Globalization and Transnational Crime 1
Economic Globalization and Transnational Crime:
An exploration of how making the world smaller also made it more dangerous
Ken Kodadek
Law 300-A1 Globalization Seminar
Professor Brietzke
April 24, 2012
Globalization and Transnational Crime 2
Economic Globalization and Transnational Crime:
An exploration of how making the world smaller also made it more dangerous
Initially, the main thrust for this project was going to center
around the positive relationship between economic globalization and
transnational terrorism. After conducting countless hours of research
in preparation for a discussion on that topic, my findings led me to
take a different track. The reason for this diversion is simple.
Undoubtedly, terrorism continues to be a serious threat to economic
development and political stability. With that being said, there is a
much bigger problem brewing, and whose dangerous effects are far more
reaching. That problem is one of transnational crime and illicit
trade. As such, this paper will address the following:
1. What is globalization, and how did it contribute to a surge in
transnational crime and illicit trade?
2. The means and methods by which transnational crime groups and
illicit traders are profiting from the global economy.
3. Taking global responsibility for failure.
4. Suggestions for fixing a broken system.
It is my sincere hope, that at the conclusion of this paper, the
reader will come to appreciate the negative consequences of
globalization; the gravity of transnational crime/illicit trade and
its impact on global security and security; what concerns the world
community must address as it continues on its quest for the
development of new technology, trade, and capital flows.
Globalization and Transnational Crime 3
What is Globalization and How Did it Contribute to a Surge in Transnational Crime and Illicit Trade?
According to Keohane & Nye Jr. (2000), globalization may be
defined as an integration of economic, social and cultural relations
across borders. Conversely, Kay (2004) states that “globalization
is best understood as the creation of a variety of transboundary
mechanisms for interaction that affect and reflect the acceleration of
economic, political and security interdependence” (p.10). Arguably,
increasing financial, trade and economic relations has had a positive
effect on developed and developing nations. As a result of
globalization, many communities in developing nations can finally say
that they have access to electricity, safe drinking water, health
systems and education where none was available before.
The keystone to globalization has been the tremendous advances
made in technology. Technology enlarged the market by lowering
transport costs, making it more efficient to engage in trade
with certain countries where in the past, the thought of doing so
would have been cost prohibitive. On the surface, this looks like a
win-win situation. Americans can enjoy bottled spring water from the
Fiji Islands or apricot jam from Egypt for a reasonable cost at a
local retailer. A producing country such as Egypt could then use the
profits derived from their products to improve their social and
political infrastructure. As a result, Egyptian citizens should
recognize a higher standard of living. Unfortunately, this is not
always the case.
Globalization created many negative consequences and the
marginalization of some groups, which led to global social and
Globalization and Transnational Crime 4
economic inequalities. Karacasulu (2006) contended that persons at the
lower end of the social and economic spectrum realized that they
cannot have equal shares in the global world legitimately; therefore
these individuals turned their focus to illicit trade and
transnational crime. The current landscape in Afghanistan is a prime
example. The lack of alternative livelihoods, especially in the
agricultural sector and the need to sustain the bare essentials of
life are major factors which contribute to illicit opium cultivation
there. The UNODC (2006) published a study that reported that the vast
majority of Afghans still lack access to basic necessities needed for
survival. In addition, it was noted that “only 19 percent of Afghan
households have televisions and 6 percent have refrigerators. Finally,
of all Afghan farmers, only 2 percent own a tractor” (p. 96).
Debt in Afghanistan is extremely high, and farmers are much
poorer than in other regions with a comparable level of debt. The
UNRISD (1994) stated that opium poppy farmers in Afghanistan can make
10-50 times more in provisioning the illegal drug market than they can
in any other agricultural pursuit (p. 15). Given this information, it
should come as no surprise that Afghanistan is currently the world’s
major producer and exporter of opium and its morphine derivative,
heroin (UNODC, 2005). Assuredly, the situation in Afghanistan will be
revisited in greater detail in the sections to follow for the
following reasons: One, opium production and exportation in
Afghanistan is but one problematic market there affecting
world security and stability. Second, Afghanistan presents an
opportunity to address the complications associated with the
Globalization and Transnational Crime 5
globalization process and how the world body can go about fixing that
which is broken.
Earlier, it was mentioned how technology enlarged the market by
lowering transport costs, but technology did something else.
Technology also enabled the trade of a whole range of goods that
didn’t exist before such as pirated software, genetically modified
marijuana, counterfeit drugs that don’t cure but kill, human organs,
and nuclear weapons fissile material and. Transnational crime groups
have benefitted by more efficient ships, roll-on/roll-off cargo
container vessels, new loading and unloading tools, better port
management, improved logistics, advances in refrigeration, new packing
materials, satellite navigation and parcel tracking. To these-which
serve all forms of trade, legitimate and otherwise-traffickers, have
added creative applications of their own. Aggressive and inventive
adoption of new technologies has helped traffickers to lower risk,
increase productivity, and streamline their business (Naim, 2005). To
be certain, this is far from the end of the story.
Commerce of all kinds surged in the 1990s as country after
country lowered its barriers to imports and exports. Whether it was
the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994; the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 or the
enlargement of the European Union in 2004- one thing is clear.
Participant countries reformed their trade rules, and lowered
obstacles, which resulted in opportunity for transnational crime and
the explosion of the illicit trade market. According to Naim, one huge
obstacle removed for transnational crime and illicit trade was the
Globalization and Transnational Crime 6
reduction of border controls either in number or stringency (p. 19).
It was largely thought that having border controls would result
in inefficiency due to back-ups attributed to the inspection of
vehicle cargo. Never were truer words spoken than the old adage that
“time is money.” Back-ups result in delay of product processing and
shipment, which in turn delays payment. Consequently, many border
controls were virtually abolished. For the border controls that
remain, one need not look farther than the problematic U.S.-Mexico
border. Inspectors there are time-pressured to check vehicles quickly;
to do otherwise will just tie up traffic for miles and overtax the
meager resources allocated to border patrol agencies.
A recently aired episode of “Texas Drug Wars” on the Discovery
channel confirmed the challenges associated with effective
border patrol. An interview with a border agent revealed that
4.5 million trucks cross the U.S.-Mexican border every year, and that
only 10-15% are searched. Because of this scant number, traffickers
are emboldened to transport contraband in this manner with virtual
impunity. In the event that a rig is searched and its contraband is
seized; the loss is simply chalked up as the cost of doing business.
Even more problematic is the situation surrounding the world’s cargo
container ports. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at
U.S. ports. They carry about 18 million containers with 400 million
tons of cargo. Of these 18 million cargo containers that arrive by sea
each year, only 2% to 10% of them are searched (McDonald, 2002).
Finally, another 157,000 smaller vessels call at U.S. harbors
(Naim, p. 180). In addition, “Express custom clearance schemes, the
Globalization and Transnational Crime 7
spread of free ports and export processing zones, the ubiquity of
air cargo and the impossibility of checking every FedEx or DHL
package all offer smugglers new ways to traverse borders with little
fear of being prosecuted” (Naim, 2005, p. 19). Arguably, to find
illegal contraband under such circumstances amounts to finding a
needle in a haystack.
At this juncture, it should be apparent that globalization has
led to economic inequalities, lack of rule of law, insecurity, the
need for survival by disadvantaged groups, and exaggerated
expectations of bilateral assistance through alternative livelihood
activities. Add the advances in technology to the cauldron and you not
only provide groups with reasons for engaging in illicit activities
and trade, but you also provide them with ease by which to make a
living. The next section of this discussion will center on how
transnational crime groups are hijacking the global economy. Specific
attention will be given to some of the larger “markets” transnational
crime groups and illicit traders are involved in and how technology
enables them to turn a profit.
The Means and Methods by which Transnational Crime Groups and Illicit Traders are Profiting from the Global Economy
A. Drug Trafficking
The trade and trafficking of illicit narcotics is an
international enterprise involving producers, distributors, money
launderers and the consumer (Shanty, 2008). It is a multinational
business, which employs tens of millions of people, and is worth
around $500 billion per year. The main source countries, for either
Globalization and Transnational Crime 8
producing or trafficking, are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Columbia, Iran,
Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand (“States of Disarray,” n.d.). To
understand the many layers involved in the production and sale of
illegal narcotics, the following example is intuitive. Consider that
the typical opium market includes the farmers (sharecroppers or
landowners), hawalars, farm-gate traders, provincial/zone traders,
main market traders, in some cases the military and government
officials, and in almost all cases- warlords and drug cartels (UNODC,
2009). Cocaine and Marijuana production and supply line chains nearly
mirror that of the opium example provided above.
Using the opium production and supply line chain illustrated
above, it would be appropriate to flesh out some numbers
as it is imperative to gain a perspective on just how lucrative the
drug business is. As such, the situation in Afghanistan will now be
revisited for it is also one of the most documented. According to a
survey conducted by the UNODC (2008), “farmers from the southern and
western regions of Afghanistan earned US $6.3 billion from opium
between 2002 and 2008. During the same time period, Afghan drug
traffickers earned more than US $18 billion. Further, Afghan farmers
paid 10% of their total income, or $600 million to the Taliban,
warlords, Mullahs or government officials as tax to ensure safe
passage of the product across the Pakistan and Iran borders for
distribution in those networks as well as China, India, and Central
Asia” (p. 99). Finally, processed heroin from Afghanistan,
provided the Taliban with an estimated $8 billion in 1999 (Ehrenfeld,
2003, p. 52).
Globalization and Transnational Crime 9
Other countries enjoying the fruits of drug revenues include
Bolivia whose coca-cocaine revenues for 2005 were estimated to be
worth as much as 20% of GNP (“States of Disarray,” n.d.). Kershaw
(2005) reported that Canada’s B.C. bud business netted $7 billion in
that same year.
Given the staggering amounts of drug revenues previously
presented, one must wonder how traffickers are so successful in
generating these figures. This question has many answers with
technology being at the heart of it all. Take the Internet. Its value
to traffickers is immense. One can broker the sale of narcotics behind
a fictitious screen-name while sipping on a latte at a cybercafé. Once
the sale is complete; the trafficker can then track his shipment
online using the tracing services made available by the USPS, FedEx,
UPS and others.
The Internet allows traffickers to communicate privately and
efficiently-consummating deals in virtual rather than geographic
space, thus effectively covering their tracks and minimizing the odds
of being caught. To demonstrate how prolific Internet use is in the
drug trade, the DEA announced that in 2005, they successfully shut
down a drug ring that used two hundred Web sites based in the United
States, Costa Rica, Canada, and Australia to sell methamphetamine,
ecstasy, ketamine, GHB, and other drugs manufactured in India and
shipped illicitly anywhere in the world (Kaufman, 2005).
The advent of cell-phones has also greatly benefitted the drug
trafficker. By purchasing a pay-as-you-go phone, one can use it to
orchestrate a specific purchase. When the sale has been completed, and
Globalization and Transnational Crime 10
there is any apprehension of being prosecuted, the trafficker can
simply remove the sim card and discard the phone. Like the Internet,
cell-phones allow for great mobility. Prior to the introduction of
this technology, groups usually had to come together at one place to
conduct business. Such practices, more often than not, put everyone at
risk and led to large scale arrests. Now, it is all about speed. Drug
networks are simultaneously local and global, and operate with such
speed that national and local governments cannot contain them.
While much has been mentioned regarding the various forms of
technology that drug traffickers employ to get shipments from point A
to B, and at least another 20 pages could be committed to this
endeavor, I would be remiss to end this topic without mentioning the
utilization of honey coated latex condoms laden with pellet sized
packages of heroin, which are then swallowed by human mules prior to
entering an airport security checkpoint. Another common practice is
surgically implanting packaged drugs into the thighs of humans or the
backs of dogs and then surgically removing them in safe houses.
Regular security measures used by the airport will generally render
these methods undetectable. Britain’s High Commission in Jamaica
estimates that one in ten passengers flying to the U.K. from that
island is smuggling cocaine in this manner (Steele & Millward, 2002).
As one can see, drug trafficking is an international epidemic. As
new technology is developed as part of the globalization process, the
unintended consequence is that traffickers learn to adapt the means
and methods by which they operate. This is to say that traffickers and
transnational crime groups either learn to negate the technology
Globalization and Transnational Crime 11
intended to impede their activities or they turn it into an advantage.
B. Arms Trafficking
The following are all examples of arms being trafficked: U.S.
manufactured Stinger shoulder antiaircraft missiles (SAM),
Sagger anti-tank missiles, long-range Katyusha rockets, rocket
launchers, mortars, anti-tank mines, and AK-47 assault rifles. The
foregoing is an example of the items being trafficked by arms dealers
in Iran. These weapons are then distributed to regional neighbors such
as Afghanistan and Syria. Coker (2001) reported that “of the 550
million small arms and light weapons in circulation today, only 3% are
used by government, military, or police forces” (A1). It is thought
that with the exception of the SAM, most of the weapons on the market
today originated from the overstock weapons and military materials
from the vastly oversize Warsaw Pact armies and the state owned
factories set up to supply them (UNOCHA, 2006).
Speaking only of AK-47s, the weapon is officially manufactured in
fourteen countries, but with advancements in technology, illegal
production has become quite common. The recipe for making an AK-47 has
remained largely unchanged by technology. What did change, was the
ability to establish production facilities where labor is cheaper and
the ability to transfer the necessary know-how to locations far away
from the headquarters RUAG Ammotec or Remington. As a result of
clandestine AK-47 manufacturers, the price of the rifle has plummeted
to about $200 in Nicaragua (Kipling, 2002). Moreover, Ghana now has
over 2,500 clandestine small and medium arms manufacturers that
produce fully functional copies of modern assault weapons and pistols
Globalization and Transnational Crime 12
that are sold for as little as six dollars apiece (Aning & Florquin
2004).
As of this writing, there appears to be much disagreement over
how much revenue is generated globally each year due to the arms
trafficking industry, and with good reason. In Afghanistan and
Tajikistan, opium is used as a surrogate currency rather than cash to
procure weaponry from northern stockpiles or trafficked from Central
Asia (Ibrahimi, 2008). In addition, arms are traded for licit goods,
which creates yet another obstacle in the revenue calculation.
Finally, there is the issue of money laundering. Given the huge volume
of financial transactions that occur on a daily basis- the most recent
estimates place that number in excess of $1 trillion, and it becomes
obvious that accurately tracking and computing revenues generated from
arms trafficking and other forms of illicit trade is next to
impossible (Weintraub, 2002).
C. Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking
Economic desperation is at the root of political and social
movements, and is a major source of pressure on people to migrate.
Repression brought to bear on those movements also leads to migration
(Bacon, 2008). A great starting point for this discussion is the
current situation in Oaxaca. Oaxacan poverty is the result of failed
Mexican economic development policies. “For more than two decades,
under pressure from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and conditions placed on U.S. bank loans and bailouts, the
government has encouraged foreign investment while cutting
expenditures intended to raise rural incomes” (Bacon, 2008, p. 25).
Globalization and Transnational Crime 13
Oaxaca is comprised of small rural farmers, whose main crop is corn.
Once NAFTA went into effect, U.S. corn products were then dumped on
this region and Mexico government subsidies ended. Consequently,
prices were decontrolled, and necessities like milk, gasoline, and
other products rose dramatically while the price of Mexican grown corn
tanked. Widespread poverty ensued and led to thousands of Oaxacans
looking for work elsewhere in other parts of Mexico, but mainly in the
U.S. This situation, and many others like it, plays right into the
hands of human traffickers and smugglers.
Alien smuggling is a $10 billion a year business and according to
the UN (2012) and is the fastest growing business of organized
crime. Technology has once again reared its ugly head as fraudulent
document providers have little to no difficulty creating a high
quality Social Security card or Driver’s License that is almost
indiscernible from genuine issue. The incurred cost for a new life is
not cheap. The price of passage for an alien can range from $2,000 to
as much as $60,000 (Meissner, 2003). In the event that the alien
cannot afford the transport toll, modern day slavery takes hold. In
such a case, the alien may work at a factory during the day, and be
stashed in a safe house where they are beaten and raped until the
smuggler is convinced that the debt has been paid.
To avoid confusion, please understand that alien smuggling and
human trafficking are two different concepts though their lines can be
blurred depending on the specific circumstances. Alien smuggling can
be defined as knowingly purchasing an illegal service to gain access
into a foreign country” (Miko, 2002). The National Security Council
Globalization and Transnational Crime 14
(2002) estimated that 500,000 to 600,000 illegal migrants who entered
the United States that same year were Mexican, and that there were
another 225,000 from Central America. Given the bleak outlook in
Oaxaca, it is understandable why aliens will pay a smuggler, and take
the inherent risks associated with the process of traversing the
border in search of a better life. In the next subsection, our focus
turns to human trafficking.
If Alien Smuggling is 1(C), then Human Trafficking is 2(C). In
the case of human trafficking, the trafficker deceives or coerces the
migrant and sells his or her labor. The U.S. Congressional Research
Service issued a report of which stating that trafficking in persons-
mainly women and children, involves upwards of 900,000 individuals who
cross international borders. Of this number, at least 20,000 find
their way into the U.S. Further, of the estimates presented,
approximately 35% are under the age of thirty-five (Miko, 2002).
Traffickers initially tempt victims with promises of lucrative
careers such as modeling, clerical, and retail awaiting them in
another country. These offers are possible through fictitious job
placement services running ads on the Internet. In the case of
children, impoverished villages are targeted whereby parents are
coaxed through payment into allowing their children to leave with a
handler on the premise that some wealthy family would like to adopt
and could offer their child a more fruitful life (Naim, 2002). What is
most repugnant, is that the U.S. Congressional Research Service (2002)
reported that young girls are acquired in this manner from villages in
Nepal and Bangladesh, and then sold to brothels in India for $1,000.
Globalization and Transnational Crime 15
Sulavik (2003) states that numerous children are bought in Myanmar,
China, Russia, and the Philippines and then placed for sale on online
markets. From there, they are then sold to prostitution rings
operating in Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
In the same vein, UNICEF (2002) reported that approximately 200,000
children are enslaved by cross border traffickers in Central and West
Africa. Arguably, globalization did nothing to improve the lives of
these victims.
D. Money Laundering
Perhaps the most challenging problem facing governments in their
regulation of international commerce is that of money laundering. To
fully understand the problem; one has to come to grips with its cause.
Beginning in the early 1990’s, criminal networks and illicit traders
became privy to new technologies, resources, and possibilities that
before this time did not exist. For instance, computers, chips, and
satellites change significantly the structure of international
finance, thereby reducing the risks associated with illegal
transnational financial transactions. (Vaithilingham & Nair, 2007).
The digitization of money blew the door open for the use of wire
transfers and credit cards for the instantaneous transfer of funds
across transnational borders. In addition, consider the cost of using
a wire transfer or credit card to conduct such a transfer. It is
minimal at best, and helps to explain why the sheer volume of
financial transactions are astronomical. When banking fees are
reduced, banking transactions increase. As a result, monetary
authorities simply cannot exercise the level of oversight required to
Globalization and Transnational Crime 16
curb the manipulation of international trade of between $800 billion
and $2 trillion each year (Wechsler, 2001).
Another issue complicating matters is that of banking secrecy.
International banks are vying for new customers all of the time. Open
competition among banks for new customers only exacerbates the problem
of money laundering even more. If a bank cannot reassure a new
customer that his/her privacy will not be compromised; the bank runs
the risk of alienating the potential customer base and losing future
profits. Li & Schaub (2004) prophesize that banks will continue to
side with the customer and the business they bring, irrespective of
how their client’s funds were derived.
The situation in the Cayman Islands seems curious. With a
population of approximately 35,000, there must be a real need for 600
banks and trust companies, 2,200 mutual funds, 500 insurance
companies, and 45,000 foreign businesses. Its banking system has
almost $700 billion in assets (Wechsler, p. 42). Obviously this is
but one example of an Offshore Financial Center (OFCs). Included in
OFCs are shell banks and shell companies, all of which offer the owner
of the funds anonymity and easy transferability (“Offshore Financial
Centers IMF Background Paper” 2000). The same International Monetary
Fund report placed estimates of global offshore assets at roughly $4.8
Trillion (IMF, 2000). Finally, the U.S. Treasury “estimates that it
loses $70 billion a year through offshore tax evasions by individuals,
while developing countries lose about $50 billion a year in taxes
through these modalities” (Naim, p. 12).
If you are interested in laundering money, and do not have access
Globalization and Transnational Crime 17
to an OFC in the Cayman Islands or Switzerland, do not worry. One can
still launder money by simply converting cash into money orders
provided that the transactions are limited to less than $10,000. For
those in Columbia, money can be laundered through systems similar to
the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Columbian drug cartels make
regular use of this method by selling Columbian drugs in the U.S. and
receiving U.S. currency in exchange. The U.S. currency is then sold
back to a BMPE agent in the U.S. at a discounted rate. The BMPE then
deposits into the cartel’s account whatever equivalent sum in pesos
the cartel and the BMPE agent previously agreed to. The U.S. dollars
that were sold to the BMPE agent are then sold to Columbian
businessmen who then use the dollars to import products from the U.S.
into Columbia. In sum, the cartel has converted their drug proceeds
into pesos without having to transfer money abroad, all while avoiding
U.S. reporting requirements (“National Money Laundering Strategy”,
2002). The BPME recycles an estimated $5 billion annually (Naim, p.
79). The hallmark of globalization is the free movement of capital.
Based on the aforementioned examples of money laundering, the movement
of capital couldn’t be any freer.
Taking Global Responsibility for Failure
It would be easy to squarely place all of the blame for
globalization’s many failures at the feet of NAFTA, the WTO, and the
EU. Undoubtedly, the passage and or creation of these three, really
motivated participant countries to relax (the term is used loosely)
controls necessary to compete in the world market. The IMF and the
World Bank seemed to have the picture of an ideal country, though we
Globalization and Transnational Crime 18
know now that none such exist. The ideal country was supposed to have
an economy that would be largely self-regulating through open
competition, and its public sector would need not provide more than
the minimum services necessary for the conduct of private business and
the protection of society’s weakest members. Judging by the examples
presented in Oaxaca and Afghanistan, the theory of the IMF and World
Bank couldn’t have been more misguided. As a result, the poor got
poorer because these institutions hedged their bets that short-term
social costs could be offset against long-term economic gain. When
farmers in Oaxaca could no longer make a living on Mexican grown corn,
they became illegal migrants searching for jobs in the U.S. The day
peasant farmers in Afghanistan found growing wheat and apples
unprofitable, they adopted coping strategies by switching to opium
poppy cultivation.
At this juncture, it would be unrealistic to suggest that the
current trend is totally reversible. The power of the profit is much
too strong for those involved in licit as well as illicit trade. You
see, profit is what unites these two groups together and creates a
symbiotic relationship. For the illicit trader or crime group, many
citizens see them as a provider of goods and services as well as jobs.
Opium poppy cultivation is a labor intensive crop. As more poppies are
cultivated per hectare, jobs become plentiful and the wages earned are
then funneled into the local economy. For the licit trader, he/she
depends on making money and in a place such as Afghanistan; the licit
trader could care less who is buying his goods because at the end of
the day it is all about profit and survival. Place the blame for this
Globalization and Transnational Crime 19
situation where you will, but this is a global problem in need of a
global solution.
Suggestions for Fixing a Broken System
Given that transnational crime and illicit trade are global
problems threatening world security and stability, it would appear
that the first place to start would be greater cooperation among
governments. So much has been made about state sovereignty. Consider
the recent stance of Venezuela. State sovereignty occupies a higher
order than drug interdiction efforts led by the U.S. Venezuela is
content to let drug growers and traffickers have free reign rather
than allow U.S. planes enter its airspace because this is somehow seen
as demeaning and a sign of weakness were Venezuela to allow otherwise.
Another starting point would be one of value reduction.
Governments and various agencies need to figure out how to make it
less profitable for transnational crime groups and illicit traders to
operate. Afghanistan presents an interesting opportunity. By
legalizing opium production, supply goes up and prices should fall.
Pharmaceutical companies such as Merck could benefit from
this since many medications contain heroin derivatives. Merck’s cost
to acquire the heroin would be reduced, and the cost of the final
product to the patient should also be cheaper. One glaring weakness to
this theory is how this affects heroin addiction in Iran, which at the
present time is rampant. If Iran’s problem could be integrated into a
final solution, it may be possible to kill two birds with one stone.
Next, the time has come to develop new mechanisms and
institutions aimed at this problem. Common complaints one hears when
Globalization and Transnational Crime 20
listening to law enforcement agencies is that of underfunding and
understaffing. Perhaps the time has come for us to reevaluate what we
are asking from agencies such as the DEA, ICE, INTERPOL, and others.
If funding and staffing lie at the root of the problem, then those
limitations need to be addressed. If it is determined that the
creation of a new institution would be better suited for dealing with
certain problems, then the duties of the DEA, ICE, and INTERPOL should
be reduced or reconfigured so that limited resources (funding,
staffing) are not overburdened to the point that they hamper
enforcement efforts. Better yet, perhaps resources such as monetary,
staffing, and intelligence could be merged between border patrol
agencies in the U.S. and Mexico with the net result being greater
effectiveness.
Finally, as a whole, more effort must be expended in order to
better understand differences between cultures and how laws,
regulations, licenses, taxes, embargos, and all the procedures that
nations employ to organize commerce, protect their citizens, raise
revenues, and enforce moral codes, affect them for each will be
affected differently and respond differently. From this information,
the marginalization of certain groups could be avoided, which in turn
would help to alleviate the problem of transnational crime and illicit
trade rather than exacerbate it.
Because of globalization, the world is smaller and it is more
dangerous. Illicit trade allows for people to reject government, and
it invites corruption. Economic shelter is provided for crime groups
and terrorists. Further, economic development is impaired, which leads
Globalization and Transnational Crime 21
to tremendous enforcement costs that could be better spent improving
social and political infrastructures. As long as competition remains
fierce within the world marketplace and technology continues to
advance at the speed of light, there is no reason to think that we
will be able to right the ship anytime soon. Transnational crime
groups and illicit traders are like parasites. To kill a parasite,
sometimes you have to kill the host. The host in this case is
globalization.
Globalization and Transnational Crime 22
References
Aning, E., & Florquin, N. (2003). The Anatomy of Ghana’s Secret Arms
Industry. Retrieved January 5, 2011, from
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-
01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-Part-1-Chapter-03.pdf
Annan, Kofi A. (2001, July 10). Small Arms, Big Problems, Remarks at
the United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. International Herald
Tribune, p. 9.
Bacon, D. (2008). Illegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration
and Criminalizes Immigrants. Boston: Beacon Press.
Coker, M. (2001, July 9). Illegal Small Weapons Pose Global
Threat. Seattle Post Intelligencer, p. A1.
Ehrenfeld, R. (2003). Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed- and How
to Stop It. Chicago: Bonus Books.
Ibrahimi, S. (2008). Turning Afghan Heroin into Kalashnikovs.
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 295, 1-15.
Karacasulu, N. (2006). Security and Globalization in the Context of
International Terrorism. Review of International Law and
Politics, 2, 1-17.
Kaufman, M. (2005, April 21). Internet Drug Ring Broken. Washington
Post, p. A3.
Kay, S. (2004). Globalization, Power, and Security. Retrieved January
Globalization and Transnational Crime 23
5, 2011, from http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0403kay.pdf
Keohane, R., Nye Jr., J. (2000). Globalization: What’s New? What’s
Not? (And so what?). Foreign Policy, Spring 2000, 104-19.
Kershaw, S. (2005, March 5). Violent New Front in Drug War Opens on
the Canadian Border: Potent Marijuana at Center of Smuggling
Chain. New York Times, p. A1.
Kipling, G. (2002). Old Guns for a New War: The Resurgence of Arms
Smuggling in Costa Rica. Peace Magazine, Jul-Sep 2002, 6.
Li, Q., & Schaub, D. (2004). Economic Globalization and Transnational
Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 48, 230-258.
McDonald, M. (2002, February 11). Checkpoint Terror: Border Searches
Snarl the Free Flow of Goods. US News and World Report, p. 1.
Meissner, D. (2003). America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil
Liberties, and National Unity after September 11. Retrieved
January 6, 2011 from
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf
Miko, F. (2002). Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and
International Response. Retrieved January 6, 2011, from
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf
Naim, M. (2002). The Fourth Annual Grotius Lecture: Five Wars of
Globalization. American University International Law Review, 18,
1-18.
Naim, M. (2005). Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are
Hijacking the Global Economy. New York: Doubleday.
Globalization and Transnational Crime 24
Shanty, F. (2008). Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism.
Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
Steele, J., & Millward, D. (2002, April 1). Britain Hit by Cocaine
Flights from Jamaica. Daily Telegraph (London), p.5.
Sulavik, C. (2003, August 25). Facing Down Traffickers: Europe Takes
on Its Fastest-Growing Criminal Enterprise. Newsweek.
Vaithilingham & Nair (2007). Factors affecting money laundering:
lesson for developing countries. Journal of Money Laundering
Control, 10, 352-366.
Wechsler, W. (2001). Follow the Money. Foreign Affairs, 80, 40-57.
Weintraub, S. (2002). Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism. The
Washington Quarterly, 25, 53-60.
Other Sources
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270ch
ap2.html
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm
http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?IndepthId=8&ReportId=58952
http://www.state.gov/un/ds/hstcenter/41444.htm
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Documents/ml2002.pdf
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/pub_ar02_en.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-
monitoring/Afghanistan/afg_survey_2005.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/rapid_assessment_afghan_2005.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG05%20_full_web_2006.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_en_web.pdf
Globalization and Transnational Crime 25
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/unodc-launches-2009-annual-
report.html
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/…/States_of_
Dis_ES.pdf
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/traffic/crs0510.htm
Globalization and Transnational Crime 26