Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Leveraged Buyouts
CharacteristicsEvidence on LBOs
An LBO (Private Equity) ModelReverse LBOs
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Definition of an LBO
• No precise definition -- different forms• Transaction in which a group of private
investors uses debt financing to purchase a corporation or a corporate division. Equity securities of the company are no longer publicly traded, though the debt and preferred stock may be publicly traded. Uses entire borrowing structure
• Often involves an LBO sponsor who contributes capital and expertise (KKR, Bass Brothers, Blackstone, etc.) and management team.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Distinct Features of an LBO
• Significant increase in financial leverage– Average debt/total capital increases from 20% to 70%
• Management ownership interest increases– Median ownership of a Fortune 500 U.S. Corporation is
0.5%, for Value Line 1000 is 5%– After an LBO the ownership is 10% - 35%
• Non-mgmt equity investors join the board– Before an LBO, non-management directors have almost
no ownership. After, non-management directors may represent 40%-60% of equityholders
– Typical board of 5 individuals, 2-3 from the LBO sponsor
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Characteristics of Potential LBO Candidates
• History of profitability• Predictable cash flows to service financing• Low current debt and high excess cash• Readily separable assets or businesses• Strong management team - risk tolerant• Known products, strong market position• Little danger of technological change (high
tech?)• Low-cost producers with modern capital• Take low risk business, layer on risky financing
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Typical LBO Structure• Varies over time with market conditions• Debt Financing
– Total debt often 60-80% of entire deal (4-5 x LTM EBITDA, but depends on industry, cash flow, etc.
– 40% - 60% senior bank debt (repayment in 5-7 years)– 0-15% senior subordinated (repayment in 8-12 years)– 0-20% junior subordinated (repayment in 8-12 years)– 0 - 15% preferred stock– 10% - 50% common equity
• Equity Ownership– 10% - 35% management/employee owned– 40% - 60% investors with board representation– 20% - 25% owned by investors not on board
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Financing• LBO sponsors have equity funds raised from
institutions like pensions & insurance companies• Some have mezzanine funds as well that can be used
for junior subordinated debt and preferred• Occasionally, sponsors bring in other equity investors
or another sponsor to minimize their exposure• Balance from commercial banks (bridge loans, term
loans, revolvers) & other mezzanine sources• Banks concentrate on collateral of the company, cash
flows, level of equity financing from the sponsor, coverage ratios, ability to repay (5-7 yr)
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Financing – Senior Bank Debt• Senior bank debt which is secured with assets like receivables,
inventory, PP&E is often priced at T-Bills, LIBOR or prime + 400 to 700 basis points (recently spreads were much lower).
• Often in tranches where first tranche is repaid quickly and other tranches are not due until maturity (7-8 year maturity with average life of 4-5 years)
• 2.5 – 3.5 x LTM EBITDA (varies by industry and rating)• Lend up to X % (40%-65%) of receivables less than Y (90) days, over
certain $ amount, at T-Bill, LIBOR or Prime, plus a risk premium• Inventory usually 20% to 60%• Securities 10% to 90% (US Govt Bonds @ 90%)• PP&E (Cars (60%), Computers (25%), Building (60% to 70%, unique
factories (10% to 30%)• Bankers like to see 25% to 35% equity for protection
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Financing – Unsecured Debt• Unsecured debt (senior and junior)• Potentially many different pieces (cash pays are senior and
senior subordinated while junior subordinated may be zero coupon issued by holding company)
• Longer maturity than bank debt• Covenants not to pay dividends, increase debt or sell
assets• Supported by cash flows and operations of the business.• High-yield a favorite (senior subordinated), but hard to sell
high yield for less than $150 million and high-yield market not always viable.
• High-yield is typically non-callable for about five years and then have call penalties for 3-5 years.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Junior Subordinated and Preferred
• Below the high-yield bonds (or below the bank debt if the deal isn’t big enough to support high-yield bonds) but above the common would be junior subordinated and preferred stock.
• Junior subordinated may be PIK (zeros) for some time period. May be issued by a holding company of the operating company and may be issued with warrants. Holding company notes almost always PIK because there is no cash flow into the holding company for some time.– In transactions of this type, the PIK interest may not be
deductible until it is paid in cash or the bond matures and is paid off (so called AHYDO rules)
• Preferred can be PIK as well, so dividends accrue but are not paid and at sale of the company the preferred holders get their investment plus accrued dividends (often call the liquidation preference) -- often sold with warrants. Alternatively, can issue convertible preferred instead of including warrants.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Common Equity• Typically 25% - 35% of capital
structure now, but varies over time.• Typically seeking a 20%-30% IRR• Often assume exit and entry
multiples are the same, but not necessarily a good assumption – rarely expect multiple expansion
• Ask what the exit strategy is likely to be.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Management Ownership• Management puts up 60% to 70% of wealth
(excluding residence)• Management share of equity (sometimes called
management promote) usually increases year by year as they meet targets (e.g., revenue and EBITDA and non-financial targets) through performance vesting options. Strike price usually at equity buy-in price at time of deal.
• Managers are sometimes offered chance to buy stock with a mixture of recourse and non-recourse notes – potential tax advantages for managers.
• Managers often already own shares in a company that does an LBO and they do not necessarily cash out those shares – that equity goes into the new entity – called rollover equity.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Sponsors• Typically won’t put more than certain percentage of a
fund in one company and another percentage of a fund in one industry. Increases in % of financing that is equity has caused deal sharing.
• Razor edge margins because of the high risk profiles. Shooting for 20% - 30% on every deal, some earn 100%, some 4%, some -80%, etc.
• Sponsor takes funds from pension funds only when required, a draw down notice (LBO sponsors do not want to be generic portfolio managers).
• Typically assume will take 3-5 years to invest a fund and then another 3-5 years to cash out (monetize) the investments.
• Expertise in layering risk, financial structure
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Sponsors• Normally get a management fee
that is 1% to 1.5% of fund size.• In addition, they split returns
between investors and themselves and often get a percentage in the capital gain of the fund (so called carried interest).
• In addition, they invest their own money in the fund.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Financial Sponsor M&A Activity
$759
$232
$50 $87$103
$64$92 $95
$151
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
$800
$900
$1,000
$1,100
$1,200
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Total $ Value of Sponsor Deals % of Total Value of M&A Deals
$ in billions % of Total Value
___________________________
Source: SDC.
1999-2007 Global Sponsor M&A Activity
$1,105
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Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Risk Profile Questions
• Is cash flow consistent (no cyclical industries)?• Is a turnaround required to meet projections?• Any outside threats to long-term performance?• Are there larger, better capitalized competitors?• Does the firm have high quality management?• Are there other successful LBOs in that industry?• Can the company grow with the leverage
increase?• What is the exit strategy?
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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U.S. LBO Acquisition Financing Market Trends
3.4 3.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.35.4
3.32.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1
0.6
0x
3x
6x
1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bank Debt/EBITDA Non-Bank Debt/EBITDA
Average Debt Multiples
________________Source: S&P Leveraged Commentary & Data. Excludes media loans. Too few deals in 1991 to form a meaningful sample.
10% 13% 21% 22% 25% 26% 24% 23%30% 32% 36% 38% 35% 40% 40%
35% 32% 31% 33%2%2% 3%3% 4% 4% 4% 6% 3% 5% 3%
0%
25%
50%
1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Rollover Equity Contributed Equity
Average Equity Contribution to LBO
Sample Capital Structure Terms for Leveraged Deals
10%22% 22% 25% 26% 24% 23%
33%40%36%
42% 41% 43% 45%38% 34%
13%
6.7x5.4x 5.0x 5.2x 5.3x 5.2x 5.8x 5.7x 5.2x
4.5x 4.1x 3.7x 3.8x 4.0x 4.2x 4.4x
34%
6.0x
35%
4.4x
30
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Exit Strategies• Exit strategies include:
– IPO– Buyout by a strategic buyer– Buyout by another financial buyer– Leveraged recapitalization --- not really an exit,
but essentially after the debt is paid down to a reasonable level, the entity issues a new round of debt and pays a large dividend to equityholders (or repurchases shares). Some, but not all, equityholders may be taken out.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Potential Motivations for an LBO• Increase in debt and concentrated ownership
increase incentives to maximize value.• Non-management on board with significant
equity stakes increases board effectiveness• Advantage to being private (filings, etc.)• Beneficial tax consequences (debt, step-up)• Transfer wealth from other stakeholders in
the firm such as employees & bondholders
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Performance of LBOs
• Evidence indicates that the median premium paid to existing shareholders is 42% (1980’s data).
• What are the potential sources of value?– Improved operating performance– wealth transfers from employees– reduction of taxes– wealth transfers from pre-buyout debtholders– overpayment by post-buyout investors
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Changes in Median Performance• In three year period after the buyout relative to
the year before the buyout (1980s data)– EBIT increases by 42%– EBIT/assets increases by 15%– EBIT/sales increases by 19%– EBIT-CAPEX increases by 96%– EBIT-CAPEX/assets increases by 79%– EBIT-CAPEX/sales increases by 43%– working capital management improves– no decline in advertising, maintenance or R&D– CAPEX falls by 33% relative to industry
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Transfers from Employees• No evidence that investor wealth gains can
be attributed to wage reductions or layoffs– median change in number of employees is 0.9%
among all LBOs and is 4.9% among LBOs that did not engage in divestitures
– significant increase in average annual compensation for non-management employees
– there is evidence that LBOs are not adding to their payrolls at the same rate as the industry (12% declines for all, 6.2% decline for those with no divestitures)
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Tax Effect of LBOs
• Firms’ interest deductions increase substantially after an LBO. Depending on how you value them & how long you think the highly levered structure will be in place, 21% to 70% of the premium is attributable to the interest
• Additional depreciation (pre-1986 Tax Reform Act accounted for at least 30% of the premium
• Ratio of federal taxes/EBIT falls from 20% pre-buyout to 1% for 2 yrs. after buyout.
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Transfers from Bondholders
• If leverage increases dramatically, pre-buyout debtholders with no protection could experience wealth losses– on average, pre-buyout debtholders lost
2.1%– represents 3% of the premium paid– wealth losses accrue only to those
bondholders not safeguarded by protective covenants (limitations on debt issuance, etc.)
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Overpayment by Post-Buyout Investors
• Evidence indicates over three years subsequent to the buyout, post-buyout equity investors earned a mean excess return of 45% (again, 1980s data).
• Evidence for debtholders is less clear as it is difficult to track bonds that default. Default rates on low grade bonds were roughly 2.5% per year, but returns are less easily quantified
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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John Harland -- An LBO?
• Typical LBO Model• Model cash flows -- see how it supports
the debt financing structure• Treat exit year as a choice variable to
determine sensitivity of IRR to exit date.• Determine the IRR for the mezzanine and
equity providers and see if it hits target• Models don’t typically assess value except
as exit multiple (can do DCF of course)
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Models as an Alternative Valuation
• LBO models can serve as an alternative valuation.
• Take the cash flow forecasts, determine the amount of financing available in the market place currently and the IRR that LBO sponsors would target for this company. Based on all that, determine the maximum amount that could be paid as an LBO transaction that satisfies the required IRR.
• Triangulate with DCF and Market Multiple Valuations
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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LBO Model Logic• Create a sources (debt, equity contribution) and
uses (purchase price, fees, debt payoff) statement for inception of LBO
• Debt schedules• Proforma balance sheet, income statement and
statement of cash flows based on operating assumptions
• Cash flows pay down the debt (senior first and then mezzanine)
• Perform valuations at alternative exit dates and determine IRR to equity holders
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Reverse Leveraged Buyouts• Reverse LBO occurs when an LBO goes public• Constituted roughly 10% of IPO market in 1980s• Leverage and ownership changes at time of
reverse LBO that moves them back toward pre-LBO structure
• Leverage falls from 83% to 56% (debt/capital)• Inside ownership falls from 75% to 49%
(management and board -- includes sponsor).• Board size increases from 5 to 7, roughly 1/3 each
of operating management, non management capital providers and external board members
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Financial PerformanceOCF Before Interest and Taxes
• Year Firm Industry-Adjusted– -1 19.3% 9.2%– 0 14.6% 4.7%– +1 11.9% 1.5%– +2 14.3% 4.1%– +3 13.5% 2.4%– Avg +1 to +3 13.9% 2.9%
• Doing much better than their industry, but evidence of deterioration relative to prior performance
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Discretionary Expenditures
• Discretionary expenditures defined as capital expenditures, advertising and R&D.– Spending as much as their industry prior to the
reverse LBO and increases subsequently (discretionary expend./sales) 2% greater than industry
– CAPEX low before reverse LBO and normal after– Advertising above industry before and after– R&D tracks industry before and after
• Employees/sales same as industry both before and after the reverse LBO
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Effect of ownership and leverage
• No evidence that changes in leverage affect performance
• Significant correlation between decline in performance and decline in ownership.– 10% additional decline in percentage equity owned
by managers results in an additional 3.6% fall in OCF/assets over three subsequent years
– 10% additional decline in percentage equity owned by non-management insiders results in an additional 4.1% fall in OCF/assets over three subsequent years
• Suggests important role for ownership incentive
Wharton School Corporate Valuation -- Chapter 18Copyright, Robert Holthausen, 2007
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Stock Market Performance
• Evidence of a large increase in stock prices of the reverse LBO firms over the next four years.
• Large increase in stock prices exactly tracks the stock market. As such, there is no evidence of positive or negative excess returns
• Very different from IPOs in general. Strong evidence of negative excess returns