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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PoliticalIslaminYemen:WhithertheIslahParty?
DANIEL T. MAHONEY III
MastersResearchPaperAdvised by Professor Charles F. Dunbar
Submitted April 13, 2009
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2009
DanielT.MahoneyIII
ALLRIGHTSRESERVED
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Iowemanythanksandaninexpressibledebtofgratitudetomyadvisor,
ProfessorCharlesF.Dunbar,whointroducedmetoYemeninthespringof2008.
IwouldalsoliketothankmyfamilyRosemary,Daniel,James,ChristineandKarenforall
theirloveandunderstandingthroughoutthisprocess.
AndthankyoutoaformerB.U.gradstudent,RepresentativeHarriettL.Stanley,whohasbeen
anexceptionallysupportivebosstheselasttwoyears.
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ABSTRACT:
Previoustounificationin1990,politicalpartieswereoutlawedinbothNorthandSouthYemen.
In
the
North,
the
General
Popular
Congress
(GPC)
was
the
political
organization
of
the
regime,
which ostensibly represented the interests of all Yemenis. In the South, itwas the Yemeni
SocialistParty(YSP)thatruled. Uponunification,politicalpartiesweremadelegalandamulti
partysystemwas inaugurated. The IslahPartywas formed shortlyafter theunification,and
wasagroupingof themoreconservativemembersofnorthernYemeni regime. Madeupof
tribal, religious and business interests, Islahwas instrumental in helping the President Salih
regimeassertdominanceovertheentirecountryby1994. Sincethen,however,thepartyhas
beenincreasinglymarginalizedbytheregimeleadingtoacompletebreakbetweenthetwoby
2005. By2008 Islah,asthe leaderofanoppositioncoalitioncalledthe JointMeetingParties
(JMP),wasabletotakeadvantageofaconfluenceofeconomic,ecologicalandsecuritycrises
affecting the regime to aid in their success to have elections scheduled for April 2009
postponedfortwoyears. WhilethisvictoryisthefirstofitstypeinYemen,andshowsthatthe
regime is inaweakened state, thedesignsof Islaharenotnecessarily theoverthrowof the
regime,butanequalplaceatthetablefacilitatedbyamoretransparentelectoralprocess. As
eventsarequitefluidinthecountryatthetimeofwriting,onecanbeonlycautiouslyoptimistic
thatthesegoalsoftheoppositionwillbegrantedinthetimeallotted. Thealternativemaybe
thatYemen
becomes
afailed
state.
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v
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Page
Abstract. iv
Introduction vi
ChapterOne 1
ChapterTwo.. 24
ChapterThree.. 40
ChapterFour
..
52
Annex....... 62
Footnotes...... 65
Bibliography 76
PaperProposal.. 83
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INTRODUCTION
AliAbdullahSalihfacesthegreatestchallengetohisruleinhismorethanthreedecadesas
Yemensauthoritarianpresident. Acountryheavilydependentonoilrevenue,Yemenhasseen
therecent
price
per
barrel
plummet
with
aconcomitant
slashing
of
its
annual
budget.
1
Corruptionisrampant. Inthenorththerearesignsthatthefifthwarinthecountrysnorthern
provinceofSaada,unilaterallyendedbytheregimelastsummer,isabouttobreakoutintoa
sixth.2 Inthesouththereisagrowingdissatisfactionwithperceivedeconomicmarginalization
thathasledtoarmedclashes,bombings,anddeathsatthehandsofsecurityforces. Tofurther
exacerbate the situation, therehavebeenan unprecedentednumberof terroristattacks in
the country during 2008, culminating in the January 2009 announcement that Yemeni and
SaudialQaedagroupshadunifiedandwouldoperateoutofYemen.3
In the past, Salih has had success in overcoming awide variety of foes and daunting
politicalandeconomicchallengesathomeandabroadandhasbeenverysuccessfulinmaking
himself
by
far
the
most
consequential
leader
the
country
has
known
since
the
1962
revolution
thatoverthrewtheImamate.Ontheheelsofinfrastructuraldevelopment,hisregimewasable
toextenditsreachintopreviouslyautonomousregionsduringthe1980s.4 In1979Hecreated
theGeneralPopularCongress(GPC)apoliticalorganization5thatbroughtalltheinfluential
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viii
inYemento thepoliticaltable: modernists,technocratsand influentialtribalists;evenexiled
formerpresidentsAbdullahalSallalandAbdulRahmanYahyaalIryani. Adecade laterSalih
wouldplaya largepart increatingamultipartypoliticalsystemuponunificationof the two
YemensthatwouldultimatelyextendhisreachacrossthewholeofunifiedYemen.
Atthesametime,Salihhasalsoenjoyedsuccess inhisnearandmoredistantabroads.
Thoughhewasmetwithearly resistancebySaudiArabiaatundefinednorthernandeastern
borders,SalihwasstillabletoabletobuildagoodrelationshipwiththeUSasaresultofhis
partnershipwithRayHuntandtheYemenHuntOilCompany. Mr.Huntscompanydiscovered
oil inYemen in1984. In1989,thePresidentseizedontheopportunitycreatedbytheendof
the ColdWar to engineer the unification of north and south Yemen andwas successful in
maintainingthatunityinthefaceofa1994SaudiArabiansponsoredsecessionbyformerSouth
Yemenileaders.6 In1990,YemenandSaudiArabiafinallyreconciledtheirdifferenceoverthe
borderbetween thetwocountries.7 Salihmadegreatstrides in repairingagreatlydamaged
relationshipbetweenYemenandtheU.S.thatresulted fromYemenstacitsupportof Iraq in
199091. SoonafterSeptember11,2001,heandhis formerprimeministerengaged intheir
own shuttle diplomacywithWashingtonD.C.,declaring their support for theU.S. Waron
Terror.8
The Yemeni Grouping for Reform, hereafter referred to as Islah, emerged as a part of
Salih'sgrandpoliticaldesignuponunificationofthetwoYemensin1990.9Withthelegalization
andproliferationofpoliticalpartiesatunification,Islahscreationwasessentiallyjustapeeling
offofthemostconservativeGPCmembersbywhichSalihandhisregimehopedtocounteract
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ix
whatever influencetheYemeniSocialistParty(YSP)theformerrulingregime intheSouth
had at unification. As an Islamist political party, though dominated by conservative tribal
memberspersonifiedbyIslahsleaderSheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmar,therewasadeep
seated animosity towards the godlessmembers of the YSP. This ultimately gave political
coveragetotheSalihregimeasitdeclawedthatparty. Afterthecivilwarof1994,theremay
havebeenanexpectationthatIslahwouldbecomethepermanentloyalopposition.
In 2005, Islah decided it was no longer prepared to play the role of a permanent
opposition.Today,IslahisenteringitsfourthyearofunitedoppositiontotheSalihregimeasde
factoheadoftheJointMeetingParties(JMP). Atthiscrucialcrossroads,itfacesthechoiceof
either remaining with the old Salihdominated system or further entrenching itself in
opposition. In late February, Salihs GPC and the Islahled JMP agreed to postpone
parliamentaryelections(scheduledforlateApril2009)foranothertwoyears.10
Broughtabout
byinternationalpressureandtheunitedoppositionoftheJMP,11
thetwoyearhiatusincreases
thelikelihoodofaresolutionofelectoraldisagreementsinfavoroftheopposition. Itwillalso
allowmoretimeforIslahtocapitalizeonthecontinuing ineffectivenessandcorruptionofthe
Yemeni regime.12
As the Yemeni ship of state lists, Islah now has ample time to consider
whethertoabandonship.
As mentioned previously, many scholars and observers believe Yemen may be fast
approachingfailedstatestatusalongthelinesofSomalia.13
Canitbeavoided? Itiswithinthis
contextthattheroleofIslahwillbeconsideredinthisstudy. Tothatend,theaimofthispaper
willbetoaddressthreeinterconnectedquestionsregardingIslah: (1)Willthepartybeableto
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x
maintain its splitwith the Salih regime andhisGPC? (2)Will thisbreak have the effect of
breakingtheauthoritarianruleofSalihsregime?and(3)Willtheoutcomebethedawnofreal
politicalpluralisminYemen?
Thepaperconsistsoffourchapters. ThefirstchapterwilldealwiththehistoryofIslahup
totheparliamentaryelectionsof2003,coveringawidehistoricalperiodfromIslahsoriginsto
its first true, though tentative, splitwith the regime. The chapterwill describehow Islahs
growingexposuretootherpoliticaltendencies,coupledwiththeregimeseffortstomarginalize
itasapoliticalparty,inevitablypusheditintotheoppositionalcamp.
ChapterTwowill speak to thecurrent stateof theparty,paying specialattention to the
periodafterthesummerof2005whenIslahmadethefatefuldecisiontodecisivelyallywiththe
JMP. MuchofthischaptersfocuswillbeontheJMP,asIslahsabilitytomaintainitssplitwith
theregimeisdirectlyrelatedtothepreservationofthisalliance. Anotherreasonforaddressing
thealliance
as
awhole
is
because
the
constituent
members,
for
the
most
part,
have
been
quite
adeptatcontainingpartydifferenceswhenconsideringthebroader issuesatstake inYemen.
Wewill conclude this chapter by looking at the currentpolitical crisis surrounding the now
postponedparliamentaryelections,scheduled forApril27,2009beforebeingpostponedthis
past February, making clear the dangers to both regime and opposition in what Gregory
Johnsentermsanelectoralgameofchicken.14
ChapterThreewill lookattheperennialchaosthat isYemen. Thechapterwillcontaina
survey of the current crises contributing to the instability of the Salih Regime: political
stalemate,war,secessionism, Islamicradicalism,economicandecologicaldisaster.And itwill
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seektoexplaintherolethatthe IslahledJMPplays inmitigating,orstoking,theseproblems.
Wewill also showhow Islahs relationshipwith theopposition especially in regard to the
instabilityintheSouthhasbenefitedthemthroughexposuretopoliticalproblemstheymay
nothaveconsideredotherwise. Apositiveeffectofthispoliticallearningmaybeanexpanded
politicalsupportbase.
