Download - Chapter x Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and ... · like intellectual property thieves, what they steal is information rather than material objects. What they are stealing

ChapterxPropertyandPrivacy:EuropeanPerspectivesandtheCommodificationofourIdentity

Corien Prins

1. INTRODUCTION

ThecentralthemeofthiscontributioncanbeaptlyillustratedbythefollowingoutcrybySteveMann:

‘Manyhotelowners,restaurantowners,andvariousothersarethieves.Whattheystealisnotyourcaroryourwallet,but,rather,yoursoul.Verymuchlikeintellectualpropertythieves,whattheystealisinformationratherthanmaterialobjects.WhattheyarestealingisHumanisticProperty.HumanisticPropertyisthatwhichwegivewithoutconsciousthoughtoreffort,anddiffersfromIntellectualPropertywhichiswhatweconsciouslyproduceforthepurposeofdisclosetootherpeople.(…)I’mnottalkingaboutanabstractconceptcalled‘privacy’.Afterall,manyofficialsseemtobelieveprivacyisjustamyth,andhasnoplaceinourutilitarianworld.Manylawmakersseemtobemoreconcernedwithkeepingthetrainsrunningontimeandkeepingcrimelowthanwithabstracthumanisticconceptslikeprivacy.I’mtalkinghereaboutsomethingalotmoreconcretethanviolationof‘privacy’–I’mtalkingaboutTheft!’1

Inhischaracterizationofpersonaldataaswealththatcanbe‘stolen’by‘thieves’andtheclaimthatindividualsshouldbegiveneffectiveinstrumentstoprotectthemselvesagainstusurpationoftheassetsthattheyhaveintheirownindividualdata,Steve

1. S.Mann,‘ComputerArchitecturesforProtectionofPersonalInformaticProperty:PuttingPirates,Pigs,andRapistsinPerspective’,First Monday,volume5,number7(July2000).Availableat:<firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_7/mann/index.html>

L.GuibaultandP.B.Hugenholtz(eds),The Future of the Public Domain,223–257©2006KluwerLawInternational.PrintedintheNetherlands.

224 Corien Prins

Manndoesnotstandalone.Duringthepastdecade,manycommentatorsandseveralorganizations(amongthemtheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandtheElectronicFrontierFederation2)havearguedthatindividualsshouldreceivefaircompensationfortheuseoftheirpersonaldata:‘Thereshouldbenofreelunchwhenitcomestoinvadingprivacy.’3Theyfeelthat,givenprotectionofpersonaldataisexpensiveandinshortsupply,whereasthecollectionanduseofpersonaldataiswastefulandinefficient,weshouldconsidermarket-orientedmechanismsbasedonindividualownershipofpersonaldata.4Intheend,ifmarketswereallowedtofunctionmoreeffectively,therewouldbelessprivacyinvasion.5Inproposingapropertyrightsapproach,Laudonarguedthatcourtshaverecognizedcelebrities’claimstoapropertyinterestintheirnameandfametoseekcompensationwheneversuchanimageisusedforacommercialpurpose.Whynotextendsuchapropertyinteresttothepersonaldataofordinaryindividuals?6For,withtheadventofdigitaltechnologies,hasn’tpersonaldataofusallbecomeanassetthatisworthrealmoney?

Thiscontributionaimstoanalyzetheappeal,benefitsandlimitationsofthecommercialappropriationofprivacy,ormorespecificallypersonaldata,fromaEuropeanperspective.Itwilldiscussandanalyzeahighlymarket-orientedargumentsuggestedtoresolvethecurrentproblemsinrespectofpersonaldataprotectioninourdigitalworld:vestingapropertyrightinpersonaldata.Doesourpresentsociety–inwhichpersonaldataareconsideredacommerciallyvaluableasset–indeedimplythatwemustconsiderprotectioninstrumentsthatarebasedonamarket-orientedrationale?

ManyoftheargumentsthathavebeenforwardedinfavorofaproprietaryperspectiveonprotectionmechanismsderivefromAmericansources.TherehasbeenrelativelylittlediscussionoutsidetheUnitedStatesofwhethersuchaperspectiveandapproachcouldresolvethepressingproblemsofpersonaldataprotection–afactthatisnotentirelysurprising,giventheEuropeanhumanrights-orientedapproachtoprivacyprotection.ThiscontributionaimstoaddEuropeanperspectivestothedebate.Itwillshowthatalthoughitisalltoooftenarguedthatthecreationofapropertyrightisnotinlinewiththehumanrights-basedapproachtoprivacy,theEuropeansystemappearstoofferconsiderableleewayforapropertyrightsmodel.TherearecertainlyopeningsunderEuropeanlawforautilitarianperspectiveonpersonaldataprotectionanditcouldevenbearguedthattheEuropeandataprotectionsystemismorereceptivetowardsapropertyapproachthantheAmericansystem.Buttheanalysiswillalsoshowthatalthoughvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatamayhavesomeappeal,albeitforrhetoricalpurposes,doubtsriseaboutwhethersuchan

2. Onthecampaignsofbothorganizations,see:J.Litman,‘InformationPrivacy/InformationProperty’,52Stanford Law Review1283-1313(2000),p.1290.

3. K.C.Laudon,‘MarketsandPrivacy’,39Communications of the ACM92-104 (1996), at p.92-104 (1996), at p.(1996),atp.103.

4. Laudon1996,supranote3,p.93.5. Id.,p.103.6. Id.,p.102;See also:A.Bartow,‘OurData,Ourselves:Privacy,Propertization,andGender’,34

University of San Francisco Law Review633-704(2000),atp.695.

Property and Privacy 225

approachwilloffertheclaimedprospectsofachievingahigherlevelofpersonaldataprotection.Specifically,thefinalintentofthiscontributionistoshowthatthepropertyargumentfailstorecognizethedataprotectionchallengesthatarisewithpresent-daydevelopmentsintheareaofcontext-awarecomputing.Iwillarguethatinasocietyinwhichourbehaviorandidentities(i.e.notindividualdataassuch),becometheobjectofcommodification,thedebateondataprotectionmechanismsmustbestructuredalonglinesofcontrolandvisibility,ratherthanownership.Thisthenwillrequireadebateontheroleofthepublicdomaininprovidingthenecessaryinstrumentsthatwillallowustoknowandtocontrolhowourbehavior,interestsandsocialandculturalidentitiesare‘created’.

Thenextsectionwillfirstbrieflysketchhowincreasingattentionhasbeengiventoutilitarianconsiderationsinthedebateaboutprivacyandmorespecificallypersonaldataprotection(section2).Subsequently,section3willshowthatalthoughourpresent-daylegalsystemdoesnotexpresslyrecognizeapropertyrightinpersonaldata,thisisinnowaymirroredinthepracticeoftheon-lineworld.Section4thenturnstotheclaimedbenefitsofvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldata,followedinsection5byananalysisoftheoften-heardargumentthatvestingpropertyrightssitsuneasilywithahuman-rightsapproachtowardsprivacyprotection.Thissectionalsolocatesthediscussioninthebroaderframeworkofpropertyandhumanrights,i.e.bydiscussingtheissueofpropertyandprivacyinbothcommercialaspectsofpersonalityandthehumanbody.Wewillseethat,asregardsthese,newcom-mercialpracticeschallengelegaldoctrineaswellasthecourtstothinkaboutthewaysinwhichprivatepropertyandhumanrightscanbebalanced.Section5alsoaddressesthequestionoftheextenttowhichindividualsareallowedtowaivetheprotectionoftheirfundamentalrightsbymeansofacontract.Forcreatingpropertyrightsassumesthatprivateorderingandcommercialarrangementsdeterminethepositionoftherespectiveparties.Section6subsequentlyaddressesthepositionofapropertyperspectiveundertheEuropeanDirectiveonpersonaldataprotection.Itwillshowthatthisregimehasgivenindividualscertaininstrumentsofcontrolandpowerovertheirpersonaldata.Atleastinacommercialsetting,apropertyapproachthusdoesnotappeartobesuchastrangephenomenonundertheEuropeandataprotectionregimeafterall.Whilevestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatamayindeedhavesomeappeal,albeitforrhetoricalpurposes,theobviousquestioniswhattheconsequencesofthisapproachwouldbe.Section7analyzeswhethersuchanapproachwouldindeedoffertheclaimedprospectsofachievingahigherlevelofpersonaldataprotection,followedbyadiscussioninsection8ofthecoststhatmayariseifpropertyrightsweretobevestedinindividuals.Section9thenturnstopossibleconcernsaboutthecommodificationofpersonaldatainrelationtothepublicdomain:towhatextent,andhowwouldestablishingapropertyrightinpersonaldataaffecttheinterestsofthepublicdomain?Moreover,thissectionarguesthatdevelopmentsintheareaof‘pervasive’computingandthesubsequenttrendtowardacommodificationofouridentitiesandbehaviornecessitateadebateontheroleofthepublicdomaininprovidingthenecessaryinstrumentstoknowandtocontrolthewaysinwhichouridentitiesarecreatedandshaped.

226 Corien Prins

2. BACKGROUND

Alookatourcontemporary,data-basedsocietyrevealsthatinformationaboutpeopleisessentialforavarietyofeconomicallyandsociallyusefulandcrucialpurposes:education,taxation,socialbenefits,healthcare,crimedetectionandterrorismpreven-tion,commerceandmarketing,tonamebutafew.Theincentivesforcompaniesandorganizationstoprocesspersonaldataarehigh:informationmeansmoneyaswellaspower.Moreover,advancesintechnologyhaveprovidedalmosteveryonewithlow-thresholdfacilitiestocollectanduseinformation:thetechnicalinfrastructureoftheInternetcombinedwithprofilingtechniquesandotheradvancedprocessingapplicationsmakeiteasyandcheaptocollect,combineanduseenormousamountsofdata.Whetheritisforcommercial,economic,politicalortechnologicalreasons,thepresent-daydealingswithpersonaldataturnoursocietymoreandmoreintoaprivacy-unfriendlyenvironment.7

Incontrasttootherlegaldomains–suchasthatofintellectualpropertyrightsandconsumerprotection–individualshavebeengivenveryfewinstrumentstoaddresstheproblemsandchallengesbroughtonbynewinformationtechnologies.Onlyahandfulofspecificlegislativemeasureshaveprovidedindividualswithmeanstocombattheinvasionoftheirprivacyrightsbroughtonbynewinformationtechnologies.Moreover,aglanceatboththecommonlawandcivillawsystemshowsthat,despiteconstitutionalrecognition,andnumerousinterpretativecases,aswellasdetailedlawscoveringtheprocessingofpersonaldata,inday-to-daypracticeprivacyappearsnotatallprotectedunderourlegalsystem.Whereasvariousinternationalandnationallegislativemeasureshavemadecopyrightevolvetowardsastrongproperty-basedinstrument,privacyrighthasremainednomorethanthesetofrulesgoverningfairinformationpracticesasdevelopedduringthe1970sbye.g.theOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)andlaiddowninregimessuchasConventionfortheProtectionofIndividualswithregardtoAutomaticProcessingofPersonalDataoftheCouncilofEurope.8Acrucialdifference,ofcourse,isthatstakeholdersinthedomainofintellectualpropertyrightsappeartohavearatherdirecteconomicandfinancialinterestbywhichtomeasureandjustifythescopeoflegalprotectiontoinsistupon,whereaseconomicinterestsandfinancialdamagesaredifficultargumentstoemploywhenitcomestodiscussingtherationaleandactualamountofprivacyprotection.9

Nevertheless,some–mostlyAmerican–commentatorshavearguedthatitisexactlyintheareaofutilitarianconsiderationsthattheargumentsandinstrumentsto

7. Or,assimplyputbyD.LeenheerZimmerman:‘Mylifeisyourdata’.D.LeenheerZimmerman,‘FittingPublicityRightsintoIntellectualPropertyLawandFreeSpeechTheory:Sam,YouMadethePantsTooLong!’,10DePaul Art & Entertainment Law Journal283-313(2000).Availableat:<papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id�211789>

8. CouncilofEurope,ETSNo.108,Strasbourg,28January1981.9. Seeonthisinmoredetail:J.Zittrain,‘WhatthePublisherCanTeachthePatient:Intellectual

PropertyandPrivacyinanEraofTrustedPrivication’,52Stanford Law Review1201-1250(2000),p.1201.


enhancethelevelofpersonaldataprotectionmustbesought:‘PropertytalkwouldgiveprivacyrhetoricaddedsupportwithinAmericanculture.Ifyoucouldgetpeople(inAmerica,atthispointinhistory)toseecertainresourceasproperty,thenyouare90percenttoyourprotectivegoal.’10Giventhatdataaboutindividualshavebecomeakeycommercialassetforbusinessesandotherorganizations,individualsmustbegivenaninstrumentthatwouldenablethemtonegotiateandbargainovertheuseoftheirdata.If,asAnnBartowobserved,‘therigidcommodificationofinformationisindeedinevitable,perhapsitistimeforindividualstoappropriatetheintellectualpropertyframeworksoeagerlyconstructedbycorporateinterests,andtoseekcontrolofthedatawegenerateandashareoftheproceedsthisinformationproduces.Wemustassertproprietaryinterestsinourselvesandhoistconsumerdatamerchantsbytheirowncyber-petards.Wemustdefinitivelyestablishthatconsumerinformationisintellectualpropertythatbelongstotheconsumersthemselves.’11And:‘Perhapsweshouldhavethesamepropertyrightsinournamesandpersonalinformationthatcorporationshaveintheirnamesanddata.’12

