Download - “Detainee Aspects of Transition”
“Detainee Aspects of Transition”
National Defense University Feb 12th, 2009
Dr. Doug Stone, MajGen USMC
Introduction‐‐‐the ChallengeThe Basics (Islam, Islamists, COIN)
The new ApproachThe Role of Leadership‐‐‐The Challenge
2
COIN Campaign Design Components
PURPOSE
GOVERNANCE
ESSENTIALSERVICES
TRAIN/ ADVISE
ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT
COMBAT OPS
INFORMATION
3
SYMPATHIZERSSYMPATHIZERS
SUPPORTERSSUPPORTERS
MEMBERSHIPMEMBERSHIP
CADRECADRE
CORE
CoreStable membership, few changes
over time, does not necessarily
believe all aspects of the
purported ideological program,
maintains links to other groups,
rarely exposes its members to risk,
occasionally co‐opts promising or
threatening individuals from the
wider organization.
CadreThe most ideologically fanatical
component, membership changes
slowly, target of propaganda from
core, trains membership, plans and
leads operations, performs
specialist functions.
SupportersFluctuating group of individuals or
temporary alliances with other
groups; carries out support and
facilitation tasks (e.g. courier
work, distribution of propaganda,
sentinel duty) for the broader
group. Sometimes includes a high
proportion of women and
children.
MembershipFluctuates frequently, target of
indoctrination and training by
cadre, individuals join and
participate to differing degrees.
Some absorb more of the ideology,
some less. Some progress to cadre
or (rarely) core status; most leave.
SympathizersNo firm commitment, often
individuals sympathize with
several groups and may shift
loyalty opportunistically based on
events. © David J. Kilcullen, 2007
Goal is to isolate irreconcilable insurgents, increase # of
moderates, and minimize impacts of detention policy on
alienating population (i.e., creating
insurgent supporters and recruits)
COIN doctrine, FM 3‐24/MCWP 3‐
33.5, 15 Dec 06Treating a civilian like an
insurgent…is a sure recipe for
failure.
Counterinsurgents
that use excessive force to
limit short‐term risk alienate
the local populace. They
deprive themselves of the
support or tolerance of the
people. This is what
insurgents want.
Frustrate insurgent recruiting.Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose
the War.
Consider how the populace
might react
Galula:“A system…which would
encourage soldiers to kill or
capture the largest number of
enemies…may well be
disastrous in [COIN].”
‘Victory’
in COIN: “…not [just] the
destruction…of the insurgent’s
forces…that, plus the
permanent isolation of the
insurgent from the population,
isolation
not enforced upon the
population but maintained by
and with the population.”
Avoid actions that might
antagonize the population
TF‐134 promoting detainee policies that exploit Iraqi cultural peculiarities to
turn moderates away from insurgency
4
TF‐134 Detention AOInterrogationObservationEvaluation
MNC‐
I Security AOPopulation Control &
Protection
Much closer coordination
between TF‐134 / operational MNC‐
I
subordinate commanders needed to enable extended effects
“Competitive Control”
model
© David J. Kilcullen, 2007
Strong indications that enhanced detention ops with
selective releases can positively impact
the greater COIN fight
–
reduce insurgent #s and capability,
bolster support for CF/GoI –
Potential Influence•
Each detainee a ‘chip’
to
influence 100+ others•
Reduce AIF recruits•
Better intel/infiltration•
Enhance pro‐CF/GoI and
IO support
•
CF/US recruitment? •
Empower moderates •
Firm policy – DO NOT:•
Conduct general mass
releases
•
Release any
high risk
detainees
TF‐134 PotentialArea of
Influence
TF‐134
Poten
tial
Area o
f
Influe
nce
Defining Strategic Success
VICTORY•
Establish an alliance with moderate
Iraqis
•
Empower them to effectively marginalize violent extremists
•
Provide momentum to the process of reconciliation with Iraqi society
Population and Capacity Projections
4002
0
3872
0
3742
0
3612
0
3482
0
3352
0
3222
0
3092
0
2962
0
2832
0
2712
0
2592
0
2522
0
2452
0
1672
5
1828
4
1940
8
2066
8
2160
6
2309
0
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-0
7Ju
l-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-0
8Feb
-08Mar-
08Apr-
08May
-08Ju
n-08
Jul-0
8Aug
-08Sep
-08
Cropper Bucca Taji Ramadi
7
Projected net 1300 detainees per
month grows TIF population to 40,000+
next year
Detention impacts on #s of insurgents and reconciliation major decision criteria,
but detention capacity, resources used for TIFs, and eventual turnover of
detainees to ISF also decision criterion
Study compares / balances factors related to reducing #
detainees and # of insurgents
Proposed, time‐phased reduction of
detainee population down to ~8000
Proposed accelerated rate of release
precludes mass release or turning over
large numbers of hardened detainees
to Iraqis.
24,5
13
23,8
89
23,7
78
21,7
63
21,4
63
21,1
53
20,8
53
20,5
43
20,2
43
19,9
43
19,6
33
17251495 1013 1437 1631
1691 1200 1240 1200 1240 1200 1200 1240
971872 902 904 900
940900 930 900 930 900 900 930
22,5
14
23,2
45
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08
Population Releases IntakesAPR 08 Projections:
30 Intakes per day
40 releases per day
TIF Detainee Population Actual & Forecast
APR 08 Actual:
28 Intakes per day
21 Releases per day
Actual Forecast
‐754 ‐623 ‐111 ‐533 ‐731
Line of Operations: 1. Unite the Ummah
Momentum
“The sword and the word will complement one another.”--Zarqawi to Bin Laden, June 2004, (U//FOUO)
“The sword and the word will complement one another.”--Zarqawi to Bin Laden, June 2004, (U//FOUO)
“... Islamic governments… are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.” - Al Qaeda Manual, (U)
“... Islamic governments… are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.” - Al Qaeda Manual, (U)
Kinetic Operations
Momentum
Means
Call to Jihad
Contains OSC material.
10
11
NOT the Enemy
Detention: Viewed as a Problem
Historic failures in custody
and care serve as recruiting
tools for foreign fighters.
Detention had also served
as a place for insurgents to
conduct recruiting, training,
and disciplining of future
combatants.
Characterize Red (Area Of Interest)
Mosul
Irbil
Tal Afar
Rte 1
Dahuk
14
The HQ Soviet 40th Army in Kabul, 1987.
Soviet Trucks in Afghanistan‐‐2002
The Fall of Saigon
TF‐134 Goals
• Ensure standards of care and custody
• Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk
‐ if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology
‐ when no longer a threat, release
• Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks
•
Collect information from detainees and provide intelligence
• Defeat any insurgency within the TIF
CRRBCapture MAG CELL &
Release Detention
Previous Detention Process (before July 2007)
GO ReviewUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Govt of Iraq Reintegration &
Reconciliation
MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting
EducationCivics & Islamic
Discussions
VOTECH & Work Programs
Family
Advocacy
Pledge & Guarantor Post‐ReleaseRelease
MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition
In
MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting
Capture
Current Engagement Process
Interrogation
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Historical Comparison: Non‐lethal Expenditures
DODIC Nomenclature Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08AA51 12 GAGE PNT CNTRL M1012 1482 895 343 78 929 282 15 10 5AA52 12 GAGE CRWD DISP M1013 1684 1425 677 70 1275 178 2 10 4AB08 12 G Extended range X1092 0 110 165 81 275 249 6 17 12B567 40MM CS TACT 47 97 30 0 8 1 0 0 0BA06 40MM N-L M1006 82 122 38 6 262 72 0 3 3BA13 40MM CRWD DISP M1029 103 97 114 9 286 125 1 0 2BA27 40MM MARKING IMPACT Ext Ran 0 3 43 4 108 23 0 2 0FN320 FN 303 IMPACT PROJECTILE 506 689 397 32 271 0 16 1 0FN330 FN 303 MARKING ROUND 1852 919 532 111 194 13 7 5 13G924 Grenade, Non-Burn CS NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0G963 GRENADE, HD TACT CS 23 12 31 0 0 0 0 0 0GG04 GRENADE, HD RUBBER BALL 86 78 56 0 0 25 0 0 1GG09 GRENADE, STUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0COTS GRENADE, CS EXPULSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0KM05 INDIVIDUAL CS DISPENSER.2/4 5 24 50 10 26 2 0 5 3WA97 CROWD CONTROL AMMUNITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0COTS TASER CARTRIDGES 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 0 3COTS OC Fogger 0 21 12 3 7 3 0 1 7
42nd NON LETHAL YEARLY
MAR‐JUL 2007
16,897 RoundsJAN‐APR 2008
1,134 Rounds
AFTERBEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
* TIFRC
SER
VICES BEG
IN
ARR
IVAL OF 16
THMP BD
E
DEP
ART
URE
OF 16
THMP BD
E 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
JAN07
FEB07
MAR07
APR07
MAY07
JUN07
JULY07
AUG07
SEP07
OCT07
NOV07
DEC07
JAN08
FEB08
MAR08
APR08
Disturbance/Riot Escape Murder Tunnels
TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts
* TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07
Surge
AFTERBEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
The Powder Keg Exploding,The Powder Keg Exploding,Jihadist UniversityJihadist University
2004‐2007Poor Intelligence
Inability to Segregate Extremists
Inadequate Command and Control
In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations.
In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations.
No Services
BEFORE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Empowering moderates through:
Intelligence
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Segregating Violent Extremists
Reconciliation Services
Proper Command and Control
TIF Weekly Re‐internments 2004‐2008
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
17-2
3 Oct 0
4
12-1
8 Dec
04
6-12
Feb
05
3-9
Apr
05
29 M
ay -
4 Ju
n 05
24-3
0 Ju
l 05
18-2
4 Se
p 05
13-1
9 Nov
05
8-14
Jan
06
5-11
Mar
06
30 A
pr -
6 M
ay 0
6
25 Jun
- 1
Jul 0
6
20-2
6 Au
g 06
15-2
1 Oct 0
6
10-1
6 Dec
06
4-10
Feb
07
1-7
Apr
07
27 M
ay-2
Jun
07
22-2
8 Ju
l 07
16-2
2 Se
p 07
11-1
7 Nov
07
6-12
Jan
08
2-8
Mar
08
27 A
pr -
3 M
ay 0
8
2004
26 Week Moving Avg.
2005 2006 2007 2008
Pledge
Start MNFRC StartReintegration Services Start
AFTERBEFOR
E
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
TIF Release & Re‐Internment2004 2004-2005 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2008
Cumulative Releases 10350 20412 34368 43319 49632Cumulative Re-Internments 37 571 1606 2847 3145Cumulative Re-Internment Rate 0.36% 2.80% 4.67% 6.57% 6.34%
7 Sept-31 Dec 07 7 Sep 07-17 May 08Cumulative MNFRC Releases 3743 8546Cumulative MNFRC Re-Internments 6 28Post MNFRC Re-Internment Rate 0.16% 0.33%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cumulative Re‐Internment
AFTER
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Expanding the Model توسيع النموذج
• High Under‐employed Rate
• Many Refugees Outside Iraq
• Many Internally Displaced
معدل عال لغير العاملين •
الكثير من اللاجئين خارج العراق •
الكثير من المهجرين داخليا •
• Lower the Under‐employed Rate
• Larger numbers Refugees Return
• Many happily return to their communities
معدل خفيف لغير العاملين •
عودة الكثير من اللاجئين •
عودة الكثير إلى مناطقهم فرحين •
A Provincial Re‐Integration Plan
مخطط المحافظات لإعادة إستقبال
GoI Provincial
Re‐Integration Center
مرآز محافظات الحكومة لإعادة إستقبال
A Path to Radicalization
•
The West, led by the United States, is engaged in a war against Islam
•
Muslims are obligated to defend their religion and there are theological justifications for
doing so
•
Violence is the necessary means to defend the religion
•Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists from population, and protect populations both inside and
outside the TIF
•Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are
contagious
•Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees, families, and releasees and establish a “social epidemic”
which
advances the objective of empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq
The Plan
Envisioning the Engagement Process
DETAIN
ASSESS
RECONCILIATION
TRANSITION
DETAIN
DETAIN
DETAIN
DETAIN
Former Detention Operations
Care & Custody Only
Our Mission
= Strategic Advantage= Strategic Risk
Care & Custody+
POPULATION ENGAGEMENT
Doctrine
Successful Practices‐‐
Emphasize intelligence‐‐
Isolate insurgents from the
population‐‐
Conduct IO‐‐
Provide amnesty and rehabilitation‐‐
Police lead; military support‐‐
Expand and diversify the security
force
Unsuccessful Practices‐‐
“Overemphasize killing and
capturing the enemy, rather than
securing and engaging the populace.”‐‐
Ignore peacetime governmental
processes, including legal procedures‐‐
Place a low priority on assigning
quality advisors to HN forces
“Old Way of Doing Business”
The Way Ahead for Detention Ops
What Works and What Doesn’t in a COIN Environmentfrom FM 3‐24 (Table 1‐1)
“In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and often impossible. Treating
a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for failure”
(7‐40).
Detention Operations in Counterinsurgency
CollectionManagementDissemination Interrogation
Operations
JointExploitationCell
JIDCLNOsDivision Target Cycle
Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess
Screening
PropertyExploitation
Theater Internment FacilityInprocessing Holding Area
Interaction with OtherAgency, Coalition, and Iraqi Intelligence Agencies
Actionable and Targeting Intelligence
XX
The Interrogation CycleThe Interrogation Cycle
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PV2 Byron FoutyPV2 Byron Fouty
CACHE
LOCATIONS
SAFE
HOUSES
PENDING
ATTACKS
MEETING
PLACES
INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP
SOURCE
OPNS
OVER 1000
INTERROGATIONS
TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT
INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPsCELLORGANIZATION
IDENTIFY
INSURGENT
LEADERS
IED EFFORTS WITH
JIEDDO, CEXC, AND
NGIC
WEAPON
SMUGGLING
ROUTES
UTILIZE
LEGAL
SYSTEM
INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQIDENTIFY SONS OF
IRAQ
INFILTRATORS
IDENTIFY
RECONCILIATION
CANDIDATES
AQI PERCEPTION OF
SOI
ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ
EFFECTIVENESS
IP CDR
ABUNUR
5XIIRsNINEWA
DEVELOP
TARGETS
JIDCJIDC
4XEFP
IIRs
RECOVERED
• Highlights of two month period (Oct ‐
Nov 2007)
–
508 Detainees led to 422 capture / kill operations–
131 of 422 ops resulted in captured / killed terrorists –
1,181 cell phones were captured–
47,000 phone numbers–
21.9 terabytes of data•
355 Violent Extremists were captured in follow‐on operations
–
Tactical Interrogation Reports produced•
Unique insights and trends into AQ network•
Key Enabler for IA / OGA / Partner Nations
SECRET//NOFORN
Detainee / Sensitive Site Material Exploitation Results
**Effective Interrogation Techniques: treat with dignity, courtesy, and
respect / love of family
“Bernie’s”
Timeline (ISN 168058—
al Shayie)
Dec 2004 –
Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy31 July 05 –
Turned over to Saudi ArabiaMar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG‐DO in Saudi Arabia
Sunday, 18 September 2005
Strategic Releases:
Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees
willing to publicly speak against Jihad
Strategic Releases
Task Force 134
DETENTION
Kuwait
City
Hamadan
Ahvaz
Dezful
Tigris R.
Euphrates R.
IRANIRAN
H3
22
6
Baghdad
1
KUWAITKUWAIT
JORDANJORDAN
H4
Tallil
2
5
12
1
10
1
Mosul Irbil
An
Najaf
Kirkuk
Al
Kut
Al
Amarah
Ar Ramadi
Ar’ar
As
Samawah
Umm QasrUmm Qasr
An
Nasiriyah
Al BasrahAl Basrah
Baqubah
Ar Rutbah
Dayr az Zawr
Rafha
Karbala
SulaymaniyahSulaymaniyah
Al
Qaim
Bashur
Al Hillah
Samarra
Fallujah
Al Kufa
Dahuk
Az Zubayr
Safwan
Tall Afar
Ad Diwaniyah
KarbalaKarbala
Al Muthanna’Al Muthanna’
Al BasrahAl Basrah
Dhi QarDhi Qar MaysanMaysan
WasitWasitBabilBabil
Al QadisiyahAl Qadisiyah
Al AnbarAl Anbar
DiyalaDiyala
Salah ad DinSalah ad Din
NinawaNinawa
At TamimAt TamimAs SulaymaniyahAs Sulaymaniyah
ArbilArbil
DahukDahuk
An NajafAn Najaf
9
SYRIASYRIA
SAUDIARABIASAUDIARABIA
LSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDA
FLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMORE
FLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUA
FLB CEDARFLB CEDARFLB CEDAR
4
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PL ALPHA
PL BRAVO
OBJ CHARLIE
Battlefield of the Mind
Moderates
GOI and CoalitionExtremists
Detainee Family Demographics: Family Social Structure is Complex
30%
48%
22%
OftenSometimesNever
66%
45%
59%
43%
5%
6%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Mother
Father
Brothers
Sisters
Grandparent(s)
Other
Does the detainee make the decisions in the household?
Who else lives in your household?
Most detainees live with extended family
Majority don’t make the decisions
Do you go to your tribal leaderto help solve problems?
Tribal influence is a factor
N = 1016 Transition In Assessment
55%
45%
YESNO
Detainees are Not Prepared to Compete More
than 60% of the Detainees Have not Completed High School
60%
5%
24%
31%
18%
11%8%
2%0% 1%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
No fo
rmal
schoolin
g 1-
5 yea
rs 6-
8 yea
rs 9-
12 ye
arsVoca
tional
schoo
l C
ollege 4
years
Military
school
Reli
gious sch
ool
Colleg
e more
than 4
years
N = 1016 Transition In Assessment
Religiosity Mosque Not Central to Most Iraqi Detainees Lives
Mosque Attendance Before DetentionDo Not Know
1%Other
1%
Special Days Only4%
Never36%
Every Week28%
Sometimes30%
Note: 70% of detainees did not attend mosque every week
N=220
Many Detainees Exhibit Signs of Psychological Trauma and
Anxiety; Very Few Have Ideas of Martyrdom and Aggression
Psychological Assessment
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Anxiety
Psychological Trauma
Depression
Aggressive Behavior
Martyrdom
Unknown 0% 0% 0% 6% 6%No 36% 56% 75% 88% 91%Yes 64% 44% 25% 6% 3%
Anxiety Psychological Trauma Depression Aggressive
Behavior Martyrdom
N = 1016 Transition In Assessment
14
8
10
4
3
2
2
5
2
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
MONEY
FEAR/THREATS
NATIONALISM/FIGHTOCCUPATION
"COALITIONACTIONS"
RELIGION/JIHAD
OTHER PRIMARY SECONDARY
14
8
10
4
3
2
2
5
2
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
MONEY
FEAR/THREATS
NATIONALISM/FIGHTOCCUPATION
"COALITIONACTIONS"
RELIGION/JIHAD
OTHER PRIMARY SECONDARY
Detainee Population Facts & Figures حقائق و أعداد إحصائية المعتقلين
Who is in detention?
Attitude Toward Coalition Insurgency & Detention Impacts Extended Family – 57% had
family member detained
27%
6%
3%
10%0%11%
43%
Brothers
Father
Son
Cousin
Grandparents
Uncles
None
Have any of your family members been detained by the Coalition?
N = 1016 Transition In Assessment
“Uneducated people join militias for
money; if there were jobs, fewer
people would join and this would
also deter future fighters from
turning towards the militias.”
“Most Al Qaeda members would like
to leave the organization, but fear
doing so because they will be hunted
down and will not be accepted back
into Iraqi society.”
Testimony from Inside the Wire
48
Attributes of a Successful Program
“Our facilities are to be a reflection of the society we desire.”
- Extremists identified and segregated from moderates- Psychiatrists/Psychologists engaged - Islamic clerics working with detainees- One-on-one counseling when required- Religious discussion programs- Family involvement- Civics classes- Art programs- Multilayered evaluation process- Provincial and Community Programs for post-release engagement- Material incentives for workers - Job placement- Continuing Education- Iraqis in the Lead
Govt of Iraq Reintegration &
Reconciliation
MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting
EducationCivics & Islamic
Discussions
VOTECH & Work Programs
Family
Advocacy
Pledge & Guarantor Post‐ReleaseRelease
MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition
In
MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting
Capture
Current Engagement Process
Interrogation
Iraqi Correctional Officer Training
Care and CustodyCare and Custody الرعايــة و الاهتمام
Detention Operations
Quality of Life: We are dedicated to the welfare of the detainees. The highest standard of custody and care is given, to include allowing visitors, receiving mail and unannounced visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
: الإعتقالعمليات
مكرس ان عملنا : نوعية الحياةسمى ا نقدم . المعتقلين احةلر
من ، عناية ال لرعايه ومعايير ا ، تلقي بالزيارات السماح هاضمن
من قبل اةزيارات مفاج البريد و . اللجنة الدولية للصليب الاحمر
Detainees receive the same medical treatment as Coalition Forces.
Healthcare for detainees is available 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.
Medical
لعلاج ا لمعتقلون ذاتاـى يتلققوات للمقدم اي ـلطبا
.فالتحال
لصحية ا عنايةلتوفير ا 24 على مدارللمعتقلين ايام الاسبوع طيلةساعة و
لطبيّــة الخدمـات ا
VOLUNTARY ADULT EDUCATION CLASSES
The Inner-Compound School is taught in concert with hired teachers and volunteer detainees.
The curriculum is varied among many subjects including Arabic, English and math.
Over 10,600 students have gone to voluntary education classes.
لبالغيـن ادروس طوعيـة لتعليـم
العنابر (لداخلي ا–ع لمجمّامدرسة تعتمد لتعليم على معلمين يتعاقد افي )الداخليه .متطوعين معتقلين معهم و
بما د لعديد من الموا ا لمنهج بين ايتنوع نكليزيه ولإالعربية، ا للغة افيها
لرياضياتا
طالب 10600ِاشترك أآثر من
Dar al Hikmah
An education center will
provide all detainees with a
basic education program.
The curriculum is based on
a core of six subjects:
Arabic, English, math,
science, civics and
geography.
Over 160 students attend
Dar Al Hikmah each week.
لحكمــة ادار
تعليمي لامرآز ل اسيوفر اساسيا يا تعليمابرنامجعتقلين لم لكافة ا
على لتعليمي مبنيا امنهج ل ا: ستة مواضيع هي س ااس، ةنكليزي لإاة، ـعربيل الغة ل ا
التربية وم، ــات، عل ـرياضي.جغرافيا الوطنية و
طالب يداوم 160أآثر من في مدرسة دار الحكمه
اسبوعيا
Voluntary Religious Discussion
Islamic Clerics offer
detainees a true
understanding of Islam.
Over 3,000 detainees have
participated in this program
thus far.
مسلمين دين رجاليقدم لإسلام امفهوما واضحا عن
. للمعتقلين
معتقل اشترك 3000أآثر من . في هذا البرنامج الى الآن
نقـاش دينـي طوعـي
Women’s Program
Counselors, teachers and clerics offer female detainees a true understanding of Islam.
Female detainees inside theater facilities comprise the group most at-risk for conducting suicide attacks on Coalition Forces.
The interment of females is controversial and poses a significant challenge for Muslim leaders and Iraqi society to understand.
57
Mental Health Program
Based upon the innovative work conducted by psychiatrists working in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, Task Force 134 is implementing a new Mental Health Program at Camp Bucca. Pilot studies are underway to evaluate the high risk populations within the facility and create a suitable engagement plan to treat detainees whose mental capacity is abnormal or maladjusted due to trauma and violence.
Work Program برنامج عمــل
لعملية ا برامج لاستشمل ة مراآز تعليمي ل المهنية او لنسيج وا صناعة تطويرل
ابوق تصنيع الط لمرافق ينعتقل لم ا تعوض لتي ساهم مكن آي ي ، إجور ماديّه ب
لدعم و ال المال من إرس . إعالة ذويهم
أنضّم للبرنامج أآثر من معتقل 3500
The work and vocational educational programs will include developing textile and brick manufacturing facilities that will compensate detainees for their labor, enabling the detainee to send money home that will help support their families. Currently, over 3,500 detainees have participated in the work program.
•
New Focus has been Sunni Shia Reconciliation Efforts in the Program Designed
by Abu Safa (300829)
–
“We need to get Imams involved in the Reconciliation Effort and for the Quad Chiefs to take
ownership for the TAKFIRI within their quads”
•
“Imams can teach about tolerance and acceptance
between Sunni and Shia. If they see and hear their
Imam accepting change they will follow.”
(10C
Chief)
•
“ We can not only affect what happens in Bucca
but also what happens in Iraq. We are here
because of this disagreement between Sunni and
Shia. We are separated from our families because
of this disagreement. We need to fix this both
here and at home.”
(9B Chief)•
“Your quad is like a house that you built from the
ground up. If there are TAKFIRI in your house its
because you brought them in, so you need to get
them out.”
(3B Chief)
(U) 3B Chief addresses the group on the rules of the
meeting
Camp Bucca Chiefs and Reconciliation
Detention: A New Solution through Reconciliation Efforts
Reintegration & Reconciliation Programs Modify Behavior‐
Educate, inform, train and empower moderate
detainees to
reconcile in detention and prepare
for release
‐
Provide support through programs that facilitate
reconciliation and
reintegration back into Iraqi
society
‐
Shia and Sunni together in all programs
Defeat the Insurgency by Empowering Moderates‐ Identify individuals for separation early in the detention process
‐
Create a transparent legal review process to
vet and
release those who are reconciled
‐ Criminals are turned over to ICS
‐
Extremists are separated.
Gangs and networks are
disrupted and exploited.
Family Visitation
Family visitation is provided to the detainees, as well as letters and phone calls.
The International Committee of the Red Cross also coordinates communication with detainees and their families.
Over 1,200 families visit their loved ones at Camp Bucca each week.
لعائليــة الزيارات ا
لعائلية الزيارات اتوفير للمعتقلين، إضافة إلى الرسائل
.لهاتفية ا لإتصالات او
لدولي الاحمر امنظمة الصليب ايضا تعمل على تنسيق
لإتصالات بين المعتقلين ا. وذويهم
عائله 1200تقوم أآثر من بزيارة ذويهم في معسكر بوآا
من آلّ اسبوع
Rule of Law
Task Force 134 supports Iraqi Rule of Law.
Detainee’s case on a periodic basis.
لقانـــوناسـيادة
على 134يعمل مرآز قيادة مساندة سيادة القانون العراقي
ين معتقل يتم مراجعة ملف ال .ةدوري بصورة
Detention Operations
Western Media
Iraqi Media Pan‐Arab Media
Public Relations & Detention
(Al Iraqiya TV)
Most‐Read Newspapers Most Listened‐to Radio
Most‐Watched TV Stations
Feb 08 Al Iraqiya 25.6%-- Al Sharqiya 23.3%
Feb 08 Al Arabiya 12.6%-- Al Jazeera 9.9%
Dec 07 Al Hurra 7.9%None* 5.8%
Feb 08 Al Sabah 24.0%-- Azzaman 9.6%-- Al Mashriq 5.2%
Dec 07 Al Sabah Al Jadeed 5.1%-- New Kurdistan 4.8%
None* 34.8%
Feb 08 Al Iraqiya 16.2%Feb 08 Radio Sawa 15.9%Feb 08 BBC 7.0%Feb 08 Dar Alslam 6.1%
-- Monte Carlo 5.3%None* 25.3%
* None = No Answer / Not Sure / None
TV 78.7%Radio 9.6%Newspaper 2.6%None* 9.1%
Most‐Important Media by Type
Iraqi Media Engagement Viewer Data Collected by MNF‐I StratEff: Jan 2008
Pledge Program
The judicial pledge is the detainee’s promise to an Iraqi judge to maintain peace and good conduct. Over 7,200 detainees have made the pledge thus far.
لضمـان التعهـد و ابرنامـج
لمعتقل يتعهد فيه القضائي هو وعد من التعهد السلام و حسن اامام قاضي عراقي بحفظ
معتقل قد أدّوا هذا 7200أآثر من . لسلوكااليمين أمام قاض عراقي
إحتفالية فجر الاسد للإفراج
This special program celebrates the release of a group of detainees. It’s conducted as a public release ceremony for the detainees and their families. Iraqi VIPs attend the ceremony and typically invite Iraqi/Pan-Arab media to cover.
يحتفل هذا البرنامج المهم بإفراج مجموعة من يحتفل بمراسيم إفراج عامة . المعتقلين
يحضر هذه المراسيم . للمعتقلين و ذويهم شخصيات عراقية بارزة، و بالطبع يتم
إستدعاء الإعلام العراقي و المناصر للعرب . للتغطيه الاعلاميه
‘Lion’s Dawn’
Release Ceremony
Release
The Government of Iraq (GOI) and Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) have partnered together to expand the number of releases from Coalition Forces custody in an effort to foster throughout the year goodwill and reconciliation.
لسـراح اإطلاق
لعراقية الحكومة اعملت قـوة ألمتعددة لالإشـتراك مع اب داعدلأا زيادة على اتلجنسيامن ق سراحها لاطتم إلتي يا
محاولةلعهدة قوات التحالف ةـلمصالحا لنية واتعزيز حسن
. لعاما طولعلى مدى
As of Nov. 1, 2007: 6,300 detainees have been released
تشرين الثانى 1لغاية إطلاق تم 2007 معتقل 6.300سراح
Implications
Releases are Strategic‐
Greater throughput between DO and Corps is necessary to uphold
both the quality
and quantity of intakes and releases
‐ Amnesty and mass releases are not viable options
Releases will Reshape the Battlespace‐
There are over 20,000 Sunnis in detention who might be released back into their
communities
‐
Closely monitoring recaptures and recidivists will be key indicators regarding the
amount of risk
Releases are Necessary ‐ If a detainee is no longer viewed as an “imperative security risk”
‐ Implications of the UNSCR expiration at the end of 2008
‐
“Passing the Buck”
will disadvantage follow‐on forces and potentially offset many of
the gains which have occurred. We need the involvement of the MNDs for successful
reintegration to occur.
The Way Ahead
Post‐Release Preparedness ‐ The impact of detainee return ceremonies
‐ “Guarantors”
proceeding in Corps areas
‐ Continuing efforts to evaluate and assess
Coordinating Our Efforts‐ Increased involvement from Corps in the MNFRC panel discussions
‐ Economic programs synced to meet the needs of battlespace owners
‐Make every attempt to avoid the unmonitored detainee release
‐ TF 134 programs and services are prepared to assist out the DHAs with:
Legal Assistance
Judicial Investigators
Assessments and Motivation Research
Early identification of irreconcilables and extremists
As a historical and
geographical center of Islam,
what happens in Iraq will
echo throughout the more
than 1 billion
people of the
Muslim Umma.
Global Impact of Expanding the Model