IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA(EASTERN CAPE - GRAHAMSTOWN)
Case No: 1062/2001
Heard on : 19 November 2009
Delivered : 14 December 2009
In the matter between:
WILMOT MANDLA CHAGI & 29 OTHERS Plaintiffs
and
SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT AND 9 OTHERS Defendants
JUDGMENT
KROON J:
[1]This judgment concerns a number of exceptions delivered by the plaintiffs to the
pleas filed by the defendants in the proceedings.
[2]The plaintiffs initially issued summons in this matter on 14 August 2001. At that
stage the parties cited were reflected as follows:
Special Investigating Unit 1st Defendant
MEC for Agriculture and Land Affairs
(Eastern Cape) 2nd Defendant
Daily Dispatch Media (Pty) Ltd 3rd Defendant
(In fact, the correct name of the 3rd defendant is Dispatch Media (Pty) Ltd).
[3]Claim A made the following allegations: On 25 August 1998 the 1st and 2nd
defendants, in founding papers filed in proceedings before the Special Tribunal,
made certain defamatory statements concerning the plaintiffs (in essence relating to
alleged misappropriation of funds belonging to the Transkei Agricultural Corporation
Ltd (Tracor)). The statements were published to various persons. In consequence
thereof the plaintiffs had each suffered damage for which the 1st defendant is liable.
(My italics).
[4]Claim B made the following allegations: At a conference held on 24 August 1998
the second defendant made and published certain defamatory statements
concerning the plaintiffs (of a similar ilk as those referred to in paragraph 3 above).
Accordingly, the 2nd defendant is liable to the plaintiffs for damages.
[5]Claim C alleged that on 21 August 1998 the 1st and 2nd defendants maliciously set
in motion certain legal proceedings against the plaintiffs making false allegations
against them. Accordingly, the two defendants were jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiffs for damages.
[6]Claim D alleged that on 25 August 1998 the 3rd defendant published, in a
newspaper owned and published by it, an article which was defamatory of the
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the defendant was liable to the plaintiffs in damages.
[7]The 1st and 2nd defendants filed their plea on 15 November 2001, which embraced
certain special pleas and a plea over. The plea of the 3rd defendant, on the merits,
was delivered on 27 August 2002.
[8]Various skirmishes took place between the plaintiffs and the 1st and 2nd
defendants concerning the special pleas filed by the latter. The upshot was that
judgments upholding the special pleas and dismissing claims A, B and C were set
aside, and the matter was remitted to this Court for further adjudication.
[9]The plaintiffs thereupon applied for, and were granted, an order joining the 4th to
10th defendants. The plaintiffs’ amended combined summons, embracing the
joinder, was delivered on 8 July 2009. The 4th to 6th defendants, the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, the State President of the Republic of South Africa and
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, were cited as interested
parties (on the basis that they were functionaries of the State and the latter was the
true party that would satisfy any judgment given against the 1st defendant in favour of
the plaintiffs – see Chagi and Others v Special Investigating Unit 2009 (2) SA 1 (CC)
paragraph 42 at 15E). The 7th to 10th defendants, the Premier of the Eastern Cape
Province, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the Executive Council of the
Eastern Cape and the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, were also cited as
interested parties “who are implicated in the commission by them of unlawful acts committed
during the purported dissolution of Tracor and its implementation as demonstrated in these particulars
of claim”. Various factual allegations were included in the amended particulars of
claim relating to conduct on the part of these defendants and the 4 th defendant. No
relief was, however, claimed as against the 4th to 10th defendants. (This is an aspect
to which I will revert later).
[10]In response to the amended particulars of claim the 1st, 2nd and 4th to 10th
defendants filed an amended plea, which included various special pleas in limine.
The 3rd defendant did not file an amended plea.
[11]On 14 September 2009 the plaintiffs delivered an exception to the amended plea
of the firstmentioned defendants (relating to the special pleas in limine as well as the
plea on the merits) and to the 3rd defendant’s existing plea on the merits. (At the
same time a replication to the amended plea was filed). Thereafter, on 21
September 2009, the plaintiffs gave notice of their intention to amend the exception
by limiting same to the exceptions to the special pleas in limine of the 1st, 2nd and 4th
to 10th defendants and deleting the exceptions to the pleas on the merits of these
defendants and of the 3rd defendant. That amendment was duly effected and the
amended exception was delivered on 12 October 2009.
[12]At that stage therefore the only exception on the table was the plaintiffs’
amended exception, to the special pleas in limine of the 1st, 2nd and 4th to 10th
defendants. (For convenience this exception will be referred to as the special pleas
exception).
[13]However, on 26 October 2009 the plaintiffs’ attorney filed and delivered a
document styled “PLAINTIFFS EXCEPTION TO THE 1ST, 2ND, 4TH TO 10TH DEFENDANTS’
AMENDED PLEA AND TO THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S PLEA” (and dated 15 October 2009).
This document purported to constitute an exception to the defendants’ pleas on the
merits. (For convenience this exception will be referred to as the merits pleas
exception).
[14]At the hearing on 19 November 2009 the first issue raised for resolution was
whether the merits pleas exception was properly before me and could be
entertained. I made an order setting aside the exception as an irregular proceeding
and I indicated that my reasons for the order would be furnished in due course. The
reasons follow.
[15]On 17 November 2009 the 1st, 2nd and 4th to 10th defendants filed a notice of
application in terms of rule 30(1). Notice was given therein that at the hearing on 19
November 2009 application would be made for an order setting aside what was
referred to as the plaintiffs’ “amended exception dated 15 October 2009” as being an
irregular proceeding. (The reference was to the merits pleas exception). The 3rd
defendant filed a similar notice. The plaintiffs filed papers in opposition to the
applications.
[16]There is a dispute as to whether the Registrar issued the notice of set down for
19 November 2009 before or after the filing of the merits pleas exception. I will
proceed on the basis that, as stated in the affidavit by Mr Tshiki, who appeared for
the plaintiffs, it was after he had filed that exception on 26 October 2009 that he
requested the Registrar to set the matter down for hearing on 19 November 2009 (a
date which had been agreed upon between the parties), including the merits pleas
exception.
[17]A point in limine, as it were, taken by Mr Tshiki was that the applications for the
setting aside of the exception were themselves irregular and should not be accepted
by the Court in that the defendants had not, as required by rule 30 (2)(b), given
written notice to the plaintiffs affording them an opportunity of removing the cause of
the complaint. It was in fact the submission of the attorney that however patent and
serious the irregularity was and however substantial the prejudice occasioned
thereby and notwithstanding that the plaintiffs were not in a position to remedy the
matter complained of, the Court is obliged to reject the application for the setting
aside of the irregular step if it had not been preceded by compliance with rule 30 (2)
(b), and to hear the exception.
[18]In fact, however, as will appear below, there was compliance with the prescripts
of rule 30 (2)(b). Mr Pretorius, the attorney acting for the 1st, 2nd and 4th to 10th
defendants, in an affidavit in support of the rule 30 application, stated that in the light
of the history of the matter and prior to receipt of the plaintiffs’ merits pleas exception
on 26 October 2009 the defendants were of the view that the only exception to be
adjudicated on the agreed date of hearing, 19 November 2009, was the special
pleas exception. That statement was no doubt correct. Mr Tshiki records in his
answering affidavit that subsequent to the delivery of the plaintiff’s amended
exception (the special pleas exception) the plaintiffs’ exception to the general pleas
of the defendants was reformulated with a view to delivering same afresh and in a
separate document (the merits pleas exception). He then states that he telephoned
Pretorius to arrange a date of set down of the exceptions and 19 November 2009
was agreed upon. Conspicuous by its absence, however, was any intimation by Mr
Tshiki to Pretorius that the merits pleas exception was to be included or, indeed,
even that such a document existed.
[19]It may be recorded at this stage that the merits plea exception is contained in a
very voluminous document comprising 77 pages and that it went considerably further
that the portion of the original exception filed that related to the pleas on the merits. I
will return to this aspect later.
[20]Pretorius formed the view that the merits pleas exception was irregular in that:
(a) there had been no compliance with rule 28(1) in that no notice of intention
to amend the exception filed on 12 October 2009 (the special pleas
exception) by the addition thereto of the merits pleas exception had been
given;
(b) no such amendment had been effected as required by the rule;
(c) the defendants had not been afforded an opportunity to exercise their
rights in terms of the rule.
[21]Accordingly, Pretorius addressed a letter to Mr Tshiki dated 30 October 2009
and faxed to him on 4 November 2009. After referring to the history of the earlier
exceptions filed by the plaintiffs Pretorius recorded that it was the defendant’s view
that only the special pleas exception was to be adjudicated on 19 November 2009.
He pointed out that the final document filed, the merits pleas exception, was
confusing in that it only related to the general pleas and not to the special pleas
which was the content of the amended exception filed on 12 October 2009 and he
requested that the position be clarified.
[22]The response to the letter was dated 9 November 2009. It read in part as
follows:
“Kindly ignore the content of our notice to amend to the effect that only the
exception pertaining to the special plea would be argued. At that stage no date
for argument was arranged and had been set. We had thought that it might take
us some time to reformulate our client’s exception to the merits of your clients’
amended plea and thought that in the meanwhile we could have the exception to
the special pleas heard but did not obtain a date in that regard. However, we
were able to reformulate the exception to the merits of your clients’ amended
plea in no time and realized that it would save costs to have the whole exception
embracing both the special pleas and the merits heard simultaneously and in this
regard decided to set down both exceptions after arranging a dated (sic) with you
as the 19th November is that date the writer obtained from Mr Pretorius.
As manifest from the index we delivered on the 26th October 2009 and the heads
of argument we have delivered in the above matter and indeed the notice of set
down, both the exception to the special pleas and to the merits of your clients’
pleas are to be heard on 19 November 2009.”
[23]The reply, dated 10 November, read as follows:
“We do not agree with your contentions in your letter of 9 November 2009.
Your clients cannot simply ignore Court Rules and amend as they please.
Defendants will only prepare on and argue Plaintiffs’ Amended Exception to the
1st, 2nd, 4th to 10th Defendants’ Special Pleas in limine, dated 14 September 2009
and served on Defendants on 12 October 2009. Such document consists of 30
pages, as stated in our letter of 30 October 2009, and it only excepts to the
Defendants’ Special Pleas. These are the issues that we regard to be decided on
19 November 2009.
Plaintiffs’ exception to the 1st, 2nd, 4th to 10th Defendants’ Amended Plea and to
the 3rd Defendant’s Plea, dated 15 October 2009 and served on the Defendants
on the 26 of October 2009, is quite clearly irregular proceeding, inter alia in that:
1. As far as we are aware of, no notification of intention to amend was given
as required by Rule 28(1);
2. The amendment was also not effected as required by the said Rule 28;
3. The Defendants have not been given the opportunity to, within 15 days
after the amendment had been effected, make any consequential
adjustments to the documents previously filed by them, as provided for in
Rule 28(8).
Please confirm then that only the Special Pleas will be argued on 19 November
2009, failing which we will bring an application to have the document of 15
October set aside.
Please revert as a matter of urgency.
All our client’s rights are reserved”
[24]In argument Mr Tshiki reiterated the stance adopted in his answering affidavit:
The merits pleas exception was not an amendment of the existing exception but a
fresh exception following on the amendment of the original exception filed which
effected a withdrawal of part thereof. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to
deliver the exception and apply for a date for the hearing thereof in terms of rules
23(1) and 6(5)(f). Put differently, the plaintiffs were entitled to reinstate the
withdrawn exception by delivering it again. It was only if the plaintiffs sought to
reintroduce the merits pleas exception by way of an amendment to the existing
special pleas exception that they would have had to follow the procedure laid down
in rule 28.
[25]The deponent to the affidavit filed in support of the 3rd defendant’s application in
terms of rule 30 for the setting aside of the merits pleas exception as irregular was its
attorney, Mrs Norval. She invoked the same grounds as mentioned by Pretorius for
the contention that delivery of the exception was irregular. She also referred to
correspondence that passed between her and Mr Tshiki. In a letter dated 3
November 2009 she commented that having regard to the fact that the exception
was only delivered on 26 October 2009 it appeared that it was not to be argued on
19 November 2009. By letter dated 4 November 2009 Mr Tshiki stated that both
exceptions had been set down for hearing on 19 November 2009. In a further letter
dated 9 November 2009 Mr Tshiki adopted the attitude that the failure of the
defendant to respond to a notice of bar calling upon it to file an amended plea to the
latest amended particulars of claim, and its instead filing a rule 30 application for the
setting aside of the notice of bar, had paved the way for plaintiffs to file the exception
to the existing plea.
[26]All the defendants made the point that they had been prejudiced by the delivery
of the merits pleas exception having regard to the complexity of the issues raised in
its voluminous documentation.
[27]In my judgment, the delivery of the merits pleas exception was an irregular step
for the reasons that follow. First, that portion of the exception which relates to the
merits plea of the 1st, 2nd and 4th to 10th defendants would indeed, if allowed, have
constituted an amendment of the existing special pleas exception. The rules provide
for the filing of an exception (itself a pleading) to a pleading filed by an opposing
party. It does not make provision for the filing of a further and separate exception to
the same pleading (even if the lastmentioned document contains discrete sections.)
What the defendants in question did was to file a single, albeit composite, pleading
containing both its pleas in limine and its plea over. Only a single, albeit composite,
exception thereto was permissible. As Mr Tshiki himself stated in his answering
affidavit, what the plaintiffs did was (purportedly) to reinstate that part of the
exception that had been withdrawn earlier (save that the new exception was more
voluminous) and that what the plaintiffs sought to do was to amplify the existing
exception. That could, however, only have been effected by way of an appropriate
amendment to the existing pleading. The provisions of rule 28 were accordingly of
application and the plaintiffs were obliged to follow the procedural steps set out
therein. That they failed to do.
[28]Had the plaintiffs not so failed it would have been open to the defendants to
have filed and delivered a notice of objection to the proposed amendment. Allowing
the plaintiffs to follow the procedure they did adopt would have been wrongfully to
deprive the defendants of their entitlement to register objections to the proposed
amendment. In fact, an objection which the defendants could have raised, as set out
in the succeeding paragraph, constitutes a further basis on which to find that the
delivery of the exception was an irregular step. It should be recorded that the aspect
in question was raised by me during argument.
[29]Rule 23(3) stipulates that an exception must state the grounds on which it is
founded clearly and concisely. As already recorded, the exception in question
comprises some 77 pages. Sixty pages thereof related to the plea over of the
defendants in question. It need hardly be observed that a document as prolix as that
does not qualify for the epithet of ‘concise’. This is the more clear when regard is had
to the facts that only a limited number of paragraphs in the amended plea over were
the subject of attack, that cognizable portions of the exceptions comprised a recordal
of allegations made by the plaintiffs in the particulars of claim and of admissions
made by the defendants in respect thereof and, more importantly, that much of the
exception, indeed overwhelmingly the greater part thereof, was devoted to argument
why, on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, or for other reasons, the defences pleaded
ought not to be upheld, as opposed to setting out grounds why the defences
pleaded, even if proved, would not in law constitute defences. That was both a
misuse and abuse of the exception procedure. The material referred to might, to a
greater or lesser extent, have found an appropriate home in a replication. It may
also be mentioned that in addition to a prayer that the exception be upheld, the
exception inappropriately and invalidly sought a finding that the 1st and 2nd
defendants, as the case may be, are liable to the plaintiffs for such damage as may
be proved.
[30]The extent to which the exception constituted an infraction of the provisions of
rule 23(3) requires it to be stamped an irregular proceeding.
[31]If in fact the plaintiffs were entitled to deliver a fresh and independent exception
in addition to the one already filed there is another reason why the delivery thereof
was an irregular proceeding.
[32]Rule 23(1) provides that an exception must be delivered within the period
allowed for filing any subsequent pleading. In the case of an exception to a plea that
period is the one within which a replication has to be filed, ie 15 days (see rule
25(1)). Save in respect of an exception to a plea an exception to another pleading
may be filed after the stipulated period unless the opposing party had taken steps to
impose a bar to the filing of any further pleading. However, the failure to file a
response to a plea (ie a replication or exception) within the stipulated period brings
into operation an automatic bar against the filing of a response (see rule 26).
Accordingly, the party guilty of such failure is precluded from filing a response,
including an exception, unless that party has sought and secured an upliftment of the
bar (either by consent of the other party or by order of court).
[33]The purported delivery of the exception in the present matter was effected a
substantial period after the date on which a replication to the plea, if any, was
required to be filed. The plaintiffs were accordingly under automatic bar against the
filing of any further pleading. They could therefore not file and deliver an exception
unless they had sought, and secured, an upliftment of the bar. They did not do so.
The filing and delivery of the exception was accordingly impermissible and an
irregular step.
[34]I turn now to deal with the portion of the exception delivered on 26 October 2009
that was directed at the 3rd defendant’s plea. Consequent upon the amendment to
their exception effected by the plaintiffs on 12 October 2009 which expunged the
earlier exception taken to the 3rd defendant’s plea there was no existing exception to
the defendant’s plea. The relevant part of the exception in question was accordingly
not intended to be, nor could it be, an amendment of an earlier exception (an earlier
pleading). The comments made above concerning amendments to a pleading are
therefore not of application.
[35]It may be accepted for present purposes (without so deciding):
(a) that in the light of its filing and delivery of its final amended particulars of claim
embracing the joinder of the further defendants and the inclusion of allegations in
respect of them, the plaintiffs were entitled to call upon the 3rd defendant to file an
amended plea on pain of being barred if it failed to do so;
(b) that in the absence of the filing of an amended plea in response to the notice
of bar the plaintiffs were entitled, upon the bar taking effect, to file and deliver an
exception to the 3rd defendant’s plea.
[36]However, the exception was required to be filed within the period allowed for the
filing of a further pleading failing which the plaintiffs were automatically barred. The
plaintiffs’ notice of bar to the 3rd defendant was served on 20 August 2009. The 3rd
defendant’s response thereto was to file on 21 August 2009 a notice of application in
terms of rule 30 for the setting aside of the plaintiffs’ notice of bar as an irregular
proceeding. (An earlier notice of bar by the plaintiffs, subsequently withdrawn by
them, had elicited a similar response, the 3rd defendant’s attorneys having earlier
written to the plaintiffs’ attorneys contending that the notice of bar was irregular in the
light of the fact the 3rd defendant had already pleaded). At best for the plaintiffs
therefore the exception to the 3rd defendant’s plea should have been filed within 15
days of the 3rd defendant’s notice in terms of rule 30. Having failed to do so they
were under automatic bar and could not file an exception thereafter without
upliftment of the bar. The delivery of the exception to the 3rd defendant’s plea on 26
October 2009 was accordingly an irregular proceeding.
[37]Secondly, that part of the document delivered that related to the plea of the 3rd
defendant (comprising some 15 pages) attracts mutatis mutandis the same criticism
as that recorded in paragraphs 29 and 30 above in respect of the part that related to
the plea over of the other defendants. Again, there was a serious infraction of the
prescript in rule 23(3) that the grounds on which an exception is based are to be
stated clearly and concisely, and the document was accordingly an irregular
proceeding.
[38]The first special plea in limine raised a defence of prescription to claims A and B
on behalf of the 2nd, 7th, 9th and 10th defendants. However, at the hearing the plea
was abandoned and the costs of the exception thereto were tendered.
[39]The second special plea in limine raised a different defence of prescription to
claims A, B and C on behalf of all the defendants (save the 3rd defendant). It sought
to meet various allegations introduced by the plaintiffs for the first time in the final
amended particulars of claim, which, so it was contended, constituted a separate
and new cause of action. The allegations charged the defendants with unlawful
conduct relating inter alia to the restructuring of Tracor, the issue of the proclamation
in terms of which Tracor was dissolved, the implementation of the liquidation of
Tracor, the retrenchment of Tracor employees, unfair labour practices, non-
compliance with the audi rule and the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, and
failure to consult the plaintiffs. The allegation related to events that occurred more
than three years prior to delivery of the plaintiffs’ amended particulars of claim;
hence, the contention that the new cause of action constituted by the allegations,
and the debt to which they gave rise, had become prescribed.
[40]There are two short answers to the contention. First, as Mr Tshiki sought to
emphasise, no relief was sought as against the 4th to 10th defendants. They were
cited as interested parties. In the circumstances there can be no talk of a “debt”
owing by them having become prescribed.
[41]Second, Mr Tshiki correctly pointed out that on a nice analysis of the particulars
of claim the allegations did not introduce a new cause of action founding a new debt.
In short, the allegations went in support of the claims that the defamatory statements
and the proceedings complained about were unlawful and had been made and
instituted animo iniuriandi on the basis, in addition to the allegations already
contained in the particulars of claim, that the 1st and 2nd defendants were aware of
the unlawful conduct referred to in the further allegations when they made the
statements and instituted the proceedings. The cause of action and the debt
invoked remained the same.
[42]The plea accordingly did not disclose a defence and the exception thereto was
validly taken.
[43]The third special plea in limine, directed at claims A, B and C on behalf of all the
defendants, sought to raise the defence of the lack of jurisdiction of this Court to
adjudicate certain issues. These related to the alleged unfair labour practices, the
retrenchment of Tracor employees, non-compliance with the audi rule and the
provisions of the Labour Relations Act, and the failure to consult with the plaintiffs. It
was again contended that the allegations constituted a new cause of action, but it is
one which is justiciable only in the Labour Court.
[44]The comments in paragraphs 40 to 42 above, however, apply mutatis mutandis.
Moreover, as Mr Tshiki pointed out, the relief sought by the plaintiffs did not a rise
out of an employment relationship.
[45]The fourth special plea in limine raised the defence of res iudicata as against the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 8th, 12th and 19th plaintiffs. These plaintiffs, together with other persons,
were plaintiffs in certain earlier proceedings instituted against the 2nd and 7th
defendants (Twani and Others v The Premier for the Eastern Cape and Others Case
no. 460/99, Transkei Division). I presided over those proceedings. Included in the
findings I made were findings that the audi rule was complied with, that proper
consultations were held with Tracor employees and that Tracor was lawfully
dissolved. Accordingly, so it was contended, the separate and new cause of action
constituted by the allegations on those scores by the plaintiffs in question was res
iudicata.
[46]It requires to be repeated that no new cause of action founding a new debt was
introduced and that no relief is being claimed as against the 7th defendant. Further, it
will suffice to point to the fact that the parties in the Twani matter and the present
matter are not identical, that the causes of action and grounds relied upon are not
the same and the relief claimed in the instant case is not the same relief as was
claimed in Twani. On the basis of the reasoning set out in paragraphs 110 to 118 of
the first judgment I delivered in Twani and in the Sorghum Brewery case referred to
therein, the issues referred to in the special plea are not res iudicata a defence was
not disclosed and the exception thereto was validly taken.
[47]Mr De Bruyn (who with Mr Pienaar) appeared for the defendants sought during
argument to refer to an exception (consisting of two parts) to the replication filed on
behalf of the plaintiffs and submitted that his clients were entitled to certain relief in
respect thereof. As pointed out by Mr Tshiki, however, that exception had not been
set down for hearing. It is assumed that the parties’ attitude to that exception will be
informed by the contents of this judgment.
[48]It may be mentioned that the conclusions recorded above do not bear on the
rights of the defendants to object at the trial to the admissibility of evidence on the
factual issues raised in the special pleas in limine with reference to the relevance
thereof.
[49]The following orders will accordingly issue:
(a) The applications of the defendants in terms of rule 30 are upheld and the
exception delivered by the plaintiffs on 26 October 2009 is set aside as an
irregular proceeding, with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel, and to be paid jointly and severally, the one plaintiff paying, the
others to be absolved.
(b) The defendants (excluding the 3rd defendant) will pay the plaintiffs’ costs of
the exception to the first special plea in limine of the defendants jointly and
severally the one paying the others to be absolved.
(c) The plaintiffs’ exceptions to the second, third and fourth special pleas in
limine of the defendants (excluding the third defendant) are upheld and the
special pleas in limine are struck out, with costs, jointly and severally, the
one defendant paying, the others to be absolved.
___________________F KROONJudge of the High Court
14 December 2009
Appearances:
For Plaintiff: Mr Tshiki c/o Whitesides Attorneys53 African StreetGrahamstown (Mr Barrow/Louise)Instructed by:
Tshiki and Sons Incorporated
For 1st,2nd, 4th – 10th Defendants: Adv de Bruyn & Adv Pienaar instructed by: The State Attorneyc/o G M Yeko
3F Anglo African StreetGrahamstown
For 3rd Defendant: Adv de Bruyn & Adv Pienaar instructed by: Netteltons Attorneys
118A High StreetGrahamstown