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Landing Craft Capability Advances and Implications for the Force Mix
Following the protracted and costly land campaigns of the early 21st Century, national security
strategies are refocusing upon the maritime domain as their preferred base from which to generate
and sustain required effects. The littoral remains an important and challenging part of this domain,
not least when projecting power ashore during an amphibious operation. Both contemporary and
emerging threats have made this seam between land and sea even more contested, reflected in the
doctrinal push to position sea bases well beyond the horizon. For example, the USMC Expeditionary
Force 21 Concept1 refers to advance force/shaping operations being launched at ranges from 65+
Nautical Miles (NM), and surface assault waves with ranges between 30 – 12 NM for transit to the
beach2. Operating at such range provides increased protection to the amphibious task force and a
greater degree of uncertainty for any adversary; they will struggle to predict both where and when
beaches may be crossed to manoeuvre towards a number of potential objectives. Conversely, it
creates a significant problem for the amphibious force in generating the required tempo of the
surface assault, providing the necessary offload volume in time to complement and support the
aviation assault component. To meet this challenge, amphibious forces should embrace recent (and
affordable) advances in surface connector technology to decrease both transit times and craft
vulnerability.
The Drive to Launch at Range
Threats to an Amphibious Task Group (ATG) operating close to the land are varied and considerable.
Fast aircraft and guided missiles will use terrain masking when approaching over land; the closer the
ATG to the shore, the shorter it’s response times. The ranges of any enemy shore based artillery
(and their associated surveillance mechanisms) must be considered when selecting an Amphibious
Operating Area. Platforms tasked with protecting the ATG will need maximum manoeuvre space
and a high ship speed to ensure the effectiveness of decoy measures. Threats from Fast Inshore
Attack Craft (FIAC), (whether deployed as an asymmetric (state operated) or irregular (terrorist
operated) means) is mitigated by range, allowing earlier tracking, identification and selective action.
The greater the range from FIAC operating bases, with a potentially increased sea state further from
shore, makes such craft less potent. Below the waves it can be argued that shallower water reduces
the conventional submarine threat (although uncertain hydrography bites both ways) but small SSK,
mini-submarines and even divers could devastate an ATG in confined and shallow waters. Mine
laying options increase with proximity to the coastline, as does the vulnerability of mine counter-
measure operations. An ATG operating at range will allow an early warning of threats, platform
manoeuvrability, full operating freedom of weapons and counter measures and a reduced
vulnerability to mines; it is also increasingly difficult to detect and track.
The Transfer of Risk from Platforms to Connectors
Whilst many of the capabilities available to a defender are not new (at least in concept) the modern
amphibious force’s appetite for risk has reduced, reflecting the decrease in the number of assets
1. (USMC 2014) 2. (USMC presentation at Sea-Air-Space 2014)
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available and the consequences of the loss of even one major platform. Carrier strike and
amphibious platforms may need to group even closer in order to share some or all of the anti-air,
anti-surface and anti-under-water capability available. In the same way that a modern amphibious
force will not choose to select a landing beach it knows will be heavily opposed, it will also strive to
minimise the threats to the launch and sustainment of the operation.
In effect, these littoral risks are transferred to the aviation and surface connectors. Whilst critical as
a component, they are more numerous, detection and targeting is more difficult and individual
losses are more bearable. The increased range to the amphibious objectives clearly affects the
tempo for both aviation and surface assault waves, critical for exploiting the advantage of
operational surprise, but the latter faces a disproportionately negative impact. Despite the wider use
of heavy lift helicopters (e.g. MH53, CH47) within the amphibious inventory, and the development of
such capabilities as the tilt rotor MV-22 Osprey, their maximum payload capability is between 8 - 15
tons3, below the weight of many modern fighting and logistic vehicles. The need for greater anti-
mine protection has seen these vehicle weights increase. The utility and reliance on these vehicles,
alongside the inherent flexibility of delivering force by both sea and air, means that surface
manoeuvre remains a fundamental element of projecting power from the sea.
