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The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor's New ClothesAuthor(s): Onora O'NeillSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 77 (2003), pp. 1-21
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The
Inaugural
Address
AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'S
CLOTHES
by
Onora O'Neill
ABSTRACT
Conceptions
of individual
utonomy
and of rational
played
arge
parts
n
twentieth
entury
moral
philosophy, et
i
how eithercouldbe basic o morality.Kant'sconception f au
ically
different.He
predicated
autonomy
neither of individual
sel
cesses
of
choosing,
but of
principles
of action.
Principles
of actio
autonomous
only
if
they
are law-like
in
form and could be uni
they
areheteronomous
f,
although
aw-like
n
form,
hey
canno
scope.
Puzzles
about
claims
linking
morality,
reason and
auton
reduced
y recognising
he distinctiveness
f Kantian
utonom
I
Introduction.
n
the last
half-centuryppeals
o
au
played
a
larger
and
larger part
in
ethical a
debate.
Yet
the advocates of
autonomy
still
disagre
it
is,
and
why
it is
important.
At times it seems
th
only
that
autonomy
has a
noble,
Kantian
pedigree
closely
to
morality.
They
are
certainly
right
that Kant links
autonomy
For
example,
he
claims
both
that
'Morality
is
thus
of
actions
to
the
autonomy
of the
will'
and that
'
the will is the sole
principle
of all moral laws and
keeping
with them.'2
However,
I
believe that ther
dence
for
strong
links between
morality
and
twen
conceptions
of
autonomy.
Recent
conceptions
of
aut
no
claim to be 'the sole
principle
of all
moral
laws
in
keeping
with
them',
and
their
claims
to Kantian
greatly
exaggerated.
We have
been
admiring
a
na
of
questionable legitimacy.3
1.
Kant, 1785,
4:439.
2.
Kant, 1787,
5:33.
3.
Differences
re
often
pointed
out;
yet
the
persistence
f
claims o
su ests
hat
man contem orar
rota onists
f
autonom
overloo
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2 ONORA O'NEILL
These
negative
claims
tell us
nothing
about Ka
omy,
or
about
its
supposed
links to
morality
and re
test the linksthat Kant thoughthe had establishedo
back to
the
Kantian
texts.
I
hope
that a short ca
those texts
will reveal
a
more
interesting
andscape
t
ited terrain so
energetically
charted
in
recent decad
II
Autonomy
as
Independence.
first
realised
quite
how
the arrayof differingconceptionsof autonomyin c
debates
had
become when
I
read
Gerald Dworkin'
Theory
and Practice
of
Autonomy.
Dworkin
offers
a
a dozen different
conceptions
of
autonomy,
which,
h
variously
been
equated
with
Liberty positive
or
negative)
..
dignity, ntegrity
independence,
esponsibility
nd
self-knowledge
..
s
critical eflection.. freedom rom
obligation
..
abse
causation...andnowledge f one'sowninterests.4
This
list
is
far
from
complete.
For
example,
Ruth
Thomas
Beauchamp
in
their
interesting
work
The
Theory of
Informed
Consent note
that
autono
equated
with a
quite
different
list
of
concepts,
inclu
privacy,
voluntariness,
elf-mastery,
hoosing
fr
one's
own moral
position
and
accepting esponsi
choices.5
Dworkin contends
that
despite
all
these
variations
tions of
autonomy
share
two features:
The
only
features
hat are held constantfrom o
another
are
that
autonomy
s a
feature
of
person
desirable
uality
o have.6
moral debatesas well as in the discussionof Kant;but the only t
completely
lear
about
autonomy
n these
contexts
s that it mean
to
different
writers'
76).
4.
Dworkin,1988,
6.
5. Fadenand
7.
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AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'S
NEW
CLOTH
I
doubt whether either claim
is true.
It
is
certainly
all
conceptions
of
autonomy
view it as a feature of
original use of the term autonomy-literally self-le
antiquity
referred to a
property
not
of
persons,
bu
Autonomous
city-states
made their
own
laws;
c
given
laws
by
their mother cities.
And,
as
we have
Kant
ascribes
autonomy
not to
persons,
but
to the
accurately,
o determinations
of the
will
or
principle
some twentieth
century
writers-structuralists,
beh
dismiss the
very
idea that
autonomy
could be a feat
personsor of the will.
There is also
no
general agreement
that
autonom
able
quality
to have'.
On
the
contrary,many
disting
writers maintain that
there is
something
morall
about
autonomy.
Often
they
condemn
autonomy
than a
form of individual
independence
whose
m
may
be
morally
admirable,
corrupt
or
merely
trivia
III
Rational
Autonomy.Many
late
twentieth
century
pr
autonomy
have taken
this
point
and
do not
identi
with
mere
independence,
of the sort advocated
by
tialists.
