Labor Markets in Professional Sports
An Overview Labor Markets Human Capital Monopsony and Free Agency Salary Arbitration Superstars and Winner-take-all When to turn pro?
What would Babe Ruth earn today?
Ruth earned $80,000 for the 1930 New York Yankees
1930 CPI = 16.7 2011 CPI = 224.939
Ruth’s 1930 salary in 2012 dollars is:
(80,000)(224.939/16.7) = $1,077,552
“I know, but I had a better year than Hoover.” - Reported reply when a reporter objected that the salary Ruth was demanding ($80,000) was more than that of President Herbert Hoover's ($75,000)
Average Salaries in Pro Sports (Nominal $)
MLB NFL NHL NBA
1970 29,303 41,000 25,000
1972 34,092 45,000 45,000
1974 40,839 56,000 65,000
1976 51,501 78,000 86,000
1978 99,876 100,000 92,000 139,000
1980 143,756 117,000 108,000 170,000
1982 241,497 157,000 120,000 212,000
1984 329,408 279,000 118,000 275,000
1986 412,520 288,000 144,000 375,000
1988 438,729 307,000 172,000 510,000
1990 597,537 430,000 211,000 750,000
1992 1,082,667 551,000 368,000 1,100,000
1994 1,168,263 674,000 562,000 1,441,000
1996 1,119,981 807,000 892,000 1,979,000
1998 1,398,831 1,000,000 1,167,713 2,818,000
2000 1,895,630 1,116,100 1,642,590 2,901,595
2002 2,295,694 1,300,000 1,790,000 3,893,801
2004 2,486,609 1,333,333 1,830,000 3,748,659
2006 2,866,544 1,947,898 1,751,845 4,176,241
2008 3,154,845 2,205,792 2,234,225 5,365,000
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006$0
$500,000
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$2,000,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$3,500,000
$4,000,000
$4,500,000
$5,000,000
$5,500,000
$6,000,000
Average Salaries in Pro Sports(2008 $)
NBA
MLB
NHL
NFL
Labor Market: Competitive Model
Labor
D1
S1
$
L1
w1
Labor Supply
Income-leisure tradeoff
Wage increase causes:
Labor
$ S
SE > IE
IE > SE
w*
Substitution Effect
Income Effect
Backward-bending labor supply curve
(work effort falls)
(work effort rises)
Labor Demand
Profit-max decision by employers Hiring Rule: hire until MRP = w
MRP
Labor
$
w2
w1
L1 L2
MRP = MP* MR
MP = ∆Q/ ∆L
MR = ∆TR/ ∆Q = P
Reflects DMR
Estimating a Player’s MRP
Scully (1974): two-step model using 1968-69 data
PCTWIN = f(PRODUCTIVITY)
REV = g(PCTWIN)
Scully’s Results
PCTWIN = 37.24 + 0.92 TSA + 0.90 TSW – 38.57 NL + 43.78 CONT – 75.64 OUT
REV = -1,735,890 + 10,330 PCTWIN + 494,585 SMSA + 512 MARGA + 580,913 NL - 762,248 STD – 58,523 BBPCT
TSA = Team Slugging AverageTSW = Team Strikeout – Walk RatioNL = National LeagueCONT = ContenderOUT = Out of contentionSMSA = Market PopulationMARGA = Differences in Fan InterestSTD = Stadium AgeBBPCT = % Black Players
1 point increase in TSA raises PCTWIN by 0.92
1 point increase in PCTWIN raises REV by $10,330
MRP per point = MP x MR = (0.92)(10,300) = $9,504 Avg Hitter: .3401/12 of team’s offense
MRP = ($9,504)(340)(1/12) = $270,000
Results
Scully (1974): Players paid 10-20% of MRP Krautman (1999)
Apprentice: 27% of MRP Journeyman: 85% of MRP Free agents
Alternative Explanation: Low salaries of younger players may reflect general training
Example: The Mark McGwire Show
During McGwire’s record-breaking run at the home run record in 1998, attendance in St. Louis increased by 1.5 million.