ChapterFourwillcontaintheconclusion. Itwilldemonstratethat,whiletheJMPcoalition
isextremely fractured,15
lessening theirchancesofbreaking theauthoritarian ruleofSalihs
regime; in fact, Islahoffers thebesthope for effecting significantpolitical change in Yemen
today. Asrecenteventsshow,suchasthepostponementofparliamentaryelectionsasaresult
ofunifiedoppositiontotheregimesbusinessasusualapproach,adifferent futuremaybe in
storeforArabiaFelix,onethatmostscholarsareskepticalof;namely,thedawnofrealpolitical
pluralisminYemenwithIslahatthehelm.
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1
CHAPTERONETHEEARLYYEARS
PRELUDETOTHEUNITARYSTATE:
Throughout the 1970s, therewere both ongoing discussions about unifying North and
SouthYemen,aswellaspartisansofeitherregimeseekingtotoppletheother. In1979,soon
after the ascension to the presidency of Ali Abdullah Salih, the southern based National
DemocraticFront (NDF),essentiallyapartofthePDRYsrulingpartysapparatus,16
launched
border skirmishes with the northern regime, in part with widespread if secret support of
northerners inaneffortto forciblyunify thetwocountriesunderthePDRY flag.17
TheNDF
wasultimatelydefeatedasaresultofsupportforSalihbyan informalgroupofconservatives
andIslamistsknownastheIslamicFront.
TheIslamicFrontwasmadeuplargelyofMuslimBrotherhoodmembersandconservative
triballeaders. ItwassupportedbySheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmar,andwassuppliedby
theUnitedStatesviaRiyadhatatimewhentheUnitedStateswaseagertostrengthenrelations
with Saudi Arabia.18
As Schwedler notes in Islam, Democracy, and the Yemeni State, the
willingnessof IslamicFrontmembers to fight for the regimestemmed fromtheirestablished
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tiesand their viewof the Souths socialists asa commonenemy. Thearmed struggles also
cemented the Islamic Fronts relationshipwith the Norths President Salih,who had taken
power in 1978.When Salih launched theGPC in 1982, Islamic Frontmembers,whowould
foundIslaheightyearslater,playedimportantroles.19
InTheHighWaterMarkofIslamistPolitics?TheCaseofYemen,AprilLongleysupportsthe
view20thattheGPCwascreated inthe1980sasacatchall,corporatistpartyofthepolitical
centerwiththeabilitytostiflecompetitionbyabsorbingcompetitors.21
Andregardlessof
itscurrent iterationasapoliticalparty, it still remainsan umbrella foravarietyofpolitical
philosophies, andhas traditionallybeen able toeludeopposition partlybecause it canbuy
supportersandpartlybecauseSalih isanexpertatcooptionand inclusion.22
In fact,Salih is
suchasuccessfulauthoritarianruler,thatSheilaCarapicocouldwritethatthetop leadership
inSanaain1995wasvirtuallyidenticaltowhatithadbeenin1985,withtheadditionofonlya
fewselfdeclaredIslamistsandacoupleoftokenproSanaasocialists.23
Around the same time that Salihs regime crystallized, Yemenwas also fastbecoming a
recipient of oil revenues, workers remittances and increased economic aid from abroad.
Looking back, William Burrowes would echo the sentiments of Eva Bellin, who said
governmentswith access to rentsusuallypaid themselves first,24
commenting in theMiddle
EastJournalthatthestatequickly,andforthefirsttime,becameaprincipalsourceofwealth
andprivategain for thewellplacedand fortunate few. Asa result, the systemhasevolved
largely intoa specialvariantofoligarchy,akleptocracy i.e.governmentof,by,and for the
thieves.25
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Manyrecipientsofthis largesse,fromconservativetribal leadersto Islamists,wouldsoon
formthepoliticalpartycentraltoourstudy: Islah. AsSarahPhillipsreports,Zaydirepublicans
likeSalihandAhmar[SheikhAbdullah]reliedonSunniMuslims,particularlytheBrotherhood,
tocounterthreatsfromtheformerlyMarxistsouth. Yemenipoliticsarenotreligioussectarian
divisions per se, but are based on a complexweb of tribal, social, religious and politically
expedientalliances.26
President Salih ranNorth Yemen in adecentralizedwaywith the supportof the tribes,
Islamistsand themilitary.27
Asmentioned,SalihsGPCwasmoreofanumbrella forvarious
politicaltrendswithintheYARthanapoliticalpartywithasetideology. ThoughtheGPCwould
begintodevelopalongpartylinesafterunification,thegovernmentoftheNorthwasbasically
anautocraticregimejoiningwithanother,theSouthsYSP, ledbyPresidentAliSalimalBidh,
undertheconditionofatransitiontodemocracy.28
PROMINENTISLAHIS:SheikhAbdullahbinHusseinalAhmarandthealAhmarfamilyhaveplayedaprominent
role in theHistory of Yemen. His fatherHussein BinNasser AlAhmarwas the paramount
sheikhoftheHashid,thestrongestYemenitribalconfederationand,untilthe1950s,alliesof
theImamate. In1959,SheikhHusseinandhissonHamidwereexecutedbyImamAhmedafter
Husseinspearheaded
atribal
alliance
that
failed
to
topple
the
Imam.29
As
Burrowes
relates,
they were executed despite the traditional rules of hospitality and safeconduct for
negotiationsmakingtheHashidleadersand,inparticular,ShaykhAbdullahbitterenemiesof
the Imamate.30
Bythe1960s,SheikhAbdullahnowparamountSheikhoftheHashidhad
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risentoprominenceforhisroleintherevolution. In1969hewaselectedtochairtheNational
Council for Yemen Arab Republic; which went on to write the North Yemens permanent
constitution.
WhileSheikhAbdullah lostsomeofhis influence intheearly1970s,heregainedmuchof
hisprominencewhenPresidentSalih came topower in1978. He servedon thePresidents
ConsultativeCouncilfromitsfoundationin1979,andin1982,becameamemberoftheGPCs
PermanentCommitteeuntilYemeniunificationin1990. UponunificationofthetwoYemens,
SheikhAbdullahformedthe Islahparty,and in1993waselectedtoparliamentwherehewas
electedSpeakerinthefirstelectionsofunifiedYemen.HewouldleadbothIslahandparliament
untilhisdeathinDecember2007.
SheikhAbdalMajidalZindani is amajor advocateof radical Islam inYemen. InCairo
duringthe late1950shewasexposedtotheMuslimBrotherhoodandbecame interested in
therelationship
between
science
and
the
Quran,
which
is
often
termed
al
i'jaz
al
'almi,
or
the
scientificwondersoftheQuran.31
Duringthe1970sherosetoprominenceastheheadofthe
state agency responsible for moral guidance and as a founder of the Yemeni Muslim
Brotherhood in North Yemen. He and fellowMuslim brothers were also seized on as a
counterweighttotheNDFaboutthistimebythenpresidentIbrahimMohamedalHamdi,who
appointedalZindaniasGuide.
In1983,ZindaniwasmadetheMinisterofEducation,apositionhedidnotholdlongashe
upsetmanypeople. Itwasunderhistenureandwithhissupport,alongwithSalihandSheikh
Abdullah, that scientific institutes, backed by Saudi funding, opened and began spreading
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Sunnismacrossthecountryasacounterweighttothesocialists.32 Marginalizedpoliticallyand
inexilethroughoutthe1980s,hispolitical fortunesrevivedagain inthe1990s whenhewas
persuadedbySalihtoreturnfromSaudiArabia,wherehehadbeenforthegreaterpartof1979
through1993,with thepromiseofa seaton thepowerful fivepersonPresidentialCouncil.33
Uponhisreturn,healsobecametheheadoftheIslamicistwingofIslah.34
AsGregoryJohnsenwrites,Inthepoliticalarena[Zindani] isafrighteningman,whohas
advocatedviolenceanddestructionforthosewhodisagreewithhim.35
Hewasamentorto
OsamabinLaden,whomhemetwhenateacherattheInstitutefortheScientificInimitabilityof
theQuranandSunnah. The institutewasbasedatKingAbdalAzizUniversity inJeddah,and
was thesite fromwhichZindani recruitedSaudisandYemenisto fight inAfghanistanagainst
the Soviets. In 1994, it was his contacts with former AfghanArabs that aided Salih in
defeatingthesouthsattemptsatsecession.
MuhammadQahtan,
Muhammad
al
Yadumi
and
Abdul
Wahab
al
Anisi
represent
the
moderateMuslimBrotherhoodwingwithin Islah. Allthreearepartyintellectualswhooccupy
administrativepositionswithinIslah,andweremostcommonlycitedfortheirpragmatismby
both IslahandnonIslahmembersof the JMP.36
Qahtan isa foundingmemberof Islahand
currentlyleadsitspoliticalofficewhileservingonitsShuraCouncil. MorethanalYadumioral
Anisi,heisnotoriousforhissharpcritiqueofboththeGPCandSalih.
AlYadumi isa formermemberofSalihssecurityapparatuswhowentontobecomethe
firsteditorofalSahwaanewspaperfundedbytheMuslimBrotherhoodatitsfoundationin
1985andcurrentlyIslahspartypaper. HeisalongtimememberofIslahspoliticalbureauwho
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wentontoserveasthepartyssecretarygeneraluntilFebruary2007,whenalAnisi,thepartys
firstsecretarygeneral,reassumedtherole.
AlAnisi
was
considered
the
third
of
Islahs
formal
leaders,
after
Sheikhs
Abdullah
and
Zindani. In1995DreschandHaykelwouldwritethathewasregardedatallpointsasenjoying
excellentrelationswiththepresident'sassociates.37
Thisisexemplifiedbythefactthat,when
badly defeated in 1993 parliamentary elections, Salih gave him a seat on the Council of
Ministers. Afterthecivilwarof1994SalihwouldelevatehimtothepostofFirstDeputyPrime
MinisterthehighestposteverheldbyanIslahi.38
Currently,hisclosenesstotheregimeisin
question. InstrumentalintyingIslahtotheJMPalliance,herecentlyfinishedaoneyearterm
asheadoftheJMP.
