Let Us Entertain You! - On Norwegian politicians’ choice of culture as a regional
development strategy -
Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Master’s Thesis
Department of Political Science
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May 2007
To Anne and Synne.
PREFACE
In August 2000 I went through the doors of the administration building on Blindern
campus to ask where I could find a building called ‘CN’. At Chateau Neuf I attended
my first lecture as a student at the University of Oslo. Today, when I sit on the 8th
floor, writing this preface, I can look back at some of the best years of my life – spent
here at Blindern.
The last year has mostly been spent working on my master’s thesis. During this
period I have received excellent guidance from Professor Harald Baldersheim, I am
deeply grateful.
Since 2005 I have worked on the project “Norden i regionenes Europa”, and I would
like to thank Morten Øgård and Jarle Trondal for the opportunity to do this, and for
trusting my knowledge enough to let me include my own question in their survey.
And to Morten especially, thank you for letting me use your office and “library”, and
for your good advice and support along the way.
My mother and father also deserve an appreciation for their never‐ending support
throughout these years as a student. I would like to give my mother extra thanks for
this one. reading and commenting on a number of student papers, including
Thank you also Tim, Odd and Shekira for proof‐reading my thesis.
And last, but not the least, I would like to thank my two roommates, Maja and Martin,
promise, from now on I will do my share of the dishes. I
Blindern, May 2007.
Table of Contents
PREFACE ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 1.................................................................................................................................................... 6
CU R LTU E= ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?............................................................................................... 6
HA I OING ON IN NORWAY?........... ................. ................. 1.1 W T S G ... ... ....................................................................7
HY I HIS SUBJECT O TEREST 1.2 W S T F I TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS?..............................................................10
CUS, TRUCTURE AND OBJECTI
N
1.3 FO S VES..............................................................................................................12
HAT IS A ULTURAL STRATEGY? .. 1.4 W C ................................................................................................................13
1.5 CULTURAL STRATEGIES IN NORWAY. ..............................................................................................................14
CHAPTER 2...................................................................................................................................................19
A T OR HE ETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE............................................................................................19
2.1 THE WORK OF NATIONS: A THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE............................................................19
2.1.2 The Network Society and Globalized Elites. ..............................................................................22
2.2.2 From Symbolic Analysts to Creative Class Members..............................................................23
2.2.3 Fourth Wave Politicians and Working Cities. ...........................................................................24
2.2.4 Local and Regional Policy Responses: Improving Competitiveness and Creating Entertainment Machines........................................................................................................................................27
2.2 ependent ariable .5 D V ..............................................................................................................................30
2.2 WHO PRIORITIZES CULTURAL STRATEGIES? .................................................................................................31
2.2.2 Independent Variables.........................................................................................................................33
CHAPTER 3...................................................................................................................................................38
DATA, M ETHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES. .......................38
3.1 WHAT KIND OF DATA DO I NEED?..................................................................................................................38
3.1.1 Presentation of Data ............................................................................................................................39
3.1.2 Problems Related to the Data ..........................................................................................................41
3.1.3 Criteria For Linear Regression Analysis. .....................................................................................42
3.1.4 Design and Structure............................................................................................................................43
5 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
3.2 OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES...............................................................................................................44
3.2.1 Dependent Variable ..............................................................................................................................44
3.2.2 Gender.........................................................................................................................................................46
3.2.3 Age................................................................................................................................................................46
3.2.4 Education ..................................................................................................................................................46
3.2.5 Party Preference.....................................................................................................................................47
3.2.6 Position.......................................................................................................................................................48
3.2.7 Economic Crisis.......................................................................................................................................48
3.2.8 CenterPeriphery....................................................................................................................................49
3.2.9 Region Versus Kommune....................................................................................................................51
CHAPTER 4...................................................................................................................................................53
AN YSI AL S......................................................................................................................................................53
UTTING CULTURA STRATEGIES TO THE TES 4.1 P L T ............................................................................................53
4.2 LOOKING FOR THE NEW POLITICAL CULTURE ...............................................................................................58
4.2.1 Female, Young, Educated, and Cultural?.....................................................................................58
4.2 Per .2 ipheral, Poor and Innovative?...................................................................................................66
4.3 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................................71
CHAPTER 5...................................................................................................................................................75
CO LU NC SION................................................................................................................................................75
IN INDINGS .... ............5.1 M F .... ...............................................................................................................................75
WO N WEGIAN TR NDS ...............................................................
A
5.2 T OR E ................................................................78
5.3 IS THIS THEORY TOO AMERICAN TO FIT THE CASE OF NORWAY? ..............................................................80
APPENDIX.....................................................................................................................................................82
LITERATURE................................................................................................................................................88
6 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
CHAPTER 1
Culture= Economic Development?
The overall purpose of this master thesis is to analyze the Norwegian local and
regional politicians’ attitudes toward using culture as a strategy for regional
economic development. The thesis will focus on answering three research questions:
1) Why is culture a strategy for regional economical development? 2) Are Norwegian
politicians positive to cultural strategies? and 3) Which politicians are positive toward
cultural strategies? Question number one will be treated and answered through a
theoretical discussion. Questions number two and three are subjects for the thesis’
analysis.
These and similar questions have been examined in the United States by, among
others, Terry Nichols Clark. His research resulted in the publishing of “The City as an
Entertainment Machine” (Clark 2004a). His findings concluded that, indeed, some
American cities and politicians had stopped thinking of production and
entertainment as different and independent concepts. Now they are adopting
cultural strategies in order to attract talented young workers to their city‐‐and these
cities are prospering. This study will use his findings as a point of departure for
examining the case of Norway. Are Norwegian politicians as willing as their
American counterparts to adopt new strategies in order to strengthen the regional
t economy? What characterizes the poli icians that are in favor of cultural strategies?
Today economic issues can hardly be discussed without mentioning the term
globalization. The introduction of this concept has changed our outlook on the world.
Whereas the borders of the nation‐states in earlier times used to double as economic
borders, today’s economy is no longer national, it is transnational. We have moved
away from what some authors (Clark & Lloyd 2000, Reich 1991) have labelled the
Fordist‐economy and into a post‐Fordist or informational networking (Castells 2000)
production society. The traditional view that financial capital is a prerequisite for
economic growth has been challenged by a belief in human capital in the form of an
7 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
educated and mobile workforce as the quintessence for economic growth (Reich
1990, Clark and Lloyd 2000, Clarke 2004, Clarke and Gaile 1998, Keating and
Loughlin 1997). The level of economic development is no longer a question of the
number of national industries, as the economy no longer is divided into national
areas. The new economy is both global and regional (Clarke & Gaile 1998). As the
globalization process has moved forth, the national, regional and local politicians
have had to change their political strategies to meet new economic challenges. Cities
and regions across the world are implementing innovative policy strategies and
using culture and amenities to develop their regions into economic centers. To pin‐
point the argument: Cities are becoming entertainment machines as the political
elites are trying to persuade educated and creative individuals to settling in their city
or community.
1.1 What Is Going on In Norway?
So, why are cultural strategies relevant in Norway? The problem in Norway is as
follows: peripheral and rural areas have, over the last decades, experienced a net
migration. People are moving away and the rural populations are decreasing. The
tendency over the last ten years has been that larger cities and areas surrounding
them have had a net immigration, whereas most municipalities in northern Norway,
northwest Norway and the rural portions of southern Norway have had a net
migration (Statistics Norway 2007). In other words, there is an ongoing process of
centralization. People are moving to the urbanized parts of Norway. A direct
consequence of this is lower tax revenues and a corresponding rise in dependency on
state finances in the areas hit by migration. The regional policy in Norway is
searching for a solution to this problem. Cultural strategies could be a way out of the
situation. The ongoing Norwegian debate on regional policy has been marked by two
distinct trends. The first trend concerns the increased focus on the regional level of
government as a development agent and less as a traditional service provider. The
second trend is the declining weight of the rural areas (distrikts‐Norge) in the
regional policy.
8 Let us entertain you!
Traditionally, the regional policy in Norway, as in the rest of Europe, was an attempt
to rectify market imperfections and redistribute resources better within the borders
of the nation‐state (Keating 1997, Ellefsen 2005, Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989).
Within this context, Norwegian regional politicians sought to strengthen and uphold
the population in the more rural areas of Norway (Bukve et. al 2004), in order to
keep up tax revenue. The citizens were all part of what Reich (1991) labeled the
‘national economic system,’ which meant that no matter where in Norway you lived,
you should be able to enjoy the same standard of living and receive the same services
as the rest of the population. This position on regional policies as a system of
redistribution with state run top‐down aid‐programs was the leading view until the
1970’s. This period was marked by policies like grants and incentives, restrictions on
investments in booming locations and the investment in public infrastructure even
before it was in demand (Keating 1997). Around 1980 there was a shift of focus
within the political sphere. The regional policy field changed from relying heavily on
top‐down programs to stressing a bottom‐up approach with a focus on development
and “self‐help” (Onsager 2004; Bukve, Onsager & Selstad 2004; Amdam & Bukve
2004b). At the same time, the idea of national economies was faltering (Reich 1990).
This change meant a shift from government to governance, from a hierarchical to a
dialogue‐ or network‐based approach to regional policy (Amdam & Bukve 2004a).
The change also meant a shift in understanding regions and society. In the post‐
modern state of Norway, terms like “learning regions”, network‐societies and
regional partnerships were adopted. The 2000‐2001 white paper (Stortingsmelding
nr. 34 2000‐2001) on regional policy stated, like the white paper from 1988‐1989
(Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989), that the focus of the regional policy should be
on knowledge, innovation, competence, and human capital. The international trend
had been moving toward the view that the main task for local and regional mayors
was to position their region in the global economy through developing comparative
advantages (Clarke & Gaile 1998). Now Norway was following suit.
The Norwegian regions should act as development agents and guidance counselors
for the municipalities and private businesses, as well as stimulate the establishment
of partnerships between local governments, private entrepreneurs and non‐
9 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
governmental organizations (Onsager 2004; Bukve et. al 2004). The counties should
be regional or local entrepreneurs. This view was fronted in the 2006 white paper
(Stortingsmelding nr. 12 2006‐2007) where the main focus was on utilizing the
comparative advantages of each region. Empirical evidence shows that this change in
politics has lead to a change in practice. Baldersheim (2000) found that the
fylkeskommune were actively pursuing their new roles as development agents. They
were in fact establishing partnerships with the state, private businesses and non‐
governmental organizations. Through these initiatives, they were able to boost their
regional resources and put them to use.
During the 1990’s, yet another paradigm shift could be registered. The peripheral
areas of Norway lost some of their political value as national politicians shifted their
stance on regional policy. Where the classic attitude had been to seek to uphold the
population in rural areas, the new attitude was to seek to strengthen the population
and economic growth in all regions (Stortingsmelding nr 34 2000‐2001;
Stortingsmelding nr. 25 2004‐2005). The implication of this shift was that instead of
wanting population growth in isolated areas, the politicians would now be satisfied
as long as the regions as a whole had a stabile or growing population. This resulted in
an increased attention toward the regional capitals and mid‐sized cities in Norway.
The shift was grounded in the cities’ important position in the development of the
surrounding regions (Stortingsmelding nr 31 2002‐2003). In the next white paper on
the regional policy (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2005‐2006) from the Labor‐led coalition
cabinet, the new course of action was upheld. However, the need for balanced
development in both urban and rural areas was also stressed (ibid)1. As Øgård
(2001:143) writes, both cities and regions have become critical agents for economic
development. This change of opinion was based on the escalating economic growth
of the cities that followed the de‐industrialization process of the 1970’s had ended
1 The latter white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2005‐2006) fronts a more traditional view on regional policy when the importance of the rural areas once again is stresses. However, this seems to be more of a change in rhetoric than in practice, as the strategies for regional development that are introduced, are the same as in the previous white papers.
10 Let us entertain you!
(Bukve et. al. 2004) and the tertiary sector had started to grow. In other words, the
Norwegian debate followed the international trends that focused on the importance
of clusters of competence for research and innovation. From this point of view, cities
were essential (ibid.). The cities were again in focus.
To conclude the Norwegian debate; Norway has followed the international trends
described by Clarke & Gaile (1998). The Norwegian regions were, as was the case in
the U.S, encouraged to act as entrepreneurs and development agents in order to
make the most of their comparative advantages. The new focus on the cities is
continuing along this line. Today, cities are regional growth engines (ibid.), and their
surrounding areas benefit from the economic strength and cultural diversity of the
cities. What differentiates the Norwegian debate on regional policy from the
European and American trend of regional expansion (Loughlin & Peters 1997,
Putnam 1993) is that instead of increasing the regional responsibilities; the
Norwegian fylkeskommune has lost important responsibilities. This could open up
new roles for the regional level. As they, in return for lost responsibility, have gained
resources to nurture their development capabilities. Within this new framework of
economic structures and absent responsibilities, the Norwegian regions, much like
their European counterparts, are beginning to transcend the nation‐state (Keating &
Loughlin 1997); consequently, it is imperative that the comparative advantages of
each area are utilized to its full potential. Moreover, cities have an advantage simply
by being cities. Among the most crucial features that can be developed into the
comparative advantages essential for attracting and establishing new businesses,
human capital is paramount. In this perspective it is crucial that the local politicians
are able to make the right policy choices to attain a high‐quality workforce. This
leads me into the next section‐‐why is this subject of interest to a student of political
science?
1.2 Why Is This Subject of Interest to Political Scientists?
First, this subject involves potential conflicts between supporters of different
policies. Politicians can chose from a wide range of possible development strategies
11 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
in order to triumph in the global competition for capital and investments.
Traditionally, such strategies have involved tax incentives, lowering production costs
for the businesses in the region and building or upgrading the region’s infrastructure
or becoming a better service provider. Today, the development of natural, as well as
constructed, amenities within the cultural sector is also considered an effective
strategy. While some of these strategies are partly overlapping, others are
conflicting. In the fierce competition for financial support, only a narrow range of
strategies will win. Herein lies the potential conflict.
Creating a comparative geographical advantage has been an important strategy
(Clarke and Gaile 1998:57); however, in today’s cities and regions, this strategy is no
longer regarded as the only road to wealth and success (ibid:1). A change in the
priorities of policies of the local officials and policy makers has been detected in the
United States; is this true for Norway, too? Are these conflicts really an indicator of a
new emerging political struggle, where supporters of traditional strategies‐‐such as
p lbecoming a better service provider‐‐are fighting against the su porters of cu ture?
This leads me to the second reason for studying this subject‐‐the growing
significance of culture and the consumption of amenities is said to be related to the
emergence of a new political culture (Clark 2004). Ronald Inglehart’s Silent
Revolution (1977) first put forth the claim that Western populations were
undergoing a value change from materialist to post‐materialist values. Clark (2004)
has cultivated the ideas of Inglehart by introducing the consumption of amenities by
the creative and educated elites in affluent societies. As the societies’ wealth has
grown, materialist desires have been replaced by “quality of life” demands, such as
culture and focus on environmental issues. The consumption of amenities is seen as a
way of creating an identity, not to show off economic superiority, thus moving away
from Veblen’s “conspicuous consumption” (Veblen 1899/1965) and his moral
critique of consumption (Bugge 2006). In other words, a cultural strategy is not a
modern version of Juvenal’s “bread and circuses” and the entertainment machine is
not an attempt to pacify the electorate or arrange for its constituents to become
modern Dorian Grays. The intention is to strengthen the local or regional economy
by responding to the needs and wants of potential inhabitants, as well as those
12 Let us entertain you!
already living in the area. In this sense, there is not necessarily a debate over
whether or not to choose between providing better services or developing amenities.
It is instead simply a strategy to attract the needed human capital so that, for
pulation increaseexample, the service level can be upheld and the po d.
Third, the subject is important because it involves policy innovation. As the economic
structures have changed, new policies have been innovated in order to meet the new
needs of cities and regions. The public sector’s ability to adapt and respond with new
policies addressing new problems is imperative in a period of rapid changes in
modes of production and technology and a greater mobility of people and capital. Do
local politicians manage to invent new policies? Clarke and Gaile argue that this is
exactly what cities are doing: ...cities are adapting to restructuring and globalization
trends with a range of policy choices unanticipated by scholars and unheard of just a
few years ago... (Clarke & Gaile 1998:1). Does this apply to Norway, too?
1.3 Focus, Structure and Objectives.
The focus in this thesis paper will be on the case of Norway. The literature on this
subject has so far been concentrated on America; however a new political culture has
been observed in Europe, too; especially in Germany (Gabriel et. al. 1998). This study
is an attempt to apply the theory concerning the new political culture and
entertainment/culture to the Norwegian political society. In light of the ongoing
Norwegian debate on the future of the regional political and administrative level, this
is getting more and more interesting, as even the existence of the fylkeskommune
now is up for debate. The Official Norwegian Report (NOU) on the subject (NOU
2000:2) has recommended a new regional structure consisting of 10 ‐ 15 large
regions, each with responsibility for the counties in fields like regional development,
specialized health care, child welfare and “care for substance abusers” (rusomsorg).