Even if McGwire was only half of the reason, just the gate portion of his MRP that year was around $15 million!
McGwire earned $8.9 million that year.
Wins Score Approach: #2 and #3
Human Capital Theory
General Training Increases MP to all employers
Specific Training Increases MP to specific firm
Human Capital Productivity Earnings
Cost
Who Pays for Training?
time
$
MRP1
MRP2
t1
MRP1 = untrained worker
MRP2 = trained worker
MRP1 - T
MRP1 – T = trainee’s net productivity
Hiring Rule: MRP = w
Tr
ww
r
MRPMRP
112
12
1
Benefit
GT: worker pays in form of lower training wage
ST: worker and firm share costs
Training period
Minor Leagues Baseball
First Contract Season: Single A: $1100/month AAA: $2500/month
Open to negotiation after that Meal money: $20 per day
Economics of Superstars Forbes Top 100 Celebrities and CEOs
Economics of Superstars Rank order tournaments: golf, tennis, auto racing
difficult to measure absolute effort (MRP) when many factors are involved
relative productivity matters rather than absolute
Effort
$ MC
E1
MR1
MR2
MR1′
Increasing MC of effort requireslarge difference between first andsecond place for optimal effort.
MC′
E2
Which of the following achievements would please you more?
a) You win fortune without fame: you make enough money through successful business dealings so that you can live very comfortably for the rest of your life.
b) You win fame without fortune: for example you win a medal at the Olympics or you become a respected journalist or scholar.
You are offered a banned performance-enhancing substance that comes with two guarantees:
1. You will not be caught.2. You will win every competition you enter for the next five years, and then you will die from the side effects of the substances.
Would you take it?
a) Yesb) No
Prisoner’s Dilemma?
1 million high-school football players - roughly 150 will make it to the NFL Odds of a high-school player going professional
in football - approximately 1 in 6,000 About 500,000 high-school basketball players -
roughly 50 to the NBA Less than 3% of all college seniors will play one
year in professional basketball Odds of a high-school player going professional
in basketball - approximately 1 in 10,000
When to Turn Pro?
Why would a player choose to leave early? Must compare the marginal cost and marginal benefit of
staying in school versus leaving.
Marginal Benefit of waiting the extra year is:
MB = (1 + g)S0 [where S0 is the pro salary and g is the growth rate in the salary]
Marginal Cost of waiting is the foregone salary plus the sacrifice on the use of that salary:
MC = (1 + r)S0 [where r is the interest rate]
When to Turn Pro?
As usual, the player is best off when MB = MC
Player should stay in school as long as g > r Player should turn pro when r > g
(1 + g)S0 = (1 + r)S0
When to Turn Pro?
Suppose a junior could earn a salary of $750,000 by declaring himself eligible for the draft. If he waits until his senior year he can make $900,000. If the interest rate is 4% should he stay the extra year?
Now consider that the player has a 12% chance of having a career ending injury in his senior year and thus having a median income of $40,000 per year. Would he consider going pro or not?
Sample Problem
Assume the pro league plans to institute a rookie salary cap of $750,000 at the end of the player’s senior year. Should the player play his senior year?