ISLAHANDTHEREPUBLICOFYEMEN,THEFIRSTFOURYEARS:
SoonaftertheunificationofYemen,therewasaproliferationofnewpoliticalparties: the
unification agreement of the new Republic of Yemen (ROY) lifted the official legal ban on
oppositionparties. Followingthisaction,severalgroupssplitfromtheGPCandformedtheir
own parties.39
Chief among these was Islah. Depending on the source, the party was
comprisedof:1. Intellectualreformist Islamists (or the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, personified by
moderates such asAbdulWahab alAnisi), a conservative tribal group (ledby Sheikh
Abdullah), and a conservativeradical salafi group (best personified by the infamous
SheikhAbdalMajidalZindani).40
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2. Or an alliance of leading tribalpersonalities, Islamists, and
businessmen.41
Islahwas formedlargelyfrommembersofthe
GPCinanefforttomarginalizetheYSPandgive
a distinct political voice to the GPCs more
religiously inclinedmembers.42
Theywere like
theGPCinsofarastheirpoliticswereastyleof
patronageand
connections
rather
than
of
ideology or of activists as vanguard of the
masses(seesidebar).43
Islah was not and is not the only Islamist
group to form in Yemen upon unification,
thoughtheyarethe largest. Therealsoexisted
radical groups who reject Islahs political
participation, and are best described as
salafiyyin (returning directly to evidence of
scripture): precisely the sort of people others
[incorrectly]tag
as
quintessentially
Islah.44
In
reality,Islahseesitselfastherepresentativeofthemoderatepartofthereligiouscivilsociety
rather than an Islamic movement that aims at implementing its conservative theological
doctrine.45Salafisare,byandlarge,outside Islah. Most Islamistswithinthe Islahpartyare
PATRONAGESalihsregimehastraditionallybeenheldtogetherby
patronage garnered by oil rents. Early on, Salih
recruited traditional tribal leaders and powerful
localinterests
into
asystem
that
[gave]
them
astake
in thestatusquo. Oneofthose tribal leaderswas
SheikhAbdullah,whowas a major stakeholder in
thepatronagenetwork. WiththepurchaseofSheikh
Abdullahssupport,theeffectsofextremistpolitical
Islam were dampened by subsuming it within the
frameworkofthelargerandmoremoderateYemeni
MuslimBrotherhoodfactionwithinIslah.1
This system of patronage, which is pervasive,
includes the selective distribution of benefits and
applicationof
punishments,
granting
a
huge
amount ofpower to the regimewhich extends to
theawardingofallgovernmentjobs. Itisclaimedto
be the biggest obstacle to reform that Yemen
faces.2 Withtheconclusionofthecivilwarin1994,
the regime dismantled court systems in the south
and encouraged the tribalization of problem
resolution there. Thispenetrationconsolidated the
regimes patronagesupported dominance
throughout Yemen. Oil receipts that have funded
thisnetworkuntilnow,however,aredwindling. To
maintaincontrol,
the
regime
will
have
to
find
alternatewaystomaintainitspreeminence.3
1YEMEN:Stateisdeterioratingandcouldfail,OxfordAnalytica
(http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB142377;accessed
March31,2009),May1,2008.2SarahPhillips,EvaluatingPoliticalReforminYemen,pg.13.3Janglingnerves,TheEconomist,
(http://www.economist.com/world/mideast
africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12342204;accessedMarch31,
2009),October2,2008.
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build, and historically benefited from, political and economic patronage
extending from the regime. In addition,many Islahi tribesmenhave entered
businessthroughgovernmenttiesandmustmaintainallegiancetotheregime
inordertoprotecttheircompanies.Giventheseconnections,manyshaykhsin
Islahsee
their
financial
and
political
fortunes
tied
to
the
regime
as
much
or
morethantoIslah.52
Islahspoliticalprogramwouldcomeintoviewintheleaduptoparliamentaryelectionsin
1993. PredictableMuslimBrotherhoodsloganssuchasIslamistheSolution,andTheQuran
and the Sunna supersede the constitution and the law were a staple, as were slogans
promising the implementation of sharia and the rejection of secularism. Their political
manifestodeclaredsupportforthepeacefultransferofpowerthroughelectionsandfocused
on the centrality of the Islamic concept of Shura.53
In effect, it presented itself as the
conservativepartyoftraditionalvaluesand,whilebasicallyanIslamistpoliticalparty,glossed
over the realdifferenceswithinandbeyond thepartyamongWahhabis,Salafis, theMuslim
Brotherhoodandothertendencies.54
PresidentSalihandhisGPCsupportedthefoundationof Islahasacounterbalancetothe
YSP,whowereseenasthemainthreattotheGPCin1990. Theywerealsoacounterbalanceto
YemensZaydiforcesastheyespousedclassicallySunniideas.55
AsEricWatkinsreports,Islahi
leaderswerediscreetpartnersinSalihsplantodismantletheYSP evenasSalihagreedtothe
mergerofthetwoYemensbasedonsharedpowerbetweentheGPCandYSPandathreeyear
transitionalperiod
leading
to
elections.
Salih
undertook
aseparate
and
secret
relationship
with the fundamentalistalIslahParty,aimedat securing thedemiseofhispoliticalpartners
fromtheSouthandgivinghimfullcontrolofthenewlyfoundedstate.56
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Islahwas coled by SheikhAbdullah and Sheikh Zindani. The glue that kept these two
together (Sheikh Abdullah being classified as a cowboy conservative by Sheila Carapico,
Zindani as a doctrinal puritan) was their shared common antipathy to certain traditions
associatedwith the imamate. AlongwithSalih, theywereidentifiedasSaudiclientswho
bothprosperedundertheSalihadministrationanddespisedcommunistsandWesterners.57
Sheikh Abdullahwas seen early on not as an opponent of the president but as someone
sufficiently connectedwith the president to intervene with him,58
while ZindanisMuslim
BrotherhoodhadbeenasactiveasAbdullahsHashidTribalConfederationintheIslamicFront.
ISLAHSEARLYCLASHESWITHTHEYSP:
Withunification Islahpursued anythingbut inclusivity.As Jillian Schwedler relates, Islah
broughttogetherarangeofpoliticalactorsunderthebannerofan Islamistpoliticalparty in
large part to aid the leaders of the former North in defeating the Souths YSP in national
electionsand
thus
diminishing
southern
power
in
postuinification
Yemen.
59
At
their
foundation they were not concerned with democracy at all but with antisecularism and
Islamistrhetoric.60
IslahsattemptstosubverttheYSPpoliticallybeganin1991. Therewasareferendumon
theconstitutionaskingwhethertheshariashouldbethesoleorprincipalsourceoflaw. Islah
hadfavored
the
former
formulation
and,
sensing
defeat,
had
ultimately
called
for
aboycott
of
thereferendum. Inthisparticularinstance,theYSPandimportantelementsoftheGPCclosed
ranksagainst Islah'sclaimsand the languageadoptedwasprincipal.61
What is interesting,
however, is that Islahs argument that the referendumwas undemocratic as therewas no
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discussionon itsubstancebutwasmerelya yesor nopropositionwas itsfirstserious
engagementofademocracynarrative,andtheonlyoneforseveralyears.62
Thenext
scuffle
took
place
in
1992
over
Zindanis
scientific
institutes.
As
mentioned
earlier,ZindaniwasinstrumentalinfoundingtheseQuranicschoolsinNorthYemenaboutthe
same timeheorganized theYemeniMuslimBrotherhood.The instituteswereclaimed tobe
frontsofIslamistmilitancybytheYSP. Ascallsforjihadversusthegodlesscommunistsofthe
YSP grew louder from 1990 onwards, the confrontation was finally taken public during
parliamentarydebatein1992.63
The instituteshave theirorigins in the IslamicFront,andwere founded soonafter their
defeat of the NDF in the early 1980s. Many key commanders of the Islamic Front were
subsequentlyrecruited intotheAfghanjihadand,upontheirreturntoYemen,setupschools
similar to those founded in Afghanistan to indoctrinate youth against the Soviets.64
The
proliferationof
these
institutes,
by1987,thereweremorethan1,100 institutes throughout
the country claiming as many as 118,000 students,65
was owed to the fact that Zaydi
republicanslikePresidentSalihand SheikhAbdullahhadreliedonSunniMuslims,particularly
theBrotherhood,tocounterthreatsfromtheformerlyMarxistsouth.66
Inaveryrealsense,
theseSaudifinancedandWahhabicenteredschoolswereturningoutaYemeniTaliban.
Theseinstitutes
also
spread
into
parts
of
the
YAR,
such
as
the
Saada
region,
that
had
only
recentlybeenpenetratedby the republican regime. Saadawaspartof thenorthern Zaydi
tribalareaconsideredthe heartlandoftheoldZaydiregime,andhadremained loyalto the
imamateuntilthebitterend(1970). SalihusedtheseWahhabiinstitutesthereinthe1980s
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againstthe[Zaydi]sayyids,someofwhomretainedproimamatesympathiesandtocounter
Zaydiparochialschooling.67
Theseinstitutes
were
suspected
to
be
an
important
contributor
to
the
assassination
campaignagainsttheYSP (acampaignthattargetedmorethan100oftheir leadersbetween
1990and199468). Tomakemattersworse,theROYwasfundingtheseinstitutes. Inessence,
the YSP was a coalition partner in a government that was carrying out an assassination
campaignagainstthem. ItwasonlynaturalthattheYSPwouldpursuegovernmentdefunding
of these institutes, and incredible that the leadersof Islahwouldbecomeenragedover the
possibility and stepup attackson YSPparliamentarians. SheikhAbdullahhimself raised the
specter ofjihad and,when the legislation to defund the institutes passed, the Speaker of
Parliament, who was a member of the YSP, had his home attacked with rocketpropelled
grenades.69
Theinstituteslostgovernmentfundingbutremainedopen.70
Amidstthese
disagreements,
the
first
ever
multi
party
parliamentary
contest
approached.
Sinceunification,theunifiedROYparliamenthadsimplybeentheamalgamationofformerYAR
andPDRYparliaments. April27,199371
andtheprecedingfreeandopendebateonissuesand
ideology,however,wouldmarkthebirthoforganizedmasspoliticsinaregionwherepolitical
powerhas long remained a closelyheld family affair.72
Itwould alsomark the endof the
unificationprocessinYemen.