They
often insist that
autonomous
action
m
be chosen
(so
to
some extent
independent),
but
ratio
They
have advocated one
or
another form of
ration
Rational
autonomy (unlike
autonomy
conceived
as
independence)might, it seems, be linked to moralit
The
principal
source for most
conceptions
of
ra
omy
is,
I
think,
not
Kant,
but John
Stuart Mill's On
explicitly repudiates
the
thought
that
mere,
sheer
i
or
choosing
is
morally important.
He ascribes
value
and reflective
choosing, by persons
of
well-develo
ality
and character.
He
claims that
A
person
whose desires and
impulses
are his
o
expression f his ownnature,as it has beendevelo
fied
by
his own
culture-
is said to
have
a
charac
desiresand
impulses
re
not
his
own,
has
no
char
than a
steam
engine
has a character.7
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4
ONORA O'NEILL
He
then
argues
that the
choosing
of
persons
with
viduality
and character benefits each
and
all,
and
s
tarians have reason to promote and protect the l
promote
reflectiveand
intelligentchoosing,
and
ther
ality
and
character:
In
proportion
o
the
development
f
his
individual
becomesmore valuable o
himself,
and
is
theref
being
morevaluable o others.8
However,
Mill
does
not
call
choosing
that
reflects
or character autonomous. So far as I can discov
speaks
of the
autonomy
of
persons
or of autonom
although
I
have found references to the
autonom
suspect
that
for Mill
the
term
autonomy
was
a ter
belonged
either
in
constitutional
discussions,
or
in
naturalistic
account
of
action,
and had no
place
in
h
ralistic account of action.10
Despite
this
divergence
n
terminology,
I
think t
centuryadvocates of rational autonomy are close t
they say
that what
is
ethically important
is not mer
mere
independence,
ut
specifically
rational
choosing
version
of)
rational
autonomy."
However,
unlike
recent admirersof rational
autonomy
are not Utilit
do not view
intelligent
and reflective
choosing,
or
th
respects
and
protects
it,
as valuable because
it is
means
to
human
happiness.
Some
of them
promot
'rational
autonomy'
not as
an instrumentalbut
as
a
human
good
or
value.
The
twentieth
century
writerswho follow
Mill in
c
some version of rational
autonomy
(rather
han
mer
pendence)
is
ethically
important,
also
disagree
abo
8.
Mill,
1859,
192.
9.
Mill, 1862,
Ch. 16.
10. Mill rejectedKant'sethicsbecausehe thoughtthat the Categ
was
not
action-guiding,
o
concluded
hat ethicsmust be based
on
would
have classified
s heteronomous ather han autonomous.
11.
Mill
no more
speaks
of
rational
utonomy
hanhe
speaks
of
aut
of
his
interpreters
se both
terms n
reporting
his
position.
For
exa
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AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLOTHE
For
example, Harry
Frankfurt n
a
now
classic
pape
lished
in 1970
distinguished
between
routine
choosin
ing that reflects second-orderdesires,and arguedth
for
the latter
sort of
choosing
set
persons
apart
and
significant.
His
famous
example
contrasts the wa
who in
choosing
her
fix
is
driven
by
mere
desire,
wit
who also
has second-order desires
to
be
a
person
immediate
desires
(the
determined
addict who
both
and to
be an
addict,
the
admirable addict
who
wa
addicted and
struggles
with her first-order
desire).
choosing
has
been
variously characterisedby oth
choosing
that is well
informed,
or
fully
informed,
or
reflectively
endorsed,
in
short
as
choosing
that
mately
based
on desires
or
preferences,
follows cer
processes.
I will
not
linger
on
the
many ingenious
accounts th
of various
conceptions
of
rational
autonomy provid
per processes
for rational
choosing.
I
suspect
that
hard to
show that
rationally
autonomous
choosin
even
generally)
leads to
ethically
superior
choices.
ceptions
of
rationally
autonomy
allow
desires and
as well as rational
procedures
for
choosing,
to
deter
autonomously
chosen:
why
then
should we
suppose
autonomy
secures ethical
acceptability?
ndeed,
as
o
autonomy
often
point
out,
hunch,
tradition
and int
times do
better;
they
may
reach
ethically
sound
choosing
with rational
autonomy may
fail
to
do
so.
On reflection it should not surpriseus that pr
rational
autonomy,
whose theories
of
action build
conceptions
of
rationality
but
also
on
specific
accou
ation,
find
that
motivation
duly
reflected
in
ratio
omous
choices,
often with
ethically
disturbing
i
Choosing
that
is
rationally
autonomous is
likely
to
e
ever individuals
prefer,
and to veer
towards
egotisti
At
best,
rationally
autonomous
choosing
is
likely
t
with egotisticalmotivationtowards more 'enlighten
est.
Many
of the ethical
objections
raised
about
au
ceived of as
mere,
sheer
independence
hen
recur as
conceptions
of rational
autonomy.
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6 ONORA
O'NEILL
And
there
is worse
to come.