In spite of this report, the counties have been stripped of their responsibility for
these tasks. To compensate for this loss, the fylkeskommune was promised more
financial resources to extend its role as an economic development agent. Whether or
not the counties so far have succeeded in this field is a contentious issue. According
13 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
to the 2006 white paper on regional policy (Stortingsmelding nr 12 2006‐2007), they
have failed; however, others argue the opposite (Baldersheim 2000). Despite the
disputed success rate, the white paper stresses that, in the near future, the regions
shall be the leading players within regional development, and that their planning
capacities must be improved (ibid.). Thus, it can be expected that Norwegian regional
politicians are willing to invent and implement new strategies.
I seek to study the use of cultural strategies in light of regional development. The
analysis’ main focus will not be on how these strategies work, the actual extent of
these strategies or even whether they are effective or not. The analysis will scrutinize
Norwegian local and regional politicians’ attitudes toward cultural strategies. The
data and the design of the thesis reflect this. However, the theoretical section will, to
a certain extent, deal with how and why these strategies work.
The data was collected during the fall and winter of 2006/07 as part of the research
project Norden i regionenes Europa, using a postal survey in which I had the
opportunity to include questions regarding cultural strategies. The data will be
presented in the second chapter. This chapter will also discuss the background for
these cultural strategies and how the theory on entertainment and culture is built up.
The chapter ends with the presentation of a hypothesis. In the third chapter,
methodological questions are discussed and the variables based on the hypotheses
are operationalized. Chapter Four will analyze the data and test the hypotheses
brought forth in Chapter Two‐‐this will mainly be done through the use of regression
analysis. The fifth and final chapter will conclude on the findings in Chapter Four.
1.4 What Is a Cultural Strategy?
Before I move on to the theoretical discussion, I will give a short explanation as to
what a cultural strategy is. The term ‘culture’ is frought with many connotations; a
more precise definition is therefore warranted. When I use the phrase “culture as a
regional development strategy,” I ascribe to culture a rather broad meaning. First,
the term ‘strategy’ reflects the institutionalized nature of today’s culture
14 Let us entertain you!
(Nilson2003:34). First of all, culture includes the construction of buildings intended
to house cultural productions, such as a symphony hall or an opera house – i.e. the
most institutionalized parts of the cultural life. Second, it includes the production of a
theatrical play, a symphonic concert, or a painting. Moreover, culture in this thesis, is
understood as both the parts of the cultural life that can exist in a free market and
the culture that is in need of public finances in order to survive (Nilson 2003:484).
The implication of this is that also parts of the cultural life that traditionally has been
seen as independent of the public agenda on culture, now is taken into account when
creating a cultural strategy or cultural policies.
The two first statements above can be classified as a more traditional approach to
culture. However, I want to apply a broader definition. Therefore, thirdly, a cultural
strategy also represents the production and consumption of natural amenities like
recreational opportunities and city beautification. Moreover, also what is labelled
“commercial” culture is a part of this understanding of culture. Last, but not the least,
as the art and cultural life is becoming more and more integrated with the
production system and the knowledge‐system (Nilson 2003:318), cultural strategies
are becoming strategies to increase the competence and knowledge in society. Clark
(2004b) takes the importance of knowledge one step further in his understanding of
‘cultural strategies’ as the creation and/or development of existing natural or
constructed amenities with the intention of attracting human and financial resources
to the region. Thus, improving the knowledge and competence in the region affected.
1.5 Cultural Strategies in Norway.
These cultural strategies have been applied in Norway too. This section will illustrate
the definition of cultural strategies through introducing some examples of how
culture is used as a development tool in the city of Kristiansand and the county of
Vest‐Agder. The municipality of Kristiansand, in the Vest‐Agder County, is a city that
seems to have acknowledged the notion that jobs alone not are enough to attract
people to an area. The assumption relies on two facts. First, Kristiansand has an
overall plan for the cultural sector which explicitly states that culture, business and
15 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
the development of the city are linked together. The municipality’s strategic plan on
culture (Kristiansand kommune 2007b) introduces ten objectives for its cultural
policies. The ten objectives will not be presented here, however several concern
what has been labeled ‘cultural strategies.’ Objective Number One states that
Kristiansand should be an attractive city to live and work in, a city in which quality of
life and a sense of belonging are central values (ibid: 3). Moreover, the list of
objectives emphasizes that the cultural policy in Kristiansand is part of a general
regional development strategy. Finally, the policy on culture should contribute to the
establishment of a culture‐based education and research program, as well as a
culture‐based business sector. The plan on culture expands from this into the
meaning of culture for the development of the city life. In this field, the plan stresses
that citizens’ need for an identity and experiences is a central element of the modern
cultural habitat in which the citizens increasingly become consumers of culture. The
practical implication of this thought is that in order to meet the modern culture‐
consuming citizen, Kristiansand must focus on culture‐based businesses. In other
words, an instrumental approach to culture is necessary. Within this school of
thought, the cultural sector is seen as a significant contributor to the general
economic growth in the region, in addition to being an important employer. To reach
the objectives stated in the plan, several important tasks and priorities are listed,
such as the construction of a theatre/ concert hall, Agder Theater, the city’s Cinema,
museums, city beautification, festivals, development of the library and programs for
youth culture (ibid.). Basically, Kristiansand is using culture as a method to attract
and develop a competence‐ and knowledge‐based workforce. To meet the
requirements of this group of workers, the city has developed the cultural sector’s
infrastructure and is focusing on providing a city centre that is visually attractive,
d nenergetic and safe in a pattern similar to that set up by Flori a a d Clark.
The second fact concerning the cultural commitment in Kristiansand is the
establishment of Cultiva, a foundation set up to provide financial support to the
cultural sector. The foundation of Cultiva was grounded in a wish to maintain control
of the profit garnered by selling shares in a local energy producer. The amount
earned from the sale was approximately 1.4 billion NOK (www.cultiva.no/english).
16 Let us entertain you!
The annual returns from the foundation’s investments are spent in such a way that it
benefits the citizens of Kristiansand by securing jobs and good living conditions
(ibid.). To meet this criterion, Cultiva supports projects within the educational and
cultural sector that can contribute to innovation, development and competence‐
building in Kristiansand. Financial support is primarily given to projects within one
of the four following fields: 1) strengthening the climate for creative and innovative
thinking, thus creating an attractive region, 2) non‐commercial projects and
businesses, 3) commercial concentration – projects that create lasting jobs and 4)
projects that add to the development of Kristiansand as a competence‐center within
the field of experience economy (Cultiva 2006). In 2006, a total of 27 million NOK
was paid out to festivals, research projects, filmmakers, musicians, opera and
theatrical productions, museums, conferences, and different projects aimed at
marketing the city of Kristiansand (ibid.). In Kristiansand, a cultural sector with a
budget of approximately 110 million NOK in 2006, (Kristiansand kommune 2007a)
Cultiva accounts for app. 20 % of the total public funding of culture. In other words,
the foundation is a significant contributor to the cultural sector in Kristiansand.
The sale of the energy producer, Agder Energi, in the Vest‐Agder region, did not only
lead to the founding of Cultiva, however. In 2000, the fifteen local authorities2 in
Vest‐Agder County, including Kristiansand, donated shares worth 590 million NOK
for the establishment of a regional competence development fund, Sørlandets
Kompetansefond. The foundation’s objective is to:
…contribute to improved competence in the county of Vest‐Agder in order to secure and
create jobs and good living conditions, including assisting in the development of the
University of Southern Norway.
(Sørlandets kompetansefond, Articles of Association)
2 The fifteen local authorities are Kristiansand, Mandal, Farsund, Flekkefjord, Vennesla, Songdalen, Søgne, Mandal, Åseral, Audnedal, Lindesnes, Lyngdal, Hægebostad, Kvinesdal and Sirdal.
17 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
The Article of Association reveals an objective that is similar to the aims of Cultiva
and the objectives stated in Kristiansand’s strategy document; to secure a good and
attractive city/region in which to live and work. The competence development fund
prioritizes three strategic areas; 1) establishment and development of competence‐
bases, 2) utilization of these competence‐bases, and 3) stimulation of new and
existing industry and businesses (Sørlandets kompetansefond 2007). In 2006, the
competence fund granted 50 million NOK to, among others, the construction of a
“knowledge‐park” in Kristiansand, PhD programs, projects to improve the teaching
of mathematics (TBM) in elementary school and a conference on experience
economy (Sørlandets kompetansefond 2006).
In 2005, the municipality of Kristiansand decided to construct a new theater and
concert hall, later named Kilden. This is an excellent example of a partnership
strategy for regional development. This building was to be a regional house of
culture for the citizens of Sørlandet, not exclusively for Kristiansand’s citizens. To
achieve this, the construction was organized as an inter‐municipal company and
the funding of the construction was split between the county of Vest‐Agder, the
local authority of Kristiansand, the Norwegian state, and Cultiva (Valvik 2007).
The total cost of the construction is 1, 1 billion NOK. The opening of Kilden is
estimated to take place in 2011. The inhabitants of Sørlandet will then enjoy a
theater and concert hall that houses the local symphony orchestra, Opera Sør,
and the regional theater, as well as displaying the regional cultural life of
Sørlandet. The building will be situated on the old port in Kristiansand. The
structure of the financial funding of this project is an example of how local
agents, through the establishment of partnerships, can increase the funds
available to their region.
Another example of the partnership model is Global Future. The project aims to
mobilize the segment of the immigrant population with higher education living in
Sørlandet. The partners are, among others, the two counties of Aust‐ and Vest‐
Agder, Cultiva, LO, NHO, Agder College University, Kristiansand municipality and
the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (http://www.cultiva.no/Global). The
main objective of Global Future is to utilize an unused and competent workforce,
18 Let us entertain you!
contributing to overall growth in the region. Other objectives are to work toward
a functional and inclusive labor market, and to create incentives to start up new
businesses and venture thinking. In this strategy lies a wish that Sørlandet will
excel and market the region as an attractive place in which to live.
The examples show a wide range of initiatives that all seek to develop the region.
Attraction is a word that is used on multiple occasions, and this reveals a strong
desire to increase the population, as well as satisfy the citizens of the region. Culture
is one of many strategies that are implemented in this struggle. All the approaches
mentioned here aim at strengthening the knowledge and competence of the region’s
workforce and citizens. This use of new strategies has, however, not garnered
universal support.
The unwillingness to support cultural strategies has created a debate in Kristiansand,
a city that has come a long way in implementing new and partly innovative
strategies. Members of Demokratene (D), a right‐wing Norwegian political party,
have actively criticized the official policy on culture in the regional newspaper
(Kleppe & Messel 2007), where they questioned the municipality’s spending on
culture instead of providing food with a higher nutritional value to the city’s elderly
population. Moreover, D and Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) were both against the
establishing of Cultiva, Kristiansand’s newly‐established foundation for financial
support to the cultural sector. Instead, they suggested spending the money on
welfare (Kristiansand kommune 2006). FrP also opposed the construction of Kilden
theater and concert hall (Bystyret 2007). This debate illustrates the controversy
around cultural strategies, as well as underlining the fact that these strategies are
actually being used!
19 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
CHAPTER 2
A Theoretical Point of Departure
In this chapter, I will establish a theoretical framework within which the data will be
analyzed and interpreted. This framework will consist of a theoretical argument set
up to answer the following question: why is culture becoming a strategy for regional
economical development? The first part of the chapter will culminate in the
presentation of the first hypothesis and dependent variable in the analysis. The
second part will focus on the prerequisites necessary in order to answer the
question: who are the politicians most likely to favor cultural strategies? Since
politicians are my objects of study, each passage will end with the presentation of a
hypothesis concerning the variation in the dependent variable. Each hypothesis
represents an independent variable.
2.1 The Work of Nations: A Theoretical Point of Departure
The theoretical argument starts with the work of Robert Reich, especially his book
The Work of Nations: Preparing ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (1991). With the
American society as an example, he responded to the fact that the modes of
production in industrialized societies had changed. Traditionally, modern, western
industry had high‐volume production as the ultimate goal; however, toward the end
of the 20th century, the production mode had shifted to producing high‐value goods.
As the high volume production of goods made for the large markets of middle class
Americans and Europeans failed to generate the large earnings this mode of
production once had generated, the larger Western firms shifted their focus and
locked it upon supplying particular customers with goods produced to meet their
particular needs (Reich 1991:82pp). This new process was the result of the fact that
the nations that had formerly chosen a policy of protection of home markets were
becoming less and less able to secure their nations’ standard of living solely through
domestic production. The protection of national business in America had helped
larger firms to keep their revenues up for a limited time period. However, this policy
20 Let us entertain you!
turned out to be unsustainable when Japanese and European firms became able to
produce standard goods cheaper and sometimes even better than American firms
(ibid: 71pp).
This enlarged competition in the home markets increased the need for “home
companies” to cut costs and improve quality. Standard goods were imported from
nations that could produce at lower costs. This resulted in a globalization of
production. Products formerly designated “Made in America” or “Made in Germany”
were no longer made in the US or Germany. A car might have been assembled in
Detroit, but its components were produced in Europe, South‐East Asia or Japan. The
car had been produced in what Reich terms “the Global Web” (ibid: 110). With the
globalization of production, national economies became part of the global economy,
leaving the term “national” more and more superfluous. From this change, Reich
argues, follows that one must see the …future of American society as distinct from the
American economy… (ibid: 9). The implication of the global economy, unattached to
any nation‐state is that …All that will remain rooted within national borders are the
people who comprise a nation… (ibid: 3). Hence, the people’s skills and insights are
the primary assets of the nation. America’s competitiveness is no longer a function of
how well GE and IBM are doing, but instead lies in how much the world is prepared
to spend on services performed by Americans because
…The real economic challenge facing the United States in the years ahead – the same as
that facing every other nation – is to increase the potential value of what its citizens can
add to the global economy, by enhancing their skills and capacities…
(Reich 1991: 8).
In his book, Reich moves on to criticize the old division of the labor force into either
business class or working class. As a response to this, he comes up with three new
categories that he believes would better describe the laborer’s different positions in
the economic hierarchy, routine production services, inperson services and symbolic
analytic services (ibid; 174p). Each category corresponds to the three different
competitive positions in which workers find themselves. Workers in the routine
production services are, as the label indicates, performing routine tasks. This category
contains traditional blue collar jobs, as well as those performing routine supervisory
21 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
jobs. These jobs are, however, not only found in heavy industry, but also in the high‐
tech industry, among others. Inperson services are services that must be provided
person‐to‐person. The tasks they perform are also simple and repetitive. The person‐
to‐person dimension means that these services are not sold worldwide, because the
worker must be physically present at the scene where the work is delivered. The
third category is symbolicanalytic services. The workers in this sector include those
working with problem‐solving, problem‐identifying, and strategic‐brokering
activities. This group of workers, along with the workers in the first category, can,
unlike the in‐person service personnel, be replaced with workers all over the world.
They are thus competing with others providing the same services in the global
market over the opportunity to receive a paycheck.
Who are the Symbolic Analysts? Reich’s eyes are on the latter category, the symbolic analysts. He argues that this
category is the winner in the new system of global economies. The symbolic analyst,
trained in skills such as abstraction, system thinking, experimentation and
collaboration, possesses knowledge that is crucial in order to succeed in the global
web. She or he is typically a scientist, a design engineer, an investment banker or a
public relations executive, and her job title is Communications Strategy Director or
Creative Management Adviser (Reich 1991:183). This group of workers is highly
exposed to global competition; however, they have a tendency to cluster together in
what Reich calls symbolic‐analytic zones, where they specialize in …common kind of
problemsolving, identifying, and –brokering. (ibid: 234). The meaning and value of
these zones is treasured around the world because clusters like Silicon Valley,
Hollywood or Wall Street cannot easily be duplicated anywhere else (ibid: 235). No
matter how strongly a state or region might wish to develop its own Silicon Valley,
this is a task that takes more than money. These zones represent skills, knowledge
and institutions that have evolved over time. Even though the inventions and
knowledge created in these zones are shared and transported to other states, cities
and people, the cumulative, shared learning that have made innovation possible do
not travel around the globe at the same speed. Within these clusters the participants
gain from the insights of others. Rapid, informal communication among the workers
22 Let us entertain you!
increases the possibility of sharing information and expertise. Being in the zone is
important for the individual trying to move up in “the business”.
Being in the zone is also important for those who are not symbolic analysts. Due to
the number of workers in these areas and the type of work they do, the demand for
different types of in‐person services in the region also grows. In this way, the zones
are creating jobs for workers outside of the symbolic‐analytic services. This
contributes to an increased economic and population growth, which again creates
new demands, thereby contributing to an even greater growth and development rate
in symbolic‐analytic zones (ibid: 238p). Their effect on the regional economy
expands therefore beyond the worth of each film, microchip or financial service
provided, and lines the pockets of cashiers, waiters, chauffeurs and secretaries. These
zones are regional growth machines.
2.1.2 The Network Society and G
Manuel Castells writes in his book, The Rise of the Network Society (1996/2000),
about the impact of the Informational Revolution on work and productivity. He
argues that a new economy emerged in the last 25 years of the 20
lobalized Elites.
th century on the
basis of the above‐mentioned revolution and its consequences for production and
manufacturing. The new informational, global and networked (Castells 2000:77)
economy corresponds to Reich’s global web. He states that the economy is
informational because it is based on the ability of central players to …generate,
process, and apply efficiently knowledgebased information… (ibid: 77). The economy
is global because its components are globally organized. Lastly, the new economy is
networked because productivity and competition is played out in a worldwide
network of interaction between business networks (ibid.).
