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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS
BY JOSEPH KATZ
Plotinus'essay
against the Gnostics (Ennead II ix) 1 has often been
commented upon. Due acknowledgment has been made of the polemical
sharpness with which Plotinus attacked what he regarded as the arrogant
myth-making and the dialectical imprecision of the Gnostics. But a much
more important fact seems to have escaped the interpreters. For it is
amazing that almost all of the ideas that Plotinus finds objectionable in
the Gnostics have been asserted by himself too in one form or another. The
polemic against the Gnostics, consequently, turns out to reveal a vital ten-
sion in Plotinus' own system, rather than a mere external differentiation of
his doctrines from others. To see Plotinus as in some sense a Gnosticmanque is to discover an important aspect of his many-faceted philosophy.In the essay against the Gnostics Plotinus, who usually is very restrained,
permits himself a large amount of emotive invective. This too suggeststhat we are touching upon a vital nerve of Plotinus' thought.
The avowed purpose of the essay against the Gnostics is to oppose those
who assert that the world of sense or its originating source are evil. Ploti-
nus declares that whatever the deficiencies of the world of sense, it is a
copy of the intelligible world and thus exhibits the order and beauty ap-
propriate to it. It is the best possible world, given its inevitable spatialand temporal character. Plotinus even goes so far-and it is going far
for a Platonist-as to say that surely those who have had the experienceof intelligible beauty and harmony will not fail to be touched by their sensu-
ous copies. " Would any musician who had once heard the intelligible har-
monies not also be moved by those of sense? "2 Plotinus even permits
himself, something exceedingly rare in him, a moralistic censure, reproach-
ing the Gnostics with unconcern for virtue and declaring solemnly that
1 The title of the essay as givenin sections 5 and 16 of Porphyry'sLife of Ploti-nus is "Against the Gnostics." In section24 it is "Againstthose who say that themaker of the world is evil and that the world is evil." The titles are not due toPlotinus and in the body of the essay neither the names of particularthinkersnorthe genericname" Gnostics" occur. In section 10 Plotinusrefersto "friendswhohad come acrossthese doctrines[the doctrinesattacked in Enn. II ix] beforebe-
comingfriends of oursand who, I do not knowhow, still persevere n them." The
brevity of Plotinus' statement of the doctrineshe attacks and the incompletenessof our sourcesmake it very difficultto determinewhichspecificmen Plotinushad
in mind. Giventhe natureof Plotinus'problem n Enn. II ix it will be permissiblein this article to use the term "Gnostics" in a genericsense-and it may well havehad just such generic significanceor Plotinus too.
For a discussionof the problemwhichspecificmen and doctrinesPlotinusmayhave had in mind, see CarlSchmidt,Plotins Stellungzum Gnosticismusund kirch-lichen Christentum,Texte und Untersuchungen ur Geschichte der altchristlichen
Literatur,new series,vol. 5, fasc. 4 (Leipzig, 1901), especially pp. 13ff.,30ff.,48ff.,82ff.
2Enn. II ix 16. All translationsn this article are my own.
289
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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS 291
literal understandingof a favorite metaphorof his, the Phaedr metaphorof the soul's loss of wings.14 Accordingto a device he frequentlyuses,the
psyche consists of hierarchicallyarranged faculties, the highest of which
never descends,so that ascent or descent becomes a matter of the shiftingawarenessof the human self.15 He suggestsin additionthat the descentofthe psyche does not springfroma flaw,but ratherfrom the powerof super-abundant perfection which, in the absence of a counter-power,exhaustsitself in all degreesof being.18 Yet these constructionsand the often tor-tuous dialectic they requirehalf imply and half defendthemselves againsta quite differentconceptionof the psyche. In somecontextsthis conceptiontoo findsexplicit statement. The fall of the soul is then derived from dis-
content and overbearing. Her fall is a withdrawalfromthe whole into anindividualisticseparateness.l7 The fall is a self-assertion. Plotinus even
goes so far as to declare on occasion that the fall stems from the soul's" arrogance."18 These passages illustrate well how close Plotinus, too, isto "acosmism,"how he is willing to violate cosmologicalorder, and dia-lectical rigor,for the sake of a drama of rebellionand redemption.
Plotinus strongly objects to the Gnostics' insistenceon their specially-privilegedplace in the universe, heir insistenceon beingthe children of god,better than other men and deities.19 There is a rationalistic and a socio-
logical aspect to his argument. He is irked that "men without station,"members of the "vulgar crowd,"should claim such distinction,and more
emphatically,that the way to salvation should flagrantlybypass dialecticand the sternintellectualand moraldiscipline t requires.20But these reser-vations do not imply immunity to the serpent's temptation: eritis sicutDeus. In Plotinus' system too identification with the One is the ultimate
goal of humanendeavor. The self in its upward flightdoesnot stop at thelevel of nous in a mere contemplationof the highest existence-as do theredeemed in Christianity. Plotinus too holds
somethinglike the Gnostic
notion of the divine sparkwhenhe says, in moreAristoteliananguage,thatascent to and union with the One means the reawakeningof the psyche'spotentialities,21 or when he declares that the supremepart of the psycheis forever united with the One.22
Plotinus' " acosmism" is of coursemore mitigatedthan the Gnostics'.According o Gnosticdoctrine, his world is the productof an evil demiurge,and men of the divine pneumaowe no allegianceeitherto this creator godorto his world.23Plotinusfinds it particularlyobjectionablen this doctrine
14Pato Phaedrus246c,Enn. II ix 4. ' Enn. II ix 2, IV viii 8.1 Enn. II ix 3, 8, of.Vii 1, 2, VI vii 8. 7 Enn. IV viii 4.18 Enn. V i 1. Often there is an attempt to minimizethe flawthat initially in-
heres in the psyche and also to shift at least part of the responsibilityupon theobtrudingpresenceof a body. See Enn. III ii 4. Such passagesbetray Plotinus'uneasinesswith the moreGnosticimplicationsof his thought.
19Enn. II ix 9, 16, 18. 20Enn. II ix 9.e1 Enn. VI ix 1I, IV viii 1. 22Enn. II ix 2. 2SCf. Enn. II ix 15ff.
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292 JOSEPH KATZ
that it assigns to man a rank higher than to the celestial realm whose beautyand order are in such marked contrast with terrestrial life. According to
Plotinus, the sun and the stars possess not only immortality, but a wisdom
and a freedom from passion superior to those of men born only recentlyand subject to lust, pain, and the fits of temper.24 A striking vindication,even a glorification, of the world of sense occurs in Ennead III viii, which
Plotinus puts in the form of a hypothetical speech by the cosmos itself:
I was made by god and as I stem from the realm beyond, I am perfect con-
taining all living things. I am self-sufficient and independent, in want of
nothing, because in me there is everything, all plants, animals, all that is
born, the plurality of gods, the tribes of demons, excellent souls, and men
happy through the quality of their life. The earth is not alone adorned by
the whole gamut of plants and all the varieties of animals, nor does thepower of the soul extend to the sea omitting the air, ether, or heaven; butthere are found beyond the earth souls, and excellent souls only, which givelife to the stars and to the well-ordered and eternal round of heaven thatin imitation of the intelligible world wisely describes a circular path aroundthe same center forever, without the need for deviation. All things thatexist within me aspire towards the Good, but each realizes it according to its
capacity; for the whole heaven depends on it, all that I possess of soul, the
gods that exist in my parts, all animals, plants, and all that is in appearance
inanimate. The latter seem to participate in existence alone, of the otherssome participate in life alone, some also possess sensation, some even reason,and some universal life. For one must not ask that unequals be equal. Onemust not ask of a finger to see, but of the eye. Of the finger one must ask,I suppose, to fulfill its proper function of a finger.25
What Plotinus says in such contexts implies no special exaltation of man.It seems only a short step to the Stoics' submission to nature or even toAristotle's notion of mortal man reaching only a temporary immortality inthe study of the eternal patterns of nature. No notion of man's super-
natural character seems to break in to require the union of two incom-mensurable orders of existence.
But such subordination of the psyche holds for Plotinus only when heviews it in its state of association with the body, or in its cosmological func-tion as a hypostasis mediating between the intelligible and the sensibleworlds. Ultimately, for Plotinus too, the psyche transcends both the sensi-ble and the intelligible worlds.26 It leaves behind sun, stars, and the otherdivinities.27 Plotinus' conception of man never reaches the boldness of theGnostic
conceptionof man the redeemer, but neither does it rest
content toassign man the function of a " part " in a universal whole. Union with theOne is as all-devouring ontologically as solipsism is epistemologically. Beit noted, moreover, that ascent is accomplished neither by grace nor prayer,but through the adoption of Plotinian philosophy.
24Enn. II ix 5, 13. 25Enn. III ii 3; cf. II ix 8.26Enn. VI ix 11, IV viii 1. Whenunited with the One, the psyche "is raised
above all the other intelligiblebeings." 27Plotinus maintains the existenceofdeities,but they are to him of inferiorrank than the One. The pluralityof godsexhibitsthe abundantpowerof the One (Enn. II ix 9).
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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS 293
There seems to be one respect in which Plotinus is profoundly different
from the Gnostics, and that is in his painstakingly rationalistic way of
arguing. At the very beginning of his essay against the Gnostics28 he
charges the Gnostics with needlessly multiplying the number of hypostases.What he has in mind is the multiplicity of entities, half-conceptual and half-
mythical, that spring from the fertile Gnostic imagination. To Plotinus the
dramatic evolution of the Gnostic world destroys the perfection of the One
by introducing potentiality into it.29 Similarly, to Plotinus the Gnostic
division of nous into an intelligence at rest and an intelligence in motion,or into thought and awareness of thought, seems to ignore the capacity for
interpenetration and unification that immaterial existence possesses and to
lead to an infinite regress (awareness of awareness of thought becomes a
superior hypostasis and so forth).30 These arguments are representative of
Plotinus' approach in general. A disciplined logic underlies Plotinus'
method. He himself is quite aware of this when he charges the Gnostic
constructions with not being " Greek." 31
Nevertheless, Plotinus cannot be called a rationalist without major reser-
vations. For Plotinus' system too rests on myth. He is, of course, unaware
of this, and on the surface pushes rationalism so far that he will usually
accept the traditional Greek myths only on the assumption that they are
metaphorical, and in particular always translates their temporal form intohis eternalistic concepts. The break in Plotinus between a rationalist
method and a mythical background is discernible at a juncture in his system
that, on the surface, seems to furnish a model of consistency: the relation-
ship of the One to nous. In Plotinus' system, nous generated by the One is
the first reflection of ultimate simplicity. On the level of nous the One's
richness splits up into manifoldness, but as the realm of nous is immaterial,its multiplicity is compatible with togetherness and eternity. Nevertheless,the apparent smoothness of the transition from the One to nous is one of the
triumphs of Plotinian dialectic. It hides the conflict between the rationalistmethod and the mythical background. As one might expect, discussions of
nous imply the former, discussions of the One imply the latter; but the
division is not really clear-cut, since the conception of nous is not without
a rather full share of myth (as, for instance, in the identification of nous
and Being), and since much logic enters into the definition of the One (as,for instance, in deriving some of the logical implications of unity).
Plotinus' discussions of nous are often a more or less hypostatized de-
scriptionof the rationalist
approach.Most
characteristicallythis is asserted
28 Enn. II ix 1. 29Enn. II ix 1, 6. 30Enn. II ix 1.31 Enn. II ix 6. Plotinus is nevertheless ed to remark that the Gnosticswith
an appearance f justicederivesomeof their doctrines romPlato (Enn.II ix 6, 17).He might have added other Greek sources, particularlythe Pythagoreans. But
rather than admit the "impurity" of the Greek tradition, Plotinus prefers to
chargethe Gnosticswith an impure interpretation. Whenhe chargesthe Gnostics
with unfitting elaborationsof the ancient doctrinesand when he speaks of the
"deceit" capturingmankind,one gets a good idea of the bitternesswith which
Plotinusfaced not only the Gnostics,but also, in all likelihood,Christianity.
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294 JOSEPH KATZ
in Ennead III viii, where he declaresthat not just rationalbeings,but all
natureaspirestowardscontemplation. "Begetting means to producesome
form; and this means to spread contemplationeverywhere."32 Practical
activity, the mechanicalarts are attemptsto get hold of ideas and expressthem in actionsor artefacts characteristicof men who cannot morepurelyholdthem in mind.33 "All life is some sort of thought ... The highestlifeand perfectthoughtare one and the samething."34 In otherwords,it is in
beingunderstoodhat thingsreachtheir fulfilment. For this Plotinusquite
properly might claim the "Greek" tradition-with reservations,for howshould one term his reification of the intellectual function? Moreover,Plotinus'havingall naturesubserve he designof contemplative ulfilment-
how like the Gnosticsit is in its anthropocentric gotism35
It is a quite differentmanner of being and a quite differentexperiencethat Plotinus understandsunderthe name of the One. It is so little intel-lectual that Plotinus denies even self-awareness o the One.36 In the de-
scriptionof the One the terms of his system forsakehim, and occasionallyhe even says that the Oneis not to be called the One37or that the Goodisnot to be calledgood.38 Thereare dialecticalreasonsfor this via negativa,giventhe conceptionof levels of realityandthe view that the properreferentof discursive anguage s sense existence. But Plotinushas a moredefinite
notionof the One,and forgettinghis negativestrictureshe refersto it in themetaphorsof joy,39of love,40of light,41even of intoxication.42
The soul is in such a state then [when unifiedwith the One] that it hascontempt even for thought, which before has given it much joy.... Nousmust have (1) the powerof intelligencewhichgives it the vision of what iscontained n itself and (2) the powerof grasping hat whichis beyonditselfby a directapprehension.... The firstvision is that of intellectualnous,the
32Enn. III viii 7. In Plotinus the Trational rinciples (logoi) of nature are
understoodat once in an ontic and an epistemicsense.33Enn. III viii 4; see also Enn. IV iv 44 wherePlotinusasserts that only con-
templation s free from the magical nfluences o whichactionis necessarily ubject.34Enn. III viii 8.S5Nevertheless,Plotinus' identificationof nous with Being creates strong am-
biguities,even to the point of an anti-intellectualistconceptionof the intelligibleworld. Plotinus'usual objectionto the notion of providence s that it ascribes de-liberationto the intelligibleworld, which in his view creates rather by its beingwhat it is (Enn. III ii 3, VI vii 1, II ix 8). In Enn. II ix 2 Plotinusasserts thatthe world soul governsnot "by
deliberation,"but
"byits
contemplationof theworld above it." The contrastof "deliberation" with "contemplation"mirrorsthe ambiguityof the identificationof nous with Being. OccasionallyPlotinus goesso far as to assertthe quitemodern-soundingdea that knowing,even the knowingof nous,springsfrom want (for instance,Enn. III viii 11). Plotinusalso tends toa conceptionof consciousnesswhich makes it a productof incompleteabsorptionin activity (for instance,Enn. I iv 10).
36Enn. VI ix 6. 37Enn. V v 6, 13. 38 Enn. VI ix 6.39Enn. VI vii 34. 40Enn. VI viii 15,VI ix 9. 41Enn. VI ix 9. 42Enn. VI vii 35.
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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS 295
other that of nouswhich loves. For whennous ceasesto be rationaland isdrunk with nectar, it becomes nous which loves and achieves the unitywhichgives happinessthroughits fullness. Such drunkenness s better for
it than a sobrietythat is above suchdrunkenness.43Salvationin the One is very much more than intellectual fulfilment. The
metaphorsdescribing he One,the metaphorsof the ascent to the Alone,ofthe fall, of the arroganceand self-assertionof the psyche,of the treacherousblackmagic of matter,44 ll describe a reality that is rich and imaginative.One need only expandwhat Plotinus says, let the imaginationrun more
freely,give it appropriate xpressionn rite and acts, and one has full blownGnosticism.
Even as it is, Plotinus'system may be taken as one vast hymn to inex-haustible seminal fertility.45 In his world everything emanates from the
highestpowerby cosmologicalnecessity,andyet this necessityinvolvesit in
pain and longing.4" The whole universe is endowedwith the qualities of
psyche. Not only man but everythinglongs to returnto, even to be ex-
tinguishedin the One.4T All being constitutesthe vast spectacleof bitter
necessityand sweetsalvation. Moder readershave beenpuzzledabouttheexistentialreferenceof Plotinus' system. But his system is at least exis-tential in its reference o psychic reality-of coursefrequentlyin symbolicratherthan literal terms. But Plotinus shrinksfrom the full implicationsof his own thought. Somethinglike Gnosticismis implied by half of his
thought,andyet he is blindto it to the extent of ignoring hat almost all ofthe ideas he finds objectionable n the Gnostics can nearly be matchedbyideasof his own. But he knewthe Gnostictemptationfromthe inside. The
very vehemenceof his essay againstthem is one moretestimonyto the factthat the bitterest battles are always against one's own unacknowledgedimpulses.
It mightperhapsbe said that Plotinus could have integratedhis thoughtbetter,had he had at his disposal the Christian distinction betweenfaithandreason or the distinctionbetweennon-discursiveand discursivesymbol-ism. But no mereconceptualdistinctionwould have helpedPlotinus48 (asit helped little many Christianthinkers who soon involved their revealedGod in the mostintricatedialecticalcontextsor askedpseudo-physicalques-tions about him). Plotinus' integrationof the discordantelements in his
systemwas dialectical,and he succeededat it so well that he mightbe called
48Enn. VI vii 35.
44Enn. IV iv 43, 44.45 For the extremes o whichthe Gnosticscarried he seminalcult see Epiphanius
Panarion26. Thereis muchof the libidinous n the Gnosticimaginationn general.46Enn. IV viii 5, VI ix 9. 4TEnn.VI viii 13.48Phrases like Porphyry's"the unreasonedand unreasonable aith" (alogos
pistis) of the Christians ndicate how muchsuch a distinction ay outsidethe Neo-platonists'orbit in their insistenceon at least the form of rationaldemonstration.They arehencegenuinelypuzzledby certaincharacteristicNew Testamentpassageswhichpromisesalvationthroughothermear, than philosophicknowledge.
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296 JOSEPH KATZ
the masterof thosewho aim at consistency. The often-praisedarchitecture
of Plotinus' system is really analogousto a Gothic facade over a modern
structureof steel and concrete. The emanationof the One into nous hides
a major discrepancy. Again, the third hypostasis,the psyche, comes closeto beinga superfluous eduplication,and the reconciliationof its cosmologi-cal with its ethical function is hardly possible.4 On the level of sensePlotinus never fully overcomes he discrepancybetween a substantial and
a privative conception of matter and evil50 (just as St. Augustine never
fully shed his Manicheanism). Plotinus' chain of being, on the surface an
unbroken continuum of all degrees of power, hides a mass of conflictingtendencies and assumptions. Yet such was Plotinus' dialectical power that
even if thepost-Enlightenment
reader hasdifficulty finding
the existential
referents of his thought, some variant of his system has up to the nineteenth
century served as the best rational yardstick of reality.51The preceding discussion also throws some light on the problem of Ploti-
nus' mystical experience. Plotinus himself in a few passages seems to layclaim to such an experience.52 Still, he hardly dwells on the experience
49To Plotinusnous is not only "vision " but also true Being and Life. Hence
once nous is endowedwith Life, the psyche seemsto lose its most specificfunction
and the world of senses could have been derived immediatelyfrom nous. There
is indeed in Plotinus'system an isomorphismbetweennous and the sense world.Both contain in their differingways-the one in immutableand nonmaterial ame-
ness, the other in space and time-the totality of things. The psyche, if Plotinus
were fully consistent, should follow the same pattern of "horizontal" plenitude.Insteadthe psyche, in one sort of context,has a "vertical" plenitude,being asso-
ciated with the various levels of reality. In other contexts it shrinks from this
sort of plenitudeto a more univocalagent whose functionis mediationand which
is a mobilebeing capableof ascent and descent. Either "vertical" plenitudeor
mobility bringthe One within reachof man,that is, of man who has undergonehe
philosophicdiscipline.Thereare otherpossible mplicationso the distinctionbetweennousand psyche,
such as its standingfor the male and femaleprinciple respectively,as is suggested,for instance,by the fact that in Plotinusthe male deities of traditionalmyths tendto be identifiedwith nous,the female ones with psyche. Cf. Rene Arnou,Le Desir
de Dieu dans la philosophicde Plotin (Paris,1921),appendixA, 296ff. The absence
of an explicitlyfemalepersonfrom the Christian rinityshould be noted,whilewith
the Gnosticdivinitiesthe feminine s usuallywell represented. (Note also the quite
positive evaluation of the BiblicalEve and women in generalwith the Gnostics.)50Enn. II v 4, 5, II viii 1lff.51 It mightbe noted that it has beena recurrentmethod in philosophy o bridge
by dialecticor metaphoror both the gap betweenincommensurablehought sys-temsor between houghtandexperience. Onefindsthis, for instance, n the Monad-
ology, where Leibniz attempts to reunitegeometrywith physical reality. Or one
finds it in the many attempts to solve the mind-body"problem,"a problemdue
in manyof its formulations o the improperoppositionof two sets of abstractions.
More recentlythis methodhas been exemplifiedn the dialecticalexercisesof those
who have put values beyondthe reach of scientificmethod and yet wish somehow
to relatevaluesto this world. 52 Enn. IV viii 1, VI ix 9.
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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS 297
itself. The experience is the indicated goal, but Plotinus describes the struc-
ture of the One, as well as that of nous, in logical rather than experientialterms. The present discussion, nevertheless, has uncovered some strong
mythical undercurrents in Plotinus. The answer suggests itself thereforethat Plotinus' thought in its non-logical aspects was not so much oriented
on a single or rare mystical experience, but rather on those unconscious or
half-conscious impulses that find expression in myth. If Plotinus is to be
given a name, he should be called a " mythic " rather than a mystic.53Plotinus is to be regarded as in a sense a Gnostic manque, and to see
him as such is a major clue to his thought.64 Plotinus seems to be launched
53 The distinctionbetween the two is sometimesa fine one, but in mystical ex-
perience,one might say, the symbolicis given active sensoryexpression, n mythit is moreintellectualized whichfits in well with Plotinus'rationalism). Myth canbe so attenuated hat, as in sometheologians,or instance," God" is not much morethan a logicalterm. Thereis, as somescholarshave noted (for instance,R. Arnou,op. cit., 276-278), muchparallelismbetweenthe ritual of the mysteryreligionsandthe metaphorsdescribing he mystic experience, ncludingfor instance the centralsignificanceof light. (In the ceremonythe climax is reachedwhen the statue ofthe god is revealed in a blaze of light.) Plotinus seems to have been acquaintedwith the ritual of the mystery religions(see Ennead VI ix 11) and this has to betaken into accountwhen one looks for the referentsof Plotinus' statementscon-
cerningsupersensibleexperience. Myth, mystery ritual, mystic experienceare ofcourserelatedexpressions f psychic striving. E. Brehier n his book La Philosophiede Plotin (Paris, 1928), chapter 7, has arguedthat the idea, often prominentin
Plotinus,of the self's absorption n a largernon-conscious xistence s not Greekin
origin,and attempts to deduce t from Indiansources. Whatever the possiblerela-tions of historical nfluence, he emotionalroots of the idea of the absorptionof theindividual n a largerwhole should be given full consideration. It is interestingtonote that the "Western" (Plotinus'"Greek") mind,in the face of certainpsychicprojections, readily resorts to the epithet "Eastern" or some equivalent. Thus
the tendencyof the essay againstthe Gnostics to separate intellectually rom one'sself certain of one'spsychic strivingsis rather general. It is one of the forms ofself-alienation.
54HazelE. Barnes, n an articleon "Neo-PlatonismandAnalyticalPsychology,"The PhilosophicalReview, LIV (1945), 558-577, states on the first page thatPlotinus "to a large extent presented in religiousmetaphysicswhat they [theGnostics]were saying by means of elaborate religioussymbolisms." The body ofthe articleis devotedto anothertopic than the direct substantiationof this asser-tion. It shouldbe noted that it is the claim of the presentarticle that Plotinus,rather than presentinga philosophicalversion of Gnosticism,presentsa much re-stricted view whencomparedwith Gnosticism. E. Brehier,op. cit., has calledatten-tion to the dual orientation of Plotinus' thought. He says (35), "We find inPlotinusa doublepresentationof reality: on the one hand a presentationakin tothe myth of the soul. . . . On the other hand, the universe . . . can be the objectof rationalthought." On p. 8 Brehierdeclares hat for all of Plotinus'attachmentto the rationalmethodof Greekphilosophy,"the problemswhich he puts himselfare problemswhichGreekphilosophynever envisaged. They are problems hat are
properly religious." It seems to the present writer that "religious" may be too
specifica term to denotethe psychicfactorsimpliedin Plotinus'thought. On the
resemblanceof Plotinian and Gnostic ideas concerningthe highest existence,see
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298 JOSEPH KATZ
on a path that he does not dare to pursue to its end. His use of reason does
not lead back to " Greek " science, and yet it bars a frank acknowledgmentof its mythical motivations. As compared with contemporary Gnostics and
Christians, there is something peculiarly unfinished and thwarted aboutPlotinus' philosophy. The ascent to the One is a more jungle-like journey,
stirring more monsters in the soul and awakening more longings than Ploti-
nus allowed. Both Gnostics and Christians saw this much better. In the
case of Plotinus too, Dionysos is playing his tricks on another sober son of
Apollo.It should finally be said that Plotinus' philosophy is properly compared
with Gnosticism, rather than Christianity. The development of what was
to become Christianity was controlled by the limitations, both positive and
negative, of a mass movement and an eventual state religion. Both Ploti-nus' and the Gnostics' are essentially minority creeds with no hope of mass
following and without the penalty of dilution. Both separate mankind into
classes, considering only a small group with special attainments as the
redeemed: Their minority status is not due to accident, but to the fullness
of their expression of certain special impulses which society at large con-
siders dangerous or impractical and from which it shrinks into conformism.
Plotinus, had he known of it, would have been sympathetic to the rebellious
interpretationthe Gnostics
gaveof the
serpent'sadvice in Eden. To
acquireknowledge of good and evil is an inspiration from the highest God, prohibi-tion of it the work of a fallen deity. In the way they interpreted the
serpent's advice Plotinus and the Gnostics differed. The gnosis of Plotinus
tends to be knowledge by discursive symbol, that of the Gnostics knowledge
by myth and even acquaintance; in Ennead IV viii 7 (cf. Enn. IV viii 5)Plotinus goes as far as to say that experience of evil may have the value of
enhancing the psyche's appreciation of good, but, he adds characteristically,
only for those who need to learn by experience rather than by science.
Neither Neoplatonism nor Gnosticism ever became genuine alternativesto Christianity, because they were both more partial and in some respectsmore perfect. Both of them continued their careers as tacit or open heresies
under Christianity (Gnosticism, for instance, in the guise of alchemy). The
temptation of intellect and the temptation of myth are as omnipresent as
Plotinus held his One to be. They lurk furtively in the very soul of the
conformist whose vaunted realism is often not much more than a defense
against such divine madness.
Vassar College.
E. Br6hier'sintroduction to Ennead VI viii in his edition of Plotinus (Plotin,EnneadesVI2 [Paris, 1938], 121). See also Hans Jonas, Gnosisund spdtantiker
Geist, Forschungenzur Religionund Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments,new series, fasc. 33 (Gottingen, 1934), 251. Jonas' entire discussion of Gnostic
acosmismand its relationto "Greek" thoughtis relevantto the problemshere dis-
cussed. Some of the problems oucheduponin the presentarticlehave found more
explicittreatment n my Plotinus'Searchfor the Good (New York, 1950). But the
body of the article is an additionto and in some respectsa revisionof what I say
in chapter 2, entitled"The nature of Plotinus'' mysticism."