vii
Contents
Note on References ix
Editors’ Preface x
Preface to the Second Edition xi
Map 1 The Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War xii
Map 2 The Holy Roman Empire in 1745 xiv
Map 3 The Kreise xvi
1 The Holy Roman Empire Explained 1 [i] Introduction 1
[ii] Starting points 2
[iii] Views and interpretations 3
[iv] Tendencies in imperial politics 11
2 Constitutional Development 21 [i] Development to 1495 21
[ii] The era of imperial reform 25
[iii] The ‘confessional age’ 36
[iv] The imperial recovery and the internationalization
of imperial politics 50
[v] Austro-Prussian rivalry and the Empire’s collapse 54
3 Key Institutions and Trends 60 [i] The emperor 60
[ii] The Reichstag 63
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viii
Contents
[iii] The imperial courts 70
[iv] Imperial taxation 75
[v] Imperial defence 85
[vi] The Kreise 89
[vii] The imperial church 93
[viii] Imperial Italy 97
[ix] Territorial absolutism 99
4 Nation and Identity 103 [i] Patriotism 103
[ii] The communications sphere 110
[iii] Symbolism and ritual 113
[iv] The legacy of imperial identity 117
5 Conclusions 120
Appendix: Holy Roman Emperors 1440–1806 124
Select Bibliography 125
Index 148
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1
1 The Holy Roman Empire
Explained
[i] Introduction
The Holy Roman Empire was once famously dismissed by Voltaire
as neither holy, Roman nor an empire. Despite covering most of
central Europe for over a millennium, the Empire is still poorly
understood in comparison with other European states, even to the
point that many scholars dispute whether it was indeed a state at
all [40; 60; 65]. Within German historiography, the Empire, or fi rst
Reich in contrast to Bismarck’s Second and Hitler’s Third, used to
be a byword for political impotency and national disunity. Recent
scholarship has done much to dispel these misconceptions, but the
very volume and scope of this newer literature has made it dif fi cult
to form a rounded picture of the Empire’s development and place
within wider European trends.
This book sets out to do this by explicitly addressing the very ques-
tions about the Empire that prove persistently diffi cult to answer: What
was it? How did it function? Why did it survive for so long? Why did
it collapse when it did? In searching for answers we will return to the
very beginning, when the Empire was founded by Charlemagne on
Christmas Day, AD 800. However, the main focus will be on the period
from 1495; an important date in the Empire’s constitutional develop-
ment, roughly marking the point when it was clear that it would not
emerge along the same lines as the great western European monar-
chies such as France or Spain. The concluding point will be 1806,
when the Empire formally disappeared in the wake of Napoleon’s
reorganization of cent ral Europe, though, as we shall see, its legacy
for German politics persisted well beyond that date.
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
2
This fi rst chapter deals with the problems of interpretation that
have emerged since the Empire’s collapse, to provide an intro duction
to the now considerable specialist literature that has appeared and
to present a new approach to its complex constitution and political
development. Chapter 2 charts the Empire’s evolution to its collapse
and identifi es key stages and trends, the most important of which are
given detailed examination in Chapter 3. The extent to which the
Empire’s inhabitants can be considered a nation and how they iden-
tifi ed with its political structure are considered in Chapter 4. A brief
conclusion then points to areas still open to further research. Though
the book is written so that it can be read from beginning to end, it can
also be approached out of sequence, particularly by using the sections
of Chapter 3 to clarify any unfamiliar institutions or terms encoun-
tered elsewhere in the text.
[ii] Starting points
At no time in its long existence did the Empire possess clearly
defi ned boundaries or encompass a single linguistic or national
group. This fact poses considerable problems for interpretation,
not least for those who have tried to write its history from an exclu-
sively German perspective. Not all its inhabitants spoke German;
many Germans lived outside its frontiers, especially to the east,
while several important German princes within the Empire ruled
land elsewhere in Europe.
The original boundaries of Charlemagne’s empire were not
clearly defi ned, and though much land was subsequently lost,
other land was colonized or conquered, extending the Empire to
the east, especially along the Baltic shore. By the late fi fteenth cen-
tury, the core area of the Empire covered that of modern Germany
and Austria, as well as Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Switzerland was still formally within the Empire, though its exact
constitutional position was a matter of some controversy. The area
of the modern Czech Republic, then known as the kingdom of
Bohemia, with its dependencies of Moravia, Lusatia and Silesia (the
latter now part of Poland), were also within the Empire, as were
Lorraine, Alsace and other areas to the west which are now parts of
France. More peripheral, but still formally part of the Empire, were
the principalities and cities of northern Italy constituting a region
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The Holy Roman Empire Explained
3
known as Imperial Italy (Reichsitalien), which stretched from Savoy
in the west to the frontiers of the Venetian Republic in the east and
those of the Papal States to the south.
The emperor’s authority was far from uniform throughout this area.
He only ever ruled a proportion of the 800,000–sq-km surface area
directly as his own personal dynastic possessions which he could pass
on by inheritance to a successor, unlike the imperial title itself, which
was elective, not hereditary. The elective nature of the imperial title
is indicative of its roots in early medieval German kingship [16; 45]
and was a characteristic the Empire shared with other great European
monarchies; notably the Scandinavian kingdoms, Poland, and espe-
cially the papacy. Like the cardinals who, as princes of the Church,
chose each new pope, so the electors (Kurfürsten), as the chief princes
of the Empire, elected the emperor. These electors, along with other
princes, high feudal lords, clerics, ecclesiastical institutions, autono-
mous cities and village communes, collectively held the rest of the
land through a complex system of ownership, overlordship and cus-
tomary, dynastic and spiritual rights. Some of the more powerful of
these territorial rulers, like the Austrian Habsburgs, and the north
German Hohenzollern dynasty, ruled, or came to rule, land outside
the emperor’s formal jurisdiction. This extended the political reach
of the Empire into other European states, contributing to the general
imprecision surrounding the Empire’s own frontiers. Exacerbating
this was the emperor’s claim to represent the secular arm of a single
Christian Europe, complementing papal spiritual jurisdiction with an
assumed pre-eminence over all other European rulers.
The preceding discussion establishes fi ve characteristics which
will remain important throughout the book and are an essential
aid to understanding the nature of the Empire. Alongside the vast
extent of the Empire and the cosmopolitan and diverse composi-
tion of its inhabitants, we can identify the elective character of the
imperial title, the emperor’s pan-European pretensions, and the
fragmented nature of his sovereignty with its diffusion of political
authority and overlapping jurisdictions.
[iii] Views and interpretations
These characteristics have long been recognized in the writing on
the Empire, but have been open to widely differing interpretations.
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
4
The view which is still dominant, at least in much Anglophone litera-
ture, was formed by German scholars in the mid-nineteenth century.
Though this view contains separate strands, all share negative value
judgements on the Empire and its institutions which are interpreted
through the lens of nationalist concerns. Fragmented sovereignty
and decentralized political power were regarded as fundamental
weaknesses which had held up national unifi cation and, for centu-
ries, condemned ‘Germany’ to a largely passive international role.
This negative assessment has some basis in evidence. Fifteenth-
century commentators already remarked on the tensions between
emperor and princes. Criticism grew with greater awareness of how
other countries were governed. Shortly after the trauma of the Thirty
Years War (1618–48), Samuel von Pufendorf wrote that the Empire
had changed from a ‘regular kingdom’ into an irregular one as the
emperor lost power to the princes. This peculiar character made it
a ‘monstrosity’ beyond the normal types of state, like monarchies
or republics [14]. The impression of decline was voiced more force-
fully in the eighteenth century by Johann Heinrich Zedler, editor of
a widely read encyclopedia which included an entry on the ‘German
state sickness, or the illness of the Holy Roman Empire’. The lack of a
strong central authority was allowing the Empire to fall apart, leaving
it open to foreign invasion [21: vol.43]. Its inability to resist the power
of centralized, unifi ed and dynamic Revolutionary and Napoleonic
France after 1792 seemed to prove this point. Writing amid the
French invasion, the philosopher Hegel declared: ‘Germany is no
longer a state’.
To most historians and many politicians after 1806, the cure was
obvious: Germany should become a Machtstaat, or centralized, author-
itarian and militarized power state. To many, Hohenzollern Prussia
seemed to exemplify the ideal German Machtstaat, possessing every-
thing that the Empire appeared to have lacked, and thus welcomed
Prussian-led unifi cation. This violent process involved two major wars.
The fi rst, in 1866, saw Prussia defeat Austria and annex many of the
north German states. The Habsburg monarchy became a separate
empire called Austria-Hungary from 1867. Then, Prussia persuaded
the remaining south German states to join it in the Second Reich by
engineering a war with France as a ‘national’ emergency in 1870–1
[35; 36].
