Reviewed by Jonathan Young
Shadow Eliteby Janine Wedel (2009)
Claims
“Shadow elites” play a key policy-making role in some areas
Changes in society and government have increased the chances for a shadow elite to control a policy area
Shadow elites go around the normal structures of bureaucratic control
Who are the Shadow Elite?
Dimension Flexians Flex Nets
Relationships Personalizing Bureaucracy
Intricate spine
Agenda and information control
Privatizing information while branding conviction
Shared conviction and action
Formal positions and power base
Juggling roles and responsibilities
Resource pool
Rules and accountability
Relaxing rules in the spaces between official and private institutions
Hybrid habitat
Other Key Ideas
Flexians are in, not of, organizations
Coincidences of interest
Reshaping bureaucracy
Power through access to information
Other Key Ideas
Focus is on executive branch activity, not writing legislation
Privatization of the functions of the state
Merging of state and private power Might-be-state, might-be-private entities Might-be-official, might-be-unofficial
roles
Why is there an increase in “flex” activity?
Redesign of governing Outsourcing Deregulation Rise of executive power
End of the Cold War
Advent of ever more complex technologies
Embrace of “truthiness”
Consequences
Private or mixed control over state resources
Contractors, rather than government officials, hold vital information
Policy is developed outside of government decision-making channels
Bureaucracy is unable to monitor or control the “shadow government”
Evidence
Social anthropologist
Studied Eastern Europe beginning in the 1980s
Interviews, news stories, and personal observation
Examples…Privatization in Russia
Harvard Institute for International Development received US AID money to support economic reforms
Small group of Russian officials and American consultants leading multiple commissions – a flex net
Shared economic and policy ideology
Harvard team controlled U.S. policy on economic reform aid
Privatization in Russia
Flex net in President’s office, drafting decrees Diverged from US AID policy
NGOs headed by flex net members had power to make major privatization decisions
Privatization decisions benefitted those with ties to the flex net; did not result in broad benefits to ordinary Russians
The Neocon Core
Flex net centered around Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith
Ideology of American military supremacy and preemptive war
Positions in government and NGOs Drafting and publicizing policy positions Raising media attention Lobbying members of Congress
The Neocon Core
Personalized policy making
Marginalized bureaucratic procedures Independent intelligence assessments
Created their own bodies of expertise and influence
Increased number of political appointees with fewer bureaucrats
Information campaign – “truthiness”
The Neocon Core Flexnet
So, what can be done?
Stronger regulation Increased openness More oversight of contractors Investigation by government, media
and NGOs
Evaluation
This is a pretty specific phenomenon
Convincing examples, but hard to know how common flex nets are
Discomfort with changes from “the way things used to be”
The Bigger Policy Picture
How are policy decisions really made?
Flex activity can be used to pursue financial gain…but also ideologically motivated
Looks at the interaction between private interests and government activity Private interests may be business
interests or may be other interests
Questions & Discussion
I have a hard time knowing if there are other policy areas dominated by flex activity…can you think of any?