Profiles of New Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria
Muhammad S. Umar Assistant Professor
Department of Religious Studies Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287-3104, U.S.A.∗
The virtual collapse of public educational system in Nigeria, especially in the Northern states, is
now widely recognized, but the transformation of the Islamic educational system that has resulted
partly in response to that collapse has not been sufficiently understood.1 The main goal of this essay
is to demonstrate that a notable aspect of the current transformation of Islamic education is the
proliferation of new Islamic schools that are significantly different from the old Islamic schools, and
to show that the new Islamic schools have emerged in response to both domestic and international
forces for change.
Specifically, the essay argues that following huge educational expansion in the 1970s,
Nigeria’s public educational system deteriorated steadily during the 1980s-1990s. These decades
also witnessed the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) actively promoting
privatization and deregulation under the structural adjustment program (SAP).2 Responding to
deterioration of the public educational system in the new policy environment of privatization and
deregulation, private initiatives established new Islamic schools in Nigeria that reflect a global trend
of transformation of Islamic education.3 Indeed, expansion of private initiatives in the educational
arena is equally observable in many countries influenced by structural adjustment programs.4 As the
global movement toward expansion, privatization, and deregulation of the educational sector
gathered momentum in the 1990s, education became the “last frontier for profit,” whose expenditure,
estimated at two trillion dollars, presents irresistible opportunities for private investors and
entrepreneurs.5 According to one estimate, “by the end of the 1990s, world governments had sold
2
more than $1 trillion in assets to private investors. And a growing number of state and local
governments had turned to private operators to run prisons, parking lots, ambulance services, public
schools and social-services operations.”6 By profiling a small sample of new Islamic schools in
Nigeria listed in appendix I (Sample of New Islamic Schools), this essay hopes to contribute to our
understanding of both the for-profit and non-profit private actors that are changing education
globally. The essay also hopes to contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of educational
dualism in Muslim countries.
Background Context
New Islamic schools emerged in Northern Nigeria in the context of the long evolution of
Nigeria’s new national policy on education, itself a part of larger transformation of Nigerian state,
economy, and society following the devastating civil war of 1967-1970, and the subsequent
emergence of the developmental state in Nigeria. It is, therefore, imperative to outline the basic
characteristics of Nigeria’s developmental state and its evolution within the last three decades. But
first, I must emphasize that it is no my goal to engage the larger debate on the failure of African
countries to have “hard states” capable of promoting sustained development in the sense of rapid
industrialization, steady economic growth and enhanced living standards.7 I only want to
demonstrate that the specific trajectories of development policies and programs adopted by
successive regimes in Nigeria during 1970s-1990s are the necessary background for the emergence
of the new Islamic schools that I want to analyze here. Therefore, I am expediently using the term
“developmental state” in the sense defined by Leftwich:
“those states whose internal politics and external relations have served to concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competence, and capacity at the center to shape,
3
pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both.”8
The widespread view in the relevant literature is that Nigeria’s developmental state has been a
disastrous failure.9 It can hardly be disputed, however, that it did exhibit the defining features that
Leftwich highlights in the above quotation, particularly in the immediate period after the civil war.
Furthermore, Leftwich emphasizes six salient characteristics of the developmental state, namely: 1)
developmental elites who are “highly nationalistic,” “relatively uncorrupt,” very capable and
determined to articulate and enforce sound policies and programs for rapid industrialization and
steady economic growth; 2) relative autonomy that frees the state “from the demanding clamor of
special interests (whether class, regional, or sectoral …) that it can and does override these interests
in the putative pursuit of national interest;” 3) bureaucratic power in the form of “very powerful,
highly competent and insulated bureaucracies with authority to direct and manage the broad shape of
economic and social development;” 4) weak civil society that lacks the capacity to challenge or
disrupt the priorities already set-up by the powerful state bureaucracies under tight control of
developmental elites; 5) subordinating private capital both domestic and foreign to the articulated
agenda of the developmental elites; and 6) authoritarian tendency is an undesirable but inevitable
outcome of these five characteristics of the successful developmental state, forcing it to rely on the
tangible results of positive economic performance for its credibility and legitimacy.10 The following
paragraphs will sketch how Nigeria’s developmental state acquires (and loses) some elements of
each of these six characteristics, but certainly not to the degree necessary for the successful Asian
models in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, or even in Botswana, the only successful developmental
state in Africa. Of course, the rise and decline of Nigeria’s developmental state is precisely the
relevant point that helps to explain the transformation of Islamic schools.
4
To begin with, Letwich emphasizes that the developmental elites become “highly nationalistic”
often in response to “internal or regional security threats and thus underlining and extending Tilly’s
thesis (for Europe) about the importance of war-making in state formation.”11 The Nigerian civil war
represents the birth pangs of the developmental state as the imperatives of war dictated the need for
centralized planning that drew together the top ranks of the civil service and the military. In the
aftermath of the war, the civil-military coalition congealed into Nigeria’s veritable developmental
elites, who launched ambitious development plans that clearly reflected not only highly nationalistic
goals, but also the intent to transform Nigeria into “a free and democratic society, a just and
egalitarian society, a united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and dynamic economy, and a land
of bright and full opportunity for all citizens.” These have been the objectives of Nigeria’s national
development plans that became a sort of mantra ritually recited by the developmental elites on all
available occasions of state ceremonies. The only feature conspicuously missing among Nigeria’s
developmental elites was, unfortunately, the decisive one of incorruptibility. The legendary
corruption of Nigeria’s developmental elites has earned the country unenviable position among the
most corrupt countries in Transparency International corruption index.12
The relative autonomy of Nigerian state from the clamor of special interests is stronger than
commonly acknowledged by scholars and Nigerians alike. The recent waves of communal and
religious violent conflicts point to the resurgence of powerful communal, religious, and regional
special interests that had earlier led to the Nigerian civil war. By once again gravely threatening the
continuing existence of the country, these special interests underscore the severe weakness of the
Nigerian state. But the important point to note is that the victorious emergence of the federal
government from the civil war meant not only the defeat of regionalist secession, but also the
opportunity to consolidate the relative autonomy of the state. Huge increases in petroleum prices in
5
the 1970s yielded surplus revenue that enabled the federal government to embark on massive public
projects through five-year development plans. Beginning with reconstruction projects after the
Nigerian civil war, estimated at over £300 million,13 the federal military government financed large
projects that steadily widened and strengthened its hold on the national economy.