Castells argues that in this new, global economy, the concept of competitive
advantage is of increasing importance (Castells 2000:122p). Strategic alliances, ad‐
hoc cooperation projects, decentralized units and networks are the new structures of
production. The combination of these elements in a firm or an enterprise is essential
to the firms’ place in the global competition and hence is determining whether the
firm can survive in the global jungle. Within this new economy, some authors have
23 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
claimed that labor follows production and is thus going through a process of
globalization. However, Castells argues, this is not true for all groups of workers.
Only the specialized fraction of the work force is in high demand in the entire world.
Who Belongs to Castells’ Globalized Workforce? This specialized and globalized group of workers comprises anyone that has the
capacity to add an exceptional value to any market, and because this group is
…decisive to the performance of business networks, of media networks, and of political
networks… the market for most valuable labor is indeed becoming globalized…
(Castells 2000:130).
The global worker typically belongs to the group of high‐level professionals that
inhabits positions such as high‐level business manager or financial analysts.
Alternatively they can be scientists, engineers or computer programmers, designers,
artists, sports stars, political consultants or professional criminals (ibid: 130). The
global worker is not unlike Reich’s symbolic analysts; in fact, Castells uses this term
himself to describe the global workforce (ibid: 295).
2.2.2 From Symbolic Analysts to Creative Class Members
I want to stick to the subject of symbolic analysts a little longer before I take the
argument one step further. In 2002, Robert Florida published The Rise of the Creative
Class… and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community, & everyday life. His work
focuses on the consequences of new production modes and technologies that were
analyzed by Reich and Castells. He argues that in this world of new production, there
is a new class emerging; the Creative Class. The class is constituted of scientists,
engineers, artists, musicians and people working in knowledge‐based professions, i.e.
Reich’s Symbolic Analysts or Castells’ globalized workforce. Not unlike the two
theorists, he claims that the function of the Creative Class within the economic
production hierarchy is to add economic value to different processes through their
creativity (ibid: 68).
24 Let us entertain you!
The members of the Creative Class see themselves, not surprisingly, as members of a
creative force. They are mobile and prone to moving around (ibid: 79), seeking other
creative environments; hence linking the economic geography to class identity
(Florida 2002:11). This corresponds to Reich’s ideas about Symbolic‐Analytic Zones;
the talented young workers cluster together in zones where they can exchange skills,
information and even jobs. Florida draws up a picture of blossoming creative zones
rich in talent, technology and tolerance that act as magnets on talented individuals.
In this sense, these creative zones are talent aggregators (Florida 2002:30). The
creative class members are drawn to …organic and indigenous streetlevel culture…
(ibid: 182), in areas where both the creators and the patrons of the culture live near
each other. This culture is clustered around streets with certain types of small
venues like music bars, art galleries, and small‐ to mid‐sized theatres for film or live
performance and coffee bars, hence the label street‐level. In other words, culture and
art are both being produced and experienced in these areas. The venues and the
inhabitants of the streets, together, make up a cultural community. Visitors that enter
this community to watch a play or drink a tall latte get to experience more than just a
play or a cup of coffee; they experience a way of living. Creative Class members might
occasionally visit “big‐ticket” football games or high‐art cultural events, but the
street‐level culture is their way of life (ibid: 183p).
2.2.3 Fourth Wave Politicians and Working Cities.
This section takes the argument one level further from street‐level culture and into
the world of policy making. Susan E. Clarke and Gary L. Gaile published in 1998, The
Work of Cities. This work was inspired by the ideas that Reich put on to paper in The
Work of Nations (Clarke & Gaile 1998: ix). Their starting point is the actions and
policy choices of cities and regions in a climate of national retrenchment, rapid
globalization and economic restructuring. The two authors take Reich’s thoughts one
step further, through adding a regional dimension to the argument. They claim the
shift from many national economies to one global economy and the rise of the global
web has not only meant a transcendence of scale upward from the national
administrative level to the international level; this change has also meant a
25 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
downward transcendence on the geographic scale (ibid: 4), in which regions and
localities have become important administrative, decision and economic arenas.
Drawing on Reich’s ideas, the authors guide the reader through six propositions on
the local policy, thus presenting a short version of their main argument. First, a new
geography of value‐added production processes underlies the work of cities. Second,
economic and geographic changes encourage shifts in national relations. Third, local
political arenas are expanding as localities receive more entrepreneurial economic
roles and broader political responsibilities. Fourth, different localities choose
different paths when responding to globalization depending on contextual variables.
Fifth, a fourth wave of policy initiatives tries to link the localities to the global web
and invest in human capital
…local policy initiatives investing in human capital initiatives and linking local economies
to global markets through trade and telecommunications strategies…
(Clarke & Gaile 1998: 9).
Sixth, lack of attention to the erosion of citizenship and social capital will help
undermine development efforts (ibid: 5‐10).
In short, as the economy is changing and the competition between regions escalates,
local politicians meet the new challenges with innovative policies attempting to
strengthen the competitiveness of their constituency. In essence, this competition is
a fight over the symbolic workers or the creative class members (Baldersheim
2001:117) that combines the ideas of Reich, Castells and Florida. Clarke & Gaile
argue that we are seeing a new geography of value‐added processes, centered on the
local accumulation of human capital. The changes in production, outlined by Reich,
encourage a new localism, with cities and localities looking for new economic and
political roles. The main task for the local mayors in the new geography is to link
local business to the global web. However, the two authors argue, globalization is not
a one‐way street; although local wealth is shaped in a global force, the different
localities are taking part in shaping these global processes (Ibid:31). Economic and
political functions are being transferred from the national level to the regional and
local level, but not through a top‐down enacted process, because the national level
has lost its opportunity to be a development agent. The nation‐state is still important,
26 Let us entertain you!
but now as an enabler for localities, not a regulator (ibid: 34). Instead local mayors
must fight for their communities’ local competitive advantages as the state no longer
possesses the tools needed to fight for the national competitiveness.
So what do the sub‐national politicians do to link their business to the global web?
Clarke & Gaile stress the US cities’ newfound roles as entrepreneurial cities that
promote innovative economic growth strategies. However, this is not a simple task.
With little state finances they have had an incentive to implement policies that
contribute to the city’s economic development in order to raise tax revenues.
Simultaneously, the cities must satisfy their citizens’ need for services in addition to
jobs‐‐not doing so would mean a difficult re‐election campaign. However, with low
tax revenues, paying for services is even harder. To deal with this political Catch‐22,
local and regional politicians are on a constant search for new policy approaches
(ibid: 55).
The policy objectives, then, are to work out local economic development strategies that
will increase revenue stability, decrease vulnerability to external “shocks”, provide good
jobs to local citizens, and increase the overall satisfaction of city residents (…) Because
they increasingly rely on local resources, local officials have strong incentives to find the
most efficient uses of their funds for development purposes.
(Clarke and Gaile 1998:55)
In spite of limited resources, cities are continuing to use entrepreneurial strategies
which have substantial opportunity costs and risks for their own revenues.
The argument so far states that a globalized working elite is emerging. The members
of this elite are working in knowledge‐based professions, professions which are as
in‐demand in China as they are in Germany. This part of the labor force is labeled
symbolic analysts by Reich. The symbolic analysts, although in high demand, are also
exposed to global competition, as a European system analyst, to a certain degree, can
be replaced with a Japanese one. However, as Castells argues, this group’s expertise
is highly valued and they therefore have the…chance to shop [for jobs] around the
globe… (Castells 2000:130). As both Reich and Florida point out, symbolic analysts or
creative class members tend to cluster in zones with other specialized workers.
These zones, rich in Creative Class members, tolerance, talent, and technology, also
27 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
promote growth in adjacent sectors and areas. Clarke & Gaile add that there is a
regional dimension to the puzzle and that local political arenas are experiencing
increased importance as the globalization process and economic change continues.
In other words, there is an economic incentive for a region or a city to join in the
competition over this group of workers. In order to do this, Clarke & Gaile argue that
politicians are innovating policies as a response to the need of their particular city or
region. The question that then needs to be answered is this: what characterizes the
symbolicanalytic zones, or: which policies improve a region’s or city’s competitiveness?
2.2.4 Local and Regional Policy Responses: Improving Competitiveness and Creating Entertainment Machines
Terry Nichols Clark might provide us with the answer to this question. He edited The
City as an Entertainment Machine (2004a), in which he picks up the thread where it
was left by Reich, Castells, Florida and Clarke & Gaile and contributes to the theory
by including the concept of consumption. He continues down the road of Clarke &
Gaile when stressing the meaning of local policy choices and the role of cities. His
argument is that the supply of natural and constructed amenities is central to where
the Creative Class settles. He attacks the traditional conception of what drives cities,
namely work and production. This belief according to Clark is simply wrong in
today’s world. His response to this mistake is to explore the reversing of the causal
process that has been assumed to drive urban growth (Clark 2004b:1). The
traditional growth model has a built‐in division between work and culture, with
culture subordinate in explanatory power to work (Clark, Lloyd et. al. 2004: 291).
The trends emerging parallel with globalization and post‐industrial societies have
contributed to the increase in the importance of culture as an explanation of urban
economic growth. Clark suggests that the causal relationship in traditional growth
models should be reversed and that …consumption, amenities, and culture [should be
recognized] as drivers of urban policy… (Clark 2004b:2). His argument is that with
increased capital and business mobility, independent of distinct geography or
localities, the meaning of location has changed. Location near a river does not
provide cheap energy or competitive advantages for microchip producers. Instead,
the challenge for new business is to locate where they can easily find and attract
28 Let us entertain you!
knowledge‐based workers‐‐i.e. human capital is an essential element. However, Clark
argues, that human capital has been treated like a factor of production, either as fixed
in a location like the more traditional land, labor and capital, or as something that
follows jobs and capital, thus not locating autonomously (Clark 2004c: 106). Clark’s
critique against this human capital theory is that it is …contextually incomplete…it
does not explain where and why human capital locates… (ibid: 106). Hence, it does not
explain what a region or a city should do in order to attract this type of workers. This
brings me to Clark’s most important theoretical contribution. His amenity theory
builds on traditional growth models, as well as human capital theory; however, the
theory takes these thoughts one step further and concludes that amenities attract
mobile talented and innovative workers (ibid: 105). In other words, amenities are
central for economic development, as can be seen in Figure 1. The implication of his
growth model is that the responsibility for economic development lies on the sub‐
national level; from this follows that local and regional politicians must implement
policies to enhance the level of amenities in their community in order to increase
their revenues.
Traditional Model of Urban Economic Growth
II Human Capital Model
III Amenity Model
Urban Amenities
Human Capital
Economic Growth
Population (Attracted by
Jobs)
Classic Factors of Production: Land, Labor, Capital and Management
+
+
+ +
Figure 2.1. Three Successive Models of Urban Development.
(Clark 2004a:106)
29 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
2.2.4.1 Defining Amenities and How Do They Attract Human Capital? According to the authors cited above, workers are not like they once were. The
creative elite have moved away from Weber’s Protestant ethic (1920/1995) and
Veblen’s moral judgment on consumption (Bugge 2006, Veblen 1899/1965). Work
no longer brings you closer to God, and non‐work activities and the consumption of
luxury goods are not sinful pleasures. Today, leisure activities are not only morally
rehabilitated; they constitute an important part of the life of the creative class
members (Florid 2002). From this follows, that, on an aggregate level, the creative
class does not choose to live in a specific area solely based on possible job options. To
the creative elite that seeks to fulfill “quality of life demands” (Clark, Lloyd et. al.
2004: 292) and emphasizes aesthetic concerns, other elements than work and career
goals matter when searching for a place to settle. According to Clark, these other
elements include amenities such as restaurants:
Some analysts who think individualistically neglect amenity aspects of restaurants, since
they are conceived as providing a purely private good – food – to discrete individuals. But
for persons pondering where to live and work, restaurants are more than food on the
plate. The presence of distinct restaurants redefines the local context, even for persons
who do not eat in them.
(Clark 2004c:104)
What are these amenities, in addition to the aforementioned restaurants? Clark
answers that amenities are a form of public good, as they benefit all firms and
citizens in the surrounding area. They do not make an area cheaper for businesses to
move in; amenities help improve localities by offering green areas, waterfronts and
the like. Moreover, constructed amenities underline and develop an area’s distinct
features, thus redefining the local context, as mentioned in the quotation above, even
for persons that do not use the particular amenity in question. The concept of
amenities, according to Clark, includes as diverse elements as good education, low
crime rates and juice bars. Clark roughly categorizes amenities into four different
types (ibid: 111):
Natural physical amenities (climate, water access, green space, overall natural attractiveness).
30 Let us entertain you!
Constructed amenities (number of bigger institutions like research libraries, fi limuseums and opera, or small rms ke used and rare bookstores, juice bars,
black‐box theaters, and Starbucks). Socio‐economic composition and diversity (income and education of
p eresidents, number of foreign‐born citizens and the ercentage of, specially, gay male households).
Values and attitudes of residents (friendliness or hostility, tolerance, individualism etc.).
Some of these amenities, such as climate, are, although today’s climate researchers
might argue otherwise, fixed. No matter how excellent the mayor in Oslo or Quebec
City might be at policy innovation, he or she cannot make a tropical haven out of Oslo
or Quebec. On the other hand, research libraries and operas can be built, small firms
can be welcomed and city beautification processes can be enacted. This leaves room
for policy innovation.
Clark finds that Americans move into amenity‐rich areas. Consequently, growth is
stronger in areas rich in amenities. The innovative sub‐population, measured by
Clark as those who take out patents, live in areas rich in both natural and constructed
amenities (ibid:124pp). However, natural amenities are more or less fixed. The socio‐
economic composition of different regions can be both a consequences and a cause
for regional policies‐‐this subject will, however, not be dealt with in this paper. This
is also the case for values of residents; a question that will also not be dealt with
here. The focal point in this thesis will be on constructed amenities rather than on
natural or socio‐economic composition. The main concern of this political science
paper is policy choices, because this is the field in which politicians have the
opportunity to contribute. This means that investments in amenities, including cafes,
small galleries and city beautification, in this paper, represent cultural strategies.
2.2.5 Dependent Variable
To conclude this section, overall, amenities do drive urban growth. Depending on
which group of workers an area seeks to attract, different amenities should be
ascribed different values. However, as natural amenities are more or less fixed, the
priorities of local and regional politicians should be on developing natural amenities
31 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
already there and on constructed amenities, as these are elements that politicians
can alter, create or encourage. After all, culture, here in the meaning of opera,
libraries, juice bars and cafes are driving urban growth as they gradually help turn
cities into Entertainment Machines. Finally, this brings me to my first hypothesis and
dependent variable.
H1: Politicians prioritize cultural strategies over other strategies in
order to meet the increased competition among regions and cities
zinduced by globali ation.
However, I do not expect all politicians to prioritize cultural strategies. Supporting
culture and consumption instead of traditional policy choices is a controversial
stance. To prioritize culture over, for instance, care for the elderly is a subject that
creates conflict in Norway (Kleppe & Messel 2007). So, what I am expecting to find is
that some groups are prioritizing cultural strategies while other groups, for instance
members of certain political parties, are unwilling to support these types of
strategies.
2.2 Who Prioritizes Cultural Strategies?
Having established a theoretical framework which states that cultural investments
can be used as strategies to increase the attractiveness of a city or region, another
question is in need of an answer: who are the politicians favoring cultural strategies?
Clarke and Gaile (1998:11) find evidence that, in the US, politicians in distressed
communities lacking natural resources are more likely to try innovative and
experimental strategies. Can this assumption be transferred to the case of Norway? If
it can, then I would expect to find support of cultural strategies among politicians in
less central areas with traditional, and maybe even faltering, economies. The
question that will be answered in this section is which individual characteristics and
contextual variables correlate with support of cultural strategies? However, a more
thorough and detailed approach is required.
Ronald Inglehart introduced a new approach to the study of voting patterns when he
published the book The Silent Revolution (1977). He argued that there had been a
32 Let us entertain you!
major intergenerational value shift in (post)‐modern, Western societies, from
materialist to what he labeled post‐materialist values. He presented two hypotheses
concerning this subject. The first hypothesis, the scarcity hypothesis, postulated that
individuals brought up in times of scarcity tend to emphasize materialist values such
as physical sustenance and safety. Alternatively, individuals brought up in times of
prosperity tend to stress post‐materialist values like quality of life, belonging and
self‐esteem (Inglehart 1990: 66). The second hypothesis concerns socialization
processes, and states that the economic and security conditions in which an
individual is raised, influences their values and beliefs later in life. This means that
post‐materialists value changes are first visible in the electorate only after a certain
time period. Inglehart’s studies showed this pattern in the American population;
younger generations growing up under favorable economic conditions strayed from
the values of the elder generations who grew up in a time of scarcity and world wars.