Proponents
of ration
may hope
to show that certain rational
processes
generallyproduce more valuablechoices. But they
able to show even this much without
independen
identifying
valuable
choices. In Mill's
hands,
where
choices
is
settled
by
Utilitarian
arguments,
here
is
arguing
that some
ways
of
choosing
are
more
likely
to
produce
valuable
choices. But without an
indepen
of valuable
choices,
it is
unclear
how
we could
sh
or
another
way
of
choosing,
such as
those favoure
conceptions of rational autonomy, is more valuab
to
promote
rational
autonomy
as a
fundamental
ra
instrumental
alue
need
quite
differentsorts of
supp
not
myself
at
all
sure
where it could be
found.
IV
Kantian
Autonomy
in
Context.
Both
Kant's admi
detractors
agree
that Kantian
autonomy
is distin
view
it differs
markedly
both
from
mere,
sheer
indi
pendence
and from
conceptions
of
rational
autonom
inescapable
inks to
preference-led
and
desire-drive
motivation.
Kant's
views
on
autonomy
were
also innovativ
writer had made such
strong
claims
about the
mora
of
any
conception
of
autonomy. Jerry
Schneewind
correct when he
writes
at
the
beginning
of
his rece
Invention
of
Autonomy,
that 'Kant invented the
c
morality
as
autonomy.'13
But what
he
invented
h
little to do with twentieth
century
conceptions
o
either
as individual
ndependence
r as
rational
au
most
convincing
evidence that
Kant was
thinking
o
quite
different
s that
very
few of his
central
claims
omy
make much sense
if
we
equate
Kantian
auto
with individual
independence
or with
current
co
rationalautonomy.
On
the
surface,
Kant
may
seem to be
promoting
s
of rational
autonomy.
For
example,
in
the
Critiqu
Reason,
and
in
man
other
works,
he
redicates
a
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AUTONOMY:THE EMPEROR'SNEW CLOTH
reason and links the
autonomy
of reason to
moralit
for
example,
that 'the moral law
expresses
nothin
the autonomyof pure practicalreason.'
4
In some t
his late
essay,
The
Conflict
of
the
Faculties,
he
goes
and
equates
all
reasoning,
not
only practical
rea
autonomy,
remarking
hat
'the
power
to
judge
auto
that
is,
freely (according
to
principles
of
thought
in
called
reason.'15
Taken out
of context these claims could
be-and
read as
very strong
and
very
confused
versions of t
autonomy is some form of rational choosing. The
less
plausible
than
contemporary
accounts
of
ration
because
they
require
us to
read
Kant
as
makin
assertionsabout
the
links between
autonomy,
reaso
ity.
Rather than
dismissing
Kant's account of
a
bizarre on
this
account,
I
shall
consider a
reading
t
specific
claims about the
structure
of
autonomy seri
The
context of
Kant's account
of
autonomy
is
view of
action. Kant
looks
at action from
the
agent'
that
is,
from
a
practical point
of view.
He
depicts a
ing
a
power of
choice
(Willkar)
that
they
can
use
in
ways. Agents
exercise
their
power
of
choice
by
ado
another
determination
f
the will. In
doing
so
they
some
practical
principle
(or
rule,
or
law,
or
plan)
m
maxim.16
Maxims
specify
at
a
fairly general
level
so
the
way
agents
set about
leading
their
lives:
I
may
maxim to
build
a
mill,17
or
to save for
my
old
age,18
funds,19
to
avenge
insults,20
to
overcharge gullible
to
pursue
my
self-interest,22
or
not
to
make false
pro
heterogeneous
sample
includes maxims
that Kant
14.
Kant, 1787,
5:33.
15.
Kant, 1798,
7:27.
16.
Timmerman,
000,
39-52.
17.
Kant, 1787,
5:26.
18. Ibid.,5:20.
19.
Ibid.,
5:
28.
20.
Ibid.,
5:19.
21.
Kant,
1785,
4:397.
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8
ONORA O'NEILL
morally
worthy
and others that
he
thinks of as
mora
able,
and some that he thinks
merely
optional
or at
of prudence.
In
speaking
of
agents'
maxims
or
determinatio
Kant
is not
making
a claim
about the efficient caus
The
principle
(law,
rule,
plan)
that an
agent ado
cause him or her
to do
anything
(how
could abstract
as
principles
laws,
rules or
plans)
be
efficient
causes?
principle
(law,
rule,
plan)
that is
adopted
is the for
action:
it
articulates
what
an
agent
chooses
to
do.
of action does not requireKant to deny that (from
standpoint)
action can be
causally
explained:
he
s
passages
that acts have efficient causes. But
in
choo
do we
do not
identify
the causes of our future actio
Determinations
of the
will are
a
promising
f
account of
reasons
for
action. Since
any
principle,
plan
that is or could be
adopted
as a determinati
must have
propositional
structure
and
content,
it
wi
reasoned assessment.