For example, Nigeria’s first national development plan for 1962-1970 period provided for a
capital expenditure of N2.2 billion, while the second plan for 1970-1975 budgeted N 3 billion in
capital expenditure. In contrast, the third national development plan during the oil boom years of
1975-1980 provided for an initial capital expenditure of N30 billion, which was revised upward to
N43.3 billion, while the fourth plan covering 1981-1985 provided for a capital expenditure of N82
billion.14 Increased petroleum revenues enabled Nigeria’s developmental elites to consolidate their
grip on state power, and by expanding their control over the economic, political, and social arenas,
they enhancing their relative autonomy from special interests. But regrettably, rampant corruption
among Nigeria’s developmental elites meant that at best no more than a quarter of these huge
revenues could be accounted for; the rest disappeared into private fortunes. And herein originates
one principal reason for the present weakness of the Nigerian state making it seemingly unable to
assert its autonomy against rising tide of violent communalism. Corruption robbed Nigeria’s
developmental elites of credibility, thereby assuring failure, for as Huff and Dewit demonstrate,
without building reputation and credibility, a developmental state is doomed.15
In the 1970s, series of political reforms neutralized communal and regional special interests and
also weakened civil society while at the same time enhancing the autonomy and authoritarianism of
Nigerian developmental state. Decentralizing the regional centers of power, most notably through
changing Nigeria’s federal structure from three regions at independence in 1960 to twelve states in
1967, nineteen states in 1976, thirty states in 1991, and thirty-six states in 1996, effectively removed
6
the political platform for communal regionalism. In 1976, a nationally uniform political and
administrative system of local government areas (LGA) replaced provinces and districts that used to
provide municipal and rural local administration.16 Between 1976 and 1979, a Constitutional
Drafting Committee produced a blueprint for a new constitution that was debated in the Constituent
Assembly. The new constitution adopted American presidential system in place of the British
parliamentary system inherited from the colonial era. These political reforms strengthen the relative
autonomy of the Nigeria’s developmental elites by expanding territorial and sectoral jurisdiction of
state power—in addition to its dominant role in the economy. Furthermore, legal reforms
implemented in the 1970s eliminated regional differences in judicial administration and the court-
system inherited from colonial era by creating a nationally unified legal system and judicial
structure. But more relevant to the main argument of this essay is of course the educational reform
(discussed in more detail below) that also radically altered the inherited colonial educational system,
and in turn provided the blueprint for new Islamic schools. Collectively, these reforms point to
Nigeria replacing the regionalism that nearly caused the country’s disintegration in the 1960s with
the relative autonomy of holders of state power, a salient attribute of the developmental state.17
The military regimes that formulated and implemented all these reforms did not allow for
Nigeria’s weak civil society to develop any significant political capacity. Apart from the complete
absence of political parties—except for the brief interregnums of the Second Republic (1979-1983)
and the still-born Third Republic (1986-1992)—professional associations, media outlets, students
and labor movements were all governed by military decrees that made them heavily dependent on
the government. More importantly, the military regimes of General Yakubu Gowon (1967-1975) and
Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979) emasculated foreign private capital through
series of economic indigenization decrees.18 Ostensibly promulgated to increase local private capital
7
participation in ownership and management of key economic sectors, the indigenization succeeded
more in increasing the dominance of the developmental state over Nigeria’s economy, and in the
process fostered the prebendalism and neopatromonialism that scholars hold accountable for badly
stunting the development of private capital in Nigeria through rampant corruption.19
The reforms that unfolded in the 1970s played a crucial role in initially bolstering the
legitimacy of Nigeria’s military regimes. The seemingly endless flow of revenue from petroleum
export promised continuing provision of social services that gave popular legitimacy to the military
regimes. This is consistent with Leftwich’s observation that successful developmental states
maintain a “strange mixture of repression and legitimacy” that explains their ability “to distribute the
benefits of rapid growth, at least in terms of schools, roads, health care, public housing and other
facilities to an expanding circle of people.”20 The accomplishments of Nigeria’s developmental state
in this regard are, however, often eclipsed by monumental corruption. In particular, over-centralized
control of resources reinforced by the authoritarianism of military rule and the patrimonialism and
prebendalism of civilian rule, gravely undermined Nigeria’s giant development projects.21 In 1982,
Nigeria was forced to adopt austerity measures under an economic stabilization program that,
however, failed to halt the slide of economy.22 As the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) began to articulate structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, the end of Nigeria’s
developmental state became only a matter of time. Beginning in 1986, erratic but continuous
implementation of structural adjustment programs by the military regimes of Generals Ibrahim
Babangida and Sani Abacha steadily forced the Nigerian state to retreat from provision and
financing of social services, including education, thereby paving the way for private initiatives in
educational sector.23 The rise and decline of the Nigeria’s developmental state is consistent with the
global trend that Mark Berger has convincingly documented.24
8
Rise and decline of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational arena
The specific trajectories of transformation of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational
arena originated from a national curriculum conference held in 1969 and a sequel seminar attended
by educational experts in 1973. Following a series of discussions, workshops, and conferences, the
federal government of Nigeria accepted recommendations in a document titled The New National
Policy on Education that was first published in 1977, and revised in 1981.25 This document
envisaged a complete restructuring of Nigeria’s public education system that was further spelt out in
the detailed blueprint prepared by the Implementation Committee for the National Policy on
Education,26 a pointer to the prominent role of Nigeria’s developmental elites in policy formulation
and implementation. Significantly, the new educational policy adopted “national objectives of
Nigeria as stated in the Second National Development Plan, and endorsed as the necessary
foundation for the National Policy on Education,”27 thus clearly linking the new educational policy
to the expansion of the developmental state in Nigeria. Writing from the insider’s perspective of a
career educational administrator who actively participated in formulating and implementing the
policy, Aiyepeku hints at the high nationalism of Nigeria’s developmental elites by emphasizing
proudly that the new educational policy gave “Independent Nigeria … an indigenous national
policy” that helps to sever colonial ties to Britain.28 The intricate details of how the new educational
policy evolved are beyond the scope of this essay,29 but three notable aspects are relevant for
understanding the emergence of new Islamic schools.
First, the previous school system (modeled on the British public school system introduced during
the colonial era) did not operate uniformly in all parts of Nigeria. Different regions used to provide
eight, seven, or six years of primary education, five to seven years of secondary education, and three
9
to five years for higher education.30 The new educational policy replaced these variations with a
uniform 6-3-3-4 school system that provided six years of schooling at primary level, three years at
junior secondary level, three years at senior secondary level, and four years at university level. The
new unified educational system reflects the centralizing tendencies of Nigeria’s developmental state
that were also evident in political, economic and legal reforms discussed earlier. In addition, the 6-3-
3-4 system implemented many other important innovations: new curriculum, new certification upon
graduation, new types of examination and assessment of learning outcomes, new areas of learning
concentration, and new educational goals and objectives that were all geared toward realizing the
main objectives of Nigeria’s development plan.31 Poor funding, mismanagement, erratic policy and
programmatic alterations due to changes of political regimes, have continuously plagued
implementation of the new educational policy over the last two decades.32 Still, the public
educational system currently operating in Nigeria is markedly different from the old system. But not
all the changes have been for the better. The dismal decline of educational standards associated with
poor implementation of the 6-3-3-4 school system became a very important factor for parents who
choose to send their children to the new Islamic schools for quality education.
There are even more linkages between the new national educational system and the
emergence of new Islamic schools. It is not coincidental that all the twenty-one schools discussed in
this essay emerged during the period of implementing the new educational policy that began in 1976
with the introduction of compulsory and free universal primary education (UPE). The UPE attracted
several millions of students to public schools, leading to a corresponding increase in demand for
resources.33 The first set of students to enroll in the UPE was estimated at 2.297 million, but the
actual enrollment was 2.992 million. Thereafter, enrollment continued to rise steadily: in 1975/76
academic year, a total of 21,223 primary schools had 177,221 teachers for 6.1 million pupils, and in
10
1980/81, the number of primary schools had reached 36,524 with 376,681 teachers for 13.76 million
pupils.34 By 1988, the total number of primary schools declined to 33,796, enrolling 12.69 million
pupils, and 308,178 teachers.35 A similar pattern of rise and decline is also discernible at secondary
and higher education levels.36
Initially, huge revenues from the sudden rise of petroleum prices in 1973 provided enough
funding for massive educational expansion, but in the 1980s, funding declined sharply. For example,
expenditure allocated to education during the second national development plan (1970-1974)
amounted to over N282 million, with the federal government spending more on universities while
state governments “centered on the expansion of facilities at the primary and secondary schools
level.”37 In the third development plan of 1975-1980, the amount rose to over N 3.1 billion. Even so,
the federal government felt confident enough to take over private schools to meet the continuing rise
in school enrollment that mirrored the expansion of the developmental state in the educational
arena.38 Thus not surprisingly, the declining fortunes of the developmental state during the fourth
development plan for 1981-1985 appeared also in the allocation for education that fell to only N 7.7
million.39 Even these figures do not adequately capture the full extent of the decline of resources
available to the educational sector. The devaluation of Nigeria’s currency began in 1984 when the
exchange rate fell from one U.S. dollar to less than one naira—N0.70—and continued declining to
about N100 to $1 by the end of the 1990s. This massive devaluation means that fewer resources
were actually available for education.
Additionally, mismanagement and corruption meant that only a small fraction of budgeted
funds was actually spent on educational projects. The decline of petroleum revenues in the late
1970s was further aggravated by widespread financial irresponsibility that characterized the civilian
administration of the Shagari Regime between 1979 and 1983. Rather than fulfilling their promises
11
to improve education, politicians diverted funds to their pet political projects.40 Consequently, school
buildings deteriorated without repairs, supplies of educational materials dried up, and teachers’
salaries were not paid for months. Successive military regimes continued to neglect education,
leading eventually to the virtual collapse of the public educational system. Sofolahan makes the
point nicely when he remarks that “the national policy was conceived in times of oil-boom, born in
times of oil-glut, and nurtured in times of economic depression.”41 The best way to decode this
cryptic remark is to recall that in 1976, the federal government introduced free universal primary
education, and in 1985 it withdrew completely from funding primary education as structural
adjustment program began the compression of the developmental state.42 In 1996, the federal
government had to concede that: “given the dramatic rise in the demand for educational services in
the face of growing population and dwindling resources available to the government for maintaining
an efficient educational system, the involvement of the private sector, communities and non-
governmental organizations would be inevitable, once again, in order to move education forward so
as to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”43 The rise and decline of the developmental state in
Nigeria’s educational arena between 1976 and 1996 paved the way for emergence of private
schools,44 including the new Islamic schools.
