Download - political law case digests
Esmeña, Kimberly Marie F.
DE LLANA vs. ALBA
Facts:
This case pertains to the question of constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Thereof and for Other Purposes.". That is the fundamental issue raised
in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
for Prohibition considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition,
seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners sought to bolster
their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to
fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall
be deemed completed.
Issue:
Whether or not the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with
the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges Under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there has not been shown
unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the
process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants,
as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from
the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the
Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant whowould thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to
its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be
in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as
far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme
Court could not have its say prior tothe action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created bythe reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is
to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of
the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would
save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand
the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting
within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long
been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that the
Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of
reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that
it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government
is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them
either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their
own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the
language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a
moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official
certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill
hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security
of tenure provision to assure judicial independence.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO.
Facts:
A petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the
MERALCO. MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act
No. 1446, section 11 which states: “Whenever any franchise or right of way
is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final.”
The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of
the matters submitted to arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a
contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be
referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and
cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the
terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. The question in the instant
petition is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of
legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal
right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
The issue would not fall within the jurisdiction granted in the SC if it
does, it would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and
render the award a nullity. If this is the proper construction, we would then
have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken wherefrom to the courts and
eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court
would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators, members of
the Supreme Court sitting as arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi
judicial functions.
The members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in
the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could
not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.
It is a judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Supreme Court being the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government.
Its power should be confined strictly within that granted by the Organic Act.
Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the
members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators.
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in
the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment
would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a
remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter,
and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress
should at some future time sanctions it, and passes a law authorizing the
court to carry its opinion into effect.
This is not the judicial power confided to the SC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic
Act and it would be illegal for the members of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the
decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition of MERALCO.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
DAZA vs. SINGSON
Facts:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its
number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives
revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by
withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-
formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from
the LDP.
The petitioner came to court contending he cannot be removed from
the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent
under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained political stability.
Respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is
political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also
maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent
being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party
be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission
on Appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the matter
Whether or not change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments
Ruling:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative for it has
the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is
before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may
not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here
is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
Tañada vs. Cuenco defined the term political question connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended
inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the
Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what
was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents
but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution.
The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the
discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable
and not a political question.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the
Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within
the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of
the proceeding in connection therewith.
It is, therefore, the court’s opinion that they have not only jurisdiction
but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the
parties herein." Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was
made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or
discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court in the negative. As provided
in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.
GARCIA vs BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
Facts:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of
Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the
transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned
corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
naphtha. Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as
the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project
was the use of “naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with
PNOC. However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January25, 1989 advising him of
BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by
changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced
for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the
presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned
by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
Issues:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance the instant
case
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled the first issue as a justiciable controversy
because first, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to
which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation
bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares of public land
precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D.
No.1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in
the proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long
before any covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is
not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have not
shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or
unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas.
Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named itself Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant’s
remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to
Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not
only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for
reasons which remain murky to say the least. And this brings us to a prime
consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore. Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution provides that: Xxx "The State shall promote industrialization
and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices."The Court, therefore, holds and
finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the
transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing
the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the
main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to
the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has
been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy
of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run
its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
On the second issue, the court holds and finds that the BOI committed
a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is
in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No
cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This
is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in
numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part
said he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than
one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign
government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what
we shall do with our heritage.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted.
PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Facts:
This is a petition by the Colleges and Universities requesting that Act
No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional, for they deprive owners of schools and colleges as
well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of
law, they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and that their provisions conferring on the
Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Respondents on their answer submitted a mimeographed
memorandum contending that, the matter constitutes no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
questions; petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said
acts; and the Acts are constitutionally valid.
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of
a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint,
a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. The Solicitor
General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause
to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are
actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the
respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits.
They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally need no
relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
Respondent averred that it is an established principle that to entitle a
private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the
result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative
action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all
members of the public. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical
threat being insufficient. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not
constitute a justiciable controversy.