Moreover,
reasoned assessm
be confined to
judging
whether
proposals
for action
or
effective means to
given
ends: for Kant instrum
ality
need be
only
one
aspect
of
practical
reason.
He
his account of instrumental
reasoning
on
one side
concentrateon the basis of his distinction
between h
and
autonomous reasons
for action.
V
Kantian
Autonomy:Heteronomy
as a Clue. The cont
heteronomy
and
autonomy
is a useful
way
into
u
Kantian
autonomy.
Heteronomy
is not a term we
life,
so
may
not seem
a
promising
clue. However-
Kant offers a
helpfully simple
account of what
h
writes:
If thewillseeks helaw thatis to determinet any
in
the
fitnessof its maxims or its own
giving
of
u
heteronomy
lways
esults.24This content downloaded from 130.132.173.156 on Fri, 19 Feb 2016 17:12:14 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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AUTONOMY: THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHE
The
differencebetween heteronomous
and
autonom
is a
differencebetween
the sorts of
principlesadopte
nations of the will. Heteronomous choosing an
autonomous
choosing
are both a
matter
of
seeki
adopting
or
willing,
some
principle
(law,
rule,
pl
adopting
some
determination
f
the will. The differ
them is
not
that
those
who
choose
heteronomously
agents,
or not
capable
of
any
independence
in
act
they
have
no
rational
capacities,
or
that
they
c
choose,
adopt
or
will
laws
or
principles.
Heteronom
is choosing. Agents with the power to choose (Will
able both of autonomous and
of
heteronomous
ch
difference
between them
is
that
agents
look in differ
in
choosing autonomously
and
choosing heterono
two
types
of
principle
are drawn or derived from
di
of
assumption.
Kant
frequently
contrasts
heteronomous and
principles
by
saying
that the former take
their
justi
elsewhere,
whereas
autonomous
principles
take their
from
nowhere else. Yet here we
may
well
lose
pati
justifications
must
begin
somewhereelse: isn't the
w
justification
to
derive
authority?
And
if a
principle
c
derivative,
why
would that
make
it
morally
special
to
especially
arbitrary?
Why
should a
principle
th
non-derivative
(whatever
that
means)
have
any
s
alone be fundamental to a
conception
of
reason?
ended
up
with
something
worse than
the
fantasy
th
autonomy
is the basis of
morality?
Have we not des
pop
existentialism o
postmodernism?
Kant's
examples
of
principles
or laws
adopted b
choose
heteronomously
are
extremely
varied.
He
agents may
defer to the
dogmas
of a
Church,
to t
rulers,
to
immediate inclination or
to
the will
of th
The common core
to
all these
examples
is
that the he
chooser
makes
some
arbitrary,
hence
unreasoned,
m
ing
a determinationof the will, whereas the autono
does not.
A
heteronomously
chosen
principle
is
'
imputing
authority
to
something
or
other,
for whos
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10
ONORA
O'NEILL
authority
either no
reasons,
or
(at most)
incomplete
given. Any
reason
to
act
on
such
principlesreflects
t
assumption,and heteronomous reasons for action
always
conditional
upon
it. Kant
puts
the
point
as f
Wherever n
object
of the will has
to be laid downa
prescribing
he rulethat determineshe
will,
there
h
other
than
heteronomy;
he
imperative
s
conditio
or because ne wills his
object,
one
ought
o act
n
su
way;
hence t can nevercommand
morally,
hat
s,
c
So
the
common
core of
all sorts of
heteronomo
that it is not fully reasoned. It depends on arbitra
authority
to
something
or
other: a
desire
or
a
dogm
of Church
or
State. Kant
often
depicts
those wh
impute authority
to such
assumptions
metaphorical
ting
to alien or
foreign
authorities.
Kant's numerousaccounts of heteronomous
willin
damental differencesbetween
lacking
individual
ut
ing
rational
autonomy
and
lacking
Kantian
autonom
wholly lack individualautonomywill not be able to c
heteronomously
or
autonomously.
In Kantian
voca
beings
lack the
power
of
choice,
so lack free
w
incapable
of moral choice or
action.
Having
a
pow
is a
precondition
for
heteronomous
as well as fo
autonomous
choosing,
so
cannot be
equated
w
autonomy.
Kant
speaks
of
beings
without
a
pow
who cannot act either
heteronomously
or
autonomo
ing no more than animalcapacitiesto choose, an a
tum as
opposed
to arbitrium iberum.27
A
person
with
power
of
choice
can
choose ei
omously
or
heteronomously. Agents
who choose
ously,
so
defer
to
arbitrarily
selected standards and
can
give
at most conditional reasons
for
their action
not,
however,
be
wholly
capricious,
and
often em
other version
of what Kant
calls
heteronomou
example, they may choose not to follow immediat
but
to
live with an
eye
to
long-term personal adv
tism),
or to the
generalhappiness
(Utilitarianism)
or
26.