Inbrief,theproponentsofaproprietaryapproachtowardspersonaldataprotectionarguethatthecommercialappropriationofpersonaldataimpliesandrequiresthelawtograntindividualsapropertyrightintheirpersonaldata.Moreover,creatingstrongerpropertyrightsisoftenthoughttobeaplausiblewayofsecuringinterestsinourmoderneraofcyberspace.Theintellectualpropertyrightsdomainisaperfectexampleofanareawheretheappealofstrongerrightshasgainedconsiderableground:legislatureshaveincreasinglybeencreatingnewformsofprivatepropertyrights.Also,ourpresent-daysocietyevolvesmoreandmoretowardsanenvironmentinwhichprotectionmechanismsbasedonprivateinstrumentsgainpriority.13

Atfirstsight,privacyandpropertyseemmutuallyexclusiveconcepts.Forprivacyrelatestomuchmorethanjustprotectingpersonalinterests:itisalsoaboutbroaderinterestssuchashumandignityandfundamentalfreedoms.14Some,however,arguethatprivacyprotectionontheonehand,andpersonaldataprotectionontheother,haveevolvedintotwohighlydistinctconcepts,wherebypersonaldataprotectionnowadayshasnothingtodowithfundamentalfreedoms.Instead,itis

10. L.Lessig,‘PrivacyasProperty’,69Social Research247-270(2002),p.255.11. Bartow2000,supranote6,p.685.12. Id.,p.634.13. See:M.J.Radin,andR.PolkWagner,‘TheMythofPrivateOrdering:RediscoveringLegal

RealisminCyberspace’,73Chicago-Kent Law Review1295-1317(1998);L.M.C.R.Guibault,Copyright Limitations and Contracts. An Analysis of the Contractual Overridability of Limitations on Copyright,TheHague,KluwerLawInternational,2002;B.M.J.vanKlink,andJ.E.J.Prins,Law and Regulation: Scenarios for the Information Age,Amsterdam:IOSPress2002;M.A.Lemley,‘PrivateProperty’,52Stanford Law Review1545-1557(2000).See alsothePropertyRegulationinEuropeanScience,EthicsandLawProjectattheUniversityofBirmingham<www.propeur.bham.ac.uk>

14. ‘Bytranslatingthedifferentaspectsofprivacyinsubjective(personality)rights,individualfreedomisforciblyencroachedupon.’S.Gutwirth,Privacy and the Information Age,Lanham,Rowman&Littlefield,2002,p.40.

228 Corien Prins

allaboutcontrollinginformationpower.15Recently,thesupportersofthispositionhavebeengivenanadditionalargumentwiththeseparatelistingofbothrightsintheEuropeanCharteronFundamentalRights(articles7and8).Moreover,whenturningourattentiontothepracticeoftheon-lineworld,aconceptualizationofprivacyasafundamentalrightthatcannotbealienatedappearsaveryfar-fetchedscenario.Individualsmakedealsforthedisclosure,collection,useandreuseoftheirpersonaldata,incertainsituationsreceivesomeformofcompensation(whichmayvaryaccordingtothetypeofdataaswellasuse),andthus‘exploit’and‘sell’theirhabits,use-profileandindividualdata.

3. PRIVACYANDPROPERTY:‘OWNERSHIP’MODELSONTHEINTERNET

Earlyin2001,ajudgeinMassachusetts,UnitedStates,approvedaproposalbyanInternetretailerspecializedinthesaleoftoys,Toysmart,todestroyalistwithnamesandotherdetailsoftheretailer’s250,000customers(names,addresses,transactiondetails,ande-mailaddresses).ThecustomerlisthadbecomethesubjectofadisputebetweenthecompanyandtheUSFederalTradeCommissionwhentheInternetcompany,havinggonebankrupt,advertisedthesaleofitscustomerlistanddatabaseinThe Wall Street Journaltothehighestbidder.Thecustomerdataturnedouttobetheonlyhopeforthemanycreditors,becauseitwasthesoleassetthatstillhadanyvalue.Thetroublesomeissue,however,wasthatinitsprivacypolicy,Toysmarthadpromisednottodisclosethecustomers’personaldatatothirdparties.Atfirstinstance,theFTCreachedanagreementwiththeon-lineretailerthatwouldallowthecompanytosellthecustomerlisttoasimilarcompanythatwaspreparedtohonortheprivacycommitment.However,consumersandprivacy-activistsbecameconcernedaboutwherethedatawouldeventuallyendup,andaBankruptcycourthadtodecidewhetherthedatacouldbesold.Toendthenegativepublicity,asubsidiaryofWaltDisneyCo.(whichowned60%ofToysmart)offered$50,000to‘buyanddestroy’thelist.Finally,thejudgeorderedthatthepaymentshouldbemadebutthatthelistshouldnotbetransferredtoDisney,andshouldinsteadbedestroyedbyToysmart.16

TheToysmartexampleisfarfromunique.Inrecentyears,withadownturninthee-business,manycompaniesdecidedtoselltheircustomerdataasameansofgeneratingcashflowandsilencingcreditors.Inmanyothersituations,customerlistsanddatabasesappearedahighlyvaluableassetaswell.Largeamountsofpersonaldatachangedhandsor‘ownership’,aspartofmerger-acquisitions,reorganizations

15. P.Blok,Het recht op privacy (The right to privacy),TheHague,BoomJuridischeUitgevers2002,p.326.

16. Fordetailsonthisstorysee:L.Enos,‘DealAfoottoDestroyToysmartDatabase’,E-Commerce Times,January10,2001.Availableat:<www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/6607.html>.


andotherstrategiccompanymovements.17The2001takeoverbytheAmericancompanyeBayoftheFrenchauctionsalesoperatoriBazarisbutoneexampleofwhatisatstakewhenitcomestotheacquisitionofsubscriber,userandcustomerlists.18AnotherillustrationofthistrendisastatementintheprivacypolicyofGoogle’shighly-debatedinitiativetooffere-mailwithmorestoragespaceinexchangeforviewingadvertisementsthataretargetedfollowingascanofkeywordsine-mailmessages:‘WereservetherighttotransferyourpersonalinformationintheeventofatransferofownershipofGoogle,suchasacquisitionbyormergerwithanothercompany.’19

Andthereismoretocome.Withthegrowingimportanceofvariousso-calledpersonalizationservices,itisclearthatownershiprightsinpersonaldataandindividualuserprofilesbecomethekeyinstrumentinrealizingreturnsontheinvestment.20Whoownsandcontrolstheprofiles,patternsandthedatathatarebehindthesepatterns?WhoownsyourpersonalYahoo-profileorourfutureGoogleGmailprofile?AnOctober2003JupiterResearchstudyfoundthattodevelopanddeployapersonalizedwebsitecanreachfourormoretimesthecostofoperatingacomparabledynamicwebsite21.Ahealthybusinessmodelforpersonalizedserviceswouldthusappeartorequirethatthekeyasset,i.e.thepersonalizedinformation,‘belongs’totheorganizationthathasconfigureditssystemtoallowuserstoperformpersonalization.22

Iftheanswertotheownershipdilemmaisuptothebusinessesthatprovidepersonalizedservices,thenitistheirdata.Companiesmayevenbelievethattheyhaveownershiprightsinthepersonaldatacompilationsbecausethelawitselfoffersseveralindicationsthatthisisindeedthecase.Inadditiontotheprotectiongrantedbymeansofthetradesecretsregime,businessesthathaveinvestedinthecollection

17. See:S.Gauthronet,‘TheFutureofPersonalDataintheFrameworkofCompanyReorganisations’,23rd International Conference of Data Protection Commissioners,Paris,September2001.

18. Gauthronet,supranote17.19. <gmail.google.com/gmail/help/privacy.html>20. Illustrativearetheso-calledrecommendersystemsthatenablepersonalizationbypresentingto

theuseralistofitems(content,services,products,etc.)inwhichheorshemightbeinterested,basedonwhatthesystemknowsabouttheuser.Thesystemautomaticallymakestheappropriatechoicesforthecustomerbasedoninputabouthistastesandinterests.Inaddition,thesystempredicts,bymeansofscoresforitems,whichproductorservicetheusermightfindmostinteresting.Thus,arecommendermightnoticeapatternofsearchingandpurchasingbehavioracrosshealth-relatedsitesthatsuggeststhattheuserhasacertaindisease.So-calledthirdpartyrecommendersaggregatecustomerdataacrossmanywebsitesbytrackingactivityacrossmanywebsitesanddrawingconclusions(purchasepatternsandprofiles)aboutthecustomersthatnoindividualwebsitecoulddraw.Formoredetailonrecommendersystemsandhowtheywork,see:B.Miller,J.Konstan,andJ.Riedl,‘PocketLens:TowardaPersonalRecommenderSystem’,22ACM Transactions on Information Systems437-476(2004).(2004).

21. Beyond the Personalisation Myth: Cost-effective Alternatives to Influence Intent,JupiterResearchCorporation,30September2003,26p.

22. Formoredetailondevelopmentsintheareaofpersonalization,see:A.M.B.Lips,S.vanderHof,J.E.J.Prins,A.A.P.Schudelaro,Issues of Online Personalisation in Public and Commercial Service Delivery(WolfLegalPublishers,2005).

230 Corien Prins

andcompilationofpersonaldataaregrantedexclusiverightsundertheEuropeanDirectiveondatabaseprotection.23Anotherillustrativeindicationmaybefoundinsection55oftheUKDataProtectionAct,whichprovidesforacriminalsanctionforstealingpersonaldatafromthedata controller(i.e.notthedatasubject).

Hence,whiletheacademicworldmaycommentthattherelevantlegalregimesdonotimplythatpersonaldatacanbecastasapropertyright,present-daypracticeintheon-lineworldhasevolvedcompletelydifferently.Hereinformation(includ-ingpersonaldata)isseenasacommoditythatcanbetradedagainstadiscountinthevirtualsupermarketorsomeotherbenefit,suchasaccesstoacertainon-lineservice.InformationgeneratedbymeansofconsumerbehaviorandtransactionsontheInternetistracked,recordedandcorrelatedwithothersources.Datamarketersandothercommercialorganizationsinvestheavilyindataprocessingtechniques,becauseitisworththemoneyandrisk.Anyonewithaccesstoinformation,anyonewhohascollectedpersonaldata,canuseitfreelyand,whatismore,subsequentlysellittothirdpartiesforlucrativeamountsofmoney.

Consumersreacttothispracticeindifferentways(somefinditchilling,othersdonotcareatall).24Andalthoughsometrytoprotecttheirprivacybyapplyingtechniquesto‘hide’theirdata,actualandeffectivetransparencyandcontrolseemsunattainable.Forindividualconsumersitisnolongerpossibletoreallyfindoutwhathappenstotheirpersonaldata,letalonetoeffectivelycontrolthedealingswiththesedata.Asaresult,manyindividualsunderstandablytrytogainasmanybenefitsaspossiblefromwhatisleftoftheirprivacy.Tothem,theonlyworkablesolutionappearstobeto‘sell’theirpersonaldata.Oneexampleofsuchabenefitisofferedbytheafore-mentionedGoogleGmailinitiative:itoffersgreaterstoragespaceinreturnforhavingGooglemonitore-mailandusetheinformationforadvertising.Thus,whiletheacademicworldarguesthatprivacyisaninalienableright,therealworldsuggestsacompletelydifferentpicture.Thishas,asmentionedabove,stimulatedsomecommentatorstoproposeacompletelydifferentapproach:establishingpropertyrightsinpersonaldata.Butwhat,then,mightbetheargumentsinfavorofsuchanapproach?

4. ESTABLISHINGAPROPERTYRIGHTINPERSONALDATA

‘Economically,privacycanbeunderstoodasaproblemofsocialcost,wheretheactionsofoneagent(e.g.,amailinglistbroker)impartanegativeexternal-ityonanotheragent(e.g.,anendconsumer).Problemsinsocialcostcanbeunderstoodbymodelingtheliabilities,transactioncostsandpropertyrights

23. Directive96/9/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof11March1996onthelegalprotectionofdatabases,OJ1996L077/20.

24. Lundbladarguesthatweliveina‘noisesociety’,characterizedbyahighcollectiveexpectationofprivacy,butalowindividualexpectationofprivacy.N.Lundblad,‘PrivacyinaNoiseSociety’,Stockholm,St.AnnaInstitute,2004.Availableat:<www.sics.se/privacy/wholes2004/papers/lun-dblad.pdf>


assignedtovariouseconomicagentswithinthesystem,andcanberesolvedbyreallocatingpropertyrightsandliabilitytodifferentagentsasneededtoachieveeconomicequilibrium.’25

Socialcostisoftendescribedaswhathappens‘whenabusinessdoessomethingthathasanegativeimpactonsomeoneelse’.26Apopularexampleusedtoillustratetheconceptisenvironmentalpollution.27Commentatorshavearguedthat,‘muchlikeunregulated,pollutingfactories,businessescollectinglargeamountsofpersonaldataareabletointernalizethegainsfromusingandsellingpersonaldata,whileexternalizingmostofthenegativeimpactthatresultsfromtheirpractices’.28Thesebusinessescanoftengetawaywithusingpersonaldatainwaysthatconsumerswouldnothavefreelybargainedfor.29Themarkethasnotonlyfailedtodisciplinebusinessesthatmisusepersonaldata,buthascreatedasystematicincentiveforover-disclosureofsuchdata.30Inotherwords,theinformationasymmetryandtheresultinghighmonitoringcoststhatconsumersfaceleadstoover-disclosureofpersonaldatabythebusinessesthatcollectthesedata.31

Inlookingatprivacyasaproblemofsocialcost,commentatorshavearguedthattheprospectsforeffectivepersonaldataprotectionmaybeenhancedbyrecognizingapropertyrightofsuchdata.Theyfeelthatthepresentconceptionofprivacyisanineffectualparadigmandthat,ifwewantstrongprivacyprotection,wemustreplaceitwiththemorepowerfulinstrumentofapropertyright.32Suchamarket-basedsolutionwould,asmentionedabove,alsobeinlinewithtoday’sapparentlywidelyacceptedpractice,theregulationofon-linebehaviorbymeansofprivateordering.33Itisnotedthatgivingindividualcitizenscontrolintheformofpropertyrightswillgoalongwaytowardsstimulatingcompetitioninthepresentsituationofinformationasymmetryandmarketfailure.Inotherwords,akeyargumentoftheproponentsofapropertyapproachisthatpresent-daydevelopmentstowardsacommodificationofpersonaldatarequirethatwevestindividualswithsomeformofpropertyrightindataandinformationaboutthemselves.