While the new national policy on education was unfolding, it initially helped to change Muslims’
longstanding negative attitude toward western education. The tremendous economic expansion
during the petroleum boom of 1970s created employment opportunities that the available manpower
could not fully utilize. Tangible material rewards of acquiring western education not only in the form
of regular employment, but also in access to patrimonial control of state economic enterprises of the
developmental state, were strong enough to neutralize Muslims’ negative attitude. Moreover, the
new educational policy provided free education first at primary level and later at all levels, including
12
scholarships at Nigerian and foreign universities. But just as bright economic opportunities, free
education, and generous scholarships raised Muslims’ acceptance of modern western education,
public financing of education began to decline precipitously. Now, Muslims must finance their own
education, a realization reinforced by the ideology of deregulation and privatization of state
enterprises. Some of the new Islamic schools were established by private entrepreneurs responding
to Nigerians’ excess demand for education beyond what the state could provide.
To sum up the argument so far, transformation of public schools under 6-3-3-4 system, massive
educational expansion, failures in implementing new national policy on education, and changes in
Muslims’ attitude toward modern western education are internal forces for change. They are
externally reinforced by the global triumph of neoliberal ideology of privatization and deregulation
as implemented in structural adjustment programs. Occurring within the last three decades, these
developments collectively demonstrate that the rise and decline of the developmental state in
Nigeria’s educational sector set the background context for emergence of new Islamic schools.
Islamic Schools: The Old vs. The New
The sample of the new Islamic schools in Appendix I shows that only one school was
established in 1976, but as the background factors discussed above unfolded during the 1980s,
eleven more schools were established, and additional nine schools emerged in the 1990s. Clearly, the
already identified changes within the broader educational arena between 1970s and 1990s are
relevant for understanding the proliferation of new Islamic schools within the same period. Before
examining more connections between changes in the broader public educational system and new
Islamic schools, let us briefly outline the contrasts between the old and the new Islamic schools.
13
The Old Islamic Schools
The old institutions of Islamic learning in Nigeria comprise two tracks. First, Qur’anic
schools provide the starting point by teaching Arabic literacy and recitation of the Qur’an to pupils
from early childhood to adolescence. Second, Ilm schools provide the second track for specialized
training in diverse fields of Islamic learning. Unlike modern formal schools, both Qur’anic and ilm
schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course
of study. Abdurrahman and Canham observe that the structure and purpose of traditional Islamic
education differ radically from those of Nigerian national educational system. In traditional Islamic
education, “there is no clear-cut division into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. There is no
progression from one class to another and from one level to another, with examination barriers
erected along the way. There are no classes, there are no age-limits, and there is no rigid timetable
with neatly timed periods for subjects.”45 In addition to giving basic skills of reading, writing, and
calculating, Qur’anic schools also expose pupils to “the life-giving words of the Qur’an, without
which the child would have no hope of happiness in this world or of salvation in the next.”46 On the
other hand, ilm schools increase “students’ understanding of the divine purpose as revealed for all
time by the Prophet.”47 Furthermore, whereas Qur’anic schools emphasize “rote learning” of
memorizing the Qur’an,48 ilm schools teach through a pedagogy of close reading of a text, along
with extended commentary on its various meanings and implications.
Typically, the teacher will be seated on mat surrounded by his disciples, who will take turn to
read from their individual Arabic texts while the teacher gives interpretation and commentary in
Hausa or Fulfulde. The core subjects in the curriculum of ilm schools comprise Qur’an exegesis
(tafsir), Traditions of Prophet Muhammad (hadith and sira), Principles and Rules of Islamic
14
Jurisprudence (fiqh and usul al-fiq), Theology (Ilm al-tawhid), Mysticism (tasawwuf), Arabic
Language and Literature (al-luggha and al-adab), Mathematics (al-hisab), Medicine (tibb), and
History (tarikh). The favorite textbooks are selected from ancient writings of classical Muslim
authors, although novices also utilize abridged versions or versification of the classics by local
authors. The traditions of Islamic learning in both Qur’anic and ilm schools emphasize the
supremacy of spiritual and moral values over bookish learning, application of knowledge to guide
the conduct of everyday life, and intellectual quest as lifelong endeavor. Also central to traditions of
Islamic learning is a master-disciple relationship characterized by deference to the master, and
sustained through face-to-face oral instruction that transmits not only learning but also spiritual
guidance, moral authority, piety and blessing.49 These traditions of Islamic learning have produced
outstanding Islamic scholars, including a number of prolific authors.50 Although still very much
alive, the ancient traditions of Islamic learning, particularly the Qur’anic schools, are facing serious
crises of relevance in contemporary Nigeria.51
As Okoye and Yau have documented, Qur’anic schools have increasingly failed to fulfill
their traditional educational mission. Instead of educating their pupils and giving them skills and
knowledge necessary for functioning effectively in society as they used to, Qur’anic schools have
deteriorated to the extent that many people regard them as no more than a breeding ground for street-
beggars.52 In the 1950s-1960s, early attempts to reform Qur’anic schools gave birth to Islamiyya
schools “originally established by private initiative to meet the growing demand for improved
standards in the [Qur’anic] schools.”53 To meet that goal, they adopted all the features of a formal
school system that were absent in Qur’anic and ilm schools.54 Islamiyya schools remained, however,
very negligible in Northern Nigeria. The new Islamic schools under examination differ in many
15
respects from Qur’anic, ilm and Islamiyya schools; they are also different from the Ilmiyya/Adabiyya
Islamic schools established in the western region of Nigeria during the early colonial period.55
The New Islamic Schools
The new Islamic schools adopt the organizational format of Nigeria’s modern public school
system, but differ in their fundamental institutional orientation toward promoting a broad Islamic
cultural orientation. The school environment is saturated with Islamic images (murals, maps of the
Islamic world, posters, Arabic calligraphy, and mosques). School administrators actively foster
Islamic identity and awareness among students and teachers not only in classrooms but also in all
school activities. Islamic congregational prayers are regularly observed in school mosques. Islamic
dress, particularly for female students, is another visually powerful way of fostering Islamic identity
and awareness in these schools. While these features collectively create a distinctly Islamic
atmosphere around the new schools, it is the curricular emphases on Arabic and Islamic Studies that
really shape their Islamic character and orientation, and differentiate them from both the old Islamic
educational institutions and Nigeria’s public schools. Variation in curricular emphases on Arabic and
Islamic Studies calls for classifying the new Islamic schools into two types: schools operating
madrasa curriculum, and schools operating modified national curriculum of public schools.
The new Islamic schools operating madrasa curriculum provide six years of training in
classical Arabic and Islamic education. The Northern Provinces Law School was the first madrasa in
Northern Nigeria. British colonial authorities established the school in 1934 to train Muslim judges
for the colonial administration of Islamic law. In 1947, the school was reorganized and renamed
School for Arabic Studies (SAS) to provide five-year training leading to Grade II Teacher
Certificate upon satisfactory performance in a written examination in English, Arithmetic, and
16
Teaching Methods, moderated and conducted by the West African Examination Council (WAEC).