Kant 1785
4:444.
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AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'SNEW CLOTH
of
a
supposed
moral
sense,
or to some
conception
f
Kant
would view twentieth
century
proponen
autonomyas endorsing arious orms of heteron
They
do not
admire
mere,
sheer
wilfulness;
he
rationally
utonomous
gents
can offer
reasons
o
they
also
accept
hat thesereasonsare
always
ess th
Heteronomoushoosers
ultimately
aveto
fall back
authority
o desireor
ideology,
publicopinion
or ce
that
be.
Although
heteronomous hoosersmake an
arbit
according ertaindesires,demandsand dogmast
reasons or
action,
hey
may
have
quite
a lot
of mor
heteronomoushoicesare often
expressed
n
moral
action
(the
shopkeeper
who is
honest for the sake
tation,
the
self-interestedhooser
whose
interests
altruistic
hoices).
But n other
situations eterono
may
act
in
capricious,
elf-centred r
even
malign
mon or
gardenheteronomy
s
reflected
n
livesthat
morally conformist,
but
without luck
may
unacceptable.
VI
Kantian
Autonomy
and
Self-Legislation.
The
limitati
onomous
reasons
are
easily
seen
and
constantly
ot
chooses
heteronomously y
adopting
a
principl
achieve
omething
or which
he
offers
only
conditi
Butcanweexpectmore?Kantthinksso. He claim
omous
choosers
adopt principles
of action
that
ditionalon
any
arbitrary ssumption
r
posit.
In the
he
puts
the matteras follows:
Autonomy
of
the will is the
property
f
the will
a
law
to itself
(independently
f
any
property
of
t
volition).29
In
this
and
many
similar
passages,
we
meet the
aspect
of
Kant's
account
of
autonomy.
What is a
28.
Kant, 1785, 4:442-3;
see
Kant, 1787, 5:39-41,
for a
more
differ
cation of
heteronomous ethical
ositions.
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12
ONORA O'NEILL
the will
by
which it is a law
to itself
(independently
erty
of the
objects
of
volition)'?
How can
the
will
a
mination simply on the basis of 'the fitness of its
its own
giving
of
universal
law'? Kant's claims hav
reflexivity
that
is
often
perplexing
and
hard,
but
impossible,
to
sort
out.
A
common
approach
to
Kantian
autonomy
hark
etymology
of the word
autonomy,
and
identifies
auto
ling
with
some
conception
of
self-legislation.
What s
assign
to
Kant's use of
this
venerable
phrase?
Far the
lar way of looking at the matter is to interpretself-l
legislation
done
by
a
self
or
subject.
On this individ
ing
we
picture
each of
many
wills as
legislating
for al
tions
immediately
arise.
First,
why
should the
legis
of
my
will
and
your
will
point
in
the same direct
why
should
we think that the
'legislative
action'
o
will must
point
in
a
morally acceptable
direction,
an
such
'legislative
action'
convince
us
that the
'princi
omy is the sole principleof morals.'
3
If Kantian
pictured
merely
as
legislation by
individual
selves,
nation
of
differentwills
remainsa
mystery
and the m
ance of
autonomy
is
just
as
obscure as
it is in
co
individual
autonomy
that
make
no
mention
of
sel
Unsurprisingly,many passages
in Kant's
writings
ar
nonsense,
or
at
the
very
least
to
implausibility,
f
w
conception
of
autonomy
with
'legislation'
by
although this readingremainsvery popular.
Could this
problem
be resolved
if
Kantian
autono
tured as
legislation
by
co-ordinated
ndividual elves
strategy
of
Rousseau's
famous account
of
self-legisl
the
problem
of
possible
divergence
between numer
lating
wills
is
resolved
by positing
an
extraneous so
vergence.
On Rousseau's
view 'The
general
will is
al
common
good'31
and
'The
general
will
is
always
always tends to the public
utility.'32
30.
Kant, 1785,
4:440.
31.
Rousseau
1755
8.
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AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLOTHE
Of
course,
Rousseau did not think that individ
will as
the General
Will demands. On the
contrary,
genceof particularwills on the General Will is a con
vergence
of 'corrected'
wills,
not
necessarily
or ev
mirrored in real time
by
the
will
of
each or
the w
Kant would see
it,
Rousseauian
self-legislation
s a
fo
onomy:
it
assigns authority
to a
conception
of the
g
and
defines
'corrected'
wills
as
pointing
in
this direc
the
problem
of
divergence
were
solved
by
this
stra
sonally
think that Rousseau defines the
problem
out
ratherthan solving it-we have not been shown a
think
that the
supposed point
of
convergence
defi
or is
morally significant.
Rousseau's
account of
l
co-ordinated elves
resolves
indeterminacy
and
disa
positing
the
authority
of the
general
will
or of the
g
for
Kant
this is
heteronomy.