Issue:
Whether or not by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may
be declared unconstitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held in negative. In the first place, they believed
that the petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no
relief in the form they seek to obtain and that there is no justiciable
controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to
entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury
and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to
determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that
he has sustained common interest to all members of the public.
The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to
the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on
the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where
conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act
assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last
resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy
between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to
obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere
academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however,
finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the
petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law
because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with
the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court
conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even
if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official
documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain
nuisance.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby denied.
TAN vs. MACAPAGAL
Facts:
On October 6, 1971 petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and
Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City,
filed for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of
themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-
Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that
the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution
through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now
outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan
laid down therein."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi on the case
Whether or not actual controversy is present in the instant case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal standing to sue
obtained by the petitioners, in the categorical and succinct language of
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 5 There has been a relaxation of this rule. As to the
requirement in making a taxpayers suit as a basis for legal standing, a
negative answers has been contemplated. The person who impugns validity
of a statue must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result to its
enforcement.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in accordance with the
controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until
after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of
certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the
matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep
its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other
departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The
legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to
what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the
meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but
only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is
no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made
concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case
be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the
command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until
such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being
announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This pertains to the Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all
others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner, Patricio
Dumlao, a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. He alleges that
the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of
a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case
or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari
Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the
determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails
the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC
from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely
affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review
on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue,
and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's
case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction. Courts are practically
unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It
is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one
who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable,
as in this case.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office
provided they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of
paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal
thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the
petitioner.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence,
as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground
alone those charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as
to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of
acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of
nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the
first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52
which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang
52 is hereby declared valid and that the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is
hereby declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SUPLICO vs. NEDA
Facts:
An agreement made by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
Hu Jintao (Chinese President) held on October 2, 2007 regarding the ZTE
National Broadband Network Project. This case is a consolidation of cases
filed by the petitioner Rolex Suplico and the other petitioner questioning the
act of the Philippine Government in entering into such deal regarding the
ZTE Project. The respondents argues on the following grounds; that the court
can no longer take judicial review on the questioned act for there is no more
justiciable controversy to be resolved because the Philippine Government
decided not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project
making it moot and academic; that there is no perfected contract in this case
that would prejudice the government or public interest, stressing that it
remained in the negotiation stage; and that the matters raised concern
executive policy, a political question which the judiciary would generally pass
upon.
Issue:
Whether or not regardless of the its mootness the Court may take
cognizance
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that while there were occasions when the
Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those
petitions moot and academic, the istant case does not fall under the
exceptional cases. It is no doubt that the petitions became moot when
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the
meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China, informed China’s President Hu
Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the
ZTE-NBN Project due to several reasons and constraints.
Under the Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory and the Court
has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the
President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our
government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court
shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of
evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-
Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2,
2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive
department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without
need of evidence. under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the official duty of the executive officials of informing this Court of the
government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also
presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary.
Other than petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court
finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the
present instance.
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice
and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political stability
indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues
which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do
more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial
discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners
want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further
discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously
establishing the factual basis or antecedents.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of
mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the
Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no
more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render
any ruling or make any pronouncement.
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny
them due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires
reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought
before the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, the petitions are dismissed.
NORTH COTABATO vs. REPUBLIC
Facts:
This pertains to the consolidated cases filed by the petitioners
enjoining the respondents from signing the agreement when the MILF had a
negotiation with the government of the Philippines through a Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was scheduled to be
signed by the Philippines in Malaysia.
The court then issued an injunction pending the signing of the MOA-
AD. While pending, the government of the Philippines ordered the Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, represented by Sec. Rodolfo Garcia and others to
cancel the Memorandum of Agreement and then further argued that case is
already moot and academic, therefore, there is no actual controversy for the
court to take cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may take cognizance of this present case,
regardless of being moot and academic
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that regardless of its mootness, the Court will
take cognizance of the case for it may be capable of repetition yet evasive
for review. Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered
moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "no matter what
the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the
MOA."
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic"
principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds
that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the
challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power
to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot
especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief
against the possible recurrence of the violation.