Apart from these standard courses offered in all teacher-training schools, SAS requires additional
training in Arabic and Islamic Studies that qualifies its graduates to teach the same subjects in
primary schools.56 In 1954, SAS began to offer an expanded madrasa curriculum that provided four
years of training in classical Arabic and Islamic Studies, leading to a Higher Islamic Studies
Certificate upon successful performance in a written examination in Arabic Language and Literature
and Islamic Studies moderated and conducted by the Board of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the
Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Unlike the Grade II teacher-training
curriculum that uses English as the language of instruction, the madrasa curriculum uses Arabic to
train ulama to serve as Muslim judges, as well as teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies.57 The
Sokoto Arabic Teachers’ College, established in 1963, followed the SAS model, and by 1979,
similar Arabic Colleges had also been established in Gombe, Maiduguri, Hadejia, Katsina, as well as
two additional ones in Kano, one of which was exclusively for women. Thus there were no more
than ten SAS-type colleges teaching madrasa curriculum in the 1970s when Nigeria’s new national
educational policy began to be implemented, but they steadily grew during 1980s-1990s. For
example, in 1994, forty-five schools were officially affiliated with the National Board of Arabic and
Islamic Studies (NBAIS)—the new name for the reorganized agency that oversees madrasa
curriculum and co-ordinates its certification examination.58
A major transformation of madrasa curriculum came in 1989. After three years of negotiations,
NABAIS persuaded Federal Government officials to grant official recognition to a modified
madrasa curriculum to be taught on the 6-3-3-4 school system. NBAIS had already redrawn the old
madrasa syllabus from a four-year course of study to a six-year one, divided into three-year Junior
Islamic Studies (JIS) and three-year Senior Islamic Studies (SIS). Other changes added courses on
17
Arabic Literature by Nigerian Authors, Social Studies/General Knowledge, Teaching Methods,
Hausa/Yoruba, and Home Economics for female students. Significantly, English and Mathematics
used to be optional subjects in the old four-year madrasa curriculum, and taught at primary school
level. Under the new six-year curriculum, both English and Mathematics were raised to compulsory
subjects and to the same level as in the public secondary schools. Junior Islamic Studies schools are
also required to offer courses on Physical Education and Integrated Science, while Senior Islamic
Studies are required to offer one science subject (Physics, Chemistry, or Biology) and Agricultural
Science or a Vocational Subject. Arabic is still the language of instruction for Arabic Language and
Literature and Islamic Studies, while English is the language of instruction in secular subjects.59
Thus whereas the old madrasa curriculum provided classical Arabic and Islamic education, with
only marginal proficiency in English, the new madrasa curriculum aims to provide proficiency in
English, and also broad competence in western secular education while still offering classical
Arabic/Islamic education.60 Appendix II (Educational Tracks and Levels) shows that 7 out of 21
schools teach both JIS and SIS curricula, one school offers only JIS, and two schools offer only SIS.
A point worth emphasizing is that all the new Islamic schools are experiencing several
problems implementing the new madrasa curriculum. Shortage of teachers for western secular
subjects, teaching materials, laboratories and textbooks are the more common problems that prevent
most schools from offering science subjects. Consequently, most students graduate without gaining
the expected competency in western secular education. Another problem is that some teachers,
parents and students regard secular subjects as a nuisance; a small number parents protest against
introduction of western secular subjects. But both sets of complainants comprise a very small
number of those who still prefer pure Islamic education, and do not affect significantly the general
impetus for combining both Islamic and western education. A more common complaint is that solid
18
classical Arabic/Islamic education had been diluted, leading to lower standards. Despite these
problems, thousands have been graduated under the new madrasa curriculum; many have completed
university education and are pursuing careers in modern professions.
I have elsewhere documented the emerging career patterns among the new cadre of ulama
trained in both Islamic and western education under the new madrasa curriculum. I have also shown
that long-term sociological consequences can be observed in the correlation between various Islamic
trends and different educational backgrounds. Specifically, I found that Islamic traditionalism is
more common among those educated in traditional Islamic education of Quranic and ilm schools,
Islamic modernism is more prevalent among those with modern Islamic education of the madrasa,
and Islamic fundamentalism is more common among those trained in the secular education of public
schools.61 Another important consequence of the transformation of Islamic education is the
increased access of more Muslim females to advanced training in classical Arabic/Islamic education.
In contrast to the very few exceptional women who used to receive Islamic education, the new
Islamic schools have produced thousands of Muslim women with high level of Arabic and Islamic
learning. The majority of these women take teaching careers in public schools while some teach at
colleges and universities, and a few of them follow the traditional ulama career of writing,
preaching, counseling, and officiating in ceremonies and ritual services. Predictably, some female
Islamic scholars favor modernist views while some adopt more traditional views particularly on
gender issues such as family planning, women’s participation in public life, etc. It seems very likely
that career Muslim women with advanced Arabic/Islamic learning will change traditional gender
roles and expectations, but the exact trajectories remained to be seen.
Before turning to examining the new Islamic schools operating the 6-3-3-4 curriculum of
public schools, I will call attention to one other important outcome of the transformation of Islamic
19
education. The Senior Islamic Studies Certificate has now replaced the old Higher Islamic Studies
Certificate based on the four-year madrasa curriculum. The old certificate was not officially
recognized by the Federal Government, and even in the Northern states it was given only limited
official recognition for careers in teaching and administration of Islamic law. Its holders could only
study Arabic/Islamic Studies or Islamic Law (Shari’a) at federal universities in Zaria, Kano, Sokoto,
and Maiduguri, and even then only after completing a three year course of study, thus doubling the
period of their university education into six years instead of the regular three years. These
restrictions are no longer applicable to holders of the Senior Islamic Studies Certificate that is now
recognized nationally as equivalent to the Senior Secondary School Certificate awarded by public
schools. The two certificates are recognized as equal levels of educational attainment for
employment and admission to universities, thus qualifying holders of the Senior Islamic Studies
Certificates for various professional courses at universities and specialized academies for police,
immigration, customs, state security service and military training. As the formation of a new Muslim
elite unfolds, it remains to be seen how much of their Islamic education will influence their future
professional lives, and how their public influence may intersect with that of graduates of the new
Islamic schools that operate the national curriculum of public schools.
Whereas madrasa curriculum provides classical Arabic/Islamic education, the national
curriculum taught in public schools provides modern western education. The two curricula also
differ in their aims and objectives. Among other goals, madrasa curriculum aims to foster Islamic
identity and consciousness with competencies in Arabic and Islamic Studies to “equip students to
orient their lives in accordance with Shari’a.”62 In contrast, the national curriculum aims at “self-
realization, better human relationship, individual and national efficiency, effective citizenship,
national consciousness, national unity, as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political,
20
scientific and technological progress.”63 It is of course true that madrasa curriculum does not neglect
secular educational objectives such as citizenship and national unity, while the national public
curriculum also seeks to foster “moral and spiritual values … [and] shared responsibility for the
common good of society.”64 Still, observable differences in institutional orientation and “silent
curricula” of the new Islamic schools and the public schools combined to make a clear difference in
the schooling impact on students attending the two types of schools. Given curricular differences in
both contents and objectives, the new Islamic schools had to change aspects of the national
curriculum to conform to their Islamic identity and goals.
Apart from the general Islamic orientation of the school environment, the second set of new
Islamic schools teaches a modified version of the national curriculum of public schools. First, Arabic
and Islamic Studies are compulsory in all the new Islamic schools instead of their optional/elective
status in national public curriculum. Most of this set of new Islamic schools include Qur’an
memorization and use Arabic as the language of instruction for Arabic/Islamic Studies. Additional
encouragement for students to focus more on Arabic, Islamic Studies, Qur’an memorization come in
the forms of special prizes for accomplishments in the three subjects, school sponsorship of major
Islamic festivals, and promoting students’ clubs and organizations. Appendix II (Educational Tracks
and Levels) shows that nine out of twenty-one schools teach the modified version of the national
public curriculum at junior secondary school level (JS), twelve schools teach it at senior secondary
school level (SS), and nine schools teach it at both JS and SS levels.
This modified curriculum provides students with modern western education and an intermediate
level of Arabic/Islamic education. In this regard, the new national curriculum as modified and
operated in the new Islamic schools differs from the new madrasa curriculum and the old national
curriculum. The new madrasa curriculum aims to train ulama that are also knowledgeable in modern
21
secular subjects, while the modified national curriculum aims to produce modern/western educated
Muslims who are also knowledgeable in Arabic/Islamic Studies. The two curricula proceed from
opposite directions: new madrasa curriculum is roughly divided into 70% Arabic/Islamic education
and 30% modern western education, while the modified national curriculum is roughly divided into
70% modern western education and 30% Arabic/Islamic education. In contrast, the old national
curriculum offered Islamic Studies only in English, and at a considerably lower level, while the old
four-year madrasa curriculum gave solid training in classical Arabic/Islamic studies with only a
trifling exposure to elementary English and Arithmetic. Clearly, the new Islamic schools offer wider
and more intensive training in Arabic and Islamic studies as well as modern subjects.
