Download - Policy Analysis ... Analyzing What

PolicyAnalysisandInstitutionsofGovernance:Analyzing….what?

December2015PositionPaper

www.appro-europe.net

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AcknowledgementsThispaperhasbenefitedfromcriticalandencouragingcommentsfromtheparticipantsandorganizersatthefollowingeventswherethekeypointsofthepaperhavebeenpresented:

• ExpertGroupMeetingon“InnovatingPublicServiceDeliverytoImplementthePost-2015DevelopmentAgenda”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Medellin,Colombia,22-26July,2015.

• ExpertGroupMeetingon“Governance,PublicAdministrationandInformation&CommunicationTechnologiesforPost2015Development”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Geneva,3-5July,2013.

• WageningenInternationalWorkshop“ScrutinizingSuccessandFailureinDevelopment:InstitutionalChange,CapacityDevelopment,andTheoriesofChange”,heldinWageningen(theNetherlands)onDecember6-7,2007.

• TheMaxwellSchoolofGovernment,SyracuseUniversity,NewYork,October14,2007• TheGraduateSchoolofArchitecture,Planning,andPreservation,ColumbiaUniversity,NewYork,October18,2007

• TheESRCGenomicsPolicyandResearchForumworkshop,“NewGovernanceToolsforNewTechnologies?”,heldatUniversityofEdinburgh,ScotlandonJune8,2005

• TheInstituteforEnvironmentalStudies“ScaleWorkshop”,heldatVrijeUniversity,Amsterdam,onJanuary24,2005

ThispaperhasalsobenefitedfromnumerousdiscussionsovertheyearswithSaurabhArora,AnthonyArundel,TommasoCiarli,SeemaHafeez,RichardNelson,AstaOlesen,MariaSavona,andSmitaSrinivas.

AuthorSaeedParto

AboutAPPRO-EuropeAPPRO-EuropewasfoundedinMarch2015tocarryoutappliedresearch,trainingandmentoring,monitoringandevaluations,knowledgedissemination,andpolicyadvocacytoinforminternationaldevelopment.APPRO-Europe(ASBL)isregisteredinBelgiumandFrance.APPRO-Europe’smissionistofacilitatecriticaldialogueondevelopmentaideffectivenessandpolicymaking.Thismissionhastwocomponents.Thefirstcomponentistomeasuredevelopmentprogressagainststrategicdevelopmentobjectivestoinformpolicy.Thesecondcomponentistotrainandmentorcivilsocietyorganizationsinevidence-basedadvocacyandgovernmentsinevidence-basedpolicymaking.APPRO-Europeoperatesthroughfundsprovidedbynationalandinternationaldevelopmentaidorganizations.Withtheexceptionofevaluationreports,allresearchfindingsaredisseminatedaspublications,downloadablefreeofchargefromAPPRO-Europe’swebsiteat:www.appro-europe.netContact:[email protected]:Collagebasedonphotographsfrom:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_topologyTheauthortakesfullresponsibilityforallomissionsanderrorsinthispaper.©2015.APPRO-Europe(ASBL).Thispublicationmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemortransmittedonlyfornon-commercialpurposesandwithwrittencredittotheauthorandAPPRO-Europewithalinktowww.appro-europe.net.Anyotheruseofthispublicationrequirespriorwrittenpermissionwhichmaybeobtainedbywritingto:[email protected].


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AbstractPolicyoutcomesoftenfallshortofpolicyintentions.Despiteglobalizationandregionalization,inmanycasesnationalproblems,policies,andpoliticsemergeandtraversethroughvaryingmodesoflocallyevolvedgovernancemechanismscharacterizedbyarangeofclearlydiscernibleformalandinformalinstitutions.Effortstooperationalizesupra-nationalorglobalpoliciesorvisionssuchastheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalscontinuetobesimultaneouslysupportedandcurtailedatthelocal/nationalscalebytheinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedindifferentcontexts.Drawingonnumerousstudiesonthediscrepancybetweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives,thispaperarticulatesaframeworkforconductinggovernance-oriented,institutionallyinformedpolicyanalysisinpoliticallyandsocio-economicallyheterogeneousenvironments.Keywords:Governance,PolicyAnalysis,InstitutionalAnalysis


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TableofContents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4

PolicyAnalysis ........................................................................................................................ 5

Governance ............................................................................................................................ 9

Institutions ........................................................................................................................... 14

InstitutionsandGovernance................................................................................................. 19

InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework ........................................................................... 22

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 24

References............................................................................................................................ 28


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Introduction

Thepolicyprocessisalmostalwayscharacterizedbydiscrepancies,andsometimesquitesignificant

discrepancies,betweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives.Thediscrepanciesareespecially

pronouncedwhenthesamepolicyintentionsaretriedoutinheterogeneousandhighlydiversified

contextsasrepresentedbythe191countriesthatsigneduptotheUnitedNationsMillennium

DevelopmentGoals(MDGs)inSeptember2000,forexample.Thesignatoriesmadeformal

commitmentstocombatpoverty,hunger,disease,illiteracy,environmentaldegradation,and

discriminationagainstwomen.IncludedamongthesignatoriestoMDGsarewealthyindustrialized

countrieswithverylargeeconomiesandstableanddemocraticmodesofgovernanceandpoororless

developedcountrieswithlessthandemocraticgovernments.Everyoneofthesignatorieshasadistinct

history,culture,institutionallandscape,andeconomicpositioning.Thisdiversityisamajorsourceof

conflictingperspectivesandcompetingagendasoftheactorsformallycommittedtomeetingMDGs.The

governanceoftheeffortsbythesigneestoMDGshasthusfarbeenfirmlybasedonabeliefinminimal

top-downgoverningand/orcoercion,relianceonlessformalnetworks,and“self-organization”.

TounderstandwhyendeavorssimilartoMDGshavehistoricallycomeupshortinfullymeetingtheir

goalsandobjectives,itisnecessarytoreviewandreassesssomeoftheunderlyingassumptionsabout

theroleofgovernments,networks,andinstitutionssystematicallycountedontocarrythroughpolicy

objectives.1Thereisrenewedurgencyandasignificantdegreeofripenessforaninstitutionalisttakeon

policyanalysis,giventhelessthansatisfactoryoutcomesofpoliciesintendedtomeetuniversalgoalson

eliminatingpoverty,protectingtheenvironment,orensuringequalrightsforwomen.Thepremiseof

thispaperisthatthereassessmentofsuchpoliciesandgoalswoulddowelltodrawandbuildonthe

pioneeringworksofSabatier(togetherwithMazmanianinthelate1970sandthe1980s),Sabatierand

Jenkins-Smith(inthe1990s),Ostrom(late1980s,1990s,and2000s),andKingdon(1980s).

Oftheseauthors,Ostrom’sexpansivebodyofworkstandsoutasincreasinglyfocusedonissuesof

governanceanditsinstitutionsinpolicyprocesses.Themainargumentinthispaperwillrunparallelto

Ostrom’sapproach,whichholdsthatonecannotdomeaningfulpolicyanalysiswithoutaddressing

1Thispaperusesthesigningbythe191countriesoftheMDGsasanillustrativecaseexample.Theframeofanalysisproposedinthispapercanbeappliedequallytopoliciesatdifferentscalesofgovernanceandindifferentcontexts,however.


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issuesofpoweringovernancearrangementsandwithoutaccountingfortheroleofinstitutionsthrough

whichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferentscales,fromglobaltonationalandlocal.Tomakethis

argument,thispaperstartswithprovidingabriefoverviewofpolicyanalysistoestablishthelinkages

betweenpolicymaking,governance,andtheinstitutionsofgovernance.