g = (900,000 – 750,000)/750,000 = 0.20 or 20%
g = (750,000 – 750,000)/750,000 = 0.00 or 0%
g = (796,800 – 750,000)/750,000 = 0.062 or 6.2%
Labor Market Imperfections Monopsony Reserve Clause Salary Caps Player Draft Arbitration Unions
Reserve Clause & Free Agency MLB: 1976
After 6 years of service NBA: 1983
After 5 years of service NHL: 1993
After 4 years of service NFL: 1994
After 4 years of service
Restrictions:• Right of First Refusal• Compensation requirements• Salary caps
Final Offer Arbitration MLB 1972 Arbitrator must select either team’s or player’s
final offer—No compromise! must base decisions on info regarding player
performance and salaries of comparable players can not consider financial condition of team
Overpaying a player leads to further overpaying down the road
1974-2012: Owners-291, Players-214
Wage
WT WPWA
Monoposony Sole buyer of labor
Enables employer to exert market power by paying lower wages
Monopsonist hires until MRP = ME and sets wage off S curve Lm < Lc
wm < wc < MRPm
D = MRP
Labor
$
S
ME
Lm Lc
wm
wc
MRPm
Worksheet Example
Player Drafts
Allocation of new players by reverse order finish
NBA: 7 2 rounds NFL: 12 7 rounds
Coase Theorem applies
Labor Unions and Labor Relations
Economics of Labor Unions
Free Market: wN, LN
Union Outcome: wU, LU
Unemployment Inefficiency (DWL)
D
SN
SU
LU LNLabor
wU
wNDWL
unemployment$
Bilateral Monopoly Union behaves as monopolist:
Sets employment where MR = S Sets wage off D curve WU, LU
Employer behaves as monopsonist: Sets employment where D = ME Sets wage off S curve WM, LM
D
S
LU LM Labor
wU
wM
ME
MR
$
WU – WM = Range of Indeterminacy
Bargaining and Strikes Each of major sports had a work stoppage
during 1990s (when overall labor strife was pretty tame)
Why resort to a strike/lockout? Irrational behavior? Excessive optimism? Excessive uncertainty? Political gamesmanship?
Contract Zone
High WagesLow Wages
Acceptable to Union
Acceptable to Employer
Contract
Zone
WE = employer threat point
Union threat point = WU
Strike fundAlternative jobs
Strike insuranceReplacement workers
Baseball’s First Strike
1912 Detroit Tigers Ty Cobb vs Ban Johnson
1972 Baseball Strike Main issue was player pension and health benefits Uncertainty
Owners were over-optimistic (believed players' threat point was lower than it was)
MLBPA was optimistic due to Commissioner’s behavior Strike lasted 13 days (including 9 days at the start of the season)
Owners lost $5m in revenues Players lost salaries but won on pension demands Arbitration was added to CBA
1972-1995: a strike/lockout preceded every CBA
1987 NFL Strike Main issue: free agency Uncertainty: Gene Upshaw and
demise of USFL Strike lasted 4 weeks (weeks 3 – 6)
Replacement players cost $1000 per game; teams profits rose by more than $100k per game
Players lost $80m in salary
1988 NFLPA Decertification
Hockey: The Lost Season 2004-05 Lockout
Whole season canceled Main issues: cost certainty (linking salaries to league revenues) Uncertainty: league losses Outcome: $39m salary cap; salaries at no less than 54% league revenues;
maximum player salary at 20% of cap; salaries rolled back by 24%
Revenue sharing; luxury tax; 5% pay cut
Revenue sharing; luxury tax; 24% pay cut
$52m salary cap linked to league revenues$40m salary cap linked to league revenues
$42.5m salary cap linked to league revenues $49m salary cap linked to league revenues
Gary Bettman
Bob Goodenow
Season Canceled!
1998-99 NBA Lockout Main issue: hard salary cap; revenue sharing Uncertainties: lackluster attendance; turmoil within NBPA;
rising power of agents (stars vs benchers) 191 day lockout Outcome: Individual player salary cap; players guaranteed
55% of BRI; limit on raises for “Larry Bird” free agents
NBA would be paid TV contract money even though games weren’t played.
Arbitrator ruled NBA did not have to pay Players with guaranteed contracts
50 game season
Discriminationin Sports
Jackie Robinson1947 Brooklyn Dodgers
Larry Doby1947 Cleveland Indians
Earl Lloyd1950 Washington Nationals
Willie O’Ree1958 Boston Bruins
Kenny Washington and Woody Strode1946 Los Angeles Rams
Labor Market Discrimination Becker “rational choice” model
Source of prejudice: Employers Employees Customers
Gary BeckerNobel Prize (1992)
Employer Discrimination
Hiring Rule: w = MRP Workers with same MRP will be paid same wage
Assume: MRPB = MRPW
d = discrimination coefficient
Perceived wage of black player: w*B = (1+d)w
“Psychic cost”
Example: w = $20 d = 0.20
w*B = (1.20)(20) = $24
MRPB = MRPW
Players
$
w = $20
w*B = $24
LWLB
wB = $16.67
Employment if blacks are paid same wage as whites: w = $20
Black wage if firm hires same number of black works as white workers
In a picture…
Note:> Owners must pay for the right to discriminate in the form of lower profits.> Competitive markets force discriminators out of the market.