Again, the long-term consequences are not yet fully clear. One observable outcome is that the
new Islamic schools that teach the modified new national curriculum are also encountering
implementation problems similar to the ones facing the schools operating on the new madrasa
curriculum, particularly shortage of qualified teachers and textbooks. But addition of Arabic and
Islamic Studies into the new national curriculum is more popular with both parents and students than
addition of secular subjects in the new madrasa curriculum. This popularity enables the new Islamic
schools to draw more and more students away from traditional Qur’anic schools that are losing their
functional relevance in relation to the contemporary economic, social, political, cultural and
intellectual realities of Nigeria. In contrast, the new Islamic schools train students for university
education and careers in modern professions, while still providing Arabic/Islamic education that
qualify students to win prestigious prizes in international competition for Qur’an recitation.
Certainly, graduates of the new Islamic schools are likely to play important social and
political roles, but the exact trajectories of those roles are not yet clear. In a sense, the establishment
of so many new Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria is indicative of a broader societal shift toward
22
the global trend of Islamic resurgence. It is the same broad shift that is also manifested in the
widespread enthusiasm for the ongoing implementation of the “Full Shari’a” in Muslim majority
states of Northern Nigeria. As new Muslim elites, graduates of the new Islamic schools will continue
to reinforce the broad societal shift toward a more prominent role for Islam in public life, especially
if these Islamic schools develop into self-perpetuating educational institutions.
Institutional Characteristics
All the new Islamic schools adopt the institutional format of modern school systems. It is not,
however, certain that they will all develop into enduring institutions principally because they have
not fully embraced the key modern traits of efficiency, innovation, record keeping, financial
accountability and bureaucratic management. It is encouraging to note that some of these schools
have already developed beyond the second decade since their establishment. Still, their institutional
continuity will depend on the extent to which key modern traits prevail over inevitable interference
of traditional attitudes and expectations.
Organizational Innovation
Their modern organizational format allows the new Islamic schools to combine both
Arabic/Islamic education and modern western education. The general tendency is for one school to
provide multiple tracks at various educational levels. There are three tracks: Arabic/Islamic Studies,
Qur’an memorization, and modern western education. And there are six educational levels: nursery
(N) pre-primary (PP), primary (P), junior secondary (JS) and junior Arabic/Islamic Studies (JIS),
senior secondary (SS) and senior Arabic/Islamic Studies (SIS), and national certificate of education
23
(NCE)—which forms the first part of Nigerian higher education system. Appendix II (Educational
Tracks and Levels) shows that only four out of twenty-one schools provide a single educational tract
or level: AIM provides only Junior Arabic Islamic Studies (JIS), BIS provides only Senior Islamic
Studies (SIS), GDQ provides only Qur’an memorization, and NCI provides only Senior Secondary
Certificate (SS). The remaining seventeen schools provide at least two tracks at multiple levels.
MCE has the largest number of four levels (PP, P, JS/JIS, and SS/SIS) and the two tracks of
madrasa and modern western education, followed by ATC with the same two tracks and three levels
(PP, JS/JIS, and SS/SIS). CIS is the only school offering the higher level NCE in addition to two
levels (JS, SS/SIS). Combining the two tracks of madrasa and modern western education at multiple
educational levels allows schools to take advantage of economies of scale, but also requires
considerable organizational skills that are not evenly available in all schools. In particular, record-
keeping, which is necessary for institutional continuity and planning for growth, is quite poor.
Similarly, only very few of these schools maintain standard accounting of their finances. Without
regular and meticulous record-keeping and financial accounting, no school can aspire to a bright
future of institutional development.
Influence of the founder(s)
Out of twenty-one schools under examination, state and local governments established three
only. Appendix III (Founders of New Islamic Schools) reveals that organizations established nine
schools, individuals established seven, and community and group of individuals established one
school each. This prevalence of private initiative in establishing these schools reflects the impact of
the neo-liberal ideology of deregulation and privatization; it also lends credence to the increasing
24
optimism that civil society and non-governmental organizations will revitalize societies devastated
by authoritarian regimes. But to what extent will these schools survive their founders?
Ordinarily, one expects that schools established by organizations will have a greater chance of
developing as an enduring institution since their future does not depend on the continuing goodwill
of the founding patron. But Appendix III reveals that of the seven schools established by individuals,
one was established in 1980, one in 1985, one in 1986, and four in the 1990s. Clearly, schools
established by individuals have endured as much as those established by organizations.
A point worth emphasizing here is that two schools (BIS and IIS) were established by
organizations with international affiliations, and it is not a coincidence that the two are among the
best managed schools. In fact, IIS is by far the best in terms of organization and academic programs;
its students have won first or second prizes in national and international competitions, including
Qur’an recitation international competition. The parent association of IIS is Nur al-Islam, which is
funded and run by a Syrian engineering firm, Shinco Nigeria Limited. Almuntada al-Islami, the
London-based parent organization of BIS, sponsors staff members to attend international seminars
taught by experts on modern management techniques. The positive impact is unmistakable in the
very efficient management of the school, leading to the steady rising of its high reputation as a center
of excellence.65 It is also relevant to note that BIS attracts foreign students from neighboring
countries. The involvement of international Islamic organizations, however, should not be over-
emphasized, since it can only be detected in two out of twenty-one cases.
The other organizations are primarily local, though not lacking some international connections.
This is especially true of Izala, which is the parent organization of two schools (AMC and AGC) and
the inspiration for many others. Izala’s Wahhabi reformism makes it possible to attract support from
Saudi Arabia, particularly in the form of scholarships for graduates of Izala schools to attend Saudi
25
Islamic universities. The Nuruddeen Society, which has a longer history of establishing schools in
Yorubaland, is the parent organization for one school in the list under current examination (NCI).
Jama’atu Nasril Islam runs three schools (AIM, ATC, JGC), and the Moslem Women Association of
Plateau State is the founder of TPS. These organizations are working hard to keep their schools
functioning as effectively as they can: some of the schools and their students have won prizes in
various local and national academic competitions, and all could easily boast of their former students
who have successfully graduated from institutions of higher learning, including premier Nigerian
universities. Still, their schools do not impress a visitor that they are as well managed as the two
schools affiliated with international Islamic organizations. The difference is partly attributable to
poor record-keeping, financial accountability, and management, and partly to the fact that the two
internationally affiliated schools enjoy greater access to more resources.
The individuals who established seven out of the twenty-one schools fall into four categories.
First, a wealthy patron provides resources including land, buildings, and equipments needed to start
the school, and often remains the major source of funds for expansion and capital projects. Such
wealthy patrons may exert strong influence on the orientation of the school. AMC, BMM, and HSS
were established by individual wealthy patrons; and AIM was also initially established by a wealthy
patron, who later handed-over the school to Jama’atu Nasril Islam organization. Second, an
individual Islamic activist who was able to mobilize resources from the local community, including
volunteer teachers, established CIS. His indefatigable activism has kept the school growing despite
numerous challenges, notably inadequate resources and lack of professional management. Third,
reputable Islamic scholars are the individuals who established GDQ and KRS by transforming their
traditional Qur’anic schools into the modern institutional format and then attracting community and
governmental support to keep the school going. Finally, an individual entrepreneur established JNI
26
to take advantage of market opportunities in Islamic education arena that have been greatly enhanced
by the prevailing deregulation and privatization. Similarly, the group of individuals who established
GMP comprises entrepreneurs responding to market opportunities (excess demands, and willingness
of parents to pay for their children’s education). This diversity of founders produces different impact
on the institutional functioning and continuing development of the new Islamic schools.