VII
Kantian
Autonomy:
Law-Like
and
Lawless
Willin
alternative
nterpretation
of the idea of
self-legislati
ter
sense of Kant's
claims,
and avoid
conflating au
heteronomy?
It
may
seem that we are
faced
with
a
we view
self-legislationsimply
as a
matter of
choosi
for
oneself
(independently,
or even
using
some ratio
then the
very
distinction
between
heteronomy
a
autonomy
is erased.
If
we view
self-legislation
as
choosing
or
willing principles
with a
certainsort
of
c
we
apparently
all into
heteronomy
by
arbitrarilyasc
weight
to that
content or aim.
As
is
apparent
from countless
passages,
Kant th
essential feature of
autonomous
willing
is
that
it h
of
law,
so is
expressed
in
law-like
determinationsof
contrasts law-like
choosing
with
choosing
determin
will
are
literally
lawless. But
what,
we
may
wonder,
lem with lawless
choosing?
Why
shouldn't we embr
extreme forms of
lawlessness
or lack of
structurebot
and action?
Isn't
any
claim
that
thought
or action
m
re uirements
law-like
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14
ONORA
O'NEILL
dispense
with all
and
any requirements
or
structu
the claims of
law-like form
surely
need
arguing.
It is fascinatingto find Kant engagingwith the po
of his
day-the
advocates of
spiritual
enthusiasm
merei-to
show
why
the
postmodernist fantasy
o
with
all
authorities,
with all
reasons,
with all
princ
for
organisingthinking
or
action,
is
deceptive.
Like
ists,
Kant
sees
clearly why
people
imagine
hat
'lawl
is
not
merely
feasible but
attractive;
but
he
also sees
atens. He
depicts
the
pleasures
of the
advocates
of
la
ing with pointed irony:
First
genius
s
very
pleased
with its
bold
flights,
i
off
the thread
by
which
reasonused
to steer t.
So
otherswith ts
triumphant ronouncements
nd
gre
and
now
seems o
have set
itself
on a
throne,
whic
graced
by
slow
and
ponderous
eason,
whose
ang
it
always
employs.
Then
ts maxim s
that reason'
giving
s invalid- we common
human
beings
all th
while hose
favoured
y
beneficent ature
all
it
illu
Kant
believes
that
this
heady
liberation
ends not
m
fusion,
but in
cognitive
and
practical
disaster:
Since
reasonalonecancommand
alidly
or
everyo
of
language
must soon arise
among
hem;
each
on
his own
inspiration.34
Communicationbreaks
down
and
superstition
rides
ity
and civil
society
fail.
Attempts
to
achieve
unlim
in
thinking
and
acting prove
self-defeating.
Lawles
mines
thinking
and
acting
because
it
undercuts
the
v
ity
of
offering
others reasons
for
believing
or
for
ac
As Kant
sees
it,
any
reasoned
use of
human freed
ing
and
in
acting
must
be
law-like
rather than lawle
Freedom n
thinking
ignifies
he
subjection
f reas
except
thosewhich t
gives
tself;
and
its
opposite
s
a
lawlessuse of
reason
inorder,
as
genius upposes
than one
can
under
the
limitationof
laws).
The n
quence
of declared awlessnesss that
if
reason
wi
33.
Kant 1786
8:145.
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AUTONOMY:THE
EMPEROR'S
NEW
CLOTH
itself to the laws
it
gives
itself,
it has to bow und
laws
given
by
another;
or without
any
law,
nothi
nonsense-can
play
its
game
for
long.
Thus th
consequence
f
declaredawlessness
n
thinking
o
from all the limitations f
reason)
s that freedo
ultimately
e forfeited
nd-because
it is
not misfo
gance
which s to
blame or it-will be
trifled
way
the
proper
enseof the
word.35
Only
law-like
thought
and
action
offers others wit
live,
think and interact
proposals
that
they
can follo
or action, so could potentiality evaluate as reason
Whateverelse
reasons
are,
they
must
befollowable b
hence
the sorts of
things
that we
can offer and
refus
challenge.
This is
why practical reasoning
cannot cu
law-like
determinationsof the will.
If
we are cavalie
likeness,
we no
longer
deal
in
reasons
for
acting
or
believing.
Needless to
say,
the demand
that
we act on law-li
is
an
extremely
weak
constraint,
that is
met both
by
ous and
by
autonomous
action.
Those whose
princi
are
heteronomous
through
and
through
act on la
ciples.
Even
if
Kant
is
right
in
diagnosing
lawlessne
and action as
catastrophic,
heteronomy might
be th
option
for
conducting
our
thinking
and
acting. Per
Kant,
morality
is at
most a
system
of
hypothetical
Perhaps
all reasons for
action are
ultimately
conditi
VIII
Kantian
Autonomy:
A
Law
to
Itself.
If
Kantian
au
possibility,
there must be
two sorts of
law-like
pri
reasons
for
thinking
that heteronomous
principl
offer insufficient
reasons
for action.