Governanceisdiscussedretrospectivelyandprospectively,withparticularattentiontothecurrent

discourseon“goodgovernance”.Alinkisthenestablishedbetweengovernanceandinstitutions,

followedbyaseparatesectiononinstitutionstooutlinehowinstitutionalistpolicyanalysismaybe

conductedinagovernancecontext.Duetospacelimitationsthecasestudiesonwhichthispaperis

basedarenotbedescribedindetailandserveonlyasreferencepoints.2

Thispaperarguesthatonlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutions(fromthevery

informalandintangibletotheveryformalandtangible)incomparablepolicyarenascanonegetafull

senseofwhythesamepolicyimplementedindifferentarenas(andatdifferentscalesofgovernance)

producesdifferentpolicyoutcomes.Takingstockofthefullrangeofinstitutionsasproposedinthis

papercanalsorevealtheentrypointsforpolicyimplementerstoinitiateprocessesthatcanfacilitate

institutionalchangeasintendedbypolicy.

PolicyAnalysis

Policyistheoutcomeofaseriesofdecisionsonwhatconstitutesaproblem,whatthepossiblesolutions

are,andhowthepreferredsolutionsmaybeimplemented(Adgeretal.2002),giventheresource

constraintsofthecommunity,thephysicalandmaterialconditions,andthemodeofgovernance

(Ostrom1999).3Initsmostcompleteform,policymakingrequiresissuedefinitionandtheidentification

oftheissuecontext,optionsorsolutions,assessmentofoptions,selectionofthemostsuitable

option(s),monitoringandassessmentofimplementation,learningforfuturepolicymakingendeavors,

andhopefullyattainingincreasedefficiency,effectivenessandlegitimacy.

2Fordetailsofthecasestudies,see“GovernanceandPolicyAnalysis:WhatofInstitutions?”Availablefrom:http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e0ac3f43-2d3e-426d-be64-845eaa4cf818/datastreams/ASSET1/content

3SeeHajer,M.(2003a:181)foraconciseoverviewofvariousdefinitionsforpolicyanalysis.


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Thatsaid,itisdifficulttocomeupwithaprecisedefinitionofpolicyanalysisbecauseofits“garbage

can”characteristics,complexity,andunpredictability.4Varyingemphaseshavebeenplacedonthe

differentelementsinprocessofpolicymakingdependingonthepractitionersandthecontext(Taitand

Lyall2004).Theseelementsincludeconstraintsattheorganizationscale(MarchandOlsen1979,1984),

interactioncharacteristicsofactors,oractants,toborrowfromBrunoLatour,indecisionmaking

domainsandnetworks(Burt1992,Coleman1990),andtheeffectivenessofpolicyimplementationat

multiplescalesofgovernance(MazmanianandSabatier1981,1983).Thesevariouselementsofthe

policyprocessmayberepresentedasFigure1.

Figure1:ElementsofthePolicyProcess

AdaptedfromOstrom(1999)

Attemptstoaccountforinstitutionsinthebroadestdefinitionofterm,capturingtheveryinformaland

intangiblesuchasvaluesystemsandcustomsandtheveryformalandtangiblesuchasrulesand

regulations,inpolicyanalysishavebeenlimitedwiththenotableexceptionofElinorOstrom’sworkin

the1990sand2000s.Itwillbeillustratedlaterinthispaperthatthisshortcomingispartlyduetothe

difficultyindoinginstitutionalanalysiswithoutasharedconceptualizationoftheterm“institution”.This

4SeeKingdon,J.(1984).


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difficultyhasbeencompoundedoverthelasttwoorsodecadesbywhathascometobeknownas“the

movefromgovernmenttogovernance”(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000)anda“hollowingout”of

thenationalstateasfarasitsclassicfunctionsandtheincreasinglysignificantroleplayedbynon-state

actorsindeliveringstatefunctions.(SeeGovernance,below).

Fromagovernanceperspective,Hajer(2003a:181-8)offersthreedefiningelementsforthepolitical

contextofpolicyanalysis:polity,knowledge,andintervention.Interpretedasastablepoliticalorder,

polityorthepoliticalsettingofpolicymakinghaschangedconsiderablysincetheSecondWorldWar.

Whereasbeforethecriticalpolicyanalyststroveto“speaktruthtopower”concentratedinthe

governmentofthenationstate,therearenownumerousothercontendersforpowerwhonotonly

wanttospeaktheirversionoftruthtopower,butalsowanttheirshareofpower.Theseinclude

transnationalormultinationalcorporationsandnetworks,non-governmentandcivilsociety

organizations,andthemediawhich,whileusedextensivelyandstrategicallybyallcontenders,are

themselvessometimescontendersforpowerthroughagendasettinginthepolicyprocess.

Thenewlandscapeofgovernanceasithasevolvedsincethe1970sismarkedbyadeparturefrom

territoriallydefinedspacesofthepost-warnationstatesandtheemergenceofanetworked(Castells

1996)orembeddedsociety(GranovetterandSwedberg2001)thattranscendsthenationstate.

Governanceinthisnewlandscapeisincreasinglyhavingtorelyonformalandinformal,supra-andsub-

nationalformsandstructures(Jessop1999,Hajer2003a).Undergovernance,policymakingisnolonger

afunctionfulfilledbyexpertsortechnocratswhosesoleroleistodevisepolicysolutionstoservevarious

identifiedneeds:thereisnowrecognitionandspaceforaplethoraofactorsandfactorsthatcollectively

governpolicyanditsmaking.

AaronWildavsky(1979),whocoinedthephrase“speakingtruthtopower”asthekeyroleforpolicy

analystsinthepolicyprocess,describespolicyanalysisintermsofdialogue,equitablebalancingof

prioritiesbetweentheempoweredandthedisempoweredamidtensionsrelatingtoresourcesand

otherconstraints,trustandmistrust,andideologiesanddogmas.Wildavsky’sapproachisechoedinthe

worksofmorerecentpolicyprocessscholars(Ostrom1999,SabatieradJenkins-Smith1993,1999,and

Kingdon1984)andpractitioners(Reich1988)whounderlinetheimportanceofcontextandthemoral

responsibilityofpolicymakersandpolicyanalysts,andthustheinstitutionallandscapeinthepolicy

process.Intheseworkssystemicattentionisbeingdrawntothegovernanceorpowerrelationalaspects


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ofpolicymaking,suggestingpolicyanalysisasbeingconcernedwithatleastthreesetsofdynamicsas

follows:

• ProblemIdentification:Establishingthemannerinwhichtheproblemforwhichpolicyisrequiredis

definedrevealsthemainfactorsandactors,ortheproblem-policy-politicsmixaccordingtoKingdon

(1984).

• PolicyDevelopment:Establishingtheinclusiveness,orexclusiveness,oftheprocesstofindsolutions

forthepolicyproblemindicatesthepolicy-makingstyle,thearena(Ostrom1999),orthe“coalitions”

(SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999),andthereforethemodeofgovernance(Kooiman1993,

1999,2003)forpolicymaking.

• PolicyImplementation:Establishinghowwellthepolicyobjectivesarebeingmetinpracticethrough

ongoingmonitoring,periodicevaluations,andcontinuouslearningindicatesthedegreetowhich

policyisviewedbyitsimplementersasasystemicandcircular,asopposedtolinear,process.