Black wage as perceived bydiscriminating firm
Monopoly Power Baseball has legal cartel
Bill Veeck foiled in 1943 Dodgers/Indians reintegrated in 1947
Integrated teams tended to dominate Dodgers, Giants, Indians, & Braves Red Sox & Phillies last to integrate Great Celtic teams built on integration
Moses “Fleetwood” Walker1880s A.A.
Bill Veeck and Larry Doby1947 contract signing
Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey1947 contract signing
Employee Discrimination Early whites didn’t want to work
with blacks Feel psychic cost Demand higher pay to work with
blacks What would employer do?
Segregation vs Discrimination Dodgers protested Robinson’s
presence
Bud Fowler 1885
Customer Discrimination Employer punished for tolerance Celtics of the 1980s? George Preston Marshall & NFL’s Redskins
Last NFL team to integrate: 1962 “Burgundy, Gold, and Caucasian”
Southern focus Forced by U.S. government
Facility on government land
Nardinelli and Simon (1990) Examined baseball card prices for black and
white players PB < PW by about 10%
"We'll start signing Negroes when the Harlem Globetrotters start signing whites."
Measuring Discrimination
Slugging Average
$
BlackWageFunction
WhiteWageFunction
SAwSAB
$200 = WB
$500 = Ww
$260 = W*B
Ww – WB = observed wage gap
W*B – WB = explained wage gap
Ww – W*B = unexplained wage gap
= 500 – 200 = 300
= 260 – 200 = 60
= 500 – 260 = 240
Ww = $500
WB = $200
How much of the wage gap, if any, is
due to discrimination?
Statistical Discrimination The use of group averages to judge individual
productivity levels Profit-maximizing strategy to reduce cost of hiring
French-speakingCanadian playersEnglish-speaking
Canadian players
MRPFMRPEproductivity
EF
Economic Findings on Pay Discrimination There is evidence that pay discrimination
existed in pro team sports in the past. But by the mid-1990s, pay discrimination is
pretty much gone. Only a negligible premium for the very best white players in the NBA appears to remain.
Interestingly, in the NHL, there appears to be pay discrimination against French-speaking players.
Role Discrimination?NFL 2009
Position White Black
Quarterback 81% 16%
Wide Receiver 11% 87%
Source: 2010 Racial and Gender Report Card
Racial Composition of Athletes, 2010Race MLB NFL NBA
White 60% 30% 18%
African American 9% 67% 75%
Latino 28% 1% 3%
Asian 2% 2% 1%
Other 0% <1% 1%
Source: 2010 Racial and Gender Report Card
Racial Composition of Head Coaches, 2010Race MLB NFL NBA
White 68% 81% 70%
African American 14% 19% 27%
Latino 17% 0% 3%
Asian <1% 0% 0%
Source: 2010 Racial and Gender Report Card
Racial Composition of Division I Head Coaches (men’s teams), 2007-08Race Basketball Football
White 76% 94%
African American 23% 5%
Latino 0.7% 0.5%
Asian 0.0% 0.0%
Native American 0.3% 0.0%
Source: 2009 Racial and Gender Report Card
Gender Discrimination Harder to measure
Men & Women seldom in same sport/venue Even same sport may vary
Tennis, figure skating, & basketball
Top Money Winners: ATP vs WTAATP Money Leaders WTA Money Leaders
Rank Player Country Earnings Rank Player Country Earnings