Kant's constant
practical
philosophy,
from the first
Chapter
of the
onwards,
is
that
morally
important
principles
must
law-likeinform, but universal n scope.Since hetero
ciples
arbitrarily
ake
for
granted specific
desires,
co
interests,
or
specific
institutions
or
cultures,
they
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16
ONORA O'NEILL
of
being principles
for all.
By
contrast,
law-like
pr
are
capable
of
being principles
for
all,
that have uni
are Kantianlyautonomousprinciples.
Kant connects
the demands
of
scope
and
law
insisting
that
It is
requisite
o
reason's
awgiving
hat it should
n
pose only itself,
becausea rule
s
objectively
nd
un
only
when it holds
without
he
contingent, ubjec
that
distinguish
ne rational
being
rom
another.3
Kantian autonomyis not a matter of persons being
(although,
of
course,
Kant holds
that
persons
are
in
a
degree,
since
they
have
a
power
of
choice).
Rat
autonomy
is a
matter
of
adopting
law-like
principles
pendentof
extraneous
assumptions
hat can hold
only
not
for
other
agents.
Kant
often
encapsulates
this
re
phrases
such as a
'lawgiving
that
needs
to
presuppo
or in
compressed
referencesto the notion of 'a
law
own'
or
'non-derivativeawgiving'.Principles hat m
dard are not
merely
law-like,
but
'hold without the
subjective
conditions that
distinguish
one rational
another'.
They
are
potentially principles
for
all,
an
for those who
uncritically
assume
the
authority
of
or a
particulardogma,
some local institutions
of
po
who
can at
most
converge
on heteronomous
princi
The idea of a
'lawgiving
that
needs
to
presuppo
is
I
think the
key
to
Kant's
distinctive
understan
legislation.
As he
presents
the
matter,
it is the
princi
or
legislating,
and
not
the
agent,
that
'presuppose
For Kant
the
term
self-legislation
cannot mean th
some terrificacts of the self
(or
terrific acts
of
the
that are
morally
important,
or
definitive
of
morali
that there are some
principles
of action that are n
from
supposed,
but
ultimately arbitrary
'authoriti
these
are
morally
important.
The
element
self
in
t
self-legislation
s
reflexive
rather than
individualisti
certain
justifications
of
principles
rather
than to cert
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AUTONOMY:THE EMPEROR'S
NEW
CLOTH
'legislators'.
Kant takes himself
to be
giving
an
ac
sort
of
law-giving
that is
reason's
own,
and
not a
lawgivings that are an agent's own. His understa
legislation places
the
emphasis
on the
notion
of
legisl
than
on
any
notion
of
the
self. Kantian
autonom
lawgiving
rather
than the
lawgiving
of
individual
ge
that
might
mean).
Reason's
lawgiving
is not
merely
a
matter of
ado
another law-like determinationof the will:
heterono
does
as much. Kantian
autonomy
is
expressed
in
ad
ciples, willings, reasoningsthat are both law-like in
form
and
do not derive
that law-likeness
from
arbit
tions that are
open
to some but not to others.
Heteronomous
reasoning, by
contrast,
relies
assumptions
about the basis of
morally significa
which
may
be available to some and not to others.
ous
principlesmay
be
widely
shared:those who
tak
the
authority
of Church
or
state,
public
opinion
or
lo
will
generally
have
plenty
of
company.
Unlike
postm
tures,
heteronomous
practical
reasoning
does not e
prehension
or
cognitive
shipwreck.
Its defect is
intelligibility
coasts on
arbitrary
assumptions
that
cannot
share,
so
cannot
provide
reasons for action
f
Heteronomous reasons do not
aspire
to be
a
law-giving
f
its ownon the
part
of
pure
and,
as
s
reason which]s freedom n thepositive ense.37
Hence, in Kant's view, heteronomous reasons ar
defective,
incomplete
or
'private'
reasons. Reasons
principle
ollowable
by
their
presumed
audiences;
fu
claims
and
demandsmust be followable
by
all and
a
That is
why they
must be
law-like,
or have the f
Heteronomous
reasons
are
law-like
in
form but
pres
shared desire or
belief,
or other
cultural or institu
of
agreement.
They
may provide in-group
reasons
to
who have deferred(heteronomously) o the same'a
they
offer no basis
for
reasoning among
those who
suppose
allegiance
to
the
same
desire or
dogmaThis content downloaded from 130.132.173.156 on Fri, 19 Feb 2016 17:12:14 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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18
ONORA O'NEILL
hence no
basis
for
reasoning
with the world at
large,
fully 'public'
reason,
hence
in Kant's
view no suffici
moralityor forjustice. This too is perhaps quite a
tion of
practical
reason: but it is not covert
heteronomy.38
Correspondingly,
he
phrase
'a
lawgiving
of its o
ene
Gesetzgebung)
is
no mere awkwardness of
expresses
the
requirement
that
anything
that can
self-legislation
of
practical
reason must be a not
onl
(gesetzgebend)
but also non-derivative
eigen).