Thecontemporarypolicyanalystmustthusstrivetoanswertwokeyquestions:

1. Onthebasisofwhattypeofinformationcanbetterpolicydecisionsbemade?And,

2. Whatandwhostructurethepolicydiscourse?

Answeringthefirstquestionrequiresadiscussionontheadequacyandappropriateuseofthecurrently

in-usemonitoringindicators.Whileafulldiscussionofindicatorsisbeyondthescopeandpurposeof

thispaper,itwillbearguedthatinformingpolicytomeetitsobjectivesrequiresasetofinclusiveand

practicableinstitutionalindicatorstosupplementthecurrentlyin-useindicatorsonefficiency,

effectiveness,andimpact.

Answeringthesecondquestionrequiresin-depthunderstandingofthe“modeofgovernance”orthe

mannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsmakesdecisionstoorganizeitself–oris

organized–basedontheavailableresources(materialandphysicalconditions),therulesinuse

(attributesofthecommunity),anddistributionofpoweramongdecisionmakers(systemofgovernance)

asindicatedinFigure1.Theremainderofthispaperfocusesonansweringthesecondquestion.

Intheknowledge-based,networksocietythecombinedpressuresofsimultaneousglobalizationand

individualizationprocessesalongwithadominantroleofmediahavesignificantlyerodedthebasisfor


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trustinandthelegitimacyofgovernment,makingthejobofproblemidentification,solutionfinding,

andmaintainingauthoritylessdependentontechnicalexpertiseandmoredependentontheabilityto

engagemultiplestakeholders(Reich1988,TaitandLyall2004).Policymakingunderthesenew

conditionshasbecome“amatterofdefininganagreeduponpackageofactionstobetakenbyavariety

ofstakeholders,oftensupportedby‘softlaw’suchascovenantsoragreementsthatareperhapsbacked

upbyregulatoryframeworks”(Hajer2003a:187).InHajer’s(2003a,2003b)andReich’s(1988)view,

theseconditionsdemanddeliberationinpolicyanalysis,andanappreciationforpoliticalactionsbased

onmutualinteraction,toensurelegitimacyandimprovecollectivequalityoflifeforallconcerned.

Legitimatepoliticalactionsandthenatureoftheagreedupon“rulesofthegame”inpolicymakingare

productsofthemodeofgovernance,discussedinthenextsection.

Governance

Duringthelastthreeorsodecades,theclassicfunctionsofthepost-industrialstateshavemoved

upwardstosupra-nationalbodies,downwardstoregionalorlocalstates,andoutwardstorelatively

autonomouscross-nationalalliancesamonglocalmetropolitanorregionalstateswithcomplementary

interests(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000,Hajer2003a).Theoutcomeofthesedevelopmentshas

beenaweakeningofthestate’sauthoritythroughthediffusionofresponsibilitiesaccompaniedwith

newformsofcivicorganizationinawidergovernancecontext.Theweakeningofthestatehasrendered

theclassical-modernist(nationalandformal)institutionsofgovernmentinadequateorlesscapableof

providingtherulesofthegameforinterdependentactorsfacewithcomplexandmulti-facetedsocietal

issuesinrapidlychangingenvironments.

ThenewapproachtopolicyanalysisincorporateswhatHajer(2003a)hascalled“thegameof‘scale

jumping’,ortheartofputtingeachinterventionattheappropriatelevel”(pages176-9),whichmay

includeformal,informal,government,andnon-governmentstakeholdersandtheinstitutionsincluding

rulesandvaluesthroughwhichthesestakeholdersorganizethemselvesorareorganized.Anoperational

considerationforthemodernpolicyanalystshouldbetodeterminewhichstakeholdersareinvolvedin

thepolicyprocessandthroughwhatstructuresorinstitutionstheirinteractionsaregoverned.

Ifgovernmentisaboutthearbitrationofhowscarcesocietalresourcesareallocated,governanceis

aboutthecontestationsaroundhowresourcesareactuallyallocated.Kooiman(2003:4)distinguishes


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between“governing”as“thetotalityofinteractions,inwhichpublicandprivateactorsparticipate,

aimedatsolvingsocietalproblemsorcreatingsocietalopportunities”andgovernanceas“thetotalityof

theoreticalconceptionsofgoverning”.Thusgoverningmaybedefinedastheprocessthroughwhichthe

contestationsandinteractionsamongthecompetingactorsaresettled.Whilegovernancedenotesa

significantdegreeofself-organizingneutrality,governingdenotesintention,preference,andagenda(s).

However,thecommonlyacceptedinterpretationofgovernanceisinfactwhatKooimanhasdefinedas

governing.5

Undertheumbrellaofgovernancetherehavebeennumerousdiscussionssincetheearly1980samong

policymakersandsocialscientistsalikeoncollaboration,inclusion,cooperation,andcoordinationon

theaccountofincreasedinterdependenciesamongactorsinmarkets,networks,andhierarchies.The

discussionsonthechangingmodeofgovernancemaybegroupedintotwomaincamps.First,thereare

thosewhoviewtheemphasisoncollaboration,cooperation,private-publicpartnerships,andsoforthas

aproductofanideologicalshifttowardneo-liberalismandamoveawayfromtheconceptionofthe

stateastheproviderofwelfareandtheconvenerresponsibleforsocialcohesion.Second,thereisthe

viewthatthedispersionandinformalizationofformalstatefunctionssignifyamovetowardamode

of"co-governance"whereinactorsincivilsocietyareabletoengagemoreinmattersofpublicpolicy

thantheydidduringtheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheSecondWorldWaranduntiltheearly1980s.

Thefirstcampviewsthemovefromgovernmenttogovernanceasanindicationofthestateabdicating

itscentralroleandresponsibilitieswhilethesecondcampseesthismoveasofferingapotentialfor

moreinclusiveanddemocraticparticipationandcivilengagementinmattersofpolicyandsocial

development.

TheproponentsofthefirstcampareanumberofmainlyBritishscholarswhosincethelate1980shave

pointedtoamovefromformalgovernmenttothelessformalgovernance(Jessop1997,1999,2001,

Macleod1996,1999,Jones1997a,1997b,1999).ThoughatfirstspecifictoBritainunderThatcherism,

thisconceptionofgovernancehasbeengeneralizedbyothersincludingAmin(1999),AminandThrift

(1994),Cox(2001,2002),EdenandHampson(1997),GoodwinandPainter(1997),Hajer(1995,2003a,

2003b),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),Scott,A.J.(1998),Storper(1997),Swyngedouw(2000),

Swyngedouwetal.(2002),andahostofotherstocapturethesignificantchangesthathavebeentaking

placeinthesocio-politicalandeconomiclandscapeofthepost-Fordistera.Jessop(1999)andPierreand

5SeealsoKooiman(2003)forafulldiscussionofthedifferencesbetweenthetwoterms.


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Peters(2000)refertoa“hollowingout”ofthenationalstatethroughthedelegationofstatefunctions

tonon-stateorquasi-stateentities.Jessop(1999)alsomakesclearthatthedelegationofgovernment

functionstoquasi-ornon-governmentalbodiesdoesnotequateasurrenderofpoliticalpowerbythe

statetonon-stateactors.

IncontrasttothefirstcampandfocusingonaEuropeanscale,theproponentsofthesecondcamp,

exemplifiedbyHajer(2003b),interprettheshiftfromgovernmenttogovernanceasamovefromliberal

democracyto“expansivedemocracy”characterizedby“increasedparticipation,eitherbymeansof

small-scaledirectdemocracyorthroughstronglinkagesbetweencitizensandbroad-scale[formal]

institutions,bypushingdemocracybeyondtraditionalpoliticalspheres,andbyrelatingdecision-making

tothepersonswhoareaffected”(p.3).Hajer(2003a,2003b)andKooiman(1993,2003)pointoutthat

classical-modernistinstitutionscharacterizedandmaintainedbycodified,well-establishedpatternsof

behavior,arenolongersufficientforgoverningeffectivelyinthechangedcontextofgovernance.The

formalinstitutionsofgovernanceareincreasinglyhavingtocompetewith“open-ended,oftenunusual,

adhocarrangementsthatdemonstrateremarkableproblem-solvingcapacityandopenupopportunities

forlearningandchangeinexactlythosecircumstanceswhereclassical-modernistinstitutionshavefailed

todeliver”(Hajer2003b:3).

TheoptimismoftheperspectiveongovernancesharedbyHajerandKooimanisremarkableinits

contrasttotheviewoftheBritisheconomicgeographersandpoliticalscientistswhosemainobservation

aboutthemovetogovernanceishowanti-democraticithasbeen,atleastintheUK.6Whetherthe

influenceofthenationalstatehasshrunkremainsamatterofdebateamongeconomicgeographers,

sociologistsandpoliticalscientists.Whatisclearinthisdebateisthatgovernanceisviewedbyallas

highlyscale-andcontext-specific.

Inthepolicymakingdiscourse,governanceisoftendescribedastheexerciseofauthorityandcontrolby

amultiplicityofpublicandprivateinterests.Thisviewofgovernanceisprevalentinmostofficial

definitionsoftheterm.Forexample,acursorylookatthemoreformaldefinitionsofgovernanceyields

aseriesofkeywordsandphrases(Table1)thatpointtogovernanceashowactorsorganizethemselves.

6SeeMacLeod(1996,1999)andJones(1997a,1997b,1999)forspecificexamplesandcasestudies.


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Table1:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsof“Governance”• Leadership;ExerciseofAuthorityandControl,Power,Coordination• Managing;DecisionMaking• Influence;Behaviour;Conduct• Interdependence;Transaction;Interaction• Social,Ecological,andPoliticalSystems• Social,Political,andEconomicActors• Society;Hierarchy;Private,Public,andCivicOrganizations• Traditions;Rules;FormalandInformalInstitutions• Structures;Culture;Processes• Conflicts;Negotiation;DisputeResolution;Coercion;Influencing;Constituting;• Knowledge;Devices;Policies• Networks,Associations,andAlliances• Issuestackledthroughgovernanceinclude:Stability

Source:Multiple(2012)

ThekeywordsinTable1aretakenfromofficialstatementsbytheEuropeanCommission,government

ministriesandagencies,foreigndevelopmentagencies,academicinstitutions,internationalcorporations

andagencies,andworksbynumerousscholarsincludingStoker(1998),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),

WeimerandVining(1999),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),HollingsworthandBoyer(1997),andahostof

others.Aswillbeillustratedbelow,clarityanddefinitionalagreementfortheterms“governance”and

“institution”remainfarfromresolved.

Toillustrate,theEuropeanCommissionusestheterm“GoodGovernance”torefertoamodeof

governingwhoseintentionsareconsistentwiththecommongoodoftheMemberStatesandthe

EuropeanCommunityasawhole.TheCommission’svisionisbasedonthefivepoliticalprinciplesof

openness,participation,accountability,effectiveness,andcoherence.Furthermore,theseprinciplesare

tobemaintainedthroughthe“institutions”oftheEuropeanUnion’sgovernancesystem(Table2).

Table2:EuropeanCommission’sPrinciplesof“GoodGovernance”Openness:TheInstitutionsshouldworkinamoreopenmanner…Participation:…ImprovedparticipationislikelytocreatemoreconfidenceintheendresultandintheInstitutionsthatdeliverpolicies.….Accountability:…EachoftheEUInstitutionsmustexplainandtakeresponsibilityforwhatitdoesinEurope.…Effectiveness:Policiesmustbeeffectiveandtimely,deliveringwhatisneededonthebasisofclearobjectives,anevaluationoffutureimpactand,whereavailable,ofpastexperience.…Coherence:…CoherencerequirespoliticalleadershipandastrongresponsibilityonthepartoftheInstitutionstoensureaconsistentapproachwithinacomplexsystem.

Source:CEC(2001:10),emphasisadded.


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WhatismoststrikingintheCommission’sdefinitionofgoodgovernanceistheemphasisontheroleof

institutionsasentitiesthatarelargelyviewedasbeing“upthere”and,atleastcurrently,insufficiently

withinthereachofordinarycitizens.Assuch,thisviewofgovernanceseemsconcernedprimarilywith

minimizingbureaucratizationandhierarchyoftheorganizationswithkeyrolesintheEUsystemof

governance.ThustheintentoftheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance(CEC2001)istomakethese

formalorganizations–withkeyinstitutionalfunctionsandwhosesizeandnumbersareincreasing–

moreaccessible,accountable,andrelevanttothegeneralpopulaceandtoretainahigherdegreeof

relevancy,credibility,andlegitimacyintheaverageperson’smind.TheWhitePaper’snecessarybut

exclusivefocusonwhatareatbestformalinstitutionsoverlookstheimportantroleplayedbyother,less

formalortangible,institutionsinEuropeangovernance,particularlyinpolicyformationand

implementation.Tofullyappreciatetheroleofinstitutions,theymustbeviewedasmorethanlarge

bureaucraticorganizations.

Thereareotherdefinitionsofgood,ordemocratic,governancethatpointimplicitlytotheimportanceof

informalinstitutions.Table3highlightsthekeywordsinsomeofsuchdefinitionsofgoodgovernance.

Table3:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsofGoodGovernance

• ServingtheCommonGood• Monitoringofauthority• Democraticallyelected,Representative,andParticipatorygovernments• Accountability;Responsiveness;Transparency;Efficiency• RuleofLawandEqualJusticeunderthelaw• GovernmentCapacitytomanageresourcesandimplementsoundpolicies• GovernmentAbilitytomaintainsocialpeace,lawandorder,economicgrowth,andaminimumlevelof

socialsecurity• GovernmentAbilitytoreformstructuresandprocesses• GovernmentAbilitytoimplementpolicyeffectively• RespectofCitizensandthestatefortheinstitutionsthatgoverneconomicandsocialinteractions• Interactionbetweenacademicsandpolicymakers• Learning;ProblemReformulation• ActorsincludebutarenotlimitedtothePrivateSector,CivilSociety,andthestate

Source:Multiple(2012)

AnillustrativeexampleisprovidedbyUNDP,whichdefinesgovernanceas:


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…theexerciseofeconomic,politicalandadministrativeauthoritytomanageacountry'saffairsatall

levels.Itcomprisesthemechanisms,processesandinstitutionsthroughwhichcitizensandgroups

articulatetheirinterests,exercisetheirlegalrights,meettheirobligationsandmediatetheirdifferences.7

Otherinternationalorganizations,e.g.,theWorldBank,UnitedStatesAgencyforInternational

Development(USAID),offersimilardefinitionsofgovernanceemphasizingtheroleofhigherformal

authorityforthecommongood(Table3).

Ifwesimplifythenotionofgovernancetomean‘thewayhumancommunities(i.e.,organizations,

polities,andcross-polityregions)organizethemselves’,itfollowsthatanalysesofmodesofgovernance

needtoincludeadiversityofactorswhohavetorelatetooneanotherduetointerdependency,and

whoallcontendforordefendapieceoftheproverbialpie,action,orpower.Wemayconclude,

therefore,thattherehasbeengovernanceaslongastherehasbeenhumansociety,characterized

aboveallbyinterdependency–itistheformthatchangesovertimeandduetovaryingresource

constraintsandopportunitiesandthestructuresthatwedeviseadaptivelytogovernourselves.The

intricateconstellationoftheformalandinformalstructuresthatweusetogovernourselvesisoften

referredtoas“theinstitutions”.But,thisbegsthequestion:whatpreciselyaretheseinstitutionsand

wherearetheymanifest?Thenextsectionoffersaperspectiveforansweringthisfundamental

question.

Institutions

Whiletheinterestininstitutionsofgovernancebyeconomistsandpoliticalscientistssomewhatfadedin

themid-20thCentury,itremainedcontinuouslypresentinSociologyandisreflectedinworksbyCooley,

Durkheim,SpencerandSumneraroundtheturnofthe19thCentury,toWeber(1924),Parsons(1990),

Hughes(1939),Davis(1949),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),Jessop(2001),andScott,W.R.(2001)among

numerousothers.Mostofthesewritershavebeeninfluencedby,orfoughtagainst,theideasput

forwardbyKarlMarxwhoiscreditedwithsignificantcontributionstothethreedisciplinesofSociology,

PoliticalScienceandEconomics.Thediversityofconceptualizationsofinstitutionsoriginatingfromthese

threedisciplineshasgeneratedaliteratureoninstitutionsthatisrichandextensiveyetintimidatingly

difficulttooperationalizeforanalyticalpurposes.

7 TakenfromadefinitionofgovernancebyUNDP,availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm.


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Toillustrate,acloseexaminationofsomeofthekeydefinitionsofinstitutionsrevealsthatinstitutions

areviewedasinformalandintangible(e.g.,norms,habits,andcustoms),semi-formal(e.g.,mental

constructsandmodels,rulesofthegame,conventions),andformal(e.g.,family,prescriptions,

proscriptions,corporations,tradeunions,thestate)phenomena(Table4).Surprisingly,few

institutionalistsappearalertedtothisdiversityofmeaningsandtheneedformanageable

conceptualizationofinstitutions.Mucheffortisdedicatedtofindthemostperfect,singulardefinitionof

institutionsinstead.8

Table4:WhatareInstitutions?1. Habitsofagrouporthecustomsofapeople(Hamilton1932)2. Settledhabitsofthoughtcommontothegeneralityofmen(Veblen1919)3. Convenienttermforthemoreimportantamongthewidelyprevalent,highlystandardizedsocialhabits

(Mitchell1950)4. Howthegameisplayed(NelsonandSampat2001)5. Normsthatregulaterelationsamongindividuals(Parsons1990)6. Conventions,rulesofaction,embeddedinsocialstructure,locallyspecific(Krätke1999)7. Setsofrulesofthegameorcodesofconductdefiningsocialpractices(Young1994)8. Mentalconstructs(Neale1987)9. Rulesofthegame(North1990)10. MentalModels(North1994)11. Collectiveactionexercisedbydifferenttypesoforganization(family,corporation,tradeunion,state)in

controlofindividualaction(Commons1924)12. Formalorganizations,patternsofbehaviour,negativenormsandconstraints(CoriatandDosi1998)13. Asetofsociallyprescribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Bush1986)14. Prescribedorproscribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Tool1993)15. Constitutionalrulesystemsforsociety,collectivechoicerulesgoverningdifferentkindsoforganization,

operationalrulesoforganizations(Ostrom1999)Source:Parto(2005a)

Thefirststeptowardreconceptualizinginstitutionsistotakestockofhowinstitutionshavebeen

definedbythosewhohaveseeninstitutionsascrucialtounderstandinghumanbehaviour.Table4is

onesuchattempt.Table4illustratesthedifficultyofdefininginstitutionsandconductinginstitutional

analysissincethereisnoonedefinitionheretocapturethemultiplicityofmeaningsortheextentto

whichinstitutionscollectivelyorganizehumaninteractioninmultipledimensions.Tomakecoherent

senseofthesedefinitionswemayattempttoveryroughlygroupthembasedonthetypeofinstitutions

towhichtheyreferasfollows:8See,forexample,Hodgson(2006),whereduringaninterviewwitharguableoneofthegiantsofinstitutionalisminEconomics(DouglasNorth),noattemptismadetoreconceptualizethenotionofinstitutionstocapturetheirimportanceandplaceininteractionsatdifferentlevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,orspheresofhumanactivity.


16

• Definitions1,2,3,4and5suggestrelativepermanencyandpointtoinformalinstitutions(norms,

habitsandcustoms,howthegameisplayed)

• Definitions6,7,8,9and10alludetosemi-formalinstitutions(rulesofthegame,conventions,

mentalconstructs,mentalmodels)andinformalinstitutions(rulesofaction,codesofconduct,

socialpractices)

• Definition11referstomainlyformalinstitutions(family,corporation,tradeunions,thestate)

• Definition12referstoformalorganizationsandinformalstructures(patternsofbehaviourand

norms)

• Definitions13and14refertomoreformalinstitutions(prescriptions,proscriptions)

• Definition15referstoformalinstitutions(constitutionalrulesystems,collectivechoicerules,

operationalrules)

Thegroupingofdefinitionsintheabovemannerrevealsthreeimportantdistinguishingfeaturesof

institutions.First,somedefinitionsunderlinetheterritorialscaleofgovernance(Krätke1999,Ostrom

1999,Young1994,2002).Second,anumberofthesedefinitionsrefertoinstitutionsasbeingmanifestin

individualbehaviourinsocietyatlarge(Hamilton1932,Parsons1990,Krätke1999,Veblen1919),

individualbehaviorwithinorganizations(Commons1924,MarchandOlsen1984,CoriatandDosi1998),

interactionsamongorganizations(Ostrom1999),andinteractionsamongnations(Young1994,2002).

Finally,onecandetectvaryingemphasesonthesocial,economic,andpoliticalaspectsofinstitutions.

Whatshouldcomethroughthisgroupingofthedefinitionsofinstitutionsisthatinstitutionscanbe

moreorlessformal/tangiblephenomenathatstructureinteractionsamongindividualsatdifferent

levels,interactionsamonggroupsofindividualsatdifferentterritorialscales,andinteractionsof

individualsandgroupsindifferentspheres(toparaphraseMaxWeber)ofhumanactivity.Viewedinthis

multi-dimensional/multi-layeredfashion,thetaskofunpackingthecomplexitythatthediverse

definitionsofinstitutionsattempttocapturebecomesmoremanageable.Asummaryoftheworking

definitionsforlevels,scales,andspheresisprovidedinTable5.

“Levelofinter-relation”isborrowedfromSociologyandreferstointer-relationsattheindividual,

organizational,andsocietallevels.“Scaleofgovernance”isborrowedfromSociology,PoliticalScience,

andAdministrativeStudiesandcapturestheterritorialdimensionofgovernance.“Sphere”isanotion

borrowedfromstudiesofSystemsDynamicsandSociology(MaxWeberinparticular)andisusedto


17

bringinterconnectednessofeconomic,social,andpoliticalarenasintoperspectivesofgovernanceat

differentscales.Thenotionofsphereisparticularlyusefulindealingwithcomplexandmulti-faceted

policyissueswhichrequireconcertedeffortstointegrateandaddresssocial,economic,andpolitical

concernssimultaneouslyandatmultiplescalesofgovernance.

Table5:Levels,Scales,andSystems

Levelsofinter-relation

Individual:Amongindividualsatlargebasedoninterpersonalinterdependencewheremanyactorsareinvolved.Organizational:Withinorganizationstosecureinternalcohesionandamongorganizationstomaximizeadaptabilityofindividualorganizationssoastomakecompatiblerespectiveoperationalunitiesandindependencewithdefactomaterialandsocialinterdependenceonotherorganizations.Societal:Amongoperationallyautonomous(or“closed”)functionalsystemseachwithitsownautopoieticcodes,programmes,institutionallogicsandinterestsinself-reproduction(adaptedfromJessop1997).

(Territorial)ScalesofGovernance

Local(subnational),national,international(betweennationallyconstituted,functionallydifferentiatedinstitutionalorders),transnational(passingthroughnationalboundaries),andglobal(coveringtheglobeasawhole).

Spheres Societymaybedefinedintermsofitssocial,economic,political,andecologicalspheresorsystems.Asubsystemcontainspartsofallsystems.

Source:Parto(2005a)

Likeallcategorizations,thetermslevels,scales,andsystems(orspheres)areconstructedandemployed

tocometotermswiththecomplexityofthisfundamentalquestion:howdoweaccountforinstitutions

inanalysesofpolicyaimedateffectingsocietalchange?Answeringthisquestionhasimportant

implicationsforfurtherresearchandpolicy.Inresearch,carefulcategorizationofinstitutionsbasedon

levels,scales,andsystemsenablesustoinvestigatethesameproblemorresearchquestionindifferent

contexts,expectdifferentfindingsduetocontext-specificinstitutionallandscapes,andidentifythe

factorsandactorsmostrelevanttochangemakingeffortsinagivencontext.Inpolicymakingand

implementation,anin-depthandmulti-dimensionalappreciationofthecollectiveroleofinstitutionsis

likelytominimizethepossibilityofsettingunrealisticpolicyobjectivesandincreaseourunderstanding

ofwhyinsomecontextssomepoliciessucceedmorethanothersinmeetingtheirobjectives.

Theseresearchandpolicyimplicationsareparticularlyrelevanttopolicymakingatregional,e.g.,

EuropeanUnion,orglobalscalesofgovernanceonsuchissuesasclimatechange,forexample.The

categorizationsinTable5provideausefulbasisforoperationalizationofamulti-dimensionalnotionof

“institutions”.Applyingthelevels-scales-systemsperspectivetoinstitutionsyieldsaloosebutnecessary

typologyofinstitutionsasdepictedinFigure2.


18

Figure2.ATypologyofInstitutions

BehaviouralInstitutions:Institutionsasstandardized(recognizable)socialhabits–manifestindeeplyingrainedmodesofbehaviourinindividualsandgroupsasreflectionsofsocialnormsCognitiveInstitutions:Institutionsasmentalmodelsandconstructsordefinitions,basedonvaluesandembeddedinculture–(tobe)aspiredtobyindividualsandgroupsAssociativeInstitutions:Institutionsasmechanismsfacilitatingprescribedorprivilegedinteractionamongdifferentprivateandpublicinterests–manifestinactivitiesofgroupsofindividualsRegulativeInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptions–manifestastheimmediateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroupsConstitutiveInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptionssettingtheboundsofsocialrelations–manifestastheultimateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroups

Source:Parto(2008)

Asimportantasthisdisaggregationandarrangementofinstitutionsareinidentifyingthem,more

importantistherangeoftangibility/formalityandscopethatitdepicts,particularlywhenweview

institutionsasphenomenathatbindtogetherandstabilizeinter-relationsatdifferentlevels,governance

atdifferentscales,andsystemsindifferentconfigurations.9

Institutionalanalysistoinformpolicyinamodeofgovernancecommittedtofundamentalsocietal

change,e.g.,toaddressclimatechange,shouldbeginwiththespecificationofthecontextinwhichthe9 SeeParto(2005a)foramoreelaboratediscussionofinstitutionsatdifferentlevels,scales,andsystems.


19

institutionsaretobestudied.Further,itrequiresdifferentiatingbetweentangibleandintangible

institutionssincedifferentlevelsofformalityandscopeofinstitutionsrequiredifferentmethods,or

mixesofmethods,ofanalysisandpolicyapproach.Thenextsectionsketchesouthowthetypologyin

Figure2maybeappliedtostudygovernanceforsustainabledevelopmenttowardmeetingMDGsatthe

EuropeanUnionscaleofgovernance.

InstitutionsandGovernance

WithoutadoubtthepoliticalwillattheEUscaleofgovernanceisbeginningtoshowsignsof

institutionalizationattheformalpolicylevel,atleastinsofarastheenvironmentalaspectofsustainable

developmentisconcerned.10However,theinformationavailablethroughconventionalsocial,economic,

andenvironmentalindicatorssuggeststhatinpracticetheEuropeanCommunityasawholeisless

sustainablenowthantwoorthreedecadesago.Thismismatchbetweenpolicyobjectivesandpolicy

outcomesisinpartaproductoftheinterplaybetweenthepolicyprocess,themodeofgovernance,and

theinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceforsustainabledevelopment/environmentalprotectionis

exercised.Insufficientattentiontoinstitutions,particularlythelesstangibleandinformalinstitutions,

hasledtosettingunrealisticorambitiouspolicyobjectives.

Toillustrate,themostwidelyusedschematicofsustainabledevelopmentshowsthesocial,economic,

andenvironmentalspheresasthreeoverlappingcircles(systems).11Sustainabledevelopmentis

depictedasoccurringintheareawherethethreecirclesoverlap.Anotherpopularapproachis“pillar-

based”which,accordingtoGibsonetal.(2005:9),

…distinguishesbetweeneconomicandsocialneeds,inparttoemphasizethatmaterialgainsarenotsufficientmeasuresorpreserversofhumanwell-being.Similarlytheadditionofparticularattentiontoculturalandpoliticalcomponents,mostcommonininternationaldevelopmentapplications,ismeanttostresstheimportanceofthesefactorsinbuildingchangethatmaybeviableoverthelonghaul.

Policyformationonsustainabledevelopmentislikelytorelyoninformationprovidedthroughcurrently

in-usesocial,economic,andenvironmentalindicators.Aninstitutionalistapproachtopolicymakingfor

10TheformalizationofEUpolicyonsustainabledevelopment,therenewedfocusonaddressingclimatechangewiththeCOP21conferencein2015,andthesteadyincreaseintheamountofavailablefundingforresearchintosustainability-relatedareasthroughsuccessiveEuropeanFrameworkProgrammesarebutsomeindicationsofthisinstitutionalizationprocess.

11ForacomprehensivereviewofdefinitionsforsustainabledevelopmentseeGibson(2001).Foranofficialexample,seeUNDP,Availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm,accessedDecember12,2004.


20

sustainabledevelopmentwoulddeviseacomplementarysetofinstitutionalindicatorstohelpexplain

theunderlyingcausesforpoorperformanceinmeetingsustainabledevelopmentpolicyobjectivesinthe

social,economic,andenvironmentalarenas.OnewaytoconceptualizethisistocombineWeber’s

notionofspheresandthetypologyofinstitutionsinFigure2.TheresultispresentedinFigure3,whose

mainpurposeistocapturetheroleandplaceofinstitutionsinvariousspheresofhumanactivity.

Figure3.InstitutionsandGovernanceforSustainableDevelopment

Source:Parto(2005b)

Toillustrate,howdowechangeunsustainablebehaviour,suchasnotrecycling,over-consuming,or

usingresourceswithoutrecognizingscarcityoradverseecologicalimpact?Somehowweneedto

capturewhysomepeoplerecyclewhileothersdonot,andwhysomecountriesorregionsaremore

sustainableincertainrespectsthanothers.ThecentralfeatureofFigure3isthatinstitutionsarepresent

asstructuringphenomenaatdifferentlevelsofinter-relationandscalesofgovernance,bindingtogether

themainspheresofsustainabledevelopment.Thedegreeofformalityandthescopeofinstitutions

increaseaswemovefrom“Behavioural”upwardsto“Constitutive”institutions.Ithastobenotedthat


21

thistypologyisveryfluidandthereisconstantinterplayandtransformationbetweenthedifferenttypes

ofinstitution.

IfwearetoexploretherelationshipbetweengovernancemodesandmeetingMDGswithaviewto

identifythepolicymakingstylesandinstitutionsthatcanbestfostermovingtowardsustainable

developmentattheglobalscale,weneedrathermorethanthecurrentlyin-usesocial,economic,

environmental,and(formal)institutionalindicatorsortheircomposites.

Forexample,theWorldBank’sWorldwideGovernanceIndicatorsdefinesgovernanceas“thetraditions

andinstitutionsbywhichauthorityinacountryisexercised”andoffersixcompositeindicatorsto

“measure”governancein199countriesatfourtimeperiodsbetween1996and2002.Theindicators

are:VoiceandAccountability,PoliticalStabilityandLackofViolence,GovernmentEffectiveness,

RegulatoryQuality,RuleofLaw,andControlofCorruption.Todeveloptheseindicatorstheauthorsuse

25separatedatasourcesfrom18differentorganizations,includingtheWorldBank,Gallup

International,theEconomistIntelligenceUnit,IMD,DRI/McGraw-Hill,ColumbiaUniversity,Freedom

House,Afrobarometer,Latinobarometro,theWorldEconomicForum,andReportersWithoutBorders.12

Theindicatorsareintendedtoserveasbenchmarksforpolicymakers,donoragencies,civilsocietyand

developmentexperts.

Withoutadoubtthereisvaluetosuchbenchmarks.However,nomatterhowinclusiveorcarefully

developedcompositeindicatorsorindicesare,theyareoutput-basedandonlyrevealstaticallythestate

ofaffairsatgivenpointsintimeandafterconsiderabletimelapse.Manyoftheelementsthatmakeup

theseindicatorsareprocessvariableswithhighprobabilityofchangeintheshortterm.Theseindicators

onlytellus‘how’thingsareorwereatagivenpointintime,leavingustospeculateasto‘why’things

haveturnedoutthewaytheyhave.

Governanceforanything,inthiscasetomeetMDGs,requiresconsciousandconscientiouseffortto

steerdevelopmentbyinterventionthroughgovernmentalandnon-governmentalactionalong

preconceivedtrajectoriesbased,toalargeextent,onlearningbydoingintheinstitutionalcontext.

Kaufmannetal.’s(2015)indicatorswouldbeoffarmorevaluetopolicymakersifaccompaniedwith

12ForadditionaldetailsontheWorldBanksGovernanceIndicators,see:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home


22

context-specificnarrativestoexplainwhytherehasbeenadeteriorationorimprovementinthemode

ofgovernanceandwhatoptionsthereareforfurtherimprovementthroughpolicyinterventiontoeffect

institutionalchange.

InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework

Inlightofthediscussionintheprecedingsections,wecanrevisitthenotionsofgovernanceand

institutionstomakethefollowingstatementsasworkingdefinitionsandguidepostsforconducting

institutionalpolicyanalysis:

• Themodeofgovernanceisthemannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsorganizes

itselfatthelowestscaleandisorganizedfromthehighestscale

• Governanceisintimatelyrelatedtoamultiplicityofinstitutions,asdepictedinFigure2,through

whichitisexercised

• Governanceforeffectingsocietalchangehastopayparticularattentiontoformalandinformaland

tangibleandintangibleinstitutionsandtheirfunctionsinfacilitatingandcurtailingchange

• Toaccountfortheroleofinstitutionsweneedto:

• Identifytheproblems,events,actors,andotherfactorsthatcollectivelyactascatalystsfor

processesthatprecedetheemergenceofinstitutionsintheircurrentforms(Ostrom1999,

Kingdon1984,andSabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999)

• Establishthecontrollabilityofthesecatalystsandusetheinformationinselectingpolicy

measuresthatutilizethecatalysts

• Setinmotioninstitutionalizationprocessesthatneutralizeundesirable/unsustainable

institutionsandreinforcedesirable/sustainableinstitutionsalreadypresent,and

• Identifywhatcomplementarycatalystsmaybeinitiatedthroughpolicyorotherintervention

tosteerchange.

Institutionalchangethroughpolicyinterventionismorelikelytooccurifintroducedthroughweaker

entrypointsonthebehavioural-constitutivecontinuumdepictedinFigure2.Amajorpolicyimplication

ofthisperspectiveoninstitutionsofgovernanceisthatmanagingsocietalchangerequiresGovernment

interventionthroughpolicymeasuresasamaincatalystofinstitutingchange.Sincegovernment

interventiondoesnotoccurinavacuumandisoftenshapedbyotherinstitutions,weareledtoask:

howdoweidentifytheinstitutionsandtheircatalystsintheirentiretyinagivenareaofstudy?Or,more

specifically,whatmethodologycanbeemployedforthispurpose?


23

Themethodologicalapproachneedstobe“postdisciplinary”(Sayer2001),“eclectic”(Swedberg1990),

“Lamarchian”(NelsonandWinter1982),and“adhoc”(Hodgson1988)sincethestudyofinstitutionsof

governancespansatleastthreedisciplinesandoveraCentury’sworthofthoughtanddebate.Weneed

todrawonasmanydisciplines,metaphors,andfieldsofstudyasnecessarytoprovideanarrativethat

captureswhatnoonedisciplinecan.Themethodologywillthusneedtoincludethefollowing

components:

• Historicalreviewofsecondarydatatodocumenttheevolutionofthearena13orsubsystemunder

study,e.g.,howtheTransportationortheEnergysubsystemsandtheircontextsdeveloped,and

why.Thisrequiresmappingdifferenttypesofinstitutions,theirinter-relations,andevolutionover

time.

• Re-interpretationofworkalreadycarriedoutoncultural,social,andhumancapitaltogather

contextualdetailsandidentifyinformalinstitutions.

• Interviewswithkeyinformantstosupplementreadilyavailabledatafromsecondarysources.The

interviewsalsoservetovalidatefindingsandintuitionsderivedfromsecondarydatareviewsand

mappingexercises.

• Re-interviewstoverifythefindingswiththekeyinformants.

• Aboveall,theinstitutionalistapproachrequiresasignificanttimecommitmentinanembedded

fashiontocapturethelesstangibleinstitutions.

Thesuggestedmethodologycanbeusedtoidentifythevariables(decisions,situations,andother

factors)thatmayhaveplayedkeyrolesineffectingatransitionfromone“stable”statetoanotherinthe

subsystemunderstudy.Byweightingandrankingtheidentifiedvariableswecanidentifythemost

importantvariablesofthesubsystem,trackchangesinthepropertiesofthesevariablesovertime,and

assessthemforcontrollability.Thenextstepistomakeeducatedguessesaboutthemixofvariables

likelytofacilitateatransitionfromthecurrentstateofaffairstoamoredesirablestablestate,e.g.,from

unsustainabletosustainableeconomicdevelopment.

13Arenasreferto“thesocialspacewhereindividualsinteract,exchangegoodsandservices,solveproblems,dominateoneanother,orfight”(Ostrom1999:42).SabatierandJenkins-Smith(1993,1999)provideasimilardescriptionfortheirnotionofsubsystemswhileKingdon(1984)uses“policystreams”.


24

Theinstitutionalistperspectivedoesnotrelegatetheroleofinstitutionstoaboxlocatedamongthe

differentcomponentsofthepolicyprocess,ortreatinstitutionsasacollective“filter”thatshapesthe

patternsofinteractions.Instead,institutionsareviewedasthebindingagentinhumaninteractionsand

manifestatalllevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,andthroughdifferentspheresofhuman

activityinagivensituation.Viewedinthismanner,Figure2canbeusedtoinventoryandcategorizethe

fullrangeofinstitutionsinagivenpolicyarena.Thefinalstepinthisproposedapproachistodevelop

andplayoutpolicyscenarioswhilemakingallowancesthatsomeofthehistoricalcausalitiesmaynot

holdduetochangedconditions.Cautionhastobetakentodealwiththepotentialconsequencesof

policyexperimentationfailures.

Policyanalysisalongtheabovelinesmayappearadauntingtask.However,mostofthedatarequired

forthistypeofanalysisarealreadybeingcollectedandthemethodologyproposedherecanberefined

continuallybasedontheavailabilityofdatafromthesesecondarysources.Amajordifferencebetween

theproposedmethodologyandconventionalsurveyworkistheemphasisoftheformeronqualitative

analysisofqualitativedatawhilerecognizingthevalueofquantitativeanalysis.Animportantpointto

emphasizeisthattoapplytheproposedmethodologyusefullyandconcretely,thearena/subsystem

needstobemanageableinsizeandclearlydelineatedforitsboundaries.Thatis,weneedtofocuson

specificissuessuch,e.g.,wastemanagement,energyconsumptionandprovision,ortransportation

ratherthanlargeall-encompassingquestionssuchas“sustainabledevelopment”or“goodgovernance”

–yet,withoutlosingsightofthelargerpictureandbyfullyaccountingformulti-dimensional

interdependenciesandinterconnectedness.

Conclusion

Ifpolicy-makingisvalueladen(Tait1992,SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999,TaitandLyall2004)

andthatduetointensifiedinterdependenciesandinterconnectedness,thereisgreaterneedforpolicy

integrationanddeliberativepolicyanalysis(Hajer2003a,TaitandLyall2004),whitherpolicyanalysisfor

meetingglobalormulti-nationalgoalssuchasMDGs?Theanswertothisquestionisfarfromdecided.

TaitandLyall(2004:17)suggestthatfromapoliticalperspectivelackofintegrationinsomecasescould

beviewedaspragmatic,useful,andperhapsevenessentialsincefullclarificationmayclarifythingsthat

arebestleftasambiguous.InstitutionalpolicyanalysisasimpliedbyTaitandLyall(2004)recognizesthat

linkingideasofgovernanceandintegrationmaybeusefulorproblematic,dependingonhoweachterm


25

isused,“bywhom,andinwhatpolicycontext”.Inotherwords,legitimacyofpolicypositionsinsome

arenascannotbetreatedasagiven.

WorkontheEUpolicymakingprocessbyLyallandTait(2005)indifferentarenassuggeststhat

integrationisdesirableinsomearenassuchasenvironmentalpolicy,butperhapsnototherssuchas

tradeingeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)wheretheprivilegeof“speakingtruthtopower”needs

tobefullyexercisedbecauseofthewidedivergenceofopinionsontheissue.Asimilarargumentmaybe

madeinrelationtoothertechnologiessuchasnuclearpowergenerationandwastetoenergy

incineration.LyallandTait(2004)distinguishbetweenhorizontalandverticalpolicyintegrationbut

perceptivelymaintainthatthedesirabilityofeithertypeisdependentonthearenainwhichthepolicyis

formedorassessed.

MeetingpolicyobjectivesforMDGsarguablyrequireseffectivecommunicationandlineofcommand

acrossandthroughdifferentscalesofgovernance,withthehighestscaledefiningtherulesofthegame.

However,inmorecomplexarenaswithconsiderablymoresignificantsocietalrisks,e.g.,tradeinGMOs

ortherelianceonnuclearpowerasa“sustainable”energysource,itmaybejustaswellthatthereis

fundamentaldisagreementpreventingintegration(andunanimity)atthenational,EUorthe

internationalscalesofgovernance.

Jordan’s(2000)indepthreviewofenvironmentalpolicydevelopmentfroma“departmental

perspective”intheperiod1970-2000offersarangeofformalinstitutionalexplanationsastowhythe

UnitedKingdomhascontinuouslyunderperformedinenvironmentalprotectionwhencomparedtothe

Netherlands.ImplicitinJordan’saccountaretheproblems,policiesand,perhapsmostimportantlyfrom

agovernanceperspective,thepoliticsofenvironmentalpolicy-makingandperformanceintheUK.

ApplyingthetypologyofinstitutionsassuggestedinthispapertoJordan’smeticulousaccountof

departmentalevolutioncoulddeciphernotonlythepolicystreamsalaKingdon(1984)butalsoalarge

numberofinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceoftheenvironmentalarenahasbeenexercised.Akey

contributionofsuchanapplicationwillbetheidentificationofthelessformal/tangibleinstitutions,and

arguablythosetypicallyleftoutofmoststudiesofgovernanceoranalysesofpoliciesthroughthelensof

publicadministrationstudies.


26

ElsewhereJordanandothers(Jordanet.al2003,SchoutandJordan2003)comeclosertounderlining

theimportanceofthelessformalinstitutionsin(EU)governanceinrelationtoenvironmentalpolicy.In

theirlistof“complicatingfactors”SchoutandJordan(2003:20)includeintra-Commissionrelations,the

needtoexertsimultaneoushorizontalandverticalpressure,theneedtocombineadministrative

capacitiesofMemberStatesintoacoordinatedEuropeannetwork,thedifficultiesingainingan

overviewofthecapacitiesatMemberStatelevel,andthesensitiveproblemofhowbesttoidentify

weaknessesatthenationallevel.

SchoutandJordan(2003)warnagainsttheexpectationthatEuropeanUnionnetworksself-organizeina

constructivemannerintheirresponsestocoordinationchallengesandrecommendthattheEuropean

Commissionshouldtaketheleadinproposingalternativeactionsthroughpolicyandregulatory

measures.IfindeedthisisthecourseofactiontobefollowedonsuchCommunitychallengesaswaste

management,transportation,energyconsumptionandprovision,immigration,andpoverty–tocitebut

afewexamples–thenitisofutmostimportancethatpolicymakersatallscalesofgovernancewithin

theEuropeanUnionareawareofandsensitivetotheroleofallmannerofinstitutionsinthepolicy

process.

Thislineofreasoningcanbeusefullyappliedtothecommitmentby191countriestoimplement

programmestomeetMDGs.Deliberativepolicymaking,whilepath-dependentatthenationalscaleand

difficulttoadoptwhereitisnotalreadypracticed,hasahigherprobabilityofsuccessatasupra-national

scalesuchasthatrepresentedbytheUnitedNations.FortheUNtoincreaseitschancesofsuccessin

effortstomainstreamMDGs,ithastorecognize,asasupra-nationalbody,theimportantroleofformal

andinformalinstitutionsthatprovidethestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferent

scalesofjurisdiction,indifferentspheres,andatdifferentlevelsofinteraction(Figures2and3).

Onlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutionsindifferentcontextsandatdifferent

scalesarewelikelytogetasenseofwhycontexts,subjectedtocomparablepolicies,generatedifferent

outcomes.Applyingthemethodologyarticulatedintheprecedingparagraphsrequiresgoingbeyond

lookingatinstitutionsfromadepartmentalorpublicadministrationperspective.Usingthetypologyof

institutionstotakestockofthestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedislikelytorevealsome

ofthemainopportunitiesforandimpedimentstoeffectingchangeinagivenpolicyarena.Inthefinal

analysis,thecentralquestionforthepolicymakerandthepolicyanalystisnothow“good”apolicyora


27

modeofgovernanceisintheabstractbuthowcloselythepolicyresonateswith,andiscapableof

changing,thepre-existingconditionsandtheinstitutionsthroughwhichapolicy-targetedsubsystemis

governed.


28

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