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust
them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David
are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David,
but also in other cases where the Court similarly decided them on the merits,
supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot
notwithstanding.
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount
public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the
wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGU’s. The assertion that the
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and,
in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not
"pontificate on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case
or controversy as this will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in
Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone
government procurement contract for a national broadband network
involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved
specific government procurement policies and standard principles on
contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein,
the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties
involved in the controversy.
In the case at bar, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of
agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD
which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the
third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the
Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and
Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive
Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General,
has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the
government will not sign the MOA-AD, "mootness will not set in light of the
terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Surely, the present MOA-AD can be
renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form,
which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court
notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is
committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and
equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be
assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present
petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the
public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF
regarding Ancestral Domain.
The present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again
apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number
of landmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners,
particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and
Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any
form.
Wherefore, respondents' motion to dismiss is denied. The main and
intervening petitions are given due course and is hereby granted. The
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the
Constitution.
IBP vs. ZAMORA
Facts:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on the
constitutional grounds in the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine
National Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter
of Instruction the "LOI" which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of
high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime
syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined
and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
Issue:
Whether or not the actions of the President was within the calling out
power of the president
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Martial law is not needed to be declared
so that President can call for help provided it is to suppress lawless violence.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
LOZANO vs. NOGRALES
Facts:
This pertains to the filing of the petitioners of this case in their
capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers prayed for the nullification of
House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members
of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend
or Revise the Constitution, upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the Members of
the Congress.
Both petitions seek to trigger a justifiable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII,
which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from
the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the
Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing
amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and
consultations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance over
the instant case
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. It is well settled that it is the
duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature,
scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of
the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the
allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy,
but to its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the
Constitution. This Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited
to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal
claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from
deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give
opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of
“ripeness.” the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness is that first, the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the
issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
In the case at bar, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained
of. Moreover, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More
importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House
Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a
constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."
While the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule
of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury”
to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to
be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file
petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not
available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to
remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of
indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty
to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.
Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.
KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated is a non-stock domestic corporation
composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders
who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The
petitioner filed this case against the respondent seeking to prohibit or
restrain the implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery
system, also known as “lotto.” The respondent, however allege that the
petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the court’s
resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has decided to establish an
on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. Thus, PCSO conducted bidding for a possible
“partner” or lessee on the said venture of PCSO. The Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), owned by a Malaysian group of
companies. After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an
online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the
International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services
and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC
claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to
40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local
investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns,
however the project pushed through.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners has legal standing to file this case
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the preliminary issue on the locus standi
of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues
raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside
this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, and technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits
are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as
to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not."
It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less
determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out
the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.
Other cases where they have followed a liberal policy regarding locus
standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing
the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No.
3452; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to
the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16
October 1976; (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan; (d) the approval without hearing by
the Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to
Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas; (e) the decisions,
orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and
the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power
Corporation from indirect tax and duties; (f) the orders of the Energy
Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings
conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the
petitioner substantial cross-examination; (g) Executive Order No. 478 which
levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported
crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; (h) resolutions of the
Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of Sanggunians; and (i) memorandum orders
issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City.
Supreme Court decided that the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved
in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Wherefore, petitions are dismissed.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO
Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and
accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or atleast
P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity.
Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may
purchase the equipment for P25 million.
The petitioner, Kilosbayan, which is composed of a civic-spirited citizens,
pastors, priest, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of
truth, justice and national renewal. It seeks to declare the ELA invalid on the
ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease be nullified.
Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with the violative
of PCSO’s charter and the decision of the Supreme Court that violated the
law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not petitioners have legal standing in the case at bar
• Whether or not provisions of the Constitution are self-executing
RULING:
The Court ruled that petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that
these various litigants with the same holding grounds has. Petitioners asset
an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for
bring taxpayer’s suits. The standing of the petitioners is a departure from the
settled rulings on “real properties on interest” because no constitutional
issues were actually involved.
An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to
issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved.
Therefore, the petitioners do not have legal standing on the case because
they do not fall under any of the categories of taxpayer’s suits.