1 Novak Djokovic Serbia $ 3,323,881 1 Victoria Azarenka Belarus $ 4,008,080 2 Roger Federer Switzerland $ 2,316,585 2 Maria Sharapova Russia $ 2,083,350 3 Rafael Nadal Spain $ 1,725,465 3 Agnieszka Radwanska Poland $ 1,650,459 4 Andy Murray Scotland $ 1,053,481 4 Caroline Wozniacki Denmark $ 596,188 5 David Ferrer Spain $ 771,998 5 Petra Kvitova Czech Rep $ 533,690 6 Juan Martin del Potro Argentina $ 769,238 6 Kim Clijsters Belgium $ 513,691 7 John Isner US $ 707,701 7 Sara Errani Italy $ 512,265 8 Tomas Berdych Czech Rep $ 521,801 8 Marion Bartoli France $ 509,326 9 Jo-Wilfried Tsonga France $ 516,678 9 Julia Goerges Germany $ 484,670
10 Radek Stepanek Czech Rep $ 516,048 10 Angelique Kerber Germany $ 414,207 11 Nicolas Almagro Spain $ 460,736 11 Ana Ivanovic Serbia $ 411,784 12 Milos Raonic Canada $ 407,883 12 Maria Kirilenko Russia $ 401,903 13 Jurgen Melzer Austria $ 389,313 13 Svetlana Kuznetsova Russia $ 395,038 14 Leander Paes India $ 372,103 14 Vera Zvonareva Russia $ 384,983 15 Kei Nishikori Japan $ 326,245 15 Samantha Stosur Australia $ 376,344
Source: tennis.com. As of April 16, 2012.
Purses in Golf’s Majors (in millions): 2011 for PGA, 2010 for LPGA
Men Women
Masters $7.5 Kraft Nabisco $2.0
US Open 7.5 US Open 3.25
British Open 7.3 British Open 2.5
PGA 7.5 LPGA 2.25
Source: PGATour.com and LPGA.com
Gender Discrimination Harder to measure
Men & Women seldom in same venue Often don’t play same sport Even same sports may vary
Tennis, figure skating, & basketball
Direct competition? Jockeys & auto racing & golf
Are women always victims?
Title IX Part of 1972 Education Amendments to Civil Rights Act Mandated equal access & opportunities for women in
federally funded education programs 3 ways to comply
Funding proportional to enrollment Show history of expansion Interests of students accommodated
Few programs in compliance But NCAA certifies all
2009-10 Marietta College Roster Slots
Male Enrollment 726 51.2% Male Athletic Participation
298 61.3%
Female Enrollment 692 48.8% Female Athletic Participation
188 38.6%
Total 1418 100% 486 100%
Impacts of Title IX Good
Spurred rapid growth in women’s sports Though most of growth early on
Gave grounds to seek remediation Bad
What happened to women coaches? Was ~80% of women’s programs - now ~ 44%
Women’s programs lose money Can meet in many ways –
Cut men’s programs rather than expanding women’s
Amateurism and College Sports
Overview College sports is similar in many economic ways
to pro sports, but the relationship between the athletics department and the university deserves careful attention
Conferences and the NCAA play an important role in limiting competition, negotiating TV broadcasts, and managing competitive balance.
NCAA player rules have dramatic impacts on the economic welfare of college athletes.
Colleges enjoy special tax and antitrust status for much the same reason as pro owners.
Amateurism & the Olympic Ideal Ancient Olympics (776 BC-393 AD)
Even central myth hypocritical Winners well rewarded by home cities
Modern Olympics (1896-present) “mens sana in corpore sano”
Amateurism reflected class snobbery Laborers not considered amateurs
American College Sports Commercialism & Corruption always present
1st competition: 1852 Harvard v. Yale in crew Sponsored at a resort by a railroad company
2nd competition brought first eligibility scandal Harvard’s coxswain had already graduated!