The younger generations were less focused on material values such as police and
security issues and more concerned with environmental issues, freedom of speech,
city beautification and aesthetic concerns (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Clark, along with
Hoffman‐Martinot (1998), has cultivated this materialism/post‐materialism (M/PM)
theory into a related theory on New Political Culture (NPC). With the
intergenerational value change as a point of departure, Clark & Hoffmann‐Martinot
(ibid:17) argues that, as Inglehart found, as economic wealth has increased and
become more evenly distributed among the population in the Western World, there
has been a shift away from emphasizing materialist values to PM values. Instead
…needs for belonging, esteem, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction… (ibid: 17)
have become more important as post‐modern society has moved away from
collective identities (Fukuyama 2007). Individuals that have adopted the NPC are
critical of an ever‐expanding welfare state, although not in favor of large welfare cut‐
backs. This fiscal conservatism is combined with a liberal view on social issues (Clark
& Inglehart 1998).
This theory can explain why the members of the Creative Class seek to satisfy their
quality of life demands through experiencing culture, music, cafés and clothes and
not solely through job options. However, can this theory explain why politicians
33 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
choose differently in the case of cultural strategies? In other words, are these
assumptions of Inglehart, Clark and Hoffmann‐Martinot as valid for politicians as for
the electorate? According to the citation above, culture can be regarded as a New
Political Culture value. Culture, understood as amenities such as aesthetics and city
beautification, are a part of Inglehart’s M/PM index (Inglehart 1990:75). A strong
emphasis on economic growth is seen as a materialist point of view; however, I will
argue that using culture to sustain economic growth still is in a PM/NPC spirit. The
argument follows the initial prerequisites of PM/NPC; high economic levels and a fair
distribution of wealth within the population as a whole. What has the NPC to do in
this thesis that mainly concerns cultural strategies for economic growth? Clark
(2004c) argues that:
New Political Culture emphasizes and [...] invests more in public good for all citizens […]
many feel these policies are paying off in the new global economy…
(Clark, Lloyd et. al. 2004:320)
I.e. NPC mayors or politicians can use cultural strategies to secure their comparative
advantages in the modern international economy. With this as a backdrop, I will
examine whether or not these assumptions are true for Norwegian regional and local
politicians. Are the politicians with an inclination toward a New Political Culture
more positive toward cultural strategies? If so, factors associated with NPC/PM
should have a high explanatory power when explaining which politicians support
cultural strategies.
2.2.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables (IV) that will be used to explain the changes in the
dependent variable are grouped in two categories. The first group of IVs concerns the
individual characteristics of each respondent based on the NPC/PM implications.
First of all, gender is important. Women and men are known to have different voting
patterns and Norwegian women have shown a tendency to be more positive toward
post‐materialists values (Aardal & Narud 1999) and thus fit the NPC scheme better
34 Let us entertain you!
than men. In this case, the implication of the gender gap is that women would be
more willing to support cultural strategies. The first hypothesis on IVs is:
H2: Women are more likely than men to support cultural strategies
because they have a less materialist orientation.
Inglehart’s second hypothesis regards age. His findings revealed that the younger
respondents are more prone to be PM than older respondents. His explanation
concerns the scarcity hypothesis. Younger people, who have grown up in a society
with a stable economic growth rate, a high standard of living, and high levels of
security, are more inclined to pursue quality of life demands and PM values than
older respondents. Hence, they are expected to be more supportive of cultural
strategies than older politicians:
H3: Young respondents are more likely than older respondents to
support cultural strategies.
Education has been a good predictor for NPC/PM support. The well‐educated have a
tendency to be more prone to support NPC politics than the less‐educated, especially
in …affluent societies with extensive welfare state programs… (Clark & Inglehart
1998:55):
H4: Respondents with a higher education are more likely to support
cultural strategies than uneducated respondents.
There is a distinct difference between the members of different parties and their
scores on the NPC scheme. The left‐right spectrum is hard to apply here; after all,
NPC is an attempt to come up with a new explanation of political sympathies. In spite
of this, previous findings (Aardal 1999) have shown that, in the case of Norway, the
parties that are the most negative and the most positive toward post‐materialist
values are found, respectively, on the left and right side of the traditional left‐right
party cleavage. These results are, again, based on the attitudes in the electorate. His
analysis does not contain data on the parties’ representatives’ attitudes toward post‐
35 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
materialist and NPC values, which is what this thesis is concerned with. Aardal’s
analysis does, regardless of this, give an indication on how the respondents will
group themselves on the cultural index. The hypothesis is that:
H5: Political preference will influence the respondents’ attitude toward
cultural strategies.
This hypothesis is rather general, and it is hard to falsify. Thus, it is not a good point
of departure for drawing high‐quality inferences (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). The
hypothesis should therefore be extended. Again, Aardal’s analysis is helpful. His
results point toward some extreme parties on both ends of the political spectrum.
FrP’s electorate was the group most negative towards post‐materialism. Sosialistisk
Venstreparti (SV) came out as the most positive, while Venstre’s (V) voters displayed
a high degree of awareness of what is often seen as the core of the NPC and post‐
materialist values, namely the environment. Three sub‐hypotheses are therefore
deduced. It should be noted that these sub‐hypotheses give the impression of the
traditional left‐right continuum. This corresponds with Inglehart (1990:383); the
center‐right voters are somewhat less concerned with PM values than the center‐left
voters.
H5a: The respondents representing FrP have the most negative attitude
toward cultural strategies.
H5b: The respondents representing SV have the most positive attitude
cultural strategies. toward
Alternatively:
H5c: The respondents representing V are the most positive toward
cultural strategies.
A last question must be answered before moving on to the next group of IVs. Does
the political position of the respondent influence the score on the culture index? Is a
mayor more positive toward new strategies than respondents who do not hold any
specific positions? Or are mayors more afraid of venturing into uncharted territory?
36 Let us entertain you!
The hypothesis relies on two assumptions; first, if political preferences do influence
the dependent variable, then mayors from different parties should prioritize
differently. Second, if the first assumption is confirmed, and if a mayor has power to
influence decisions, then position should influence the dependent variable. The sixth
hypothesis is:
H6: The respondent’s position in the city council influences his or her
score on the cultural index.
The second group of IVs concerns structural relations and does not concern NPC. As
mentioned in the theoretical discussion above, increasing global competition is the
foundation of this theory. The argument of Clarke and Gaile (1998) is that the more a
region is exposed to this competition, the more willing it is to try new strategies.
According to Clarke and Gaile (1998:11), cities that have been hit hard by economic
restructuring are more likely to innovate and try experimental strategies. From this
the next hypothesis is derived:
H7: A sense of economic crisis in the respondent’s fylke or kommune will
enhance positive attitudes toward the use of culture strategies.
The seventh IV relates to the expected variation between regions and cities.
According to Clark & Hoffmann‐Martinot (1998) and Clark & Inglehart (1998),
citizen responsiveness is a hallmark for the NPC politician. City politicians have a
shorter “distance” to their inhabitants than regional politicians. This could mean that
they can pick up new signals from their citizens and, hence, have the opportunity to
be more responsive to the wants and needs of citizens and local firms. Moreover, the
kommuner in this sample are the biggest cities in their regions. City politicians have
been found to be more supportive of NPC strategies (Gabriel et. al. 1998). Therefore,
the local politicians in this survey can be expected to support cultural strategies. On
the other hand, fylkeskommunen has lost central responsibilities over the last years
and, in return, they have been promised resources to increase their development
capacities. From this point, they have been searching for new roles, and may
therefore be more open to experimenting with new strategies. As the fylkeskommune
37 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
is responsible for less sectors and service areas than the kommune, this might make it
easier to prioritize new strategies. As my arguments work both ways, I have chosen
to deduce two hypotheses:
H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than
city politicians because they are searching for new roles.
H8b: City Politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than
regional politicians because of their proximity to the citizens.
Clark (2004a:111pp) argues that geographical conditions have a significant influence
on the possibilities for economic growth. Traditionally, this has been understood as
natural resources and access to water; however, this conception of geography is
changing. Today, an unfriendly climate with low temperatures is considered a
drawback for areas trying to attract new knowledge‐based workers because people
tend to move toward the Sun Belt (Clark 2004a). This certainly puts Norway, and
especially the northern parts of the country, in a rough spot. Not only does northern
Norway suffer from a cold climate, but the distance to central markets is large and
transportation costs are higher than in the south. Also, the knowledge‐based workers
are further away from the main airports of Norway. Together, these disadvantages
render the peripheral parts of Norway more exposed to the increasing economic
competition. In other words, the argument consists of a center‐periphery dimension
in which the more disadvantaged areas must fight harder to win in the global
competition (Clarke & Gaile 1998). The rational consequences of this are that the
politicians would react by compensating for these disadvantages. As climate and
geography are fixed factors, the politicians must turn to policies that attract people
and capital despite the climate. The implication of this argument is that:
H9: The respondent’s score on the culture index is influenced by whether
they live in a central or a peripheral region.
This variable will, however, only be tested against the regional politicians. This issue
will be dealt with closer in the next chapter which concerns the operationalization of
these hypotheses.
38 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
CHAPTER 3
Data, Methodology, Design and Operationalizing the Variables.
This chapter deals with issues concerning the choice of data, methodology and
testing of hypotheses deduced in the former section. The dependent and independent
variables together make up a model of analysis that needs to be tested against data in
order to be falsified or confirmed. The first step toward testing the model is to
discuss what kind of data is necessary.
3.1 What Kind of Data Do I Need?
In order to test the hypotheses around which the analysis is structured, data is
required. I have chosen a quantitative approach to collect and analyze the data. The
units in this thesis are Norwegian regional and local politicians. The main data
source is a survey conducted as part of a project labeled “Norden i regionenes
Europa”. The survey data allows for an overview of the attitudes toward cultural
strategies in Norway by examining a large number of respondents. Survey data limits
the possibility to scrutinize the situation in one particular city or region. This thesis
paper does not seek to explain empirically why and how cultural strategies are
implemented, and a statistical analysis of survey data is sufficient. Moreover, it
allows for keeping the different IVs constant and identifying the variables that
influence the dependent variable. In addition to data on the choice of cultural
strategies, data showing how the politicians or respondents view other possible
strategies is needed. The survey in use draws on both, and the respondents’ attitudes
toward a series of alternative strategies for meeting the international competition
are examined.
Furthermore, the hypotheses deduced in the section above specified my IVs. They are
as follows: gender, age, education, party preference, sense of crisis in the region or
kommune, political position, local or regional status of the politician and center‐
39 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
periphery measured as the distance from Oslo. The survey provides information on
the respondent’s gender, age, education and party preference, as well as local versus
regional politicians. Age is measured as the respondents’ age in years. As for
education, the respondents are asked to self‐report their education; however they
have been grouped into six different education levels in the data file. Position is
reported under the headline “political responsibilities”. The local and regional
politicians received surveys either asking the questions from a local or regional
perspective, so whether the respondents’ are local or regional politicians is
registered according to type of questionnaire received. The respondents’ values on
contextual variables, center‐periphery and sense of crisis were gathered from other
sources.
3.1.1 Presentation of Data
The data was collected as a part of the project “Norden i regionenes Europa”. The
project team, of which I was a member, surveyed Norwegian regional and local
politicians. As there was little data on the pursuit of cultural strategies in Norway, I
got the opportunity to include some questions on the subject in the survey. The
project’s main objective was to collect information on Norwegian local and regional
politicians’ attitudes toward ongoing European regionalization processes, their
networks or social capital and their use of IT.
The total population was Norwegian local and regional politicians. However, to limit
the number of participants, a selection was made. All the 19 Norwegian
fylkeskommuner were selected, but only the members of the fylkesutvalget (FU)
(county council) and its equivalents were asked to take part. Of Norway’s 431
kommuner (municipalities), only the county capitals were selected. As Oslo is both a
council and a municipality, the sample consists of 18 regional capitals. The same
selection was made for the municipalities as for the counties; the politicians in the
formannskap (city board) represent the sample. The selection was inherited from a
former study; an almost identical survey was conducted in 1997‐98 (Baldersheim et.
al. 2001) with the same selection. However, the questions regarding cultural
40 Let us entertain you!
strategies were not a part of the first survey. I, therefore, lack the opportunity to
compare data over time.
The surveys were mailed to the respondents’ addresses as registered by each
participant’s municipality or county. The participants had the opportunity to either
return the printed version of the survey by mail or by using a web application. The
data was registered using SPSS. The questionnaires were mailed on the 1st of August
2006. The respondents who did not return the questionnaires received new
questionnaires in two consecutive rounds. The data collection process was finished
in November 2006. This means that the units were politicians elected in the 2003
local and regional election. The survey’s final response rate was 52%, which gives an
N of 205.
Four questions3 in the survey make up my dependent variable. The questions
concern city beautification, attracting knowledge‐based workers, constructing
buildings in order to house cultural entities and establishing public “venture capital”
firms to help increase spending on culture. The data has been registered as four
separate variables; however, in order to have one dependent variable, an
operationalization process has to be carried out. The four variables are grouped
together to form a cultural index. Each individual respondent receives a score on this
index, based on the scores on the four initial variables. This score is their value on
the dependent variable.
In addition to this, data on the sense of economic crisis operationalized as
unemployment rate, and on the center‐periphery score, was collected from Statistics
Norway. This means that all respondents from the same city or region are ascribed
the same score.
3 Question number 16 u, v, w, and x.
41 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
3.1.2 Problems Related to the Data
My main data source is the postal survey. The response rate was 51, 6%; however,
the dispersion among the different parts of Norway varied. The northernmost parts
of Norway, Troms and Finmark, have especially low response rates, as does the city
of Bergen. On the other end of the scale, Hedmark, Hordaland and Møre og Romsdal
have good response rates. This need not be a problem, but, if the politicians in
Finmark do not answer because they are not interested in the subject, or because
their effort within regional policies are lower than in the rest of Norway, this can be a
problem (Skog 2003:89).
The dependent variable is a set of attitudes toward the potential use of cultural
strategies. Data on attitudes does not provide information on actions, or what would
actually happen in a real budget struggle. Although one respondent may answer that
he thinks that cultural strategies are important, there is no guarantee that he would
not prioritize the local kindergarten over cultural strategies. In the case of cultural
strategies, these strategies work through several layers, affecting first human capital
than strengthening the economic growth and increasing population growth.
Moreover, there will be a significant time lag from the implementation of certain
policies until the outcomes can be seen. On the other hand, granting funds to a
kindergarten might be more visible and hence easier to defend from a political point
of view. Tove Mordal (1989) argues that this type of data does not necessarily
predict future actions (Mordal 1989:39). However, as the respondents here are asked
to state which strategies they think can help their community in the international
competition; I will argue that the answers concerning their attitudes provide
valuable information.
Another issue concerns the validity of the dependent variable. Does it measure what
it is supposed to measure? A general issue is whether the respondents understand
the topic the same way or not. In this survey, the participants have the opportunity to
comment on the questionnaire if they choose. Most respondents chose not to
comment; however, some comments have revealed some minor problems among the
regional representatives.
42 Let us entertain you!
Last but not least, I would like to discuss the reliability of the material. As the
questions are standardized and all respondents received the same questionnaire, the
data is mostly reliable; gender and age are hard to misunderstand, and the
respondents would give the same answer even if they were asked ten times. The
possible problem lies here mostly with the collection and registration of the data,
especially with the recording of the education level. The problem is that while some
respondents were extremely meticulous about their answers, others wrote “studies
at the University of Oslo” as their response. The problem arises when these answers
are grouped into categories ranging from having finished elementary/high school to
those having an academic degree. To make the data as reliable as possible, I chose to
categorize the above‐cited answers together with the category for those who had
once embarked on an academic degree without finishing it. Only those writing that
they had a degree from a university or college were awarded full score on this
variable.
3.1.3 Criteria For Linear Regression Analysis.
The first step of the analysis is to test the first hypothesis against the data. As I
assume that the IV’s effects on the dependent variable are linear, my statistical
analysis will be a multiple linear regression. This does mean that certain criteria
must be met. The first research question that must be answeredwhich strategies are
the most prioritized‐‐will, however, not be analyzed using regression analysis. The
respondents were asked in Question 17 to state which of the strategies mentioned
they believed were good strategies for their municipality or county to succeed in the
international competition between regions and municipalities. The question of
priority will be answered by sorting the 24 statements by their average score.
With this exception, the main analysis’ tool will be a linear regression analysis. In
order to use regression analysis, some basic criteria must be fulfilled (Skog 2003).
First of all, the data must be examined for outliers. As the parties FrP and H have in
their programs that the regional level should be abolished, I have reason to expect a
few outliers. A case‐wise diagnostics revealed that Unit Number 56 had standard
43 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
residuals that diverged more than three standard deviations from the average value.
As a consequence of this, the unit was excluded from further analysis.
Casewise Diagnostics
Case Number Std. Residual culture_index Predicted Value
Residual
56 -3,679 1,00 3,7863 -2,78629
The assumption on linearity must be fulfilled. Multicollinearity seems not be a
problem, with the exception of the center‐ periphery dimension, where VIF for
Sørlandet and ‘support for KrF’ both are rather high. As the two variables are
interesting from a theoretical perspective, they will be kept in the analysis with the
consequences this has for the standard error. An analysis of the residuals reveals that
the standardized residuals deviate somewhat from the normal distribution.
However, the deviation is moderate‐‐this interpretation is supported by the normal
probability plot. The standardized residuals are all grouped around a straight line,
which indicate that the predicted value corresponds with the observed values
(Christoffersen 2004:108). The scatter plot for the culture index reveals a grouping
around a horizontal line, which means that the values on the dependent variable are
linearly distributed. With the criteria for linear regression being met, I can move on
to the analysis.