ItwasinthisspiritintherunuptoelectionsthatIslahheldtheirUnityandPeaceparty
conference, adopting the slogan theQuran and the Sunna supersede the constitution and
[secular]law.73
Theironyofaconferenceonunityandpeaceadoptingsuchasloganwasnot
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loston theYSP,whomusthave feltquite skepticalof its intentions amidstan assassination
campaignthatwaskillingmanyprominentYSPmembers.
THE1993PARLIAMENTARYELECTIONS:TheYemenisfacedagargantuantaskinconstructinganelectoralsystemfromscratchin
ordertoholdelections. TheprocesswascarriedoutbyanewlycreatedSupremeElections
Committee(SEC),whichdrewup301equallypopulatedvotingdistrictsandestablishedallthe
proceduresassociatedwiththeelectoralprocess,suchasvoterandcandidateregistration,
campaigning,voting,observationandcounting. SheilaCarapiconotesthatinternational
electionmonitors,journalists,andobserverswereuniformlyimpressed,whilenotingthe
processwasnotwithoutincident. Choosingtoremainoptimistic,shedeemedincidentssuch
asballotstuffing,briberyandgunfireresultingindeathastestimonytoacompetitiveand
pluralistenvironment.74
The positive impact of the 1993 parliamentary elections cannot be overstated; and the
hopefulness of Carapicos article analyzing the event soon thereafter should not be
diminished.75
However,with thebenefitofhindsightandwith somehumorPaulDresch
unveiledthetruenatureofthe1993electoralprocess:
There were certainly irregularities (famously Hamid alAhmar in Hajjah
removedtheballotboxesatgunpoint;theYSPofficetherewasdestroyedby
bazooka fire) but generally the pollingwas conducted fairly. The subtleties
precedingthepollwerecomplex. InseveralplacesGPCandIslahcededplace
one to the other, and vast numbers of independent candidates coalesced,
realignedandsuddenlywithdrew inpatternsspecifictoeachconstituencybut
producinga result inwhichGPCmanagershadconfidencebefore theprocess
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started[emphasisadded].76
TheGPCandIslahwereincahoots,andtheirtargetwastheYSP. Notonlydoestheabove
quoteencapsulatethepracticeofcoordination,apracticewherebypoliticalpartiesmake
decisionsonelectedseatsaheadofanelection,butitevidencesthecorruptionofthebody
chargedtooverseetheelectionstheSEC.
AftertheAprilelectionswereoverandthedusthadsettled, itturnedoutthatwhilethe
GPChadgained themostseats farandaway, Islah77
hadnudged theYSP forsecondplace.78
Therehad
also
been
GPC/Islah
coordination
on
more
than
one
third
of
the
301
parliamentary
seats. AsDreschandHaykelwouldwrite,duringthe1993elections,itwassaid,nolessthan
seventyIslahcandidateswithdrewinfavorofGPCcandidates,whilethirtypeopleelectedinthe
name of the GPC were in fact Islah supporters.79
There there occurred a scuffle over
appointments to the 5man presidential council and the apportionment of secretariats of
whichIslahtooksomeincludingtheSecretariatofAwqaf(endowments).
Thebiggestpointofcontention,however,wasoverthemakeupofthepresidentialcouncil
where thepresidentandvicepresidentwerechosenandexecutivepowerwielded. Because
Islah had outpolled the YSP, they demanded a seat on the fiveman council. Prior to the
election, itwascomposedof twoYSPmembersandthreeGPCmembers. Interestingly, Islah
wasgranted
aseat
at
the
expense
of
the
GPC,
and
not
the
YSP,
reconfiguring
the
makeup
to
be
221. InOctober1993SheikhAbdullah,whohadbeenelectedSpeakerofParliament,put
forwardaslateforthepresidentialcouncilwithZindaniastheIslahcandidate. Inparliamentary
voting,ZindaniplacedthirdaftertheGPCcandidatesbutinfrontofbothYSPcandidates,one
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ofwhomdidnotreceivesufficientvotes. Obviously,thisdidnotsitwellwiththealBidhand
theYSPasZindaniwasthemostnotoriousradicalwithin Islahandhisnominationcouldhave
easilybeenperceivedasaslapinthefacetotheformerrulersoftheSouth.
Throughoutlate1993andintoearly1994,manyconferenceswereorganizedinaneffortto
resolvetheimpasseoverpowersharing. EffortsbyneutralgroupssuchastheYemeniNational
Dialogue of Political Forces aswell as other conciliatory groups, however,were ultimately
thwartedwiththeassassinationofalBidhssonswhenacompromiseseemedintheoffing. In
early 1994, alBidh took himself toAden andmade the fateful decision to reconstitute the
formerPDRY.80
THE1994CIVILWAR:
Ithasbeensaidthatthecivilwarcanbeexplainedasarejectionofpluralismanddialogue
bybothmilitary leadershipswhoultimatelywanted tomaximize theirdomain,whichmeant
eitherhalfthepowerinunifiedYemenorasecededautonomoussouthernstatetoalBidh,and
totalcontrolofaunifiedYementoSalih.81
Islahwas firmlyfavoredthe totalcontroloption
and,asinthedaysofoldwhentheIslamicFronthadaidedSalihagainsttheNDFintheinfancy
ofhisYARregime,soIslahaidedSalihintheinfancyofhisnewestregime.
Intermittent skirmishing had been occurring since early 1994, but the true war got
underwayonApril27,1994inthecityofAmran. Inacalltoarms,severalIslamistsclaimedthat
tofighttheYSPwasjihad. AbdalWahhabalDaylami,amemberofIslahsoontobecomethe
ROYsMinisterofJustice,issuedafatwadeclaringsocialistskafirandtheirkillingsanctioned.82
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BothSheikhAbdullahandZindaniwerescathing intheirdenunciationoftheYSP,andZindani
wassuccessfulinrecruitingmanyAfghanveteransintothefight.83
Themajority
of
Islahi
Islamist
support,
however,
was
moral.
Though
Islamist
auxiliaries
mayhaveprovidedcriticalsupportinsomeinstances,andbeenstoriedtohaveadvancedlike
antsasifblindinthefaceofheavyfire,thetruthisthattheirtotalforcenevernumberedmore
than5,000.84
Thebulkofthefighting,andcasualties,werebornbynortherndraftees.
Withinthreemonths,theYemeniArmyhadtakenAdenandthewarforsecessionwaslost.
AsSanaa
radio
ever
colorful
would
proclaim
on
V
Day,
[Bidh]
and
his
deviant
gang
had
wageredontheirmilitarymachine. Theyhavefoundthemselvesascumdrowninginthemud
oftreasonatwhichallYemenisspit.85
ItwasthusthatIslahhadactedasaproxyofSalihsin
thedestructionoftheYSPasapoliticalopponent. WithalBidhs failure,heandmanyother
topleadersofthepartysoughtasylumoutsideYemenwhileinsidemanytopleadershadbeen
assassinatedover
the
previous
three
years.
As
aresult,
Islah
moved
in
to
take
many
of
the
vacatedYSPSecretariatsandtheYSPasanoppositionpartywouldbeadministeredablow
fromwhichitisonlybeginningtorecover.
The Civil War of 1994 may be seen as a pretext for quickly adopted constitutional
amendments that rescinded many of the progressive reforms allowed since the 1990
unification.86Sarah
Phillips
explains
the
sweeping
nature
of
these
changes:
InSeptember1994,barelytwomonthsafterthefightingceased,constitutional
amendments were passed by a special committee, without a popular
referendum.TheYSPsdefeat in thewarcosttheparty itsparliamentaryveto,
allowingamendmentstobedrawnupbytherulingGPCIslahcoalition.Closeto
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half of the original articles in the constitution were amended, and 29 new
articleswere added. The amendments abolished the Presidential Council and
broadened thepowersof thepresident.ThePresidentialCouncil,which in the
1991 constitution was a fivemember body elected by the parliament, was
replacedby
the
Consultative
Council
(Majlis
al
Shura),
whose
59
(now
111)
membersareappointedbythepresident.UnlikethePresidentialCouncilbefore
it,theMajlisalShurawasinitiallyanadvisorybodythatcouldnotissuebinding
resolutions,althoughithassincebeengrantedsomeminorlegislativefunctions.
The legal code of the former South, much of which was quite progressive,
particularlyregardingwomen,wasalsoformallynullified.Furtherconsolidating
power in the executive, the amended constitution allowed the president to
appoint theprimeminister,head theSupreme JudicialCounciloverriding the
constitutionalseparationofpowersanddecreelawswhenparliamentwasnot
in
session.
87
AsSchwedlernoted,therewasasubstantialcoolingdownofthe politicalopening.88
Atthe
same time, there were also postwar midlevel defections from Islah to the GPC,89
quite
possiblywiththeassumptionthatthedaysofpartypoliticswasover.
TheWar also allowed for a reconstituted Political SecurityOrganization that resumed
extrajudicial
detentions
during
the
state
of
emergency
and
which
continued
to
assert
itself
well
afterSalihandtheGPChadconsolidatedruleengagingintheusualArabroundupofregime
criticsduringthe1997elections.90
Responsibilityofthepress,notfreedom,becamethenew
byword,allowingSalihsconsolidatedregimetoforestalltherestorationoftheprivilegesand
toleranceestablishedduringthefouryearliberalinterlude. CivilSocietynowrepresenteda
fragile
but
still
meaningful
defense
against
extra
legal
harassment
by
security
personnel
and
publicprosecutors.91
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ISLAHENTERSTHEWILDERNESS:
Salih awardedmany political offices formerly held by the YSP to Islah after thewar as
booty.92
For
their
part,
Islah
used
moderates
to
fill
ministerial
posts
ameaningful
decision
as
itsuggestedtheIslahleadershipsrealizationthattomaximizethepartysinfluence,itneeded
to presentministers thatwould receive bothwide government support aswell as popular
acceptance.93 Thetruthofthematter,however,wasthatfollowingtheYSPsdefeat,theSalih
regimenolongerhadanyneedforIslah.
Illustrativeof
Islahs
marginalization
following
the
civil
war
was
the
award
to
the
party
of
onlyprimarilyserviceministriesas rewardforsupportofaunifiedYemen. Thiswasjustthetype of political opening that represented a closing of political space as the Salih regime
channeled Islahs political participation in fields, serviceministries,whose reformwould be
painfulanddifficult,andthusunpopularwiththecitizenry.94
Theleveloffrustrationoverthe
inabilityto
accomplish
anything
led
to
an
exodus
from
government
of
Islah
ministers
who
felt
theirattemptsatreformhadbeenidentifiedasIslamistbytheGPCinordertobuildresistance
totheirefforts.95
Theflightwascompletebytheendof1996.
Withthe1997parliamentaryelectionsonlyayearout,theGPCannounceditsintentionto
attain themajorityof seats in Parliament.96
This angered Islah greatly,whose rankandfile
memberswere
feeling
increasingly
marginalized.
The
party
responded
by
entering
into
discussionswithYemens firstpoliticalopposition coalition,ofwhich theYSPwas the senior
party, theSupremeCoordinationCouncil forOpposition (SCCO).97
TheMuslimBrotherhood,
whichwasthemoderateIslamistvoicewithinthepartyandranitsinformationarm,eventoyed
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with the ideaofboycottingelections. While thepoliticalpowerof important figureswithin
Islahmayhavebeenon the increase, suchasSheikhAbdullah, their risewasowingmore to
theirpersonalclosenesswithSalihandhisregimethanpartyaffiliation.98
While nothing ultimately came of the Islah/SCCO talks themselves, Islah had set a
precedentbypubliclybreaking stepwith theGPC for the first time. Their approach to the
oppositionalsocausedSalihsregimetoallegedlycometoacoordinationdealwithIslahby
whicheachpartywouldagreenottoruncandidatesagainsteachotherincertaindistricts.99
If
thisagreementwaseveranythingmorethanaruse,itwasapretextfortheYSPtoboycott.100
1997wasaconfusingmomentforIslah. Notonlyhadthepartystruggledwiththeideaof
boycotting theelection,butwhen coordinationwith theGPC failed, theyhad signed ajoint
statementof cooperationwith theSCCO. Whilejoining the SCCO,however, Islah stillmade
effortstoretainclosetiestotheGPCinordernottobethrownintothepoliticalwilderness.101
Muchof
this
confusion
was
aresult
of
growing
factionalism
within
the
party
exemplified
by
the
MuslimBrotherhoodledpolicybranchofthepartyengagingwiththeoppositionfromthemid
1990s onward. Simultaneously Islahs leading personalities retained their close relationship
withSalih. Thegrowingincoherencyofthepartywasevidenttoall.102
Asmentionedearlier, Islahwasformed in1990asacombinationoftribesmen, Islamists,
includingSalafis
and
Muslim
Brothers,
and
businessmen.
While
the
core
of
its
ideology
was
drawn up by theMuslim Brotherhood, andwas thereforemoderate, the tribal component,
personifiedbySheikhAbdullah,lentitpoliticalcoverageinthebeginningasaresultofitstiesto
theSalihregime. ThisinnerdiversitywasnotaproblemintheearlydaysofIslah/GPCalliance
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againsttheYSP.103
However,theallianceofconservatismthatbroughttriballeaderstogether
withIslamistsunderthetentoftheIslahpartywasstartingtocomeapart.
AsJohnsen
warned
in
The
Election
Yemen
Was
Supposed
to
Have,
as
always
in
Yemen,
it
is
important to remember that,while political parties are not purely ornamental, behindthe
scenesalliancesoftribeandkinshipmeanmuchmorethanparty loyalty.104
Itappearsas if
SheikhAbdullahandthetribalIslahis,whohadbuilt,andbenefitedfrom,awebofpoliticaland
economicpatronageextendingfromtheSalihregime,werecontentwiththestatusquo.105
TheMuslim
Brotherhood
Islahis,
however,
were
not
happy
with
the
status
quo.
While
the
tribal faction within Islah were busy tying themselves as closely as possible to Salih, the
Brotherhoodwas engagedwith formulating party policy. As Schwedler submits in Yemens
AbortedOpening,the Islamists in Islahdidhaveanagenda,albeitdemocraticreformthrough
literacy inserviceofuniversal Islamiceducation.106
Butmoreoften thannot, Islahscentral
bureaucracy[would
announce]
formal
policies
and
positions
that
[were]
directly
contradicted
by the statements of prominent leaders in the party.107
Writing shortly after Yemens
unification in 1990, Former US Ambassador to Yemen Charles Dunbarwrote: the strong
positionSalihhasbuiltforhimselfvisvisthetribes,theinabilityofthesouthernleaderstoact
independently,andthecontradictionsthatbesettheconservativeopposition[emphasisadded]
areundoubtedassetsforthe[Salih]leadership.108
Thisassertionwouldringtrueuntilthemid
2000s.
Islahspoliticalmarginalizationand,ultimately,shifttowardamoreoppositionalrolewith
regardtotheGPCcanthusbedirectlytiedtotheGPCsuccesswithsubstantialIslahaidinits
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struggle for domination over the YSP.109
With Islahs progressivemarginalization over the
courseofthe late1990sintotheearly2000s,thefracturednatureofthepartywaslaidbare:
With party leaders contradicting official positions and Muslim Brotherhood members
dominatingpartybureausbutnotpositionsthattied IslahtotheSalih/GPCregime,therewas
bound tobe interparty fordiscord.110
Ultimately, thisdiscordwouldplague Islah tovarying
degreesandinonefashionoranotherfrom1997untilabout2005.
THE1997ELECTIONS:ISLAHCHANGESCOURSE
Withthe
YSP
boycotting,
aright
wing
coalition
went
into
the
1997
elections
virtually
unopposed. However,thoughtheGPCdidntrunGPCcandidates incertaindistricts,theydid
runcandidatesonlyas independentsand Islahwastrounced.111
Theonlycitywhere Islah
mighthavewonamajority,Ta'izz,was likely averted through thisprocessby theGPC. The
upshotwas that the GPC candidateswon 63% of the parliamentary seats, and unofficially
controlledabout
75%.
With
hindsight,
Sheila
Carapico
would
comment
in
2003
that
it
was
theseelectionsthatfirmlymovedIslahintoopposition: TheGPCnoweasilyrubberstamped
anygovernmentproposalincludinganextensionofitsownparliamentarytermofoffice.112
WiththeGPCsdramaticvictoryin1997,therewasnoneedfortheGPCtoformacoalition
government. They offered Islah no cabinet portfolios. And even though Abdullah was
reelectedto
his
speakership
of
the
lower
house,
this
had
more
to
do
with
his
tribal
and
presidentialconnectionsthanhisleadershipofIslah. Besides,AbdullahandZindani,asleaders
of Islah,notoriouslyalignedwiththepartyand itsplatformwhen itsuitedthemwhiletaking
contradictorypartypositionsalmostcasually.113
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With Islahs electoral defeat, they became openly critical of the GPC, causing their
businessmenconstituencytomeltawaywiththeirsupport. AsAprilLongleynotes,Islahslowly
lost powerfulmerchant support to the GPC as they, and the tribal tendency in Islah,were
loathe tomove squarely into the oppositional camp. Longley claims the reason behind
businessmenabandoningthepartywasfinanciallymotivatedandthat,regardlessofsimilarities
inideologybetweenthemandtheMuslimBrotherhood,theyjoinedtheGPCtoprotecttheir
investments. Theywentontomakeanassertionthathasbecomequiteprevalent inYemen
today: Chambers of Commerce and prominent businessmen were firmly in Salihs corner
becausetheybelievedaYemenwithoutSalihwouldleadtoviolence,instability,andthelossof
investments.114
Islahincreasinglybegantomoderateitspoliticalagenda. AsLongleyfurtherrelates,Islah
was originally founded as a religiousparty. The party fought the socialists and struggled to
make Sharia the basis of law. Now party leaders speak on issues foreign to their original
charter, suchasdemocracy,human rights,andwomens rights.115
Butmore than that, the
IslamistswereworkingwithformerideologicalenemiessuchasleftistswhichSchwedlertook
tobemorethanjustastrategicaccommodation.116
Thenarrowingofpoliticalopportunity for themajorityof Islahiswascausingawidening
engagementwiththeopposition,confirmingthenotionthatinstitutionalconstraintsstructure
behavior[as]oneofthekeypropositionsof[apoliticalsciencetheoryknownas]theinclusion
moderation hypothesis. According to this logic, groups will begin to cooperatewith even
former enemies when the incentives are strong enough.117
At the same time, Islah was
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proving a related theory that beliefs and agendas can evolve over time as political actors
engageinformsofpluralistparticipation.118
Thisideological
moderation,
admittedly
not
uniform
throughout
Islah,
gained
momentum
during the late 1990s with meetings between Islah and YSP leaders at NationalIslamic
ConferencesaswellasworkshopsandjointconsultationsorganizedbytheNationalDemocratic
Institute(NDI)topromotedemocraticvaluesandinstitutions. IthasbeenclaimedthattheNDI
coordinatedthedirecttalksbetween IslahandtheYSPthat ledtotheiralliance.119
Thepoint
howeverisnothowtheywerebroughttogether,butthattheywerebroughttogether. Itisalso
interestingthatIslahsmoderationwastakingplaceoutsidethepowerstructure,leadingJillian
SchwedlertoadjusttheinclusionmoderationdefinitiontoassertthatIdeologicalchangemay
resultnotfromparticipation,inpluralistprocessesperse,butfromengagementwithmultiple
narratives:120
As the 1999 presidential elections approached, the relationship between the
Islahparty
and
the
GPC
had
severely
deteriorated.
Contacts
between
certain
Islah leaderssuchasMuhammadQahtan,theheadofthepoliticalsection,and
secretarygeneralMuhammadYadumiandYSPleaders,notablyJarallahUmar,
thepartysdeputysecretarygeneral,werestillsporadicbutmorefrequent.121
Islah leaderssupportedthepresident in1999,butby2001were inseriousdialoguewith
theYSP. In July2001,SheikhAbdullah signaled that the tribalmembersof thepartywere
unhappyaswell,sayingIslahwasspeakingwiththeoppositioninordertopushthegovernment
backtowardsthedemocraticpath. Byearly2003,Islahhad,togreatextent,movedintothe
oppositioncampandparticipated in the foundingof the JMPwhoselifeand timesare the
subjectofthenextchapter.
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CHAPTERTWOTHEMARCHTOWARDSOPPOSITION
THEJMPISBORN:
MuchlikeIslahwasformedbackin1990tocounter,andultimatelyneuter,YSPdominance
intheformerPDRY,sowastheJMPformedtounderminethedominanceoftheGPC. Thechild
ofJarallahOmaroftheYSP,122
asouthernerwho ledthecommandoforcesoftheNDF inthe
north during the late 1970s, Islah was brought into the JMP fold by prominent Muslim
Brotherhood Islahis123
MuhammadalYadumi,AbdulWahabalAnisiandMuhammadQahtan.
Thethird force in forming the JMP isapoliticalscienceteacherandmemberoftheZaydial
Haqq party, Muhammad Abd alMalik alMutawakkil. One of the JMP political platform
ideologues, alMutawakkil characterizes the political problems in Yemen as not a struggle
betweenMarxismandcapitalism,orbetweenPanArabnationalismandstatenationalism,or
between Islamandunbelief,norevenastrugglebetweennorthandsouthorbetweenShafii
andZaydi,
but
between
two
sets
of
values:
values
of
democracy
and
values
of
domination.124
TheYemenioriginsoftheJMPrestwiththeaforementionedpeople,buttheywerefirstput
togetherbyoutsideforces. AsMichaelleBrowersexplains,MutawakkilandJarallahmetatthe
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1994NationalIslamic Conference in Beirut, a conference that continues to be held and of
whichMutawakkilhasbeenanorganizer. ItisattheseconferencesthatJarallahalsocameinto
contactwithbothalAnisiandQahtan. Inaddition,theNationalDemocraticInstitute(NDI)has
worked with both Islah and the YSP to promote democratic values and institutions while
holdingworkshopsandjointconsultations. IthasbeenclaimedthattheNDIcoordinatedthe
directtalksbetweenIslahandtheYSPthatledtotheiralliance.125
But itwasntjust themoderate Islahiswhowereseriouslyengaged in reassessing Islahs
relationshipwith the Salih regime. In a BBC interview in July 2001,Abdullah portrayed his
partys relationship with YSP as one of coordination to push the regime back in the
democraticdirection,claiming,forthesakeofdemocracy,weshouldgiveourhelptoallthe
forces that are loyal to democracy.126
ThatAbdullah used the loaded term coordination,
shouldnotbeoverlookednorshouldthefactthatAbdullahhadsaidthat Islahhadmore in
commonwith theGPC than theoppositionjust three yearsearlier. Jillian Schwedlerwould
echoAbdullahsentimentabout thesame time,commentingthatthe firstyearsafterYemeni
unificationhadlookedpromising,butthatthegovernmentcurrentlyresembledtheautocratic
preunificationNorth.127
As 2002 progressed and the parliamentary elections of April 2003 drew nearer, the
coalitionworkedontheirpoliticalvisionforYemen:
The opposition hoped to win seats in the 301member parliament with a
platformcallingforfair,free,ruleboundcontestedelections;policiestoalleviate
Yemen's acute problems with public security, increasing poverty, dire water
shortages and inadequate services; and a rule of law plank calling for the
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eradication of corruption, the protection of human rights and rights of free
expression.128
On December 28, 2002, after addressing an audience of several thousand at a closed
conventionat
the
Islah
party
headquarters
in
Sanaa,
Jarallah
was
gunned
down
at
close
range.129
The father of the JMP, at the pinnacle of accomplishment, died en route to the
hospital. ThoughthemotivesandaffiliationsattributedtoJarallahsassassinareunclear,Sheila
Carapicoandothershave commented that fewArab leaderswould toleratea former rebel
commanderspearheadingelectoralopposition.130
TheJMPcoalitionwasformedshortlyafter
Jarallahsassassination,
and
Islah
was
immediately
the
dominant
force.
The
YSP,
the
Populist
NasiristUnityOrganization,theUnionofPopularForcesandAlHaqq,theTruthparty,rounded
outthecoalition.131
Muchliketheparliamentaryelectionsof1993and1997,Islahwentontogainabout20%
ofthepublicvotein2003. WiththedeathoftheJMPfounderjustfourmonthsearlierandin
themiddle
of
an
Islah
convention
it
was
surprising
that
the
coalition
didnt
fracture.
Interestingly, for the first time in parliamentary elections therewas no coordination; the
traditional15%ofthevotethatusuallywenttoindependentswerenowfirmlywiththeGPC.
ISLAHCHOOSESOPPOSITION:
IftheParliamentaryelectionsof2003occurredtoosoonaftertheformationoftheJMPfor
the coalition to properly engage the public,132
the presidential election of 2006, running
concurrentlywithlocalelections,wouldbetheirfirsttest.
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Throughout2004andmostof2005,Islahremainedambivalentwithitsloyaltiesregarding
theopposition,ofwhichitwasapart,andtheregime. AsPhillipswrites,manyIslahmembers
stilldidntwanttobeunambiguouslypartoftheopposition,133
and Islah leaderswereclear
that they didnt have capacity to form an alternate government, being reluctant to oppose
Salihsgovernmentinsuchawaythatmighttoppleit.134
Thisstanceledmanytodistrustthem.
THEBEGINNINGOFTHEENDOFTHESALIH/ABDULLAHRELATIONSHIP:
For themost part, this ambivalence came to a head because of a sharp difference of
opinionbetween
Sheikh
Abdullah
and
President
Salih
stemming
from
aproposed
substantial
reductionofthenationalfuelsubsidyinJuly2005. Thesubsidyreductionledtoriotsinallthe
majorcities. Forwhatmayhavebeenthefirsttime,therewasmassiveopencriticismofSalih
inthestreetswithcriesoflaaSanhanbadalyawm,135
togetherwithchargesthatSalihwas
anenemyofGod. MohammedalYadumi, theSecretaryGeneralof the Islahpartyanda
MuslimBrotherhood
member,
saw
his
opening.
As
Phillips
reveals,
Yadumi
told
the
president
thatthepossibilityofanotheralliancebetweenthetwopartieswasnowover. Hereportedly
warnedPresidentSalihthatwhilehemightbeabletoremovesomeofIslahsleaders,theparty
wouldendure.136
The 2005 disintegration of the relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and Salih was a
watershedfor
Islah,
binding
them
closer
to
their
former
ideological
rivals.
Less
than
four
months later, inNovember 2005, The JMP released its platform forpolitical, economic and
social reform. Claiming there are nomore fantasies in theminds of Yemenis about the
catastrophethatiswaitingforthem,theJMPproclaimedtheonlyoptionwastotalreform.137
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Thedocumentcalled forreformoftheconstitution,parliament,andjudiciary,aswellasfor
the peaceful rotation ofpower, respect for the law and the constitution, theprevention of
corruption,greater limitationsonthe roleofthemilitaryandsecurityapparatus,civilservice
reforms[and]greaterpopularempowerment.138
Andwhilethedocumentwasanimpressive
account ofwhat needed to be done to right the ship of state, Sarah Phillips identifies the
explicitsplitIslahwasmakingwiththeGPCintheopeningpagesasthetrueslapinthefaceto
Salih:
Leaving aside the question ofwhether the JMP knows how to achieve these
reforms,the
documents
power,
and
probably
the
reason
behind
the
regimes
accusationsoftreasonandconspiracy, lies in itsarticulationofasplitbetween
theopposition,particularly Islah,andtherulingparty.This isasignificantstep,
considering Islahshistoricalplacewithin the regimespatronagenetwork,and
onethatcouldmarkthewillingnessofthepopularIslamistpartytoopposethe
governmentmorecoherently.139
ByDecemberof2005,paradigmaticchangeswereoccurringinIslah. SheikhAbdullahsent
astrongmessagetoSalihthroughhissonHusseinwhowasaGPCMPwarningthePresident
thathewouldconsiderbreakingwiththeGPCtoformanewpartyiftheregimedidnotalterits
policies. Also,theMuslimBrotherhoodmovedtodistancethemselvesfromthe[Islahi]Salafis
byannouncingwomenwouldbetrainedascandidatesforthe2006localelections.140
Inaclear
decisionthatsignaledtherenewedcommitmentof Islahtoopposetheregime,bytheendof
themonthaJMPexecutivecommitteehadbeenformedwithMuhammadQahtanofIslahasits
spokesperson.141By early 2006, Islahs Muslim Brothers had gained ascendance in deciding the partys
political direction. With the exodus of conservative businessmen a decade earlier and the
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recentsuccess inmarginalizingtheSalafis,personifiedbyZindani,142
thereremainedonlytwo
majorcontendinggroupswithintheparty:thetribalistsandtheMuslimBrothers. Atthesame
timethetribalgroup,which,accordingtoPhillips,hadenjoyeddisproportionatepowerduring
the 1990s resulting from its relationship with the regime and president, saw their power
diminishing in relation to theMuslim Brotherhood Islahis as a result of the Salih/Abdullah
split.143
With the increasingexclusionof SheikhAbdullah from the informal (patronage) system,
Phillips
believes
Islah
had
to
reach
out
to
the
other
opposition
parties
for
protection.
As
a
result of years of dialoguewith the opposition, this yielded an advantage to themoderate
MuslimBrotherswhilefurthereroding Islahsexclusionarypoliticalideology.144
Asmentioned
previously, therehadbeen a substantial rollback inprogressivepolitical reforms adopted at
unification following the 1994 civilwar. Islahs open rapprochementwith the YSP sent an
importantmessagetosupportersandwouldbesupportersoftheirparty: thenowdominant
tendencywithinthepartywasno longersatisfiedwiththeYemenspoliticalstatusquo.Their
membershipwiththeJMPmeanttheydesiredtopreserveandexpandwhatfewdemocratic
openingsremain.145
THE2006ELECTIONS:
TheGPChadreactedseverelytotheJMPplatform,claimingittobeboilerplatethatmerely
sought todivideYemenis in the leadup toelections. In fact, it seems theSalih regimewas
actuallyworriedthattheJMPmightbesuccessful. GPCofficialsmetindividuallywithleadersof
the opposition parties, and effortsweremade to drive awedge between the coalition by
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makingpromisestobothIslahandtheYSP.146
IslahwasofferedcabinetpositionswhiletheYSP
was offered a return of property and offices confiscated after the civil war if they would
abandonthe JMPandcome intoalignmentwiththeGPC. Phillipsassertsthat Islahwrestled
withtheirchoiceuntilonlyfivemonthsbeforeelections,butthenthrewitselfinverypublicly
withtheopposition.147
Theregimeseffortshadfailed.
ButSalihultimatelyhadnoreasontoworry. ApparentlyaidedbysubstantialfraudtheGPC
achieved a resounding victory in local elections.148
In presidential balloting, Salih was
overwhelminglyreturnedtoofficewithmorethan77percentofthevote. Therealsoexisted
factionalism in the JMP thatworked against them,which led the JMP to putmost of their
energies into thepresidentialelection insteadof focusingon the localelections,where they
may have made inroads. To make matters worse, two weeks before the election Sheikh
AbdullahssonHamidberatedSalihinaspeechduringaJMPrallyattendedby300,000forthe
JMPspresidentialcandidate,FaisalOthmanBinShamlan. Itwassoprovocativearallythatthe
specterofviolenceintheeventofaShamlanvictorywasraisedandSheikhAbdullah,whowas
almostcertainlyinvolvedinthisturningupoftheheatontheregime,hadtodiffusethecrisis
byendorsingSalih.149
The JMP losswas staggering. Where they had poured themajority of their resources,
Shamlanhadcomeawaywithonly23percentof thevote. In the localelections they fared
evenworse. ManyYemenischolarssaw littlepositive inthe2006electionsoutcome for the
JMP. Longley claimed it confirmed the oppositions internal weakness and political
immaturity,150
whileBurrowesbelievedtheJMPhadbecomedistractedfromlocalelectionsby
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betweentheJMPandGPChadcollapsedandtheJMPinstitutedaboycottonassociationwith
theSCER.
Inorder
to
restart
the
registration
process
and
hold
elections
on
time,
the
NDI
brokered
the June 18th
Agreementbetween theGPC and JMP (see annex). Amongother things, the
accordaddedtwoJMPmemberstotheSCERbringingthetotalfromseventoninemembers;
apportioned the supervision of election commissions along a 54/46 percent GPC/JMP split;
guaranteedtheneutralityofthestatemedia,militaryandsecurityforces;prohibitedtheuseof
state
facilities
and
mosques
for
the
purpose
of
campaigning;
and
promised
a
thorough
examinationofthevoterlistbybothGPCandJMPlegalteams.157
InhindsightitisclearthattheregimeviewedtheJune18th
Agreementasapretexttodraw
theoppositionback into theprocess. Both theNDIs Reporton the2006 Presidential and
LocalElectionsintheRepublicofYemenandtheEUEOMsYemen2006:FinalReportmake
itplain
that
the
regime
subverted
the
Agreement.
There
was
serious
abuse
and
misuse
of
publicresources,158
securityforce intimidationofoppositionrallies,andpaymentofbonuses
to governmentemployeesjustdaysbefore theelection. In addition,promisesmade to the
opposition intheAgreementthatbothsideswouldworktogethertoaddressseriousflaws in
thevoter listwere ignored. This listwasacknowledgedbytheSCERtohaveat least150,000
duplicationsand
names
of
ineligible
and
underage
voters,
but
was
arbitrarily
amended
withoutinputbytheJMPandinanontransparentmanner. Thepromiseofanelectroniccopy
ofthevoterdatabasebeingmadeavailabletotheJMPwasalsoignored.
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Thoughtheelectionmayhavebeengenerallycharacterizedas openandgenuine,there
was a lot ofwork yet to do tomake theprocessmore trustworthy and transparent to the
oppositionandcitizenryatlarge. Asaresult,theEUEOMmade35recommendationsfollowing
the elections to improve the process.159
Both the JMP and GPC agreed to take up these
electoralreformsinadvanceofParliamentaryelectionsscheduledforApril2009.
FOOLMETWICE:
Throughout2007and into2008, theGPCand JMPwere inparliamentarydiscussions to
cometoanunderstandingthatwouldamendtheelectionlawsaswellaschangehowtheSCER
wasconstitutedandbetterdefineitsresponsibilities. Majorproposedchangestotheelection
lawsincludedthestipulationsthatnoindividualshouldbeforcedtocasthisvoteforacertain
nominee, [and that] any civilormilitaryofficialwho is found tousehisauthority to forcea
voterorhisemployeestoworkinfavororagainstanypoliticalnominee,partyororganization,
willbe
tried
according
to
the
stated
punishments
as
well
as
dismissal
from
their
post
position.160 Other principal amendments pursued by the JMP sought to confine the
registrationofvoters to theirplaceofbirthor residenceandguarantee. the impartialityof
publicfinancingandstaterunmediaduringelectioncampaigns.161
Whileelectoralreformdiscussionswereunderway,theterm forthethenSCERmembers
expired. ThoughEUEOMrecommendationscalledfortheappointmentofjudgesasopposed
topresidentialselectiontothecommission,theJMPhadcounterproposeditsformationfrom
parties represented in parliament. This was not an idle proposal, as judgeships were
presidentialappointments.162
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ByJuneof2008,theGPCandJMPhadstillfoundnoagreementonhowtoaddressthese
issues. Asaresult,theGPCsoughttobringtheamendmentstothefloorofparliament,where
theprocesswouldhavebeencompromisedbythesheernumberofGPCparliamentarians. In
response, the YSP led a JMP boycott of parliament on June sixth. They did not return to
parliamentuntilamonthlaterandonlyaftertheGPCagreedtosuspendparliamentarydebate
ontheamendmentsuntilagreedtobyallparties.163
ByAugust,andwithelectionsonlyeightmonthsaway, thestrugglebetween the regime
and
the
JMP
reached
a
fever
pitch.
Amidst
GPC
claims
that
they
had
an
agreement
with
the
JMPonelection lawamendmentsand JMPcounterclaims that theyhadnot,164
TheYSP first
staged a parliamentary sitin before again leading the way in another JMP parliamentary
boycottonAugust sixth. This time theboycottwasnotonlyover the stalledparliamentary
process,butincludedJMPcallsforthereleaseofpoliticalprisonersandaresolutiontothecrisis
in theSouth.165
The followingweek,oneof theGPCs most loyalparties, theArabBaath
SocialistParty,defectedfromtheGPCtotheJMP.166
OnAugust18,2008,Parliament finally took thematter toavote. JMPparliamentarians
were present as President Salih had promised the release of political prisoners two days
earlier.167 Using the excuse that the JMP failed toput forth their SCERnominees thatday,
somethingthe
JMP
refused
to
do
as
they
had
consistently
called
for
the
election
laws
to
be
amendedfirst,GPCparliamentarianstooktheopportunitytodefeatallamendments.168 They
then proceeded to confirm the old SCER commissioners in their positions, allowing for the
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addition of three JMPmembers as a sop. The JMPwas unified in its condemnation, and
steppeduptheircriticalattacksontheregime.
Assummer
turned
to
fall,
Salih
and
his
regime
were
fruitless
in
their
efforts
to
drive
a
wedgebetweentheJMPmemberpartiesandfindacceptanceinsomecorneroftheopposition
for theiractionsofAugust18th. Inwhatwas seen as aneffortby the regime to split Islah,
ZindanireenteredthespotlightastheheadofanewandhighlycontroversialCommittee
forProtectingVirtueandFightingVice.169
AndPresidentSalih,usingterminologyreminiscent
of
the
1994
civil
war,
excoriated
the
JMP
as
traitors
who
were
involved
in
inciting
a
crisis,
organizingdemonstrationsandsitins,andcallingforsecession [emphasisadded].170
At the
endof September the JMPmadehistory in refusing apresidentialdecree thedecreehad
reappointedformerJMPcommissionerstothenewlyformedSCER,andtheJMPsrefusalwas
thefirsttimethishadeveroccurredinYemen.
ByOctober,
the
JMP
had
decided
to
boycott
the
SCER
voter
registration
process,
set
to
begin the following month, and was considering how they would view the parliamentary
elections. InaYemenPost interviewwithIslahsGeneralSecretaryAbdulWahabalAnesi,al
AnesiwasquotedassayingtheJMPwouldnotboycottelections,butwouldalsonotparticipate
according to criteriadesiredby rulingGPC.171
Withinaweekafter the interview,alAnesi
citing
the
importance
of
elections
in
bringing
political
reform
said
JMP
would
try
to
hold
independentelections,leadingSalehtoappointformerForeignandPrimeMinisterDr.Abdul
KarimalEryaniastheregimesnegotiatorwiththeJMP.172
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When the SCERadministered voter registration process began inNovember, therewas
resistance to theprocessacross the country,andnotonlyby the JMP. Asa result, security
forcesarrested JMPsupporters forpeacefulprotestand thehandingoutof literature. Some
voterregistrationcentersclosedduetoalackofturnoutwhileotherswereattacked,onewith
grenades.173
Intribaldistricts,electioncommitteeswere forcedoutnotbecauseofthe JMP,
butbecauseofgovernmentfailureregardingdevelopment.
Butthesituation[was]worseningandconfrontationsbetweenthegovernments
forcesanddemonstrators,believedtobepushedbyJMP,claimedlivesinsome
provinces,inadditiontosomanyinjuries. SheikhHamidalAhmar[whosefather
SheikhAbdullah
had
died
in
late
December
2007]
addressed
tens
of
thousands
of
peoplesayingthattheJMPandYemenipeople[were]strugglingforchange.He
accusedtheregimeofrevoltingagainstdemocracy[by]usingitsmajorityinthe
Parliament lastAugust,when itrefusedsomeamendmentstotheelection law
andformedthe[SCER]withouttheapprovalofJMPsblocsintheParliament.174
HamidalAhmarwentontosaythattheprotestsagainsttheSCERcommitteeswerejustthe
beginning,andthattheJMPwoulduseallpossiblemeanstostoptheillegalelections.175
As the protests increased, Parliament extended local council terms, cancelling local
elections thathadbeen scheduled for samedayasparliamentaryelections.176
If the regime
thoughttheirdecisionwoulddampendemonstrations,theyweremistaken.
OnNovember 27th
what isnow characterizedby theopposition as bloodyThursday,
awakeningThursday,orthe November Intifada,177
governmentsecurityforcesandpolice in
SanaaopenedfireonthousandsofprotesterscallingforaboycottoftheApril2009elections.
Reporters on the scenewere beaten by troops using batons andweapon butts.178
One
witness claimed that government troops opened fire and threw bricks and tear gas at the
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protest[ors],prompting a stampede,which caused someof theinjuries.179
When itwasall
over,dozenswerehurt,atleastthreecritically.
Inmid
January,
aEuropean
delegation
arrived
in
Yemen
to
mediate
between
GPC
and
JMP.
Their chief goal was ostensibly to reconstruct the SCER and engage the opposition in its
operation,and theywouldseektodelay theelections forsomemonths inorder todoso.180
ButtheJMPhadalreadybeenfooledbyjustsuchatacticbackinJune2006,andtheywerent
abouttoletithappenagain. Bytheendofthemonth,sourcesleakedtotheYemenPostin
anarticleprovocativelyentitledEUMission:WewillnotObserveElections ifOppositionnot
Involvedthat themissionwasworkingtowardsdelayingtheelectionsforoneyearsothat
thedemandsofoppositionpartiescouldbemetduringthisperiod. Themissionwasalsoclear
withtheregimethattheywouldnotsendobserversforonesidedelections.181
ByearlyFebruary,theregimelauncheditselfonalastditchoffensivetoforceitswillupon
theopposition
and
hold
elections
on
time
and
according
to
their
political
scheme.
In
one
interview,theHeadofthePoliticalOfficeatGPC,AbdullahAhmedGhanim,accused Islahand
theYSPofembracingterroristgroupstopromotetheirextremistideas.182
Oneofthesegroups,
whichwe shall address inChapterThree,were theHouthis in Saadaprovince,whosemost
recent rebellion against the government dated back to the summer of 2004. Days later,
Ghanimwonderedaloud inanother interview,Whydothosepartieshighlight [the]nameof
AlQaeda inYemenand theirunitywithotherAlQaedacomrades inSaudiArabia? Healso
contendedthattheJMPsoughttocreateanewalliancethatmightinvolveinadditiontoJMP
member parties, Houthi rebels in Sanaa, those who instigate secession in southern
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governorates,and representativesofextremistand terroristcurrents thathave tieswith the
IslahParty.183
Asweeping,ifnotanincrediblyfarreaching,condemnationoftheJMP.
Intandem
with
their
slur
campaign,
the
regime
gave
ground.
Claiming
that
everything
is
allright[andthat]thecrisis[was]onlyintheeyeofthebeholder,184
theGPCaffirmedthatthe
elections would still go off in April, and that the parliament was readying to revote the
amendmentsdefeatedbackinAugust:185
anaffirmationtheJMPignoredaspoliticalposturing.
TheJMPsmelledblood. Theirunityincrisis(datingbacktothepreviousJune)together
withthe
threat
of
aunified
opposition
boycott
erased
more
than
adecade
of
defeat
and
exploitationat thehandsofthe regime. Withthe implicitsupportof internationalobservers
whorefusedtomonitoronesidedelections,theydidnthavelongtowait.OnFebruary24th,a
deal brokered by the EU delegation, along with members from the NDI, postponed the
electionsfortwoyears. SoonafterParliamentvoted intheaffirmativetoallowthetwoyear
postponement,Anisi
announced
his
support
for
elections
but
said
it
had
been
impossible
to
holdthemwhilethecrisesinbothnorthandsouthYemenpersisted,implicitlylayingthedelay
attheGPCsdoorstep.186
SheikhHamidAlAhmar,aleadingmemberofIslahPartyandakey
supporterofJMP,wasmoreequivocal. Sayingthepostponementwasapositivesteptowards
improving national dialogue on important political issues, he called on all Yemenis to get
involved in solving their political problems, admitting that the JMP call for dialogue is a
confessionofthefactthat[the]oppositionpartiesaloneareincapable[ofhandling]thecurrent
crisis.187 Salihhadfinallyblinkedfirst. Itwasthedawnforanewtypeofoppositionpoliticsin
Yemen.188.
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ThesuccessoftheJMPdidnotoccurdivorcedofothercalamitiesthateithererodedthe
regimesabilitytosuccessfullyadministerthestate,ormadeevidenttheir inability,or lackof
desire, tosuccessfully resolvepoliticalconflict. Inmanycases, JMPgoalsand these troubles
weremutually reinforcing. Beforewemove on to our conclusion, then, it is important to
addressthemanyproblemsapartfromtheJMPthattheSalihregimefaces,understandingthat
the regimehas effectively received a twoyear reprieve as a resultof thepostponement of
parliamentaryelections. Untilnow,Salihhasalwaysbeenveryeffectiveat findingaway to
balancefactionsagainsteachotherinordertoprolonghisrule. Thequestionnowis: Doestwo
yearsgivehimenoughtimetofindhiswaybacktothetop?
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CHAPTERTHREEYEMENSPERENNIALCHAOS
Mostnationalnewspapers,whenreflectingonthepastyearofeventsintheircountryand
constructingatop
10,
usually
are
not
as
grim
as
the
Yemen
Post
was
on
December
29,
2008.
Theriseinterroristattacks,warinSaada,naturaldisastersinHadramaut,protestinthesouth,
and stalled negotiations between the GPC and JMP made the top 5; while the rise in
kidnapping, the drop in oil prices and threats to the diminishing Yemeni Jewish community
rounded out a somber picture.189
Bitterly, the paperwould reiteratewhat has become a
mantraof
the
regime:
however,
GPC
leaderships
stress
that
the
crisis
is
only
in
the
mind
of
thosewhospeakabout itsexistence.190
WiththeYemenTimesalsoreportingtheregimeas
sayingeverything isallright [and that] thecrisis isonly in theeyeof thebeholder,191
they
identifiedwar inthenorthandtroubles inthesouthasroundingoutatriumvirateofpolitical
obstacles,alongwiththeJMP,thatwilldominatethecountryspoliticalspherein2009.192
ECOLOGICALDISASTERANDTHESCARCITYOFNATURALRESOURCES:OnOctober24,2008,catastrophicflashfloodswereunleashedthroughouttheHadramaut
following three days of heavy rains. More than 180 people were killed and 20,000 left
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homeless after mud houses were washed away by 30 hours of heavy rain.193
In the
Hadramaut Valley, close to 100,000 acres of farmlandwas swept away. According to the
YemeniAgriculturalMinistry,thedestructionincluded570,857palmtrees,5,239lemontrees,
35,819otherfruittrees,and66,680beehives.194
Thetopsoilwasalsowashedaway, leading
agricultural officials to predict things would take between five and eight years to rectify
themselves.
Thisdisaster isrepresentativeofaloomingprobleminacountrywhere40percentofthe
populace isalreadyundernourishedandwhichcurrently importsabout80percentof itsfood
needs.195
Whileinternationalagencieshavesteppedintofillthefoodgapforthetimebeing,
foodsecurityhasyettobeaddressed inearnestby theregime,whichrelieson itsdwindling
income fromoil to import thebulkof the countrys food. Asnational income fromoil and
agriculturecontinuetoplummet,andseveredroughtreducesarablelandtoonlythreepercent
ofthecountry,Yemensstagnanteconomy[truly]offersatroublingprospect.
Totop itoff,Yemenfaceswidespreadwaterscarcityandsoildepletionduetoextensive
cultivationofthenarcoticqat.196
TheWorldBanksmostrecentMENADevelopmentReport
observesthat:
Yemenisoneofthemostwaterscarcecountriesintheworld;percapita,ithas
nomore than2percentof theworldsaverage.Agricultureemploys3million
peopleout
of
aworkforce
of
5.8
million,
and
uses
[95.3]
percent
of
water
supplies. Overabstraction of groundwater encouraged by fuel subsidies and
demand for themildlynarcoticcropqathadcreatedanacute firstlevelwater
availabilitycrisis.Whileestimatesvary,itisbelievedthatinmanyofthehighland
basins,where a significant share of the population is concentrated, stocks of
waterareatcrisislevels,andsomevillagesarealreadybeingabandoned.197
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Plainly stated, food and water security represent a huge problem for Yemen. In the
summerof2008itwasnotedthatagricultureaccountedfortheincomeofnearly75percentof
thepopulationbetween2000and2005comprising21percentofGDPandcloseto60percent
ofYemensnonoilexports. Agriculture,however,islosingground. Muchofthisretreatisthe
result ofwater scarcity, the insufficient public investment in the sector, and the growing
cultivationofwater intensive crops suchasqat198
anevergreen shrubwithnonutritional
benefitwhoseleavesaresaidtoreduceappetite,sharpenthesensesandalleviatefatiguewhen
chewed.
Theclarioncalltoreassesswatersustainabilityseemstobefallingondeafears,however.
TheWorldBankhasbeenreportingforyearsthatwatersustainabilitystartedtoworseninthe
1970swiththediggingofdeeptubewellsforbothdrinkingandagriculturalusewhichledtoa
substantialdepletionofgroundwater.199
Thegroupalsoreportedmorethantwodecadesago
that8090percentofallnewwellsbeingboredintheHighlandswereusedfortheproduction
of qat.200
If some of the more liberal estimates are true, then almost 90 percent of all
groundwaterandat least36percentof totalwater resources inYemenarebeingexpended
annuallyonqatcrops.201
Withagricultureaccounting for the incomeofnearly75percentof
thepopulation,itisintheqatmarketthatthemajorityofYemeniworkersmaketheirliving.
Another natural resource at risk, and one tied into southern grievances, is oil. Since
unification,oilhasgreasedthewheelsoftheregimespatronagearrangement. Ithasbound
thetribes,oppositionpoliticians,businessmenandreligiousextremistsintoawebofpersonal
loyalty,202
whileprolongingSalihsreignthroughthewarpingofpartypolitics. Inrecentyears
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therehasbeenasubstantialdeclineinYemenioilproductionfromahighofalmost450,000
barrels per day (bpd) in 2002, to an estimated average of about 320,000 in 2008. This