25. P.Sholtz,‘TransactionCostsandtheSocialCostsofOnlinePrivacy’,First Monday,volume6,number4,May2001,Availableat:<firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_5/sholtz/index.html>

26. Sholtz,supranote25.Indescribingtheconceptofsocialcost,SholtzusestheworkofR.Coase,The Firm, the Market and the Law: The Nature of the Firm,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1988,pp.33-56.

27. Seeonthise.g.P.Samuelson,‘PrivacyasIntellectualProperty’,52Stanford Law Review1125-1173(2000),p.1125;Sholtz,supranote25.

28. Sholtz,supranote25.29. Id.;andP.Swire,‘Markets,Self-Regulation,andGovernmentEnforcementintheProtection

ofPersonalInformation’,inUSDepartmentofCommerce,Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age,WashingtonD.C.,NationalTelecommunicationsandInformationAdministration,1997,availableat:<ssrn.com/abstract�11472>.

30. Swire,supranote29.31. Sholtz, supranote25.32. P.Sholtz,‘TheEconomicsofPersonalInformationExchange’,First Monday,volume5,number

9(September2000).Availableat:<firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_9/sholtz/>.33. Lemley,supranote13,p.1546.

232 Corien Prins

Thesuggestionthatprivacyshouldencompassanenforceableownershipright,whichinfactwasadvocatedasearlyas1967byAlanWestin34andfurtheranalyzedonthebasisoflawandeconomicsinsightsbyRichardEpsteinandRichardPosner35,hassparkedthedebateabouttheopportunitiesandrisksofa‘propertization’ofpersonaldata.36Proponentsofstrengtheningprivacyprotectionbymeansofapropertyrightarguethatpersonaldata‘belong’todatasubjectsas‘their’property.Individualsgenerallyhavealegalrighttobeleftaloneandthustorefrainothersfromaccesstotheirpersonaldata.Theconceptofprivacyprotectspersonaldatafromunauthorizeddisclosureanduse.Asaresult, thelawthatimplementsthisconceptmustnotonlyprovideindividualswith‘thesense’thattheyhavesomesortofexclusiveright,37butalsoactuallyprovidethemwithaneffectivetool,i.e.anexclusiverighttotheirpersonaldata.38

Somecommentatorsfavorgrantingindividualspropertyrightsintheirpersonaldatabecauseindividualshaveclearinterestsoftheirownincontrollingtheirpersonaldataandmustthereforebegiventhebenefitsofthepropertyconcept.Vestingapropertyrightwouldallowindividualstomakeindividualizeddealsfortradingtherighttousetheirpersonaldataagainstpreferentialservices,money,orotherbenefits.39Anothersuggestedbenefitfordatasubjectsisthatbyvestingapropertyrightinindividuals,businesseswouldbeforcedtointernalizethecostsassociatedwiththecollectionandprocessingofpersonaldata.Atpresent,businessesgainthefullbenefitofusingpersonalinformation,but,asnotedabove,donotbearthesocietalcosts:personaldatacanusuallybecollectedforfree,andwiththeadventofnewtechnologies,ithasbecomemucheasierandcheapertogatherandusedataofindividuals.Oncecompanieshadtointernalizethesocietalcostsassociatedwithusingpersonaldata,theywouldperhapsbelessinclinedtogatherandcompilepersonaldatathantheycurrentlydo.This,inturn,wouldenhancelevelsofprivacy.40Moreover,‘placingsomecostburdenonprocessorsandusersofpersonaldatapromotesgreaterrespectforindividualdignitythanrequiringindividualstopurchasetheirprivacy

34. A.F.Westin,Privacy and Freedom,NewYork,AtheneumPress,1967,pp.324-325.35. R.A.Epstein,‘Privacy,PropertyRights,andMisrepresentations’,12Georgia Law Review463-465

(1978);R.A.Posner,‘TheRightofPrivacy’,12Georgia Law Review 393-422(1978).36. Someearlycontributionstothedebateonproperty,contractrulesandprivacyare:Laudon,supra

note3;M.Cloud,‘TheFourthAmendmentDuringtheLochnerEra:Privacy,Property,andLibertyinConstitutionalTheory’,48Stanford Law Review555-631(1995-1996);P.M.Schwartz,‘PrivacyandtheEconomicsofPersonalHealthCareInformation’,76Texas Law Review1-76(1997);PeterP.Swire,‘CyberbankingandPrivacy:TheContractsModel’,SanFrancisco,Computers, Freedom & Privacy Conference,March1997availableat:<www.peterswire.net/cyber.htm>;P.P.Swire,R.E.Litan,None of Your Business. World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive,WashingtonD.C.,BrookingsInstitutionPress1998,pp.86-87.

37. Samuelson,supranote27,p.1129.38. Laudon,supranote3,p.92.39. Id.,p.104.See alsotheoverviewoftheargumentspresentedbyP.Samuelson,supranote27,

p.1125.40. Laudon,Laudon,supranote3, p. 104.p.104.


againstadefaultruleofno-privacy’.41Thus,thecostsarenolongeronlybornebythoseindividualswhobothdesireprivacyandcanaffordit,butinsteadbysocietyasawhole.42Further,itisnotedthatbyvestinganownershiprightinpersonaldataitwouldbecomeexpresslyclearthatsuchdataareownedbythedatasubject,notbythebusinessthatcollectedthem.43

Anotherclaimmadebytheproponentsofthepropertyapproachisthatnewadvancesintechnologynowmakeitconsiderablyeasiertocreateandsustaintheconditionsforindividualandpersonalizedchoicesofdatause(suchasrestrictionsonuseandthirdpartyreuse).Asisshownintheareaofcopyright,technologyoffershighlyattractivemeanstoupholdpropertyrightsthatweretooexpensiveandburdensometoprovideinthepast.SeveralyearsagoPhilipAgrehadalreadydescribed‘technologiesofidentity’whichmadeitpossibletopreventpersonaldatafrombeingcollectedatall.44Severalcommentatorshavearguedthatthereisaprofoundrelationshipbetweenthosewhowishtoprotectintellectualpropertyandthosewhowishtoprotectprivacy.45Theircommondesireistoprotectandcontrolthedistributionanduseofinformation.Hence,theeffortsofthesoundrecordingandfilmindustryatregainingcontrolbymeansoftechnology(e.g.byapplyingdigitalrightsmanagementsystems)offerinspiration,aswellaslessons,tothosewhoseektostrengthenandenhancetheprotectionofpersonaldata.Justasthetitleholderofacopyrightedworkmaywishtoletuserslisten,vieworreadhisworkalimitednumberoftimes,aswellasrestricttheminsharingtheworkwithothers,individualscanmonitortheuseoftheirpersonaldataande.g.limitsecondaryandbroaderuseoftheirdata.46Inlinewiththisargument,Cohencontendedthat‘thesametechnologiesthatenabledistributedrights-managementfunctionalitymightenablethecreationofprivacyprotectionthattravelswithdata–obviatingtheneedforcontinualnegotiationofterms,butatthesametimeredistributing‘costs’awayfromindividualswhoaredatasubjects’.47Also,academicsinthedomainofeconomicshavefocusedontheeconomicincentivesthatcanjustifythedevelopmentandadoptionofprivacyenhancingtechnologies.48

41. J.E.Cohen,‘ExaminedLives:InformationalPrivacyandtheSubjectasObject’,52Stanford Law ReviewMay1373-1438(2000),p.1390.

42. Cohen,supranote41,p.1390.43. Seeforanextensiveoverviewoftheliteratureonthis:Litman,supranote2,footnote19;Lemley,

supranote13,p.1545,footnote5.Aninterestingoverviewofpublicationsfrombothalegalaswellas(micro-)economicperspectivecanalsobefoundonthewebsite‘TheEconomicsofPrivacy’maintainedbyAlessandroAcquistiat:<www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/economics-privacy.htm>

44. P.E.Agre,‘BeyondtheMirrorWorld:PrivacyandtheRepresentationalPracticesofComputing’,inP.E.Agre,andM.Rotenberg(eds.),Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape,Cambridge,MITPress1997,p.29.

45. Seee.g.Zittrain,supranote9.46. Id.47. Cohen,supranote41,p.1391.48. A.Acquisti,‘ProtectingPrivacywithEconomics:EconomicIncentivesforPreventiveTech-

nologiesinUbiquitousComputingEnvironments’,WorkshoponSocially-informed Design of Privacy-enhancing Solutions,4thInternationalConferenceonUbiquitousComputing(UBICOMP

234 Corien Prins

5. PROPERTYRIGHTSANDHUMANRIGHTS

Theproponentsofvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatasuggestthatwedo‘own’ourprivacyinsomesense,thatpersonaldatarightsaretightlyconnectedwithownershipandcontroland,assuch,theserightsarealienable:theycanbewaivedor‘sold’.Ofcoursetherearethosewhodonotfavorpropertyrightsinpersonaldata,aswillbeshownlateroninthischapter.Butasidefromthecommentatorsthathavespecificpointsofcriticism,therearethosewhoclaimatamorefundamentallevelthatsuchanapproachdoesnothaveafutureinthoselegalsystemsthatvalueprivacyasahumanright.49ItisarguedthatsecuringprivacybymeansofpropertyrightsisindicativeofatypicalUSapproachtothematter.50Thosewhoareconvincedthattheconceptandrationaleofpersonaldataprotectionshouldbeshapedalongthelineofpropertyrights,areclearlyinfluencedbytheenormouspowerofpropertythinkingthatissotypicaloftheAmericanlegaltradition.51Incontrast,theEuropeandebateonprivacyprotectionwouldtakeahumanrightsperspectiveontheissue:theconceptof(commercial)propertymaynotbevestedinprivacybecauseprivacyisattachedtoindividualsbyvirtueoftheirpersonhood,and,assuch,thisrightcannotbewaivedortransferredtoothers(eitherforcom-mercialorforotherreasons).Also,humanrightsareconceivedascloselylinkedtoconstitutingandmaintainingaperson’spersonalintegrity.Theyarethereforeseenasnon-commodifiablerights.‘Humanrightsarerootedinanoncommodifiedunderstandingofpersonhoodandtheattributesandcontextnecessarytoconstituteandmaintainpersonhood.’52Typicalofthehuman-rightsperspectiveistheideathatprivacyisnegativeinnature:itisviewedasarightofnon-interference,notasarightofpositiveentitlement.Thenegative,autonomy-basedconceptionmerelyprovidesindividualswitharightaslongastheirpersonalinformationremainsintheprivatesphere.However,oncepersonaldataenterthepublicsphere,individualsremainlargelypowerlessindeterminingwhatfurtheruseismadeofthesedata.Inbrief,theproblemwithcreatingpropertyrightsinpersonaldataundertheEuropeanlegalsystemwouldbethatitdoesnotfitthehumanrightsperspectiveasadoptedin,e.g.,Article8(1)oftheRomeConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,providingthat:‘Everyonehastherighttorespectforhisprivateandfamilylife,hishomeandhiscorrespondence.’Also,thehumanrights

02),Goteborg,Sweden,September2002.Availableat:<guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2002/privacyworkshop/>See alsovariousofthepublicationslistedat:<www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/economics-privacy.htm>

49. SeeSamuelson,supranote27,citingRadin(footnote93).50. M.J.Radin,‘IncompleteCommodificationintheComputerizedWorld’,inNivaElkin-Koren,

NeilWeinstockNetanel(eds.),The Commodification of Information,TheHague,KluwerLawInternational2002,pp.17-18.

51. Cohen,supranote41,p.1379.52. Radin,supranote50,p.17.


dimensionwasexpresslyusedbytheEuropeanParliamentasanargumentinthedebatesontheSafeHarborPrinciples.53

Atfirstglance,itindeedseemsalittleawkwardtobringthepropertyargumentintothehumanrightsdebate.This,then,mayalsobethereasonwhyveryfewEuropeantheoristshavereflectedontheideaofapropertyrightvestedinpersonaldata.Inthe1980s,CatalatandPoulletelaboratedonthematteraspartoftheirsearchforanexplanationofindividuals’rightsregardingdatapertainingtothem.Indrawingaparallelbetweenpersonaldataprotection,aius in rem,andintellectualpropertyrightsprotection,Catalatdefendedthethesisthattherightofpropertycouldbeseenastheexplanationofthenotionofpersonaldatarights54,whereasPoulletrefusedtoacceptthisposition,arguingthatanexplanationintermsofthenotionoffreedomwasmoreappropriatetoenlightentheratioofdataprotection.55Morerecently,Bygravebrieflytoucheduponthepropertyrightsthemeinhis2002studyontherationaleofdataprotectionlaw.56Althoughhedoesnotexpresslydeclinethepropertyrightsoption,Bygravetakesaveryskepticalposition.Interestingly,hishesitationsrelatetopracticalproblemsandnotsomuchtofundamentalhuman-rightsrelatedobjections.57Thus,althoughsomehavebeencritical58,wemayconcludethatduringthepastdecadesthemajorityofthetheoristsstressedthatthehumanrightsperspectiveformstheveryessenceoftheEuropeanpersonality-basedratioofprivacyandpersonaldataprotection.59Inthisperspectivethereappearstobelittleroomforapropertyapproach.

53. EuropeanParliament,CommitteeonCitizens’FreedomsandRights,JusticeandHomeAffairs,Report on the Draft Commission Decision on the adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles,C5-0280/2000-2000/2144(COS)),22June2000.Availableat:<europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/adequacy/0117-02_en.pdf>

54. P.Catalat,citedin:Y.Poullet,‘DataProtectionbetweenPropertyandLiberties.ACivilLawApproach’,inH.W.K.Kaspersen,A.Oskamp(eds.), Amongst Friends in Computers and Law. A Collection of Essays in Remembrance of Guy Vandenberghe,TheHague,KluwerLawInternational,1990,p.161.

55. Poullet,supranote54,pp.161-181.56. L.A.Bygrave,Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits,TheHague,

KluwerLawInternational,2002,pp.120-122.57. ToBygrave,itisquestionablethattheadoptionofpropertyrightsapproacheswillassistarguments

forprovidingincreasedlevelsofdataprotection,becausesuchrights–likemostotherrights–areseldomappliedinanabsolutemanner.Inaddition,hearguesthatmanyofthechallengesfacedbydataprotectionlawandpolicy(amongthemtheabilityofdatasubjectstocomprehendthelogicofinformationsystems)cannotbeadequatelyaddressedunderthepropertyrightsrubric.Bygrave,supranote56,p.121.

58. Seee.g.L.Bergkamp,‘ThePrivacyFallacy:AdverseEffectsofEurope’sDataProtectionPolicyinanInformation-DrivenEconomy’,18Computer Law & Security Report31-47(2002),p.31.

59. Seerecently:Gutwirth,supranote13,pp.39-41,arguingthatvestingapropertyrightconflictswiththenotionthatprivacyneedstobeseenintheperspectiveoffreedom.Moreover:‘Theattemptstocreateanunequivocalsubjectiverighttoprivacyareimplicitlybasedonthewrongassumptionthatthelawhastoandisallowedtoimpose‘goodvalues’.See also:P.deHert,‘InternetenPrivacy’inK.Byttebier,R.Feltkamp,E.Janssens(eds.),Internet en Recht. InternetInternet

236 Corien Prins

Nevertheless,therearesignsofagreaterreadinessinseveralareasoftheEuropeanlegalsystemtoacknowledgetheimportanceofelementsofpropertythinkinginthehumanrights,humandignityandautonomyarena.IllustrativeisArticle1‘ProtectionofProperty’ofProtocolNo.11totheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms.60AlthoughthesecondandthirdpartsofthisarticlearedirectedtoTreatymembersandnotindividuals,thefirstpartisexpresslydirectedtoeverynaturalandlegalperson:‘Everynaturalorlegalpersonisentitledtothepeacefulenjoymentofhispossessions.Nooneshallbedeprivedofhispossessionsexceptinthepublicinterestandsubjecttotheconditionsprovidedforbylawandbythegeneralprinciplesofinternationallaw’.Thequestionariseswhetherpersonaldataconstitute‘possessions’forthepurposeofthisarticle.61AlthoughtheEuropeanCourthasthusfarneverexpresslyaddressedthestatusofpersonaldataunderthisarticle,severalrulingsprovideclearindicationsthattheconceptofpropertyiscertainlynotrestrictedtophysicalgoods.IntheGasusruling,theCourtstipulatedthat:‘…thenotion‘possessions’(inFrench:biens)inArticle1ofProtocolNo.1(P1-1)hasanautonomousmeaningwhichiscertainlynotlimitedtoownershipofphysicalgoods:certainotherrightsandinterestsconstitutingassetscanalsoberegardedas‘propertyrights’,andthusas‘possessions’,forthepurposesofthisprovision(P1-1).’62Aglanceatseveralotherrulingsonthenotionof‘possessions’makesclearthatitcoversawiderangeofnon-physicalgoods,amongothersintellectualpropertyrights.63

Butthereareotherdevelopmentsthattestifymoreexplicitlytothegrowinginfluenceofpropertythinkinginthehumanrightsdomain.First,aswillbediscussedinmoredetailbelow,thepropertydimensionisbecominganimportantphenomenonintheareaofpublicityrights.Manycourtrulings,withasanillustrativerecent

et le Droit,Antwerpen,Maklu2001,pp.404-414(rejectingapropertyapproachandarguingthattheSelbstbestimmungsrechtisthebasisofdataprotectionlaw,p.405).

60. ProtocoltotheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomsasamendedbyProtocol11(ETSNo.155).Theamendmentscameintoforceon1November1998.Availableat:<conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm>.

61. Asidefromtheconceptualizationof‘property’and‘possessions’underthisProtocol,thebroaderissuethatofcourseneedsdiscussioniswhetherthenotionofownershipencompassesthesortofownershipthatweseektodefinewhendealingwithpersonaldatarights.Theunderstandingofownershipthatappliestophysicalthings,suchaswatches,booksorcars,doesnotencompassallofthelegallyrelevantintereststhatthetermprivacydenotes.Thiscontributionhoweverdoesnotdevelopadefinitionofpropertyordiscussestheargumentsthathavebeenbroughtforwardinthedebateonthedifferentconceptionsofownership.Nordoesthiscontributionanalyzethevariousfunctionsofproperty.Seeontheseissuesinrelationtohumanrights:G.F.Gaus,‘Property,RightsandFreedom’,inE.F.Paul,F.D.MillerJr.,J.Paul(eds.),Property Rights,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress1994,pp.213-214;D.Beyleveld,andR.Brownsword,Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress2001.

62. Gasus Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands,EuropeanCourtonHumanRights,24January1995,SeriesA,vol.306B,§53.Available at: <hudoc.echr.coe.int>Availableat:<hudoc.echr.coe.int>

63. More in detail on this argument: C.M.C.K. Cuijpers,Moreindetailonthisargument:C.M.C.K.Cuijpers,Privacyrecht of privaatrecht? Een privaat-Een privaat-rechtelijk alternatief voor de implementatie van de Europese privacyrichtlijn,TheHague,Sdu2004.


exampletheMay2004UKrulingintheNaomiCampbellcase64,testifytothehybridcharacterofcommercialpersonalityrights.Here,commercialinterestscombinedwiththepropertyargument,appeartoplayakeyroleinthedebateontheproperscopeofprotectingpersonalitycharacteristics,suchasaperson’sname,appearance,voice,signatureorlikeness.Anotherareawheremarket-orientedargumentsenterthedomainofhumanrightsisthatofbiotechnology.

5.1. ProPerTy, PrIvacy and PersonalITy

Severalyearsago,themagazineHello!publishedwithoutpermissionphotographsoftheweddingofcelebritiesMichaelDouglasandCatharineZeta-Jones.Thenewly-wedswereclearlynotamused.Theirangerwas,however,fuelednotsomuchbythefactthattheyfelttheirprivacyhadbeenviolated.Rather,thecouplehadenteredintoanexclusivepublicationcontractwithanothermagazine,OK!,andhadmadethe‘private’matteroftheirweddingintoacommercialtransaction.Bypublishingthepictures,Hello!haddeprivedthemoftheir‘right’toexploittheircelebritystatusforprofit.65

TheDouglascaseaswellasmanyotherexamples–amongthemrulingsontheclaimsofafootball-player,TVpresenter,actors66andafore-mentionedNaomiCampbell67–allshowthatthereisacleardemandforexclusiverightsinpersonalcharacteristicssuchasaperson’sname,appearance,voice,signatureorlikeness.

64. ThesupermodelNaomiCampbellwantedcompensationforthepublicationbytheDaily Mirrorofarticlesandphotographsthatsuggesteddrug-addiction.Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers[2002]EWHC499(QB).Overturnedonappeal:[2002]EWCACiv.137.OnMay6,2004thelawlordsoverturnedina3-2majoritytherulingoftheCourtofAppeal,acknowledgingthatindividuals,includingcelebrities,havearighttoprivacywhichiswiderthantheexistingUKlawofbreachofconfidence,ordisclosureofprivateinformation.Availableat:<www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc�/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/22.html>.

65. Thecouplewenttocourt,arguingtheircaseonanactionforbreachofcommercialconfidenceandtheUKDataProtectionAct1998.Afteraddressingtheroleofthelawofconfidenceandattachingconsiderableimportancetotherightsoffreedomofexpressionaswellasprivacy,thecourtheldHello!liabletopayOK!£1,033,156tocoverthetotalcostofitslostsales,thelossofadvertisingrevenueandwastedcosts.DouglasandZeta-Joneswereawardedasumof£50eachundertheDataProtectionAct1998and£7,000forwastedcosts.Thecase,aswellasmanyotherstoriesthatdealwiththebalancetobestruckbetweenprivacyandfreedomofthepressarediscussedindetailin:J.Rozenberg,Privacy and the Press,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2004(chapter2).

66. SeetheEwanMcGregorcase,decided11November2003,inwhichtheactorwonanactionagainstaphotoagencyoverphotographsofhistwochildren[McGregor v. Fraser,HighCourtofEnglandandWales,No.[2203]EWHC2972,11/11/03].

67. Foradiscussionofseveralcases,see:Rozenberg,supranote65;R.Wacks,‘Privacy,Property,andPersonality–DoWeNeedThem?’Conference Paper, Edinburgh 2000, available at: <www.ConferencePaper,Edinburgh2000,available at: <www.availableat:<www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/>.See alsothepersonalitydatabase,establishedaspartof‘Privacy,Property,Personality’,aprojectoftheAHRBResearchCentreforStudiesinIntellectualPropertyandTechnologyLawbasedintheSchoolofLawattheUniversityofEdinburgh:<www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/personality/database.htm>

238 Corien Prins

Thequestiontheniswhatargumentsnecessitatealegallyrecognizedentitlementinone’sownindividualfeatures.Somecommentatorshavecontendedthatthekeyargumentinfavorofestablishingpersonalityrightsfortherichandfamousrelatestomarket-orientedarguments:theeconomicinterestsoftheperson(actor,singer,supermodelorothercelebrity)whohasinvestedconsiderabletime,laborandeffortinhisorherappearance,image,fameorreputation,deservesprotection.Apublicityrightprovideseconomicincentives(itstimulatesthecreationofa‘personality’)andsafeguardsafairdistributionofaperson’smarketvalue.68Moreover,publicityrightsstimulateeconomicgrowth:companiesmayobtainanexclusivelicensetocommerciallyexploitaperson’scelebritystatusinordertorunanexclusivenews-item(theDouglas/Zeta-Jonesexample)ormarketingcampaign.Anotherlineofargumentholdsthatallowingpersonalityrightsresultsinmoreefficientuseofacelebrity’spersona.69Finally,whileanalyzingtheproperty-relatedjustificationsforpublicityrightssomecommentatorsrelyontheparallelwithintellectualpropertyrightsandmorespecificallywithcopyright.70Theargumentsinfavorofbothcopyrightandpublicityrightsoriginateineconomicincentives,fairdistributionandsafeguardingmarketvalue.71Aswillbeshownbelow,thereappeartobe,however,cleardiffer-encesinthepropertyregimessurroundingcopyrightandpossiblepropertyregimessurroundingprivacyrights.

Opponentsofaproperty-basedrationalehavearguedthateconomicinterestsalonecannotjustifytheexistenceofapersonalityrightinpersonalcharacteristics.Itissimplynotplausiblethatasinger,actororcelebrity,whoearnshismoneybymakingmusicandfilms,orperforming,andhassoldhimselftothehighestbidder,haswaivedalldignity-basedaspectsofhispersonality.OrasWebernoted,freecommercialappropriationofapersonabyothersisunsatisfactorywithregardtohumandignity,becausethedecisiontobeassociatedwithacertaincommercialproductisnotentirelyacommercialissue,butpartoftheinnercoreofaperson’spersonality.72Thesecondargumentofrelevanceinthedebateonpersonalityrightsisthereforerelatedtodignity-basedconsiderations.Dignitysurvivesacommercialtransferofacertainpersonalitycharacteristic.Privateautonomy(self-determination),identityandprivacyareseenasmajoraspectsofdignity:theindividual’sdignity,hisautonomousstatusconcerningtheindiciaofhisidentity,doesnotallowappropriationbyotherswithoutgoodreason.73

68. Seeonthesearguments:O.Weber,‘HumanDignityandtheCommercialAppropriationofPersonality;TowardsaCosmopolitanConsensusinPublicityRights?’,1Script-ed. Online Journal of Law and Technology178-261(2004).Availableat:<www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/docs/personality.asp>.

69. M.Madow,‘PrivateOwnershipofPublicImage:PopularCultureandPublicityRights’,81California Law Review127-240(1993),pp.223-224.

70. See:Weber,supranote68.71. Althoughnotingthatexclusiverightsintheareaofcopyrightarejustifiedasstimulusforinvest-

mentincultureandindustrialinventions,whereaspublicityrightsservenopublicinterestorhighereconomicgoal.Weber,supranote68.

72. Id..73. Id.,citingD.Lindsay(footnote109).


HuwBeverly-Smith,inanalyzingcommon-lawandcivil-lawcourtrulings,neverthelessconcludesthatitisthevery‘mixtureofproperty-basedargumentsandargumentsbasedonprotectingpersonaldignity(that)inevitablyreflectsthehybridnatureoftheproblemofappropriationofpersonalityandbothitseconomicanddignitaryaspects’.74Althoughthereisnointernationalconsensusonthespecificrulesrelatingtothecommercialappropriationofpersonalcharacteristics,suchasthoseresolvingtheconflictbetweenpublicityrightsandotherimportantinterests(suchasfreedomofthepressandarts)75,itisclearthatwhenexaminingtheinterestsofpublicityrightsinvolved,thecourtsareprotectingnotonlyinterestsrelatingtohumandignityandpersonality,butalsointerestsineconomicandproprietynature.76Tosummarize,thecombinationofeconomicargumentsanddignity-basedargumentsappeartoadvocateforanindividual’sentitlementinhisorherpersonalcharacteristicsandthusinfavorofestablishingpublicityrights.77Here,humanrightsandpropertyrightsseemtogetalongratherwell.

5.2. ProPerTy, human dIgnITy and The human body

Morethantenyearsago,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtruledinthefamouscaseMoore v. Regents of the University of California78thatanindividualwhosecellswerederivedfromhisspleendidnothaveapropertyinterestinthis‘naturallyoccurringrawmaterial’,whereasbycontrast,thedoctorswhocreatedacelllinefromthismaterialweregrantedapatent.Inotherwords,Mr.Moorecouldnotclaimpropertyrightsinhiscellsbecausethiswouldslowthefurtherdevelopmentofresearch.Theresearchers,however,weregivenacommerciallyhighlyvaluablepropertyright.

Contrarytowhattheoutcomeoftherulingmayimply,legalactsintheareaofbiotechnologyandintellectualpropertyrightsinparticularshowthatinformationrelatedtoindividualhumanbeingsisnotnormallyregardedassomethingthatcanbeownedorsoldforprofit.Art.4oftheUNESCODeclarationontheHumanGenomeandHumanRightsspecificallyreferstotheargumentof‘dignityandidentityofall

74. H.Beverly-Smith,The Commercial Appropriation of Personality,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2002,p.287.Theauthoroffersadetailedaccountandanalysisofthevariousperspectivesonpersonalityrights.See also:E.Volokh,‘FreedomofSpeechandInformationPrivacy:TheTroublingImplicationsofaRighttoStopPeoplefromSpeakingaboutYou’52Stanford Law Review 1049-1218(2000),p.1049(Online:<www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/privacy.htm>)

75. Onthemultitudeofdifferentlegalinstrumentsbetweenjurisdictions,see:Weber,supranote68.

76. Seeonthisindetail:Beverly-Smith,supranote74,chapter11.77. Foradiscussionofthedownsideofvestingapropertyrightinpersonality,see:D.Leenheer

Zimmerman,supranote7.78. 793P.2d479(Cal.1990),cert.denied,111S.Ct.1388(1991).Foradetaileddiscussionand

analysisofthecase,aswellasitsbroaderimplicationsforthedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivateinformation,see:J.Boyle,‘ATheoryofLawandInformation:Copyright,Spleens,Blackmail,andInsiderTrading’,80California Law Review1413-1540(1992).

240 Corien Prins

humanbeings’whenstipulatingthat‘Thehumangenomeinitsnaturalstateshallnotgiverisetofinancialgains.’79AsimilarprovisionisincludedinArt.21oftheCouncilofEurope’sConventiononHumanRightsandBiomedicine.80Bothprovisionsseemtosuggestthatcommodificationofinformationonindividualhumanbeingsisnotacceptedbythelaw.Nevertheless,astheMoore v. Regentsrulingclearlyshows,intellectualpropertyrightsareindeedgrantedinrespectofhumanmaterial.OtherdevelopmentsintheUnitedStatesalsoshowthatlegislativeinitiativesmayallowforthecommodificationofhumanbodyparts.81

InspiredbytheMoore v. Regentscaseaswellasbytechnologicalprogressinbiomedicine,varioustheoristshavediscussedthecontroversyonprivacy,propertyandthehumanbody,suggestingthatthedebateoverownershipandthelimitsofrightsofpropertyandcontroloverobjectsandinformationrelatedtothehumanbodyhasonlyjustbegun.Isitpermissibleforustotransfertherightsoverourbodies,bodypartsoruniqueinformationaboutourbodiestoothers?Dowehavecommercialpropertyinthemorwouldthisviolatehumandignity?Aglanceatthepublicationsshowsthereislittleconsensusaboutwhetherthereshouldbeprivatepropertyrights(patents)overstemcellsandgenesequences.Proponentsanswerintheaffirmative,arguingthatonlybygrantingsuchrightswillweguaranteetherequiredinvestmenttoproducemedicinesandtreatmenttherapies.Othersregardthecommodificationofourbodiesasadreadfulscenario,decliningthattheruleofeconomicsdeterminesownershipofsomething(ourbody)thatbelongsinprincipletoourselvesoreveryone(consideringitpartofourcommonhumanheritage).82Reflectingontheissueofownershipofhumanbodyparts,varioustheoristshaveattemptedtodrawalinebetweenwhatiscommodifiableandwhatisnot.83Indoingso,commentatorshaveshownthatsettingthelimitsofmonopoliesingenesandbodypartsappearsdifficultandtricky.84

Severaloftheargumentsmentionedinthedebatesontheappropriationofhumanbodyparts,aswellasanindividual’spersonality,willbeencounteredfurtheroninthischapter,intheanalysisconcerningtheestablishmentofapropertyrightinaperson’sdata.Fornow,wecansummarizethisbriefsketchbyconcludingthat

79. Article4oftheUNESCOUniversal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,Paris11November1997.Availableat:<www.unesco.org/shs/human_rights/hrbc.htm>.

80. CouncilofEurope,Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedice,Oviedo,1997.online:<conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/164.doc>.

81. BeyleveldandBrownsword,supranote61,p.171(footnote1).82. Seeonthedifferentargumentse.g.A.McCallSmith,‘Property,DignityandtheHumanBody’,2

Privacy and Property. Hume Papers on Public Policy29-38(1994);BeyleveldandBrownsword,supranote61,chapter8.

83. See,e.g.,BeyleveldandBrownsword,supranote61,inparticularchapter8;G.Laurie,Genetic Privacy. A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress2002(inparticularchapter6);J.Boyle,supranote78;C.BarradandM.Valerio,‘Geneticinformationandpropertytheory’,87Northwestern University Law Review52-70(1992);M.Everett,‘Thesociallifeofgenes:privacy,propertyandthenewgenetics’,56Social Science & Medicine 53-65(2003).

84. Seee.g.M.J.Radin,Contested Commodities,Cambridge,HarvardUniversityPress,1996.


thecommercialexploitationofattributesofanindividual’spersonalityorbodyapparentlyhasimportantpotentialforourmoderneconomy.Newcommercialpracticeschallengelegaldoctrine,aswellasthecourts,tothinkaboutthewaysinwhichprivatepropertyrightsandhumanrightscanbebalanced.Atleastonelineofargumentholdsthatcommercialandeconomicimperativesdemandthatadequateprotectionforhumanrightscanonlybesecuredifweexpandthescopeofpropertyrightstoincludeintangibleobjectsrelatedtoindividualpersons.

5.3. conTracTual freedom and human rIghTs

Thebasicassumptionunderapropertyapproach,whetherappliedtonameandfame,humanbodypartsorpersonaldata,isthatindividualsareabletoexercisetheirfreewillwithrespecttotheserightsthroughtheconclusionofcontractualarrangements.Creatingpropertyrightsassumesthatprivateorderingandcommercialarrange-mentsdeterminethepositionoftherespectiveparties.However,towhatextentareindividualsallowedtowaivetheprotectionoftheirfundamentalrightsbymeansofacontract?85Canconstitutionalrightsbesoldtothehighestbidder?

Asmentionedabove,opponentsofthenotionthatprivacyisacommodifiableassetbasetheirargumentsontheclaimthatprivacyisahumanrightand,assuch,cannotbealienated.Butthehumanrightsargumentmay,ofcourse,alsoworktheotherwayaround:inapuresense,theideaofhumanrightsisallaboutempowerment.Itcouldbearguedthattodenyindividualsapropertyrightinprivacyforthereasonthatsuchanapproachsitsuneasilywithhumanrights,wouldviolatetheseverysamerights:whyshouldwepreventfreeindividualsfromusingwhatmeanstheyhavetostrengthentheirposition,evenifthisdoesinvolvebeingexploitedbyothers?86Denyingindividualsapropertyrightwouldleavethemlessabletobargainfortheirinterests,andthusless-empowered.Thequestionthenarises,whattakespreference,individualautonomyorthehumanrightslaiddowninourconstitution?

Theprincipleofindividualautonomyassumesthatpartiesenterintocontractsvoluntarily,guaranteeingthemaconsiderabledegreeoffreedomtoenterintocontractualobligations.Thisprincipleisalsorecognizedinrelationtoconstitutionallaw,meaningthatfreedomofcontractevenprevailswhenthecontractseestofundamentalhumanrightsthatareaccordedprotectionundertheconstitution.Thus,undercontinentalEuropeanlaw,individualsareallowedtowaivetheprotectionoftheirfundamentalrights,albeitthattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsrequiresthattheindividualwhoconsentstowaivinghisfundamentalrightsdoessoinanexplicitmanner.87Whenappliedtopersonaldata,theconstitutionalrecognitionofprivacythusdoesnotpreventindividualsexploitingtheirprivacyrightsbyusing

85. Ofcourse,thecontractualarrangementmayalsobeusedtoprotectprivacyinthatitimposesanobligationtorespectprivacyandnottodisclosecertainpersonaldata.

86. See also:BeyleveldandBrownsword,supranote61,p.171.87. See therulingsDeweer/Belgium,ECHR27February1980,A35§48-54;De Wilde,Ooms,

Versyp/Belgium,ECHR18June1971,A12§65,availableat:<www.dhdirhr.coe.fr>.See alsoon

242 Corien Prins

theinstrumentoffreedomofcontract.Individualsarefreetonegotiatethecontentofagreementstobestsuittheirneeds,andtoensurethemostefficientexploitationoftheeconomicvalueoftheirpersonaldata.

Butotherlegalregimesmayneverthelesspreventanindividualfromalienatinghisrightsinpersonaldata.Asknown,theEuropeanUnionhaslaiddownspecificprovisionsasregardstheuseofpersonaldatainitsDirective95/46/EC.88AnissuethatthusremainstobedealtwithrelatestotheintersectionbetweenEuropeandataprotectionlegislationandthefreedomofcontracts:can–andifyes,towhatextent–contractingpartiesdepartfromthelegalframeworksetundertheEuropeandataprotectionDirective?MayindividualsfreelydecidewhethertheywanttobenefitfromthelevelofprotectionestablishedbytheEuropeanlegislature,anddoestheprincipleofcontractualfreedomthusoverrulethelegislativebalanceinprotectingpersonaldataasestablishedattheEuropeanlevel?OrdoestheEuropeanDirectivelimittheparties’freedomofcontractbecauseitdictatesthattheyshouldadheretoacertainminimumstandardofprivacyprotection?89

6. CONTRACTUALFREEDOM,CONTROLRIGHTSANDTHEEUPERSONALDATADIRECTIVE

ToanswertheabovequestionweneedtoexplorewhetherthespecificprovisionsoftheEuropeanDirectiveonpersonaldataprotectionstipulateanythingontheirmandatorycharacter.Inthepast,theEuropeanlegislaturehasintervenedseveraltimesincontractualrelationships.Ithasfounditappropriatetointerveneincontractualrelationshipsintheareaofconsumerprotectionandintellectualpropertyrightsandthushasputinplacemandatoryprovisionstolimittheparties’freedomofcontract.Art.9(1)oftheEuropeanComputerProgramsDirective,e.g.stipulatesthat‘anycontractualprovisionscontrarytoArticle6ortotheexceptionsprovidedforinArticle5(2)and(3)shallbenullandvoid.’90OtherexamplescanbefoundinArticle15

theseandotherrelevantrulings:R.A.Lawson,H.G.Schermers,Leading Cases of the European Court of Human Rights,Nijmegen,ArsAequiLibri,1997,pp.637-638.

88. Directive95/46oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof24October1995ontheprotectionofindividualswithregardtotheprocessingofpersonaldataandonthefreemovementofindividualswithregardtotheprocessingofpersonaldataandonthefreemovementofsuchdata,Official JournalL281/31,1995.

89. CompareBergkampwhoargues:‘Inotherwords,evenifanindividualwantstogiveupsomeorallofhisprivacyrights(e.g.toobtainalowerpriceforaproductorservice),EUlawwillnotlethimdoso.TheEUprivacyrightscannotbewaivedinanymatter.Consequently,anyagreementpursuanttowhichadatasubjectwaivessomeorallofhisrightsundertheDataProtectionDirectiveisvoidandunenforceable,eveniftheagreementotherwisemeetsalthevalidityrequirementsandisinthedatasubject’sinterest.’LucasBergkamp,European Community Law for the New Economy,Antwerp,Intersentia,2003,p.123.

90. CouncilDirective91/250/EECof14May1991onthelegalprotectionofcomputerprograms,OJ1991L122/42.


oftheEuropeanDatabaseDirective,91Article12ofDirective85/374dealingwithproductsliability,92Article12ofDirective97/7ontheprotectionofconsumersinrespectofdistancecontracts93aswellasDirective99/4494andDirective00/31.95

AglanceattheEuropeanDirectiveonpersonaldataprotectionrevealsthatitdoesnotcontainprovisionsorindicationsastotheimperativecharacteroftheprovisions.96Incontrastwiththelegalframeworksmentionedabove,theDirectiveisalmostcompletelysilentonthemandatorycharacterofitsprovisions.Nordoesitindicatethattheestablishedlevelofpersonaldataprotectionisofamandatorycharacter.Giventhatinpractice,individualsareoften‘weakerparties’–duetothefactthattheyrarelypossessthesufficientinformation,aswellasresources,tocontroltheuseoftheirpersonaldataandthustheircontrolasabargainingtoolinexchangeforcertainprivileges–itissomewhatsurprisingtonotethattheEuropeanlawmakersdidnotinterveneincontractualrelationshipsontheprocessingofpersonaldata.Nevertheless,giventhattheDirectiveissilentonthemandatorycharacteroftheDirective’slevelofprotection,thelogicalconclusionmustbethatindividualsarefreetoregulatebycontractthecollection,use,distributionandfurtherprocessingoftheirpersonaldata.97Hence,contrarytowhatmightbeexpected,theEuropeanDirectiveallowspartiestocommerciallyexploittheirpersonaldatawithoutanyinterferencefromtheEuropeandataprotectionregime.

Theconclusionthatfreedomofcontractprevailsintheareaofpersonaldataprotectiondoesnot,ofcourse,meanthatthecontractingpartiesmayfreelydeterminetheirrelationship.Clearly,theprincipleoffreedomofcontractdoesnotallowpartiestoreacharesultthatismostunfavorabletoaweakerparty.Whenpartiescontractontheprocessingofpersonaldata,theirrelationshipisaffectedbygeneralprinciplesof

91. Directive96/9/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof11March1996onthelegalprotectionofdatabases,OJ1996L077/20.Art.15:‘AnycontractualprovisioncontrarytoArticles6(1)and8shallbenullandvoid’.

92. CouncilDirective85/374/EECof25July1985ontheapproximationofthelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprovisionsoftheMemberStatesconcerningliabilityfordefectiveproducts,OJ1985,L210/29.Art.12:‘TheliabilityoftheproducerarisingfromthisDirectivemaynot,inrelationtotheinjuredperson,belimitedorexcludedbyaprovisionlimitinghisliabilityorexemptinghimfromliability’.

93. Directive97/7/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof20May1997ontheprotectionofconsumersinrespectofdistancecontracts,OJ1997L144/19.Art.12:‘(1)TheconsumermaynotwaivetherightsconferredonhimbythetranspositionofthisDirectiveintonationallaw.(2)MemberStatesshalltakethemeasuresneededtoensurethattheconsumerdoesnotlosetheprotectiongrantedbythisDirectivebyvirtueofthechoiceofthelawofanon-membercountryasthelawapplicabletothecontractifthelatterhascloseconnectionwiththeterritoryofoneormoreMemberStates’.

94. SeeArt.7.Directive99/44/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof25May1999oncertainaspectsofthesaleofconsumergoodsandassociatedguarantees,OJ1999L171/12.

95. SeeArt.10.Directive00/31/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof8June2000oncertainlegalaspectsofinformationsocietyservices,inparticularelectroniccommerce,intheInternalMarket,OJ2000L178/1.

96. Art.8(2)(a)howeverprovidesthatmemberstatesareallowedtoprohibittheprocessingofsensitivedataevenwhenthedatasubjecthasconsentedtotheuseofthesedata.

97. Seeindetailonthis:Cuijpers,supranote63.

244 Corien Prins

law(e.g.toprotectweakerpartiestoacontract)onthebasisofwhichanumberofmeasureshavebeenestablishedtoredesignthebalanceofpowerbetweencontractingparties.MostsystemsofcontinentalEuropeanlawcontainavastarrayoflegalrulesthatlimitthestrongerparty’sfreedomofcontract.Thesemeasuresrangefromtheimpositionofsubstantiveprovisionsthatstrengthenthepositionoftheweakerparty,totheprohibitionofcertaincontractualclausesthataredeemedunfairorexcessive,andthelegalobligationstofulfillcertainformalitiesatthetimeoftheconclusionofthecontract(amongthem,theformofthecontractandtheinformationtobeprovidedtotheweakerparty).Itisclearthatalsointhesphereofpersonaldata,theseandothermeasuresallowthecourtstointerpret,supplement,orcorrecttheinequalitiesofbargainingpowerbetweencontractingparties.

TheconclusionthattheEUDirectiveclearlyfacilitatesacontractualapproachtoprotectingpersonaldatamayevenbetakenonestepfurther.ForitcouldbearguedthatutilitarianconsiderationsweighheavilyundertheEuropeansystem.Asknown,theDirectivehastwoaims:1)achieveaharmonizedminimumlevelofpersonaldataprotectionintheEuropeanUnionand2)abolishexistingbarrierstotheflowofpersonaldatabetweenEUmemberstatesbyallowingthefreeflowofpersonaldatawithintheEuropeanUnion.WhensubsequentlyconsideringtheconstitutingprinciplesoftheDirective,onenotesthatinessence,theregimehasnothingtodowiththetraditionalhumanrights-basedperspectiveofcontrolandrespectfortheprivatesphere.Instead,theDirectiveworkswithasetofprinciplesoffairpersonaldataprocessingwhichhaveverylittletodowithfundamentalinterestsessentialtoindividualautonomy,dignityandfreedom.ThestartingpointoftheEuropeanlegalregimeisthatprocessingofpersonaldataisinprincipleallowed,providedthatitisdoneinaccordancewiththestipulatedprinciplesoffairness,finality,transparency,proportionality,confidentiality,andcontrol.

AlthoughtheEUDirectivefavorsutilitarianconsiderationsinprotectingpersonaldataaswellasallowingforprivatearrangementsregardingthelevelofprotection,thisdoesnotimplythattheframeworkacknowledgespropertyinterestinpersonaldata.TheEUregimedoesn’tevenexpresslyrecognizeasastartingprinciplethelegalrightofanindividualtocontroltheuse,disclosureorfurtherdistributionofhisdata.Onecouldevenarguethatitisnotthedatasubjectwhodetermineswhathappenstohispersonaldataandmaypursuehisparticularinterestswithrespecttothesedata.Instead,itistheprocessorofthepersonaldatawho,providedheactsinaccordancewiththeseaboveprinciples,mayfreelycollect,use,controlandfurtherprocesspersonaldata,unlessoneoftheenumeratedexceptionsapplies.Hence,thepropertyperspectiveisdefinitelynotthestarting-pointtakenundertheEUDirective:itdoesnotforbidtheprocessingofpersonaldatawithoutthepermissionoftheindividual,itmerelyguaranteesafairuseofpersonaldata.

Nevertheless,whenviewedfromtheperspectiveofcontrolrights,theEuropeansystemdoesoffersomeindicationsthatindividualshavebeenaccordedwithcertaininstruments.Firstly,Article14(b)oftheDirectivestipulatesthatanindividualmayobjecttotheuseofhispersonaldatafordirectmarketingpurposes(absoluterighttoopt-out).Althoughthisprovisiondoesnotrestrictinadvancetheprocessingofpersonaldatafordirectmarketingpurposes,anindividualmayapplythisprovisionto


controltheuseofhisdata.Secondly,Article7oftheDirectivementionspermissiblegroundsforprocessingpersonaldata.Inacommercialsetting,fouroftheseappearparticularlyrelevant.Fromthesefour,threeprovidethedatasubjectwithatleastsomepowertoinfluencetheprocessingofhisdata.Firstofall,Article7(a)allowsprocessingwhenthedatasubjecthasunambiguouslygivenhisconsent.Secondly,Article7(b)makesitpermissibletoprocesspersonaldataifthisisnecessaryfortheperformanceofacontracttowhichthedatasubjectisparty,orinordertotakestepsattherequestofthedatasubjectpriortoenteringintoacontract.Finally,Article7(f)allowstheprocessingincasethis‘isnecessaryforthepurposesofthelegitimateinterestspursuedbythecontrollerorbythethirdpartyorpartiestowhomthedataaredisclosed,exceptwheresuchinterestsareoverriddenbytheinterestsforfundamentalrightsandfreedomsofthedatasubjectwhichrequireprotectionunderArticle1(1).’98Althoughineverydaypracticethesegroundsofferdatasubjectsverylittlepowertodeterminetheactualuseoftheirpersonaldata,thegroundsdovestsomeformoflegalcontrolinindividuals.Finally,Article8isworthdiscussinghere.Thisprovisiongrantsspecialprotectionto‘sensitivedatarevealingethnicorigin,politicalopinions,religiousorphilosophicalbeliefs,trade-unionmembership,andtheprocessingofdataconcerninghealthorsexlife’.Suchdatamayonlybeprocessedundercertainclearly-definedcircumstances,oneofwhichbeingthatthedatasubjecthasgivenhisexplicitconsent.Sinceallothercircumstanceslistedarerarelypresentinacommercialsetting,theprocessingofsensitivedataforcommercialpurposeswillalmostalwaysrequiretheexplicitconsentofanindividual.99Therequirementofexplicitconsentimpliesthattheindividualmusthaveclearlyindicatedhisassenttotheprocessing.Sincenon-sensitivedatacansometimesbelinkedtosensitivedata(e.g.navigationaldataonanindividual’svisitstowebsitesthatcanbelinkedtohealth-relateddata),theimplicationsoftheconsentrequirementmaygobeyondthescopeofpuresensitivedata.

TheabovediscussionshowsthattheEuropeanDirectiveisclearlynotshapedfromthebasicperspectiveofanindividual’sautonomyandchoiceregardinghispersonaldata.Nevertheless,someinstrumentsofcontrolandpowerareincludedintheregimeandsomemaythusclaimthat,atleastinacommercialsetting,apropertyapproachmaynot,intheend,besuchaverystrangephenomenonundertheEuropeanregimeafterall.OnecouldevenarguethattheEuropeanlegalsystemondataprotectionappearsmorereceptivetowardsapropertyapproachthantheAmericansystem.Butwouldvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldataofferindividualsabetterinstrumentwithwhichtoprotecttheirinterests,thussolvingpresent-dayproblemsofdataprotection?Whilevestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatamayindeedhavesomeappeal,albeitforrhetoricalpurposes,theobviousquestioniswhattheconsequencesofsuchanapproachwouldbe.Issuchanapproachviable,and

98. InthesituationscoveredbyArt.7(f),theindividualmayobjecttotheuseofhispersonaldata.However,incontrasttotheusefordirectmarketingpurposes,theopt-outrightisherenotabsolute.

99. See also:C.Kuner,European Data Privacy Law and Online Business,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress2003,p.70.

246 Corien Prins

woulditreallyoffertheclaimedprospectsofachievingahigherlevelofpersonaldataprotection?

7. REFLECTIONSONPROPERTYINPERSONALDATA

Asmentionedearlier,notallcommentatorsapplaudtheideaofanexplicitlegalrecognitionofthepropertizationofpersonaldata.Someevenarguethatadiscussionoverapropertyapproachversusadignityapproachdoesnotseemespeciallyhelpfulbecausesuchadiscussionundulyprivilegesformoversubstance.100

Afirstreasonwhyitisarguedthatapropertyrightsapproachcannotplayanadequateroleinprotectingprivacyrelatestotheconceptofpropertyitself.Propertyisnotsimplyanaturalorinnatequalityofobjects,sincethedefinitionoftheconceptisitselfasocialconstruct.101Propertyisbasedon‘socioeconomicfactsandonthatwhichasocietyconsiderslegitimate.’102Moreover,asEtzioniargues,differentsocietiesdefinedifferentobjectsandinterestsasappropriateorinappropriateobjectsofprivatepropertyintheirattempttobalanceindividualinterestswiththebroaderinterestsofsociety.Hence,thepropertyconceptcannotprovideastrongandprivilegedgroundforprotection:‘…relyingonprivatepropertyrightstoserveasabasisforprivacyhardlygivesthisrighttheprivilegedstandingthatindividualsclaimforit.’103

InreactiontothespecificsuggestionmadebyLessigtoassignindividualsapropertyinterestinhisorherpersonaldata,Schwartzhasdrawntheattentiontoseveralotherstructuraldifficultieswithsuchapropertizationapproach.Hemen-tionsamongothersthelackofcollectiveaction(‘individualprivacywishesneedtobefeltcollectivelyinthemarket’104)andthephenomenonofboundedrationality(‘defaultrulesandformtermscanhavegreatpsychologicalforceandarelikelytorewardthosewhootherwisehavegreatpower(…)Specifically,inthecurrentmarket,thismovewillbenefitthepartieswhoprocessandshareourinformationandnotthosewhohelpusplacelimitsonthisprocessing.Asaresultofthiscurrentpowerdynamic,individualsfacedwithstandardizedtermsandexpectedtofendforthemselveswithprivacy-propertyandavailabletechnologyarelikelytoacceptwhateverdataprocessorsofferthem.’105Inlinewiththisargumentothercommenta-torshavecontendedalsothatthebenefitsofaccordingapropertyrightareunclear,asitwouldbeaPyrrhicvictory:onlinecommerceisincreasinglygovernedby(standardized)contractsbetweenprovidersandusers,andlessbyapriori(default)

100. ComparetheexcellentarticlebyJ.KangandB.Buchner,‘PrivacyinAtlantis’,18Harvard Journal of Law & Technology229-267(2004).

101. A.Etzioni,The Limits of Privacy,NewYork,BasicBooks1999,p.201.102. Id.,p.200.103. Id.,p.201.104. P.M.Schwartz,‘BeyondLessig’sCodeforInternetPrivacy:CyberspaceFilters,Privacy-Control,

andFairInformationPractices’,2000Wisconsin Law Review743-788(2000),p.767.105. Id.,p.768.


entitlementstructures.106Intheday-to-daypracticeoftheonlineworld,businessesandotherusersofpersonaldataapply‘takeitorleaveit’termsunderthethreatofexclusionordenialofaccesstodigitalservices.Individualsthusappearto‘gladly’consenttocertainusesoftheirpersonaldata.Evenwhentheydonotwishtoconsentorarereluctanttodoso,theyareneverthelessforcedtoconsentbecausewithoutuse-rights,companiesareunwillingtoprovidetheserviceswanted.Inotherwords,vestingapropertyrightwouldnotmakeanydifferencebecausebargainingwouldappearimpossible,orconsumerswouldhavenoeffectivechoiceinthematter.107Asuggestedsolutionwouldbethedevelopmentofglobalminimalbackgroundstandardsofdueprocessandpublicpolicylimitsonprivateagreements.Suchanapproachisseenasanecessaryingredientforself-orderinginanon-lineworld.108Othersarguealongthisline,claimingthattodoanygood,thepropertyrightmighthavetobeinalienableandwaivableonlyincertainlimitedcircumstances(comparabletothemoralrightsunderintellectualpropertylaw).