3.1.4 Design and Structure
Bryman and Cramer (1990) state that there are two basic types of research designs,
experimental and survey/correlations design. Mehlbye et. al. (1993) differentiates
between three types of designs: survey, field experiment and case‐studies. This
thesis paper has a survey/correlation design. The design applied here deals with the
problem of inferring causal relationships through statistical control. This means that
the different variables’ effect on the dependent variable is isolated, thereby
controlling the effect of a third variable. The study is cross‐sectional, which means
that I have collected data on the population sample within the same time period
(Skog 2003:71). The data will be analyzed using SPSS. This way I get a “snapshot” of
44 Let us entertain you!
within the cultural and kn
the population and their values on certain variables. A result of this is that I am not
able to say anything about changes in the population; what I can study is the variance
within the data. Moreover, establishing causal relationships with a survey design is
difficult (Mehlbye et. al. 1993).
To answer the second research question, I will compare the average value of the
respondent’s for the different strategies stated in question 16 (see Appendix 6). With
the exception of this first step, the main analysis will follow the structure set up by
the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. Each hypothesis will be tested
against the data, using regression analysis. The “null‐hypothesis” will be rejected and
the alternative, that is my hypothesis, will be kept at a significance level of .90. This
means that there will be a 10 % chance of rejecting a true “null hypothesis”.
3.2 Operationalizing the Variables
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the choice of cultural strategies. Based on the survey data
the dependent variable will be measured constructing a “culture index”. Before I can
construct this index, however, culture must be theoretically defined. This definition
builds on Clark’s constructed amenities in order to attract knowledge‐based workers
and, thus, influence the socio‐economic composition of the area (Clark 2004c:111).
My operational definition is given by the items in the questionnaire. The respondents
were asked to state on a five point scale whether they supported the following
strategies4: 1)5 try to attract knowledge‐based workers, 2) develop recreational and
entertainment opportunities, 3) establish arrangements to stimulate new businesses
owledge‐based sector and 4) develop infrastructure for
4 The headline of this question is (my translation): It’s alleged that increasing internationalizing is leading to a situation with competition between regions and cities in Europe. What do you think that your region/ kommune should do to s s competition? trengthen their stance in thi
5 Questions 16 u, v, w and x
45 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
cultural activities (examples are building a theatre, concert hall, opera etc.). The first
statement concerns attempts to attract knowledge‐based workers, and thus reveals a
commitment to the overall goal of these strategies. The second question covers
Clark’s constructed amenities, as does the fourth question. The third statement
relates to the organizational set‐up of these strategies, whether or not this is under
direct political control or whether this has been out‐sourced to specialized branches.
A factor analysis of the four indicators revealed one factor that fulfilled Kaiser’s
criterion with an eigenvalue higher than one (Christoffersen 2004:236). The four
items all had factor scores between 0,700 and 0,800. A missing value count was
carried out and disclosed one unit with one missing value, two units with two
missing values and 17 units with four missing values. In order to include cases with
missing values in the index, the missing values must be replaced with valid values
(Christoffersen 2004). This implies methodological and theoretical questions. The
methodological questions concern what happens when a value is assigned to a unit.
The theoretical question relates to which value the unit should be assigned on that
item. The problems regarding missing values imply that as few missing values as
possible should be included into the index. On the other side, leaving units out of the
analysis means losing information. With this in mind, I decided to include units with
one missing value into the analysis. On the basis of the factor analysis and the
theoretic assumptions, the four indicators were merged together in an additive
index. The missing values were replaced with the average score on the three other
indicators. The dependent variable now had possible values ranging from one to five.
The culture index has an N of 188 and the mean value is 3,932. The mean suggests
that the dependent variable is skewed toward the right.
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
culture_index 188 1,00 5,00 3,9322 ,87546
Valid N (list-wise) 188
46 Let us entertain you!
3.2.2 Gender
The IV gender is a natural dichotomy and the politicians in the sample were asked in
question number one to state their gender. The answers were coded into score “zero”
for men and score “one” for women. No missing values.
3.2.3 Age
Age has been used as reported by the respondents. Age was reported as “years old”.
The youngest respondent is 26 and the oldest is 77. 4 respondents have missing
values.
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Age 201 26 77 52,00 10,671
Valid N (list-wise) 201
3.2.4 Education
The respondents were asked to report their education as their highest education or
exam. In other words, the question was open and the answers had to be recoded in
order to be used in a regression analysis. The type of answers varied from stating
degree, university, exams and topics, to brief statements such as “University of Oslo”
or “høgskole”. Simple statements of this type were interpreted as meaning having
studied at a university without receiving a degree. Only respondents that specifically
stated they had a degree were seen as having a higher education. Thus, the variable
was dichotomized into two categories “higher education” and “lower education.” The
idea behind the division was theoretical. Both Florida (2002) and Clark (2004) focus
on the importance of college degrees in determining the influence of the creative
class or the NPC. Furthermore, Clark and Hoffmann‐Martinot (1998) claim that
educated persons are more prone to support the NPC, and that NPC parties generally
are supported by younger people with university degrees (Clark and Hoffmann‐
47 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Martinot 1998:198). I therefore want to treat only the politicians with a degree as
having a higher education. This category does, however, include a broad spectrum of
educations such as kindergarten teachers, teachers, accountants and doctors, as well
as people with PhD degrees. Likewise, the “lower education” category contains
respondents with 7 years of primary schooling, as well as respondents who have
studied at universities, but did not continue on to finish their degree. “Lower
education” was given the score “zero,” “higher education” the score “one.”
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Education 205 ,00 1,00 ,4976 ,50122
Valid N (list-wise) 205
3.2.5 Party Preference
The respondents were asked to report the name of the party to which they belonged.
The answers included ”Sosialistisk Venstreparti,” “Arbeiderpartiet,” “Senterpartiet,”
“Venstre,” “Kristelig Folkeparti,” “Høyre,” “Fremskrittspartiet,” ”By‐og bygdelista,”
”Demokratene,” ”Pensjonistpartiet” and ”Reformpartiet.” These answers were not
scaled, and hence could not be used in a regression analysis. The variable was
therefore recoded into dummy variables. A dummy variable is a variable with the
values one or zero and each value is represented by a dummy variable. One of the
categories is used as a reference group, thus measuring the change in the dependent
value when moving from the reference category to another category. Here I decided
to use “Fremskrittspartiet” as a reference category because they were predicted to be
the most negative to the use of cultural strategies. Given that the FrP politicians
would receive the lowest score on the culture index, using this party as a reference
category would increase the probability of getting significant results for the party
variable. The regression coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the score
on the culture index when you, for instance, compare an “SV” politician with an “FrP”
politician, all other things controlled. The “Reformpartiet,” “Pensjonistpartiet,” “By‐
48 Let us entertain you!
og bygdelista,” “lokale lister” and “Demokratene” were recoded into an
“others”/”øvrige” category because the number of cases were so low that running an
analysis with these parties as separate variables would not provide any significant
information.
3.2.6 Position
The respondents’ position was recorded in the questionnaire in question 3 and 7 in
the questionnaire, where the respondents were asked to state their occupation and
their position within the party organization. The information was recoded into a
dichotomous variable where “one” meant mayor, “vice mayor” or member of the city
council (byråd) for the regions and municipalities with a parliamentarian structure.
Also, respondents that sat in parliament, but who were not mayors, were given that
value “one”. Those not holding a mayoral position or the like were given the value
“zero”.
3.2.7 Economic Crisis
The next hypothesis concerned the influence of an economic crisis. In order to
operationalize this variable, an adequate measurement had to be found. I decided to
use unemployment rates to measure the level of crisis. Information on
unemployment is easily available from Statistics Norway and data can be found and
used at both the regional and local level. A limitation does apply to the data; they
only indicate the number of registered unemployed. The real unemployment rate can
be higher than the data reveals; for instance, stay‐at‐home mothers are not counted,
although they might be at home involuntarily. However, I would argue that the
unemployment statistics reveal the relative difference in economic fortunes between
different kommuner and fylkeskommuner. The numbers used are the level of
2 0 unemployment in Norway at the end of November 0 6.
The overall level of unemployment in Norway is at an all‐time low level. This
constitutes another problem concerning the use of unemployment rates as an
indicator of crisis. When considering the unemployment level in Norway, none of the
49 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
respondents in the sample lives in areas ridden by economic crisis. In fact, in this
sample, in the fylke with the highest registered number of unemployed, Finmark,
only 3, 7% of the population between 16 and 74 years old are out of work. Compared
to the rest of Europe and the US this is a low number. In other words, unemployment
poses no great threat to the Norwegian economy. However, the areas with a higher
unemployment rate are expected to show a lower economic performance rate than
the areas with very little unemployment. This can be seen when checking for state
transfers; in Finmark, a major portion of the budget is financed by state transfers
(www.ssb.no/kommuner/region.cgi?nr=20). On the other hand, the difference in
economic performance between regions and municipalities might spur the
responsible politicians into acting. Politicians in an area with an unemployment rate
that is perceived as high, relative to other areas within Norway, would have an extra
incentive to act. I will therefore argue that the unemployment rate provides an
effective proxy variable for measuring a sense of economic crisis.
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Unemployment 204 1,30 3,70 2,1176 ,50940
Valid N (list-wise) 204
3.2.8 Center-Periphery
The question in need of an answer in order to operationalize this variable is “what is
a periphery?” Rokkan and Urwin (1983) answer this question by stating that the
relationship between the center and its periphery consists of three dimensions:
dependence, difference and distance. The first dimension, dependence, is economic.
The periphery relies on the center for economic support or transfers. The second
dimension, difference, concerns cultural differences. Lastly, distance reflects the
geographical distance from the center to the periphery. The trisection of the term
periphery does call for an index measuring the degree to which a city or county is
central or peripheral.
50 Let us entertain you!
First, the economic dependence must be covered. The size of the general state
transfers, specifically block grants‐‐that is, state grants that have not been earmarked
for specific purposes‐‐in comparison to the size of the budget for each kommune or
fylkeskommune is an excellent measurement for economic dependence. In Oslo, only
9, 2% of the budget is state transfers of this kind, whereas in Finmark 40, 7% of the
budget is financed by block grants. It is worth noting that Finmark and the regions in
North‐Norway receive additional funding called “North‐Norway funds,” as well as a
“regional fund,” on the basis of their peripheral geography. These two extra sources
of income are not part of my data here. The data I have used is gathered by Statistics
Norway and is available from their web site (http://www.ssb.no/kommuner/). A
problem related to this data is that, as mentioned in the section on unemployment,
these data do to a certain degree correlate with the unemployment rate.
The second part of the periphery definition is difference in culture. Operationalizing
this term is challenging. In which respects does the periphery culturally differ from
the center? Vignaux (2003) builds on Rokkan when he examines the politically
cleavage structure in France and compares it with Norway in order to explain why
there is no Christian democratic party in France. She expresses a sense of wonder
regarding why a Christian Democratic party could be established in a country so far
from Rome. Rokkan (1987) provides an answer: the establishment of the Christians
People’s Party (KrF) was a result of mobilization along the religious cleavage in
Norway, a cleavage he argues is a part of the territorial cleavage in the Norwegian
political landscape. Vignaux (2003) goes on to claim that although KrF claims to
represent the views of Norwegian Christians, this is not the case. This can be
illustrated by scrutinizing KrF’s weak standing in Norwegian rural areas and the
northern parts of Norway (Viganux 2003; Rokkan 1987). KrF appeals mostly to
members of the Low Church in peripheral areas. The members of the High Church
always have represented the establishment in Oslo or in Copenhagen, and KrF has
fought against their views. This means, according to Vignaux, that the existence of
KrF can only be understood as an expression of a center‐periphery conflict. Indeed,
this conflict does have a cultural dimension built on the puritan culture of the Low
Church and Prohibition. The support for KrF can therefore be used as a measure for
51 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
questionnaires were collec
the periphery’s cultural difference from the center. The second dimension consists of
the support of KrF in the 2005 parliament election.
The third element is geographic distance. The five provinces (landsdel) were used to
group the regions on this variable. The five provinces are “Østlandet,”6 “Sørlandet,”
“Vestlandet,” “Midt‐Norge/Trøndelag” and ”Nord‐Norge.” ”Østlandet,” includes Oslo.
Five dummy variables were constructed on the basis of this information, and
“Østlandet” was used as a reference category, and thus, excluded from the analysis.
That means that all coefficients must be interpreted as the difference between
“Østlandet” and the respective provinces.
The grouping of the three dimensions in an index turned out to be difficult. The
Chronbach’s Alpha was ‐.055, which indicates a very low inner consistency. This
implied that the three items could not be grouped in an index. Instead, the three
dimensions were analyzed within the same block in the regression analysis, thus
indicating the level of periphery. The underlying assumption behind this variable is
that living in a central or peripheral fylke influences the politicians’ attitudes toward
the importance of cultural strategies. However, one element has yet to be covered.
The center‐periphery index only covers the fylkeskommune. The reason is that all the
communes in the sample are cities and by definition not peripheral. This means that I
can only test the regional politicians on this variable. A problem with these indicators
could be multicollinearity; this will be tested in the regression analysis.
3.2.9 Region Versus ommune
The final independent variable concerned whether the respondent lives in a
kommune or a fylkeskommune. The respondents received different questionnaires
modified to fit either local or regional politicians. This was registered as the
ted, and fylkeskommune received the value “one” and
K
6 Østlandet consists of Oslo, Akershus, Buskerud, Østfold, Vestfold, Telemark, Hedmark and Oppland. Sørlandet consists of Vest‐Agder and Aust‐Agder, Vestlandet of Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane and Møre og Romsdal. Trøndelag consists of Sør‐Trøndelag and Nord‐Trøndelag, and Nord Norge of Nordland, Troms and Finmark.
52 Let us entertain you!
kommune the value “two”. A commented must be made to this variable, because this
variable will be excluded from the analysis when the center‐periphery measures are
included. This follows from the face that only the regional respondents will be tested
on these variables. This will be dealt with in the following chapter which concerns
the analysis of data.
53 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
CHAPTER
Analysis
4
This section will analyze the data from the survey. The third chapter supported the
use of regression analysis on this data material, and thus regression analysis will be
my main analytical tool. However, I will also use other analytical tools in order to
reveal patterns in the data. The structure of this chapter is given by the structure of
the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, the hypotheses will be analyzed
simultaneously, and however, the findings will be commented on one hypothesis at
the time.
4.1 Putting Cultural Strategies to the Test
The first hypothesis concerns the thesis’ overall research question: Do Norwegian
local and regional politicians prioritize culture at all? Question number 16 in the
questionnaire outlines 24 possible policy choices. The items cover a broad range of
strategies from the more traditional “providing better services”, via “better training
for the region’s/ municipalities’ personnel” to the more NPC related “construct
infrastructure within the culture sector”. The answers were reported on a five‐point‐
scale, one for each of the 24 statements. The respondents stated whether they, on the
one extreme, “totally agreed” or, on the other extreme, “totally disagreed” with each
statement. Four statements concerned cultural policy choices. To what extent do
respondents choose cultural strategies rather than other possible strategies?
To answer the question, the first step was to carry out a principal component
analysis. The analysis revealed six different components within the data (see
Appendix 2). Component number one consisted of the statements 16a), f, p, q, r, s, u,
v, w, and x. As the table shows, these statements concern culture as well as
knowledge and competence. The second component included 16b), g, h, i, j, k, and t,
statements linked to questions about the international competence in the region or
municipality and services providing. The third extracted component was made up of
54 Let us entertain you!
16d) m, and n, all concerning regionalization. The fourth component comprised
regional restructuring and consisted of 16e) and l. One item alone scored on the fifth
component, 16c), restructuring of the municipality or the region. The sixth and last
component concerned the region or municipality’s orientation towards
concentrating development tasks within the region or municipality. 16o) loaded on
this component. The first component is the one that will be in focus in this thesis.
Consisting of both the cultural and competence/knowledge variables, it fits the thesis
overall objective perfectly. It reveals an inner correlation between support of
strategies concerning competence and strategies concerning culture, thereby cutting
straight into the theory behind this analysis: That culture attracts competent men
and women. The factor analysis shows that the correlation between culture and
knowledge is not purely a technical one; respondents who think competence and
knowledge are important also think that culture matters. Despite this, the dependent
variable is not made up of the entire first component; as this thesis’ main focus is on
cultural strategies.
The next analytic step was to test hypothesis one:
H1: Politicians prioritize cultural strategies over other strategies in
order to meet the increased competition among regions and cities
induced by globalization.
In order to do this, the score on the four culture indicators had to be compared to the
score of the 20 other statements in the questionnaire. The analysis revealed an
overall score of the policy choices in question, as well as how the different items
were appreciated among local and regional politicians. The results are listed in
scending order in a
Table 4. 1.
55 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Strategies ranked in ascending order, mean. Results from 1997‐98 included in second column.