Second sport: Football Rutgers v. Princeton (1869): First academic scandal
4 Rutgers players were flunking math
University of Michigan (1894) 7 of 11 starters were not registered students
NCAA as “Incidental Cartel” Restricts movement
Prevents “tramp athletes” Monopsony power
Players have little mobility Drives down pay
OSU
High Low
UMHigh 50
5020
90
Low 9020
7575
NCAA Recruiting Game
Dominant Strategy?
Competitive Equilibrium?
Cooperative Optimum?
Athletic Scholarships NCAA forbade them until 1956
NCAA rules often ignored “Seven Sinners”
CitadelUVAVMIVPIUMDVillanovaBoston College
The “Student Athlete” “Student athlete” is a legal term
Disavows desire for pay Colleges do not have to provide workmen’s
compensation Stars worth more than tuition (Brown 1993; 1994)
In football >$500k/yr In basketball >$800k/yr
The Value of an Education An athlete who…graduates is overpaid”
Joe Paterno
Do athletes get an education? On average athletes graduate at the same rate
as non-athletes Handout
Long and Caudill (1991)Male college athletes earn more than non-athletes
Why do Some Sports do Worse? Some athletes less prepared
Lower SATs, HS rank, HS GPA True for basketball & football Not so for softball or golf
Is dropping out a rational investment?
Academic Standards Preserve academic integrity
Don’t recruit students who cannot read Creates barrier to entry
Established powers keep out new entrants Competitors cannot pay athletes more Now cannot take weaker students either
History of Standards Nothing uniform until 1965
1.600 Rule To play needed projected 1.600 GPA
1973: Replaced 1.600 with 2.00 rule Ostensibly higher standards Actually needed C+ average in high school
Could take any courses Worst abuses came under this rule The sad case of Chris Washburn
470 out of 1600 on SAT
Proposition 48 (1983)
Provisions Needed SAT=700 & GPA=2.00 in 11 core courses If not: no scholarship in 1st year & cannot play
Was Prop 48 Racist? Disproportionately affected black athletes
SATs for blacks average 200 points lower Are SATs a valid predictor of college performance?
Still – graduation rates rose for whites and blacks A concession: Partial Qualifiers
Could receive aid if pass one criterion
Proposition 42 (1989)
Meant to eliminate partial qualifiers Loophole restored – and then some
Under Prop 48 scholarship “counted” Under 42 doesn’t count against limit
Proposition 16 (1992)
Created sliding scale Lower GPA permitted if SATs higher & vice versa
Clearinghouse evaluated individual courses Allows partial qualifiers to practice Challenged in court
Students claimed disparate racial impact Won initial case
Verdict overturned on technicality NCAA does not disburse federal funds
Latest Revision (2003) Eases initial restrictions
14 core courses (up from 13) Sliding scale
2.0 core GPA requires 1010 SAT 3.55 core GPA requires 400 SAT
No Partial Qualifier status Stiffens progress requirements
Need 40% of degree requirement after 2nd year Need 60% of degree requirement after 3rd year Need 80 % of degree requirement after 4th year
Academic Progress Rates (APR) School scored for student progress
1 point if athlete stays enrolled 1 point for staying academically eligible
Computes % of total possible points Consider Big State U’s basketball team
52 possible points (13 players *2 points*2 semesters) If one player is ineligible in spring – lose 1 point APR=100*(51/52)=981
If its score falls below 925, BSU could lose scholarships
Entry Barrier or Academic Standards? Small schools
May be unable to compete with larger schools Faculty fear
Greater pressure to pass Proliferation of garbage classes
Profitability of Specific Programs at Division I-A Schools
(measured in $1000s)
Sport 1997 1999 2001 2003
All Men’s Sports 3,300 4,000 4,900 6,100
Football 3,200 3,700 4,700 5,920
Men’s Basketball 1,600 1,600 1,600 2,020
Women’s Basketball - 500 - 600 - 700 - 775
All Women’s Sports -2,300 -2,400 -3,200 -3,600
Source: Table 11.8, Leeds and Von Allmen, 2008
NCAA Financial Database
Football Coaches Salary Database
March Madness NCAA has 14-year, $10.8 billion contract: CBS & Turner Sports Tourney revenue now $810 million/year
$770m in TV rights $40m from ticket sales, etc.
