DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIG
HTS
SPECIA
L TOPI
CS
CPO 4
306
SPECIAL TOPICS COURSES
If you have taken a Special Topics Course previously you can still get credit for this one
If you take this one and want to take another Special Topics Course in the future you can do that and get credit
Opportunity to explore a new topic
PURPOSE OF THIS COURSE
To explore what has happened in cases of democratization after human rights violations
To consider this question across several different regions of the world
To allow you to help me think about a new book on human rights and democracy
Books as listed on syllabus
One book is Anderson, 2010
Books also on reserve 2 hours plus overnight.
CoursepackHard copy = $25E copy = $9.40
Also includes Anderson unpublished, chapter 3 only
READINGS
There are no texts for a class like this
Frei
Wood
Coursepack
Anderson
TALK ABOUT THE READING
WHAT HAPPENS IN CASES LIKE THESE?
What difference does it make that a nation experienced gross human rights violations?
Is it possible to develop democracy in the aftermath of such events?
What alternative paths have nations chosen?
Latin AmericaChileEl SalvadorArgentina
Europe: Germany
Africa: South Africa
CASES CHOSEN
THE LATIN AMERICAN CASES
Argentina First case Few examples to follow Became an example itself
Chile Came later Possibly the most successful
El Salvador
possibly the least successful
ORDER OF THE COURSE
Germany First Worst Early example
Latin America Largest number of cases
South Africabest known
best example
COURSEPACK MATERIAL
Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson: Truth vs Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions – selected chapters
Anderson unpublished (don’t read this yet)
ROTBERG AND THOMPSON
First introduction to some of the issues
Vocabulary
dilemmas
GOALS
Truth
Justice
Reconciliation, social healing
GOALS
Preventative (never again)
Restorative (healing for victimes [if alive]; for families [ if victims are dead]; and for society at large)
Move society to a new place where it can let go and move forward
CHOICES
Acknowledge or ignore?
Investigate or close the books?
Trials? Yes or no
If Trials then where? Military courts? Chile Civilian courts? Argentina International tribunals? Germany Special judicial authorities? S Africa
CHOICES: INVESTIGATE
Once we know, then what
Punishment or amnesty?
If punishment, what punishment?
Reparations or no?
POWER OF OUTGOING REGIME
Varies considerably
Human rights violators want impunity
Power can also change with time
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Varies
Can be central and essential (Germany, El Salvador)
Can be interested observer (S. Africa)
Can be totally absent (Argentina)
INTERNATIONAL ROLE
Depends on timing
This has only been a field since 1990s
If you were Germany you had no examples
Today there are many examples, all slightly different
CHOICES IN FINDING TRUTH
Public or private
Who to interview
Should you also interview perpetrators?
OTHER RELEVANT TERMS
Forgiveness
Vengance
Just punishment
Catharsis
Repentance
Restorative justice
COURSEPACK CHAP 2GUTMANN AND THOMPSONRealism: the task is too large, let it go and move on Prosecution is impossible or unfeasible
Compassion Relief Redemption Forgiveness Spirituality, possibly a religious experience (role of religion)
TERMS
Retributive justice (punishment)
Restorative justice (dignity)
Reparations
All of these cases have had to make decisions about each of these terms.
BLAME
History
How far back do you go?
Is history irrelevant at some point?
Example of S Africa and the Boers vs the English
ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS
Amnesty and restoration are incompatible
Amnesty ruins democracy
Amnesty makes justice impossible
Disharmony is good for democracy
WHAT
ABOUT
HUMAN
RIGHTS
VIO
LATI
ONS BY
LIBERAT
ION M
OVEMENTS?
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS
Ignore
Punish
Acknowledge but treat differently: justifiable struggle versus deliberate repression
VALUE OF DELIBERATION
Sitting down to talk has a value
Social discussion is part of democracy
Try to disagree without being extreme
WHO IS GUILTY?
The top general or president?
Those who gave orders?
Those who followed orders?
Those who were spies?
Those who voted?
Those who looked away?
Those who did not fight back?
FORGETTING VS REMEMBRANCE
Forgetting favors perpetrators
Remembrance provides dignity. This is a crucial point. Society must acknowledge what happened to these people
But eventually victims also need to forget or accept
How far to go in either direction?
FORGIVENESS
Do people have to forgive?
Should people decide never to forgive?
MIRED IN THE MUCK OF COMPROMISE
From Elizabeth Kiss, p 70
Most countries have found answers to all of these questions that are compromises
Someone is always dissatisfied
Someone always wants more or less
GERMANY
WHAT
TO D
O WIT
H THE N
AZIS?
BRIEF
HISTO
RY OF
GERMANY
2001 WIT
H ME?
IF NOT,
THEEN A
ND WILS
ON OR A
NY OTH
ER BRIE
F TE
XT ON G
ERMANY
HISTO
RY
GERMANY DEMOCRACY
Germany came to democracy late relative to France, Britain and US
Became democratic after being a monarchy
Began democracy just prior to WWI
GERMAN SKEPTICISM ABOUT DEMOCRACYInexperience with democracy
Greater faith in a central, non-democratic leader
Democratization coincided with Defeat in war Economic depression
BREAKDOWN OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY
Defeat in war: reparations payments, esp to France
Economic crisis
Hitler offered a solution: let me solve all your problems for you
Germans voted for him
COMPLEXITY OF THE FASCIST VOTE
Social Democrats opposed Hitler and the Nazis from the outset They were the only party to take this position They recognized Hitler for who he was
Conservatives did not take the Hitler threat seriously. Did not oppose him but did not support him
HITLER’S VICTORY
Nazism won a plurality, not a majority
In a parliamentary system
Making Hitler Chancellor, not President
A position more like Prime Minister in Britain
This is not a separate presidential mandate but his PARTY was in power
END OF DEMOCRACY
Hitler then ended all elections
Someone burned the Reichstags (symbolic more than practical) but it has come to symbolize the end of democracy
Probably was the Nazis but this has never been proven
Gradually increased repression and control
HITLER’S SOUP KITCHENS
Provided food to poor and unemployed
Credit support for farmers losing farms
Family support for new and young families
Various types of real poverty relief
Ursala’s story
COMPLEXITY OF HITLER SUPPORT
Not everyone supported the Nazis but many people did
Those who supported the Nazis had good reason to do so
The ugly side of Nazism did not reveal itself until after it won power and not even immediately after winning. Nazism came slowly, the stealth factor.
DEFEAT IN WAR
Utter collapse of the Nazi regime with no power and no legitimacy
No influence over new democracy
Absolute occupation by Allied Forces
Germany divided
RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
Overseen by Western Allies, W Germany only
Began with Nuremburg Trials, top officials
Suicide of Hitler
Denazification (Chap 2 of Frei)
FREI: CHAP 1
1945-1949
By 1949 major trials past
1949 amnesty law
AMNESTY
4 years of trials
Effort by Western allies to govern Germany
When does Germany begin to govern itself?
Expenditure of time by Western governments
DELIBERATION
Result of parliamentary decision
Extensive discussion in media
Further discussion by judiciary and in law journals (amnesty to be applied by judges inside domestic courts in individual cases)
OVERSEEN BY WESTERN ALLIES
Adenauer checked the law with the occupying powers
Checked again as it formulated itself
Respect for Adenauer by Allies
FURTHER AMNESTY DETAILS
Context for democracy had existed before the 12 years of Hitler’s authoritarianism
Only one side target of prosecution
Brits offer amnesty on certain days (part of German argument)
Amnesty started small, expanded gradually
QUOTE
What must cease in Germany is the chase after human beings (p 22)
The end of vengance
Figures p 24
----------
Amnesty also as a rejection of occupation, re-establishment of nation, assertion of self
FREI CHAP 2: DENAZIFICATION
Also begun and imposed by Western Allies
Purge of officials from positions of power, influence, decision-making.
Nazi Party outlawed: Establishment of elections but you are not allowed to run as a Nazi or vote for Nazism
A LEGISLATION FOR THE PAST
4 years of denazification had been a legislative perspective looking backward
Need to look forward
Loss of human capital and expertise
Exclusion of millions from society
PUTTING A PROCESS IN PLACE
P 32 – definitions of categories of those excluded and purged
Gradual extension of amnesty to groups 2-5
WHY DENAZIFICATION?
Recovery of human power vs continued loss of skills, education, training, intelligence
Effort to rebuild a nation
Rejection of occupation
CHAP 3:
READ THIS
ON YO
UR OW
N, NO LE
CTURE H
ERE
FREI CHAP 4: AMNESTY LAW 1954
P 67: 1945-1951: 17,000 legal investigations
5,500 convictions
Shifting public mood Reluctance to continue trials Tired of it all
SHIFTING MOOD
Social reluctance, a social decision Compare this with Argentina
A Vengeful, punitive, vindictive society? Compare this with S. Africa
Quote p 91
FREI P
ART II
THE Q
UESTION O
F W
AR CRIM
INALS
DEFINITION
Began with top commanders, Hitler and his top men
Began with Nuremberg Trials
Continued downward through military ranks
Ended with soldier, policemen, SS and all those following orders
Included concentration camp staff
REACTION OF GERMAN PUBLIC
Support for trials of top political command
Shock over revelations of what regime did
Growing distaste for continuation of trials
What right to foreigners have to do this?
Became outright resistance
EASTERN GERMANY?
What was happening there?
Mostly unknown
30,000-40,000 condemned
We do not know. This book still needs to be written
CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT
Focus on Germany and Nazis took western attention away from Soviet Union
Growing threat of Soviet power and fear of it
Desire by Bonn and West Germany to be part of democratic alliance against USSR
Need to make Germany into a friend
WAR CRIMINAL PROBLEM
By 1955 this had become a question of average soldiers and prison guards
Just about everyone in jail had been following orders
Why should they face punishment when average citizens did not? (singled out men and young people)
Growing resistance from right
THE PROBLEM OF THE RIGHT
Most legal parties were democratic, legalistic and not neo-Nazi
This allowed democracy to continue to develop
Continuation of war crimes imprisonment strengthened right, weakened democracy
Growing resistance from average Germans
ROLE OF PARLIAMENT
All of this continuously debated in parliament
Also debated in media, especially newspapers
This is what Gutmann and Thompson call deliberation: this is the best way to arrive and the best solution
SOCIAL RESPONSE
Growing refusal to help Allies catch escapees
Growing resentment of Allies
Gradually and quietly most prisoners released
GUILT OF A NATION
If anyone is guilty then everyone is guilty
Then no one is guilty, or at least not guilty enough to keep paying a price
Nazism without Nazis: yes it was a bad regime but no specific person is any longer guilty
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
Reduced German willingness to do their own soul searching
This is what they are doing now
RETURN OF THE NAZI RIGHT
Allied bottom line: this would not happen
Prepared to back that position with military might
But also pragmatic and realistic: end the continued punishment – take away the soil upon which neo-Nazi right was beginning to grow.
FREI - CONCLUSION
Overarching goal of Adenauer years Reintegrate Nazis into German society Which necessitated amnesty
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICY
Agreed upon by most observers: consensus
Sweeping scope
Speed
GERMANY’S RETURN TO NATIONHOOD
Rejection of denazification policy
Rejection of allied definition of collective guilt
Solidarity of the not guilty or the less guilty with the more guilty
Return toward normalcy, while also having lost half their country
GERMAN JUDICIARY
This case began with extensive international intervention, i.e. defeat in war and occupation.
Higher level of external intervention than any other case here
But it terminates with the domestic judiciary playing the central role
Initiative moved from international to domestic, a significant achievement
AMNESTY THEMSELVES
A need to stop self-flagelation
A need to give meaning to their own loss of lives
An inability to cope with the full reality of what the Third Reich had done and their own complicity in those crimes
NOT BECAUSE T
HEY W
ERE
INNOCENT
BUT PR
ECISELY
BECAUSE T
HEY W
ERE GUILT
Y
AS IF TO SAY:
Yes, we did this.
In fact, we did more than we are quite prepared to look at just now
But so what?
What are we supposed to do now?
Should we freeze and do nothing now because of what we did then?
Or should we move on?
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF NAZISM
Undoubtedly still there
1953 election among parties who knew that one decade earlier the majority of the electorate would have voted for Hitler (possibly overstated)
Never able to take hold owing to Allied presence
Brown trickle or dark fountainhead ? P 306
AND THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACYOld German Prussians
Adherents of the monarchy
Hindenburg supporters of the old German right
AN EXPERIENCE OF DISINTEGRATION
Threat of no longer being a nation
Losing Germany entirely
Had already lost half
This was more than they could cope with and so a selective and limited memory emerged and a desire for self-amnesty
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT
USSR seen as greater threatEspecially by AmericanAdenauer’s clear desire to link the new Wester
German state to the west ideologically, economically and militarily
So if German army demanded amnesty he was prepared to go along with it for that reason
Adenauer’s perception that USSR constituted an individual threat to Germany along. They had already taken half his country.
AMBIVALENT ROLE OF THE ALLIES
POSITIVE
Ensured that no Nazi party would gain power
Protected against USSR
NEGATIVE
Still an occupying powerStill overseeing all German decisionsStill a target of resentment
GERMAN REARMAMENT
Goal of German military
Also of Adenauer
Also of the Americans (more than the West Europeans, as you can easily understand)
Asocial elements
Criminal regime
German soldiers
Regime of criminals
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
BASIC LAW
Slide 93 and 94 of 2001
LIMITED ABILITY TO ADDRESS THE PAST
This would continue for several decades
Perhaps is changing now
This last chapter is highly critical of the Germans and I do not know if he could have published this in 1960.
WHEN I AM AWAY
1. If you miss class you are responsible for the material you missed and you are responsible for it obtaining it without contacting me. Form a student contact.
2. If you need a syllabus, find one without contacting me. Sources include
1. Other students2. Political science main office (do you know
where that is?) If not, find out. Use the campus guide/map.
3. If you miss class the day the exam is passed out, do not try to reach me afterwards to get the exam. If you miss class, that is not my responsibility. It is your responsibility. Form a student contact. Do not miss class. Pay attention to exam dates and key class events.
ARGENTINA
NEWER CASE
This is a much newer case but still one of the early cases in the modern history of human rights studies.
This case dates to 1983 and the immediate years thereafter, esp up to 1985, 1986.
A BRIEF HISTORY
Long history of military coups
First democracy was 1916-1932
Subsequent decades characterized by circumscribed elections (not all parties allowed to compete) or by more military governments
PERONISM
An authoritarian populism
That instituted elections the Peron felt certain he could win
Particular and peculiar emotional hold over the low income population
BATTLE OVER PERONISM: 1956-1973
Effort by military and wealthy elites to exclude Peronism
Effort by Peronism to exclude everyone else
Deteriorated into political chaos and terrorism in 1970s
1973-1976 Peronist presidency
1976 MILITARY COUP
March, 1976. This has become a national day of memorial and commemoration in Argentina
Military coup removed elected Peronist governments
Yet another military government except….
THIS
WAS T
HE MOST
BRUTAL D
ICTA
TORSHIP
EVER.
THE DIRTY WAR
Popular name for the military dictatorship of 1976-1983
The military called it the Process of National Reconstruction, also known as “El Proceso.”
During this time the military murdered people, approximately 30,000.
PATTERNS OF THE DIRTY WAR
People disappeared. This became a verb. The military “disappeared” people.
Kidnappings at night
Breaking and entering homes where people slept
Kidnapping and jailing entire families, including children, infants, and pregnant women
PATTERNS OF THE DIRTY WAR
Kidnappings in broad daylight
Kidnappings from cafes, offices, schools and campuses
Most common were midnight break-ins and when people were walking alone on the street
THEN WHAT?
For most of the dictatorship, no one knew the answer to that question
Argentines simply knew that their friends, families, children had disappeared
So the mothers went looking for them. These became the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.
MOTHERS’ ACTIVITIES
Schools, offices, friends’ houses
Hospitals
Police stations
Morgues
CHARACTER OF THOSE DISAPPEARED
Mostly young people. Your age group was a particular target
People age 20-35
University students and young people
Activists
Professionals engaged in resistance Human rights lawyers Independent union organizers
CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH
Many people this age are dating people
Headed toward marriage
Starting jobs, families, careers
Starting families
At least some of the disappeared were young women who were pregnant. This gave you no protection against being “disappeared.”
SO THE MOTHERS WENT LOOKING
Now they were also looking for grandchildren, babies, infants they had never seen
They searched hospitals
Clinics and women’s care centers
Morgues
THE HEADSCARF
Symbolism
Self identification
To converse with each other and share information.
FINDINGS OF THE MOTHERS
That these people were really and truly gone
That something terrible may have happened to them
That the police may have known something and denied it
That babies were also gone
A MOTHERS’ SOCIAL MOVEMENT
This became the origins of the social movement that eventually brought down the military
Thursdays at 3: those who survive still walk there at that time
Men could support but not participate and here’s why:
THE FALL OF THE PROCESO
A mothers’ and grandmothers’ movement
Other human rights movements
International condemnation
Falkland Islands/Malvinas War, lost, defeated by Britain
Economic crisis
RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
Military agreed to step aside and allow elections
Amid nationwide and international recriminations, disgust and outrage
The military had little power to negotiate their new condition. Remember this. This matters.
But they also had no remorse or regrets.
MOVIES
The Official Story La Historia Oficial
Cautiva
The Secret in their Eyes
La noche de los lapices
LANDERSO@
UFL.E
DU
LANDERSO@
POLIS
CI.UFL
.EDU
ON WRITING
Intro, concl, body of essay
Topic sentences
Grammar : green
Spelling: red
Thesaurus
1983 ELECTION
Radicals and Raul Alfonsin promised investigation and trials. “No podemos actuar como nada hubiera pasado.”
Peronist (Luder) said nothing about human rights but were widely suspected of pacting w/ military and offering amnesty
Age-old Peronist affinity with the military (Peron was an officer)
1983 ALFONSIN VICTORY
Human Rights Policy = # 1 Agenda Investigate what happened Try the topbrass Have the military try themselves
MILITARY RESPONSE
Military found everyone innocent
This was a war
In war there are casualties
So now what? Do you say “OK, let’s move on?” Or do you move jurisdiction elsewhere?
INVESTIGATE
Truth Commission
Find out what happened
Then decide what to do
Head = Ernesto Sabato
NUNCA MAS TRUTH COMMISSION
Finally the truth emerges
The disappeared were imprisoned in clandestine prisons
The police and military knew all along where they were
They were tortured, raped, killed
Bodies dumped in the South Atlantic
Human rights violations
Murder, rape, kidnapping
Theft of property
Numbers unknown
Location of children unknown
Forensic work
Then finally DNA
How to respond?
Amnesty?
Judicial trials and domestic legal system?
Upon what grounds?
These acts were legal under the military regime.
Can justice be retroactive?
SO NOW ARGENTINA KNEW THE TRUTH
Now what? Now what?
POSSIBLE RESPONSES
ARGUMENT # 1: TRIALS
Military trials of their own members
These were military men so they should not be tried in civilian courts
Laws applied should be those of previous regime
No retroactive justice allowed
ARGUMENT # 2: IGNORE
Explosive issueWould invite another coupWhen the military regime was in power these were not illegal acts
STEP ONE
Move decision-making to Congress
Remember Gutmann and Thompson: call for deliberation
Centralizing Congress as decision-making body protected Alfonsin (easier to overthrow one man than 400)
FIRST CONGRESSIONAL LAW
Try the military, including all those who engaged in egregious behavior
Sapac amendment
How broad is that???!!!
EARLY TRIALS
Had the potential to address all military members
Soldiers and officers alike
Continue trials downward
Apparently endless investigations
CONGRESSIONAL DECISION
TRY THEM IN CIVILIAN COURT
Military have refused to find themselves guilty
Congress moved trials to civilian courts
Judiciary = center of process
Human rights law, Geneva Convention not laws of military regime
BROADCAST PROCEEDINGS
Make trials publicTiming to touch the next generationMonths of proceedings
PUBLICIZE
Live coverage
International attention
Played on daytime television at 3 pm when all children are at home
Reach the next generation first: so that it will never happen again
MILITARY RESPONSE
Anger
Resentment
Threats
Attempted coup
SEVERAL COUP ATTEMPTS
These began during the trials
Alfonsin government thought they would discontinue but they did not
Growing military strength as democratic government weakened
Move toward economic collapse
GROWING MILITARY RESISTANCE
Anger
We have done nothing wrong
This was a war. People died. This is what happens in war.
Threatened coup
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
OBEDIENCE DEBIDA
Following orders
Denial would have meant death to soldiers
Deliberate effort by military to incriminate everyone
PUNTO FINAL
After a certain date no new cases could be filedFrantic 6-month period of putting together cases and filesEnd of trials thereafter
END OF INITIAL ARGENTINE RESPONSE
These 2 laws ended the legal response
Military still dissatisfied but accepted this solution
Mothers very angry but helpless to change the situation
ARGENTINA MOVES ON
Economic crisis
Reform of labor
New election
Defeat of Radicals
Return of Peronism to power
1989 ELECTION
Peronist victory
New President: Carlos Menem
Old Peronist sympathy with military
MENEM AGENDA
The economy
Other reforms like control over labor
Education
Human rights was not part of Menem’s agenda
MENEM IN POWER
Amnesty
!!!
All generals released
All other military prisoners released
Left terrorists also released
AMNESTY
MENEM’S AGENDA FOR MILITARY
Forget the disappeared
Move on
Keep military on tight leash
Keep them occupied otherwise NATO Peacekeeping forces (Argentina???!!!)
ONE FINAL COUP ATTEMPT
Against Menem
Menem ordered the military to fire
They followed orders
Rebels taken prisoner
This was the last attempted coup (so far)
Promotion of Balza
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Women and young girls
Refusal to date soldiers
Scorn for the military and for soldiers
Low pay, difficult to make a living
OUTCOME
Volunteers all but disappeared
Draft continued
END OF DRAFT
One final event
Death of recruit
Public response
Ending of draft: now a fully volunteer army
Probably do not have military power to overthrow the government. Maybe
KIRCHNER YEARS
National day of mourning every year in March
Re-opening of some trials
Mostly symbolic
WHAT WAS LEFT UNDONE?
FURTHER TRIALS?
What do you think
REPARATIONS
Social policiesindemnity
ASSESSMENT OF ARGENTINE CASE
RECOMMENDATIONS
What would Gutmann and Thompson have recommended in the Argentine case?
What would others have recommended?
How far did Argentina go toward those recommendations?
FACTS FROM CASE
Honest effort to find truthMore accountability; more deliberation
CHILE
BACKGROUND
Chile: coup 1979
Elected ousted: Allende Socialist Elected by plurality Extensive reforms Military coup US involvement
CHILEAN MILITARY REGIME
Pinochet
3,000 disappeared
Parties illegal
Elections ended
All civil rights (association, speech, freedom of press)
ENDING OF MILITARY REGIME
Plebiscite: 1988 – Yes/No Parties reactivated Parties united: Voto para el NO Pinochet position: economy
Pinochet lost
1989 ELECTION
3 parties competed
Center won
Chile returns to democracy
PINOCHET STEPPED DOWN
Amnesty
Impunity
No trials
Etc etc etc
RUTHLESSNESS OF THE REGIME
Movies: Missing House of the Spirits
Law abiding
CHILE
Started late and slow
Possibly accomplished more than Argentina
Certainly accomplished more than El Salvador
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM CHILE?
Particularities of the Chilean case
Was this the best way to proceed?
Advantages of going slowly
Role of international actors
Early efforts
Aylwin’s sincerity
Aggression of Armed Forced
Limited progress
But it was not a total loss
Later role for international actors
Pinochet’s visit to London: turning point
Role of the Courts
TWO PHASES
CHILE’S PHASE I: DOMESTIC EFFORTDeclaration by President
Rettig Report
Reparations
DECLARATION BY PRESIDENT
March 1990 Aylwin’s inaugural speech Find truth Social debt for economic system reconciliation
Established investigative commission which let to Rettig Report
Help to Exiles
Reform judiciary
RETTIG REPORT
Officially established and sanctioned by the executive
Gave the truth commission legitimacy and some power
Recommended reparations
Hostility of military
Also investigated terrorism by the left
WORK OF RETTIG COMMISSION
Traveled nationwide
Interviewed everyone who wanted to present their case
Staff members (60 in all) studied documentation gathered by human rights organizations
NOTE: this was unique in Chile: careful documentation of violations during dictatorship
REPARATIONS
The belief that reparations were appropriate and possible
7000 people targeted for reparations
$380 monthly salary for specified period
Health and educational benefits to families of disappeared
SYMBOLIC ACTIONS
National Day of Mourning over death of Allende
Public launching of Rettig Report
MILITARY RESPONSE
Never apologized
Never admitted wrong doing
Reiterated reasons for Coup: if they had it to do all over again they would do exactly the same thing
Ultimate show of force in Santiago
Pinochet’s absolute defiance
Discussion groups Tuesday
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BACKS DOWNFear of coup
Decision that democracy was more important
Roll back of progress on any human rights issues
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
If international actors had not stepped in this would have been the end of the story
Aylwin tried to reform the judiciary
Forward progress stopped by aggression of military and fear by democratic government
END OF PHASE I
Aggression by Armed Forces
Fear on part of democratic government
Desire by some social sectors to move on
CHILE’S PHASE II
Pinochet’s visit to London
Entry of international actors Spain: demand to extradite Pinochet from
Britain British refusal to comply
Domestic Courts Legitimized and reinvigorated by international
actors Beginning of a new battle through legal system
PINOCHET’S ATTITUDE
Impunity
Wealthy man seeking maximum health care
He felt he had done nothing wrong
The rest of the world would agree
LONDON WEAKENED PINOCHET
Gave weight to international opinion
Held up a mirror to Chile
Chile cared about international opinion
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Limit to what they can do
They cannot Punish someone else’s military Arrest and try nationals in another country Change laws
But they can use their own domestic court system
And international law
SECOND EXAM
Between Chile and Argentina, which country did a better job addressing human rights violations? Tell me what standard or benchmarks you are using to compare and assess the policies of these two countries. Say why you think what you think. Write 7 pages.
Due in class March 19.
DOMESTIC COURTS
Linked into what was happening abroad
Already fortified by domestic reforms
Chile’s court system became the new forum for forward progress on human rights issues
HOW D
OES CHILE
STA
CK
UP?COMPA
RED TO W
HAT?
ALL THINGS ARE RELATIVE
COLLINS PERSPECTIVE
Chile looks pretty good
Chile looks good compared with El Salvador
Chile started out not so impressive but got better
OTHER COMPARISONS
To ArgentinaTo Germany
CHANGES TO THE SYLLABUS
March 19-28 El Salvador: Read Wood, 2003, entire book
Part III: South Africa April 2-11 South Africa: Read Wood, 2000 and Wilson, entire book
Part IV: Overview and Assessment April 16-18 Coursepack chapters again
April 23 Final exam
WE W
ILL S
PEND T
WO
WEEKS O
N EL S
ALVADOR
FOR E
L SALV
ADOR WE W
ILL B
E USIN
G WOOD A
ND COLL
INS
IF YO
U HAV
E NOT
READ COLL
INS:
SALVADORAN PA
RT, T
HEN READ T
HAT N
OW
EL SALV
ADOR
ALSO KNOWN AS SALVADOR
Smallest country in Central America
Poorest country in Central America
Second most violent history, second only to Guatemala where they are currently using the term genocide
We do not study Guatemala
TWO WEEKS ON EL SALVADOR
Background
Human Rights
EL SALVADOR: OVERVIEW
This is your worst case scenario
Why is this true?
Is this acceptable or could the Salvadorans have done better/more?
Where does Salvador stand in comparison with our other cases?
THE FOURTEEN FAMILIES
Small country in land mass
Extremely high population density
Limited sources of revenue COFFEE SOME COTTON SOME CATTLE
1930S-1980S
Extreme exploitation of the population
A tiny wealthy class
Most people were poor
No middle class
1930S-1980S
First popular resistance in 1930s – massacre
1940s-1960s: continuation of same
US preoccupied with World War II and then with Cold War
This is the period of the Somoza years in Nicaragua (for those of you who took 3303)
BEGINNING OF RESISTANCE
Early 1980s: development of revolutionary movment
FMLN: Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)
Beginning of a guerrilla war
SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA
Nicaragua had a successful socialist revolution
Threw out dictatorship
Semi-socialist government with command economy
US opposition – mostly failed
Salvadoran dictatorship was 14 families, not one manEffort to imitate NicaraguaUS tried to prevent socialism before the fact rather than removing it after the revolution
NICARAGUA AS THE MODEL
Salvadoran effort to follow Nicaraguan example
Popular revolution from below
Armed insurrection when the people would participate
ANDERSON AND WOOD
Wood: Civil War
Comparative Perspective with South Africa
Anderson Failed revolutionary
insurrection
Comparative perspective with Nicaragua
WOOD O
N EL S
ALVADOR
THIS
IS T
HE STO
RY SHE T
ELLS
INSURRECTION
Revolutionary effort to remove the 14 families
Who were supported by a brutal military
Which was funded by the US
1980-1992
Revolutionary effort lasted about 12 years
Modeled on successful Sandinista revolution which triumphed July, 1979
Gradual effort by FMLN to conquer the country militarily
As FSLN had done in Nicaragua Started in North 4 fronts converging on Managua Military defeat of Somoza’s National Guard
DIFFERENCES FROM NICARAGUA
United States was paying closer attention
14 families more coherent and a more difficult target
Funding from US for military
Funding from Nicaragua, Cuba and everywhere else for FMLN
FAMOUS DEATHS
Death of Archbishop Oscar Romero
Movie: Romero (Raul Julia)
Death of 4 nuns, including lay missionaries, one young woman college age
Book: Roses in December Did this also become a movie?
DISCUSSION
This is where Liberation Theology was key
Liberation Theology influenced different national clergy communities differently
Influential in: Chile Salvador Nicaragua
Not influential in Argentina
Bergoglio (Argentine
Church more
generally)
ChileanChurch(record keeping
)
Romero (speakin
g out)
Taking up arms
Protection of combatents; nonviolent
participation
Speak out at home
Travel, speak out
Shelter to all, arms
THESE E
VENTS B
ROUGHT
INTE
RNATIO
NAL
ATTE
NTION
OJO:
THE B
EGINNIN
G OF
INTE
RNATIO
NAL ACTO
RS
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION
US funding became international scandal
Brutality of military became target of investigation by Amnesty International
Congress ultimately cut funding to Salvador unless and until human rights violations declined
SALVADOR WAS NOT NICARAGUA
Some people participated but most did not
Repression was more severe and more effective
Wood estimates in her case study areas that 60% did not join the insurrection
Nicaraguan percentages were much higher
STANDOFF: NEITHER SIDE WON
FMLN could not defeat the fortified Salvadoran military
Salvadoran military likewise could not defeat FMLN
Economy is absolute shambles
The whole point of 14 families (get rich) was lost by the devastation of continuous war
STANDOFF
Where the rich (through the military) made the people afraid for the lives
The people made the rich unable to work, unable to grow their crops, unable to live in the countryside
LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY
This situation appeared poised to endure indefinitely
Neither side prepared to back away
Neither side controlled El Salvador
Wood calls this contested sovereignty
1992 PEACE A
CCORDS
DEFIN
ITIV
E IN
TERVEN
TION O
F IN
TERNAT
IONAL A
CTORS
PEACE AGREEMENT
Brokered by United Nations
Input from Amnesty International and other human rights watch organizations
US agreed to peace accords but was not trusted to broker accords – not an impartial actor
AGREEMENT
Both sides would stop fighting
Elections with participation by FMLN
Elections would be repeated and all parties allowed to compete
Results would be respected
ELECTIONS: LONG-TERM
First elections: victory by right
Next elections: victory by center
2011 elections: first national victory by FMLN
Also contested at local level
FMLN victory in San Salvador
Growing control at local level
COLLINS ON EL SALVADOR
Agreement NOT to investigate human rights violations
Agreement NOT to use the judiciary domestically
No investigation of the truth
No Truth Commission
No Trials of Military
SALVADORAN M
ODEL:
MOVE ON
FUNDAMENTA
L BASIC
S OF
SALVADORAN S
ITUAT
ION W
AS TO IG
NORE WHAT
HAD H
APPENED
NO INVESTI
GATIO
N OF
MILITA
RY BEHAV
IOR
LIKEW
ISE N
O INVESTI
GATIO
N OF
FMLN
TACTI
CS TOW
ARD POPU
LATI
ON
CURRENT SITUATION
This situation has not changed
Elections gave victory to right at first
Then to the Center
And now, in 2011, FMLN has won the presidency for one term
ELECTORAL CONTEST
Rotation in power at national level
Gradual gain of seats by FMLN in legislature
Gradual gain of mayorships in local elections
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION:
Unchanged across all these electoral contests
There has been no Kirchner-style effort to re-open the books
Even the FMLN in office has not moved on the judiciary
Peace accords are now 21 years old
HOW L
ATE IS
TOO L
ATE?
IS T
HE SALV
ADORAN STO
RY O
VER?
CAN ANYT
HING B
E DONE?
IF SO, W
HAT
CATH C
OLLIN
S
ON EL S
ALVADOR
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Lack of initiative from domestic actors
Primary power to ARENA
FMLN as legitimate actor and political party
UN: peacekeeping and mediation
Then technical assistance
PDDH: UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTSDenounce
Advise
No enforcement capacity: similar to role of Courts in older democracy
1994-97
Impunity preserved
Clean slate
INTERNATIONAL REPORT
Filed with recommendations
Absolutely rejected by those in power (ARENA)
FRAGILITY OF PEACE
Peace accords seen as fragile
Had been achieved upon assumption of no trials
This perception continued for many years
Was this perception correct?
1993 AMNESTY LAW
Passed on year after Peace Accords
Right in power
FMLN only just gaining toehold as legitimate political actor
FORD V GARCIA
One of four cases
Came to jury trial
Jurors unaware of context and history
Defendants found not guilty
NETWORKING AMONG HROS
Extensive contacts
Could potentially act together if domestic context changed
To date courts have shown no willingness to find anyone guilty
INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS
How is Salvador seen in the community of nations?
Does the government care about pariah status?
ARENA did not
Perhaps the FMLN will
SOUTH A
FRIC
A
STOP-OFF EN ROUTE TO INDIA
Cape Town
Dutch East India Company
First white toe-hold in Africa
These Europeans began to settle, in and around Cape Town.
But they came to stay
GENERALITIES
Distance to South Africa
Frequent flyer miles
Stop-offs for gas
Apartheid
EUROPEAN INFLUENCE
Dutch: Afrikaners
Afrikans = derivative of Dutch
British: also a major language
Multiple African languages
THE BOERS
Dutch term for white South African natives
Roots in S. Africa reach back more than 400 years
They do not consider themselves Europeans
Some blacks do not consider them Africans
They consider themselves Africans
ATTITUDES TOWARDS BLACK SOUTH AFRICANSBoth groups racist
Both wished to lay claim to South Africa
Wealth of the territory
Differences between two groups
Cecil Rhodes
THE BOER WAR
Won by Britain but aftermath left greater power with Afrikaners
Some people think this was the beginning of apartheid
APARTHEID
Official system of legalized racism
Placing the races apart: apartheid
Gradually became more rigid and brutal
Criminal regime vs regime of criminals
The Power of One
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Black Africans eventually forced to live outside main cities
Bus passes to allow domestic travel for blacks
Restricted hours
Poverty: provided low cost service (maids and gardeners) for whites
Brits as slightly more cosmopolitan
Afrikaners as more rural people, ranchers, farmers
BRITISH – DUTCH TENSION
COMPARE TO US SOUTH
We have been called an unofficial apartheid system
What would you put here?
black codes, restricted travel
Jim Crow
blacks not counted as full person
blacks as property
blacks as maids
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF SYSTEM
Whites lived very nice life-style
High level of development in African context
Universities and scientific research
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR BLACKS
Separate
But some services
Better health and longer lives
Population explosion
ECONOMIC PROTEST VS GREATER REPRESSIONGradually increasing black South African
opposition
White South Africans responded with repression
British descendants largely NOT in political control
an in-between group
a neutral language
Hostility, protest, repression in upward spiral
WOOD ON SOUTH AFRICA
Protest gradually made economy unviable
Comparison with El Salvador
Wealthy and middle-class Boers found themselves unable to continue to make money
African National Congress as protest group/revolutionaries
Never became a successful revolution
1980’S INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
US and Europe invested in South Africa
International pressure to divest
International human rights organizations
S Africa as international pariah
DOWNFALL OF APARTHEID
1990 agreement by Boers to allow open elections
Agreement by ANC to lay down arms and abandon insurrectionary struggle
International rejection of South African system
International boycott
Domestic initiative with strong international pressure and support
FIRST ELECTIONS
1994: several years later
First open election in which blacks ran and voted
Mandela victory
Subsequent white victory
New ANC victory
Disappearance of white party: they do not have the votes
Blacks are vast numerical majority
CONTEMPORARY SYSTEM
Parliamentary system
Problem of the single party
Role of Mandela
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
White flight and declining opportunities for whites
Low educational level for blacks: cannot fill white jobs, at least not yet
AIDS
Crime
CONTEXT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
Nature of these crimes
economic system
actual violent acts (Biko, many others)
Soweto repression
Domestic actors:
Some awareness of need to redress past
Disagreement over how
International actors
AN EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE PROCESSDecision NOT to conduct trials through judicial
system (blacks did not trust that system)
Decision to search for truth but also grant amnesty
Truth-telling by perpetrators would produce amnesty
Failure to tell the truth could remand offenders to trials through legal justice system
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
Extensive attention, support and acclaim abroad
International press attention
CHARGE FOR TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Find the truth
Record what happened
Search for forgiveness
Telling one’s story
Make everything public
INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLE
Considerable internal soul searching
what happened and what was wrong
what should be done
social healing
retrospection
RELIGIOUS OVERTONES
Key role for domestic leadership
Mandela as voice for forgiveness
Had spent 30 years in jail so he was practicing what he advocated
Also Desmond Tutu: Protestant Bishop
advocated forgiveness and path toward self-healing and letting go. (Different from Menem)
THIS PROCESS WORKED – SORT OF
In South Africa today you can hardly find anyone who says they supported apartheid
Transition to majority rule (which is black rule) has been remarkably peaceful
Nation in movement toward democracy which has many problems
Vast animosities and large-scale violence have not occurred
WHAT IS LEFT UNDONE?
Economic question:
TRC largely addressed gross human rights violations
Did not address the economic system and the extent to which blacks may be permanently behind whites in skills.
This is a class situation and all countries have it. It is perhaps worse in South Africa
WILSON’S PERSPECTIVE
Most observers have praised the South African result
Wilson is a dissenting voice.
For that reason we are reading his book
WILSON ON SOUTH AFRICA
TRC EMPHASIZED RESTORATIVE JUSTICEAND SOCIAL HEALING
Emphases:
finding the truth
truth over justice
telling one’s story (among victims)
acknowledgement
forgiveness if possible
forsake revenge
REAL GOAL WAS NATION-BUILDING
With emphasis on modern nation state, civic rule, elected government and a multi-racial national community
Africa is a world of tribes where the national state is a foreign concept imposed by Europeans. It does not fit in Africa.
ANC SACRIFICED BLACK INTERESTS
To gain a nation
To gain white support/agreement/inclusion
Nation over justice
FOUR YEARS OF NEGOTIATION
White National Party (NP) and the black party African National Congress (ANC)
Neither side could win (remember the argument of Wood)
If struggle continued infrastructure would be even more damaged than it already was. Nation might never rebuild.
Why continue to fight?
WHITE POSITION
We built this nation
This is the most advanced and civilized nation in all of Africa (and this is true)
We built the universities, highways, hospitals, park system, agriculture and industry (including diamond mines)
In black hands this nation would still be a wreck like the rest of Africa
WHITE POSITION CONTINUED
If not for our organized energy you (blacks) would not be inheriting the most advanced nation in the continent
Moreover, you have us to thank for your own health. Without our health care system the black population explosion would never have happened and we would not be where we are today
We will not be endlessly punished for the apartheid regime.
APARTHEID WAS WRONG
We acknowledge now that apartheid was wrong
The violence used to maintain the system was wrong
We are willing to end apartheid and bring blacks into government, indeed into control of government
But we will not submit ourselves to endless trials. We agree to end the system. We do not agree to be punished for it.
WHITE ATTITUDES TODAY
Today in South Africa
no one supports apartheid
no one ever supported apartheid
how did this system ever get started if no one wanted it?
ANC RESPONSE
OK
If that is your attitude, we don’t like it
But we accept it
ANC GOALS
Democracy
allow national elections
allow the ANC as a legal party
allow blacks to vote for the ANC
allow majority opinion to determine the electoral victory (parliamentary system)
respect the outcome Human
rights
MANDELA WANTED A NATIONAL STATE
Controlled by the majority of citizens
Respected by the international community
Relying upon and using the institutions of state used in all democracies
OUTCOME: 1994 ELECTIONS AND OTHERSTRC was then a negotiated parliamentary
solution
Came out of the elected parliament that held ANC, NP, and IFP representatives
TRC came into being in 1995
Carried out its work over four years
Ended by late 1998
BETRAYAL OF THE AFRICAN PERSPECTIVEBlack African leaders of the ANC
betrayed what their black African supporters really wanted in order to achieve peace with whites and build a nation
Nelson Mandela: political leader
Desmond Tutu: spiritual leader
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY
This is the Zulu Party
Associated with eastern South Africa and far removed from Cape town
History of violence
Used extensive violence in the struggle
CHANGE IN INKATHA APPROACH
Initially resisted Mandela leadership and goals
Eventually accepted TRC goals
Also had a lot of their own reason NOT to have trials of human rights violators
WILSON: WHAT BLACK AFRICANS WANTED Revenge
Forgiveness is a Christian concept
These people are not Christians
This was a foreign-imposed set of goals and values
RESULT
Africans in urban ghettos did not accept this outcome
Vigilante justice carried out by individuals
People knew who did what and the neither forgot nor forgave
Particular violence against blacks who had been hired as thugs by the white police. These people had to move out of their neighborhoods or ended up dead
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS FEEL DISSATISFIEDThey do not want to tell their story
They do not want to forgive
They want revenge, death to perpetrators
They are willing to carry it out themselves
CRIME
This has become a major issue in South Africa
This is where it began and this is why it began
LIMITS TO THE TRC
Acknowledgment that original mandate was too large
1990-1994 was too long to investigate
Could not write a complete history (in fact, this is the task of scholars and historians, not of government, much less of a special commission)
Result is patchy, ended by time frame and end of money not by natural point of closure (also true in Argentina)
THIS WILL NOT DO
Quote from p 56
Discovered extensive violence by IFP against blacks
Never fully rectified
Can it ever be fully rectified?
SOLUTION WORKED FOR SOME
Some truth uncovered
Some lies rectified
Some people satisfied
But many were not. Perhaps most were not?
THE AFRICAN ETHIC
Revenge, vengeance and retribution
Vengeance comes from the failure of state institutions
Impunity is incompatible with human rights
Amnesty and forgiveness have undermined peaceful coexistence in South Africa
P 161: Description of revenge and its role in society
P 162: revenge, vengeance, retribution
OTHER LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Local town hearings
People’s Courts
These are tribal institutions that go back to pre-white African heritage
They are not recognized by the state
WHO IS CORRECT HERE?
Wilson has raised important issues
TRC had limits
Many remained dissatisfied
DISCIPLINARY DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVEThe perspective of politicians
build a state
And of theorists (Guttman and Thompson)
The perspective of an anthropologist
Wilson is trained to do grassroots research
Focus on micro picture and not on larger national picture
WILSON’S PERSPECTIVE IS TIME-BOUND
Looks at immediate aftermath of establishment of new democracy
Looks at TRC years (1995-98)
Looks at most raw and conflictual years
What would he find now?
ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
Mandela as a forgiving personality
Suffered as much as many and had personal reasons for vengeance
Forwent his own desire and needs for vengeance
Tutu’s rhetoric (Wilson would say this was unnatural and not native to Africa)
WHERE DO YOU STAND ON SOUTH AFRICA?
WHICH COUNTRY DID BEST AND WHY
WHICH COUNTRY DID WORST AND WHY?
WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES?
QUESTIONS
Are we in the clear?
Or do we have human rights issues to confront?
YOUR ANSWERS
No and no.
History?
slavery/aftermath
Japanese internment
native americans
education
MORE TO ANSWER FOR
Should we address history?
Or learn from it?
FINAL EXAM
Pass out exam April 16
Hold class April 18 for discussion, questions, help
Final exam due April 23 at 8:30 am either in class (hard copy) or by email
CITE
Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State, Cambridge, UK, 2001, p. 11.
Wilson, 2001, p. 201.
THINKING ABOUT THE EXAM
Broader Issues: Overarching variables
Domestic actors: initiative
International actors: initiative/pressure
Power of outgoing regime
How decisions were made: deliberation
WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED?
Punishment?
Retributive justice?
Restorative justice?
Social healing?