October 2019 Dear Colleagues,
Please find attached the CVs of economics PhD students on the job market from Arizona State
University. Our recent graduates have placed in some of the world’s top universities and published in
the profession’s top journals. We are excited about the work of this year’s class and expect that they
too will change the way economists think about important issues. In addition to their research, all of our
students have substantive independent teaching experience. Please do not hesitate to email me at
[email protected] with any questions.
Sincerely,
Edward Schlee
Professor of Economics and Placement Director
Arizona State University
Name Education (all schools UG & Grad) Research/Teaching Fields email address
Job Market
Paper/Dissertation Title Link to website Committee/Advisors
Ahmet Altinok
Integrated BS and MS in Teaching Mathematics (2012) Bogazici University‐TurkeyMA in Economics (2015) Bogazici University‐TurkeyPhD in Economics (2020), ASU
Matching, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics, Political Economy [email protected] Dynamic Many‐to‐One Matching
https://aaltinok.wixsite.com/mysite
Chair‐ Hector Chade Alejandro ManelliAmanda FriedenbergNatalia Kovrijnykh
Eric González Sánchez
B.S. in Information Systems at University of Chile (2010)M.A. in Economics at Georgetown University‐Alberto Hurtado University (2012) PhD in Economics at Arizona State University (2020)
Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining, Game Theory. [email protected]
Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options
https://sites.google.com/asu.edu/ericgonzalezsanchez/
Chair‐ Alejandro Manelli Eddie SchleeHector Chade
Diana MacDonald
BSc Business Administration (Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, 2008)MA Management Science (Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, 2009)MA Applied Economics (Universidad de Chile, 2012)PhD Economics (ASU, 2019)
Applied Theory, Search and Matching [email protected]
Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach www.dianamacdonald.com
Chair‐ Hector Chade Alejandro ManelliAmanda Friedenberg Kelly Bishop
Sophie Mathes
B.S. Economics at University of Mannheim (2012) Additional coursework in Mathematics at Heidelberg University (2012‐2015).PhD Economics at ASU (2020)
Environmental, Urban, Health, Applied Micro [email protected]
The Dynamics of Residential Sorting and Health on a Warming Planet sophie-mathes.com
Co‐Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff Co‐Chair‐ Alvin Murphy Alexander BickJonathan KetchamKelly Bishop
Tomás Sanguinetti
B.A. Economics, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina (2011) M.A. Economics, University of Torcuato di Tella Buenos Aires, Argentina (2013)PhD Economics, ASU (2020)
Health Economics, Public Economics, Insurance Markets, Decision‐making under risk and uncertainty. [email protected]
Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff Daniel Silverman Edward SchleeJonathan Ketcham
Nazim Tamkoç
BA Economics at Bogazici University (2012) MA Economics at Bogazici (2015)MS Economics at ASU (2019)PhD Economics at ASU (2020)
Macroeconomics, Economic Development, Inequality [email protected]
Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development nazimtamkoc.com
Chair‐ Gustavo Ventura Berthold Herrendorf Domenico Ferraro
Job Market Candidates 2019-2020
How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part-D
Job Market Candidates 2019‐2020
Ahmet Altinok
Website | CV
Job Market Paper:
Dynamic Many‐to‐One Matching
Eric González Sánchez [email protected]
Website | CV
Job Market Paper Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options
Diana MacDonald [email protected]
Website | CV
Job Market Paper Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach
Dissertation Committee
Chair‐ Hector Chade Amanda Friedenberg Natalia Kovrijnykh Alejandro Manelli
Research/Teaching Fields
Matching, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics, Political Economy
Research/Teaching Fields Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining, Game Theory.
Dissertation Committee
Chair‐ Alejandro Manelli Hector Chade Eddie Schlee
Research/Teaching Fields
Applied Theory, Search and Matching
Dissertation Committee Chair‐ Hector Chade Kelly Bishop Amanda Friedenberg Alejandro Manelli
Placement Director- Eddie Schlee [email protected] Placement Coordinator- Laura-Jean Talts [email protected]
Job Market Candidates 2019‐2020
Sophie‐Marie Mathes
Website | CV
Job Market Paper
The Dynamics of Residential Sorting and Health: Implications of Climate Change in the U.S.
Tomás Sanguinetti
Website | CV
Job Market Paper
How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part‐D
Nazim Tamkoç
Website | CV
Job Market Paper
Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development
Research/Teaching Fields
Environmental, Urban, Health, Applied Micro
Dissertation Committee
Co‐Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff Co‐Chair‐ Alvin Murphy Alexander Bick Kelly Bishop Jonathan Ketcham
Research/Teaching Fields Health Economics, Public Economics, Insurance Markets, Decision‐making under risk and uncertainty
Dissertation Committee
Chair‐ Nicolai Kuminoff Jonathan Ketcham Daniel Silverman Edward Schlee
Research/Teaching Fields
Macroeconomics, Economic Development, Inequality
Dissertation Committee
Chair‐ Gustavo Ventura Domenico Ferraro Berthold Herrendorf
AHMET ALTINOKLast updated: October 2019
Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Phone: +1 (480) 738-9128Email: [email protected]: www.aaltinok.wixsite.com
Placement Director: Eddie SchleePlacement Coordinator: Laura Talts
[email protected] [email protected] 480.727.7931
Personal InformationTurkish Citizen / Permanent US Resident (in progress)
English (fluent), Turkish (native)
EducationPh.D Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Expected, 2020
Committee: Hector Chade, Amanda Friedenberg, Natalia Kovrijnykh, Alejandro Manelli
MS Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. 2015
MA Economics,Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2015.
Integrated B.S and M.S. in Teaching Mathematics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012.
Research Fields- Primary. Applied Theory, Microeconomics
- Secondary. Matching Theory, Contract Theory, Political Economy, Mechanism Design, Public Economics
Working Experience- Instructor:
Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2019Courses: Game Theory and Economic Behavior - ECN 416 (in progress)
Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2018 - Fall 2019Courses: Math for Econ: Bootcamp - ECN 594 - PhD CourseEvaluation: 5.9/7.0
Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Summer 2018Course: Principles of Microeconomics - ECN 212Evaluation: 6.2/7.0
- Teaching & Research Assistant:
Teaching Assistant, ECN 312, Intermediate Microeconomics, ASU, Spring 2017, Spring 2018
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Teaching Assistant, ECN 414, Advnced Microeconomics, ASU, Fall 2016Teaching Assistant, ECN 714, Microeconomic Analysis II - PhD Course, ASU, Spring 2016Research Assistant, Prof. Alejandro Manelli, ASU, Fall 2016Research Assistant, Center for Economic Design, Bogazici University, Fall 2013- Spring 2014Teaching Assistant, EC 512, Microeconomics II - MA Course, Bogazici University, Spring 2014Teaching Assistant, EC 483, Special Topics in Game Theory, Bogazici University, Spring 2014
Honors, Scholarships and FellowshipsCompletion Fellowship - Graduate College, ASU, Fall 2018
Dissertation Progress Award - Department of Economics, ASU, Spring 2018
Academic Performance Award - Department of Economics, ASU, Spring 2017, 2018, 2019
Publications
”Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project under Time-Inconsistency,” with M. Yılmaz, Journal of Eco-nomic Behavior & Organization, January 2018, 145: 114-140.
Working Papers
“Dynamic Many-to-One Matching” (Job Market Paper)Abstract. We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: matching isirreversible, participants —exogenously— join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agentsare perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: the side with many slots can manipulatethe subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: canwe analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic-one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, we show that if theseconditions are not met, then the early matchings are “inferior” compared to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, weextend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extensionwe provide a rationale for the little unraveling observed in the US medical residency matching market compared tothe US college admissions system.
Work in Progress
“Group Lending, Sorting, and Risk Sharing”Abstract. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor. Group lending withjoint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions. Such a contract performs two roles: it affects thecomposition of the groups that form, and determines the properties of risk sharing among their members. Eventhough the literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there is evidence also ofgroups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that, the literature lacked the risk sharing behavior ofthe agents within a group. This paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capitalfrom the microfinance institution, and share risks among themselves. I show that the composition of the groups is notalways homogeneous once risk sharing is included. In such cases, first best is achieved since heterogeneous groupslead to homogeneous society, eliminating the role, that reports to the MFI play in this set-up.
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ReferencesHector Chade (chair)Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
Amanda FriedenbergProfessor of EconomicsEller College of ManagementUniversity of [email protected]
Natalia KovrijnykhAssociate Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
Alejandro ManelliJPMorgan Chase ProfessorW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
ERIC GONZALEZ SANCHEZ https://wpcarey.asu.edu/economics-degrees/candidates-on-the-market
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
Placement Director: Eddie Schlee [email protected] 480.727-7824
Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts [email protected] 480.727.7931
Office Contact Information
CPCOM 415D
Tempe, Arizona 85287-9801
Cell phone number: 480-375-5246
Undergraduate Studies:
Bachelor of Science in Information Systems, Universidad de Chile, with honors, 2010.
Graduate Studies:
Arizona State University, 2014 to present, PhD in Economics.
Thesis Title: “Bargaining with Interdependent Outside Options.”
Expected Completion Date: May 2020.
Georgetown University-ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2011-2013, Master of Arts in
Economics, summa cum laude.
References:
Professor: Alejandro Manelli Professor: Hector Chade
Department of Economics
501 E Orange St, CPCOM 490H
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Department of Economics
501 E Orange St, CPCOM 455F
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
480-965-4682
480-965-4714
Professor: Edward Schlee
Department of Economics
501 E Orange St, CPCOM 490D
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
480-965-3531
Teaching and Research Fields:
Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Bargaining and Game Theory.
Teaching Experience:
Fall, 2019 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, Arizona State University, Instructor.
Fall, 2017
Spring, 2018
Microeconomic Analysis I (PhD class), Arizona State University, teaching
assistant for Professor Edward Schlee.
Microeconomic Analysis II (PhD class), Arizona State University, teaching
assistant for Professor Alejandro Manelli.
Summer, 2017
2015-2019
Fall, 2011
Fall and Spring,
2010
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory, Arizona State University, Instructor.
Teaching assistant for undergraduate honors classes and other undergraduate
courses at Arizona State University.
Microeconomics I (M.A. class), Georgetown University-ILADES Universidad
Alberto Hurtado, teaching assistant for Professor Lucas Navarro.
Teaching assistant for undergraduate courses, Universidad de Chile.
Research Experience and Other Employment:
2013-2014 Research Center for Social Complexity, Universidad del Desarrollo, researcher.
2010-2012 Universidad de Chile and Universidad Alberto Hurtado, research assistant.
Professional Activities:
2017 Journal of Economic Theory, reviewer.
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
2018 Performance Bonus and Dissertation Bonus, Department of Economics, Arizona
State University.
2017 Best writing performance in comprehensive exam, Department of Economics,
Arizona State University.
2013
2012
2006-2010
2006
Best academic performance, Master of Arts in Economics, Georgetown
University-ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado.
National Scholarship, Conicyt, for graduate studies.
Honor Roll, School of Economics and Business: Best academic performance each
year, Bachelor of Science in Information Systems, Universidad de Chile.
National Scholarship, Juan Gomez Millas, undergraduate studies.
Research Papers:
“Bargaining with Outside Options” (Job Market Paper)
I study a split-a-pie bargaining problem between two agents. The types of both agents determine the value
of their outside options-- I refer to this as interdependent outside options. The presence of interdependence
in outside options, brings relevance to the enforcement power of the mechanism designer. Since
mechanisms potentially reveal information about the other player, if players cannot be forced to stay with a
proposed outcome (non-binding arbitration), they might claim the outside option, given the updated
beliefs. Outside options are inefficient, thus, first best mechanisms assign zero probability to the outside
options for every report. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for these mechanisms to be
implementable. The condition suggests that inefficiency is triggered by unbalanced forces at conflict. The
condition is the same for non-binding and binding arbitration, considering binding arbitration, the case
when proposed outcomes can be enforced. Furthermore, the potential information leakage problem is
bypassed with first best mechanisms, because they can be taken not to reveal any information. Conversely,
if first best mechanisms are not possible, some information is revealed by the mechanism. I solve for the
second best mechanisms with binding arbitration and find a condition under which they can be
implemented under non-binding arbitration. With this I show that non-binding arbitration can be as
effective as binding in terms of efficiency. I analyze some properties of the second best mechanisms, in
particular, leakage of information and ask whether the mentioned equivalence between binding and non-
binding arbitration can arise or break, in general.
“Cold war in Eastern Island: Building Moai as costly signal for military strength” joint work with Paul
Seabright, Miguel Fuentes, Ricardo Guzman and Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert.
Between the years 1250 C.E. and 1500 C.E., the ancient Rapa Nui sculpted over 900 moai, representing the
clans’ ancestors. The moai era was a long period of peace. During 250 years that it lasted, the island’s
population grew from a few hundreds to 7,000 people or more (maybe as many as 17,000). But for some
reason, around 1500 A.D., moai building was halted, a fratricidal war ignited between the clans, and as a
results the Rapa Nui civilization collapsed. We claim that the clans used the moai to signal their military
power, which was not directly observable. The stronger the clan, the larger the moai it built. Using the
information conveyed by the moai sizes, the clans negotiated a division of the island’s resources, without
having to resort to war to determine who were the most powerful clans. The moai functioned as credible
signals of military power because the most powerful clans were also the most efficient moai builders. We
formulate a game-theoretic model that lends plausibility to our hypothesis and also shows conditions for
breaking the process of construction observed.
Research Papers in Progress
“Persuading to not be elected: Communication and incentives for team performance”
Given a set of agents, the team, one of them must be chosen to be a leader. Each agent has private
information about their leadership skills. Once the leader is chosen, each member chooses an action and
the outcome is determined jointly by the actions of all members and the skills of the leader. The team
needs to define a rule to assign a leader of the team and to split the outcome. I am interested on defining
the rules of sharing the outcome and assigning the leader that maximize the total welfare of the team, as
well as, analyzing the impact of particular rules in terms of welfare. In particular, I find that there are
scenarios where low type productivity members do not want to persuade the rest of the team that they have
high leadership skills, because if they are elected leader, the team would rest on their claimed high
leadership ability and choose suboptimal actions, I refer to this as persuading to not be elected. On the
other hand, there are scenarios where low types could benefit from convincing the rest that they are good
leaders because they can induce high effort from the rest of the team and adjust their own action according
to the true type of the leader. The strategic disclosure or concealing of information of the designer of the
mechanism can help to discipline the incentives of the team members for truth telling and choosing higher
types leaders.
“Optimal regulatory policies with synergies” joint work with Gino Loyola.
We study the problem of a regulator that needs to define rules for mergers of companies that may have
synergies. Each company has private information about its type that influences the payoffs obtained when
competing, for instance how cost efficient a firm can be. At the same time, the pair of types of two firms
merging determines the synergies that they can obtain. Two highly efficient firms merging can have
synergies when merging. In this context, is not always the case that the regulator wants competing firms all
the time. In certain cases mergers are preferred for welfare reasons, however, the need to put incentives for
truth telling ties the regulator to not allow as much mergers as he wants.
Language and IT
English fluent, Spanish native.
IT: C++, Java, PHP, E-Views, Stata, Matlab, GAMS, Mathematica.
Diana E. MacDonald
Last updated: November 2018
Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Phone: (480) 845-2227Email: [email protected]: www.dianamacdonald.com
Personal Information US Citizen / ChileanPersonal Information English (fluent), Spanish (native)
Education
Ph.D Economics, Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Expected 2019
MA Applied Economics, Universidad de Chile. Santiago, Chile. 2012
MA Management Science, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. 2009
BSc Business Administration, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. 2008
Research Fields
Primary. Applied Theory, Empirical Microeconomics
Secondary. Matching, Contract Theory, Family Economics
Teaching Experience
Instructor
Arizona State University. Tempe, Arizona. Fall 2018Courses: Principles of MicroeconomicsEvaluation: 5.9/7.0
Universidad Adolfo Ibanez. Santiago, Chile. Fall 2009 - Fall 2013Courses: Game Theory, Industrial OrganizationEvaluation: 6.1/7.0
Teaching Assistant
Honors Microeconomics, Arizona State University. Spring 2018
Honors Business Statistics, Arizona State University. Spring 2018
Intermediate Microeconomics Theory, Arizona State University. Spring 2017
Managerial Economics (MBA course), Arizona State University. Fall 2015/Fall 2016/ Fall 2017
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Honors, Scholarships and Fellowships
Edward Rondthaler Award, Arizona State University, 2018
Best Progress Towards Dissertation, Arizona State University, 2017
Best Oral Presentation for Third Year Paper, Arizona State University, 2016
Department of Economics Performance Award, Arizona State University, 2015-2018
Experiences
Visiting Student. Ecole Polytechnique, Universite Paris-Saclay. Paris, France. May-Jun 2016
Research Assistant to Professor Amanda Friedenberg. Arizona State University. Spring 2015
Visiting Student. Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. Jan-Feb 2012
Junior Consultant. Cognus Chile. Santiago, Chile. Mar 2009 - Feb 2010
Research in Progress
“Adoption from Foster Care: A Dynamic Matching Approach”
Abstract. Unlike adoption from private agencies, parents experiment by fostering a child beforeadopting. This feature leads to endogenous foster destructions and foster transitions into adoption.Using confidential data, I document stylized facts of this market and develop a two-sided dynamicmatching model consistent with features and facts of the market. I assume children and parentsface uncertainty about the quality of the match. I find that foster destruction is not only a resultof ‘bad’ foster matches being dissolved but it is also driven by children’s decision to experiment‘better’ matches. Experimentation allows agents to maintain ‘good’ matches and avoid ‘bad’ fostermatches. Yet, since transfers received by parents when adopting are strictly smaller than whenfostering, parents in ‘good’ foster matches might not have incentives to transit into adoption. Thefollowing trade-off arises: parents forgo part of the monetary transfer to eliminate the risk that thechild leaves the foster match. How much parents are willing to forgo depends on the likelihood thatthe child finds and forms a preferred foster match. I find that less demanded children are at higherrisk of parents substituting adoption for fostering.
“Assortative Matching with On-the-Match Random Search” with Hector Chade
Abstract. On-the-match search is a natural and realistic feature of partnership formation in manymarkets, such as labor and marriage markets. Incorporating on-the-match search adds a trade-offabsent in models where agents are not allow to search while matched. In our model, agents not onlycare about the payoff received from the match, but also the probability that the partner leaves andthey become unmatched. Hence, in equilibrium, partners who produce higher payoffs are not alwayspreferred since there is a higher probability that they leave to form a new match. Moreover, given thatmatch-status and match-partners evolve over time, we are needed to provide a suitable definitionfor Positive Assortative Matching (PAM). A sorting exhibits PAM if the conditional cumulativedistribution function over matches is increasing in the agents’ attributes. When agents attributescan be either low or high, the sufficient conditions ensuring that our definition of PAM will arisein equilibrium are weaker when on-the-match search is allowed than when it is not. If utility is
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strictly non-transferable and the payoff function is strictly increasing in the partner’s attribute thenthe equilibrium sorting exhibits PAM. For transferable utility, an strictly increasing and strictlysupermodular function suffices.
“The Unintended Consequences of Paying Parents to Adopt: Evidence from Min-nesota’s Foster Care System” with Kelly Bishop
References
Hector Chade (chair)Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
Kelly BishopAssistant Professor of EconomicsW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
Amanda FriedenbergProfessor of EconomicsEller College of ManagementUniversity of [email protected]
Alejandro ManelliJPMorgan Chase ProfessorshipW.P. Carey School of BusinessArizona State [email protected]
Sophie MathesLast updated: August 30, 2019
Arizona State UniversityWP Carey School of BusinessDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Email: [email protected]: http://www.sophie-mathes.com/
Personal
Citizen of Germany
Languages: German (Native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent)
Doctoral Studies
Ph.D. Economics, expected 2020, Arizona State UniversityAdvisors: Nicolai Kuminoff, Alvin Murphy
Research interests: Environmental Economics, Health Economics, Urban Economics
Undergraduate Studies
2012-2015: Mathematics, Ruperto Carola University of Heidelberg
2009-2012: B.Sc. Economics, University of Mannheim - Thesis advisor: Michèle Tertilt, PhD
Research Projects
Dynamic Model of Residential Decision-Making. Analyze how individual heterogeneity in age andhealth systematically affects residential decisions. Estimate valuation of amenities for different statesof health and age.
Pollution Poverty Trap. Document that lower-income seniors over time fare worse in terms of health.Research how health shocks translate into income shocks and trigger residential resorting into inexpen-sive, more polluted areas. Pollution exposure then leaves individuals more vulnerable to subsequenthealth shocks.
Using Location Choices to Value a Statistical Life. It has been shown that places of residence havea causal effect on mortality. Combine this insight with information about variation in prices acrosslocations to estimate the Value of a Statistical Life from a new angle.
Sophie Mathes 2
PresentationsScheduled10/2019: ECN PhD Reunion Conference, W.P. Carey Scool of Business, Arizona State UniversityPast08/2019: “Egg-timer”, Sloan Summer School in Environmental and Energy Economics,
UC Berkeley07/2019: 94th Annual Conference WEAI, San Francisco06/2019: 2019 ASHEcon Conference, Washington DC05/2019: 2019 AERE Summer Conference, Lake Tahoe NV04/2019: Seminar, Department of Economics, Arizona State University09/2018: Seminar, Center for Environmental Economics and Sustainability Policy,
Arizona State University08/2018: Camp Resources XXV, North Carolina State University03/2018: Seminar, Department of Economics, Arizona State University
Honors and Awards2019: Graduate College Travel Award, Arizona State University
Travel Grant, ASU Graduate and Professional Student AssociationPerformance Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University
2018: Performance Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University
2016: Graduate Teaching Assistant Award, Department of Economics, Arizona State University
2012: Thesis Award “Elisabeth Altmann-Gottheiner” for outstanding theses in the field of genderand diversity research, Department of Gender Equality, University of Mannheim
Memberships
American Society of Health Economists, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, UrbanEconomics Association
Research Experience
2017: Arizona State University, Research Assistant to Prof Alexander Bick
2013: German Council of Economic Experts, Research Assistant
2012–13: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Michèle Tertilt
2011–12: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Thomas König
2009–10: University of Mannheim: Research Assistant to Prof Markus Frölich
Sophie Mathes 3
Teaching Experience
2019: Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics (ECN 312), Arizona State University
2016: T.A., Mathematics for Economists (ECN 770), Arizona State University,Prof Andreas Kleiner
2014: T.A., Empirical Methods in Economics (undergraduate level), Ruperto CarolaUniversity of Heidelberg, Prof Melanie Arntz
ReferencesNicolai Kuminoff (co-chair)Associate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State [email protected]
Alvin Murphy (co-chair)Associate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State [email protected]
Kelly BishopAssistant ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State [email protected]
Jonathan KetchamDistinguished Research ProfessorDepartment of MarketingArizona State [email protected]
Alexander BickAssociate ProfessorDepartment of EconomicsArizona State [email protected]
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TOMÁS SANGUINETTI
November 2019
https://sites.google.com/view/tomas-sanguinetti/home
Placement Director: Edward Schlee [email protected] 480.727-7824
Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts [email protected] 480-727-7931
Office Contact Information
Department of Economics
W.P. Carey School of Business
CPCOM 425A
501 E. Orange Street
Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
P.O.Box 879801 Phone: 480-965-6880
Tempe, AZ 85287-9801 Cellphone: 480-577-4280
Undergraduate Studies
Posgrado en Economía, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina, 2013
B.A in Economics, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2011
Graduate Studies: Arizona State University (2015 – present)
Dissertation: Decision-Making in Health Insurance Markets
Expected completion date: June 2020
References
Nicolai V. Kuminoff (Chair) Jonathan Ketcham
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
480-727-9802
Earl G. and Gladys C. Davis Distinguished
Research Professor in Business
Department of Marketing
Arizona State University
480-965-5507
Edward Schlee Daniel Silverman
Professor
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Professor/Rondthaler Chair
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
480-965-3531
480-965-4832
Research Interests
Applied Micro, Health Economics, Public Economics, Decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
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Teaching Experience
Summer, 2019 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, ASU, instructor
Summer, 2018
Fall, 2019
Spring, 2019
Fall, 2018
Fall, 2017
Spring, 2017
Macroeconomic Principles, ASU, instructor
Advanced Honors Microeconomics, ASU, Prof. Edward Schlee, TA
Economic Development, ASU, Prof. Manjira Datta, TA
Advanced Honors Microeconomics, ASU, Prof. Edward Schlee, TA
Environmental Economics, ASU, Prof. Michael Hanneman, TA
Environmental Economics, ASU, Prof. Michael Hanneman, TA
Research Experience and Other Employment
2012-2015 UTDT Business School, Research Assistant for Juan José Cruces
2009-2011
2007-2008
Ministry of Industry, Argentina, Technical Advisor
Ministry of Production of the Province of Buenos Aires, Technical Advisor
Presentations
2019 Arizona State University Economics Department Reunion Conference
2019 Arizona State University General Economics Workshop
2018 Arizona State University General Economics Workshop
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships
2018-2019
2018
2018
Performance Bonus Award, Arizona State University
Best oral presentation (Comprehensive examination), Arizona State University
NBER Health Economics Research Boot Camp Participant
Working Paper Abstracts
How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part-D
Job market paper
This research is the first economic study to investigate how couples make enrollment choices in
individual insurance markets. I leverage administrative records for Medicare Part D enrollees to
distinguish widows and divorcées from married couples. I estimate a stochastic choice model of
household demand that takes into account risk aversion, expenditure risk, risk sharing, and inertia. I use
the model estimates to study how coordination within couples and interaction between couples and
singles affects the way that markets adjust to policies designed to nudge individuals toward choosing
higher value plans, particularly with respect to adverse selection. The data reveals striking facts about
insurance choice. I find that 78% of couples decide to ``pool" by buying the same plan. This figure
remains constant even for couples with extremely different health risk. My estimates imply that
monetary value of plan pooling to the average couple is approximately half their monetary value of
inertia, $1,584 vs $3,152. I use the model estimates to conduct several counterfactual policy experiments
and find that nudging consumers to choose the plans that maximize their expected utility in a
hypothetical deregulated environment without risk adjustment and premium subsidies would increase
couples' welfare by 11% and decrease singles' welfare by 2% on average. Adding the federal
government's current risk adjustment formula increases the disparity between welfare gains for couples
and welfare losses for singles. Additionally adding the federal government's current formula for
subsidizing plan premiums causes the policy to generate average welfare gains among both couples and
singles of 36% and 5% respectively
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Stochastic Dominance Tests of Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions
(with Jonathan Ketcham and Nicolai Kuminoff)
A growing empirical literature aims to design and evaluate policies that manipulate “choice
architecture” to nudge consumers toward making certain types of decisions. This research agenda is
motivated by evidence that consumers behave in ways that violate parametric approximations to
conventional economic models of utility-maximizing decision-making. We develop a new non-
parametric framework to evaluate the robustness of this evidence to assumptions about the parametric
form of utility. Our framework uses stochastic dominance rankings to assess the quality of consumer
decision-making under uncertainty when consumers choose among a finite set of objects that are
differentiated by price, risk and quality. We use this framework to develop measures of decision-making
quality at both the extensive margin (e.g. choosing an object off the efficient frontier) and the intensive
margin (e.g. distance from the frontier). We apply the methodology to assess the quality of consumer
decision making in Medicare Part D markets for prescription drug insurance markets from 2006 to 2010.
Work in Progress
How Do Social Interactions affect Private Decisions? Evidence from Health Insurance Markets
(with Jonathan Ketcham and Nicolai Kuminoff)
Individual choices are influenced by social interactions. When making important financial decisions,
individuals often seek advice and information from family, friends, neighbors, and specialists. In this
paper, we assess the value of information provided by social networks in retirement communities.
Retirement communities vary in their opportunities for social interaction. Some communities are
designed for seniors to be entirely independent; others are organized around fully or partially assisted
living. This variation makes retirement communities an ideal “laboratory” to investigate how peers and
specialists affect individual decision-making. We observe approximately 15,000 seniors making
repeated health insurance enrollment decisions in Medicare Part D between 2006-2010 before and after
entering a retirement community. We leverage migration decisions to identify how their choices are
affected by those of their peers. We also use measures of decision-making quality constructed in a
companion paper to investigate how decision-making quality is affected by the various types of social
interactions that different retirement communities afford.
M. NAZIM TAMKOÇSeptember 2019
Arizona State UniversityDepartment of EconomicsP.O. Box 879801Tempe, AZ 85287-9801
Office: CPCOM 415FPhone: (480) 570-5422Email: [email protected]: www.nazimtamkoc.com
Placement Director: Eddie Schlee [email protected] (480) 727-7824Placement Coordinator: Laura Talts [email protected] (480) 727-7931
Doctoral Studies
Arizona State University, 2015 to presentPhD, Economics, Expected Completion Date: May 2020Research and Teaching Fields: Macroeconomics, Development Economics, Inequality
References
Gustavo Ventura (chair)Professor of EconomicsArizona State [email protected], (480) 965-5881
Berthold HerrendorfProfessor of EconomicsArizona State [email protected], (480) 965-1462
Domenico FerraroAssistant Professor of EconomicsArizona State [email protected], (480) 965-5498
Previous Studies
MS, Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, U.S., 2019MA, Economics, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2015BA, Economics, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012
Teaching Experience
Instructor2019 Summer: ECN 211 Macroeconomics Principles, ASU2018 Summer: EC 489 Statistics for Incoming M.A. Students, Bogaziçi University2017 Summer: EC 205 Macroeconomics I, Bogaziçi University
Honors and Grants
CSEL Smith Research Grant (ASU, 2019)CASEE Fellowship (ASU, 2015, 2016)
Conferences
2019: ASU PhD Reunion Conference2018: Midwest Macroeconomics Group Meeting in Vanderbilt University
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Research Papers
Production Complexity, Talent Misallocation and Development (Job Market Paper)Abstract: I study the organization of production across countries, as summarized by the number of managers perplant, the number of workers per manager and the mean size of plants in terms of employment. First, I documentthat in the manufacturing sector, richer countries tend to have (i) more managers per plant, (ii) less workers permanager and (iii) larger plants on average. I then extend a knowledge-based hierarchies model of the organization ofproduction where the communication technology depends on the managerial level in the hierarchy and the abilitiesof subordinates. I estimate model parameters so that the model jointly produces plant size distribution and numberof managers per plant in the U.S. manufacturing sector. I quantitatively evaluate the effects of information andcommunication technologies, as well as size-dependent distortions that are studied in the development literature.I find that both higher communication costs and size-dependent distortions reallocate employment and outputtoward simpler forms of organizations with fewer managers per plant and smaller plant size. My results show thata 10% increase in communication cost parameters can account for a 35% decrease in the aggregate output withouthaving a significant effect on the number of managers per plant. On the other hand, size-dependent distortionshave bigger effect on output relative to similar studies that ignore organizational differences among productionunits. I find that when the largest, more complex, plants face distortions that are twice as large as distortions facedby smaller plants, output declines by 33.4% and the number of managers per plant falls by 30%.
Bribery, Plant Size and Size Dependent DistortionsAbstract: In this paper, I study the relationship between bribery, plant size and economic development. Briberyis a transfer from one party to government officials in order to ‘get things done’. Using the Enterprise Survey, Idocument that small plants spend higher fraction of their output on bribery than big plants do. Then I develop a onesector growth model in which size-dependent distortions, bribery opportunities and different plant sizes coexist. Iconduct two sets of exercises in order to quantify the interplay of size-dependent distortions and bribery. First, Icalibrate model parameters to generate plant size distribution of the U.S., by assuming the U.S. is free of distortions.Then I introduce size-dependent distortions to the undistorted economy and evaluate their effects with and withoutbribery opportunities. I find that size-dependent distortions become less distortionary in the presence of briberyopportunities and the effect of such distortions on the plant size become reversed since bigger plants are able toavoid from distortions by paying larger bribes. Subsequently, I calibrate the model with distortions and briberyopportunities to Turkish data. My results indicate that changes in the distortion level do not affect output andsize significantly because managers are able to circumvent the distortions by adjusting their bribery expenditures.However, the removal of distortions can have a substantial effect on both the output and the mean size. Output inTurkey can increase by 12.3%, while the mean size can increase by almost double.
Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists: Wage, Income and Consumption Inequality in Turkey (with Orhan Torul),R&R at Journal of Economic InequalityAbstract: In this paper, we investigate the evolution of Turkey’s wage, income and consumption inequalities thor-oughly following a cross-country comparable methodology via the Turkish Statistical Institute’s Household BudgetSurvey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions micro data sets. We first show that Turkey’s wage, incomeand consumption inequalities all exhibit downward time trends over the 2002-2016 period, which aligns well withthe rapid minimum wage growth over the period of interest. We further show that in these time trends, while wageinequality estimates display strong countercyclicality, income and consumption inequalities exhibit rather acycli-cal time-series movements. Second, we report that while recent education premium estimates of Turkey are similarto those in the early 2000s, gender and experience premiums, as well as residual wage inequality component de-crease over time. Finally, we show that Turkey’s income and consumption inequality estimates exhibit similar timetrends with moderate level differences, and these trends are robust to the choice of inequality metrics. As the firstof its kind in its depth, robustness and cross-country comparability, we aim that this paper contributes to a betterunderstanding of Turkey’s economic inequalities.
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