It is
for living by principlesthat could be described as l
reason,
so fit for all
(regardless
of their
particular
a
ogy,
desires or
culture),
that
underpins
Kant's disti
the
metaphor
of
self-legislation
and that links his
c
autonomy
to fitness for universal law. It
is this
allows him to claim
that
autonomy
and
universalisa
alternative
formulations of the
Categorical Impera
able
from
one another and
equally,
indeed
equival
mental to
morality.
As
Kant
puts it,
The
principle
f
autonomy
s,
therefore:o choose
way
thatthe maxims f
your
choiceare ncluded s
in
the samevolition
9
As Kant sees
it,
combining
a
formal requirement
l
with a
scope requirement universality)
allows us to d
substantive
constraints,
which he views as basic
morality. Morality
is
fundamentally
a matter of
principlesof action that could not be adopted by
not be universal laws. If
we
adopt
only
law-like de
of
the will
that could
be universal
aws,
we
must
ado
ciples
that
(we
judge)
all
and
any
others too
could
a
must
reject many tempting
and
interesting principl
Kantian
autonomy
bypasses
the
problem
of
possibl
38.
Indeed,
Kant sometimes
presents
t as the
basis of all
reasonin
practical easoning,ncludinghatpartof practical easoninghatsu
'To make use of one's reason
means no
more
than to ask
oneself,
supposed
o assume
omething,
whether ne couldfind t feasible o
or
the
ruleon whichone assumes t into a universal
rinciple
or th
Kant, 1786,
8:146n.
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AUTONOMY:
THE EMPEROR'SNEW
CLOTH
of individual
choices,
which would have
to be res
legislation
were a
matter
of
each
individual
legisl
The key to Kant's thought is the explicit identific
legislation
or
autonomy
with
adopting only
law-li
that can 'hold without the
contingent,
subjective
co
distinguish
one rational
being
from
another'.
Once we have shifted our
conceptions
of
self-legi
way
that a coherent
reading
of
the
Kantian texts
r
no
longer
so hard to see
why
he
thinks that
au
demand
of
practical
reason.
If
we think
of
reasons
received,exchangedor refused,acceptedor challen
reasons that cannot be followed
by
some
of
those
to
are offered
will be
defective
or
incomplete: they
of
ited,
incomplete
reasons
for
action.
IX
From Practical Reason to
Morality.
Practical
rea
demands that
principles
we offer
to others as
basic
action are indeed fit to be reasons for
others,
so a
autonomous.
Kant,
I
think,
assumes
that once
adequate
account of
practical
reason,
an
account of
not
be
far
away.
He writes
in
the
Groundwork
Th
principle
of
autonomy
is the sole
principle
of
moral
shown.'40
I
think
this
too
optimistic;
and
it is
certainly
a
tas
day. Although
I
hope
I
have
set out
why
the
Kant
of autonomyis fundamental o reasongiving,it woul
work
to
determine whether it is
the sole
principle
o
equivalent
to the other
formulations of
the
Catego
tive,
and to set
out
the
role
of other
considerati
reasoning.
This task
constitutes
the
programme
of K
and
political writings.
There he
aims
to
show
that
Autonomy
f the will is the
sole
principle
f all mor
duties
n
keeping
with
them;heteronomy
f
choice
hand,
not
only
does not
ground
any
obligation
t all
opposed
o the
principle
f
obligation
nd to the
m
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20
ONORA O'NEILL
will. That
s to
say,
the
sole
principle
f
morality
o
pendence
rom all
matter
of the
law
(namely,
r
object)41
nd
at
the
same time
in
the
determin
through
he
mere
orm
of
giving
universal
aw
that
be
capable
of
42
In
the
fairy
tale
the
emperor processed
stark
naked
child
dared to
point
this
out. As
I
see
it,
the newe
autonomy
that have
played
so
large
a
part
in discus
ality
and
politics
since the
mid-twentieth
century,
a
penetratedthe innermostand outermost reaches o
professional
life
(especially
in
the
English
speakin
pretty scantily
clad. Neither
mere,
sheer
independ
called rational
autonomy
has much
to
commend
it,
t
no
doubt,
can be contrasted with even
nastier
pos
face
a
choice. Either
we
accept
some
contemporar
of
autonomy,
so must
conclude
that it is
at best
a
sometimes
suspect) aspect
of
the moral
life. Or
w
the Kantianconceptionof autonomyseriously,and
reason to
consider whether
it
just
might
be
'the sole
all moral
laws
and
of
duties
in
keeping
with
them'.
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7/24/2019 O'Neill Emperor's New Clothes (2003)
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AUTONOMY:
THE
EMPEROR'S
NEW
CLOTH
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J.-J., 1762,
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