The Surface Connector Challenge
The performance of the heavy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) continues to provide a very real
solution to the issue of covering distance quickly; with the full weight load of a Main Battle Tank
(MBT) it has a planning speed4 of 40 knots and can reach a beach (and beyond) at 30 NM from its
launch in 45 minutes5. Their ability to cross 80% of the globe’s coastlines6 and operate into the
hinterland over mud, marsh, ice and sand make them a highly attractive asset. However, they are
comparatively expensive to purchase, run, maintain and train to operate, and numbers carried
within an ATG are limited. Their wide beam restricts the number stowed in the amphibious platform
dock, being broadly twice the width of an LCU (UK MK10) that can lift the same MBT load.
Fig 1 - US LCAC
3. (Bell n.d.) (Placeholder1) 4. Planning Speed – the operating speed used to gauge journey times for planning purposes. 5. (Textron Marine & Land Systems 2011) 6. (ibid)
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There are indications of concern within the most capable amphibious force in the world, the United
States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine Corps (USMC), that their current surface connector
capacity does not close the gap between doctrinal aspiration and operational reality7. Despite the
impressive speed of the LCAC, their finite numbers carried within an ATG and the extended
operating range means that the build-up of heavy equipment shore side is not fast enough. The fact
that the USMC have abandoned their extensive and expensive efforts to develop an Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle that could triple the afloat speeds of the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(between 8- 12 knots)8, exacerbates this issue further. The Mobile Landing Platform concept9,
providing more LCACs and an increased operating capacity, will undoubtedly mitigate some of this
shortfall. However, the transition of Ship Life Extension Programme (SLEP) LCACs to the new LCAC-
100 fleet over the next 20 years may see a decline in availability before the new connector fleet is
fully in place.10
The challenge of operating well beyond the horizon is even more of an issue for those amphibious
forces without heavy LCAC to deliver armour, vehicles and combat supplies to the beach. The speed
of conventional displacement landing craft (utility) has changed little since their development from
World War II, with planning speeds varying from approximately 14 knots for lighter loads (60 ton
tank and below) to 9-10 knots (72 ton tank). Originally planned to operate within less than 5 NM of
the beach, the extended range of declared sea bases does not allow the required tempo of
amphibious flow. Whilst first waves can be launched to ensure arrival at H-Hour, it is the interval
between the second, third and on stream waves that are so important to the Commander Land
Forces, to ensure consolidation on the objectives before any counter attack. Slower landing craft
become more exposed and vulnerable to enemy action on theses longer transits to and from the
beach, with crew times extended and embarked troops fatigued.
Modern Alternatives to the LCAC?
However, recent developments offer a real alternative to non-displacement surface connectors. The
French company CNIM have designed the L-CAT 100, a catamaran hulled landing craft used by the
French Navy since 2011, with a well deck mounted on rams, that when raised clear of the water is
able to operate at speeds of up to 25 knots, depending on the load.11 When the ramp is lowered the
craft can operate in shallow water towards the beach, or even offload at a jetty.
7. (USMC Surface Connector Summit 2014) 8. (LVTP7 Landing Vehicle, Tracked 2014) 9. (The US Navy’s Mobile Landing Platform Ships (MLP) 2015) 10. (Commander Naval Sea Systems Command | 1333 Isaac Hull Avenue, SE | Washington Navy Yard, DC 20376-1080 | 202-781-0000 | n.d.) 11. (IHS Janes 2015)
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Fig 2. CNIM L-CAT 100
A more traditionally robust design, but with a step change in capability, is BMT’s Fast Landing Craft
(FLC), the Caimen® 90. A shaped monohull with BMT’s Tribow design and three powerful waterjets,
it is broadly the same size as a UK Mk 10 LCU. It has been tank tested to be able to deliver a 90 ton
load at 22 knots, and 40 knots when unloaded12. Notably this performance is only marginally
impacted by sea state, with a speed drop of only 1 knot at sea state 4. The same sea state, with
wave heights between 1.25 – 2.5 metres, will have a far more detrimental impact on a loaded LCAC’s
operating speed13.
Fig 3. BMT Caimen®90 Fast Landing Craft
There are other penalties associated with operating LCACs. High daily and routine maintenance
rates reflect both the complexity and cost of a gas turbine against a diesel engine, and the
vulnerability of some LCAC components such as the skirt. The twin gas turbine engines have a high
fuel use rate, at approximately 1000 US gallons per hour (with payload) to transit 40 NM14.