Borussian, or Prusso-centric historiography, exemplifi ed by Hein-
rich von Treitschke (1834–96), projected the process of unifi cation
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The Holy Roman Empire Explained
5
backwards into the period before 1806, ascribing to Prussia and the
Hohenzollerns an ‘historic mission’ to defend ‘German interests’
and forge national unity. Treitschke compared the medieval Empire
with its fragmented, disunited early modern successor [37]. The con-
trast was implanted visually on generations of German schoolchil-
dren, through their atlases showing the extensive medieval Empire as
a solid bloc, until the fi fteenth century, when it was replaced by a col-
ourful mosaic of micro-territories. Treitschke blamed this ‘decline’ on
Roman Catholicism and the cosmopolitan territorial empire of the
Austrian Habsburgs: two factors that continued to trouble Bismarck’s
solution to the national question in the nineteenth century. The
nationalist rejection of the Greater German solution, which would
have encompassed not just Austrian Catholics, but the Habsburgs’
Czech, Slovak, Polish, Hungarian and Italian subjects, necessarily
entailed a historical rejection of the Empire which had once included
these elements.
The dominance of the Borussian interpretation did not exclude
other views, however. Many writers expressed regret that Prussian-
led unifi cation had created a ‘small Germany’, excluding Austria
and other areas associated with the old Empire. Others sought sol-
ace in an Austrian variant of Borussianism, arguing that the separa-
tion of Catholic Austria from the more predominantly Protestant
Germany was historically inevitable, whilst also celebrating the
Habsburgs’ longstanding association with the Empire’s imperial
tradition. Alongside these views related to the two German great
powers are a variety of more particularist perspectives, charting
the history of the various regions that were once territories of the
Empire and which often survived, like Bavaria or Württemberg, in
modifi ed form, as states within the Second Reich until 1918.
The horrors of Nazism thoroughly discredited the Machtstaat as
a desirable concept, but did little to shake the basic outline estab-
lished by the Borussian approach. German history continued to be
written largely from the perspective of the larger territorial states
like Prussia or Bavaria, with discussion of the Empire kept to a mini-
mum. The older view remained that the Empire had failed to trans-
form itself into a modern state some time in the sixteenth century,
leaving it incapable of surmounting either the religious discord
of the Reformation, or the political tensions of the Thirty Years
War. The Treaty of Westphalia, ending that confl ict in 1648, was
interpreted as fi xing German politics in a framework incapable of
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
6
further development. The Empire then entered a period almost
invariably labelled ‘terminal decline’ until its ‘inevitable collapse’
in the struggle with the superior forces of Revolutionary France.
Those studies published after 1945 that did address the Empire
directly, generally remained within the legalistic approach of the
earlier scholarship, charting the development of individual institu-
tions largely out of the context of wider social, political or cultural
events [123; 126]. This contributed to conclusions that remained
generally negative, since the discrepancy between legal theory and
political practice within the Empire was often considerable.
One important change, however, was a shift to a broader geograph-
ical perspective, more alive to Germany’s Catholic past, yet without
attempting to revive the pseudo-historical claims to dominance of
the area that had once been within the Greater German political
sphere. A partial explanation for this can be found in the post-war
partition of Germany, which saw the traditional Protestant German
heartlands of Brandenburg and Saxony transferred to what became
the Communist German Democratic Republic. Those East German
historians who concerned themselves with pre- nineteenth-century
history retained the old focus on the German territorial state, but
now analysed its class basis in Marxist historical terms. The Empire
and its institutions remained peripheral to these investigations,
which interpreted the period after 1495 in terms of an underlying
socio- economic transition from feudalism to capitalism and concen-
trated on economic, especially industrial and agrarian, development
and the social tensions perceived as arising from this.
Thus, the revival of interest in the Empire which took hold in
German historical circles in the late 1960s was largely the work of
Catholic historians and those concerned initially with religious his-
tory who were based in the western Federal Republic. The most
important of these was Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, whose two-
volume study of the last 30 years of the Empire represented a mile-
stone in what has become the revisionist interpretation [42]. Aretin
subsequently extended his study, culminating in a three-volume
history of the period 1648–1806 [43; 44]. The central tenet of the
new approach has been to see the Empire on its own terms, rather
than regarding it as a failed attempt to create a centralized nation-
state. The Empire and its institutions are seen as vibrant entities
in their own right, taking their place alongside the territorial state
as important elements of the German past. Interest in the new
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approach prompted the publication of major documentary collec-
tions [2; 3; 4; 9; 10; 13] and began to infl uence English-language
research from the mid-1970s, notably through the work of Gerhard
Benecke and Michael Hughes [25; 29; 32; 33; 35; 79].
This revisionism emerged as part of a broader trend to seek out
an alternative German past by discovering popular, democratic
and pacifi c themes that had been displaced or neglected through
the earlier glorifi cation of the Machtstaat. Though receiving some
backing from the political establishment, the results proved con-
troversial, particularly as the critical work of German emigré histo-
rians working in the United States began to fi lter over to Europe.
A major concern of this work was to fi nd some explan ation for the
Nazi era; generally by emphasizing that German historical develop-
ment deviated somehow from a European norm along a Sonderweg, or special path, leading towards militarism and political authori-
tarianism. Though focused primarily on the later nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, this work implicitly endorsed the older
Borussian notion of the Empire’s exceptional political develop-
ment. By failing to develop into a unitary state, the Empire allegedly
delayed both nation-statehood and democracy. Attempts to ‘catch
up’ with the rest of Europe led to Bismarck’s hasty and violent solu-
tion which failed to unite the ‘cultural nation’ of German speakers
within a single ‘political nation’. This view remained very infl uen-
tial, because it allows the large body of older scholarship (much of it
written to a high technical standard) to be combined with a seduc-
tively persuasive explanation for the twentieth- century ‘German
catastrophe’. A good example is Heinrich August Winkler’s recent
survey which opens by stating: ‘everything that divides German
history from the history of the great European nations had its ori-
gins in the Holy Roman Empire’ [41: 4].
A perhaps more benefi cial result of the Sonderweg literature
and the debates it sparked was to encourage a greater emphasis on
social history. This happily coincided with a similar interest among
those historians working on the Reformation [221]. Together,
these impulses reinvigorated the earlier revisionist trend started by
Aretin, and from the late 1980s there has been a conscious effort
to locate constitutional and political history in a social and cultural
context, most notably by Volker Press and Helmut Neuhaus [55; 57;
100; 101; 104; 151]. This emphasis on institutions and legal devel-
opment as socially reproduced practice has drawn attention to the
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
8
individual, personal dimension of the Empire’s past that was per-
haps in danger of becoming obscured by dry constitutional his-
tory. The overall effect has been to reinforce the revisionists’ point
that the Empire was far from moribund and that its institutions
and political culture were vibrant elements of the German past.
However, much of the promise of this approach remains unfulfi lled,
especially in English-language historiography, most of which either
treats the Empire as a shadowy backdrop to Luther’s Reformation,
or ignores it completely in favour of micro-studies of communities
or social groups divorced from their political context.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunifi cation of the two post-
war Germanies (1989–90) were followed closely by the consolida-
tion of the European Union (1992) and its subsequent expansion
eastwards to include countries like Poland and Hungary. These
developments transformed debates about German state and nation-
hood. The growth of representative politics is now discussed in the
light of European integration, rather than Cold War arguments
over the merits of ‘bourgeois’ liberal democracy or communist
‘popular’ movements. Germany is no longer a divided state, but
part of a wider political system to which governments have surren-
dered important elements of their sovereignty; a transformation
which many citizens feel threatens their national identity.
Such concerns lie behind the current debate over which terms best
characterize the Empire. The word ‘Reich’ remains open to misunder-
standing. An exhibition on the early modern Empire in Regensburg
in 2000 deliberately avoided using it, because the organizers believed
the public would confuse it with the Third Reich, or think that ‘Old
Reich’ meant Bismarck’s empire. Rather more seriously, a minor
international incident fl ared up the same year when the French inte-
rior minister accused Germans of trying to dominate Europe through
the European Union as they had done with the Holy Roman Empire
[65: 300–1].
All comparisons with modernity are stridently rejected by a number
of senior German historians. Heinz Schilling argues that the consti-
tutional changes around 1500 known as ‘imperial reform’ (see 2.ii)
only created ‘a partially modernised imperial system’ [60]. Wolfgang
Reinhard and Axel Gotthard likewise declare the term ‘state’ an
inappropriate label for what the latter calls ‘an extremely decentral-
ised, federal structure’ acting as ‘an umbrella over the territories’
[50: 1–9; 59]. Though less critical, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger also
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9
avoids the term ‘state’ in favour of ‘an association (Verband) resting
on tradition and consensus’ in which federal elements like alliances
between princes acted as a substitute for constitutional coherence
[66: 116]. For Gotthard, Schilling and Reinhard, the Empire remains
Pufendorf’s monstrosity in a most negative sense. Though they all
accept Aretin’s revised view that the Empire still functioned after
1648, their work still reads like Zedler’s list of defi cits: a lack of clear
borders, unifi ed territory, homogenous population, standing army,
strong central institutions.
