.Merrill,The
CharacteroftheGovernmentalAction,36VT.L.REV.649,66171(2012)
(outliningsixthemesorideasconsideredbycourtswhen
evaluatingcharacter).
InPennCentralitself,theCourtstatedthat[a]takingmay
morereadilybefoundwhentheinterferencewithpropertycanbe
characterizedasaphysicalinvasionbygovernmentthanwhen
interferencearisesfromsomepublicprogramadjustingthebenefits
andburdens
ofeconomic
life
topromote
the
common
good.
438
U.S.at124(internalcitationomitted). Inthiscase,theTowns
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
34
actionsarenotpartofapublicprogramadjustingthebenefitsand
burdensofpublic
life.
Rather,
the
Town
singled
out
Shermans
development,suffocatinghimwithredtapetomakesurehecould
neversucceedindevelopingMareBrook. TheTownsalleged
conductwasunfair,unreasonable,andinbadfaith. Thoughthe
precisecontoursofthecharacterfactormaybeblurry,wecan
neverthelessconcludethattheTownsconductinthiscasefalls
safelywithinitsambit.
BalancingthePennCentralfactors,weconcludethatSherman
statedanoncategoricaltakingsclaim.
2. StatuteofLimitationsTheTownarguesthatShermanstakingsclaimisbarredby42
U.S.C.1983sstatuteoflimitations,whichthepartiesdonot
disputeisthreeyearsinthiscase. SeeOrmistonv.Nelson,117F.3d
69,
71
(2d
Cir.
1997).
According
to
the
Town,
in
evaluating
whether
Shermanstatedaclaim,weshouldhaveconsideredonlywhat
occurredinthethreeyearsbeforethecomplaintwasfiled.
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Butthatargumentwouldmeanthatagovernmententity
couldengage
inconduct
that
would
constitute
ataking
when
viewedinitsentirety,solongasnotakingoccurredoveranythree
yearperiod.Wedonotacceptthis. TheTownusedextremedelay
toeffectataking. ItwouldbeperversetoallowtheTowntousethat
samedelaytoescapeliability.
TheonlywayplaintiffsinShermanspositioncanvindicate
theSupremeCourtsadmonitioninPalazzolothatgovernment
authoritiesmaynotburdenpropertybyimpositionofrepetitiveor
unfairlanduseproceduresistoallowtothemaggregateactsthat
arenotindividuallyactionable. See533U.S.at621. Aclaimbased
onsuchadeathbyathousandcutstheoryrequiresacourtto
considertheentiretyofthegovernmententitysconduct,notjusta
sliceofit.
Infact,
insupport
ofthe
prohibition
on
repetitive
and
unfair
procedures,theSupremeCourtcitedacasemuchliketheonebefore
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36
us:Montereyv.DelMonteDunesatMonterey,Ltd.,526U.S.687(1999).
Thatcase,
already
described
above
inmore
detail,
involved
nineteen
differentsiteplansandfiveformaldecisionsoverfiveyears. Id.at
698. Cityplannerskeptdemandingproposalswithfewerresidential
unitsafterthepropertyownerscompliedwiththepreviousdemand.
Id.at69598;seealsoTahoeSierra,535U.S.at33334(citingDelMonte
Dunesandsuggestingthatdelayinbadfaithcouldsupportatakings
claim).
InNationalRailroadPassengerCorp.v.Morgan,theSupreme
Courtallowedhostileworkenvironmentclaimstosimilarlybe
evaluatedintheirentirety. 536U.S.101(2002). Inthatsituation,the
unlawfulemploymentpractice...cannotbesaidtooccuronany
particularday. Itoccursoveraseriesofdaysorperhapsyears....
Id.at115(internalquotationmarksomitted). Andeachactthat
makesup
the
unlawful
conduct
islikely
not
actionable
on
itsown.
Id. Asaresult,theSupremeCourtconcluded,hostilework
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37
environmentclaimsaretimelysolongasanactcontributingtothat
hostileenvironment
takes
place
within
the
statutory
time
period.
Id.at105.