Rank Question number 20‐06
1997‐98
24 16 l) Transfer development tasks from region or municipality to region/municipality 2,70 2,94
23 16 k) Increase the ”travel budget” for international contacts for politicians and public servants
2,89 2,79
22 16 j) Establish an international committee 2,95 2,88
21 16 c) Reorganize the region/municipalities’ organization and leadership structure 2,96 (‐)
20 16 o) Concentrate the region/municipality on development tasks 2,97 3,27
19 16 t) Establish/ develop a regional EU‐office 3,37
18 16 h) Train the administrative staff in taking care of international contacts 3,47 3,61
17 16 g) Establish partnership alliances with regions in other states 3,53 3,71
16 16 w) Establish arrangements to stimulate new businesses within the cultural and knowledge‐based sector
3,54 (‐)
15 16 e) Bigger regions/municipalities /merge regions 3,55 2,64
14 16 x) Develop infrastructure for the cultural sector 3,70 (‐)
13 16 i) Market the region/municipality internationally 3,78 3,63
12 16 d) Take over tasks from the state 3,81 3,11
11 16 m) Improve cooperation between regions and municipalities 3,87 4,30
10 16 p) Stimulate the development of centers of technologic competence 3,92 4,00
9 16 n) Transfer more of the development functions from the state to region/local level 4,01 3,76
8 16 v) Develop recreational and entertainment opportunities 4,02 (‐)
7 16 f) Cooperate with other regions/ munici. in strategic alliances/partnerships 4,13 4,42
6 16 b) Become a better service provider 4,19 4,47
5 16 a) Prioritize regional tasks/ development of the private sector 4,24 4,23
4 16 q) Establish strategic partnerships with colleges/ universities/ private sector 4,39 4,36
3 16 u) Try to attract knowledge‐based workers 4,43 (‐)
2 16 s) Develop better communication (electronic) in the region 4,45 4,56
1 16 r) Develop opportunities for higher education. 4,64 4,67
Table 4. 1
56 Let us entertain you!
The least popular strategy is 16 l, to transfer developmental/engineering tasks from
either the regional or the local level to respectively the local or regional level, with an
average score of 2, 70. The most popular strategy is 16 r, to increase the education
level, with an average score of 4, 64. The analysis so far has revealed some variation
between the different scores of the policy choices. The four items in the culture index
were ranked respectively as number 3, 8, 14 and 16. In other words, one item, “try to
attract knowledge‐based workers” received a high score; however the other three
received more mediocre scores. Now, what does this mean?
First, the overall objective for to the supporters of these strategies, to attract
knowledge‐based workers to their community, is the third most popular strategy in
the bundle. This item can also be seen in conjunction to the most popular strategy in
the analysis; “stimulate to increase education”. So, although none of the four items
top the list, there is a significant interest in developing an educated and knowledge‐
based workforce among the respondents. Second, also the next cultural strategy, 16v,
“develop recreational and entertainment opportunities” scored in the top third,
ranked as number 8. This confirms that Clark’s “entertainment machine” also have
some support in Norwegian regions and municipalities. This pattern is supported on
the national level as stated in the white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2006‐2007)
on regional policy from 2006. Areas with a weak private sector and a decreasing
population receive support from the national level in order to develop and support
local initiatives to create attractive districts, new jobs, and provide good services and
a good cultural sector.
As for the two less popular items in the culture index they add some nuances to the
analysis. These two items have a more practical appeal; they are not so much
strategies as concrete measures. Basically, where the two former items are less
tangible, the last two items cry for action and economic spending. They are therefore
important indicators of the willingness to spend money on cultural strategies. And
the results here were less encouraging for the supporters of culture. However, none
of the policy choices fall in the least popular third of the ranked strategies. In other
words, there is some willingness to support the cultural sector financially. But as the
score of statement 16b) “become a better service provider”, which was ranked as
57 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
number six, implies, culture will lose the battle for money in a fight against dental
care or elderly in need of public health care. However, when comparing the results of
this analysis with the results from the corresponding analysis made in 1998‐99 the
picture is somewhat reversed. Table 4. 1 shows the average value on the same items
in 1998‐99. The cultural strategies were not a part of the survey then. Despite of this,
the results still give an indication on the score of the different items. The most
interesting outcome of the comparison is that statement 16b here is ranked as
number three. When removing the cultural strategies from the table, 16b is ranked
fifth in the former analysis. In other words, the relative support of this strategy has
been diminished. This could have been caused by the fact that the fylkeskommune has
lost the responsibility for important areas during this time period. However, as this
sample consists of not only regional but also local politicians, there is reason to
believe that there has been a change in attitudes. This is also supported by the
findings of Gabriel et. al (1998) in Germany, where traditional development
strategies have lost their foothold.
To sum up, there seems to be an overall agreement that improving the qualifications
of the local or regional workforce is important. The disagreement lies in how this
goal is to be attained. To develop the education level in the region is the number one
strategy, but also attracting new, more skilled inhabitants is essential. Item number
16w and 16 x) with their mid‐level score give a reasonable support to these
“attraction” strategies. Politicians do, to a certain degree, support cultural strategies.
But, as might be expected, the support for cultural strategies is reduced when
financial issues arise. Everybody wants a better workforce; they do however disagree
on how.
Does this support the hypothesis? It is clear that the empirical evidence does not give
an unconditional support of the hypothesis. Only one of the items on cultural
strategies is among the top three of the 24 strategies, and the others have lower
scores. On the other hand, the overall goal seems to be backed by the data, as “trying
to attract knowledge‐based workers” are highly appreciated among the respondents.
In other words, there is an awareness of the problems addressed by among others
Reich (1991), Castells (2000), Clark (2004) and Florida (2002). The data also
58 Let us entertain you!
disclosed that issues within the culture and entertainment sectors are prioritized.
They are viewed as more important than ‘Regional offices in Brussels’, ‘training of
administrative staff’, ‘administrative reorganizing in the fylkeskommune or
kommune’ and ‘establishing partnership alliances with other regions’. To end this
section; several strategies were prioritized; however, cultural strategies are among
the favored strategies for regional and local politicians. This does not mean that
everybody is inclined to support them, as shown earlier and confirmed in the
analysis, these strategies are creating a debate. And hence, the choice of such
strategies is not self‐evident.
4.2 Looking for the New Political Culture
This section will first test the four hypotheses concerning the influence of the
respondents’ individual characteristics on the choice of cultural strategies. The
regression analysis was carried out through introducing one variable at a time. This
tactic makes it easier to reveal potential correlations between variables, as every
step demonstrated how the coefficients changed when new variables were added to
the analysis.
4.2.1 Female, Young, Educated, and Cultural?
The first independent variable or hypothesis to be tested against the data concerned
gender. The hypothesis postulated on this theme was:
H2: Women are more likely than men to support cultural strategies
because they have a less materialist orientation.
The results of the bivariate analysis with culture as dependent variable can be seen
in Table 4. 4, model 1, with the model summary in table 4.2. The R2 indicates that
gender alone accounts for 1, 4 % of the variance in the dependent variable whilst the
entire model made up of individual characteristics, is responsible for approximately
59 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
35 % of the variance7. Model 4 indicates that, with education, age, position and party
preferences controlled, the standardized coefficient is ‐.126. Women were ascribed
the value zero, and men the value one, hence this coefficient should be interpreted as
that women on average score .126 scale‐units higher than men on the dependent
variable, everything else controlled. The significance level of .061 means that with a
significance level of .90 the hypothesis is confirmed. However, the low R2 indicates
that gender explains only a minor part of the total change in the culture index.
The M/PM‐NPC was used to develop the next hypothesis. Individuals brought up in a
period of economic growth and stability tend to be more post‐materialist orientated
(Clarke & Inglehart 1998; Clarke 2004, Inglehart 1977; 1990). Thus younger
respondents were predicted to be more supportive of cultural strategies than older
respondents. On the basis of this assumption the following hypothesis was
developed:
H3: Young respondents are more likely to support cultural strategies
ones.than older
When confronted with the data this hypothesis did, however, not find support. In
fact, at a first glance, the data disclosed a conflicting effect. Model 2 and 3, in which
gender and education are held constant, displayed a significant and positive
coefficient. In other words, model 2 and 3 demonstrated that the older the
respondents were, the more positive to culture they were! This picture is, however,
nuanced down in model 5, where political preferences and political position are
taken into account. With parties accounted for, the coefficient is reduced to a mere
.058 with a significance probability of .406. The fact that the results are changed as
an effect of introducing party preferences to the matrix indicates a correlation
between party preferences and age. The effect first visible was a spurious effect
caused by the age distribution in the different parties. A bivariate correlation
analysis between age and party preference backed this assumption, the FrP and SV
7 Adjusted Rsquare are respectively .044 and .265.
60 Let us entertain you!
politicians are significant (.05‐level) younger than the average respondent, whereas
the members of the “others” category are significantly older than the average
respondent (see Appendix 1). An explanation to this unexpected finding is that
culture, the way it is defined in the questionnaire, does not appeal to young persons.
The statements do not separate “high culture” from “low culture” closely enough to
what Florida (2002) and Clarke (2004b) did. On the other hand, the statement
number 16v) “Develop recreational and entertainment opportunities” indicates a
more “street level type of culture” (Florida 2002) approach as described by Clarke
and Florida. To conclude this paragraph; the data does not support the third
hypothesis, and the claim that younger people are more positive to cultural
strategies than older respondents is rejected.
The fourth hypothesis concerned the educational level of the respondents. The
wording of the hypothesis was as follows:
H4: Respondents with a higher education are more likely to support
culture strategies than uneducated respondents.
Once again the hypothesis was deducted from the NPC scheme; respondents with a
college or university degree were supposed to be more positive to culture than
respondents with little or no higher education. Table 4.3 and model 3 prove that
when controlling for age and gender the standardized regression coefficient for
education is .207 (significant at a .05 level). Model 4 does once again wreck this
assumption, when holding party preference constant, the beta coefficient is reduced
to .102 and is no longer significant. Again, this hypothesis must be rejected on the
basis of the data material; education has no significant effect on the respondents’
score on the culture index. When scrutinizing Table 4. 4 it is obvious that party
preference and education are correlated. Appendix 3 maintains this conclusion, the
members of KrF (significant at a .01‐level) and SP (.10‐level) are more educated than
the average politicians in this sample, and the politicians stating that they belong to
FrP are significantly (.01‐level) less educated than the analysis’ average respondent.
This means that the beta coefficient for education could be hiding some of the effect
of party preferences because the “distribution” of education among the different
parties is uneven. This lack of effect can maybe be traced back into the data,
61 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
approximately 50 % of the respondents reported that they had an academic degree.
This is a much higher percentage than the percentage with a degree in the overall
Norwegian population. Statistics Norway
(http://www.ssb.no/emner/04/01/utniv/) reports that in 2005 25 % of the
population had a minimum of 2 years of academic training. In this sample, the
criteria for being ascribed the value “higher education” were that the respondent had
a college or university degree. In other words, stricter criteria were applied in this
analysis than what has been used by Statistics Norway. Hence, the disproportional
education ratio between the respondents and the Norwegian population is expected
to be even higher. As the politicians in this sample have a much higher average level
of education than the electorate, and the NPC data were based on the Norwegian
electorate’s attitudes towards M/PM‐NPC issues, the assumption that the hypothesis
was based on might not be true. And the lack of effect on education could perhaps be
ascribed to the fact that there is little variation in this variable compared to what has
been found in the electorate.
The next hypothesis to be put to the test regarded an element not that must be
included in a political science paper; party preferences. In the light of the above
testing of hypotheses it is not surprising that political preferences are supposed to
influence the score on the culture index.
H5: Political Preference influences the score on the culture index.
First thing first, when bringing the parties into the analysis the R2 soared. Gender, age
and education were together able to explain 8.1% of the variance in the dependent
variable. Party preferences made the R2 almost skyrocket to .270. In other words,
party preference alone has an explanatory power more than three times stronger
than the other three variables put together. This makes it the single most important
variable in the analysis. Party preference was not a scaled variable; dummy variables
were therefore constructed in order to be able to introduce party preferences to the
regression analysis. This meant that the coefficients must be interpreted as the
change in score on the culture index when comparing any party to the reference
group, in this case Venstre (V). V was selected as reference group because their
62 Let us entertain you!
politicians were expected to receive the highest score on the culture index. This
implied that all the other party variables were predicted to have negative
coefficients, as they were expected to have a negative influence on the culture index
in comparison to V.
According to Aardal (1999:62‐63) FrP voters are the most negative to post‐
modernist values. On the basis of Aardal’s findings, their influence on the culture
index was expected to be the most negative in this sample. When using V as a
reference category, this assumption was supported. When everything else (age,
education, position and gender) was held constant, the beta coefficient for FrP
politicians was ‐.569 (significant at a .000‐level).
The biggest surprise in the bunch was SV’s low value on the dependent variable.
Research on voter behavior and attitudes in Norway (Aardal 1999) has unveiled a
post‐materialist attitude among SV’s voters. In fact, the voters have been the most
post‐materialist voter group in Norway, with positive attitudes towards immigration,
environmental issues as well as secularization and more classic leftist values. SV’s
politicians were therefore expected to be among those most positive towards
cultural strategies. This assumption was rejected by the findings in the analysis, the
evidence displayed an effect opposite of what was expected; the SV politicians
received on average a .258 (.05‐level) (Model 5) lower value on the culture index
than V. In fact, the only party with a more negative beta coefficient was FrP. This was
a surprise because it revealed a discrepancy between the voters and the politicians in
the party. It was tempting to test SV’s beta coefficient on the welfare strategy
statement “providing better services” (16b) because of their emphasis on providing
services such as childcare (Sosialistisk Venstreparti). A cross tabulation (see
Appendix 4) analysis between party preferences and 16b) revealed that
approximately 45 % of SV’s politicians in the survey had rated 16b) as very
important, i.e. given it a top score. FrP had the same rating. However, among the
Høyre (H) politicians the level was even higher, here 60 % of the respondents had
rated 16b) as very important. This indicated that SV’s low value on the culture index
could not be explained by the fact that they might have prioritized “better services”
over culture.
63 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Senterpartiet (Sp) received a beta coefficient of ‐.195 (.05 level) in comparison to V’s
politicians. This was less surprising than SV’s low score, as Sp’s voters according to
Aardal (1999) tend to be more orientated towards traditional values. Moreover, it
was postulated in this thesis that being a local or a regional politician had an
influence on the score, especially since the local politicians were city politicians. Sp,
originally the Farmers’ party has had great support in the rural areas of Norway
(Rokkan 1987). A crosstabulation between party preference and regional/local
politician revealed that this pattern still was true for Sp, as can be seen in Table 4.2. If
city politicians were more positive than regional politicians, this factor might add to
why Sp was among those most negative towards cultural strategies. The
crosstabulation was extended to include SV, however, here the distribution between
cities and regions was more even, and hence this could not explain why SV scored so
low on the culture index.
Table 4.2
As expected V had one of the highest scores in
the sample, however, as the coefficients of H,
KrF, Ap and ‘Others’ were not significant, it
was not possible to confirm that V scored
higher on the dependent variable than the
other parties. The lack of variation within this
group of parties was interesting, especially since KrF‐voters have tended to be more
on the traditional side and less post‐materialist than the rest of the group (Aardal
1999:62‐63). Appendix 3 displayed the correlation between education and party
preference, and this might be an explanation to why KrF received such high scores.
KrF’s respondents had a higher education level than the other parties (Pearson’s r
.232), and this could help explain the NPC attitude of the KrF respondents. Although
education did not have a significant effect on its own when party preference was
introduced, it did point in the direction that educated respondents were more
Crosstabulation, SV and SP
SV SP
Region 14 43.8 % 10 71.4 %
Municipality 18 56.2 % 4 28.6%
positive.
In the section on age, there was a finding that the age distribution within the sample
was uneven. It was found that SV and FrP had significantly younger respondents,
64 Let us entertain you!
while the “others” category had the oldest ones. It has now been shown that the SV
and FrP have the most negative respondents in the survey. The lack of significance
for age, and even the fact that age seemed to work in the opposite direction of what
was postulated in the hypothesis, might be attributed to the fact that the youngest
“parties” were the most negative towards cultural strategies. This indicates that
party politics, even on the regional and local political level, is more important for the
representative’s attitudes than their age.
It is clear that party preferences had a strong influence on the respondents’ score on
the culture index. The results have been most surprising, as SV, a party that was
predicted to be positive towards cultural strategies, in fact turned out to be one of
the most negative ones. The rank of the parties in the sample with respect to the
culture index is now, in ascending order, FrP, SV, Sp and H, Ap, V, KrF and “others” in
a joint top position. The headline’s assumption that there was a correlation between
female, young, educated, post‐materialist and cultural respondents does not hold
true. The female respondents confirmed that they were, as expected, more positive
towards cultural strategies than their male counterparts. However, neither age nor
education had the effects that were originally predicted. This means that most NPC
assumptions were rejected in the analysis. The conclusion to be drawn from this is
not that there are no elements of the NPC in Norway, however, the explanation
variables normally used to explain voter preferences, did not have the same
explanatory strength when applied to Norwegian politicians.
The data also contained information on the respondents’ political positions.
H6: The respondent’s position in the city council influences his or her
score on the cultural index.
The regression analysis revealed that whether a respondent held a mayor position
or other central political offices, such as Member of Parliament or member of the
regional or city board, or not, did not influence the dependent variable. This rejected
the argument that mayor tenure and leadership experience should improve the
willingness to support untraditional policy choices. In other words, H6 was rejected.