Conclusion
Three important aspects of the new Islamic schools of Northern Nigeria reflect key features of
the current transformation of Islamic education in Muslim countries, and changes in the broader
global educational arena. First, neoliberal reform measures of privatization and deregulation have
forced the state to retreat from provision of social services, including education. These policies
appeared credible in light of the mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiencies associated with the
failures of the developmental state, for which Nigeria stands as the paradigmatic example. Private
initiatives have emerged to meet excess demands for education. Shobhana Sosale observes that
private financing and provision for education have historically been prevalent, but “during the course
of the 20th century, however, the role of the state (public sector) assumed predominance for purposes
of nation-building and instilling national identity.”66 State predominance in education has created
“numerous constraints,” including inefficiencies, misallocation of resources, and financially
unsustainable educational expansion. Pressures for increased private initiatives in the educational
arena comes from both the supply side (declining state provision and increased private provision),
and from the demand-side (parental choices for quality, cost and value, and cultural and religious
preferences). These observations are clearly reflected in the changes in Nigeria’s educational system.
27
For example, the rise and decline of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational arena and
serious decline of educational standards resulting from the corrupt management and erratic
implementation of the 6-3-3-4 school system created the supply-side factors (i.e. shortage of
providers of quality education) that contributed to the emergence of the new Islamic schools of
Northern Nigeria. Muslims’ preference for combining both Islamic and western types of education
constitutes the strongest demand-side factor for the continuing growth of the new Islamic schools.
The participation of state governments, local and international Islamic organizations, wealthy
patrons, and individual entrepreneurs all reflect how supply/demand and public/private factors
combined to create different models of private initiatives in the educational arena. This development
shows that educational privatization and deregulation occur in several forms: 1) the auctioning of
public educational assets to private entrepreneurs, 2) various models of provision, financing, and
management of education, and 3) opening different levels of primary, secondary and higher
education for private participation.67 While conforming to the global trend of educational
privatization, the new Islamic schools profiled in this essay illustrate the specifically Islamic features
that are also observable in the educational transformation of many Muslim countries.
Combining Islamic learning and modern western education has remained a difficult issue in
Muslim countries since the nineteenth-century. The new Islamic schools of Northern Nigeria exhibit
some of the varieties of educational dualism that have been developed in Muslim countries,
including Mali,68 Senegal,69 Sudan,70 Malaysia,71 and Indonesia.72 Incorporating Qur’anic education
in the tahfiz track of the new Islamic schools has made it possible to memorize the Qur’an and
acquire both Islamic learning and western education, thereby equipping graduates with the multiple
sets of skills they need to function effectively in meeting contemporary challenges of modern
society. This Northern Nigerian experiment provides a solution to the crisis of relevance confronting
28
the old Qur’anic schools more effectively than the UNESCO/UNICEF initiative of introducing
vocational training into the old Qur’anic schools. Similarly, offering both Islamic and western types
of education in the same school environment seems to be more realistic than the idealistic model of
“Islamization of knowledge,”73 and cheaper than attending separate schools to acquire Islamic and
western education. These Northern Nigerian experiments have not yet solved all the persistent
problems of educational dualism in Muslim countries;74 they do, however, point to the possibilities
of educating Muslims to live according to Islamic values and beliefs in the multi-cultural and
increasingly inter-connected modern world.
The social and political consequences of the worldwide educational transformation in Islamic
societies are manifesting themselves in contradictory trends. On the one hand, Dale Eickelman
demonstrates the subtle ways in which mass education, mass communication, and neo-liberal
policies of privatization and deregulation have opened up public spaces for debating the relevance of
Islamic heritage in modern society. As a consequence of these developments, Eickelman contends
that Islamic modernity is underway, leading to an understanding of Islam as civic dialog.75 On the
other hand, Nasr calls attention to the active role of the state in the transformation of Islamic
education in Pakistan. The Islamization policies of the military regime of Ziaul Haq have resulted
not only in the expansion of madrasas and reform of their curricula, but also in the increased
militancy of the teeming number of madrasa graduates. Doctrinal and regional differences
characterizing the various madrasas translate into factions among the new cadre of Islamic elites
seeking alternative employment outside the public sector that could not provide needed jobs to all of
them. Escalation of sectarian violence is the outcome of the intense competition for limited
employment opportunities as well as for dominance of the Islamist political constituencies in
Pakistan.76 The Pakistani trend seems more prominent in Nigeria, where growing Islamic activitism
29
has steadily become more and more attractive in the face of continuing deterioration of the public
sector under the predatory regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha. As I argued elsewhere,
graduates of the new Islamic schools are at the forefront of the increasing demands for the full
application of Islamic law that has become more irresistible since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in
1999.77 The Islamist activism of graduates of new Islamic schools, not only in Nigeria and Pakistan,
but in many Muslim countries as well,78 can be seen as the conservative wing of an emerging Islamic
modernity.79 This observation corrects the over-emphasis on Islamic liberalism that features
prominently in Eickelman’s insightful analysis of the social and political consequences resulting
from transformation of Islamic education.
30
Appendix I
New Islamic Schools: Abbreviation, Name, and Date of Establishment
1 AMC Abdulrahman Mora College of Islamic Studies, NO 56 Aminu Road, Tudun Wada, Zaria 1985
2 AGC Abubakar Gumi College of Higher Islamic Studies, Aminu Road, Tudun WadaZaria 1990
3 AIM Ali Iliya Memorial Junior Arabic Secondary School, P.O. Box 2872, Jos 1981 4 ATC Arabic Teachers’ College, P.O. Box 927, Jos 1976