Althoughthiswayofapplyingastatuteoflimitationsis
generallyusedintheemploymentdiscriminationcontext,wehave
notlimitedittothatareaalone. SeeShomov.CityofNewYork,579
F.3d176,18182(2dCir.2009)(concludingthatthecontinuing
violationdoctrinecanapplytoEighthAmendmentdeliberate
indifferenceclaims);seealsoFahsConstr.Grp.,Inc.v.Gray,725F.3d
289,292(2dCir.2013)(percuriam)(concludingthatforEqual
Protectionclaimsbroughtunder1983,[w]hereaplaintiff
challengesacontinuouspracticeandpolicyofdiscrimination...the
commencementofthestatuteoflimitationsperiodmaybedelayed
untilthelastdiscriminatoryactinfurtheranceofit(internal
quotationmarks
omitted)).
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38
Here,Shermansclaimisbasedonanunusualseriesof
regulationsand
tactical
maneuvers
that
constitutes
ataking
when
consideredtogether,eventhoughnosinglecomponentis
unconstitutionalwhenconsideredinisolation. Asinthecontextof
thecasesdescribedabove,itcannotbesaidthatShermansproperty
wastakenonanyparticularday. ButbecauseShermanalleges
thatatleastoneoftheactscomprisingthetakingoccurredwithin
threeyearsoffilingthecase,hisclaimisnottimebarred.We
thereforeneednotreachtheissueofwhetherthelimitationsperiod
istolledunder28U.S.C1367(d).
II. OtherFederalClaimsTheDistrictCourtruledthatotherfederalclaimswereunripe
forthesamereasonitconcludedShermanstakingsclaimwas
unripe. BecausewehavedeterminedthatShermanstakingsclaim
was,
in
fact,
ripe,
the
District
Courts
ruling
can
no
longer
stand.
Therefore,forthefederalnontakingsclaimsthatweredismissed
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39
solelyonripenessgrounds,theDistrictCourtshouldconsideron
remandwhether
Sherman
stated
aclaim.
Someclaims,however,theDistrictCourtdismissedforfailure
tostateaclaim. Theywere(A)claimsunder42U.S.C.1981and
1982;and(B)aproceduraldueprocessclaimbasedontheTowns
consultantsfeelaw. Thoseclaimswereproperlydismissed.
A. Section1981andSection1982ClaimsTheDistrictCourtconcludedthatShermandidnotstatea
claimbasedon1981,anditdeniedasfutileShermansrequestto
addaclaimunder42U.S.C.1982forthesamereasonsitdismissed
the1981
claim.
SeeSherman,
2013
WL
1148922,
at*6n.6.
Forbothclaims,Shermanmustallegefactssupportingthe
Townsintenttodiscriminateagainsthimonthebasisofhisrace.
SeeRiverav.UnitedStates,928F.2d592,60708(2dCir.1991).Jews
are
considered
a
race
for
the
purposes
of
1981
and
1982.
United
Statesv.Nelson,277F.3d164,177(2dCir.2002).
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40
ShermansallegationsthattheTowndiscriminatedagainst
himbecause
he
was
Jewish
are
insufficient.
He
states
that
the
municipalDefendantsknewthathewasJewish,andthatata
TownBoardmeeting,heheardTowncitizensexpressfearthat
MareBrookmightbecomeaHassidicVillagelikethenearby
KiryasJoel.Healsoallegesthatamodelhomewasvandalized
withaspraypaintedswastika.However,noneofthisislinkedto
anyTownofficial.Nordoesheallegethatanysimilarlysituated
nonJewsweretreateddifferently. Therefore,theDistrictCourt
correctlydismissedthe1981claimanddeniedShermanleaveto
amendtoaddthe1982claim.
B. DueProcessChallengetoConsultantsFeeLawTheDistrictCourtalsoproperlydismissedShermansclaim
thattheTownsimpositionofitsconsultantsfeelawdidnot
provide
sufficient
procedural
due
process.
Town
Code
48
3
providesthatanapplicantforapprovalofanylanddevelopment
proposalshallreimbursetheTownsreasonablefees. Pursuantto
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
41
485(A),[a]napplicantmayappeal,inwriting,totheTownBoard
forareduction
inthe
required
reimbursement
amount.