Anotherremarkthathasbeenmadeisthatapropertizationofpersonaldatawouldmerelyaddresstheproblemsofpersonaldataprotectioninrelationtoprivatesectoruse:‘Consumersmayhavesomebargainingpowerwithadirectmarketingfirmthatwantstotradelistsofnamedindividuals;citizens,however,havenobar-gainingpowerwhenfacedwithawarrantoranyotherpotentiallyprivacy-invasivetechniquebackedupbythesanctionsofthestate.’109And,astheauthorsremindus,wasitnotthepowerofgovernmentagenciesthatwereconsideredtoposethemostsignificantchallenges?

Creatingapropertyrightinpersonaldatamayalsobeobjectionablebecauseactuallylicensingallthenecessarydatawouldbecostly,inconvenient,andtime-con-suming.Ifwevestedapropertyrightinpersonaldata,itwouldmeanthatcompaniesandorganizationshavetoobtainpermissionfromeachofthehundredsofmillionsofindividualswhosepersonaldatatheywantedtoprocess.‘Atthemosttriviallevel,wewillallbefillingoutalotmoreforms.Whilethismaybeanannoyancefortheindividualsinvolved,thosewhoarecompilinglargeamountsofdatamayfindtheaggregateeffortandcostdaunting.’110Proponentsofownershiprightshavereactedbyarguingthatbyapplyingtechnologicalmeans,thecostofexpressingpermissionsalongsidecustomerinformationmayreducesodramaticallythatitisnoweasierandcheaperforconsumerstomanagethepropertyrightsovertheirpersonalinformationthanitisforthecompaniescollectingit.111Zittrain,describingtheuseofpersonaldatainthemedicalarena,madetheclaimthat‘trusted’architectures,i.e.hardware

106. Radin,supranote84,p.18.107. See also:DeHert,supranote59,p.409.108. RadinandPolkWagner,supranote13.109. C.J.BennettandC.D.Raab,The Governance of Privacy. Policy instruments in global perspective,

Aldershot,AshgatePublishing,2003,p.17.110. Lemley,supranote13,p.1552;Samuelson,supranote27,at:1137.111. SeerecentlyLessig,supranote10,atp.263:‘Myassumptionsaboutthevalueofaproperty

systemassumethatthenegotiationsandpreferencesaboutprivacywouldbeexpressedandnegotiatedinthebackgroundautomatically.ThiswastheaspirationofthetechnologyPlatformforPrivacyPreferences(P3P)initsfirstdescription.’

248 Corien Prins

andsoftwarethattakenoteofvariousentitlementstopersonaldatatheystoreandthatautomaticallyenforcethoseentitlements,couldhelpnegotiatetheallocationofuserightstopersonaldata.Thinkingintermsofprivicationarchitecturescouldbalancethelegitimateinterestsofpartieswhowishtousedataandtheinterestsofindividualswho‘produce’thesedata.112

Butthisdoesnotsolvetheproblementirely.Therearemanylegitimateusesofindividuals’personaldata,meaningthatanextensivelistofexceptionstothepropertyrightwouldhavetobedrawnup,andwemayquestionwhetherthespecificsoftheseexceptionsmayalwaysbetranslatedintotechnicalcode.Also,wemightconcludethatcertainusesarenotacceptableandconsentcouldneverbegiven,whichagainwouldnecessitatealistof‘unacceptable’uses(e.g.intheareaofsensitivedata).113Inotherwords,establishingapropertyrightwouldattheveryleastimplytheintroductionofsomesortofstatutorydelineationofpermissibleandimpermissibleusesofpersonaldata.Butintheend,wouldsuchasystemnotbeverysimilartothepresentframeworkestablishedundertheEUDirectiveonpersonaldataprotection?

Vestingapropertyrightinpersonaldataalsowouldconfrontuswiththedif-ficultquestion,inwhatsortsof‘personaldata’propertyrightsshouldbevested?Exactlywhatdatashouldandwillfallwithintheambitofthepropertyright?AsnotedbyLemley,themorebroadlywedefinetheright,themorewewillinterferewitheverydaycommerce.Inillustratingthispointhementionstheexampleofstockmarketdatathatareaggregatedfrombillionsofindividualbitsofinformation,eachrepresentinganidentifiablefinancialtransactionbyanindividualoracorporation.‘DoI“own”knowledgeofthepriceatwhichIboughtstockinMicrosoft?Ifnot,howcanwedistinguishthatinformationfromotheraspectsofmyfinanciallifethatIwouldverymuchliketokeepprivate?Andifso,willwepreventtheWall Street Journalfromreportingstockprices?’114

IfweweretofollowthedefinitionlaiddownintheEUDirective,thescopeofpersonaldatawouldberatherbroad.115Anillustrationthatotheropinionsmayexist,however,isthedebatedUKDurantCase.116Inthisdecision,handeddownby

112. J.Zittrain,‘WhatthePublisherCanTeachthePatient:IntellectualPropertyandPrivacyinanEraofTrustedPrivication’,52Stanford Law Review1201-1250(2000).

113. SimilartoArt.8(2)(a)oftheEUDirectiveondataprotection,providingthatmemberstatesareallowedtoprohibittheprocessingofsensitivedataevenwhenthedatasubjecthasconsentedtotheuseofthesedata.

114. Lemley,supranote13,p.1550.115. Art.2(a)oftheEUDirectiveondataprotectiondefinespersonaldataastomean‘anyinformation

relatingtoanidentifiedoridentifiablenaturalperson(‘datasubject’);anidentifiablepersonisonewhocanbeidentified,directlyorindirectly,inparticularbyreferencetoanidentificationnumberortooneormorefactorsspecifictohisphysical,physiological,mental,economic,culturalorsocialidentity’.

116. Inthiscase,Mr.Durantsoughtdisclosureofinformationconcerninghiscomplaintsinordertore-openhiscaseagainstBarclaysBankand/ortosecureaninvestigationofthisbank’sconduct.Aspartofhisactivities,DurantaskedtheFinancialServicesAuthority(FSA)todiscloseinformationrelatingtohiscomplaint,basingthisrequestonsection7oftheUKDataProtectionAct1998.TheFSAdisclosedsomeoftheinformationrequested,butrefusedtoprovideotherinformation


aCourtofAppealon8December2003,averystrictinterpretationofwhatamountsto‘personaldata’wasgiven:wheneverthefocusofcertaininformationissomethingotherthananindividualperson(butdoesincludeinformation‘about’anindividual),suchinformationwillnot‘relateto’theindividualand,therefore,doesnotqualifyaspersonaldata.117Inotherwords,whendetailsofawebsitevisitor(IPaddress,name)arecollectedandthosedetailsareinprinciplenottobeusedtoprofileanindividuals’spendingpreferences,butinsteadarecollectedforfraud-detection(andthusmaypossiblyhaveatalaterstageimplicationsforindividualpersons),suchinformationwillnotbeconsideredpersonaldata.118Whereasdifferentopinionsonthescopeofthecriterion‘personaldata’mayhavecertainproblematicconsequences,theyarenotasfar-reachinginsituationsinwhichpersonaldataareworthmoneyfortheveryreasonthattheyareanindividual’sproperty.Hence,akeyproblemwillbethatvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldataimpliesthat‘someone’definespreciselywhatisworthapropertyright.Butwhothenwillmakethepaternalisticchoicebetweendatathatareandarenotwithintheambitofanindividual’spersonalproperty?Thelegislatures,thecourts,orindividualsthemselves?119Giventhatthedecisionwillnotmerelybeinfluencedbyeconomicfactorsbutalsobymoralandsocietalconsiderations,whichagainmaybehighlydependentonthespecificsofthecontextinwhichthedatamaybe‘sold’and‘used’,thepropertyapproachwouldfaceseveredifficulties.120

Inthecontextofdefiningtheproperscopeoftheterm‘personaldata’,oneadditionalissueneedstobeconsidered.Incertainsituations,personaldatamaynotberelatedtomerelyoneuniqueindividual.Onesuchsituationwouldbewhereotherindividuals(e.g.familymembersorinthecaseofgeneticdata,membersofthesamebiologicalgroup)couldalsohaverightstocertainpersonaldatabecausethepersonaldataare‘shared’data.Theseotherindividualscouldalsobeconsideredas‘datasubjects’withalltherightsthatfollowfromthis.Establishingapropertyrightinsuchdatawould,attheveryleast,implysharedexclusiverights.Given

aswellas‘redacted’otherpiecesofinformation(inordertoprotectiontherightsofthirdpersonswhocouldbeidentifiedonthebasisofthatinformation).DurantdisagreedwiththeapproachtakenbytheFSAandtookthemattertocourt.Michael John Durant v. Financial Services Authority,[2003]EWCACiv1746,CourtofAppeal(CivilDivision),8thDecember2003.Thefulltextofthejudgmentcanbefoundvia<www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/1746.html>.

117. ‘Merementionofthedatasubjectinadocumentheldbyadatacontrollerdoesnotnecessarilyamounttohispersonaldata.Whetheritdoessoinanyparticularinstancedependsonwhereitfallsinacontinuumofrelevanceorproximitytothedatasubjectasdistinct,say,fromtransactionsormattersinwhichhemayhavebeeninvolvedtoagreateroflesserdegree…Inshort,itisinformationthataffectshisprivacy,whetherhispersonalorfamilylife,businessorprofessionalcapacity…’

118. SeethecommentarybytheUKInformationCommissioner,‘The‘Durant’CaseanditsimpactontheinterpretationoftheDataProtectionAct1998’.Availableat:<www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk>.

119. See also:Gutwirth,supranote13,pp.39-41.120. Letaloneotherdifficultquestionssuchas:howdowecreateremunerationpaymentschemes;

realizecommercialpersonaldatatransferonbehalfofchildrenandmentallyillpeople;sortoutactualownersofpersonaldatafromfake?

250 Corien Prins

thenatureofcertainpersonaldata(whensensitiveorfinancialdataareinvolved),itisconceivablethatconflictsarisebetweenthedifferenttitleholders,eitherwhenitcomestosellingtherightsorkeepingthedataconfidential.Individualswho‘share’apropertyrightincertainpersonaldatamayhavedifferentopinionsasregardsthequestionwhethertheirprivacyshouldbeaddressedinmarketterms.Somemayfavorthesellingoftheirdata,whereasothermayforcefullyrejectsuchapropositionbecauseitwouldcompromisetheirrighttoself-determination,dignityandautonomy.Giventhepresent-daydevelopmentstowardsgroupprofilingandmultipleidentities,therewillsoonnolongerbesuchasimplescenarioofindividualdatabelongingtoindividualpeople.

Afinalremarkrelatestothecomparisonmadewithintellectualpropertyrights.Asmentionedearlier,variouscommentatorshavemadeananalogywithintellectualpropertyrights.However,whenanalyzedmoreclosely,propertyrightsinpersonaldataappeartobeofadifferentnaturethanpropertyrightsinintellectualworks,puttingtheusefulnessofsuchananalogyindoubt.Firstly,asnotedbyLemley,intellectualpropertyexistsonlywherethereisapublicgoodsproblemandpeopleneedincentivestoinvest,i.e.tospendtimeandmoneyinthecreationofnewworks.121Withpersonaldata,bycontrast,thereisnosuchneed.Thecentralaimisquitetheopposite:thesuppressionoftheircollection,useandfurtherdistribution.Secondly,personaldataareusuallygeneratednaturally:bydoingcertainthingsoractingaccordingtocertainpreferences.Contrarytoacopyrightedwork,personaldataarenotthefruitsofourintentionaleffortstocreatethesedata.Thus,thediffer-encesinthepropertyregimessurroundingcopyrightandapossiblepropertyregimesurroundingpersonaldatarightsisthatintheformercase,thereisanexplicittheoryoftherelationsbetweenprivateproperty,intellectualproducts,andsocialbenefit.TheUSConstitutionexplicitlystipulatesthatpropertyrightsaregrantedinorderto‘promotetheprogressofscienceandusefularts.’Creativeworksandinventionsaregoodforsociety.Noonewouldinventandcreateworksiftheydidn’tgetpaidforit.SoUSCongressmayassignpropertyrightstoinventors.Thereisnosucharticulationofatheoryrelatingpropertyrightsinpersonalinformationtoabroadsocialgoal.Anduntilthereis,untilitisclearwhat‘social’benefitsaccruefromthoseprivatepropertyrights,oneshouldbehesitanttoendorsethem.Finally,wewouldnotwanttobefullydeprivedofcontroloverourpersonaldata,ourbehavioralpreferencesorbuyinghabits.Transferofpropertyrightsinpersonaldataaboutourselves,thusalienatingourprivacyforcommercialandeconomicbenefit,wouldseemanuncomfortablescenario.Anon-exclusivelicensewoulddo,makingitdistinctfromintellectualpropertyrights.122Thisdistinctionrelatestotheargumentthattheconceptofintellectualpropertyrightsisbasedontheideaofexchangefor

121. Lemley,supranote13,p.1550.122. See howeverSholtz:‘…theconsumerretainsrightstothepropertyevenafterithasbeentransferred

tothecommercialorganization(undercontract).Anobviousanalogywithanotherpowerfulformofinformationpropertyrights,namelyintellectualpropertyrights,isappropriate.WhenIbuyaCDfromamajorHollywoodlabel,theHollywoodlabelstillretainpropertyrightstothemusiceventhoughtheCDisnowinmypossession.Ihavenotsomuchpurchasedpropertyrightsto


value,whereasprivacy,ontheotherhand,isill-suitedtobeingdefinedintermsofexchange.123

8. THECOSTSOFAPROPERTYRIGHTSAPPROACH

Forvariousreasons,commentatorsandinterestgroupshavearguedthatvestingpropertyrightsinpersonaldatawouldalsobedetrimentaltovariousinterestsandthattherefore,thecostsofsuchanapproachwouldbetoohigh.Afirstobjectiontocreatingapropertyrightinpersonaldataisthatthiswouldriskenablingmore,notless,commodificationandthusproducingless,notmore,privacy.124Paradoxically,aprotectionofpersonaldatabyaccordingdatasubjectsapropertyrightwouldincreasethevalueofinformationandthustheincentiveforbusinessestoobtain(bywhatevermeans)thesedata.125Framingtheprivacydebateintermsofproprietaryrightsandtradeindataneglectsthefactthatwhatdatasubjectsreallyseekis‘toguaranteeindividualscontrolovertheirpersonaldata’.126Welack,asJulieCohenargued,‘awordfordescribingcontroloverthingswithoutlegalorbeneficialownershipofthem’.127Whatismore,treatingpersonaldatasolelyasamatterofindividualnegotiationandpartyautonomyincontractingarrangementsneglectsthemorefundamentalunderlyingvaluesofprivacy,aswellasthecollectivesocietalinterestsindignityandautonomyofindividuals.Opponentsofthestrengtheningofdataprotectionbymeansofpropertyclaimsthereforeconcludethatinvoking‘platonicidealsofownership(…)justavoidstacklingthehardpolicyquestions(…)’.128

Anothercost-relatedargumentagainstestablishingapropertyrightinpersonaldataseestoapointofcriticismheardinthedebatesonpublicityrights.Hereitisarguedthatacommodificationofpublicityrightswouldleadtounacceptablecostsintheformoflostuses,becauseindividualsmaynotalwaysadequatelycapturethevalueoftheirbenefits.129ThisargumentisbasedonLandesandPosner’stheorythatreturnsthatlieinthedistantfutureareusuallydeeplydiscountedbyindividualsandhavelittleeffectontheirpresentdecisions.130Thiswouldmeanthatindividualscouldforegothegrantingofalicensefortheuseoftheirpersonaldataifanadequateremunerationcouldnotreasonablybeanticipated.131Thisargumentrelatestothe

themusicasIhavepurchasedalicensetolistentotheCDinmyownhomefornon-commercialpurposes.’Sholtz,supranote25.

