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F r e e d o m a n d D e t e r m i n i s m i n S p i n o z a
JOHN N. R USS ELL
Indiana Cent ral Un iver sity
Spi noza 's unrel entin g emphasis on dete rmin ism and
necessity seems, at first glance, incompatible with his
espous al of hum an freedom. In what follo ws, I exp li
cate Spin oza' s meani ng of the term freedom and argue
that h i 8 use of the term is compatible with his these s
of dete rmin ism and necessity . I conclude by noti ng
some pro ble ms that Spinoza's determi nism pos es for his
moral theory.
Spino za's Denial of Freedom
Spinoz a d oes reject some meanin gs of th e term
freedom. He repud iate s the idea of free ch oic e. (By
free cho ice I mean the possib ility that a man could
have chos en to act other than he actuall y di d. ) He
further dismi sse s any account of will or d esir e
that wou ld su pport a cred ible account of free ch oi ce .
For Spinoz a, nature admits of no conti ngenc y, ca
price , or indet ermin atene ss. In fact, man 's ver y idea
of free cho ice is the illusory resul t of ina deq uat e
know ledg e. (M]en belie ve themse lves to be fre e, he
writes,
simply beca use they are cons ciou s of their ac
tions, and unco nsci ous of the causes where by those ac
tions are determined.
1 1 1
Man is limited by the con fus ed
perce ptio n that charac terize s inadequate knowl edge and,
hen ce, de lus iv ely ascr ibes the adje ctiv e fr ee .to an
alleged phe nom eno n of choice. Accord ing to Spino za,
hu ma ns fail to reco gniz e that acts of cho ice are c aus ed
and subseq uentl y imagine themselves free inasm uch as
they are cons ciou s of [their] vol itio ns and de si re s,
but they never eve n dream, in their igno ran ce, of the
caus es whi ch have disposed them to wish and de si re .
2
Spinoz a disa gree s with those who assert that human
action s depen d on the wi ll, since this is a mer e
phras e witho ut any idea to correspo nd th er et o.
1
Much
like the intellect, the will is mere ly a par tic ula r
mode of think ing. Whether the will is conce ived as
fini te or infi nit e, it too requir es a cau se by wh ic h
it shoul d be cond iti oned to exist and act. * Mor eov er ,
the wil l is rela ted to God bec aus e it must be co nd i
tioned by God
I
Pro p, xxi x] to exist and act in a par
ticular manner. * Explaini ng human action in terms of
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tistogimg V o l . X I . N o . 1
I S S N :
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the will illustr ates our ignorance; suffi cient acco unts
of huma n action deri ve only from our hav ing clea r and
adequa te ideas of what causes beha vior .
Analog ously , Spinoza rejectes the not ion of dec i
sion as representin g an adequate expl ana tion of free
cho ice . Clearly, a mental deci sion and a bod ily ap
pet ite , or determ ined state, are sim ulta neou s, or
rather, are one and the same thing . . . . ' A deci
sion is not free (i.e., a dec isi on cann ot be the cau se
of itself). External causes, then, const rain decisio ns
as well.
Spinoza flatly af firms that everyt hing pro cee ds
from a sort of necessity, and with the utmo st pe rf ec
t i o n :
7
Noth ing in the unive rse is conti ngent , bu t all
things are conditi oned to exist and oper ate in a
part icul ar ma nner b y the nec essi ty of divi ne
nature.•
Me n are not free in the fic tit iou s sens e tha t the y
imagine; ignor ance—i nadequ ate kn ow le dg e— is the source
of this false mean ing of freedom that Spino za rej ect s.
Noth ing in nature is indeterm inate or uncaus ed, as
Spi noz a rema rked in a letter to Bo xe l: the wo rl d (is)
a nece ssar y effect of divin e nat ure , thu s he utterly
(denies that ) the world has bee n made by cha nce . •
Wit h respect to n ecessi ty and hu man choi ce, Stuart
Hamps hire aptly conclu des that
Any stateme nt of the kind an alt ern ati ve act ion
was possibl e or he could have done other wise,
is necess arily the sign of the inco mple tene ss of
our scientific knowle dge or an exp res sio n of our
pr es en t st ate of ign ora nce . . . .*'
In conclu sion, then, huma n choice s are neit her unc aus ed
nor arbitrary; that choic es are c apr ici ous is, for
Spinoza, ch im er ic al —a n idea born out of ignorance.
Nece ssit y applies to will and decis ion. Will
is not a free caus e, only a nec ess ary or con str ain ed
c a u s e .
1 1
Will is ext ern ally cause d and in no way ca n
it adeq uate ly support the idea of free cho ic e ; the
wil l is dete rmin ed to exist and act only by God . Th us ,
Spino za clearly opposes any concep tion of freedom as
tanta mount to being uncause d or inde term inat e. Rath er,
cau ses deter mine the will and, hence , hum an beh avi or
can be considered neith er capr iciou s nor acc ide nta l.
Corre spond ingly , since decision is simu ltan eous wit h
a det erm ine d state, it is not a free ca us e. So de ci
sion also fails to sufficiently account for the idea of
free choice.
In conc lusi on, then, Spin oza all ows for no free
choi ce ; the scope of necessit y is uni ver sal . Nec es si
ty prec lude s the possibi lity of free cho ice , whe the r
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conceiv ed under the rubric of will or deci sion.
Thing s could not hav e been brou ght into bei ng by God
in any man ner or in an order diff eren t from that wh ic h
in fact has obtained.
1 1
Henc e, man coul d not ha ve
acted oth er than he did; no alte rnat ive choic e and ac
tion were even possible:
Eac h so called act of cho ice in the mat ter is
in reality a necessari ly determined ass ertio n or
d en ia l . . . . T he vo li ti o, o r m en ti s d e c re -
tum,
1 1
is t h u s — l i k e any ideal or extended event-¬
absolutely determined and nec es sa ry .
1 1
God, Spinoza's all-inclu sive substance (Deus save Natu-
ra),
compris es the univer se, and each ment al or phy
sical event of experie nce follows nece ssar ily from
this one subs tance .
Spinoza and Cause
Spi noza rej ect s the notion of final cau ses in
nat ure ; eve ryth ing in nature pre ced es from a sort of
necess ity and wit h the utmost per fe cti on .
1
* The
not ion of final cau se does away with the per fe cti on of
God : for if God acts for an object , he ne ce ssa ril y
desires something which he lacks.
1
* But th is idea is
absurd, for it cont rad icts the ver y nat ure of God .
Acc ord ing ly, Spino za states that nat ure ha s no goal in
view, and that final causes are mere huma n fi g m e n t s.
When men strive to illustrate that natur e do es nothin g
in vai n . . ., they seem to have dem on str ate d that
nature , the god s, and men are all mad to g e t h e r .
1 7
But
what does Spinoza affirm about types of causes?
Spinoza accepts the idea of effic ient causa lity,
and he att rib ute s it to the deity . God is the sole
free ca u se . God, absolutely the first c a u s e ,
enco mpa sses all that is. Ever ythi ng that is, is in
God, and wit hou t God nothin g can be, or be
c o n c e i v e d .
1 0
From the necessi ty of di vi ne nat ure
must follo w an infin ite number of thi ngs in inf ini te
wa ys . . . .
M 1 1
He is the effi cient caus e of all that
can follow wit hin the sphere of infinite in te ll ec t.
1 1
Th is eff ici ent cau sali ty appli es not only to the ex
istence of things, but also of their es se nc e.
1 1
Thin gs depe nd on God for their coming into exi ste nce
and their continuing in existe nce or be in g.
1
*
Do es Spino za regard the not ion s of formal and
materia l causa lity as equally crucial to the des crip
tion of God ? Hi s answer to this que sti on is ne ga tiv e.
Efficient caus ality best charact erizes God 's activity .
Spinoza rejected Arist otle' s disti nctio n of mat ter and
form, modi fyin g them with the substantival attr ibut es
of thought and extens ion. Accordi ngly, as Wolf son
notes, the Aristo telean designation of cau ses as
mate rial and formal likewise dis app ear s ; Spino za sub-
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sumes formal causality under efficien t causality, henc e
the effici ent cause most aptly des cri bes Go d's
n a t u r e .
2 8
Effic ient causality applies to bot h the phys ical
and menta l modes of experie nce. God, the effi cien t
cause of that whi ch occurs withi n the sphere of inf i
nit e intel lect , can surely be regar ded as a thi nki ng
thin g. Th us it is apparent that the actu al be in g of
ideas ow ns God as its cau se, and the ide as of bo th
the attri butes of God and partic ular th in gs hav e, as
thei r eff icie nt caus e, God hims elf , inso far as he is a
thinking thing.
3
' Perhaps an example wil l he lp to
clarify this applicability.
Consi der the activity of buildi ng a hou se. Spino za
sta tes that a caus e referred to as final is noth ing
else but hum an des ire . . . . For ins tan ce, when we
say that to be inhab ited is the final cause of this or
that hou se, we mea n noth ing mor e than that 'a ma n . . .
had a desire to build a h o u s e .
1 , 2 7
The specific desi re,
that of the bei ng inhabited , is real ly the eff ic ien t
c a u s e .
2
'
An amplification of the term desi re will
illumi ne how efficien t causali ty relat es to the men tal
mode.
An appe tite is an ende avor when refe rred to mi nd
and body in con junc tio n.
1
' Desi re is def ined as
appetite with consciousness th ere of.
2
' Des ire, then,
is an effici ent cause and is an appetite wi th co nsi ous -
ness appended. Consc iousn ess clearly conc erns the me n
tal mode of experi ence; thus efficien t causal ity ap
pli es to the mental mode of exper ience . Spino za's ex
ample,
the activity of building a hous e, illu stra tes
that effici ent causalit y pertain s to bot h the phy sic al
and mental aspects of experie nce.
Man's Conatus
Spin oza states that everyth ing insofar as it is in
itself, endeavors to persist in its own b e i n g .
2 1
Conatus, then, is the self-preservi ng effo rt of par tic
ula r thi ngs . In this endeavor, a thing resist s that
which could take away its ex is te nc e.
1 2
In shor t,
con atu s is the actual ess ence of the thing in
q u e s t i o n .
1 , 1 1
The tendency toward self- prese rvati on is
pres ent in and comprises the very defi niti on of par tic
ular things, for Spinoza.
Gener ally speaking, conatus is also a theor y that
conce rns the interaction of thin gs. Mot e that a pa r
ticula r thing is, for Spinoza, that whi ch has a con di
tioned, finite existe nce. Under this endea vor, each
part icul ar thing withi n the univ erse, by the eternal
ne ces sit y of the natu re of the uni ver se as a wh ol e of
wha t it is a part, striv es to mai nta in its
existence.
1
* Nat ure , then, is compr ised of indi vid ual
mod es that constantly endeavor to mai nta in thems elve s
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and, in so doing, interact with diffe rent par tic ula r
mo de s that affect them.
Con atu s applies to the attribu tes of both exten sion
and thought . An obviou s parallel can here be obs erved :
conti nuanc e or resistance in movement is the ex pres sion
of the body 's cona tus. Continu ance in thought rep re
sents the min d's cona tus. Finally, the mind strive s to
affirm the exis ten ce of the body, s ince any idea ne gat
ing the bo dy' s exis tenc e cannot be po stu al ted in our
mind, but is contrary t he re to .
When con atus refe rs to the mind alon e, the ende avor
is call ed will.' * When referre d to the min d and
body in conjunction, it [conatus) is called appe
tite.
1 7
Spin oza's point is that desi re and appet ite
are equiv alent term s. A subtle diff eren ce remain s,
though. Whe n we are cognizant of our appet ites, d esi re
pre vai ls. Man, howev er, is aware of his appe tites and
ur ges (though not of their caus es) and so, p arti cula rly
wh en we hav e this self-awa renes s in mind , we may s peak
of d e s i r e .
Ma n's Con atu s and God
Ma n is an indivi dual thing and indi vid ual thi ngs
are nothin g but the modifi cations of attrib utes of God,
or mod es by wh ic h the attr ibute s of God are fixed and
expressed in a determinate ma nn e r. Spinoza further
reas ons that the esse nce of bo th the hum an bod y and
min d must be conc eive d throug h the ver y ess enc e of
God. *
8
Inasmu ch as individua l thi ngs dep end on and
par tic ipa te in Div ine substance , they are, in a re
stricted sense, infinite and etern al. God 's caus alit y
unfol ds throu gh eternal infinite mode s and its eff ects
are like wise eter nal and infin ite. The idea of . . .
every part icu lar thing actually existin g, nec ess aril y
involves the eternal and infinite essen ce of God . *
1
Hence a part icu lar being, like man, part icip ates to a
degree , in eternity: Now in a sense part icul ar thing s
are e t e r n a l — i . e . , *vi causa cui inhaerent.' ** To the
extent that individual things part icip ate in the one
Divine substance, they are eternal.*
1
Ma n' s con atu s ha s as its source of pow er, the po we r
of Go d. Go d is the cau se of the bei ng of th ing s or of
their con tin uin g in existence. ** Thu s, the force by
whic h each part icul ar thing perse vers in exist ing fol
lows from the eterna l nece ssit y of Go d' s nat ure . *' In
conclu sion, then, ea ch ind ividual's ende avor toward
self-p reser vation or conatus origin ates from the ne ce s
sity and eterni ty of God 's natu re.
Interrelation of Cause and Con atu s;
Asser tion of Human Freedom
Spin oza 's typolog y of cause inclu des those that are
inade quate and adequate. Cona tus should be placed
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wit hin the context of this dist inct ion. Once this ob
ject ive has been accomplished, an affi rmati on of hum an
freedom can be explained.
An inadequate
1 1
or part ial cau se is a cause
throug h which , by itself, its effect cannot be und er
stood. *' Men are passive whe n someth ing tak es
pla ce withi n us , or follows from our natu re exter nally ,
we being only the partial ca us e. *
7
An adequate caus e is a cause throug h whi ch its
effe ct can cle arly and dis tinc tly be conceive d. ** It
exis ts when through our nature somethi ng tak es pla ce
wit hin us or externall y to us , which can thro ugh our
natu re alone be clearly and disti nctly underst ood. *'
Me n can be said to act or be acti ve when any thi ng
takes place . . . whereof we are the adequate c a u s e .
Each individual thing strives to mai nta in itself
and thi s foll ows from the natu re of God, acco rdi ng to
Spin oza: (T]he force by whic h each par tic ula r thing
per sev ere s in existing follows from the nece ssit y of
God's nature. '
1
Clearly the force of cona tus is ne
ces sar y by virtu e of the esse nce of God; con atu s is not
extern ally constra ined or caused. Thi s fact is basi c
to our und ersta nding Spinoza 's c once ption of hum an
freedom.
Man in Bondage or Co nstr aint
Tha t which follows from external caus es, whe re ma n
is pass ive, is constrained rather than free . Spino za
state s that constrai nt occurs when somethi ng is det er
mi ne d by some thing exte rnal to itsel f to a fixed and
def ini te meth od of existence or act ion . *
1
On e can be
bound, then, whe n constrain ed by the action of anothe r
indi vidua l. Man is but a parti al caus e, conc erni ng
that whic h follows from his nature exte rnal ly. Hen ce
bond age is, for Spinoza, equivale nt to i nade quate
causa lity and represent s the absence of fr eedom.
Ma n as Acti ve and Fre e
Tho se acts which follow from adequat e caus es are
neit her compelled nor constrained from with out. Whe n
ma n is the adequ ate causal agent of hi s act ion s, the n
he is free. Individuals are activ e accor ding to
Spinoz a, when they are the authors (causes ) of thei r
own act io ns. To the extent t hat an in div idu al is
ac ti ve —t he adequate cause of his own ac ti on s— th at in
div idu al is free . Her e we see that freedom, acti vity ,
and caus al agency are compat ible t erm s.
How can we free ours elve s from the con str ain t of
pass ion and bonda ge? The determ inatio n that cha rac
teri zes reason or adequate knowl edge can release us
from the yoke of pas sio n. More narr owly , we can mod if y
and tran sfor m confus ed ideas and pas si ons (like a pa r
ticular emotion) through self-conscious reflection.
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Spi noz a stat es that an emotio n, wh ic h is a pas sio n,
cea ses to be a pass ion, a s soon as we form a cl ea r and
distinc t idea thereof. *' Now any emot ion that Spino za
cal ls a pa ss io n is also a confu sed idea . Whe n we form
a clea r and dis tinc t idea of a give n emo tio n . . . the
emotion will cease [in effect] to be a p a ss io n .
1 4
Acc ordi ngly , we attain freedom by form ing cl ea r and
distinc t ideas (adequate know ledg e) about pa ss io ns .
Note that these clear and distinct ideas are c a u s e s —
instances of cognitive or mental determin ation. Gen er
ally, then, we determine solely by the kno wle dge of
the mind, the remedies against confuse d ideas or em o
tions.**
Man 's Conat us, God and Freedom
We recal l that, for Spinoza , God alon e is the sol e
free caus e. Moreo ver, man 's cona tus der ive s from the
etern al nec ess ity of Go d's nat ure ; in short, roan's
conat us is really God' s cona tus. Any huma n act that
follows from conatus is not const rained or compe lled
from wi tho ut. Rathe r, it is the pro duc t of ade qua te
causalit y. To the degree that man' s acts deriv e from
cona tus, he can be said to be fre e.
Exposition of Freedom
Man 's freedom, in marke d contrast to God 's, is not
perfect (complete). Man 's freedom is limite d. Ma n is
free wh en he is seen in hi s pro per rel ati on to God .
Hu man freedo m cann ot exist whe n ma n is con cei ved as
separ ate from God and the infin ity of the who le mo da l
system. Human freedom is an e x t e n s i o n — a mani fest a
t i o n — o f the power of God. In this context, man' s
freedom is neither absolute nor const ant. Rathe r, an
indivi dual' s being active or free var ies in de gre e.
Striving to main tain one' s self (conatus ) can be hi n
dere d or limited by oppo sing the co nat us of ot he r
indiv idual s. In other wor ds, individual thin gs in
teract and each thing 's conatus resis ts that of anoth er
in the pro ces s of interaction. Howe ver, the oppo sing
conat us of each particu lar thing doe s not cons titu te
exte rnal con str ain t per se, as seen in pr op er rel ati on
to God.
The Compat ibilit y of Freedom and De term inis m
In wha t sense doe s Spinoz a employ the term free ?
Clearly Spinoza rejects an idea of free as mea ning
uncau sed or indete rmina te. The matt er of a free act,
wheth er caused or uncaused, is irrele vant. Freedom
is con sis ten tly employe d by him wit hin the conte xt of a
thoro ugh- going determinis m. Bu t determi nism must be
contrast ed wit h compulsion or constrain t; these term s,
in Spin oza, are not s ynon ymou s.
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Freedom and determinism are comparable terms, but
freedom contrasts with bondage. The free agent acts in
a determinate manner, but without being constrained or
compelled. All acts, both those which are free and
those which are bound, are caused, determined. But the
crucial difference lies in the type of determination
proper to each. Free actions represent adequate types
of determination; bound acts represent passive in
stances of determination.
If freedom is seen as a determined act that is
devoid of compulsion or external constraint, then
freedom and determinism are indeed compatible terms.
Acts can thus be free, yet determined. But freedom as
Spinoza intended the term, is not compatible with bon
dage,
passivity, or compulsion.
Critique
What type of determinism characterizes Spinoza's
use of freedom? A free person is self-determining in
that he actively causes his behavior by forming ade
quate knowledge of passions. Adequate knowledge—
having clear and distinct ideas--represents self-
directing, rational determination that frees one from
bondage or servitude. In his view of freedom, Spinoza
also denies that an individual could have chosen to act
in any way other than he did. This denial creates
some difficulties for Spinoza's moral theory.
Spinoza's unrelenting determinism obviates a norma
tive ethic. A person's behavior derives from two types
of determination: either behavior is self-caused
through adequate knowledge or behavior is externally
caused (constrained) by passion. As William Frankena
points out, a central goal of normative ethics is to
guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide
what we should do in this case and in that. *
7
Spinoza's metaphysical determinism, however, eliminates
the prescribing of moral shoulds or oughts, since,
whether behavior is self-caused or externally caused,
the person could not have acted other than he did.
Self-causation and external causation are not determi
nants of choice.
The matter does not end here though. What type of
moral theory are we left with, if a moral agent can
perform only that action that he ipso facto performed?
A prescriptive ethic, wherein moral agents are exhorted
to realize ethical ideals, seems irreconciliable with
Spinoza'8 determinism. At best, then, Spinoza is left
with a descriptive ethic, wherein we observe, analyze,
and describe the moral conduct of agents. Hence
Spinoza's determinism truncates a traditionally impor
tant objective of moral theory. In a letter to Spinoza
(Epistle LXXVII) Oldenburg warns Spinoza about this
very implication of universal necessity : (God's) in
flexible fate, and . . . irresistible power compel us
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to act in a give n manne r, nor can we pos si bl y act
otherwise. *'
Consi der another problem that e merg es from
Spino za's determin ism. The idea of moral res pon sib il
ity bec ome s rather untenable, if antecen dnt cau ses
nece ssar ily deter mine subsequent eve nts . Again,
Olden burg broug ht this problem to Spinoz a's atten tion :
the doctri ne of fatalistic necessi ty render s [mora l]
r ew a rd s a nd p u ni s h me n ts . . . i ne f fe ct u al . . . . F o r
if we men are, in all of actio ns, moral as wel l a s na t
ural,
und er the pow er of God, like clay in the ha nd s o f
the pott er, with what face can any of us be accus ed of
doi ng th is or that, seeing that it wa s imp oss ibl e
[emphasis adde d] to do otherwise. ** Old enb urg con
clude s hi s argument by saying that Everyone ma y plead,
'Thy po wer cann ot be escap ed from, 0 God; the re for e,
since I could not act o ther wise , I ma y just ly be
excused.' '
0
Spinozistic determinism pre clu des mor al
blame and praise.
Finally, Spin oza's problem int ensi fies wh en he
spe aks of ide als that mora l agent s ought to see k:
. . . [EJvery man should (emphasis ad de d) love
him sel f, should see that whi ch is use fu l to him
. . . and should, each for him sel f, en dea vo r as
far as he can to prese rve his own be ing .'
1
Spinoz a's advocacy of metaphysi cal deter minis m con
flicts wit h his prescribing moral s shoulds; cons ider
the prob lema tic al ternatives this pos es :
I. 1. Spinoza cannot both advocate met aph ysic al
determin ism and presc ribe moral shou lds.
2. Spinoza advocates metaphysical dete rmin
ism.
3. Thus Spinoza cannot pres cri be mor al
shoulds.
II. 1. Spinoza cannot bot h advocate meta phy sic al
determin ism and presc ribe moral sho uld s.
2 . Spinoza presc ribe s moral sh ould s.
3. Thu s Spinoza cannot advocate metap hys ica l
determinism.
Spinoz a can not have it bot h wa ys . But he do es a dvo cat e
metap hysic al determinism, and he pre scr ibe s mor al
shoulds. Accord ingly, Spinoza 's denyi ng that an ind i
vid ual coul d hav e chose n to act other than he in fact
acted, rende rs his moral theory prob lema tic.
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NOTES
'Spinoza, Benedict de. The Ethics, trans. R. H.
M. Elwes (Washington: M. Walter Dunne, Publisher,
1901), Eth. Ill: 2 Note.
Ibid.,
Eth. I App.
Ibid., Eth. II: 35 Note
Ibid., Eth. I : 32 Proof
Spinoza, Eth. I: 32 Cor. 2.
Ibid.,
Eth. Ill: 2 Note.
Ibid., Eth. I App.
Ibid., Eth. I: 29.
Spinoza, Epistle Lviii (Spinoza to Hugo
Boxel).
'Hampshire, Stuart, Spinoza (London: Farber and
Farber,
m c m l i ) ,
p. 113.
'Spinoza, Eth., I: 33 Proof.
*Ibid., Eth. I: 32 Proof.
Joachim, Harold H., A Study of the Ethics of
Spinoza, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1901), p. 197.
*Spinoza,
Eth. I App.
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
'Ibid., Eth. I
'Ibid., Eth. I
'Ibid., Eth. I
'Ibid., Eth. I
Ibid., Eth. I
'Ibid., Eth., It
17 Cor. 2.
16 Cor. 3.
15.
16.
16 Cor. 1.
25.
*Ibid., Eth., It 24.
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C f .
H. A. Wolfson
1
8 The Philosophy of Spinoza,
v o l . 1, pp. 302-3; 422.
Ibid.,
Eth. XI: 5.
J
'Ibid., Eth. IV Preface.
Ibid.
*Mbid., Eth. Ill: 9 Note.
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Eth. Ill: 6.
Ibid., Eth. Ill: 6 Note.
Ibid., Eth. Ill: 7.
H a m p s h i r e , Spinoza, pp. 92-93.
Ibid., Eth. Ill: 10.
Ibid., Eth. Ill: 9 Note.
Ibid.
H a r r i s ,
Errol E., Salvation From Despair: A
Reappraisal of Spinoza
1
s Philosophy (The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 113.
S p i n o z a ,
Eth. I: 25 Cor.
Ibid., Cf. Eth. V: 22 Proof and 23 Proof.
S p i n o z a , Eth. II: 45.
Joachim, A Study, p. 76.
4 1
S p i n o z a , Eth. II: 45 Note.
S p i n o z a , Eth. I: 24 Cor.
Ibid., Eth. II: 45 Note.
Ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 1.
Ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 2.
••ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 1.
Ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 2.
Ibid.
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Ib id ., Eth. II: 45 Note.
Ib i d. , Eth. I Def. 7.
Ib id ., Eth. V: III.
Ib id ., Eth. V: III Proof.
Ib id ., Eth. V: Preface .
C f .
Spinoz a, Eth . I: 29 and 32 Pro of;
Ham pshi re, og. cit., p. 113, and G. H. R. Par kin son ,
On the Pow er and Freedom of Man , in Es sa ys in Inter
pretat ion, eds . Mauric e Mandelbaum and Euge ne Free man
(La Sal le, IL: Op en Court,
1975),
p . 22 .
Fr an ke na , William E., Ethics 2nd ed.
(Englewood Clif fs, NJ: Prentice Hal l, Inc.,
1973),
p .
12.
Ol de nb urg , Epistle LXXVII.
I b i d .
I b i d .
Sp in oz a, Eth. IV: 18 Not e.
389