Download - Cyberwar
![Page 1: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Shubra Bhattacharyya
IS CYBER WARFARE A RELEVANT PART OF THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?
![Page 2: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
INTRODUCTION• Cyber War – “Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or
networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption” - Richard Clarke , former special advisor to the US President
• Cyberspace is different
• Ability to mobilize users/netizens
• Ability to provide large quantity of information
• Ability to shrink distances
![Page 3: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
IS IT REALLY A PLACE?• “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”
–John Perry Barlow, a Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 1996
![Page 4: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
CYBERLIBERALISM VS CYBERREALISM• Both acknowledge cyberspace as a new type of territory which is anarchic.
• However they differ in :
• Understanding of agent-structure debate
• Likelihood of regulating action within Cyber space
• Whether it represents ungoverned or merely unclaimed territory
![Page 5: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
THE LIBERAL VIEW• The two strands
• The Utopian and
• The Regulators
• Both are optimistic about:
• cyberspace’s democratizing and liberating potential
• The actor learning in a peaceful and progressive direction
• However, utopians see cyberspace’s development as an organic growth process, while regulators believe its happening due to international cooperation.
![Page 6: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
UTOPIAN VS. REGULATORS
UTOPIANS REGULATORS
Part of the “World we live in” Alternate Universe
Information as a free good
Information as a collective good.
![Page 7: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
THE REALIST VIEW• Cyberspace is a technological change in the existing international system—rather than a
new creation.
• Extension of battlefield as well as marketplace
• Not a revolutionary space.
• Cyberspace is capitalist , not socialist.
![Page 8: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
THE REALIST VIEW (CONTD..)• Advantages of the Cyberspace :
• Force Multiplier
• Enables the quest for strategic paralysis
• Cyberspace’s unique open, anarchic system is a danger rather than an opportunity.
![Page 9: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
CYBERWARFARE
• Stuxnet
• China – Taiwan, China – US Conflict
• Russian CW against Estonia
• Is CW a strategic weapon?
• Can CW be employed with the intent to achieve a strategic political agenda?
• Did the targeted nations concede a strategic political objective?
![Page 10: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA• Background
• Early 2007 Estonian Government decides to relocate a World War II Soviet War Memorial from the capital city of Tallinn to a military cemetery outside of the city.
• The Russian government as well as many Russia citizens are outraged at the perceived slight.
• It is generally accepted that this was the catalyst for the cyber attacks that occurred soon after the uproar over the war memorial
![Page 11: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack
• Diplomatic :
• Estonia adopted a look West policy
• Increases diplomatic relations with other Central European States.
• Starting in 2005 Estonia starts to diplomatically distance itself from Russia.
• Estonia wanted to interact with Russia as an equal nation.
![Page 12: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack
• Information
• Few countries in the world to allow voting to occur over the Internet
• Aggressively embraced the information age
• 90% of people aged between 12 – 24 use internet
• 58% of people aged between 24 – 49
• 95% Banking transactions conducted electronically
• Information security procedures were not capable of preventing the attacks, but once started they were able to respond effectively.
![Page 13: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack
• Military
• In 2006 – 2007 Estonia increased military spending as it wanted to become a contributing partner in EU and NATO.
• Wanted to distance itself from security reliance on Russia.
• Instead wanted to pursue a “Look West” military policy
![Page 14: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack
• Economic
• Baltic Economic Powerhouse in 2006
• Information Technology (IT) was among the most significant economic sectors
![Page 15: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Summary of the Attack
• Primary target were government and government related internet sites.
• Civilian sites were also targeted but no military sites were attacked.
• The Internet security professionals were unable to defend their systems from attacks which initially were originating from .ru domain but then the attacks started originating from all across the world.
• A complete shut down of traffic coming into Estonia from the international community had to be enforced.
![Page 16: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
As per Martin Libicki CW can be used for
Espionage
Disruption Corruption Distraction
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)
![Page 17: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:
• Diplomatic
• Diplomatic stance towards Russia deteriorated.
• Ties with Western allies strengthened immediately as Western government went to Estonia’s aid.
• Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Ford said in 2007 the Baltic states, “will never be left alone again, whether threatened by old, new, or virtual threats. . . .”
![Page 18: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:
• Information
• Estonia looked to NATO and the EU for increased protection of its information infrastructure
• In response NATO established a “Centre of Excellence” in Tallinn within one year of the attacks to conduct training and research into CW.
• Estonia developed sophisticated policies and strategies to safeguard its information infrastructure, specifically through published information security strategy doctrine (Cyber Security Strategy, Estonian Ministry of Defence 2008).
![Page 19: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:
• Military
• Maintained all military and NATO military commitments and did not modify any domestic military programs.
• Published strategy for Cyber Security.
• Rather than avoid the potential dangers of CW as a result of the cyber attack, Estonia moved aggressively to develop measures to prevent CW within a year of the attacks.
![Page 20: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:
• Economic
• Despite efforts by Russia to Estonian Economy, Estonia continued to perform well for the rest of 2007.
![Page 21: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
IS IT RELEVANT?• Is CW a strategic weapon?
• No, but future possibilities are there where it can be used as a strategic weapon. And this might lead to a security dilemma.
• Can CW be employed with the intent to achieve a strategic political agenda?
• Yes. The intent for causing changes in Diplomatic, Information and Economic power was there although Russia failed in its objectives.
• Did the targeted nation concede a strategic political objective?
• No, but the opposite happened. Estonia forged quick alliances and distanced itself from Russia.
![Page 22: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CW• Incidents in real world can lead to actions in cyberspace and vice versa.
• Identifying the true enemy could be a problem.
• Low costs of entry with potentially high returns on investment.
• Attractive tool for waging asymmetric war.
• Non Violent means of coercion.
![Page 23: Cyberwar](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051817/5478a06ab4af9f9c5b8b46b6/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
BIBLIOGRAPHY• Ed Pilkington, “Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war”, 31.05.2011, The
Guardian, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/31/washington-moves-to-classify-cyber-attacks
• Nicholas C. Rueter, Department of Political Science Duke University, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 2011
• Stuart S. Malawer, Cyber Warfare:Law and Policy Proposals for U.S. and Global Governance, VIRGINIA LAWYER, February 2010, Vol. 58
• Mary McEvoy Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace:The Colonizing of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik”, International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 381–401
• BRADLEY L. BOYD, CYBER WARFARE: ARMAGEDDON IN A TEACUP?, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Feb – Dec 2009
• Misha Glenny, “Cyber-weaponry, virtual battlefields and the changing face of global warfare”, 16.05.2011, The Guardian, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/16/cybercrime-warfare-stuxnet-weapons-hacking?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487
• Cyber Security Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy Committee, Ministry of Defence, Estonia, 2008