The
appeal
mustbefiledwithinfifteendaysfromthedeliveryofthevoucher
itemizingtheservicesperformedandtheamountchargedforthose
services. 485(B);483(K)(L). Theitemizedvoucheris
accompaniedbyanotice,informingtheapplicantofthese
requirements. 483(L).
Shermanmakestwoargumentsinsupportofhisdueprocess
claim.4 First,hearguesthattheTowndidnotprovideSherman
withactualnoticeofwhathewasbeingaskedtopayfor....
AppellantsBrief58.However,thecomplaintstatesthatwhilehe
initiallydidnotreceiveinvoicesfortherequiredconsultantsfees,
4Shermansargumentsinsupportofthedueprocessclaimraisedforthefirst
timeinhisreplybriefarewaived. SeeJPMorganChaseBankv.AltosHornosde
Mexico,S.A.deC.V.,412F.3d418,428(2dCir.2005)([A]rgumentsnotmadein
anappellantsopeningbriefarewaivedeveniftheappellantpursuedthose
argumentsinthedistrictcourtorraisedtheminareplybrief.).Wealsodonot
considerShermansargumentthattheprovisionsinquestionviolatedNewYork
lawbecausetheDistrictCourtdeclinedtoexercisesupplementaljurisdiction
overthatclaim.
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43
opportunityforahearingaregiven,dueprocesswillbesatisfied,
regardlessof...whether
the
owner
takes
advantage
ofthe
opportunityforahearing. Brodyv.Vill.ofPortChester,434F.3d121,
131(2dCir.2005);seealsoSmigav.DeanWitterReynolds,Inc.,766
F.2d698,70809(2dCir.1985)(rejectingproceduraldueprocess
challengetotheimpositionofcostsandattorneysfeesbecausethe
partyhadanopportunitytobeheardbutfailedtotakeadvantage
oftheopportunity). TheDistrictCourtthereforeproperly
dismissedthisclaim.
III. StateLawClaimsThe
District
Court
declined
toexercise
supplemental
jurisdictionoverShermansstatelawclaimsonthegroundthatit
haddismissedallofhisfederalclaims. BecauseShermanstatedat
leastonefederalclaim,wealsovacatetheDistrictCourtsdecision
to
remand
the
state
law
claims
to
state
court.
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44
CONCLUSION
Because
of
the
way
the
Town
handled
Shermans
MareBrook
proposalandsubsequentlitigation,Shermansclaimbecameripe.
Accordingtotheallegationsinthecomplaint,whichwetakeastrue
forthesepurposes,theTownemployedadecadeofunfairand
repetitiveprocedures,whichmadeseekingafinaldecisionfutile.
TheTownalsounfairlymanipulatedthelitigationofthecaseina
waythatmighthavepreventedShermanfromeverbringinghis
takingsclaim. Itremovedthecasefromstatecourt,andthenmoved
todismissonthegroundthatthetakingsclaimmustbeheardin
statecourt.
We
cannot
accept
this
tactic.
Throughout
itall,
the
TownpreventedShermanfromdevelopinghisland.HadtheTown
actedmorereasonably,theclaimmayneverhavebecomeripe,and
notakingmayeverhadoccurred.WeREVERSEtheDistrictCourts
decision
to
dismiss
Shermans
federal
takings
claim.
BecausetheWilliamsonCountyripenessrequirementsare
satisfied,weVACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontotheextentit
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SHERMANV.TOWNOFCHESTER
dismissedShermansfederalnontakingsclaimssolelyonripeness
grounds.On
remand,
the
District
Court
may
consider
whether
Shermanhassufficientlystatedthoseclaims.
WeAFFIRMtheDistrictCourtsdecision(1)todismiss
Shermans1981claim,(2)todenyShermanleavetoamendtoadd
a1982claim,and(3)todismissShermansproceduraldueprocess
claimbasedontheconsultantsfeelaw.
Becauseatleastonefederalclaimhasbeenstated,we
VACATEtheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodeclinetoexercise
supplementaljurisdictionoverShermansstatelawclaimsonthe
groundthatallthefederalclaimshadbeendismissed. Onremand,
theDistrictCourtmayreconsiderwhethertoexercisesupplemental
jurisdictioninlightofthenewpostureofthecase.
WeREMANDtotheDistrictCourtforfurtherproceedings
consistentwith
this
opinion.
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