As to the provisions of the constitution that are invoked by the petitioners,
Section 5, 12, 13 and 17 in the Article II of the Philippine Constitution, are not
self-executing where they do not confer the rights which can be enforced in
the courts but only to provide guidelines for legislative or executive action.
By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That explains with what
the court had said, “the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se it is left to Congress to deal with the activity as
it sees fit”. Furthermore, the Supreme Court expounded the reason through
stating that the policies and principles invoked by the petitioners in this case
do not permit of such right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, indeed, as already stated, petitioner’s opposition is not really to the
validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral. This is
not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and
Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Wherefore, the petition of as well as the motion for reconsideration is
Denied with finality.
JOYA vs. PCGG
Facts:
Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters
Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and
the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central
Bank, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos,
his relatives and cronies.
The petitioners averred that they have the legal standing to file this
petition because they are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply
concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic
wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant
petition
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the altruistic and noble purpose of the
petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first
be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites
for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there
must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional
or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.
On the first requisite, Supreme Court held that one having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff
in an action. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
The interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related
party. Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and
in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private
persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations
established to promote non-Philippine arts.
On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when
they were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces
of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends
and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration
was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and
silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically
passed on the government without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus
is dismissed.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
Facts:
Respondent Public Estate Authority entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with AMARRI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
islands. The agreement also requires the reclamation of an additional two
hundred fifty hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.
Petitioner Franklin I. Chavez filed this case as a taxpayer contending
that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by
respondent of the reclaimed lands to AMARRI. The petitioner wants that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands
of the public domain to private corporations. And also, the petitioner further
asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of
the State that are of public dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing on the case
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner has standing to bring this
taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First
is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is
the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens.
The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information
on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the
second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
The petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a
taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the
public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public
interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well
being of the people.'
The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such
as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set
aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, in ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the
Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.' In Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that
'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner
is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the
right.' Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public
funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the
important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of
the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, Supreme Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought
by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to information
and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources, matters of transcendental
public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared null and void ab initio.
DAVID vs. ARROYO
Facts:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and
General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of
National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry
out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by
invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5
were stated as follows, Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the
cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as
well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said
groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald
Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation
of news stories and various documents. Arrest of Congressman Crispin
Beltran by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and
attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The
petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987
Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant
case
Ruling:
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice
on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-
parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or
‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David
and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R.
No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor
General does not question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the
opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.
They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.
Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be
represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court
the alleged violations of their basic rights, as applied in different cases, when
the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s
assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly
may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be
granted standing to assert the rights of their members. We take judicial
notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies
and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are
national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have no legal
standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP
as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance
of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No.
171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant
petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds.
The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no
longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that
she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from
pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral
protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or
result of her case.
To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits
with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental importance”
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the
“PP 1017 cases.”
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he
be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
GONZALES vs. NARVASA
Facts:
On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was
filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and
the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays
that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish
the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials
holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a
list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and
turned over to Malacañang.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a
citizen and as taxpayer
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to
bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized
interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the
requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not
present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not
sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.
As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation
granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There
being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner
cannot be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. The petitioner has failed
to show that he is a real party in interest. In the petitioner’s request of
disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke
before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest
is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with the exception that
respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the
information requested.
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad
interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Senators being the petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of the
appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the
President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even
while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The essence of an
appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the
President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim
appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance.
But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s
issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
dismissed.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law
is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly
based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the
terms it uses. Particularly, in the terms; combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi in attacking
the validity of the law using the facial challenge
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be
plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under
the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by
a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
Wherefore, Court holds that RA 7080, known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659 the law constitutional and petition is dismissed for
lacking merit.
UMALI vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. On August 1, 1994,
President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner
for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during
his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said
confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an
Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately
referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on
Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was
directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and
Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. On October
6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the
service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's right to Security of
Tenure.
Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process of law.
Ruling:
The claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. Burden
of proof was on Umali, but he failed to adduce sufficient evidence. Petitioner
was not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show
petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged
violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body.