5 BMM Baban Maryam Memorial Primary School, No 59/13 Dilimi Street, Jos 1997
6 BIS Al-Bayan Islamic Secondary School, No 30 Rock Haven, Jos 1995
7 CIS College of Islamic Studies, Bauchi Road, P.M.B. 2003, Jos 1986
8 CQS College of Quranic Studies, Kano State Ministry of Education, Kano 1986
9 GMP Gamji Memorial Private School, 10 Bauchi Road, Opposite Unipetrol Station, Jos 1998
10 GDQ Gwani Danzarga Qur’anic Secondary School, 504, Koki, P.O. Box 13616, Kano 1993
11 HSS Al-Hilal Secondary School, P.O. Box 1638, Rikkos, Jos 1996
12 IIS Al-Iman International School, P.O. Box 6334, Jos 1982
13 JNI Jabal Nur International School, 828, Bauchi Ring Road, P.O. Box 1883, Jos 1991
14 JCS Jos Community Secondary School, P.O. Box 2122, Naraguta, Jos North Local Government Council, Jos 1993
15 JGC Jama’tu Girls College of Arabic Studies, P.O. Box 1054, Zaria 1983
16 KCI El-Kanemi College of Islamic Studies, P.O. Box 2334, Jos 1985
17 KRS Kofar Ruwa Senior Islamic Secondary School, Kofar Ruwa, Kano 1980
18 MCE Muslim Community Education Center, 14/15 New Rikkos Layout, P.O. Box 2700, Jos 1986
19 NCI Nuruddeen College of Islamic Studies, P.O. Box 316 Laranto, Jos 1986
20 SAI School for Arabic and Islamic Education, Gaskiya Road, Zaria 1993
21 TPS Taoheed Private School, Old Airport Road, P.O. Box 1499, Jos 1983
31
Appendix II
Educational Tracks and Levels
School N PP P JS SS QM JIS SIS NCE
1 AMC x x x
2 AGC x x x x x
3 AIM x
4 ATC x x x x x
5 BMM x x
6 BIS x
7 CIS x x x x
8 CQS x x
9 GMP x x x x
10 GDQ x
11 HSS x
12 IIS x x x x x
13 JNI x x x
14 JCS x x
15 JGC x x x
16 KCI x
17 KRS x x x x
18 MCE x x x x x x
19 NCI x
20 SAI x x x x
21 TPS x x x x x
32
Appendix III
Founders of New Islamic Schools
SN School Date Founder
1 AMC 1985 Individual
2 AGC 1990 Organization
3 AIM 1981 Organization
4 ATC 1976 Organization
5 BMM 1997 Individual
6 BIS 1995 Organization
7 CIS 1986 Individual
8 CQS 1986 Kano State
9 GMP 1998 Group of Individuals
11 GDQ 1993 Individual
12 HSS 1996 Individual
13 IIS 1982 Organization
12 JNI 1991 Individual
14 JCS 1993 Jos L.G.A.
15 JGC 1983 Organization
16 KCI 1985 Organization
17 KRS 1980 Individual
18 MCE 1986 Community
19 NCI 1986 Organization
20 SAI 1993 Kaduna State
21 TPS 1983 Organization
33
∗ I collected the data for this essay in field research in Nigeria during July-December 1999 and May-August 2000 with funding from Faculty Grant of Arizona State University, which I hereby gratefully acknowledge. I presented an earlier version of the essay at the workshop on innovations and their contextualization in African Islamic societies at University of Bayreuth, Germany, 9-10 February 2001. I am grateful for the generous hospitality of the organizers of the workshop, Professors Roman Loimeier and Rudiger Seesmann, and critical comments and suggestions of the workshop participants. I collected more data at the Melville J. Herskovits Africana Library of Northwestern University, Evanston, IL during my tenure (2001/2002) as preceptor of the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) at the Program of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University. I wish to thank ISITA directors, Professors John O. Hunwick and Sean R. O’Fahey, ISITA co-coordinators, Mathew Cenzer and Rebecca Shereikis, and all ISITA 2002 fellows, PAS administrators and staff who made my ISITA experience productive and memorable. 1 Arewa House, Northern Education Research Project, Towards the Improvement of Education in the Northern States of Nigeria: An Agenda for Action, (Kaduna: Arewa House Center for Historical Research and Documentation of Ahamadu Bello University, 2000); Festus Okoye and Yunusa Z. Yau, The Condition of Almajirai in the North West Zone of Nigeria, (Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, 1999); E.O. Adeniji and K.A. Salawu, Stabilizing the Nigerian Educational System (Abeokuta, Nigeria: Federal College of Education, 1996); P.K. Ajila, et el., Restoring Confidence in Nigerian Educational System in the Year 2010, (Abeokuta, Nigeria: GOAD Educational Publishers, 1998); B. Olamosu, Crisis of Education in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Books Farm Publishers, 2000); and D. Ojerinde, Falling Standards of Education in Nigeria: Myth or Reality, (Ibadan, Tafak Publications, 2000). 2 World Bank, Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, implementation, and impact, (Washington, D.C.: 1994). 3 Dale Eickelman, “Mass higher education and the religious imagination in contemporary Arab societies,” American Ethnologist 19 (1992): 643-655; Mozammel Haque, “Muslim Education in India,” Muslim Education Quarterly 17/3 (1999): 66-75; Linda Herrera, “Song without Music, Islamism and Education: A Case From Egypt,” Revue des Mondes Muslmans et de la Mediterranee 85-86 (Spring 1999): 149-159; A.E. Muzawi , “The Contested Terrains of Education in the Arab States: An Appraisal of Major Research Trends,” Comparative Education Review 43/3 (1999): 332-352. 4 David Cohen, “The Worldwide Rise in Private Colleges,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (March 9, 2001); Leon Tikly, “Globalization and Education in the Postcolonial World: towards a conceptual framework,” Comparative Education 37/2 (2001): 151-171; and World Bank, Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995). 5 For example, see: “Investment Opportunities in Private Education in Developing Countries,” An International Conference Sponsored by the International Finance Corporation, Member of the World Bank Group, (Washington DC, June 2-3, 1999); and the cover story titled “Education: The last Frontier for Profit,” The UNESCO Courier (November, 2000): 16-37. 6 Yochi Dreazen and Andrew Caffrey, “Private Concerns: Now, Public Works Seem Too Precious for the Free Market,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) (Nov 19, 2001): 1A. 7 Pierre Englebert, “Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy,” World Development 28/10 (2000): 182-1835. 8 Adrian Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy? Democracy and the Developmental State,” in Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice, edited by A. Leftwich, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p 284. Cf. Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), particularly the chapter two “The Developmental State: The Odyssey of a Concept,” (pp. 32-60) where Chalmers Johnson, whose 1982 book on the role of the state in fostering “Japan’s economic miracle” is generally credited with sparking the on-going controversies on the concept of developmental state, revisits his earlier views and replies his many critics. 9 For example, see: Peter M. Lewis, “Economic Statism, Private Capital and Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria,” World Development 22/3 (1994): 437-51; Sayre Schatz, “Pirate Capitalism and the inert economy of Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies 22/1 (1984): 45-57; Adebayo Olukoshi, Economic crisis, structural adjustment and the coping strategies of manufacturers in Kano, Nigeria, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), and Adebayo Olukoshi, The elusive prince of Denmark: structural adjustment and the crisis of governance in Africa, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 1998). 10 Letwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy,” p. 285-89. 11 Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy?” p. 285. 12 Hakeem Jimo, Tidiane Sy, and Dame Wade, “West and Central Africa,” Transparency International Regional Reports, 2001, available online at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/, accessed on December 14, 2002.
34
13 Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s Forward March: Broadcast by His Excellency Major General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, on the Occasion of the Launching of Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, (Lagos: Associated Press of Nigeria), p. 6. 14 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985, (Lagos: The National Planning Office, Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1981), vol. 1, p. 1. Also see: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Building the new Nigeria: national development plan, 1970-74, (Lagos: Nigerian National Press, 1971). 15 W.G. Huff and G. Dewit, “Credibility and Reputation Building in the Developmental State: A Model with East Asian Applications,” World Development 29/4 (2001): 711-24. 16 Federal Government of Nigeria, Guidelines for Local Government Reform, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976). 17 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since independence, (London: Hurst and Company, 1998); Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 18 Thomas J. Biersteker, Mutinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 53 ff. 19 Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (March 1996): 79-103. 20 Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy?” p. 288-89. 21 Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 79-103. 22 The National Institute, Workshop on the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982: Its Impact on the Nigerian Economy with Particular Reference to the Indigenization Policy (Kuru, Nigeria, The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1983). 23 Adedotun O. Phillips and E. C. Ndekwu, eds., Structural Adjustment Programme in a Developing Economy: The Case of Nigeria, (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1987) and Adebayo O. Olukoshi, eds., The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, (London: James Curry, 1993). See also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 188 ff. 24 Mark T. Berger, “The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30/2 (2001): 211-34. 25 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy of Education, (Lagos: Government Printer, rev. ed. 1981). Babs Fanfuwa, History of Education in Nigeria, (Ibadan: NPS Educational Publishers, new edition 1991), pp. 206-255. 26 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Implementation Committee for the National Policy on Education, Blueprint, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1978). 27 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy on Education, p. 7. 28 T.F. Aiyepeku, 6-3-3-4 System of Education in Nigeria (Ibadan: NPS Educational Publishers, 1989), p. 3. 29 J.S.O. Sofolahan, “Main Paper: Implementing the 6-3-34- System of Education,” in Moving Education in Nigeria toward the Year 2000: Proceedings of the First, Second, and Third Congresses of Nigerian Academy of Education, edited by R. Ogbonna Ohuche, (Enugu: Optimal Computer Solutions in association with Nigerian Academy of Education, 1991), pp. 19-38. Cf. Fafunwa, History of Education, pp. 206 ff. 30 Aiyepeku, 6-3-3-4 System of Education in Nigeria, p. 2. 31 S. I. Okoli, Curriculum Provisions in the National Policy on Education, (Awka, Nigeria: Christon Printing and Publishing Company, 1991). 32 Sofolahan, “Main Paper,” 19-38. 33 Leo C. Okeke, “Education reform and expansion in post-independence Nigeria: A nation in transition, 1960-1992,” Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1993. 34 Federal Government of Nigeria, Statistics of Education in Nigeria, 1980-1984, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Education), pp. 5-8. 35 Federal Government of Nigeria, National Rolling Plan, 1996-1998, (Abuja: National Planning Commission, 1996), vol. 1, p. 181. 36 Ibid., pp. 182-87. 37 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974: Second Progress Report, (Lagos: Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, 1974), p. 84. 38 Cordelia C. Nwagwu, “The Development of Private Educational Institutions in Nigeria: Issues, Problems and Prospects,” Proceedings of Nigerian Academy of Education on Private and Community Participation: Proceedings of the 1997 Congress of the Nigerian Academy of Education, 1998, pp. 73-80. 39 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan, vol. 1, p. 255-59. 40 Sofolahan, “Main Paper,” pp. 25-29. 41 Ibid., p. 34.
