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Medicare payment policy and its impact on program spending
James E. Mathews, Ph.D. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
February 6, 2015
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Outline of today’s presentation
Brief background on MedPAC Medicare financials in context Medicare’s payment systems – overview Components of fee-for-service payment
systems (FFS) Medicare Advantage (MA) and Part D
(Medicare’s prescription drug benefit) New payment model: Accountable Care
Organizations
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I. MEDPAC BACKGROUND
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Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
Independent, nonpartisan legislative branch commission; 17 members representing broad cross-section of health care
Commissioners appointed by the Comptroller General for 3-year terms; can be reappointed
Make recommendations to the Congress and the Secretary of HHS
Vote on recommendations in public Two standing reports to Congress; also
various mandated reports 4
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MedPAC’s principles for evaluating Medicare payment policy
Beneficiaries: Ensure access to high quality care in an appropriate setting
Providers: Give providers an equitable incentive to supply care efficiently
Taxpayers: Appropriately control program spending and ensure Medicare obtains the best possible value for its program dollars
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II. MEDICARE FINANCIALS IN THE BROADER BUDGET CONTEXT
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The federal budget picture
Federal debt = 74% of GDP at end of 2014, up from 36% of GDP in 2007
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, other health insurance programs and net interest will be 15% of GDP by 2024 (CBO February 2014) Total federal spending has averaged 19 percent of GDP
over the past 40 years Medicare alone = 3.5% of GDP in 2013; will grow to 4.8% of
GDP by 2030, and 6.3% by 2085
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Medicare faces serious challenges with long-term financing
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Medicare Part A trust fund will be depleted by 2030; will require more revenue or pay out fewer benefits
Medicare Part B consumes 14% of all income tax revenue
41% of Medicare’s funding comes from general revenues
An even larger share of general revenues will be required to finance the program in the future (45% in 2030)
Medicare also consumes a greater share of beneficiaries’ Social Security benefits over time – e.g., SMI premiums and cost sharing equaled 23% of average Social Security benefit in 2014; share will increase to 44% by 2088
Source: 2014 Medicare Trustees Report
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Medicare spending, by sector, 2013
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Inpatient hospital 24%
Home health
3%
Hospice 3%
Managed care 25%
Physician fee schedule
12%
DME 1%
Outpatient hospital
7%
Other 8%
Prescription drugs provided under Part
D 12%
SNF 5%
Total spending 2013 = $575 billion
Source: 2014 Medicare Trustees Report
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Components of Medicare spending
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Number of beneficiaries
(population)
Number of services
(utilization)
Payments per service
(payment rates)
Total program expenditures
X X =
Growth in Medicare spending over time is affected by change in per-beneficiary spending &
changes in enrollment
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III. MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY
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Components of Medicare
Fee-for-Service (FFS) Part A – Inpatient hospital, most post-acute
care Part B – Outpatient hospital, ambulatory care
Private plans Part C – Medicare Advantage (private health
plans administering A&B benefits) Part D – Prescription drug plans
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
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Elements of provider payment policy
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Unit of payment e.g., episode vs. per diem, individual service vs. discharge
Level of payment Home health payment rates
Distributional equity within a payment system
Skilled nursing facility therapy payments; payment adjusters
Equity across payment systems
Site-neutral payments: physician office vs. OPD
Incentives for quality and coordination Hospital readmissions penalty
RESOURCE: MedPAC Payment Basics series
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Unit of payment: What is the right increment in which Medicare should pay for a service?
Pay per service = more services (e.g., advanced imaging; pre-PPS home health visits
Pay per diem = provider responses; site-neutral issues (e.g., SNF / IRF)
Pay per discharge (e.g., hospital services) = more provider responses (e.g., LTCH length of stay)
Pay per episode (or bundle of services) = who gets the payment?
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Many LTCH cases discharged immediately after short-stay outlier threshold
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0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Num
ber o
f dis
char
ges
Length of stay
MS-LTC-DRG 207MS-LTC-DRG 189
SSO threshold for MS-LTC-DRG 189
SSO threshold for MS-LTC-DRG 207
Note: SSO (short-stay outlier). Source: MedPAC analysis of MedPAR claims.
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Level of payment: Is Medicare paying enough…or too much?
Medicare’s average payments to home health agencies have exceeded average costs by over 10% for over a decade
When home health payment rates were set in 2000, Medicare assumed an average of 31 visits per episode
By 2012, visits dropped to an average of 18 visits per episode 16
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Home health agencies’ Medicare margins have been high since the advent of PPS
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0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Higher margins result if 2011 results are adjusted for
findings from audit of Medicare cost reports
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Reset home health payment rates to align better with costs
MedPAC recommended resetting (rebasing) home health payment rates
PPACA mandated CMS begin rebasing rates Began in 2014 Reductions are offset by market basket
increases MedPAC recommends accelerating and
increasing rebasing reductions
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Distributional equity: Is Medicare paying fairly for all patients and services?