~60% goes to Division I conferences & schools $167m distributed according to program size
Number of sports offered Number of athletes on scholarship.
$167m distributed according to performance Conference gets 1 "unit" per member game Each unit worth ~$222,000.
Non-Profit vs Profit Seeking Principle-agent problem Growing payroll costs for sports programs
Clicker Review
A college player should stay in school when:
a) b) c) d)
29%
0%
10%
62%
a) staying in college another year increases his earnings.
b) staying in college another year increases his earnings above the interest rate.
c) staying in college another year increases his earnings below the interest rate.
d) staying in college another year reduces his earnings.
Salaries have risen dramatically in the NBA because of the dramatic rise in
a) b) c) d)
0%
19%
76%
5%
a) the quality of the players b) the opportunity cost faced by
players c) the market value of the product
the players produce d) the strength of the Players’
Association
According to the Coase Theorem, free agency should leave the distribution of talent
a) b) c) d)
10%
76%
10%5%
a) more equal than before b) less equal than before c) exactly equal among all
teams d) the same as it always was
Free agency came to MLB and the NFL in different ways because
a) b) c) d)
14%
33%
10%
43%
a) the football owners practiced collusion while the baseball owners did not
b) the MLBPA had to rely on the courts
c) the NFLPA had to rely on the courts
d) the NFL had a limited exemption from antitrust laws, and baseball did not
In November 1989, the NFL Players Association, the union for NFL players, disbanded. Why?
a) b) c) d)
10%
38%
48%
5%
a) The union was bankrupt due to failed strikes in 1982 and 1987.
b) The players were upset with the union’s lack of ability to gain full free agency for its members and wanted to bring in new leadership.
c) The union wanted to remove the NFL’s non-statutory labor exemption and pursue an antitrust claim against the league. This could only be done by decertifying the union.
d) The court had declared in Powell v. NFL (1987) that the union was guilty of conspiring against the NFL in order to raise wages.
Most mainstream economists view discrimination as
a) b) c) d)
29%
14%
43%
14%
a) a taste. b) overstated.c) a mistake due to the
misperception of people’s true skills.
d) a way for capitalists to keep the working class from uniting.
Integration was much faster in football than in baseball because
a) b) c) d)
48%
14%10%
29%
a) of the competition provided by a rival league
b) the owners in the NFL were less discriminatory than the owners in MLB
c) football fans are far less discriminatory than baseball fans
d) football had to get the approval of liberal-minded colleges and universities
a) women have brought far fewer discrimination suits
b) women seldom compete with men in the same event
c) women aren’t as good at sports as men
d) it is difficult to separate out racial effects from gender effects
It is difficult to determine whether women are victims of discrimination in professional sports because
a) b) c) d)
10%5%
0%
86%
The notion of a “student-athlete” was developed in order to
a) b) c) d)
33%
5%
24%
38%a) assert the primacy of education b) eliminate under-the-table
payments to athletes c) keep athletes from filing for
workman’s compensation d) prevent gambling scandals
The University of Michigan’s Athletic Department cannot break even because
a) b) c) d)
5%0%
48%48%
a) it is very poorly run. b) its costs rise as quickly as its
revenues rises. c) it gives much of what it makes to
the academic side of the university.
d) NCAA rules prohibit Athletic Departments from making a profit.
The shift to “two-platoon football” was a way for
a) b) c) d)
5%
62%
19%14%
a) professional teams to turn profits into losses
b) colleges to exploit “student-athletes”
c) the NFL to exert monopsony power over its players
d) colleges to spend increasing revenues
a) The prisoner’s dilemmab) The winner’s cursec) The outlawing of the reserve
claused) The entry of new schools into the
NCAA
The monopoly power that the NCAA held over TV networks fell apart due to
a) b) c) d)
48%
0%
33%
19%