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42 Federal Government of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan, vol. 1, p. 259. 43 Federal Government of Nigeria, National Rolling Plan, 1996-1998, vol. 1, pp. 171. 44 Nwagwu, “The Development of Private Educational Institutions in Nigeria,” p. 77. 45 A. M. Abdurrahman and P. Canham, The Ink of the Scholar: The Islamic Tradition of Education in Nigeria, (Lagos: Macmillan, 1978), p. 51. 46 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 47 Ibid., p. 54. 48 Vivid description of traditional pedagogy of Qu’anic schools can be found in Danjuma A. Maiwada, “Curriculum Development in Koranic Education,” Kano Studies new series 2/2 (1981): 146-68. 49 M. Maqsud, “Moral Education in Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria,” Kano Studies new series 1/3 (1978): 53-60. 50 A. Mohammed and M.B. Khan, “From Cradle to Grave: The Contribution of the Ulama to Education in Nigeria,” Kano Studies new series 2/2 (1981):110-128; Omar Bello, Islamic Education in 18th Century ‘Nigeria’: Tarikh Mustafa al-Torodi, (Sokoto: The Islamic Academy, 1994). For bibliography of individual scholars, see. John O. Hunwick, et el., Arabic Literature of Africa, Volume II: The Writings of the Central Sudanic Africa, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). 51 For example, see: Abdulkarim U. Dan Asabe, “Islam and History of Learning in Katsina State from the Jihad (1807) to the Colonial Conquest (1903): The Case of the School of Tsohuwar Kasuwa, Katsina City,” Tambari: Kano Journal of Education 3/1 (1996): 72-78; M.D. Sulaiman, “Islamic Education and the Preservation and Transmission of Culture: A Study of the Hausa Migrants in Lokoja, 1903-1933,” Tambari: Kano Journal of Educatio 2/1 (1995): 118-25; Zakariyya I. Oseni, “The Traditional and Modern Ulama in Edo State of Nigeria: Achievements and Problems,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 19/2 (1999): 223-34. For comparative perspective on Islamic education in West Africa, see: Humphrey J. Fisher, “Islamic Education and Religious Reform in West Africa,” in Education in Africa: Research and Action edited by R. Jolly, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House for African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1969), 247-62; Saul Maher Saul, “The Qur’anic School Farm and Child Labour in Upper Volta,” Africa 54/2,(1984): 71-86. 52 Okoye and Yau, The Condition of Almajirai, p. 67. Cf. Sulaiman Khalid, “Nigeria’s Educational Crisis: The Almajiranci System and Social Realities,” Islamic Culture LXXV/3 (2001): 85-103. 53 Abdurrahman and Canham, Ink of the Scholar, p. 65. 54 For the origins and development of Islamic schools during the colonial period (1903-1960), see the colonial records preserved in Nigeria’s National Archives in Kaduna under the title “KADMINEDUC AS 2/8 Volumes 1 and 11: Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria.” Also see: G. Tahir, “The Significance of Leadership Perceptions and Solutions to Issues and Problems of Western Education in Hausaland, 1940-1960s,” Kano Studies new series 2/3 (1982-1985): 163-78. 55 For example, see: W.O.A. Nasiru, “Attractions and Reactions of Lagos Muslims to Christian Sponsored Western Education, 1890-1926,” Al-Fikr: Annual Journal of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan 13 (1992):70-80; M.A. Abdur-Rahim, “Colonialism and Islamic Education in Western Nigeria before 1960,” Al-Fikr: Annual Journal of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan 13 (1992):13-20; Muhib O. Opoleye, “An Assessment of the Contributions of Ilmiyyah schools for Arabic and Islamic Learning in the Southern Nigerian Uiversities,” Muslim Education Quarterly 11/2 (1994): 29-45; Stefan Reichmuth, “A Regional Center of Islamic Learning in Nigeria: Ilorin and Its Influence on Yoruba Islam,” in Madrasa: La Transmission du Savoir Dans Le Monde Musulman, edited by Nicole Grandin and Marc Gaborieau, (Paris: AP Editions Arguments, 1997), 229-245; Stefan Reichmuth, “Islamic Learning and its Interaction with ‘Western’ Education in Ilorin, Nigeria,” in Muslim Identity and Social Change in sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Louis Brenner, (Bloomingdale, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 189 ff., and Stefan Reichmuth, “Education and The Growth of Religious Associations Among Yoruba Muslims—The Ansar-ud-Deen Society of Nigeria,” Journal of Religion in Africa 26/4 (1996): 365-405. 56 Colonial records relating to School for Arabic Studies are preserved in Nigeria’s National Archives, Kaduna, under file NO “KADMINEDUC AS 2/12.” 57 “Report of the Committee on Higher Moslem Education, 1953,” in file No ZARPROF SCH/1, Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna. Also see: H. Alkali, “A Note on Arabic Teaching in Northern Nigeria” Kano Studies 3 (1967): 10-11. 58 Sheikh Nuruddeen Hassan, Muhammad S. Abdullahi, and Alhaji Ben Yunusa, The History and Activities of the National Board of Arabic and Islamic Studies, (Zaria: Institute of Education Ahmadu Bello University, 1994), pp. 61-66. 59 Ibid, 43-56. 60 Nigerian National Council of Principal and Supervisors of Islamic and Arabic Secondary Schools, Manhaj al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya Li’l-Thanawiyya, (Zaria: Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, n.d.). 61 Muhammad S. Umar “Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s,” Africa Today 84 (Summer 2001): 127-150. 62 Manhaj al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya Li’l-Thanawiyya, p. 3. 63 Federal Government of Nigeria, New National Policy on Education, p. 7
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64 Ibid. 65 Ministry of Education (Plateau State), Area Inspectorate Office of Education, Jos North Local Government Area: Annual Report for 1996/97 Session, p. 205. 66 Shobhana Sosale, Trends in Private Sector Development in World Bank Education Project, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000), p. 1. 67 Ibid., p. 3. 68 Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: religion, power, and schooling in a West African Muslim society, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). Cf. Peter Easton, “Mali: Indigenous Knowledge—Blending the New and the Old,” World Bank IK Notes 25 (2000):1-4. 69 Sylviane D. Kamara, “Senegal Upgrades its Koranic Schools,” UNICEF Feature No 00143.SEN, (April 1995). 70 A.A. Qasim, A Study on Quranic Schools as a Tributary of General Education in the Sudan, (Khartoum: UNESCO, 1991). 71UNESCO, Regional Seminar of Experts on Quranic Schools and their Roles in the Universalization and Renewal of Basic Education, (Khartoum: UNESCO, 1993). Also see: UNESCO, Mobilizing Project to Combat Illiteracy: Igniting the Spirit of Exchange, (Paris: UNESCO Workshops, Basic Education Division, 1994), 14-17; and Peter Easton et el., “Education and Koranic Literacy in West Africa,” World Bank IK Notes No 11 (August 1999). 71 R. Hashim, Educational Dualism in Malaysia: Implications for theory and practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 72 Roland A. Lukens-Bull, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Modernity and Tradition in Islamic Education in Indonesia,” Anthropology and Education Quarterly 32/3 (2001): 350-72. 73 B. Aisha Lemu, “Islamization of Education: A Primary Level Experiment in Nigeria,” Muslim Education Quarterly 5/2 (1988): 70-80; Sheikh A. Lemu, “Initial Success of Islamization of Knowledge in Nigeria,” Muslim Education Quarterly 10/3 (1993): 33-38; and Bshir S. Galadanci, ed., Islamization of Knowledge: A Research Guide, (Kano: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Nigeria Office, 2000). 74 Bradley J. Cook, “Islamic versus Western Conceptions of Education: Reflection on Egypt,” International Review of Education 45:3/4 (1999): 339-357; J. Mark Halstead, “Towards a Unified View of Islamic Education,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 6/1 (1995): 25-42; and Muhammad Q. Zaman, “Religious Education and The Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2 (1999): 294-323. 75 Dale F. Eickelman, “Islam and the Languages of Modernity,” Daedalus 129 (Winter 2000): 119-35. 76 S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34/1 (2000): 139-1980. See also Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institution in Paksitan, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 120 ff. 77 Umar, “Education and Islamic Trends,” p. 145. See also Victor F. Wan-Tatah, “The Shari’ah Issue in Nigerian Politics,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 2/1 (2000): 28-37. 78 A. I. Tayob, “Defining Islam in the Throes of Modernity,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 1/2 (1999):1-15. 79 For the idea of religious modernities, see the review essay by Robert Hefner, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism,” Annual Review of Anthropology 27 (1998), pp. 83-104.