Patients are classified into payment groups based on diagnosis, procedures
Payments also adjusted for patient demographics and risk factors
Adjustments may be made for cost of staff wages, outliers, transfers
Providers may also receive special payments based on location or status, e.g., rural, teaching, or serving low-income patients
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Distributional equity: Skilled nursing facility example
In skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), uneven financial performance among providers
In part, a reflection of an imbalance in the SNF PPS
Payments for therapy and non-therapy ancillary (NTA) services are inaccurate
PPS overpays for therapy services
PPS sometimes underpays for NTA services
Longstanding MedPAC recommendation to revise the SNF PPS
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Revised PPS would redistribute payments among providers
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SNF group Percent change in payments
High share of all days that are: Intensive therapy -7% Clinically complex & special care 5 to 7
Hospital-based 21 For-profit -1 Nonprofit 4 Rural 4
Source: Impacts relative to current policy estimated by the Urban Institute 2014.
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Equity across payment systems: Medicare’s payments for the same services in different settings
Many of the same services provided in free-standing physician offices and hospital OPDs
Problem: OPPS rates typically much higher than physician fee schedule rates
e.g., mid-level office (E&M) visit 80 percent higher in OPD
Recent trend of hospitals purchasing physician practices and services moving to the OPD
Result: Increase program spending and beneficiary cost sharing; may not change clinical aspects of care
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Addressing higher payment rates in OPDs Set OPPS rates so that payment rates are
equal whether service is in OPD or freestanding practice?
For specific services, do OPDs: Have more complex patients? Maintain standby capacity? Have greater packaging of ancillaries than
PFS? Commission recommendations: March
2012, March 2014
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Incentives for quality and coordination: Reducing hospital readmissions
In 2005, 13.3% of Medicare beneficiaries discharged from a hospital returned within 30 days on a potentially preventable readmission
Medicare spent $12 billion on potentially preventable readmissions (2005)
Avoidable readmissions represent poor patient outcomes and reveal uncoordinated care
Beneficiaries are put at financial and health risk
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PPACA created financial incentives to reduce hospital readmissions Hospital readmission reduction program enacted in
2010 Payment penalty started in October 2012 Penalty based on 2009 – 2011 performance Policy uses three conditions and requires NQF
approved measures (AMI, heart failure, pneumonia) In aggregate penalties equal about 0.3 percent of total
base inpatient hospital payments in FY2013 Average penalty for hospitals with penalty about
$125,000 Penalty capped as 1% of base operating payment in
2013, 2%—2014, 3%—2015 and thereafter
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Improving readmissions reduction program
MedPAC approach to improving the hospital readmissions program Use an all-condition, potentially preventable
measure Set the target in advance Compare hospitals with like shares of low-
income patients Expand readmissions penalty to SNF
(enacted in 2013) and home health providers
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Private plans: Medicare Advantage and Part D Medicare Advantage (MA) allows beneficiaries
to receive Medicare A&B benefits through a private plan
Part D plans provide outpatient prescription drugs
MA and Part D plans are paid a capitated amount each month for each enrollee
Payments are adjusted based on patient diagnoses and other characteristics
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How MA and Part D payments are set
Both programs rely on plan bids MA payments are based on bids and bidding targets
(benchmarks) If bid > benchmark, program pays benchmark, enrollee pays
premium If bid < benchmark Medicare keeps a share of the difference,
beneficiaries get the rest extra benefits or lower cost sharing
Part D plans bid and Medicare averages plan bids to determine what government contribution will be Plans bids also determine what premium beneficiaries will pay Medicare also makes additional payments for low income
beneficiaries and those who reach the catastrophic cap
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Issues with Medicare Advantage
Few plans bid below FFS costs
Medicare paid 4% more for enrollees in MA than if they were in FFS Medicare in 2014, and 105 percent of FFS in 2015, but historically has paid much more
Costs of subsidies borne by tax payers and Medicare beneficiaries through Part B premiums
Principle: Savings from efficiency allow plans to provide extra benefits and increase enrollment or guarantee plan availability everywhere?
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Emerging trends in Medicare Advantage
PPACA enacted changes to the MA benchmarks to reduce payments
Benchmarks, bids, and payments are moving down relative to FFS Medicare and extra benefits have stayed at about $75 per month
Some plans have demonstrated ability to provide the Medicare benefits for less than FFS Medicare
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Trends in Part D
High satisfaction among Part D enrollees Stable premiums and good access to prescription drugs Many plan options to choose from
Cost trends are increasingly of concern
Costs for individual reinsurance and the LIS (where Medicare bears the risk) are growing much faster than the premiums
Prices of single-source drugs continue to grow aggressively and drug pipeline is shifting towards higher-cost biologics/specialty drugs
Large increases in prices of older generics
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New Payment Model: Accountable Care Organization
Per capita fee-for-service payments and quality measures against benchmark
Providers and program share savings 5 million beneficiaries receiving care from an ACO Many of the same policy issues apply Distributional equity across settings Incentives for quality/coordination How benchmarks are set
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Questions or additional information?
Ways to stay connected Medpac.gov – MedPAC listserv
medpac.gov/blog – Twitter: @medicarepayment
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March and June Reports to Congress
Comment letters to HHS
Secretary
Contractor reports
Ad hoc / mandated
reports
Congressional testimony
Payment basics series
Data books