65 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .112 .012 .007 .84788 2 .196 .038 .028 .83893 3 .285 .081 .066 .82239 4 .520 .270 .229 .74716 5 .522 .272 .226 .74845
Table 4. 3
Coefficients
Model Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients
Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta VIF
1 (Constant)
4.256 .211 .000
Gender -.193 .126 -.112 .128 1.000 2 (Constant
) 3.626 .351 .000
Gender -.223 .126 -.129 .077 1.012 Age .013 .006 .162 .027 1.012
3 (Constant)
3.465 .348 .000
Gender -.258 .124 -.149 .038 1.021 Age .014 .006 .171 .017 1.014 Education .352 .121 .207 .004 1.010
4 (Constant)
4.496 .427 .000
Gender -.218 .115 -.126 .061 1.077 Age .004 .006 .055 .429 1.158 Education .173 .120 .102 .153 1.211 SV -.601 .276 -.260 .031 3.442 AP -.308 .260 -.163 .238 4.556 SP -.704 .329 -.195 .034 2.009 KrF -.431 .299 -.150 .151 2.600 H -.363 .270 -.163 .181 3.554 FrP -1.498 .297 -.569 .000 3.062 OTHERS -.212 .330 -.059 .522 2.018
5 (Constant)
4.474 .429 .000
Gender -.218 .116 -.126 .061 1.077 Age .005 .006 .058 .406 1.164 Education .173 .120 .102 .153 1.211 SV -.596 .277 -.258 .033 3.445 AP -.322 .262 -.170 .220 4.591 SP -.702 .330 -.195 .035 2.009 KrF -.451 .301 -.157 .135 2.629 H -.372 .271 -.167 .171 3.565 FrP -1.499 .297 -.569 .000 3.062
66 Let us entertain you!
OTHERS -.212 .330 -.059 .521 2.018 Position .091 .145 .042 .531 1.062
Table 4. 4
4.2.2 Peripheral, Poor and Innovative?
The second chapter postulated that poor and peripheral regions would be more
prone to support cultural strategies. The idea behind these thoughts was found in
Clarke & Gaile (1998) where the authors argued that …distressed cities are now more
likely to innovate and try these experimental strategies… (Clarke & Gaile 1998:11).
The first structural hypothesis was constructed to test the effect of economic distress
on the respondents’ attitudes towards cultural strategies in the regions and
municipalities in the survey.
H6: A sense of economic crisis in the respondent’s fylke or kommune will
increase the use of culture strategies.
To operationalize this hypothesis, the unemployment rate in every region and
municipality was used as a sign of economic distress. The data did support this,
however, the change in the R2 (Table 4.5) implied that unemployment rate accounted
for only approximately 2.0% of the total variance. The sixth hypothesis stated that a
sense of crisis would increase the score on the culture index, the standardized
regression coefficient when age, gender, education, position, party preference and
‘type of unit’ are controlled is ‐.157. The interpretation of this coefficient is that when
the unemployment rate is raised, the average score on the dependent variable is
decreased. The evidence did not support Clarke and Gaile’s (1998) findings from the
US, where distresses cities tended to be more innovative. This could be a result of the
operationalization of the variable. In Norway the overall unemployment rate in
November 2005 was 3.0 % (Statistics Norway, table 04471). The variance in the data
material was only 2.4 percent points, with 3.7 % as the highest value and 1.3 %
percent points as the lowest value. The lack of variation in the unemployment rate
can reduce the explanatory power of this variable.
The ninth IV was developed into two hypotheses on the basis that different
arguments suggested different effects for local and regional politicians on the culture
67 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
index. The H8a argued that because of the diminished responsibility in health care
issues, the fylkeskommune would be in search of new roles. Hence, the regional
politicians would be more interested in applying innovative strategies such as
culture.
H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize culture strategies higher than
city politicians because they are searching for new roles.
H8b argued that local politicians in cities were closer connected to their electorates
and therefore would be paying a closer attention to the performance of the city, and
thus, be more fascinated by new strategies such as culture.
H8b: City Politicians will prioritize culture strategies higher than
regional politicians because of their proximity to the citizens.
The regression analysis supported the second hypothesis. When region was coded
“one” and city was coded “two” the coefficient of .161 should be interpreted as when
everything else was equal, a local politician received a .161 higher score on the
culture index than a regional politician. The result is in agreement with the findings
by Gabriel et. al. (1998) on Germany. When examining determinants of mayors’
spending preferences, they found that when it came to “culture” and “parks and
recreation areas” the urban vs. rural dimension had the single most explanatory
power (ibid: 227). City mayors were more prone to spend money on these strategies
than mayors in more rural areas. Especially when thinking of the proposition 16x)
“construct infrastructure in the cultural sector” it was reasonable that cities scored
higher. Large theaters or cultural halls need a certain number of potential visitors
and this favors the cities in this sample. However, as the regional politicians were not
necessarily rural politicians but politicians for the entire fylkeskommune this
argument lost some of it potential. Regional politicians could also support their
.region by establishing houses of culture in the regions’ cities
The white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989) on regional policy in 1989
emphasized for the first time that the fylkeskommune should be given means to
develop their role as entrepreneurs and developers. This view has been upheld in the
white papers on regional policy that have followed since. The argument was that
68 Let us entertain you!
with this political support, the regional politicians would be more positive towards
cultural strategies, as they were supposed to act as development agents. However,
the analysis disclosed that the regional politicians were in fact less positive than the
local respondents. Hypothesis H8b has thus been confirmed, while the H8a has been
rejected.
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .112 .012 .007 .84788 2 .196 .038 .028 .83893 3 .285 .081 .066 .82239 4 .520 .270 .229 .74716 5 .522 .272 .226 .74845 6 .543 .295 .246 .73881 7 .565 .320 .269 .72773
Table 4. 5
Hypothesis number nine took Clark’s (Clark 2004b:111) claim that an unfriendly
climate in combination with long distance to relevant markets, made peripheral
areas such as Northern‐Norway more exposed to international competition, as a
point of departure when developing the following hypothesis:
H9: Politicians in peripheral regions are more prone to support cultural
strategies.
The argument was that areas exposed to competition would actively try to make up
for their short‐comings and enhance their stance in the global economy and hence,
prioritize cultural strategies. The independent variable was operationalized along
Rokkan & Urwin’s (1983) ideas that a periphery is economically dependent,
geographically distant and culturally different. The three components of the variable
were treated as one block in the analysis. The analysis was limited to the regional
politicians which meant that the N was 102. This also meant that the other
coefficients might be changed in comparison to the coefficients in Table 4. 4 and
When introducing the three center‐peripheriality (CP) measures into the analysis,
three things happened. First, gender was no longer significant. Second, the
unemployment rate was not significant. Third, the explanatory power (R2) of the
69 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
model was heightened to .496. The model’s explanatory power (adjusted R2) was
approximately 37 % (Table 4.7). This meant that when controlling for the CP
dimension, gender could no longer explain the variation in the dependent variable.
This suggested a correlation between gender and the CP‐dimension. Moreover, the
effect of unemployment on the dependent variable was diminished by the
introduction of the C‐P dimension, and again, this suggested a correlation between
unemployment rate and the one or more of the items in the CP‐dimension. In
particular, the size of the state block grants and the level of unemployment rate
displayed a correlation (see Appendix 5).
Coefficients Model Unstandardized
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta VIF
6 (Constant) 5.001 .479 .000 Gender -.193 .115 -.112 .094 1.087 Age .003 .006 .044 .529 1.173 Education .176 .119 .104 .140 1.211 SV -.533 .275 -.230 .054 3.478 AP -.262 .260 -.138 .315 4.636 SP -.735 .326 -.204 .025 2.013 KrF -.413 .297 -.143 .167 2.637 H -.319 .269 -.143 .237 3.591 FrP -1.481 .294 -.562 .000 3.064 OTHERS -.194 .326 -.054 .554 2.020 Position .119 .143 .055 .409 1.069 Unemployment -.260 .110 -.156 .019 1.073
7 (Constant) 4.584 .500 .000 Gender -.217 .113 -.126 .057 1.094 Age .005 .005 .056 .410 1.180 Education .141 .118 .083 .233 1.228 SV -.541 .270 -.234 .047 3.479 AP -.291 .256 -.153 .258 4.645 SP -.687 .321 -.190 .034 2.020 KrF -.367 .294 -.128 .213 2.647 H -.334 .265 -.150 .208 3.593 FrP -1.439 .290 -.546 .000 3.074 OTHERS -.295 .324 -.082 .364 2.051 Position .142 .141 .065 .318 1.074 Unemployment -.262 .108 -.157 .016 1.073 Regional vs.
local pol. .281 .111 .165 .013 1.096
Table 4. 6
70 Let us entertain you!
Running the regression analysis revealed that only one of the three components in
the C‐P‐dimension had an influence on the culture index. Both financial support and
“support of KrF” did not have significant coefficients, province (landsdel), was the
only component with an effect on the dependent variable. Østlandet, Nord‐Norge,
Trøndelag and Vestlandet had approximately the same value on the dependent
variable. The respondents from Sørlandet, on the other hand, were more positive
towards cultural strategies than the politicians from the other four provinces. In
other words, the geographic component was the only part of the center‐periphery
analysis that had an effect on this issue. This should be taken into account when
interpreting the positive effect for KrF’s voters on the dependent variable, as
especially Kristiansand and Vest‐Agder and this province is known for its strong
support of this party8. A last comment must be added, two of the items in the CP‐
dimension are potential examples of collinearity, province, here understood as
Sørlandet, and support of KrF. The VIF for the two items is respectively 6.752 and
8.105, both rather high values. This indicates that both variables are correlated with
each other, and hence, that it is difficult to come up with their isolated effect on the
dependent variable (Skog 2003:274). A consequence of this could have been to
exclude one of the two indicators, however, that would mean a loss of information,
and as both the indicators were theoretically interesting, they were kept in the
analysis.
Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate 1 .622 .387 .292 .75970 2 .705 .496 .369 .71715
Table 4.7
8 In the Parliament election in 2005, KrF received 17,7 % of the votes in Kristiansand, and 18,9 % in Vest‐Agder, which in the case of Vest‐Agder, was the best result for KrF in the country.
71 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Coefficients
Model Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients
Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta VIF
6 (Constant) 4.768 .710 .000 Gender -.180 .182 -.100 .325 1.273 Age .009 .008 .102 .289 1.144 C .058 .189 .032 .760 1.376 SV -.691 .407 -.271 .093 3.187 AP -.282 .396 -.135 .478 4.518 SP -.483 .454 -.144 .291 2.308 KrF -.480 .411 -.175 .247 2.827 H -.319 .409 -.132 .438 3.625 FrP -1.616 .413 -.671 .000 3.699 OTHERS -.303 .655 -.050 .645 1.453 Position .260 .209 .118 .217 1.134 Unemployment -.321 .169 -.184 .062 1.180
7 (Constant) 4.769 .876 .000 Gender -.066 .176 -.037 .707 1.332 Age .003 .008 .034 .715 1.216 Education .102 .184 .057 .580 1.468 SV -.496 .408 -.194 .228 3.609 AP -.092 .398 -.044 .817 5.109 SP -.293 .450 -.087 .517 2.538 KrF -.490 .397 -.179 .222 2.963 H -.132 .401 -.055 .743 3.906 FrP -1.588 .400 -.660 .000 3.892 OTHERS -.092 .629 -.015 .884 1.505 Position .233 .209 .106 .268 1.268 Unemployment -.484 .242 -.278 .049 2.708 Block grants in
% .012 .018 .086 .513 2.438
Support for KrF -.002 .051 -.011 .964 8.105 Sørlandet .929 .625 .325 .142 6.752 Vestlandet -.008 .325 -.004 .981 3.526 Trøndelag -.340 .305 -.108 .270 1.322 Nord-Norge -.007 .383 -.003 .985 2.970
Table 4.8
4.3 Summary
To end this chapter I will give a short summary of the analysis. The first section of the
chapter put the cultural hypothesis to the test: Did the politicians support cultural
strategies? The test disclosed that the hypothesis was somewhat supported. When
72 Let us entertain you!
applying the six components extracted in the factor analysis, the knowledge,
competence and cultural strategies were the most supported strategies. The cultural
items alone were also on the popular end of the scale, all in all, the first hypothesis
found partial support.
The second hypothesis stated that women were more likely to support cultural
strategies than men. When controlling age, party preference, political position and
education, gender was significant and the negative coefficient confirmed the
hypothesis. However, when unemployment rate and the CP‐dimension were
introduced into the analysis, gender was no longer significant. Hence, province as an
expression of CP was more important to the value on the dependent variable than
gender.
Young respondents were predicted to be more positive toward culture than older
respondents. The regression analysis revealed that, when controlling age and
education, the older politicians were more positive than the younger ones. However,
when party preference was introduced, the coefficient was no longer significant. This
implies that the positive effect was partly spurious and caused by the uneven age
distribution within the parties. Consequently, the third hypothesis was rejected.
The fourth hypothesis concerned education. As the literature on this subject
predicted that the persons with higher education were more positive to NPC
strategies than persons with little education, the hypothesis stated that high
education would give a high score on the culture index. When first analyzing the data,
education showed a significant influence on the dependent variable. When
controlling for age and gender, education still had a significant influence on the
dependent variable. When party preference, unemployment rate and center‐
periphery were added, the significance level was reduced, and education did no more
e have an effect on the culture index. Hence, the hypothesis was reject d.
The fifth hypothesis stated that political preference would have an effect on the
dependent variable. This was supported. V, H, KrF and Ap proved to be the most
positive parties with respect to the culture index. Most surprisingly, SV turned out to
be among the most negative parties, contrary to earlier predictions. As predicted, FrP
73 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
turned out to be the most negative, while SP was able to sneak in between SV and V,
H, KrF and AP. However, the most unexpected part of this analysis was that party
preferences seemed to outmaneuver the other independent variables. Only gender so
far survived the inclusion of party preference, and even the strength of gender was
significantly reduced when party preference was accounted for. This finding was a
surprise, although the literature and theory in this field has shown that party
preference among other variables explain the attitude towards NPC variables, the
strength of party preference was unexpected.
Political position does not matter for the choice of policy response. The sixth
hypothesis stated that there would be a difference in score on the culture index
between mayors and ordinary city or county board members. This assumption was
rejected in the analysis.
The next hypothesis declared that a sense of economic crisis would increase the
choice of cultural strategies. The empirical evidence proved this assumption to be
wrong. Holding age, gender, education, party preference and type of answer
constant, a higher unemployment rate did not support a higher use of culture
strategies. In fact, the higher the unemployment rate, the lower was culture
prioritized. In the analysis of the regional politicians, this effect was reduced when
the center‐periphery variables were introduced. Then economic crisis turned out to
have no effect on the dependent variable.
The eighth hypothesis was divided into two. As the arguments concerned “type of
unit” or whether regional or local politicians would be more positive towards
culture, pulled in different directions, the two following hypotheses were developed:
H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than
city politicians because they are searching for new roles.
H8b: City Politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than
regional politicians because of their proximity to the citizens.
The empirical evidence was clear that H8b was to be kept and H8a rejected. With a
positive coefficient of .165, the city politicians turned out to be more positive than
the regional politicians.
74 Let us entertain you!
The last hypothesis concerned the center‐periphery dimension. The theory predicted
that the more peripheral a region was, the more prone its politicians would be to
support new strategies such as culture. This variable was only tested on the data for
the regional politicians as the local respondents were city politicians and thus not
situated on a peripheral area. Although only one of the items turned out to be
significant, province (landsdel), the evidence showed that the regional politicians
from Sørlandet tended to be more supportive of cultural strategies. It is also worth
noting that the center‐periphery variables removed the effect of unemployment rate
in the data material. This is not surprising, financial support and unemployment was
expected to correlate.
The results from the analysis have been summed up in table 4.9. These findings will
be discussed further in the concluding part of the thesis.
Hypothesis Theme
Supported
H1 Cultural strategies vs. other strategies. Partial
H2 Women more positive than men. Yes
H3 Younger more positive than older. No
H4 Educated more positive than less educated No
H5a
FrP the most negative. Yes
H5b SV the most positive. No
H5c V the most positive. Yes
H6 Position matters. No
H7 Economic crisis increases the score on the culture index. Yes
H8a Regional politicians more positive. No
H8b. City politicians more positive. Yes
H9 Peripheral regions are more positive. Partial
Table 4. 9
75 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
5.1 Main Findings
Three research questions were asked in the first chapter. Question number one
concerned the theoretical argument: Why is culture becoming an increasingly popular
strategy for regional economical development? In chapter two theories were
presented arguing that the modes of production had changed as the economic
structures shifted from a fordist to a post‐fordist arrangement. This shift produced
yet another change, this time towards a more specialized division of work. Due to the
specialization of production, a new social class of workers, be it creatives or symbolic
analysts, emerged. The members of the new social class were educated, mobile and,
drawn towards other members of the same class. This, in turn, led to a clustering of
young, talented workers in zones rich in creativity and knowledge‐intensive
businesses. Analysts, such as Clark (2004) and Florida (2004) found an interest in
these zones, and discovered that in addition to creative and competent inhabitants,
these regions were also rich in amenities and culture. Clark found that, contrary to
what has normally been assumed, the cultural diversity was not a mere bi‐product of
the economic success these zones had experienced. In fact, his findings pointed in the
opposite direction. The creative class members moved around the world in search of
culture and amenities. This led him to conclude that what an opera has to offer in
terms of cultural amenities, products and services, drives urban growth.
Florida (2002) argued that culture is important because it works as a magnet on
talented workers. As the theoretical discussion revealed, culture, understood in a
broad sense as amenities and entertainment, have an effect on where people settle to
live and work. Thus, culture contributes to economic growth. This growth generated
from culture, is a result of two different processes. First, culture is an attractor.
Members of the creative class, with education and specialized skills, are attracted to
76 Let us entertain you!
areas with a broad range of leisure activities in addition to job options. This
attraction results in population growth, and an educated and competent workforce.
This results in a comparative advantage to the region. The second process works in a
more traditional way. The cultural sector has become a large employer, thus there is
a direct effect on economic growth from this sector. The two processes are
intercorrelated. The population growth that the first process caused boosts the need
for new workers in the cultural and the service sector. Thus, the two processes
interfere with each other, thus creating a strong growth mechanism.
This thesis tried to apply this causal chain to the case of Norway, through research
question number two: How positive are Norwegian politicians towards cultural
strategies for urban and regional growth? When comparing cultural strategies to
other strategies, the empirical evidence showed that the respondents’ attitudes
towards cultural strategies represented through the mean attitude, were highly
positive. Especially the item “trying to attract knowledge‐based workers” was a much
valued strategy. However, the respondents’ scores on the dependent variable
revealed substantial variation. The politicians’ answers varied from completely
uninterested in choosing cultural strategies, to giving them a perfect score. In other
words, there is disagreement between Norwegian city and regional politicians on
th p c n t. whe er to rioritize ulture or o
The third research question: Which politicians are positive towards cultural
strategies? dealt with this conflict. Through answering the question an attempt was
made to explain what determined on which side of the conflict a respondent would
end up. Education, age, and political position could not explain the variance in the
dependent variable. Two individual characteristics did have an influence on the
dependent variable, respectively gender and political preference. Women were
significantly more prone to support cultural strategies than men. The influence of
party preference was unexpectedly strong. The hypothesis postulated that SV’s
respondents would be among the most positive towards the strategies in question.
However, the regression analysis disconfirmed this hypothesis, based on Aardal’s
(1999) findings SV has had the most positive voters with respect to strategies and
values often referred to as post‐materialist or part of the new political culture. This
77 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
result could mean that SV has had a change of heart concerning these issues. If that is
not the case, then SV’s politicians are surprisingly unresponsive towards the values
and opinions of their voters.
As the hypothesis predicted, FrP’s politicians turned out to be those most negative
towards cultural strategies. The average FrP politician’s value on the dependent
variable was .546 units lower than the value of the politicians in V, SV, FrP and SP
clustered on the negative side of the continuum, while AP, H, KrF and V grouped
themselves on the opposite side. This finding contradicts the results of Inglehart
(1990). Inglehart found that center‐left parties are slightly more likely to be post‐
materialist than center‐right parties, whereas in Norway, the parties that form a
center of the political spectrum, are grouped against the left and right wings together
with SP. In addition to this unexpected grouping of parties, the strength of the party
variable itself was surprising. Party preference was clearly the set of variables that
had the highest explanatory power in the model. In fact, of the variables in the
original model of analysis, only the assumptions on the influence of gender, party,
unemployment and regional vs. local politicians were fully confirmed in the analysis.
The analysis of the variable regional vs. local politicians also provided important
findings. When trying to develop a hypothesis, it became obvious that the arguments
pointed in different directions. The solution was to add two hypotheses, one that
assumed that the regional politicians would be the most positive, and one that
assumed that local politicians would prioritize culture more than regional politicians
would do. The analysis revealed a clear pattern; the politicians in the municipalities
were clearly more supportive of culture than the regional representatives were. The
results disclosed a more traditional attitude to the region’s role as a development
agent than what was found in the cities. Regions are slower or more reluctant to
prioritize cultural strategies. Does this indicate lack of capacity for policy innovation
in regions, or that the theory is inadequate in the Norwegian context? This issue will
be picked up in the last section of this chapter.
An additional analysis was carried out, including only regional politicians in order to
test the centre‐periphery (CP) hypothesis. The CP dimension consisted of three
78 Let us entertain you!
items: province (landsdel), size of block grants from the state, and the level of
support for the Christian People’s Party (KrF). These measures provided little
support for the hypothesis that peripheral regions would be more supportive of
cultural strategies. The other two indicators of peripheriality do not seem to have
any influence. One peripheral county, Finmark, seems to stand out with a particularly
high level of polarization in the attitudes toward cultural strategies. The impression
from the data in Finmark is that there is heavy polarization in this county, with the
respondents distributed at the two extremes of the scale9. The results are surprising,
as Finmark, maybe the most disadvantaged area in Norway, does not seem more
eager than other counties to try alternative strategies to increase its attractiveness.
5.2 Two Norwegian Trends
When analyzing the data, two possible trends became evident. First, are we
witnessing the emergence of a new political cleavage? Second, does the popularity of
cultural strategies accelerate the ongoing process of centralization, thus under
cutting the overall goal of Norwegian regional policy?
My presentation of Norwegian examples of cultural strategies pointed at an ongoing
debate between supporters and opponents of cultural growth strategies. Opponents
claimed that the level of spending on culture was too high and that it had led to a
worsening of the situation for the elderly in Kristiansand. The fight was over whether
to choose a traditional or a new approach to enhancing their city’s position in a
competitive economy. FrP and D stood on the same side condemning spending on
culture. On its own, that is not a surprise, as FrP have often belittled culture,
especially high culture (Skjævesland 2007, Gjerde 2007). However, seen in
conjunction with the attitude of SV’s politicians in this study, it is obvious that we
have an unusual composition of parties on the anti‐cultural side. Cultural strategies
9 It must be stresses that thi conclusion is drawn from data consisting of only a few respondents.
79 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
are policy choices that do not fit with the traditional left‐right political scheme. Could
this be a sign of an emerging political cleavage?
According to the theory of new political culture, championships of social issues and
conservative fiscal policy have been found to go together (Clark & Inglehart
1998:11). This study reveals some of the same tendencies. The center‐left and –right
parties support new strategies and the populist left and right are in favor of
strategies that increase the overall spending on traditional welfare issues. SV and
FrP, as well as AP, and Sp, have joined forces before in a display of ‘fiscal liberalism’,
understood as an inclination to increase the public expenditures, in an attempt to
provide cheaper child care (Stortingets instilling nr 250, 2002‐2003). These issues
divide the political systems along new lines. The level of spending on service
provision is still a political issue, but, overall, the welfare state has strong support
from parties of all colors. This lack of political disagreement opens up for other
conflicts, and thus a new political cleavage.
The second trend in the data concerns the ongoing centralization of population and
economic activity in Norway. At the heart of the Norwegian debate on regional policy
is the position of the rural areas of Norway. The long‐established aim of Norwegian
regional policy has been to secure the living standards of these areas through
subsidies and development of infrastructure. The 1990’s brought on a shift in this
policy area. Cities were given a role in regional policy more than before. However, it
is still claimed that regional policy under the label “balanced development” aims at
stabilizing the economic situation of the rural parts of Norway. In the light of Clarke
& Gaile’s (1998) findings, that peripheral areas are more exposed to competition, it
could be expected that politicians from these areas were more willing to think
alternatively. The analysis discourages this idea. The cities are more innovative than
the regional level when it comes to implementing new strategies, and with the
exception of Sørlandet as a cultural periphery, peripheral regions are no more
innovative than central regions.
The objective of cultural strategies is to attract creative and knowledge‐based
workers to an area or a region in order to generate a population growth. When these
80 Let us entertain you!
strategies have more support in the cities, and probably more often applied, the
result is that these areas gain yet an advantage. And cities already have an advantage
by being cities. According to the pattern found in my, there is little evidence that this
policy will help the rural regions close the gap between themselves and the cities.
When analyzing the data along a geographic dimension, the southern part of Norway
is the most innovative in the sense that it is the regions that are the most positive to
cultural strategies. It is also a region where large amounts of money are spent on a
wide range of cultural activities. However, in the Greater Kristiansand region as well
as in the rest of Norway, people are moving from the countryside and into more
urbanized regions. Hence, if amenities do drive urban growth, the cities are the
winners.
5.3 Is this Theory too American to Fit the Case of Norway?
Some patterns found in the data diverged from the model of analysis that was set up
in the theory section. Variables that belong in the core of the NPC/PM theory like
gender, education and especially age had little or no explanatory power. Instead, the
difference between regional and city politicians and party preferences were the main
predictors of support for cultural strategies. Does this mean that the NPC have little
support in Norway? The answer seems to be two‐faced. On one hand, the pattern in
Norway matched the pattern found elsewhere (Gabriel et. al. 1998); cities are
important providers of culture. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the
political preferences points in the opposite direction. As the parties did not group
according to the left‐right scheme of class politics, the explanatory power of parties
does not necessarily mean a step away from the NPC‐theory. The division between
on the one hand the populist right, the populist left and the center‐party (SP) and on
the other hand AP, H, KrF and V demands other explanations than class politics can
supply. And the NPC does provide such an explanation.
The NPC theory has its backdrop in developments of the American economy and the
value changes of American citizens. These value changes have happened in both
political parties and the electorate. American politics is, however, not Norwegian
81 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
politics, and the political culture in a state with proportional elections may be
different from the American political culture. In spite of this, traces of these value
changes have also been found in Norway, although the Norwegian people do not fit
Inglehart’s theory10 (Hellevik 2001). I nevertheless want to suggest that the patterns
visible in this thesis might be a NPC compatible pattern emerging in the Norwegian
context. The fact that FrP, SV and SP are demonstrating the same inclinations
concerning cultural strategies, underlines the problems of the party systems to adapt
to new political conflicts of a less materialist or economic character. It is too early to
conclude as to the fate of NPC in Norway. However, the increased volatility of
Norwegian, and Western voters may indicate that the political culture is changing.
10 With the exception of the years 1985‐1987, in which the Norwegian population form a perfect fit to Inglehart’s model (Hellevik 2001).
82 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Appendix
Appendix 1
Age Age Pearson
Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed) N 201
SV Pearson Correlation
-, 142(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) ,045 N 201
AP Pearson Correlation
,020
Sig. (2-tailed) ,776 N 201
SP Pearson Correlation
-, 040
Sig. (2-tailed) ,570 N 201
V Pearson Correlation
,068
Sig. (2-tailed) ,338 N 201
KrF Pearson Correlation
-, 033
Sig. (2-tailed) ,646 N 201
H Pearson Correlation
,076
Sig. (2-tailed) ,285 N 201
FrP Pearson Correlation
-, 144(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) ,042 N 201
OTHERS
Pearson Correlation
,257(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 N 201
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
83 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Appendix 2
Component Matrix Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 16a) satse på
regionalpolitiske/næringspolitiske oppgaver
.657 .224 .169 .196 -.083 .052
16b) bedre tjenesteyter .245 .365 -.036 -.324 .457 .115 16c) Omorganisering .087 -.064 .422 .178 .192 .556
16d) overta oppgaver fra staten .501 -.130 .438 .373 -.031 -.350 16e) kommune/
fylkessammenslaåing .356 .207 .081 .584 .373 .088
16f) samarbeide med andre komm/strategiske allisanser
.715 -.030 -.025 -.055 .006 -.130
16g) allianser med regioner i andre land
.645 -.488 .018 .001 .076 -.108
16h) skolering -håndtering av internasjonale kontakter
.632 -.415 -.271 -.056 .121 .046
16i) markedsføre fylket/kommune .669 -.335 -.261 .004 -.010 .179
16j) eget internasjonalt utvalg .566 -.540 -.091 .016 .150 .079 16k) styrke reisebudsjettene .642 -.405 -.364 .088 .151 .025
16l) overføre oppg. fra kommune til fylket/ fra fylket til kommune
.189 .431 -.404 .457 .198 .079
16m) forbedre samspill fylke-kommune
.358 -.229 .543 -.297 -.194 -.012
16n) overføre utviklingspol arb fra stat til region/kommune
.584 -.064 .453 .323 -.019 -.359
16o) konsentrere kommune/fylke om utviklingspol oppg
.292 -.198 -.067 .099 -.549 .384
16p) utvikling av teknologiske kompetansesentra
.629 .250 -.043 .121 -.305 .193
16q) strategiske allianser med uni/høgskole/næringsliv
.763 .286 .149 -.194 -.145 -.021
16r) satsing på høyere utdannelse .616 .331 .297 -.204 .025 .060
16s) bedre kommunikasjon i regionen
.652 .205 .237 -.064 .035 .288
16t) regionalt europakontor .237 -.211 .181 -.278 .472 .049 16u) tiltrekke kunnskapsbasert
arbeidskraft .688 .318 .027 -.292 .024 -.028
16v) by-/kommuneutvikling - rekreasjon, underholdning
.699 .231 -.293 -.207 .061 -.178
16w) etablere stiftelser - nyetablering i kultur/kunnskap
.622 .135 -.345 .026 -.256 .044
16x) utbygginger innenfor kultursektoren
.558 .209 -.320 -.030 -.074 -.275
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 6 components extracted.
84 Let Us Entertain You!
Appendix 3
Pearons’s correlation between party preference and education.
Education
Education Pearson Correlation
1
Sig. (2-tailed) N 205
SV Pearson Correlation
,110
Sig. (2-tailed) ,118 N 205
AP Pearson Correlation
-, 074
Sig. (2-tailed) ,291 N 205
SP Pearson Correlation
,117
Sig. (2-tailed) ,094 N 205
KrF Pearson Correlation
,232(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 N 205
H Pearson Correlation
,028
Sig. (2-tailed) ,691 N 205
FrP Pearson Correlation
-, 292(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 N 205
OTHERS Pearson Correlation
-, 064
Sig. (2-tailed) ,364 N 205
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
85 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
Appendix 4 Better service provider * party preferences Crosstabulation
SV AP SP V KrF H FrP Better service
prov. 1 Coun
t 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
0 % .0% .0% .0% .0% 3.1% 9.1% 2 Coun
t 2 3 1 0 0 0 1
6.5 % 5.8% 9.1% .0% .0% .0% 4.5% 3 Coun
t 1 4 1 1 4 7 0
3.2 % 7.7% 9.1% 11.1% 22.2% 21.9% .0% 4 Coun
t 14 27 8 3 7 5 9
45.2 % 51.9% 72.7% 33.3% 38.9% 15.6% 40.9% 5 Coun
t 14 18 1 5 7 19 10
45.2 % 34.6% 9.1% 55.6% 38.9% 59.4% 45.5% Total Coun
t 31 52 11 9 18 32 22
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Appendix 5 Correlations
Unemp. Block Grants
Pearson Correlation
1 .288(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
Uneom-ploy-ment
N 203 203 Pearson
Correlation .288(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
Block grants
N 203 203 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
86 Let Us Entertain You!
Appendix 6
1Det hevdes at internasjonaliseringen fører til en situasjon med økende konkurranse mellom regioner og kommuner i Europa. Hva bør etter ditt syn din fylkeskommune gjøre for å hevde seg i denne konkurransen?
Kryss av for om du er enig eller uenig i følgende satsinger.
Helt uenig
1
2
Vanskelig å si
3
4
Helt enig
5
a) Satse mer på regionpolitiske oppgaver/ næringsutvikling
b) Bli en bedre tjenestyter (helsetjenester, utdanning, osv.)
c) Omorganisere regionens organisasjon, ledelse og styringsstruktur
d) Overta oppgaver som i dag utføres av staten
e) Større fylkeskommuner/ slå sammen med andre
f) Samarbeide med andre fylkeskommuner/ strategiske allianser
g) Etablere allianser med regioner i andre land/grenseregionalt samarbeid
h) Skolere administrasjonen til å håndtere internasjonale kontakter bedre
i) Markedsføre fylket internasjonalt
j) Sette ned et eget internasjonalt utvalg i fylkestinget
k) Styrke reisebudsjettene for internasjonale kontakter for politikere og tjenestemenn
l) Overføre utviklingsoppgaver som i dag ivaretas av kommunen til fylkeskommunen
m) Forbedre fylkeskommunens samspill
16
1 A translation of this questionnaire can be found in table 4.1.
87 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
med kommunen n) Overføre mer av det
utviklingspolitiske arbeidet fra staten til regionene
o) Konsentrere fylkeskommunen om utviklingsoppgaver
p) Delta i utviklingen av teknologiske kompetansesentra
q) Inngå strategiske allianser/partnerskap med universiteter/ høgskoler/næringsliv
r) Stimulere til satsing på høyere utdannelse i regionen
s) Utvikle bedre kommunikasjoner (elektronisk infrastruktur) i regionen
t) Etablere/ videreutvikle regionalt Europa-/EU-kontor
u) Satse på å tiltrekke seg kunnskapsbasert arbeidskraft.
v) Satse på by-/ kommuneutvikling med hensyn til rekreasjons- og underholdnings-muligheter.
w) Etablere stiftelser eller andre ordninger for å stimulere til nyetablering innenfor kultur- og kunnskapssektoren.
x) Foreta utbygginger innenfor kultursektoren (teaterhus, kulturhus eller lignende).
88 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo
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