Others are more positive and have extended Aretin’s revisionism
well beyond correcting Borussian distortions to stress the Empire
as a modern, even ‘post-modern’ state. Georg Schmidt is the most
infl uential exponent of this trend, arguing there were effectively
two early modern Empires [30; 63; 64]. One was the medieval feudal
hierarchy extending beyond Germany to Imperial Italy, Bohemia,
Austria and the Netherlands. This persisted beyond 1500 only as a
set of jurisdictions exploited by the Habsburg dynasty to manage
their territorial empire which included all these non-‘German’
areas. The other is what Schmidt calls the Complementary Empire-
State (Komplentärischer Reichs-Staat) covering only the German ‘core’
area, roughly corresponding to the borders of the modern Federal
Republic. The inhabitants of this area were united by the com-
mon political ideal of ‘German Freedom’ (see 4.i), making them a
Federal Nation. The complementary element was the diffusion of
different state functions to several political levels within the Empire-
State. ‘National’ institutions coordinated defence and guaranteed
justice. An intermediary level known as the Kreise (Imperial Circles;
see 3.vi) provided a regional infrastructure ensuring general com-
pliance with norms and decisions, while administration, resource
mobilization and social control were exercised at the territorial
level by the numerous principalities and cities.
While Schmidt sees the Empire as the fi rst German nation-state,
Peter Claus Hartmann offers it as a federal ‘central Europe of the
regions’, borrowing directly from the language of the European
Commission in Brussels to present the Empire as a model for the
current process of greater integration. His use of ‘the principle of
subsidiarity’, another piece of Euro-Speak, essentially means the
same as Schmidt’s concept of complementary statehood. While
he sees it as a state, Hartmann rejects Schmidt’s idea of it as a
nation, arguing that the Empire was actually European rather than
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
10
German [51; 293]. Johannes Burkhardt also believes that Schmidt
has not gone far enough in the Empire’s positive reappraisal, claim-
ing it ‘had already, at the start of early modernity, solved the con-
stitutional issues which others are only beginning to discuss in the
twenty-fi rst century’ [65: 314].
Underlying this dispute over terms lies fundamental disagree-
ment on history’s purpose. Burkhardt demands that early mod-
ern history be ‘politically relevant’ by addressing the contemporary
world [65: 299]. This is a valid point, given the preoccupation of
the media and much of education with more recent events to the
exclusion of the rest of the human past, as well as the short mem-
ories of governments only too happy to cut funding for seemingly
unfashionable topics. However, this has been criticized for fos-
tering false continuities between past and present. Reinhard, for
instance, argues that the Federal Republic has nothing to do with
the old Empire, but is instead a Machtstaat orientated towards
‘British parliamentarianism, French etatism, and Prussian offi cial-
dom’ [59: 340, 356].
Both Schmidt’s critics and his supporters feel that his dogged
attachment to the terms ‘Empire-State’ and ‘Federal Nation’ is unfor-
tunate, and distorts his interpretation [59: 343; 65: 301]. Empire-State
hinders rather than helps understanding. The word Staat is some-
times attached to Reich in early modern texts, but generally to mean
constitutional order, rather than in the modern sense of a state.
However, this does not mean we should not see the Empire as a
state. The main problem with Schmidt’s critics is that they either
see political development proceeding along a single path of pro-
gressive centralization towards a modern unitary state, or (like
Reinhard) regard such as state as the only and fi nal outcome [288].
Their refusal to use the term ‘state’ for the Empire unwittingly per-
petuates the Sonderweg thesis, depriving German history of the com-
mon conceptual language necessary to make comparisons with
other histories. There have been many kinds of state in European
history and, as Burkhardt points out, the really interesting question
is not whether the Empire was a state, but what kind was it?
Schmidt’s other great service has been to place the question
of national identity back on the historical agenda in a way which
avoids the dangers inherent in calls for a Pan-German approach
voiced in the 1930s. The richness of the ensuing debate is dem-
onstrated by the need to devote an entirely new chapter in this
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The Holy Roman Empire Explained
11
edition to cover it. Whether Schmidt is right to restrict the
Empire’s history to a German core will be considered across the
next two chapters.
Though no consensus has been reached, it is possible to draw
three important conclusions from the work which has appeared
since the 1960s. First, the Empire’s political development must be
viewed in its wider, especially social context. Second, the Empire’s
structure resulted from the interaction of all its components, includ-
ing its own institutions, as well as international pressures, rather
than a simple dualism between emperor and princes: a point put
forcefully by Helmut Neuhaus [56]. Third, the presence of these
other factors in imperial politics suggests that the course of the
Empire’s development was far from inevitable and that various
‘alternative’ paths existed at different stages of its history.
[iv] Tendencies in imperial politics
These alternatives have been partially explored in an infl uential
collection of essays edited by Volker Press [101]. The most signifi -
cant conclusion of this volume is to reinforce the point that the
alternative to the Empire was not simply the Machtstaat, whether
it be in the singular unitary form of the entire Empire under fi rm
imperial control, or its fragmentation into smaller, independ-
ent centralized territorial states. The existence of multiple paths
of political development highlights the important fact that the
Empire contained several, often contradictory tendencies at any
one time. An examination of these goes a long way not only to
explaining the course and outcome of major events such as the
Thirty Years War, but also exactly what kind of political entity the
Empire was.
The possibility that the Empire might be brought under greater
direct imperial control can be labelled the monarchical principle
within imperial politics. This was present throughout most of the
middle ages in much the same way that kings elsewhere sought to
extend and consolidate their authority. Just how far any emperor
ever seriously contemplated achieving this after 1495 remains a
matter of historical controversy, as the many studies of individual
emperors show [107; 108; 109; 114; 121; 134]. Certainly, the fear
that the princes and lesser rulers might be deprived of all or part
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The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
12
of their autonomy through some form of ‘imperial absolutism’
remained an issue till the end of the Empire and a major factor in
determining relations between them and the emperor.
The continued evolution of the traditional hierarchical struc-
ture formed the second trend. As we shall see, this gave the Empire
its peculiar character of a multi-layered political structure subordi-
nate to the emperor’s overall authority, but not his direct control.
Though unique to the Empire, this structure rested on ideas com-
mon throughout those parts of Europe once touched by Catholicism.
These ideas included a distinctly early modern form of political rep-
resentation based on the division of society into corporate Estates
(Stände) according to the social function of their individual mem-
bers [34: 233–58]. Though far from exact or all-encompassing in
practice, this created a broad three-way division into clergy (who
prayed for everyone’s salvation), nobility (warriors and leaders)
and commons (providing society’s material needs). Overlying and
reinforcing this social organization was the existence of the Empire
as a community of feudal ties (Lehensverband), binding its members
in complex, interwoven chains of dependency and obligation, all
ultimately subordinate to the emperor’s supreme overlordship.
Emerging through the middle ages, these two elements shaped
the hierarchical structure by the late fi fteenth century. Political rep-
resentation was determined by both social and territorial status in
a complex relationship which seemed illogical to later generations.
The horizontal division of lords according to their nominal secular
and spiritual functions was overlaid by a vertical partition of both into
superior and inferior groups [141]. Superior lay and church lords
were distinguished by their possession of imperial fi efs (Reichslehen),
or jurisdictions they held directly from the emperor. This gave them
the status of imperial immediacy (Reichsunmittelbarkeit), meaning
there was no intervening level of jurisdiction between them and the
emperor. This group encompassed around 10,000 fi ef-holders and
their families in 1500. The majority were knights (Ritter) or barons
(Freiherren) holding lesser fi efs, often only encompassing a few vil-
lages. An elite minority has entered history as the ‘imperial’, or less
accurately, ‘German princes’; a convenient shorthand for around 320
fi ef-holders who were further stratifi ed according to an increasingly
fi nely graduated hierarchy of titles, but who essentially subdivide into
two groups. The senior one comprised those with ‘full’ princely titles
ranging upwards from margrave (Markgraf, or marquis), landgrave
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 129780230239784_02_cha01.indd 12 3/5/2011 10:54:06 AM3/5/2011 10:54:06 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire Explained
13
(Landgraf), prince (Fürst), duke (Herzog), and elector (Kurfürst). All
were united by their possession of ‘crown fi efs’, entitling them to
receive their investiture directly from the emperor in person. There
were 37 secular and 53 spiritual full princes in 1521, the latter dis-
tinguished by the combination of their secular and spiritual titles, as
in ‘prince-bishop’ (Fürstbischof). The more numerous junior group
comprised 143 counts and 83 abbots, abbesses, and priors, all of
whom usually received their investiture indirectly through a repre-
sentative of the emperor.