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise
the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings.
Charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation
conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the
Ombudsman.
The petition is dismissable; issues posited do not constitute a valid
legal basis for overturning decision arrived at by the CA. Taking into
consideration that the charges in the Ombudsman were dismissed, BIR and
Commissioner’s office were no longer interested in pursuing the case, and
due to the position taken by the Sol. Gen, The Court hereby GRANTS the
petition. AO No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to
retire with full benefits.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted
LAUREL vs. GARCIA
Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents,
their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the
sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-
ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during World War II. As intended, the subject property became
the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since
that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the
lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the
Philippine government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods
and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in
Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first
“Whereas” clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to
sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property
has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at $225 million.
Issue:
Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
alienated by the Philippine Government.
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the
authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. As property of public
dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides
in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare
and cannot be the object of appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly
classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property
belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
[1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership “until there is a formal declaration on
the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite. A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property’s original
purpose. Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an “authority to
sell”, does not have a provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of
the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. It merely
intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.
Further, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at
the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the
Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law since the
President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court
sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner Ojeda.
Wherefore, the petitions are granted.
DANTE LIBAN vs. GORDON
Facts:
Petitioner Dante V. Liban et al, filed a petition in Court to declare
Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners
were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter,
while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
board of Governors.
During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23,
2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners
alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a
member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution
Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional
provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did
not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer
service to which is neither an office nor an employment.
Issue:
Whether or not by accepting the PNRC position, did Gordon forfeit his
Senate Seat.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that accepting the PNRC position does not
forfeit Gordon his sit in the senate. The Philippine National Red Cross is a
private organization performing public functions. It does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from
private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must
not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and
independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their
fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence,
voluntary service, unity, and universality.
Wherefore, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition
in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SERRANO de AGBAYANI vs. PNB
Facts:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if
any, to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of
this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de
Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit
against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently
enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from
proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to
plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer
enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed.
There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant
that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act
subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation,
then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting.
Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant
Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of
the province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on
said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same
year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office
of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance
of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both
defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed
from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff. Defendant
Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's
own theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period
from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26,
1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the period of
moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation
of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the
loan.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling the case at bar
Ruling:
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the
time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was
tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No.
32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was
promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as
a defense.
Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of
plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed.
HACIENDA LUISITA vs. PARC
Facts:
The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned
by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the
Spanish owners of Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill,
Central Azucarera de Tarlac. Jose Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requested
assistance from the Philippine government in raising the necessary funds
through: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from the Manufacturer’s
Trust Company in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill; and (b) the
Government Service Insurance System, to obtain a peso loan for the
purchase of the Hacienda.
The Central Bank used a portion of the country’s dollar reserves as
security for Cojuangco’s loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco
would acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within 10 years
from its acquisition. On May 7, 1980, the Marcos government filed a case
before the Manila Regional Trial Court to compel Tadeco to surrender
Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land could be
distributed to the farmers. On December 2, 1985, the Manila RTC ordered
Tadeco to surrender the land to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
When Corazon Aquino became President of the Philippines, President Aquino
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, which
outlined her agrarian reform program. EO No. 229 included a provision for
the Stock Distribution Option, a mode of complying with the land reform law
that did not require actual transfer of the land to the tiller. On June 10, 1988,
President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The CARL included a provision that
authorized stock distribution as a mode of compliance; the SDO allowed a
corporate landowner to give its farmers and farm workers shares of its stocks
in lieu of actually distributing the land to them.
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0)
to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS
the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The
Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which
the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation
of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries to choose
whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land
distribution.
Issues:
Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
Whether or not Republic Act No. 6657 known as CARL is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled the instant case using the operative fact
doctrine. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies
to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have
the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of
the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.
The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the
FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and
homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.
On the second issue, Supreme Court held that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
constitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule
on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis
mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling
in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless
that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may
justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.
SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO
Facts:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA
regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
to petitioner.
It was stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has, No valid license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment; Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
the same code.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.
Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents as
members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No.