12. (BMT DSL 2014) 13. (Textron Marine & Land Systems 2011) 14. (Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 2014)
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Compare this to a UK LCU Mk 10, which carries a similar payload weight. In the same hour it will
consume approximately 70 US gallons - but will only travel 9-10 NM15. To deliver the same payload
the same distance, the LCU will use less than a third of the LCACs fuel – but take over four times as
long to complete. The BMT Fast Landing Craft will straddle these rates, burning 315 US gallons an
hour, using 525 US gallons to deliver the payload 40 NM (but taking 40 minutes longer)16.
Surface Assault Performance Comparisons
The following tables compare broad speed and estimated fuel consumption data from the US LCAC,
the Tribow FLC, the L-CAT 100 and a UK LCU Mk 10, showing time taken to deliver combat loads to
beaches at 12 NM (fig. 4) and 30 NM (fig 5). A common offload time of 5 mins, and a reload time of
10 minutes, has been added to each assault wave interval period.
Planning Speed
(knots) 1
st
wave
on
beach
2nd
wave
on beach 3
rd
wave
on beach Estimate of
total fuel used
(US Gallons)
LCAC (H) 40 18 mins 69 mins 120 mins 2,000
FLC 22 out/ 40 return 33 mins 99 mins 165 mins 872
LCAT - 100 18 out/ 25 return 40 mins 123 mins 206 mins 1,496
LCU Mk 10 10 72 mins 231 mins 390 mins 455
Fig. 4 - Journey times and fuel usage - 12 NM to beach
Planning Speed
(knots) 1
st
wave
on beach 2
nd
wave
on beach 3
rd
wave
on beach Estimate of total
fuel used (US
Gallons) LCAC (H) 40 45 mins 150 mins 255 mins 4,250
FLC 22 out/ 40 return 82 mins 224 mins 366 mins 1,811
LCAT- 100 18 out/ 25 return 100 mins 287 mins 474 mins 3, 440
LCU Mk 10 10 180 mins 555 mins 930 mins 1,085
Fig. 5 – Journey times and fuel usage - 30 NM to beach
Connector Stowage
Whilst payload and speed remain important connector capabilities, the number able to be carried to
the sea base will have a significant effect on the volume and tempo of offload. Fig. 6 shows the
comparative dock ‘footprints’ of the LCAC, L-CAT 100 and FLC, using a single MBT as the common
15. Data from BMT DSL records. 16. Ibid.
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point of visual reference.
Fig. 7 shows two FLC superimposed over the LCAC profile – their combined beams of 2 x 25.2 feet
(7.7M) at 50.4 feet (15.4M) being marginally broader than the single beam of the LCAC at 48 feet
Fig. 7 shows two
Fig. 6 – Comparative FLC, LCAC and L-CAT
footprints
Fig. 7 – Footprints of 2 x FLC superimposed
over 1 x LCAC
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(14.6M). It should be possible for two FLC to be accommodated in the same dock space as a single
LCAC, although issues such as dock dividing walls, and the current width of docks would need to be
addressed. For new designs there would be minimal impact on the whole platform design. For this
paper this premise is followed to illustrate the potential gains of an increase in numbers of fast
surface connectors able to be carried by an ATG
Connector Fleet Comparisons
A relatively simple scenario demonstrates this valuable point. A Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) such
as the USA Wasp Class can carry 3 x LCAC17, or in this assumption, 6 x FLC. A Landing Platform Dock
(LPD) such as the USA San Antonia Class can carry 2 x LCAC18, or in this assumption 4 x FLC. A
comparison is made over the time to deliver a representative amphibious Surface Assault Echelon
(SAE) by respective connector fleets to the shore at 30 NM range. For this example the combat
echelon from the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) represents two mechanised infantry companies with
a troop of tanks in support. In a simplified payload requirement, excluding beach and engineer
enablers, the vehicle lift is shown in Fig. 8.
17. (IHS Janes 2015) 18. Ibid
Fig. 8 Representative surface assault echelon lift requirement
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The total lift, or payload, of each craft is shown at fig. 9:
The table at Fig 10. shows the payload and delivery times (cumulative) from when the first waves
leave the assault platforms.
Craft Type Wave 1 on beach Wave 2 on beach Observation
5 x LCAC 45 Mins
2 x MBT
12 x LAV
6 x HMMWV
150 Mins
2 x MBT
12 x LAV
6 x HMMWV
BLT SAE short of 8 x HMMVW by
delivery of 2nd wave.