The remaining 50,000 or so noble families in the Empire formed
the second principal group of ‘mediate’ lords, meaning their rela-
tionship to the emperor was mediated by one or more intervening
levels of lordship. This inferior group was also internally strati-
fi ed along a scale of titles ranging for lord (Herr), through knight
upwards to duke and even prince. Likewise, they subdivided accord-
ing to status, often simply (if somewhat perversely) called ‘lords’
or magnates for the senior, and knights for the junior group. The
senior group was only found in the east of the Empire, in Austria,
Bohemia and other areas that had been acquired by the Habsburg
dynasty by the early sixteenth century. Many Bohemian magnates’
possessions were far more extensive than those of some impe-
rial princes, but their lands never acquired the status of full imperial
fi efs, which would have given their owners the quality of imperial
immediacy. The lessor lords, or knights, held their fi efs either from
one of these magnates, or from the imperial prince with jurisdic-
tion over them.
The growth of towns in the twelfth century added a further
non-noble element to this pattern. Towns were not personal fi efs,
but still represented jurisdictions over dependent inhabitants.
Town governments were elected by enfranchised citizens, but all
urban inhabitants remained subordinate to their feudal overlord.
Numerous towns emancipated themselves from their immediate
lay or spiritual lord to become free cities from the mid-twelfth cen-
tury. This development was often encouraged by the emperor as a
counterweight to powerful princes. By 1500 around 80 favoured
towns had received the status of ‘imperial city’ (Reichsstadt), indicat-
ing they had no overlord but the emperor himself. The other 4000
or so urban settlements in the Empire remained ‘territorial towns’
(Landstädte), meaning they were incorporated in one of the numer-
ous lordly fi efs.
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 139780230239784_02_cha01.indd 13 3/5/2011 10:54:06 AM3/5/2011 10:54:06 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
14
Representation followed this hierarchy of lordship, with each
level claiming to represent the interests of those below it as part of its
obligation to promote the broader, ‘common good’ (Gemeinwohl). These rights became ‘territorialized’ through their customary and
legal identifi cation with specifi c areas. Over time, the crown fi efs
were increasingly regarded as distinct territories (Länder) consti-
tuting the Empire, with the more numerous mediate fi efs simply as
subordinate subdivisions of these [273].
The reciprocal nature of feudal ties reinforced the particip atory
element in decision making that lay at the heart of Estates representa-
tion. Important decisions affecting the lives of all were only held to be
binding if they had been taken with the consent of the representatives
of the key social Estates. This principle became entrenched through
the political struggles of the middle ages, obliging the emperor to
consult the holders of the chief imperial fi efs over policy. These fi efs,
together with their rulers, collectively became known as the ‘impe-
rial Estates’ (Reichsstände), whose assem blies became known as diets
(Reichstage). Lower levels of repres entation emerged in many of the
individual territories to discuss policy with the local ruler. These ter-
ritorial Estates (Landtage) varied considerably in composition, but
frequently included com moners from the leading towns, as well as
representatives of the local clergy and nobility [254: 1–22].
The exact division of these powers and responsibilities was far
from clear by the late fi fteenth century. Crucial issues remained to
be resolved. It was still not clear which imperial fi efs had, or indeed
desired, the right to participate in central decision- making, parti-
cularly as this right was increasingly associated with the obligation
to contribute men and money to common causes, like collective
defence. The desire of the imperial knights (Reichsritter), ruling
lesser imperial fi efs, to dodge these obligations contributed to
their exclusion from the full voting rights of imperial Estates in the
sixteenth century. Similarly, it was far from certain what form col-
lective bargaining between emperor and imperial Estates should
take, and likewise what powers any assembly like a Reichstag should
have. Whereas the Borussian interpretation previously condemned
this situation as a sign of weakness and decline, recent historiogra-
phy regards it as open-ended and dynamic [45; 49; 56; 58].
This uncertainty contributed to the growth of federalism as a
third political tendency alongside the monarchical principle and the
traditional hierarchy. This is perhaps the most controversial area in
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PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire Explained
15
recent research and certainly one which is not yet fully worked out
[78]. Federalism is usually associated with modern republics like
Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Labelling ele-
ments of the Empire as ‘federal’ risks implying that either these
were already modern, or constitute the origins of contemporary
institutions. The modernity of federalism lies in its basis in rela-
tively equal interaction between members. Federal constitutions
might give one region more parliamentary seats than another, but
this will rest on common criteria, such as the size of their respec-
tive populations. Such equality was inherently alien to the Empire,
which related political rights to a status hierarchy. The Empire
could accommodate federalist tendencies which, in turn, did
strengthen it under some circumstances. However, federalism ulti-
mately contributed to its replacement by the Confederation of the
Rhine (Rheinbund) in 1806.
Three strands of federalism can be identifi ed within imperial
politics, all of which contributed to the Empire’s overall develop-
ment and historical legacy. These are, briefl y, princely-territorial,
aristocratic and proto-democratic, or radical. They need to be dis-
cussed in turn and will highlight issues that will feature throughout
the rest of the book.
The emergence of distinct territories within the Empire is a
major, long-term trend that has already been mentioned. Until
comparatively recently it was discussed solely within the terms of
what has been labelled ‘territorialization’ (Territorialisierung) [45]. In its essentials, this label encompasses what is discussed for other
European countries as ‘state-building/formation’; in other words,
the emergence of a sovereign monopoly of legitimate power over
a defi ned area, supported by a judicial, military and administra-
tive infrastructure to make rule effective and to secure and sustain
recognition of it from external agencies, such as foreign rulers.
The fundamental difference between this process in the German
territories and its equivalent in France and elsewhere is that it
was territorial rather than national. In place of a single monopoly
of power for the whole country, a multitude of smaller, localized
monopolies evolved in the numerous component territories within
the Empire [95]. As later sections of this book will show, there are
numerous debates on how and why this process took place, to what
extent it was completed and with what consequences for broader
society.
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 159780230239784_02_cha01.indd 15 3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
16
One factor, however, is certain, and that is that German territor-
ialization was closely bound up with the wider fate of the Empire. This
relationship was ambiguous. The consolidation and demarcation of
distinct territories weakened the imperial structure as their growing
self-suffi ciency lessened their long-term depend ency upon it; yet this
process was only possible through their continued membership of
the Empire, which both legitimized their existence and protected
them from the encroachments of hostile, predatory neighbouring
European states. Few German territories possessed the resources to
survive as viable, independent states outside the imperial structure.
Indeed, it is highly signifi cant that even Austria and Prussia, which
achieved this, remained at least partially dependent on the Empire
until its fi nal collapse.
While these factors have long been acknowledged, they have
been studied primarily from the perspective of the individual terri-
tories, rather than for their implications for the overall structure of
the Empire. In fact, their impact embraced two of the chief political
tendencies within imperial politics. At the territorial level, the proc-
ess of political consolidation tended to undermine the hierarchical
order by subordinating previously distinct elements, like the territo-
rial Estates, to increasingly absolutist forms of princely rule. In this
respect, the princes were pursuing the monarchical principle within
their own domains. However, this process only took place with the
sanction of higher elements in the traditional structure, not least
the fact that princely power was legitimized from above by imperial
law and its immediate relation ship to the emperor. This was not
always in the emperor’s interests, since princely autonomy widened
the gap between him and the human and material resources of the
individual territories: in other words, it weakened the monarchi-
cal principle. To forestall any moves towards more direct imperial
rule, the territorial rulers tended to champion their right to repre-
sentation at national level through the Estates principle. In this way,
they contributed to the development of those institutions, like the
Reichstag and the regional subdivision of the Empire into Kreise, which strengthened hierarchical order by consolidating the inter-
mediate levels between emperor and territories.
The princes thus wore a political Janus face, pursuing absolutist
centralization within their own territories, whilst resisting it on the
part of the emperor. Both involved recourse to the institutions and
laws of the Empire, further indicating the redundancy of the older,
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 169780230239784_02_cha01.indd 16 3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire Explained
17
dualist model of emperor–princely relations. Given the continued
ties to some form of overarching political structure, the long-term
implications of territorialization were to push the Empire towards a
looser federation of autonomous, consolidated states. This is indeed
what occurred in the process of its fi nal collapse which saw the sep-
aration of Austria and Prussia as viable independent states, and
the grouping together of the remaining German territories in the
Confederation of the Rhine under French protection. Similarly,
the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), which emerged from
the post-Napoleonic settlement in 1815, also embraced this variant
of federalism, this time within a broader framework that included
the two German great powers.