1205. The group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded
to the residence of the petitioner.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the
seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The
said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the
Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were
done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
can validly issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest under Article 38 of
the Labor Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Under the new Constitution, it is
only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it
was declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Section 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise
of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges
of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary
of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of no force and effect. The power of the President to order the arrest of
aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under
the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.”Furthermore, the search
and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that
the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things
to be seized.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
PEOPLE vs MATEO
Facts:
On October 30, 1996, one for each count of rape in ten information
filed, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court
and recommends an acquittal of the appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme
Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution
Ruling:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules
of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is
not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among
the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on
the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant.
Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to
convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the
Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical
dilemma.
Wherefore, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera
to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th
election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby dismissed.
In re: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
Facts:
This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel
Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent
Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in
the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors elections.
Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while
petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern
Mindanao, have had two National Presidents each. Following the rotation
rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region
in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP
for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. Petitioners asseverate that it is in
this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from
the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. The transfer of IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur, they add that he could have been disbarred
in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not
surrendered his California license to practice law.
Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position
of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on
May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. The respondent
asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy,
contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-
Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera can still practice the profession in the
Philippines
Ruling:
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature
for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from
being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.
Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for
the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the
post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably
too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to
decline the nomination. We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring
member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he
cannot be barred.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De
Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to
pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a
fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not
shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral
fitness to run for governor.
On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed
the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their
support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to
substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of
Court.
SANGUNIANG BAYAN of TAGUIG vs. ESTRELLA
Facts:
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then
mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate
proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In
his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the
municipality.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in
the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the
order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of
the matter, it was better to have a handwriting expert examine the
questioned ballots to settle once and for all the questions and objections
relative to the ballots. Complainants claim that: respondent gave
unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on the other hand, undue injury to
Mayor Garcia as well as to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of
their duly elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision
and reports were prepared, issued, and executed with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that respondent
conspired, confederated, and confabulated with the NBI officials concerned
and Papa to make the NBI Reports and the decision favorable to Papa; that
respondent did not bother to check the figures and to analyze the data
contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of said reports
would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that the hasty
transfer of ballot boxes from respondent's sala to that of Judge Vivencio
Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the
examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the judge himself
rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Estrella acted in accordance with his duty
Ruling:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of
14,664 ballots from 713 precincts and without the guidance of objections
from revisors, the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and
determination, sorted out as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6)
groups. This was done in a record time of less than two (2) months, from
March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.
To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of
ballots, is almost impossible to accomplish. One would have to spread the
14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a floor or table space
bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands
of ballots, pick at random groups of ballots – six groups in all – and, by
examining them, reach a conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups
were written by one person.
It is no doubt that this is simply an impossible procedure. And we are
not convinced that through this method, the NBI could correctly and with
scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.
Indubitably, the foregoing has raised the suspicion of partiality on the
part of respondent. Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are
intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary
that is capable of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial.
Wherefore, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious
misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a
fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
SOLID HOMES Inc. vs. LACERNA
Facts:
On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered
into a Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The
subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3,
Block I, Phase II, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600
square meters, more or less. The total contract price agreed upon by the
parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the manner
stipulated.
The respondents made the down payment and several monthly
installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase
price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final
payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands
of the respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint
for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28
June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In
their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was
only P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of
the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of
the said amount.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer
dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of
action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had
complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the
respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject
property. In view of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the
Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance
with the provisions of the same contract.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not reversing
the decision of the Office of the President.
Ruling:
The Petition is unmeritorious. The constitutional mandate that, “no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,” does not preclude
the validity of “memorandum decisions,” which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals.
This Court likewise declared that “memorandum decisions” comply
with the constitutional mandate. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in
administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to
decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled
“Judiciary,” and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect
to the judicial branch of government.
Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of
executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the
requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. Given the fact that the
respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject
property so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of
the Deed of Sale and the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB
Arbiter’s discretion to proceed hearing the respondents’ complaint in pursuit
of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the parties’ claims
and defenses. Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed
with the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both
parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled
by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the
balance of the purchase price of the subject property, after which, the
petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of
said property.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied.