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The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914Author(s): Jonathan GrantSource: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 9-36Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677343Accessed: 06-03-2015 04:01 UTC
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The Sword f
the Sultan:
OttomanArms mports,854-1914
Jonathan
Grant
AT
he
beginning
f
the
nineteenth
entury
he OttomanEmpirewas
self-sufficient
n
its
armaments
production,
yet by
1914 its domes-
tic
military
nd naval manufacturing
apacity had eroded to such an
extent
that the
empire
had become
almost
completely
dependent
on
imports.
While Turkish ttempts o foster
omestic
production
apabili-
ties
proved sporadic
and unsuccessful,
he
Ottoman
Empirewas
trans-
formed nto
one of
the most
important
markets for
armaments
n
the
world.Why
did
this erosion
in
production
apacity occur, and why
did
the Ottomans
ultimatelyrely
on
importing
he hardware
rather than
domesticating
he technology?
Did the
unwillingness
f
foreign
irms o
transfer
echnology
orce he
Turksto
import
he
finished efense
goods
and
preempt
the
development
of Ottoman
war
industries?Was
there
a
conscious design
on
the
part
of
the
European producers
of armaments
o
make the Ottomans dependent? In lightofthe evidence,the answerto
the last
question
must be
negative.
Rather than
to any foreignplot,
the
process leading to Ottoman
dependency
on
foreign
rms
suppliers
should
be
attributed
more
accu-
rately
to the
interplay
f
external
and internal
factors.
Externally,
he
impersonal
forcesof
rapid technological hange
and
the
development
of
an
international rmaments
mass
marketmade the
rapidacquisition
of
the latest defense
equipment
a
financially
ound
choice.
Internally,
he
political
and
personal
decisions
of Sultan
Abdul
Hamid
11
1876-1909)
profoundly
ffected he course of
Turkish
policy.
This article
emphasizes
Turkish
gency
over
foreignmanipulation
as the
key
to understanding
the
erosion
of the
domestic
defense
industries.
Furthermore, lthough
the
Ottomans
failed o achieve
self-sufficiency
n
armamentsproduction,
the Turkish case
may
be considered
a
qualified success
in
that
the
Ottoman
state did
obtain
high quality
equipment quickly
and
relatively
cheaply,given
ts
limited
financial
means.
The Journal of Militarvy listory 6 (January 2002): 9-36 C) Societv forMilitaryHistorr
*
9
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JONATIIANGRANT
Ottoman
war
industries
had
deep
roots
n
the
gunpowder
ge. Since
the fifteenthentury he Ottomanshad manufactured heir
wn military
and naval equipmentusingforeign xpertise nd copying oreignmodels.
After alling ehind technologically
uring he eighteenth entury,
urk-
ish domestic productionbegan
to return o a high evel of quality begin-
ning in the 1780s, thanks to the help of formalmissions
of technical
specialists
from
western Europe. By
the
early
nineteenth
century the
Ottoman Empire
once
again
had
become self-sufficient
n
its
military
production.'
Ottoman
armaments
policy
from the 1850s
up
to World War
I
reflected
he
empire's
weak industrial
nd financial
foundations,
s the
Ottomangovernmentncreasinglyooked to the industrial nd financial
capabilities of Germany,Britain,
and
France to
meet its
needs for
weapons
and
military quipment.
Ultimately, mported
rms became a
substitute
ordomestic
ones,
as the Ottoman
state
armaments
ndustry
could not compete with
the foreign roducers
n
quantity r modernity
of
weapons
and
ships.
It became
easier
simply
to
restock with the
newest, top-of-the-linequipment rather
than lose
time
and money
attempting
o
create and maintain
domestic arms
industry.
This complete dependence on foreign uppliers to meet Ottoman
defense needs
placed
the
country
n
an
extremely
ulnerable
position,
and
presented
the
potential
for foreign uppliers
to
exert influenceon
Turkishpolicy through
he
manipulation
f the flowof
arms
and
equip-
ment.Recognizing hispossibility,
he Ottomangovernment ried o min-
imize risksby avoiding xclusive
reliance
on
any single
foreign upplier.
Given
these
conditions,
he Ottoman
Empire
in the
pre-1914 years
can
serve
as a valuable
case study
for
he
dynamics
of
the arms trade
n
the ThirdWorld.
The Ottoman Empirewas not unique in grapplingwith the chal-
lenges ofmodernizing ts
defense
ector.
Russia, Japan,China,
and
Egypt
similarly
onfronted he
problem
of
mportingmilitary
echnology
rom
the
West,
with
varying egrees
of success.
By
1914
Russia
and
Japan
had
accomplished
the
most
n
terms f
developing
domestic
military
ndus-
trial
base, yet
even
they
had
not
achieved
self-sufficiency
n
armaments
or
warship production.
For all these
modernizing ountries,
the chal-
lenges posed by
the
high
costs of
foreign xpertise, mported
materials,
and skilled abor placed severe economic strains on state resources. In
orderto
meet defense
requirements
s
quickly
as
possible,
all
these
pow-
ers turned
o
imports
o
a
greater
r lesser
degree.2
1. Jonathan rant,
Rethinkinghe Ottoman
Decline':
Military
echnology if-
fusion n the Ottoman mpire, ifteentho
Eighteenth enturies, ournal
f World
History 0 (Spring 999): 179-201.
2. David B. Ralston, mporting he European
Army Chicago:
University f
ChicagoPress,1990);
Thomas
L.
Kennedy,
he
Arms
ofKiangnan:
Modernizationn
10 *
THE
JOURNAL
OF
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The Sword
of theSultan
While they made
this substitution
f imports, he question facing
Ottoman policy-makers
was fromwhom to buy arms, for they always
considered multipleoptions forsuppliers.Based on an analysis of the
patterns of Ottoman
arms and equipment purchases, it is
possible to
establish
a
periodization
consisting
of four phases: (1) circa 1850-85,
when
domestic
arms production
waned as reliance on importsfor the
bulk of defense tems
grew; 2) 1885-95,
marked by the preference or
Germany
n
both military
nd naval
orders; 3) 1898-1907,
the period
of
renewal
of
naval orders
fromBritain
nd France
while
Germany
con-
tinued as thepreferredupplier
for and forces;
nd
(4) 1908-14, when
Britain
was preeminent
n
Ottoman
naval ordersand the Franco-Ger-
man rivalry n military rders ended in the selectionofGermany.
Overall,
the
entire period may
be seen as
characteristic f one way
in which
the Ottoman
Empire reacted to
the
issue
of
Westernization.
n
the
realm
of warfare,
t
was
more acceptable, or rather ess
objection-
able,
to
incorporate
Westernborrowings
han
n
other
areas of state and
society.
The eclecticism
with which the Ottomans
combined arms
sys-
tems
and
purchases
fromvarious countries demonstrated
Take the
best
from he
West policy.
A concise
summary
of
the
sixty-odd
years
wouldbe thatthe Ottomans bought suppliesfrom hose countriesrec-
ognized
as world eaders
in
particular
ategories.
More
specifically,
his
meant
that the
Ottomans imported army weapons
and
supplies
from
Germany
nd naval
systems
rom ritain
and
to
a
lesser
degree
France).
In both
cases,
the
respective
countries
were
acknowledged
and
respected as the best.
A
good
deal of attention
has
been
given
to the
place
of
the
Ottoman
Empire, and the
Middle East
in
general,
n
the
developing
world
econ-
omy.
These
studies
have tended to concentrate
n the
transformation
f
traditional griculturentoan export ectorserving heneeds ofthemar-
kets of the core of the
world
economy,
or
they
have
examined the
ruina-
tion of domestic textile
industries
by cheaper European imports.3
However,
there has been
no real
systematic
study
of
the
changes
in
theChinese Ordnance ndustry, 860-1895
(Boulder,
olo.:
Westview ress,1978);
JohnDunn, Egypt's ineteenth-Century
rmaments
ndustry,
ournal fMilitary
History61 (April1997): 231-54; JonathanGrant, TsaristArmament trategies,
1870-1914, Journal
of Soviet Military
tudies
4
(March 1991): 141-49; Joseph
Bradley,
uns for the Tsar: The State,Labor and
Technology
ransfern the
Russ-
ian Small Arms ndustry DeKalb: Northern
llinoisUniversity
ress,1990); Japan,
in
Conway's
All the World's ighting hips
1906-1921 (London:
ConwayMaritime
Press,1985),
222-23.
3.
*evket
Pamuk,
The
Ottoman
mpire and European Capitalism,
1820-1913
(Cambridge:
ambridge niversityress,1987); RogerOwen,The
MiddleEast in
the
World
conomy,
800-1914 (London:
Methuen nd
Co., 1987).
MILITARY HISTORY * 11
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JONATIAN GRANT
Ottoman war industries.This
is
rather surprising iven the historical
importance f the military n the Ottoman Empire.4
Superficially,ne might xpect a degreeofdependency n the arma-
ments sector because the rest of the Ottoman economy was subinfeu-
dated to the West; however, his proved not
to
be the case. There was no
monolithicWesterncontrol because the West was
not
a single unitary
economic actor. The
individual
states
and the
private arms suppliers
engaged in keen competitionpolitically nd economically, llowingthe
Ottomans to
exercise choice
in
arms
and
financial
markets.
Ultimately,
he
primary
ause
of
the decline of Ottoman war
indus-
trieswas
a financial ne.
By
far
nd
away money
was
the
commodity
he
Porte mported hemost, nd capital provedtobe thetrue bottleneck n
Ottomanproduction.
Technical
expertise
or
necessary
materials
uch as
coal
and
iron could
be obtained
with
ease
if the
fundswere
available. It
is true that the technological hanges caused difficultiesor n unskilled
labor force,but the Turkishworkerswere certainly rainable.Moreover,
the
greatesthardship
for he
Ottomansregarding
abor
was retaining or-
eign experts,due largely o
the
need to pay
them
higher alaries.
Government
evenues
were
the lifeblood
of the war
industries,
nd
by the nineteenthcenturythe Ottoman Sick Man ofEurope clearly
had
a circulatoryproblem. Attempts o
raise revenues
failed, and the
Ottomans acked
the means
to
cover the costs
of
reforms nd continual
wars.
When
they
had
the money, the Ottomans
chose
to
pay
the
high
costs required
to
maintain their
armed
forces.
During
the
1830s the
armyclaimed
70
percent
of total revenues.5
The
government imply
ran
out
of money
n
the 1840s,
and
consequently,
he war
industries
began
to
atrophy.
State
borrowing
ffered
he
apparent
solutionto the
problem.Begin-
ningin 1841 the state issued short-termonds to pay a war indemnity
but soon exhausted
internal sources.
The
only
alternativewas
foreign
loans,
which commenced
during
he Crimean
War
(1854-56)
when the
Turks
borrowedfrom
rivate
bankers of
their
military llies,
Britain nd
France. After he
war
Sultan Abdul
Aziz
(1861-76)
continued
to
spend
money, mostly
for the construction
f
palaces,
and the debt
increased
further.Due to
inefficient
dministration
and
tax
collection,
the
Ottoman
government egularly
an in the
red
financially
nd covered the
deficits y more borrowingthighratesof nterest.UnderAbdulAziz, as
4. WilliamHale, Turkish
olitics and the
Military
London: Routledge, 994).
Turkishnaval imports n the period 1908-14
are
described
n
Paul Halpem, The
Mediterranean aval Situation,
908-1914 (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1971), 314-54.
5. Owen,MiddleEast,
59-62.
In the
early
1800s
the
Ottoman
nnual
public
rev-
enue was approximately2,250,000-?3,750,000 ompared
o the
British verageof
?16,800,000 for
787-90.
12 * THE JOURNAL OF
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The Sword of the
Sultan
much as
one-third f
government
ncome went toward
paying he
debts.
As a
result, duringthe 1870s
the
salaries for
oldiers and
bureaucrats
were chronically n arrears.6
By 1880 the
government aced
bankruptcy, nd the large
Turkish
war
indemnity to
Russia resulting
from
the
Russo-Turkish
War of
1877-78 threatened catastrophe. To stave
off
fiscal collapse, Sultan
Abdul Hamid
II
in
1881 issued
the
Decree
of Muharrem
creating the
Ottoman Public Debt Administration
PDA).
The
Ottomansderived
con-
siderablebenefit rom he
PDA,
as half
f
their
debt
was
forgiven
nd bor-
rowingfrom
European
sources
became
easier. A
negative aspect of
the
PDA, though,was
its authority
o collect ts
own
taxes
within
he
empire;
consequently,muchofthe state revenuethatcould have flowed nto the
government'shands went instead
to the
PDA.
Over the
whole period
from
854 to 1914, Ottomangross
borrowing otaled
399.5 millionTurk-
ish lira.
Of theloans,
45
percentwas used to
liquidate debts, another34
percent
was
taken
out
as
part
of the
commissioning
f the
loans,
and
only
6
percent 22.3 million
Turkish
ira)
went
for
military xpenditure.
Sultan Abdul Hamid
II
saved the state fromfinancial
ruin, but
at
the
expense
of
not
paying
teachers' salaries or
buying
the
technological
means for heempire to defend tselfwith ts owndomesticresources.7
Military roduction,
1850-85
The
most
outstanding
haracteristic
f
Ottoman domestic
military
production
was
thedegree
of
state
control.All the
factories hat manu-
factured nd maintained war materials
were
state-owned
nd adminis-
tered. The
government
department responsible
for these
various
activities was the Ministryof Imperial Ordnance (Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti),
which
was
independent
of
the
Ministry
of War
(Bab-i
Seraskeri).
The
Ordnance
Ministry
was entrustedwith the
production,
repair,
and
supply of
weapons
and
military
quipment,
and
directly
administered
he
Zeytinburnu
actory
nd
powder
mills
n
Istanbul and
Anatolia.
Comprised
of
defense,
communications,
nd
supply depart-
ments,
ts main
duties
were
guarding
he straits nd
training
echnical
personnel.8
6. Owen,MiddleEast, 61; Afif iiyiiktugrul,smanli Deniz
Harp Tarihi
II.
Cilt
(Istanbul:
.
C.
Deniz Basimevi, 973), 1; JustinMcCarthy, he OttomanTurks New
York:Addison
Wesley
Longman, 997),
301-4.
By 1863 the nternal ebt was 32.5
million urkish ira,
nd the foreign
ebthad reached
40 million.
7. McCarthy, ttomanTurks, 04-13.
8. Erkem
Mustevellioglu,
smanli
Askeri
Teskilat ve
Kiyafetleri
876-1908
(Istanbul:
Askeri
Miize
ve
Kiiltiir itesi Komutanligi ayinlari, 986), 9-10.
MILITARY HISTORY *
13
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JONATHANGRANT
In general,Ottoman
ndustry
was weak and
underdeveloped, nd
the
domestic defense ndustrieswere no
exception.
The few
existing
facto-
ries had resulted fromgovernment fforts o create a modern army.
Technological developments
played
a role
in
driving
under
Ottoman
domestic firearms
manufacturing.
he
advances in rifled
gun
barrels
duringthe 1840s required a
greater degree
of technical
precision and
more money than the Ottomans were
able
to manage. By the
middle of
the
nineteenth
entury, ttomanfactories roducingmilitary oods
con-
sisted
of the
factory
t
Izmit
that made
cloth and
military niforms; he
Istanbul
fez
factory; he
Zeytinburnu actory hatproduced cotton cloth
for
militaryuniforms;
he
military quipment factory
t
Beykoz
that
manufacturedmilitary hoes, boots, bandoliers, nd cartridge elts;and
the
Tophane
arsenal
and artillery actory
n
Istanbul.9This list
demon-
strates
that
most of the factories
produced
items of
military
lothing. t
would appear then, that greater
emphasis
was
put
on
having
the
army
dress
in
a modern
style,
rather han
equipping
t
with
modern
weapons.
By
the
early 1870s, the domestic
military roduction
f the
Ottoman
Empire could not provideenough equipment
and
supplies to sustain
the
empire's
rmed forces
n
time
of
war.
The
Tophane works,
which
with
ts
associated workshopsemployed about fifteenhundredmen, was the
main
Ottoman arsenal. It
had the
capacity
to
repair every
kind
of
weapon
with
onventional
gunstock,
s
well
as swords. n
addition,
fac-
tory
at
the
Golden Horn
(Halic)
could
repair
and manufacture
ome
weapons.
The
Zeytinburnu
factory
ould
produce
ten
thousand car-
tridges er day.
The
powder
works t
Bakirkoy
nd
Azadli,
established
or
modernized
during
he
1790s,
continued
n
production.
There
were also
two
major saltpetre
works
nd one
major sulphur
works.
However,
hese
establishments
roved ncapable
of
meeting
Turkish
requirements,
nd
almost everythingwas obtained from foreignfirms. Furthermore,
although
he
arsenals at
Tophane
and
Zeytinburnu
maintained
an
enor-
mous
quantity
of
military
tores,
the bulk
was
obsolete and
worthless.
With
supplement
f
English
raftsmen
rought
o the
stanbul
Tophane
factories,
ome
rifles,
ronze
cannon,
and
mountain
guns
could be man-
ufactured,
but not in sufficient
uantities.
Besides
guns,
the
Imperial
arsenal
at
Tophane
also
turned
out
a numberof
arge
cases intended
for
submarinemines and some
torpedoes.10
9.
OmerCelal
Sarc,
Ottoman ndustrial
olicy
1840-1914,
n Charles ssawi,
ed., The Economic History f theMiddle East, 1800-1914
(Chicago: University f
Chicago Press,1975), 55-56; Owen,
Middle
East,
117.
See also
Larry
H.
Addington,
Th-e atterns fWar Since theEighteenth entu?y Bloomington:ndiana
University
Press,1984), 3.
10. Rumbold o Granville, April1872, ForeignOffice FO) 78/2216;
Elliot to
Earl
of Derby, May 1875,
FO
78/2383,
Public
Record
Office
PRO), Kew, Surrey,
England;
Ramiz
Ertem, 877-1878
Osmanli-Rus
Harbi
Kafkas Cephesi
Harekati
H.
14 * THE JOUR-NALOF
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JONATIAN GRANT
obtain the
materials necessary
for
maintaining
he
army
that
domestic
sources could
not
provide.
As the
government ought
n
immediate
rem-
edy for the situation,American industrypicked up the slack. In this
instance the
Ottoman choice appeared remarkably imilar to
Egyptian
decisions in the late 1860s.'4
The easy acquisition of
modern weapons from oreign
manufactur-
ers greatly acilitated he immediate
trengthening
f the
Ottoman
army.
This armamentpolicy certainlymade an impression n the
foreign or-
respondents covering the war. According
to the
London
Daily News,
The various forts nd lines [at Varna] mountedover three
hundred
guns, varying
from 10 to 15 centimetres
calibre,
and all
of the
latest
model. The supply ofammunition eems unlimited; nd all day long the
troopstoil unloadingthe
barges
crammed with hell and
cartridge oxes
brought p by
the
transports. '5
Moreover,
he Ottoman
mport trategy
yielded
a
significant ualitative
advantage
for
the Turks over
the Rus-
sians
in
this war. The
Turks
achieved
superior firepower
nd
longer
range withtheirAmerican
repeater
rifles nd German
steel
breechload-
ing artillery.
Armed
with
these imported weapons, Turkish forces
inflicted xtremely igh
asualties
on Russian forces
singRussian-made
weapons of esser quality.'6
As a field test of the
import strategy,
he
Russo-TurkishWar of
1877-78 resoundingly
alidated Ottoman
choices. Both
Russia and the
Ottoman
Empire
had a tradition f
strong
tate control
n
military
ndus-
try.
Both had
attempted
o modernize
their
forces
n
the
eighteenth
en-
tury nd had fallenbehind
again by
the time of the
Crimean
War,
when
the two
empires
had
possessed comparable
evels of
military
echnology.
Their
respectivereactions to the
Crimean
experience
showed the
grow-
ing dependency
of
the Ottomans.
The
two states
adopted
strategies
or
modernizationwhich were absolute opposites.Whereas the Ottomans
moved ever
closer to
total
dependency
on
Western
mports
o modern-
ize their
forces,
Russia
diligently
worked to establish a
modern,
domes-
tic
military industry.
Yet,
when
war came
in
1877,
the
Turks
undoubtedly
held
the
advantage
n
quality
of arms.
Naval
Production,
1850-85
Ottomannaval productioncapabilitiesfellbehind in the mid-nine-
teenth
century.
The failure of
Ottoman
naval
yards
to
develop
into a
truly
elf-sufficient
ource for the
empire
was due in
large
measure to
14. Dunn, Egypt's
ineteenth-Centuryrmamentsndustry, 42-43.
15. WarCorrespondence f theDaily News, 36.
16. WilliamMcElwee,The Artof War Waterloo
o
Mons (Bloomington:ndiana
Universityress,1974),
193-94.
16 * THE JOURNAL OF
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The
Sword of
thte
ultan
threefactors: ime,
money, nd
the
rapidly hanging echnology f naval
systems.These factors
ombined
to end the possibility or strong, eli-
able indigenous naval industry.Anynaval program, ven for a country
with well-established
apabilityfornaval production,
akes a greatdeal
of time and money,
both ofwhich the Ottoman Empire acked. Through-
out the period,the government
aced wars
and enjoyed only ntermittent
peace; thus, t did not have enough
time
to wait for
hips to come off
he
local yards. Confronted
with continual
financial
difficulties,he govern-
ment
certainly
did not have
the
resources to
cover the expenses of the
ships themselves,
much ess the
start-up
osts of
expanded
docks. These
two factorsserved only to magnify
he
impact
of the
third factor,
he
incredibly apidchanges takingplace in naval technology. or example,
perhaps the most unstable, unpredictable
time
in
the
historyof naval
developmentwas
the final
quarter
of
the nineteenth
century
and the
early part
of the twentieth,
when
the
rapid
transition rom
ronclads
to
heavy
steel
dreadnoughts
made
many systems
obsolete before very
much
time
had elapsed.
As
a
result,
he
Ottomangovernment, long with
many
other
states,
found
t more
prudent
o
buy from broad, and then
make replacements
s
new
technology
rose.
Aftermaintaining reasonablyrespectablenaval construction apa-
bility
or he first
art
of
the
century,
he
Sublime
Porte's government's)
position
deteriorated
n the 1850s
and
significant
omestic naval pro-
duction
began
to come
to an end.
During
the
Crimean
War,Russia
crip-
pled Ottoman
naval
strength y destroying
he
Ottomanfleet
t
Sinop
in
1853.
To
compensate
for the loss,
the Porte
purchased warships
from
abroad for he
first
ime, cquiringeight
vessels fromBritain nd France
in
1854
and
paying
forthem with
a
foreign
oan.17 The
development
of
steam-powered
ronclads lso
contributed
o the
demise
ofTurkishnaval
yards.The necessity omaintain omekindof naval force omparableto
the
European
ironclads caused
more
foreign
urchases.
As
a result of
these
factors,
he
foreign omplement
within
he
Ottoman
navysteadily
rose. In the period1859-68,
some
thirty
hips
were
purchased
abroad,
as
opposed
to thirteen
manufactured
domestically.
The British-
and
French-made
hips
carried
ust
over one-half f
the
navy'sguns
and most
of
the tonnage.
Whole
classes
of
ships
were
entirely oreign.
or exam-
ple,
all four sail corvettes
originated
n
Britain,
ll
five river
gunboats
came fromFrance,and theentire ronclad fleetwas of British r French
manufacture.18
17.
Nejat
Giilen, iinden
Buguine ahriyemiz
Istanbul:Kastas A. S. Yayinlari,
1988), 122.
18. Bulwer o Russell, 3 June
1860, FO 78/1507;Alisonto
Earl
of Clarendon,
27 December 1857, FO 78/1276;
Biiyiiktugrul,smanli
Deniz Harp Tarihi II. Cilt,
16-18.
MILITARY HISTORY *
17
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.....
.....
. . ......
.... .. . .. ...
...... ....
...
. ... .. ....... .
...
.. ....
i::
..... .....
.
.... . .......
.. . ....... .......... ... .
........ . ....
..... .....
......
..
. ..... .... . .
.... ... ...
.. . . . .... ......
A
P
Map
1:
Major dockyards
in the
Ottonwn
Empire,
c. 1870.
MILITARY HISTORY
19
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JONATIIAN
GRANT
launched in 1870.21 Finally, ecause of nonpayment, our ronclads
were
never actually delivered.
Amongwooden vessels, domestic production iguredmuch more sig-
nificantly. hese vessels included frigates nd sloops. It appears that a
little ver
half
of the wooden ships came
from
omesticyards.While
the
Turkish onstructionwas
verygood,
t
also relied
on
Englishmechanics.
Most of the wooden ships came from urkishwharvesusing high-quality
lumber fromAsia Minor,Bulgaria,
nd the
Danubian Principalities.
The
Istanbul
and Izmit
yards produced frigates
nd
sloops, while additional
sloops
came from
Gemlik.
The rest of the wooden
ships apparently
were
the
workof
British acilities.22
Overall, then, the Ottomanfleet at the timeof the Russo-Turkish
War was an
impressiveforce, ontaining high
number
of
state-of-the-
art
ironclads
purchased
from
broad,
as well as a
couple
of
domestic
manufacture.
Although asically
a
coastal defense
navy,
he
fleet hould
have
been
more than
adequate
for he
empire's
needs. The
London
Daily
News
evaluated the fleet
n the
following
manner:
Turkey
then,
has
numerically peaking,
ne of the finest leets
n
the
world, nd this naval
force
n other
respects
also is now not so
deficient s it
was
some
months
ago. 123 t the outset of the war, most foreignobservers rated the
Ottoman
navy superior
to the Russian one. The fact that the
Russians
outperformed
he Turks and crossed
the
Danube
rather
asily
reflected
more
on the
quality
of
Ottoman
naval
leadership
than
on its
equipment.
The
years
from
he
1870s
to
1885, then,
can
be seen as a
phase
of
decreasing importance
of
domestically
manufactured
weapons
and
ships.
This was
true
of
both the
army
and the
navy. Accordingly,
ach
service branch
developed
its
own
pattern
f
imports.
The
army
favored
German
artillery
nd
American
or French
rifles,
while the
navy
tended
towardsBritish nd Frenchships and British uns.
Military roduction,
1885-1907
In
the next
period, 1885-95,
German
defense
mports
ose to
a
posi-
tion
of virtual
hegemony,
s
part
of a
broader
expansion
of the
German
role in Ottoman economic
relations.Since
1800
Great
Britainhad been
the
major
Ottoman
trading artner, ccounting
for
roughly
ne-quarter
of all Ottomanexports mostly agricultural roducts)and deliveringn
turn
between 30
and 40
percent
of
Ottoman
mports.
n
terms f
foreign
investment
within
the
Ottoman
Empire,
however,
the
British share
21. Ollier,
Cassell's Illustrated History,
1: 141;
Giilen,
Diinden Bugimne
Bahriyemiz, 34-35; Conway's
All theWorld's ighting
hips,
1860-1905,
389-9 1.
22. Ibid.,392-93; Cooke,
Ottoman mpire,
60.
23.
War
Correspondence
f
the
Daily News,
22.
20 * THE JOURNAL OF
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-________________________________________
The w ord of
thte
ultan
*HaSk
'y(Imperial
akoy
(Arsenal)
N
t: .
:A--
N
.
.
' -
+
~Navy
ophan
t 0;/
Nse// ;
--:--0-Arsenaly3
I e
)-Top
-k.
IcaIac
Map
2: Istanbul area.
decreased
over
the
period
1888-96
from 0
percent
to 20
percent.
At
the
same
time
the
German share
of
foreign
nvestment ose from
percent
to
25
percent,
while the French became
the
single largest
nvestor
by
increasing their share from 30 percent to 50
24
The Germans
owed their new-found
dvantageous
position
to
the
policies
and
temperament
f
Sultan
Abdul Hamid
a,
who was
highly
autocratic,
deeply suspicious,
and
overly
ontrolling.
He had an
obses-
sive
preoccupation
with
oyalty
nd relied
heavily
on
a
private
network
of internal
pies
and
police
informers.
he
value
he
placed
on
personal
loyalty
over
efficiency
r
performance
hus
promoted
corruption
nd
favoritism.
he effects f his autocratic
tyle
manifested
hemselves
neg-
atively n theOttomanarmed forces.The Sultan distrusted heOttoman
navy
because
it had
played
the
key
part
n the
coup
that
deposed
Abdul
Aziz,
his
predecessor.
Ever fearful f
conspiracy,
Abdul Hamid
kept
his
forces on a short
eash. He
forbade the
navy
to leave
its docks
on the
Golden
Horn in
order to forestall
ny
potential
movement
against
the
24. Erik
Zurcher,Turkey:
A
Modern
History London:
I. B.
Tauris
and
Co.,
1997),
89.
MILITARY HISTORY
*
21
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JONATHAN
GRANT
palace; consequently, he ships
rusted
way
at
anchor.Similarly, he Sul-
tan was waryof the armybecause he
suspected thatthe military olleges
promoted iberalism among the graduates. Therefore,he consciously
promoted
nd
favoredofficerswho
had
not been
trained at the acade-
mies and who lacked
background
n
modern military cience.25
In the aftermath f the
Turkishdefeat by Russia, the Sultan sought
a
German militarymission
to
oversee
training
nd
modernization f the
Ottoman
army.
n
June
1880 he
requested
that
officers
f
the
German
General
Staff, nfantry, avalry,
and
artillery
services come to the
Ottoman
Empire
on
three-year
ontracts.
n
April 1882,
officers
ohler,
Kamphoevener, on Hobe,
and Ristow
rrived,
nd the
Sultan gave them
rankswithin heOttoman army.Later that same year,Colmar Freiherr
von
der
Goltz oined the mission.
After
Kohler's
death
in
1885, von der
Goltz
functioned
s
acting
head of the mission and
remained in the
Ottoman
Empire
until
1895. After is
departure
he nfluence f
the
mis-
sion
declined,
and
by 1898, only
three
of the
German officialswere
still
in
Turkey.26
Abdul
Hamid had
his own reasons
for
preferring
erlin. n
1876-77,
priorto the Russo-TurkishWar,
he
Ottoman
War
Ministry ad engaged
a considerable numberof British fficerswith thehope that theirpres-
ence would be followed
y
active
English
ntervention
n
favor
f
Turkey.
After
he Berlin
Congress
1878),
when the
Britishnot
only refusedto
stand
up
for
Turkey
but
in
addition
deprived
it of
Cyprus,
the
Sultan
made
every
effort o
minimize
the authority
nd
influence
of
these
British officers.
rospects
for a French mission also seemed
unlikely
because
the Sultan
distrusted
France
as much
as Britain.
Therefore,
n
place
of
Britain, he Sultan now looked
to
Germany
s the first
military
power
in
Europe
and as
the most
disinterested
egarding urkey.
Abdul
Hamidstronglyesiredto retaingoodoffices t Berlin. However, is dis-
trustful
ature
meant that no
foreignmilitary
mission would ever be
treated
with real
confidence
and no
foreign
fficerwould ever
be
given
serious
exclusive
authority xcept
under the
exigencies
of
hostilities.
Moreover,
he
foreign
fficers iscovered
to
their
dismay, ccording
to a
British
fficial, hat
zeal
and
industry
n
their
part
are
discouraged
nd
are
positively
distasteful. 27
ndeed,
von der Goltz
complained repeat-
edly
about
his
inability
o effect
more
improvements
n the
Ottoman
army. Specifically, he Sultan forbadetrainingmaneuversbecause he
feared that
they
could
serve as
a means for
military oup,
and out of
25.
Hale,
Turkish olitics,28-29; Ziircher, urkey,
4.
26. JehudaWallach,
natomie inerMilitarhilfe,
ie preussich-deutschen
ili-
tarmissionen
n
der Turkei, 835-1914 (Dusseldorf: roste
Verlag, 976), 35, 43, 54,
64, 85.
27.
Chermside
o Ford, 26 May 1893,
enclosed
in
Ford to
Rosebery, 9 May
1893, FO 78/4479.
22 * THE JOURNAL OF
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The word f he ultan
similar concerns,
he
never
allowed
the
troops
to
practice
with live
rounds.28
For theirpart, he Germans used theirprivileged ositionto support
the cause of German military uppliers as theyoverhauledthe Ottoman
armed forces.29 ecause theywere
incorporated
within
he framework
f
the
Ottoman military ystem,
members
of the
German mission had
tremendous pportunities
o
expand
the
role of German
arms
and
equip-
ment in the Ottoman army.
Primarily, his unique position gave the
German
officers asy
and
frequent
ccess to members
of
the Ordnance
Ministry, hichcontrolled upply
nd
military roduction.Until
1889 all
the German officerswere
subject
to the
Serasker (War Minister).
How-
ever, fter on derGoltzrefused orenewhis contract hatyear because
of dissatisfactionwith his lack
of
nfluence,
he
was attached
directly o
the
Imperial MilitaryHousehold
with the
right
o
address reports o the
Sultan. Some
Turkish fficers
nd
foreign
bservers
grumbled
bout the
German mission.
A
British epresentative
oted: One of the main han-
dles for ntrigue
as been
the
accusation against
the
Chief
of
the Mission
being
nterested
n
supplies
of
war-likematerial
by
German firms
..
but
in 1891-92 there was an active
but
unsuccessful ntrigueby the
then
FrenchMilitaryAttache n favour f a FrenchMilitaryMission. 30
The
German military
mission
proved
to
be
a
boon
for
German
firms.
In
1882,
the
Ottoman government
laced
a
large
order with
Krupp
for
artillery
o
replace
and
repair
the
fortificationsnd batteries of the
Bosphorus and (anakkale. This
order
largely
resulted from
the
insis-
tence ofvon der
Goltz,
head of
the
mission,
who
in
1885
managed
to
sell
500
Kruppheavy guns
to the
Ottomans. The
magnitude
f this sale can
be
appreciated
when
one considers
that n
the 1877-78
war,
there were
590 field
guns among
the
army
n
Europe.
In
1886 the
Ottomans
bought
426 fieldgunsand 60 mortars romKruppand favored heGermanfirm
Schichauwerft ith
n
order for
orpedo
boats.
Then in
1887,
as a result
ofthe
military
mission'srearmament
rogram
or he Ottoman
rmy,
he
Ottomans
purchased
half a million
rifles
and
fifty
housand carbines
from he
German
firms f Mauser
and
Loewe.31
28. Hale, Turkish
olitics,29.
29. For a thorough iscussionof the German militarymission, ee Wallach,
Anatomie inerMilitarhilfe,5-85.
30. Ford to Earl of
Rosebery, o. 159, 24 April1893, FO 78/4479;No.
208, 26
May, 1893; enclosure,Chermside
o
Ford,
Position
of
German
Military
Mission at
Constantinople.
31. White o Rosebery,
1 February 886, FO 78/3869;White o
Salisbury,
8
February 888, FO 78/4098;
lber Ortayli,
kinci
Abdulhamit
dnemindeOsmanli
Imparatorlugunda
Alman
Niifuzu (Ankara:
Ankara finiversitesi
iyasi
Biligiler
Fakultesi ayinlari,
o. 479, 1981), 65-68; Ollier,
assell's Illustrated
istory,
:140;
MILITARY
HISTORY
*
23
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JONATIIANGRANT
Undoubtedly
the
Germans profited
from
these
sales,
but Abdul
Hamid acted as
the
decisive force
n
granting
he orders
to Germany
nd
played a directrole n selecting he armaments.Forexample, n 1887 an
Ottoman military ommission
deliberated
whether
o
adopt the
Mauser
or
the Martini s the new rifle
ystem.
Over the
objections
of the War
Ministry
nd other
Turkish military uthorities,
he
Sultan ordered a
provisional contract with Mauser. Only
financial
difficulties revented
the immediate conversionof the provisional
contract
nto
a final
one.32
In
spite
of
growing gitation
n
Istanbul against
the
Mauser contract,
he
Sultan
considered the deal
as
his own
act and
deed,
and
in
the end his
will prevailed.33However,by
1890
none of the
Mausers had
yet
been
issuedto thetroopsor training chools; instead,theyremaineduncrated
in
storage.34
The year 1889 was a banner
one
for
German
arms sales
to the
Ottomans,
who as a
resultof
the Kaiser's visit to Istanbul
placed
a
mas-
sive
new order for
rtillery
rom
Krupp,
rifles
rom
Mauser and
Loewe,
and
torpedo
boats
from
chichau.
Such
a
large
order
required
financing,
and the Germans
happily
arranged
loan. The
Deutsche Bank
acted as
contractor,
nd the
income
from
he Public Debt's
fishing
ndustry
was
pledged as security.35Whenput into context with the annual expendi-
tures
in
the
Ottoman
budget,
the enormity
f this
purchase becomes
apparent:
the loan
represented
n
amount
equal
to 19
percent
of the
total
military/navaludget
and about
10
percent
of
the total Ottoman
revenues
for he
year.
n
the years
ahead,
the
Sultan continued
to
make
large
arms
purchases
from he Germans.36
WVallach,natomie
iner Militarhilfe, 05. The
1882
order
was
for1,206,987
iras
worth fartillery.
n
1888 Turkishwar
orders o Germanfirmsmounted o
2.2 mil-
lion marks.
32. White o FO (telegraphic), o. 10,
30
January
887,
FO
78/4002.
33. WVhiteo
Salisbury, 8 November
887, FO 78/4001.
34. Chermside
o
WVhite,
6
January
891, FO
78/4342.
35. WVallach,natomie inerMilitarhilfe,
05;
Rafii-Sukruuvla, The Ottoman
Debt 1850-1939,
n
Issawi, d., Economic
History,
04. The
Ottomans pent total
of 15.3
millionmarks
n
1889.
JustinMcCarthy,
he
Arab World, urkey, nd the
Balkans: A
HandbookofHistorical tatistics Boston:
G.
K.
Hall
and Co.,
1982), 160,
184. The amountof
the
loan issued
was
1,617,647 gold
lira,although he amount
actually eceived otalled ,132,352 ira,
or roughly
0
percent
f
the ssue. The sum
actually ollected by the Ottomangovernmentn thefinancial ear 1888-89 was
1,571,375,960
kurus or approximately
5.7
million
old
ira).
The
budget llocated
for he
Harbiye
Nezareti nd the
navy
was
807,203,175
kurus
or roughly
.1 million
gold ira).
36. Chermside
o Fane,
5
July
1890, FO
78/4276;
Ford
to
Rosebery, 4 April
1893, FO
78/4479; otharRathman,
erlin-BaghdadBerlin:
Dietz
Verlag,
962), 18;
Wallach,
Anatomie
iner
Militarhilfe,
05; Ortayli,
kinci Abdulhamit
oneminde,
68.
In 1889 and 1890 the
Ottomans
pent
six million
marks
for
uch items
s
one
thousand
ield
uns
from
rupp
nd several
hundred
housand
ifles romMauser nd
24 * THE JOURNAL OF
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The Sword
of
heSultan
The Germans also improved their arms trade position by the way
they onducted the military eforms. or example, n 1893 von der Goltz
declared that a number of Ottoman officersmust become proficient n
the handling nd use ofthe rifles ewlydeveloped n Germany.He stated
furthermorehat the munitionsfactory t Tophane would have to pro-
duce
dummy cartridges,
nd
then
these new
rifles hould be given to
the troops. Clearly, the
close German
ties with the Tophane-i Amire
Nezareti paid off.During this time the French and Britishwere practi-
cally eliminated from he Ottoman arms market.By 1894 Krupp's and
Mauser's exploitation
of their
complete market sovereigntybrought
accusationsfrom oreign bservers hattheGermanswere selling xpen-
sive and low-qualitygoods. Amongthe German items ordered by the
Ottomans
were
torpedo boats,
field
artillery,
oastal
guns,
rifles,
nd
ammunition.37
Meanwhile,
t
is difficult
o
gauge
domestic
production of military
supplies, rifles,
nd
other weapons
for
the
army
from
the Hamidian
period up
to WorldWar I.
Clearly
the
Turks had
trouble paying forthe
maintenance of plant and foreign experts. During the
1880s
seven
Britishworkmen t
Tophane
filed
petitions
ver
wage arrearsamounting
to six thousand Turkish ira. The claims of these British ubjects occu-
pied the attention f the British mbassy
from
882 to 1889, but owing
to the impecunious state of
the Ottoman
Treasury,
o
settlementwas
forthcoming.ndeed,
since
April
1888 the Ottoman Bank
had
refused
o
pay anyone's salary, ncluding
the German
generals
and the
Ottoman
diplomatic service.38 ventually
the British
employees
at
Tophane
did
receive
back
pay
for
he
period
from
May
to
September1888,
but
claims
for rrearsfor he
previous
five
years
remained
outstanding.39
The
fragmentary
vidence of Ottoman domestic
armaments
produc-
tion suggestsa noticeable decline in capabilities afterthe 1880s. For
example, duringthe 1890s, Tophane
could turn out
only
ten Martini-
Henry rifles week,
a
production
rate
significantly
ower than the one
hundredrifles
er
week
manufactured
here
n 1888.40
n
the
years
1902
and
1903
the Turks
attempted
o
manufacture
ix
quick-fire
ield
guns
Loewe.
n
1891 they ought pproximately
.9 million
marksworth f rms;
for 892
and 1893 the amounts
were10.1 millionmarks
nd 13.1 millionmarks espectively.
37. WVallach,natomie iner Militalrhilfe,
7, 105; Ortayli, kinci Abdulhamit
Ddneminde, 8. In 1895 an additional 2.2 millionmarksworth fgoods came from
Germany.
ll in all
in
the period 1885-95, no less
than 100 million rancs
worth
f
orders orwar materialwent o German nterprises.
38. White to Salisbury, November
1888,
FO
78/4105; 15 November1888,
Enclosure:memorandum
4 November 888,
FO
78/4105.
39. WVhiteo Salisbury, December1888,
FO 78/4106.
40. Captain Sir
W.
Cecil Domville,Report
55, Turkish leet and
Dockyards,
1890,
12,
AdmiraltyADM)
231/18, RO; Doniville,
eport 88, Turkish leet and
Dockyards, 888,
12,
ADM 231/14.
MILITARY HISTORY
*
25
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JONATHAN
GRANT
on the
Krupp model presented
by
the
Kaiser,
but
Tophane's production
proceeded
rather
slowly owing
to want of
funds.41
y
the time
of the
BalkanWars 1913), Tophane was manufacturingome handgrenades.42
The
underdeveloped state
of
Ottoman industry generally
becomes
apparent
when
compared
to
other
sectors of
the
economy.
n
1894-95
therewere
approximately 86,000 factory
workers
ompared
to 185,000
government
fficials,
nd a combined
total of
servants,maids,
and sec-
retaries xceeding186,000.43
By and
large the
equipping
of the
Ottoman
army
became the
province of foreign mports,
specially
fromthe
Germans.
During the
1890s,
the
mainstay
of the Ottoman
infantry
ecame
the
Mauser
rifles
manufacturednGermany.44 ere again,theOttomansfound teasier to
buy
the newer
models. German
dominance
in
orders
forthe
army
was
still
unquestionable.
The
Germans
achieved their
greatest
sale-over
twice
the
size of
the
large
1889
order-in
1905,
when the
Ottomans
placed
an
enormous
order for
military quipment
from
Krupp. Because
of the order's size, once
again
the Deutsche
Bank
contractedthe
loan.
Since
the Ottoman
government
found itself unable to
pay
arrears
amounting
o almost one
million ira
on
its former
ontractsfor
Krupp
gunsand Mauserrifles,twas decided to payoff he old debt and at the
same
time
arrange
new contract
by
means of
a
loan
from he
Deutsche
Bank.
Additional ustoms duties
for
military
quipment
and the
6
per-
cent additional
revenues of
the Public Debt
Administration
erved
as
security
or he loan.45
41.
Intelligence epartment,
WVar
ffice, Reports
n
Changes
n
VariousFor-
eign
Armies
uring
heYear
1902, 82,
WO 106/6179;
ntelligence epartment,
ar
Office, Reports n Changes n VariousForeignArmiesDuring he Year1903, 85,
WO 106/6180.
42.
Captain Sir
NV.
ecil Domville,Report188,
Turkish leet
and Dockyards,
1888, ADM
231/14;Captain Domville,Report 55,
Turkish
leet
and
Dockyards,
1890, ADM
231/18; Ortayli,
kinci
AbdulhamitDdneminde,69;
Ramiz
Ertem,
Balkan
Harbi Garp Ordusu
Karadag
Cephesi
H.
Cilt (Ankara:GnkurBasimevi,
1984),
40.
43. Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and
Social Ch-aracteristics
Madison:University
f
Wisconsin
ress,1985),
59, 218.
44.
Ford
to
Earl
of
Rosebery,
4 April1893, FO
78/4479;
Reports n Changes
in Various oreignArmies uring heYear 1902, WO 106/6179; aptainC. B. Nor-
man,
The Turkish
Army f To-Day,
n American
Monthly
eview
ofReviews, 16
(November 897): 593-94.
45.
Reports
n
Changes
n Various
oreign
Armies
During
he Year
1905, WO
106/6182;
A.
S. Avetian,Germanskii mperializmna blizhnemvostoke Moskva:
Izdatel'stvoMezhdunarodye tnosheniya, 966),
109-10;
Suvla,
The
Ottoman ebt
1850-1939,
105. The
Krupporder
n
1905
was
worth etween
60
and 70
million
francs.
The
new loan from
Deutsche
Bank
amounted
to 2.64 million
gold lira, of
which
2,098,800 about
79.5
percent)
was
actually
eceived.
26 *
THE JOURNAL OF
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-__
_ _ _ _ _
The Sword
of theSultan
Naval Production,
1885-1907
The late 1880s saw little
new naval
construction,nd the
domestic
naval programof the latterpart of Abdul Hamid's reign proved to be
largely
bortive.
n 1886 the Turksdid succeed
in
building orpedoboats
in
Istanbul
by copying
one-hundred-foot
oat built
by the French firm
Forges
et Chantiers and purchased
the
previousyear. Based
on this ni-
tial success
the Turkish ockyard
aid
down the
keels for hree
dditional
boats.46
British Admiralty ntelligence
observed about these torpedo
boats
that
Everything
as
made in the
dockyard,
nd
it
speaks highly
for
their
factory hat
they should be
able to run
the engines without
hitch the first ime
they
were tried,
nd to make 17 knots.
Royal Navy
observerCaptain
Henry
Kane rated
the Turkish
dockyard
n Istanbul as
better
han
the
Russian
yards
at Kronstadt r Nikolaev
n
1886,
although
not as
good
as
English yards. Captain
Kane
reported,
The factory
s a
large
establishment, airly
itted
p
with
machines,
and
capable of good
work.They have
iron and brass
foundries, puddling
housewith everal
furnaces,mills
for
olling
rmour-plates,
ngle-iron, ars,
and sheets; two
smitheries,
with a
15-ton
and
7.5-ton
hammer;
fitting,recting,
and
boilershops,and altogether,
very
complete
establishment. 47 owever,
just a fewyears atertheconditions n thedockyardhad deteriorated ig-
nificantly.
he
steel factory
roved
to
be
dysfunctional,
nd
most of
the
castings
were useless because
of
insufficient eat from he furnace. By
1894
the
dockyard
had
fallen
nto a
neglected
state.
Construction
had
commenced
for
everal ships,
which remained
n
skeletal form oryears.
The
yard
lacked
systematic
management.
For
example,
after
designing
new hulls that requiredyears
to
build,
the
Turks
put
old
engines
and
old
guns
nto them.
n
one
glaring
ase,
the Turks eft
he
armor-clad bd-ul
Khadir
on
an
inadequate building lip,
and
fortwo
years
the
ship
sank
into the ground.
A
comparatively
arge
naval
building rogram
was initi-
ated
in
the
1890s. Construction
of
two
Shadiye-class
cruisers
com-
menced at
Izmit,
but
neitherwas
ever launched.
Similarly,
battleship
begun
in
1892 was
never
completed.Although
he
domestic
naval
pro-
gram
of the late Hamidian period
did
have
some
degree
of
success
regarding
maller hips,
the
Hamidian era
essentially
marked the end
of
domestic
building
programs
n the
empire.48
n terms of
domestically
produced
warships,
he
mediocre
program
f the
1890s
was
the
last
one
46. Trotter
o WVhite,
2
April
1886, enclosed in White
to
Rosebery,
3
April
1886, FO 78/3870.
47.
Captain
Henry
C. Kane,
R.N., Report
127,
Turkish
leet and Dockyards
1886,
6, 11, ADM 231/10.
48. Captain
Domville,
Report
55, Turkish
leet and Dockyards,
890, ADM
231/18;
Captain
Egerton, eport
85, Turkey,
leet,Dockyards,
uns, 1894,
ADM
231/24;
Gillen,Dunden
Bugiine
Bahriyemiz,
58-59.
MILITARY HISTORY
*
27
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JONATHANGRANT
to give any significant rders. Thereafter, specially duringthe Young
Turk era, foreign-manufacturedhips completelydominated the Otto-
man naval buildingprogram.
The period 1885-95 also marked a point of departure n the pattern
of Ottoman naval purchases, which the Germans came to dominate.
Expediency, ost,
and
Abdul Hamid's personal involvement ll played a
part n bringing bout the turning oint fornaval procurement n 1886.
Initially, he Turkshoped to buy more boats from rance,but the French
informed he TurkishAdmiralty hatno torpedoboats would be available
for immediate
purchase.
Faced
with the need to
place construction
orders, the
Turks solicited
bids.
The
Germans
sharply
underbid
the
French and offeredpectacular savings, greeing o providetwelveboats
at a lowertotalpricethan the
French had
proposed
for
nly eightboats.
The Sultan gave
the contract
himself.49
n the
ongoing ompetitionwith
Armstrong, rupp gained
the
upper
hand.
From 1886
to 1890
all five
Sinub-class wooden
sloops
were rearmed
with
Krupps.
n
1891, many
of
the
Ottoman hips replaced
their
previously
mounted
British
Armstrongs
with Krupps.Additionally,
he
torpedogunboats
and
third-class
ruisers
built
at Istanbul
possessed Krupps.
n terms
of
ship production,
German
firms lso gained substantially. he Ottoman navyhad no German-built
ships
n
1877,
but
n
this
new
period
the
German
firms
roduced
thirteen
torpedoboats (five
built
by
Schichau
in
1886, eight
built
by
Germania n
1887-92).
The French did
sell
six
torpedo
boats
to the
Ottomans
n the
years 1885-86 (La Seyne
and
Des
Vignes
built
three
each),
but
received
no
more
orders after1886.50
Therefore,
886
can be
seen as
the
begin-
ningof German hegemony
n the
Ottoman
naval
market.
Obviously,
he
big
loser
in all this was
Britain.
The
true
magnitude
of
German gain
at
this
time
showed
in the almost
complete
removal
of
Britain froma naval market which she had commanded previously.
Britain till
had a minormarket n
supplying
Whitehead
torpedoes,
but
this
was a mere
fraction
f her
former
usiness.
Nevertheless,
he
Sultan
did take a
liking
o the
English-made
Nordenfelt ubmarine
nd
accord-
inglypurchased
a
pair
out
of his
personal
funds.
To an
Englishobserver,
thispurchase
seemed
more
a
vanity
s
His
Majesty
has
alreadypaid,
not
only
the value
of
the material
obtained
from
England,
but the
cost
of
putting
hem
together ere,
the
atter
perationhaving
aken threetimes
as longand cost threetimes as much as theestimate. '51
The
German
hegemony
n
Ottoman
naval
orders
turned
out
to be
short-lived.
From
the
late
1890s to
1907,
the Ottoman
government
49. White o Granville,
9 April 885, FO
78/3751;CaptainHenryKane, Report
127, Turkish
leet and Dockyards 886,
ADM 231/10.
50. Chermside o Fane, 5 July
890, FO 78/4276;Captain HenryKane,
Report
127, Turkish leet
and Dockyards, 886, ADM
231/10.
51. Ibid.
28 * THE JOURNAL OF
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Thze
word of theSultan
embarked upon a foreignbuilding and
reconstruction rogramfor ts
navy. During those years the British firm
Armstrongmade a rousing
comeback. In 1898, the contract for rebuilding he ironclad Mesudiye
went to
Armstrong-Ansaldo,
branch
of
the
British irm n Genoa. Arm-
strong ompleted
the
ob
in
1903, along
with
he new construction f the
armored cruiserAbdul Hamid.
In
the reconstruction f 1903-7, Arm-
strong-Ansaldomodernized
three
ironclads.
Only
one
ironclad was
handed to a German firm Krupp)
in
1903-7,
and this was only because
Ansaldo had been unable to
complete
the
work n
1899. The British ven
moved into the German domain of
torpedo boats. Armstrong-Ansaldo
builteleven of
these
craft n the
years
from
901 to 1906. So, the period
1897-1907 markedthe returnofBritainto theOttomannaval market.
Meanwhile, he French and Germans
also
acquired
some
Ottoman naval
orders
n
the
1903-7 program.52
Naval
Production, 1908-14
The
Young
Turk Revolution
brought change
in
naval
affairs.By
deposing
Abdul
Hamid
II
in
1909,
the
Young
Turks
removed the single
most important mpediment o revitalizing he Turkish navy. Accord-
ingly, hey planned formajor
improvements
n
the
composition of the
fleet
and called for
six
battleships,
twelve
destroyers,
welve
torpedo
boats,
and
six
submarines.53
he
Young
Turks did not limit
their
ambi-
tions
merely
to
upgrading
the
class
of their
navy,
but also
sought
to
strengthen
omestic
productionby developing
he
capacity
to
build
their
own
dreadnoughts.
To this
end
they
pursued
a naval
docks contract
which
would
put
in
place
the
necessary
nfrastructureor
elf-sustained
warshipconstructionwithin heempire.
However,
the
Young
Turk
program
did
not have the chance to
develop fully.
he
Italian
NVar,
he Balkan
Wars,
and
finally
WorldWVar
interrupted
nd
hampered
t. As a
stopgapmeasure,
the
government ur-
chased a numberof
vessels
which had
originally
een intendedfor ther
countries. n the end the
Young
Turk
plans
for
elf-sufficiency
ere
frus-
trated
by events,
nd
expediency
once
again
favored
mports
s the solu-
tion
for
Ottoman
policy
makers.
Having
announced
the new naval
policy,
the
government
et about
achieving ts goals. In 1909 the YoungTurkgovernment iscussed the
procurement
f
capital ships
forthe
first
ime. The
plan
for
1910
called
fortwo
battleships
of the
Reshadiye class,
and the
corresponding
rder
went to
the
BritishfirmVickers.
AlthoughKrupp
obbied
hard for the
52. Report841, Turkey,Greece and Roumania.War \Tessels. 908, 30-36,
ADM 231/49;Giilen, iinden Bugiune ahriyemiz, 34-35.
53.
Conway'sAll theWorld's
ighting
hips, 1906-1921,
388.
MILITARY HISTORY *
29
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JONATILAN
RANT
order,Vickerswon out by offering particularly
weet deal
to the Turks.
Then
in
July 1911, Vickers' bankers
Glyn
Mills
guaranteed
a
large
advance to the Turks n respect of paymentdue to Vickers on the war-
ships.54
Vickers
became the
primary
naval
supplier
in
the final
phase of
Ottoman
policy.55 ltimately,
he battleship
deal
with
Vickersturned ut
to be unfortunate or the Ottomans because
the British
retained the
Reshadiye after ts aunch in 1913.
In the meantime, he Ottomanstried
to bolster their fleet s quickly
as
possible by buying
two
old German
battleships
n
1910. As another stopgap
measure,
in
1913 they pur-
chased the Rio
de
Janeiro,
which Brazil
had intended
to buy from
Britain, t a reducedprice.56
For the ast fewyears before
WVorld ar
,
Britain
ruled the
Ottoman
naval market.This resurgence
n
Turkey
was
part
of
her
mprovednaval
trade
worldwide
for
the years 1900-14,
when
British
xporters
f
war-
ships
and naval ordnance had 63.2
percent
of
the world market
com-
pared
with
Germany's
7.6
percent.
Vickers
had in
hand
Turkish
armament orders
equivalent
to 84
percent
of British
manufactured
exports
to the
Ottoman
Empire
n 1913. The
crowning
British
chieve-
mentthatyear was the acquisitionof the docks contractfor he Vickers-
Armstrong
Turkish
Company,
the
result of
collaboration between
Vickers and
Armstrong
or he
exploitation
f
Ottoman
state
docks
and
arsenals.
The
Ottoman
government
eld the
controlling
hare
ofthe
cap-
ital of this enterprise,
with the
minority
ivided between Vickers and
Armstrong.5'
The dock commission
triggered
war
of
threats
between
Germany
and Britain. n October
1913,
the Ottoman
government lanned
to reach
54.
Tyne
nd WearArchive ervice
TWAS)
130/1268,
no.
3,
Armstrongoard
MeetingMinutes,
0, 131, 134, 171; Giilen,
Diinden Bugiine Bahriyemiz,
85-86;
Clive Trebilcock,
The Vickers
Brothers:Armaments nd Enterprise,
854-1914
(London:European
Publishers td.,
1977), 130.
Vickers
rovided
or ix months' ree
creditwith ayment
n tenequal parts,
nd
paid
for
he
startup
osts. The GlynMills
advance to the
Turkswas ?600,000.
55. Trebilcock,
ickers rothers,
21. In 1911 Vickershad contracts
rom he
empireworth pproximately
.2 million old ira,
nd promises or further.5 mil-
lion n 1913.
56. Avetian, Germanskii imperializm, 116; Gillen, Diinden Bugiine
Bahriyemiz, 81, 186. The ship
was priced
t ?3.4 million, ut theOttomans ought
her for 2.3 million
57.
Trebilcock,
ickers rothers, 23-24;
Zafer
Toprak,Tiirkiye'de
Milli kti-
sat 1908-1918 (Ankara:MAYA
Matbaacilik-Yayincilik,
982), 362;
J. D.
Scott,Vick-
ers: A History
London: Weidenfeld
nd
Nicolson,
1963), 85; Suvla,
The Ottoman
Debt,
1850-1939, 106. The capitalof
theVickers-Armstrongurkish
ompanywas
?250,000
sterling;
ts oan to
the
Ottomans
was for .485 million
old
ira at 5.5
per-
cent nterest.
30 * THE JOURNAL OF
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JONATIAN
RANT
optionsopen
with he French. Like
Abdul
Hamid before
hem, he Young
Turks requested and received
a new
German military mission to
strengthenheirposition, nd theyputforthhequestion about the rear-
mament of the
artillery
nd
coastal
fortificationsf
the
straitsby Ger-
man factories
with
broad credit
foundations.
he Frenchtold
Cemal Bey,
the Minister f Marine, that they would not
object to the German mis-
sion as long as France was not deprived
of orders
forwar materials.The
struggle etween French and
German
firms ecame
so bitter hat Cemal
Bey undertooknegotiationswiththe business and
government ircles of
each
country.6'
Just year
beforeWorldWar
began,
both
German
and
Frenchfirms
lobbied forwar orders. n the fallof 1913 the OttomanWVar inistrywas
preparing o orderabout six hundredguns,
ofwhich
two-thirds ouldbe
mountain
guns
and one-thirdfield
guns. Prospects
for
arger
orders of
shells
lay ahead,
since their number
did
not exceed two
hundred
for
every
fieldor mountain
gun. The
Balkan
Wars had
shown
the
superior-
ity of Schneider artillery ver
Kruppguns,
and
therefore, ttoman offi-
cials
generally agreed
that the
mountain
guns
should
be
ordered
in
France.62 The Ottoman
government's
aspiration
to
support modern
artillerynd concentratea largepartofthe order withSchneider com-
pelled
the
Germans to
take
corresponding
measures.
At this
time
the
numberof Krupp pieces
in
the Ottoman
army
was
twice
as
great as the
number
of
artillery ieces
of
other
manufacturers, nd Krupp had no
intention f etting his
commandingposition slip away.63
The Ottoman officials used
the