Discussion of the aristocratic and radical variants of federalism
has emerged from the wider historical debate on forms of repres-
entation in the German past. This began in the West in the 1950s,
partly as a semi-offi cial attempt to legitimize the institutions of the
new Federal Republic, and partly as a general revival in the neglected
history of German liberalism. The conclusions emerging from these
studies tended to remain within the framework of the old dualist
model of imperial politics, simply substituting proto -democratic
forms of representation for the former emphasis on the Machtstaat
as the only ‘alternative’ to a decaying feudal struc ture. There was
also often a strong element of Whiggish teleology as several writ-
ers sought to trace the origins of later, parliament ary democracy to
the institutions and culture of the old Empire. This is particularly
true of studies of the Reichstag [143], work on the territorial Estates
[72; 250], and more recently an attempt to see the assemblies of
the Kreise as forerunners of the Federal Republic’s upper house
(Bundesrat) [211].
Criticism of West German parliamentary democracy in the 1960s
contributed to a revival of interest in more radical forms of repre-
sentation, something that was also given a boost by research into
popular dimension of the social and religious transformation in
the Reformation. Peter Blickle has been a leading exponent of this
approach, developing what has become known as the ‘ com munalism
thesis’ [26; 27]. Rejecting both the older, romanticized ideal of peas-
ant communities and the more rigid Marxist models favoured by the
East German historical establishment, Blickle none theless argues
that German history has an ‘alternative’ tradition to that of contin-
uous domination by feudal-aristocratic classes and the authoritarian
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 179780230239784_02_cha01.indd 17 3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
18
state. In particular, peasants developed a com mon identity through
their participation in the agrarian economy with its collective tasks
and face-to-face community life. The demands of ‘outsiders’, such
as feudal and ecclesiastical lords, reinforced this sense of solidarity
which could, given favourable circumstances, extend not just across
regional boundaries, but also to embrace the lower sections of urban
communities. Com munality was given institutional form through
the relatively decentralized, autonomous nature of local government
through out much of the Empire. Most village communities enjoyed a
considerable degree of self-regulation, with property-owning peas-
ants electing their own councillors and judges. Even in those areas
where peasant rights were eroded through the develop ment of for-
mal serfdom by the seventeenth century, notably east of the River
Elbe, much of daily life was still decided collectively by the male
heads of households. Intrusion by the territorial state was minimal
and even secular, and ecclesiastical lords relied largely on co-opting
village headmen to represent their interests and ensure feudal obli-
gations were met [34]. Urban government was generally more highly
stratifi ed, but the relatively small size of many of the Empire’s towns
and cities ensured strong communal elements were also present.
While few dispute these general observations, the conclusions
drawn by Blickle have prompted considerable criticism. Blickle’s
main contention is that rural solidarity and self-government encour-
aged what he calls ‘communalism’, which is interpreted as a prelim-
inary stage to ‘democratization’. The presence of strong communal
forms is seen as a prerequisite for popular collective action, includ-
ing demands for political representation and challenges to feudal
authority and that of the authoritarian territorial state. The com-
munal basis of many popular revolts, notably the German Peasants
War (1524–6), seems to reinforce this point. However, for Blickle’s
critics, such as Volker Press and Bob Scribner [34: 291–326], the
communalism thesis is another version of the neo-Whig tradition,
attempting to trace modern popular anti-authoritarianism back
into the past.
Certainly, the weight of recent research, both on peasant com-
munities and the territorial Estates [261; 268], suggests that there
is no easy link between these early modern phenomena and later
forms of representation and political action. Nonetheless, the debate
does draw attention to alternative forms of federalism present in the
Empire alongside that based on the territorial states. The strongly
9780230239784_02_cha01.indd 189780230239784_02_cha01.indd 18 3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM3/5/2011 10:54:07 AM
PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire Explained
19
corporate ethos of the German nobility, like that else where, already
provided a basis for cross-regional political co operation, most nota-
bly in the cantons of the imperial knights formed in the sixteenth
century to protect their common interests against the encroach-
ments of the more powerful territorial princes [157]. Other than
those in Württemberg and a few minor ter ritories, all Estates con-
tained powerful aristocratic representation which could domi-
nate the local assembly completely, as in Meck lenburg. Like the
knights, many Estates felt threatened by the pro cess of territoriali-
zation, as this proceeded largely along centralized, absolutist lines.
Confederations between Estates of different ter ritories facing sim-
ilar threats offered not merely the prospect of resisting encroach-
ments from above, but possibly even displacing princely rule
altogether. These aristocratic confederations found their popular
counterpart in those between cities and peasant communes that
developed in the later middle ages. Though such urban alliances
as the north German Hansa or the southern Swabian League [209]
rarely extended beyond mutual security to develop durable institu-
tions for collective action, the alliance among the Swiss cantons was
to have lasting signifi cance.
Recent work [71; 101; 254] indicates that these aristocratic and
popular forms represented real alternatives to the monarchical
and hierarchical principles in the sixteenth century. The repeated
failure of Habsburg attempts to subjugate the Swiss cantons led to
their de facto independence from the Empire by 1499. Attempts by
rural communities elsewhere to follow this route ended with their
defeat in the Peasants War of 1524–6. However, the religious and
economic ties between the recently converted Protestant Swiss cities
and those in southern Germany and the Rhineland encouraged
various aspirations among the latter to ‘turn Swiss’ during the fi rst
half of the sixteenth century [71]. These hopes remained unful-
fi lled, but similar religious and political tensions encouraged the
cities and provincial Estates of the Netherlands to unite in opposi-
tion to the Spanish Habsburgs in the Dutch Revolt of 1567–1648.
Arguably, these areas were already breaking away from the Empire,
having been assigned to the Spanish Crown by Emperor Charles
V in 1548. However, economic, religious and strategic ties between
the Dutch and northern Germany remained strong, and were rein-
forced by prolonged Dutch military occupation of key towns follow-
ing the Thirty Years War. The Estates of Rhenish principalities like
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PROOF
The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806
20
Jülich, Cleves and Berg, as well as those in Westphalia such as East
Frisia, continued to seek Dutch political and military support, even
after such action on the part of territorial Estates was formally pro-
hibited by the Peace of Westphalia [28; 250]. Elsewhere, the desire
to strengthen aristo cratic autonomy was also fuelled by the confes-
sional divide left by the Reformation. The situation was particularly
acute in the Habsburg lands by the late 1590s, as the dynasty shifted
to more aggressive Counter-Reformation Catholicism in an attempt
to impose greater direct rule on its disparate provinces. The Estates
of Hungary, Bohemia and Austria, dominated by a largely Protestant
nobility, cooperated in a series of alliances to preserve what they
regarded as their traditional liberties. These extended to contacts
with areas outside the Empire, including the Estates of Transylvania
and the Ottoman Sultan.
None of these efforts succeeded in establishing a stable alternative to
the princely territorial state, not least because this was not the nobles’
principal intention. Though the Peace of Westphalia con fi rmed Dutch
independence, it also consolidated princely power through the con-
cept of territorial sovereignty (Landeshoheit). Con trary to popular
belief, this did not make the princes virtually in dependent, but it did
confi rm that the initiative within territorial affairs lay with them and
not the Estates or any other corporate group. Despite its subsequent
consolidation under princely abso lutism, the territorial state did not
become all-pervasive, nor did it entirely displace the other tendencies
present within imperial politics. The relative importance of these cur-
rents can best be appreciated by charting the Empire’s constitutional
development; the task of the next chapter.
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PROOF
148
Index
Aachen, imperial city, 114Abbt, Thomas (1738–66), 107, 118absolutism, 16, 19, 20, 51, 85,
99–100, 114, 120, 123defi ned, 99enlightened, 102, 107see also imperial absolutism
Albertine Wettins, 40, 42–3Albrecht II (1397–1439, king from
1438), 27Alsace, 2, 50, 70Ansbach, margraviate, 91archchancellor, 33, 64Aretin, Karl Otmar Freiherr von,
6–7, 9, 97armies, 47, 51, 53, 79–81, 85, 87–9,
96Asch, Ronald G., 36, 46associations, see Kreis associationsAugsburg, imperial city, 48–9, 66,
77, 89, 113Augsburg, Religious Peace of
(1555), 41–3, 48Austerlitz, battle (1805), 59Austria-Hungary, empire
1867–1918, 4Austrian Kreis, 92Austrian monarchy, 9, 16, 17, 51–2
army, 80–1, 88–9Estates, 20, 45–6, 101fi nances, 45–6, 75, 77–82, 97–8government, 32–3, 36, 45–6, 50,
55, 73, 101, 108, 116population, 56rivalry with Prussia, 4, 37, 54–8,
84, 89, 102, 106–7, 117, 122
size, 55, 104society, 13, 48, 101see also Habsburg dynasty
(Austrian)Austrian Succession, war
(1740–48), 55, 89, 98
Baden, margraviate, 32, 64, 108Bamberg, bishopric, 96Basel, treaty (1795), 58Bavaria, duchy, later electorate, 5,
44, 46, 74, 108exchange plans, 57fi nances, 55, 80, 89infl uence, 56, 58, 93, 102size, 55, 104
Bavarian Kreis, 88, 92Bavarian Succession, war (1778–9),
57Bayreuth, margraviate, 91Behringer, Wolfgang, 110Belgium, 2, 27Benecke, Gerhard, 7Berg, duchy, 20Berlin, 114 Bismarck, Otto von (1815–98), 1, 5,
7, 104Black Death, 26Blickle, Peter, 17–18, 26, 28Bohemia, kingdom
Estates, 20, 101relationship to Empire, 2, 9, 13,
24, 27, 30, 40, 64, 73, 92, 105, 108, 116
revolt of (1419–34), 28, 92, 108revolt of (1618–20), 46–8, 80, 101
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1489780230239784_09_ind.indd 148 3/5/2011 11:18:37 AM3/5/2011 11:18:37 AM
PROOF
Index
149
Bologna, 114Borussian interpretation, 4–5, 9,
14, 35, 57, 61–2, 87, 100Brady, Thomas, 29, 38Brandenburg-Prussia, 50
fi nances, 57, 82 great power status, 56, 89, 102,
106–7, 122 interpretations of, 4–6, 100, 101–2, 123
military power, 85, 89, 117relationship to Empire, 16, 17,
30, 49, 52, 56–7, 64, 69, 72, 79, 82, 84, 92, 94, 101–2, 118
size, 54–5, 56, 104see also Hohenzollern dynasty;
PrussiaBremen, archbishopric, 95Brothers’ Quarrel (1606–12), 46Brunswick, duchy, 40Burgundian Kreis, 92Burgundy, duchy, 21, 26, 27, 40, 64,
73, 108Burkhardt, Johannes, 10, 36Byzantium, 22, 26
Calenberg, see HanoverCalvinism, 43–4, 48cameralism, 102Campo Formio, treaty (1797), 58, 99capitalism, 6, 110Carolina law code (1532), 34Castile, 36Catholic League (1609), 40, 46censorship, 63, 111, 114Charlemagne (742–814), emperor
from 800, 1, 2, 21, 22, 114, 116Charles IV (1316–78), emperor
from 1355, 35, 76Charles V (1500–58), emperor
from 1519, 19, 39–40, 47, 63, 78, 79, 105, 106, 111, 114
abdication, 34, 41, 42, 97election, 27, 30, 61interpretations, 27, 35
Charles VI (1685–1740), emperor from 1711, 51, 55, 76, 123
Charles VII (1697–1745), emperor from 1742, 55
Charles (1433–77), duke of Burgundy from 1467, 21, 26
Clement VII (1478–1534), pope from 1523, 114
Cleves, duchy, 20, 46Cologne, electorate, 30, 41, 52, 64,
75, 91Cologne, imperial city, 110‘common good’, 14, 100Common Penny (Gemeiner Pfennig),
76–8communalism, 17–19, 26, 28–9community, 18, 28, 38, 48, 122Confederation of the Rhine
(1806–13), 15, 17, 59, 75, 117–18
confessionalization, 36–50, 101, 104, 106–7, 110, 112, 122
defi ned, 37–8Constantinople, 26corpora (confessional blocs), 44, 48,
49, 67Counter-Reformation, 20, 44–5, 95Courland, duchy, 94courts, princely, 51, 101, 107, 110,
114–15see also imperial courts
culturepersonal presence, 23, 33, 45,
69, 113, 122representational, 110written, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 90,
111–12currency regulation, 34, 42, 67,
83–4, 90customs union, 83, 85
Dalberg, Karl Theodor von (1744–1817), elector of Mainz (1802–3) and prince primate (1803–14), 117–18
Defenestration of Prague (1618), 46Denmark, 29, 54, 69, 94despotism, 75Diestelkamp, Bernd, 70Ditmarschen, 29Donauwörth, imperial city (until
1607), 41, 46
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1499780230239784_09_ind.indd 149 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
PROOF
Index
150
dualism, see imperial politicsDuchhardt, Heinz, 54, 100Dutch Republic, 20, 95, 103, 105,
108–9, 121Dutch Revolt (1567–1648), 19, 41,
108–9Dutch War (1672–79), 53, 87
East Frisia, principality, 20, 74ecclesiastical reservation, 43economic change, 6, 26, 66economic regulation, 34, 67, 82–5education, 35, 71, 96, 107electoral capitulation
(Wahlkapitulation), 31, 44, 61–2, 86
electoral college (Kurfürstenrat), 64, 66, 67
Electoral Rhenish Kreis, 88, 91electors (Kurfürsten), 3, 13, 30–1,
41, 42, 49, 52, 54, 60–2, 68, 72, 79, 80, 93, 115, 116
emigration, 42emperor
authority, 3, 11, 12, 16, 31, 44, 47–8, 51–4, 60–3, 66, 71, 86, 93, 101, 120–1
coronation, 21, 30, 78, 114election, 3, 30–1, 60, 93, 114, 116fi nancial position, 23, 29, 47,
75–82, 98–9international position, 3, 22, 36,
37, 51–2prayers for, 108, 111regional infl uence, 24–5, 36, 97–9title, 3, 21, 59, 63, 107, 114, 116,
121emperor’s suites (Kaisersäle),
113–14Empire
collapse, 1, 5, 15, 89, 102, 117–19, 122
collective security, 9, 14, 32, 34, 44, 51–3, 57–8, 66, 76–82, 85–9, 105, 115, 122
complimentary character, 9, 36, 121
conservative character, 57, 75,
82, 102, 118, 122economic policy, 34, 67, 82–5, 90feudal element, 12–14, 22, 51,
66, 97–8formal title, 21–2, 104, 109international position, 16, 26,
37, 46, 50–60, 69–70, 86–8, 102, 105–6, 118
‘modernity’, 8–10, 36, 37, 101, 121personnel, 35, 71political representation within,
11–14, 16–20, 30–2, 63–70, 90, 120
population, 26, 47, 56reorganized (1801–3), 58, 64–6,
68, 72, 96, 117–18size, 3, 56, 78as a state, 4, 6, 8–10, 35–6, 85,
97, 117, 121symbols, 64, 108–9, 113–16
England, 26, 36, 54, 56, 69, 111, 121Enlightenment, 96, 107, 118Erthal, Friedrich Carl von
(1719–1802), elector of Mainz from 1774, 96
Estates (Stände)armed, 53, 87–8, 96social, 12, 14territorial, 14, 16–20, 30, 34, 47,
64, 74, 76, 101, 114, 120see also imperial Estates
European Union, 8, 9, 84
federalismaristocratic, 15, 17, 19–20, 121interpretations, 8–9, 14–15,
122–3 princely, 15–17, 52, 65, 87–8, 121radical, 15, 17–20, 37, 121
Feine, Erich, 51Ferdinand I (1503–64), emperor
1556, 27, 28, 32–3, 40–1, 42, 43, 45, 67, 79
Ferdinand II (1578–1637), emperor 1619, 46–7, 67, 80, 101, 123
Ferdinand III (1608–57), emperor 1637, 47–8, 52, 53
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1509780230239784_09_ind.indd 150 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
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Index
151
feudal ties, 3, 9, 12, 33, 34, 51, 97–8feudalism, 6, 17–18feuding, 26, 85fl ags, 115–16France, 2, 8, 41, 49, 53, 61, 85, 87,
97–8, 111, 112German view of, 106infl uence in the Empire, 17, 21,
50, 52, 55–9, 60, 70, 84, 91, 95, 105, 114, 117–18
monarchy, 15, 26, 36Francis I Stephen (1708–65),
emperor from 1745, 55Francis II (1768–1835), Holy
Roman emperor 1792–1806, Austrian emperor from 1804, 59, 69, 117
François, Etienne, 48Franconian Kreis, 25, 88, 91Frankfurt am Main, imperial city,
77, 84, 112, 114, 115Frederick III (1415–93), emperor
from 1440, 27, 29, 61, 71, 116Frederick III/I (1657–1713),
elector of Brandenburg (1688), king ‘in’ Prussia from 1700, 114
Frederick II ‘the Great’ (1712–86), king of Prussia from 1740, 55, 57, 106–7, 111
French Revolution (1789), 57, 110, 118
French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), 4, 57–8, 81–2, 86, 89, 93, 99, 109, 122
Galen, Christoph Bernhard von (1606–78), prince-bishop of Münster from 1650, 96
Gandersheim, imperial abbey, 95Geizkofl er, Zacharias (1560–1617),
imperial treasurer, 77–8‘General Crisis’ of the seventeenth
century, 46Genoa, 97, 109German Confederation (Deutscher
Bund, 1815–66), 17, 75, 93, 99, 118
German Democratic Republic (1949–90), 6, 17
‘German freedom’, 9, 41, 44, 105German kings, see Romans, king
of theGerman language, 2, 104–5, 107,
109, 112German Peasants War (1524–26),
18, 19, 28–9, 39, 74, 87Germany, Federal Republic of, 2, 6,
8–10, 17, 115, 122Gernrode, imperial abbey, 95Golden Bull (1356), 30–1, 33,
60–2, 64, 67, 73, 115, 116Golden Fleece, heraldic order, 108Gotthard, Axel, 8–9, 37, 121Göttingen, 106Graz, 113Great Northern War (1700–21), 89Guelph dynasty, 92, 95guilds, 110
Habermas, Jürgen, 110Habsburg dynasty (Austrian), 3–5,
19, 21, 26, 44, 98, 107, 113dynastic ambitions, 24, 27, 32,
61, 88–9, 96, 97, 99and imperial title, 27, 42, 55, 59,
86, 116see also Austrian monarchy
Habsburg dynasty (Spanish), 19, 92
Hamburg, imperial city, 107Hanover, duchy, later electorate,
54, 64, 70, 88, 95, 115Hansa, 19, 115Hartmann, Peter Claus, 9Haug-Moritz, Gabrielle, 49Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
(1770–1831), 4, 117, 118Henneberg, Berthold von
(1441–1504), elector of Mainz from 1484, 25, 32, 33
Henshall, Nicholas, 100Hessen-Kassel, landgraviate, 32, 39,
40, 64, 101Hildesheim, bishopric, 95Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945), 1
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1519780230239784_09_ind.indd 151 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
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Index
152
Hohenzollern dynasty, see also Brandenburg-Prussia
Hughes, Michael, 7, 51Huguenots, 41, 49Humanism, 26, 31, 35, 104–8Hungary, 8, 20, 22, 24, 26–7, 40,
43, 52, 59, 116relationship to the Empire 28
Hussites, 28, 30, 92, 108
imperial absolutism, 12, 51, 120–1imperial ban (Reichsacht), 44, 56, 63imperial chancellory, 33, 64Imperial Church (Reichskirche)
composition, 13, 93, 95dissolution, 50, 58, 94–5infl uence, 23, 39–40, 65, 113, 122politics, 22, 44–5, 62, 94–7women in, 43, 65, 95
imperial cities (Reichsstädte), 13, 29, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 64, 68, 71, 83, 91, 104
Reichstag representation, 66imperial counts (Reichsgrafen), 58,
64, 65–6, 68, 91, 94 imperial courts, 50, 70–5, 86, 102,
111–12, 123case load, 72–3fi nances, 71, 72, 76, 78, 82location, 71, 113–14personnel, 35, 71see also Reichshofrat,
Reichskammergerichtimperial currency regulations, 34,
42, 83–4imperial deputation
(Reichsdeputation), 67–8, 72, 114Final Decision (1803), 58, 64, 66,
68, 96imperial estates (Reichsstände), 14,
16, 30–6, 39, 41–2, 44, 47, 52–3, 59, 68, 70–1, 76, 78, 94, 109
numbers, 12–13, 58, 65, 93status, 30, 102
Imperial Executive Ordinance (1555), 34, 68, 86, 90
imperial fi efs (Reichslehen), 12–13, 29, 62–3, 76
imperial immediacy (Reichsunmittelbarkeit), 12
Imperial Italy (Reichsitalien), 2–3, 9, 22, 51, 61, 97–9
imperial knights (Reichsritter), 12, 14, 19, 29–30, 93, 117, 118
revolt (1521–23), 29, 87imperial law (Reichsrecht), 16, 26,
34, 71, 74, 102, 106, 115imperial patriotism, 103imperial police ordinances, 34imperial politics
alleged dualism in, 4, 11, 16–17, 24, 25, 32, 36, 68, 102, 120
internationalization of, 50–9, 74, 87
religion in, 35, 36–50, 52, 71, 106, 122
imperial postal service, 110–11imperial prelates, 13, 64, 65–6, 68,
91, 93–5imperial publicists, 103imperial recovery, 51–4, 74imperial reform, 8, 25, 29–38, 57,
66, 71, 76, 82, 88, 89–90, 107imperial register (Reichsmatrikel),
31, 76–7, 82, 94imperial taxation, 30–1, 42, 52–3,
67, 71, 75–82, 90, 98–9, 111imperial translation, 22, 105, 115,
122imperial vicar (Reichsvikar), 60–1Innsbruck, 113Interim (1548), 40, 42interregna, 60–1, 65investiture, feudal, 45, 75–6Investiture Contest (1075–1122),
22, 24Italian Wars (1494–1559), 26, 97Italy, 52, 99, 115 see also Imperial
Italyitio in partes, 48–9
Jacobins, 57Jena, battle (1806), 117Jesuit order, 45Jewish communities, 72, 75, 108Joseph I (1678–1711), emperor
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1529780230239784_09_ind.indd 152 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
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Index
153
from 1705, 51Joseph II (1741–90), emperor from
1765, 55, 57, 99Jülich, duchy, 20, 46, 92juridifi cation, 73–4
Karlsruhe, 114Kehl, fortress, 81Konstanz, bishopric, 90Kreise (Circles), 9, 16, 36, 57, 64,
73, 83–4, 87, 89–93, 97, 108, 115, 123
assemblies, 30, 32, 35, 67–8, 69, 81, 90
associations, 88, 91, 121convenors, 90–1
Kunisch, Johannes, 100
Landeshoheit, see sovereigntyLatvia, 94League of Princes (Fürstenbund,
1785), 57Legstädte, 77Leipzig, 77, 84, 112Leopold I (1640–1705), emperor
from 1658, 51, 53–4, 63, 86, 87, 98, 123
Letter of Majesty (1609), 47liberalism, 17, 100Liberation, Wars of (1813–15),
103, 118literacy, 111Lithuania, 22Long Turkish War (1593–1606),
43, 46, 77, 79, 98lordship, see feudal tiesLorraine, duchy, 2, 21, 55Louis XIV (1638–1715), king of
France from 1643, 49, 91Lower Rhenish Kreis, see
Westphalian KreisLower Saxon Kreis, 25, 114Lübeck, bishopric, 95Lucca, 97Ludwigsburg, 114Luh, Jürgen, 49Lunéville, treaty (1801), 58, 99Lusatia, 2, 92
Luther, Martin (1483–1546), 27, 38–40, 43, 105, 111
Luxembourg, 2, 27dynasty, 24, 27, 28, 108, 116
Machtstaat (power state), 4–5, 7, 10, 11, 17, 85, 100
Magdeburg, archbishopric, 95Mainz, city, 81Mainz, electorate, 25, 33, 52, 58,
64, 66, 91, 96, 117Mantua, duchy, 97maps, 5, 35Maria Theresa (1717–80), empress,
55–6Marxist interpretations, 6, 8, 17matricular system, 31, 76–82, 90Matthias (1557–1619), emperor
from 1612, 46, 61Maximillian I (1459–1519),
emperor from 1493, 27, 32, 35, 61, 63, 71, 78, 86, 97, 116
Maximillian II (1527–76), emperor 1564, 43
Mechelen, 73Mecklenburg, duchy, 19, 74, 95, 106mediatization, 31, 58
defi ned, 29Medici, dynasty, 98Milan, duchy, 97–8‘military revolution’, 26, 85Mirandola, duchy, 97‘modernity’, 10, 25monarchical principle, 11, 14, 19,
60–1, 120–1monarchization, 54monarchy
composite, 28, 121elective, 3, 24itinerant, 23, 27mixed, 25, 121universal, 22, 36, 105–6
Moravia, 2, 92Moraw, Peter, 24, 36, 64Moritz (1521–55), elector of
Saxony from 1547, 40Moser, Friedrich Carl (1723–98),
112
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1539780230239784_09_ind.indd 153 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
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Index
154
Moser, Johann Jacob (1701–85), 105–6, 112, 121
Mühlberg, battle (1547), 40, 111Münster, bishopric, 92, 96
Naples, kingdom, 97–8Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821),
1, 58–9, 99, 103, 107, 117–18Nassau, dynasty, 24Nassau-Siegen, Wilhelm Hyacinth
(1666–1742), prince of 1699–1708, 75
nationalism, 7, 103–19, 122defi ned, 103–4federal, 9–10, 104
nationalist historiography, 4–5, 104, 107, 118, 123
Nazism, 5, 7negotia remissa (unfi nished
business), 52Netherlands, 2, 9, 19, 27, 43, 52,
57, 78 see also Dutch RepublicNeuhaus, Helmut, 7, 11, 85neutrality, 38, 61, 69, 117newspapers, 111–12Nine Years War (1688–97), 49nobles
numbers, 12–13, 26, 29politics, 15, 17, 19–20, 23, 29, 31,
40, 93, 101titles, 12–13
normative year, 42, 43, 48–9Nuremberg, imperial city, 77, 114,
117
Osnabrück, bishopric, 95Otto I (912–73), emperor from
936, 22Ottoman empire, 20, 26, 43, 45, 46,
52, 53, 80, 105–6, 122Ottonian dynasty, 22
Paderborn, bishopric, 95Palatinate, electorate, 30, 43–7, 49,
61, 64, 79, 91Palm, Johann Philipp (d. 1806), 117papacy, 3, 22, 27, 30, 37, 79, 80, 95,
98–9, 105–6, 114
Paragraph 180 (1654), 53, 77Parma, duchy, 97Passau, treaty (1552), 41, 42patriotism, 103patronage, 51, 62, 63, 65, 101–2peasants, 113
protest, 18, 28–9, 74–5Philippsburg, fortress, 81Piacenza, duchy, 97Poland, 2, 3, 8, 22, 40, 54, 55–6
partitions, 56Polish Succession, war (1733–35),
52, 98Prague, 27, 35, 45, 113Press, Volker, 7, 11, 18, 51 Pressburg, treaty (1805), 59princes, college of (Fürstenrat), 65–6Princes Revolt (1552), 41, 42priviligium de non appellando, 73priviligium majus, 116privy councils, 32, 101Protestant Union (1608), 40, 46Prussia, duchy, later kingdom, 54
royal title, 54–5, 98, 116see also Brandenburg-Prussia
public order, 34, 42, 120public peace (Landfrieden), 40, 66,
68, 72, 85, 89defi ned, 86
public sphere, 110publishing, 63, 111–12Pufendorf, Samuel von (1632–94),
4, 9, 121Pütter, Johann Stephan
(1725–1807), 106
Quedlinburg, imperial abbey, 95
Ranieri, Filippo, 70Recess, 39, 53Reformation, 35, 38–40, 43,
105–6, 111interpretations, 5, 7–8, 25, 36–8right of, 41–2, 48
regalia, 114, 116Regensburg, imperial city, 8, 58,
66, 70, 77, 113, 117Reich
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1549780230239784_09_ind.indd 154 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
PROOF
Index
155
Second, 1, 4–5, 8Third, 1, 8, 123
see also EmpireReichscamerale, 75Reichshofrat (Imperial Aulic
Council), 33, 42, 45, 70–3, 75, 78, 99, 113
Reichskammergericht (Imperial Cameral Court), 32, 34, 35, 42, 68, 70–4, 76, 78, 82, 90, 114, 118
Reichskammerzieler, 76, 78Reichsregiment, 32–3, 61, 68, 90Reichstag (imperial diet),
alternatives to, 67–8, 120envoys, 35, 69–70, 97, 113, 118interpretations, 14, 17, 63–4, 69,
123legislation, 34, 42, 57–8, 69, 76,
79, 82–3, 86, 89–90location, 66, 113–14meetings, (1495) 21, 25; (1500)
89; (1521) 38, 66; (1526) 39; (1529) 39; (1555) 41; (1570) 68, 86; (1576) 83; (1608) 79; (1613) 47, 79; (1640–1) 47, 80; (1654) 52–3, 62, 77
news about, 112origins, 14, 16, 30, 32, 36, 64permanence, 63, 66, 68voting arrangements, 14, 33,
39–40, 43–4, 48, 49, 65–7, 91, 94–5, 97, 117
Reinhard, Wolfgang, 8–10Renaissance, 26Rijswijk, treaty (1697), 49Roman law, 26, 35Roman Months (Römer Monate),
78–81Romans, king of the (Römischer
König), 30, 60, 62Romanticism, 107–8, 118Rome, 21, 30, 78Rossbach, battle (1757), 56, 85Rudolf I (1218–91), emperor from
1273, 90Rudolf II (1552–1612), emperor
from 1576, 45–6, 61, 79, 108, 110, 113, 116, 123
Russia, 54, 56–9, 70
St Bartholomew Massacre (1572), 41Salian dynasty, 22Salzburg, archbishopric, 50, 64,
80, 94San Remo, 97Sardinia, 97–8Savoy, 3, 61, 76, 97–8, 105Saxon duchies, 74Saxony, electorate, 6, 79, 106
electoral title, 30, 40, 43infl uence, 47, 61, 80, 89, 92, 102and Poland, 54, 55–6religion in, 39, 49, 54, 94
Schilling, Heinz, 8–9, 35–6, 37, 85Schindling, Anton, 95Schmalkaldic League (1531–47),
40, 105, 111Schmidt, Georg, 9–11, 36, 104, 121 Schulze, Winfried, 73Scribner, Robert, 18secularization, 42, 43, 48, 54, 55,
65, 72, 96–7defi ned, 94–5
Sellert, Wolfgang, 70Seven Years War (1756–63), 56,
84–5, 89, 106–7, 112Sicily, 97–8Sickingen, Franz von (1481–1523),
29Sigismund (1368–1437), emperor
from 1433, 27, 28Silesia, 2, 55–6, 89, 92, 105social disciplining, 37social structure, 12Sollberg-Rilinger, Barbara, 8, 23Sonderweg (special path), 7, 10sovereignty, 37, 62–3, 100
territorial (Landeshoheit), 20, 47, 48, 54, 100–1
Spain, 26, 27, 32, 36, 52, 61relationship to the Empire, 40,
42, 47, 79, 92, 97–8, 108–9Spanish Succession, war (1701–14),
52, 54, 88, 89, 98
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1559780230239784_09_ind.indd 155 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
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Index
156
Speyer, imperial city, 39, 86, 114state formation, 15, 87, 100Staufer, dynasty, 22, 24Strasbourg, bishopric, 41subsidies, 79, 87Swabian Kreis, 25, 88, 91, 92Swabian League (1488–1534), 19,
90Sweden, 50–1, 52, 54, 55, 69, 73,
95, 106Switzerland, 2
attempts to join, 19, 29, 37, 40, 94
emergence, 19, 29, 103, 121identity, 109
Tacitus, Publius Cornelius (AD 55–116), 105
territorializationcauses, 22, 76–7, 86–7consequences, 17, 33–4, 36, 65,
91, 111–12process, 14, 16, 34–5, 95, 99–102,
114Teutonic Order, 92Thirty Years War (1618–48), 11
causes, 37, 41–6impact, 4, 5–6, 19, 47–9, 53,
79–81, 83, 100, 106Thurn und Taxis, family, 110toleration, 38, 48–50tolls, 83–5towns, 13, 18–19, 25, 26, 110trade fairs, 84, 112Transylvania, 20Treitschke, Heinrich von
(1834–96), 4–5, 107Tridentine decrees (1563), 42, 45Trier, electorate, 30, 64, 91Tunis, 111Turkish wars, 43, 52, 68, 77, 79,
81, 99see also Long Turkish War
Tuscany, grand duchy, 97–8
Überlingen, imperial city, 35Ulm, imperial city, 35, 59United States of America, 7, 15universities, 35, 71, 106, 115Upper Rhenish Kreis, 88, 91, 97Upper Saxon Kreis, 25, 92, 114Utrecht, treaty (1713), 54
Venice, 3Vienna, 27, 51, 71, 104, 113, 114
Congress (1814–15), 17, 92, 118
occupations of, 59siege (1683), 52
Visitation (judicial review), 72Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de
(1694–1778), 1, 122
Wallenstein, Albrecht Wenzel von (1583–1634), general, 67, 80
war, see under individual confl icts Weimar Republic, 122Westphalia, Treaty of (1648)
guarantors, 50–1interpretations, 5–6, 21, 47, 49,
51terms, 20, 47–8, 60, 80, 83, 92,
95Westphalian Kreis, 20, 25, 88, 91–3Wettins, dynasty, 40, 42–3Wetzlar, imperial city, 114Whig interpretation, 17, 18Winkler, Heinrich August, 7witchcraft, 74Wittelsbachs, dynasty, 24, 44, 61Worms, imperial city, 38Württemberg, duchy, 5, 19, 30, 64,
90, 91, 102, 115ruler-Estate dispute in, 74, 101
Würzburg, bishopric, 82, 91, 96
Zedler, Johann Heinrich (1706–63), 4, 9
Zeeden, Ernst, 37
9780230239784_09_ind.indd 1569780230239784_09_ind.indd 156 3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM3/5/2011 11:18:38 AM
PROOF