10 x FLC 82 Mins
4 x MBT
12 x LAV
12 x HMMWV
224 Mins
12 x LAV
8 x HMMWV
BLT SAE delivered and with extra
space in 2nd wave for 5 x MBT, or 20
x LAV/ HMMWV
Fig. 9 Single landing craft payloads
Fig. 10 Comparative connector fleet payload and journey times (@ 30NM)
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This theoretical scenario shows the effect of a greater number of (smaller) connectors. Despite
being slower craft (when loaded), the greater total payload per wave of a FLC fleet allows the whole
of the surface assault echelon to be delivered to the beach by the second wave and have extra space
for 20 LAV/ HMMWV or 5 x MBT. Despite the LCAC fleet’s superior speed and individual payload, its
lower numbers mean that the whole surface assault echelon will not be delivered until the third
wave; in this case at 255 minutes, 31 minutes behind the FLC fleet. This example does not account
for craft redundancy; degradation of availability, by mechanical or enemy means, should favour the
larger FLC fleet.
However, the most significant results are generated when the LCAC and FLC fleets are mixed:
Optimal Connector Fleet Mixes
Such mixes exploit the advantages of both types of craft: smaller, more numerous FLC that can carry
compact heavy loads, with bigger, faster LCACs that can carry greater volume across any beach and
beyond.
A fleet mix, able to be stowed in the LPD and LHD, of 2 x LCAC + 6 x FLC will generate a total single
lift of 4 x MBT, 20 x LAV, 10 x HMMVW – only 4 x LAV and 10 x HMMVW short of the full combat
echelon. If speed and access is a greater priority to payload, a 3 x LCAC + 4 x FLC fleet mix will
generate a total single lift of 4 x MBT, 12 x LAV, 6 x HMMVW.
It is interesting to note the relative unit purchase prices of such connector fleets. An estimate of the
cost of an FLC has been generated by BMT and independently endorsed by a number of industry and
shipbuilding partners. The cost of an LCAC has been taken from publically released programme
information. However as each nation has unique requirements, purchasing and procurement
practices, the values presented should be taken as indicative to show the relative cost of each
platform type. In this illustration the following planning assumptions are made:
1 x LCAC costs US$47.6M19
1 x FLC costs US$10M20
This leads to the following fleet costs:
5 x LCAC = US$ 238M
10 x FLC = US$ 100M
2 x LCAC + 6 x FLC = US$ 155M
3 x LCAC + 4 x FLC = US$ 183M
No comparison of through life costs has been made, however this will be affected by fuel, manning,
maintenance and training regimes and connector numbers.
19. (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab assesses potential landing craft replacement 2014 ) 20. From BMT assessment, endorsed by separate industry estimates
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Wider Roles
There are some roles that are far better suited to the displacement landing craft than a hovercraft,
exploiting its ability to operate for extended periods independently, or as part of a boat group
temporarily detached from its parent platforms. The increased speed of the craft and ability to carry
different combat systems means they could be used in the fleet/force protection role. The ability to
patrol, loiter, moor, anchor and beach, all at distant range, allows the LCU to act as a floating
command post/mother craft for reconnaissance tasks, boarding operations or riverine patrols, with
smaller assault craft using it as refuelling, maintenance and accommodation base from which to
operate for days or weeks. Such capabilities can be extended for disaster assistance and
humanitarian relief roles, including logistical and medical support, the movement of plant and heavy
equipment, a diving platform or ferry operations.
Conclusion
Developments in hullform hydrodynamic design have now freed the landing craft utility from its
‘floating skip’ reputation. The step change increase in performance offers a surface connector that
can meet the demands of increased operating range and de-risk this vital link of the amphibious
chain. They provide a compelling alternative to heavy LCACs for those forces that cannot justify the
resources necessary to operate this impressive capability. And for LCAC equipped navies, a fast
landing craft’s heavy payload lift, smaller dock footprint and capacity for wider amphibious roles
provides a complementary capability to operate on similar terms alongside these larger surface
connectors.
Toby Middleton
BSc MA Colonel Royal Marines (Retd)
Head of Business Development - Amphibious Platforms BMT Defence Services Ltd
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