Download - Freedom of Assembly Cases

7/28/2019 Freedom of Assembly Cases

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CASE DIGESTSFREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY


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Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006Azcuna, J.

FACTS: The rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and

going towards Mendiola bridge. Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue where BAYANs rally

was violently dispersed. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only

Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to

stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan

et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence

or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of

expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is

sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The

words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the

government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government

because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated the petitioners right, as an organizations and

individuals, of peaceful assembly.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that B.P. No 880 is valid and constitutional. It is not an absolute ban of public

assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus

readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful

cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise they would

not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of

grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is

for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,

public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even

under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Darenn S. Ba-at Escrupulo JD 1


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IBP vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola

Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda

as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action was

thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in

the permit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their

constitutional right to public assembly.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his

discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his

perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The

opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an

unfavourable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of

the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such

modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which

blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory

any judicial scrutiny thereof.



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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE

AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition thegovernment for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, theState shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equalprotection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass orconcerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to thegeneral public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic orsocial; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall begoverned by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Actshall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers andemployees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, andby the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare,park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keepingauthorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting ofthe parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person orpersons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public

assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, inwhich case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of agovernment-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of saideducational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by laware not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:


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(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose ofsuch public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity;and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction theintended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city ormunicipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipalbuilding.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there isclear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, publicsafety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from thedate the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor orany official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by theapplicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting thedenial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his

permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal CircuitTrial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to theappropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shallbe required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, beimmediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to thenext in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for anappreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official actingin his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to theparticipants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interferencewith the free flow of commerce and trade.


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Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of apublic assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall beconducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be l imited to thefollowing:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawfulactivities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assemblymay be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with therights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interferewith the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingentunder the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when theirassistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility toprovide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression isprimordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform

with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of theiruniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equippedwith baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the publicassembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call theattention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown atthe police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of thelaw enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assemblywill be dispersed;


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(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate,the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the publicassembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless heviolates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute agroup for dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permitwhere a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having firstsecured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such

purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished orheld criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by themayor or any other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by themayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse

the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of thepublic assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle,its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in theimmediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:


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(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished byimprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six

years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day tothirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after theeffectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictionswhich, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings maybe held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks withinthe period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, thevalidity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or partsthereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.



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CASE DIGESTSFREEDOM OF RELIGION


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Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003Puno, J.

FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the

complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for

an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had

eventually begotten a son. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of

Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal

impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoralconduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent

neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise

Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state

has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary

to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even

a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to

prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general

application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a

case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious

exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state



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Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009Velasco, JR., J.

FACTS: Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against MichaelSandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo! Sinungaling! Gago ka talaga, Michael! Masahol ka pa sa putang babae, o di ba?Yung putang babae, ang gumagana lang doon, yung ibaba, dito kay Michael, ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O,masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating for generalviewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him

liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Sorianochallenged the order of the MTRCB.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court is justified in imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the televisionprogram Ang Dating Daan on the ground of host petitioner Sorianos remarks about Iglesia ni Cristos Michaelprostituting himself when he attacked Soriano in the Iglesias own television program.

RULING:The Supreme Court held that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to theaverage child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the USSupreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to beobscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating ofthe show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on

how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.

The Supreme Court also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissibleadministrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order ofsuspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter withoutrunning afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a priorrestraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issuedto him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.



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Austria vs NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999Kapunan, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is areligious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner was apastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated. On various occasions from August to October 1991,

Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former toadmit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in hisdistrict and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be madeaccountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect thetithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Petitioner received a letter inviting himand his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpiredbetween him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently,petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, wilful breach of trust, serious

misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer'sduly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.

1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter 4) SDA filed motion forreconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent.Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involvesthe separation of church and state.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the principle of separation of church and state finds no application in thiscase. The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strongfences make good-neighbors. The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the twoinstitutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits oftheir respective exclusive jurisdictions. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair asto bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, orform of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws andregulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemedunworthy of membership. Examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication,ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religioussignificance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here isthe relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no

relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of terminating anemployee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from thereligious congregation.



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Islamic Dawah Council Of The Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003Corona, J.

FACTS:Petitioner Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines claims to be a federation of national Islamicorganizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Dawah Council ofSoutheast Asia and the Pacific and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. On October 26, 2001, respondent Officeof the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designatingrespondent Office of Muslim Affairs to oversee its implementation. Petitioner contends that it is unconstitutional forthe government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is afunction only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 46 is not constitutional.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslimorganizations of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of MuslimFilipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. Theprotection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws andministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit forhuman consumption, properly labelled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedomof Muslims.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court do not share respondents apprehension that the absence of a centraladministrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue certificationsfor products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that Muslim consumers can actually verify through thelabels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the

reliable and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easilyavert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization.



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Velarde v SJS, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004Panganiban, J.

FACTS: The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any ofherein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring themembers of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.They alleged that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion.

The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:

1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether theactions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition hasraised only a question of law.

2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and stateeven tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped atsome point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of theseparation clause."

The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration,Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitute a justiciablecontroversy. Why?

a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by thesereligious leaders might become beholden to the latter.

b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner wasviolated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law orthe constitution,

c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights. It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However,courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.

It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed

to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? JaimeCardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has notbeen actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on thepart of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, aparticular candidate. It is a time-honoured rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.



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Taruc vs De la Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005Corona, J.

FACTS: Petitioners were expelled/excommunicated from the PIC by Bishop de la Cruz by reason of disobedience to

authority, inciting dissension, and threatening to occupy the parish causing anxiety and fear among the members.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the

Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower

court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied so

they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a

quo and ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being re-filed before the proper forum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving the expulsion/excommunication of themembers of a religious institution.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious

institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said

institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their

discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to

just church regulations.


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