123. Cohen,supranote41.124. Cohen,supranote41,p.1379;Litman,supranote2,p.1283.125. Litman,supranote2,p.1303.126. Cohen,supranote41,p.1379.127. Ibid.128. Id.,p.1436.129. Zimmerman,supranote7.130. Ontheeconomicargumentsinfavorofarightofpublicity,see:W.M.LandesandR.A.Posner,

‘AnEconomicAnalysisofCopyrightLaw’,18Journal of Legal Studies325-33,344-53(1989),pp.332-333.

131. Zimmerman,supranote7.

252 Corien Prins

largerproblemoftheinformationasymmetrythatexistsbetweencompaniesandconsumers.Itseemsverydifficultforindividualstounderstandwhatisactuallygoingonwhenonlinebusinessescollectanddistributetheirpersonaldata,besufficientlyattentivetotheimplicationsofsuchusefortheirproprietaryrights,letalonethattheycanverifywhatisreallygoingon.Hence,ingeneral,itappearsverydifficultforindividualstofullyunderstandthepossibilities,benefitsaswellasdangersoflicensingtheirpersonaldata.Takenonestepfurtherthisargumentrelatestothepositionthatindividualsneedtobeprotectedandthatrightsinpersonaldataprotectionshouldthereforebeinalienable,soastopreventunsophisticatedpeoplefrombeingluredorpressuredintogivinguptheirproprietaryrightswithoutunderstandingtheimplications.132

Afinalobjectiontovestingapropertyrightinpersonaldata–raisedinparticularbythedirectmarketingindustry–isthatsuchanapproachwouldinevitablyrestrictthefreeflowofpersonaldatathroughouttheeconomy.133Ifindividualscouldpreventthecollection,dissemination,oruseofdataaboutthemselves,asignificantportionofmoderncommercewouldnolongerbepossibleoreconomicallyvaluable.134Inotherwords,ifweweretoaddcontrolstoregulatetheflowofpersonaldata,wewouldtakeawaythevaluethatthemarketadds.Personaldatahavetobeavailabletoallbecausethisisnecessaryforsustaininginnovationandmarketincentives.But,ashasrecentlybeencontendedbyChanderandSunder,itmayfirstbequestionablewhetherthefreelyavailabledatamayindeedbeequallyusedandexploitedbyall.For,inpractice,‘differingcircumstances–includingknowledge,wealth,power,access,andability–rendersomebetterablethanotherstoexploitacommons.’135Thesedistributionalcircumstancesandlimitationsmayalsohamperthefreeavail-abilityandusabilityofpersonaldata.

Moreover,commentatorshaveclaimedthatthefreeflowofinformationargumentisflawed,arguingthatrestrictinginformationflowsalmostalwayscreatesvalue:‘Thetrickistogettheconstraintsthatgoverntheinformationflowjustright.Overlyrestrictivecontrolsdoreduceeconomicvalue,butontheotherhandcompletelyopenandfreetradeofinformation(asistrueofpersonalinformationexchangeintoday’seconomy)isusuallyveryinefficientaswell.Ahappymediumthatbalancestherightsoftheinformationproducerswiththeneedsoftheinformationconsumersisrequired.’136AnotherargumenthasbeenmadebyCohen,indicatingthat‘the

132. SeeonthispositionBergkamp,supranote58,p.123.Also:J.E.Cohen,‘DRMandPrivacy’,18Berkeley Technology Law Journal575-617(2003),para.III.B,arguingthatthedecisiontopromotethevaluesofself-determinationandhumandignity‘inthelawof‘privacy’whilesimultaneouslyenablingeasyevasionofaccountabilityvia‘contract’wouldbenothingshortofperverse.Takingtheseintangibleharmsseriouslyrequiresamoreconsistentapproach.’

133. Seee.g.B.B.Read,‘SearchingFartherForCustomerData’,PlanetIT,12December2000,citedin:Sholtz,supranote25,at:<firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_5/sholtz/index.html>.Availableat:<www.callcentermagazine.com/shared/article/showArticle.jhtml?articleId�8701704&classroom�>

134. Lemley,supranote13,p.1550.135. A.ChanderandM.Sunder,‘TheRomanceofthePublicDomain’,92California Law Review

1331-1373(2004),p.1331.136. Sholtz,supranote25,at:<firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_5/sholtz/index.html>


beliefthatmorepersonalinformationalwaysrevealsmoretruthisideology,notfact,andmustberecognizedassuchforinformationalprivacytohaveachance.’137AccordingtoCohen,theunhesitatingacceptanceofthe‘moreisbetter’argumentisdeeplyboundupwithliberalpoliticalphilosophy,andthisrepresentsoneofthekeyobstaclestoeffectuatingmeaningfulprotectionofpersonaldata.

Finally,withrespecttothefreeflowofinformationargument,thedifficultquestionarisesofbalancingpropertyinterestswithanotherinterestatstake,thatofpreservingthepublicdomain.Inthedebatesonpublicityrights,severalauthorshavearguedthatacommodificationofnameandfameandthusthecreationofapublicityrightwouldrepresentaseriousthreattothepublicdomain.138Moreover,theypointoutthatthelimitingprinciplesthataresaidtoplayanimportantroleinprotectingthepublicdomainhavelosttheirforceasourpresent-daylegalculturecomestorelymoreandmoreontheprivatizationmodel.Asmentionedearlier,thepublicdomainargumentisanoften-usedargumentagainstthepropertizationofvarioustypesofdata,creativeworks,humanbodyparts(humangenome),personalnameandfame,etc.Lately,thetopicofthepublicdomainhasreceivedconsiderableattentionandinthemeantimemanyquestionsinrelationtothehistory,theoryandfutureofthepublicdomainhavebeenposedanddiscussed.139Thefinalissueforthischapter’sanalysisisthereforetherelationshipbetweenthepublicdomainandvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldata.

9. COMMODIFICATIONOFPERSONALDATA,IDENTITIESANDTHEPUBLICDOMAIN

Therelationshipbetweenthepublicdomainandthecommodificationofpersonaldatacanbeapproachedindifferentways.Alikelyeffectoftheprivacy-as-propertysolution,asnotedearlierbyLitman,wouldofcoursebethatbyrecognizingpropertyrightsinpersonaldata,wefurtherendorsetheideathatfactsmaybeprivatelyownedandthattheownerofafactisentitledtorestricttheusestowhichthatfactmaybeput.140Inthisway,vestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatawouldhaveadetrimentaleffectontheequilibriumbetweenthepublicdomainandprivateproperty,becauseitwouldfurtherbroadenthescopeofexclusiverights.Suchabroadeningofthescopeofexclusiverightswouldclearlypresentadangeroussignalinthepresenttrendtowardsprotectionism.

137. JulieE.Cohen,‘Privacy,Ideology,andTechnology:AResponsetoJeffreyRosen’,89The Georgetown Law Journal,2029-2045(2001),p.2036.Availableat:<www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/privacyideology.pdf>.See also:D.Solove‘TheVirtuesofKnowingLess:JustifyingPrivacyProtectionsAgainstDisclosure’,53Duke Law Journal,967-1065(2003),arguingthatmoreinformationdoesnotnecessarilyleadtomoreaccuratejudgments.

138. Zimmerman,supranote7.139. Seee.g.thepaperspresentedattheNovember2001ConferenceatDukeUniversitySchoolof

Law.Availableat:<www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp66dWinterSpring2003p1.htm>140. Litman,supranote2,p.1294.

254 Corien Prins

However,wouldamovetowardsestablishingapropertyrightinpersonaldatamakeadifferenceinday-to-daypractice?Woulditindeedbedetrimentalofthepublicdomain?Giventhat,toalargeextent,individualsdependontheuseoftheirdataandthatpersonaldataarethemotorofourinformationsociety,amovetowardsalegallyrecognizedpropertyrightinpersonaldatawillineffectnotchangethefreepublicavailabilityandexchangeofthesedata.Itcouldbearguedthatatpresentpersonaldataarealmostbydefinitionpartofthepublicdomain.Theyaresowidelyavailable,obtainableandusablethat,forpracticalaswellaslegal141purposes,theyseemtobelongtothepublicdomain.Wouldthischangeifpropertyrightswerevestedinpersonaldata?Intheory:yes.Butinreality,personaldatawillcontinuetobewidelyavailabletoorganizations,companiesandthepublic.EvenifpersonaldataweretobeprotectedbytechnologiessuchasP3Porothertechnicalnegotiatingprotocols,individualswouldneverthelessbewilling,requiredorforcedtomaketheirdataavailableforusebythirdparties.Whiletitleholderstocopyrightedworksmaytoalargeextentoverseethelimitedconsequencesofthisdecision(effectsonroyaltiesobtainedand‘fame’),thesameisnottrueforindividualswhodecidenottoselltheirpersonaldata.Theaxisofvariationhereisnotthatstraightforward.For,incontrasttocopyrightedworks,decisionsonaccesstoanduseofpersonaldatamayhavefar-reachingandsometimesunknowneffectsonaperson’spositionandabilitiesineverydaylife.142Incontrasttocopyrightedworks,theissueofcontrolofpersonaldataisnotsomuchastowhetherpersonaldataareused.Instead,itisaboutthespecificsofthecontextinwhichthedataareprocessedaswellastheactualusestowhichpersonaldataareput.Tocapturetheessenceofthisprotectionneed,HelenNissenbaumrecentlyproposedtheintroductionoftheconceptcalled‘contextualintegrity’.Thisalternativeconceptwouldtieadequateprotectionforprivacytonormsofspecificcontexts,‘demandingthatinformationgatheringanddisseminationbeappropriatetothatcontextandobeythegoverningnormsofdistributionwithinit.’143

Anotherwaytoconsidertherelationshipbetweenthepublicdomainandthecommodificationofpersonaldataisbyfocusingnotsomuchontheindividualdata,butontheeffectsofthepresent-daytechnologies,inparticularthealmostlimitlesssurveillancecapacitiesofnewtechnologies,suchaslocation-basedsystems,radiofrequencyidentifiers(RFIDs)andon-linepersonalizationinstruments.Inasense,thesesurveillancetechniquesrequirethatweshiftourattentionfromindividual

141. Aswasdiscussedearlier,thepresentdataprotectionregimesareconstructedalongthelinesoffairinformationprocessing.Inprinciple,theuseandprocessingispersonaldataisfree.See alsoSimonG.DavieswhoarguesthattheEuropeanDirectiveonpersonaldataprotectiondoesalmostnothingtopreventorlimitthecollectionofpersonalinformation.S.G.Davies,‘Re-EngineeringtheRighttoPrivacy:HowPrivacyHasBeenTransformedfromaRighttoaCommodity’,inP.E.AgreandM.Rotenberg(eds.),Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape,Cambridge,MITPress1997,pp.156-157.

142. Seeforillustrationsofthis,thecontributionsin:D.Lyon(ed.),Surveillance as Social Sorting. Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination,London,NewYork,Routledge,2003.

143. H.Nissenbaum, ‘PrivacyasContextual Integrity’,79Washington Law Review119-157(2004).


setsofpersonaldatatowardthestatisticalmodels,profilesandthealgorithmswithwhichindividualsareassignedtoacertaingroupor‘identity’.Forthesemodelsandalgorithmsareprivatelyowned,andthusunavailableforpubliccontestation.Buttheinterestsofpersonaldataprotectionseemtorequirethattheyaremadeknowntothepublicandthusarepartofthepublicdomain.Letmediscussthispointinsomemoredetail.

Ourbehaviorinthe‘publicdomain’isincreasinglymonitored,captured,stored,usedandanalyzedtobecomeprivately-ownedknowledgeaboutpeople,theirhabitsandsocialidentity.Indeed,thetermcommodificationofpersonaldatamaylooseitssignificanceonceweacknowledgethistrendtowardacommodification of identities and behavior.Itisthistrendthatislackinginthepresentdebateonprivacyandproperty.Personaldataarenotusedandprocessedanewandinisola-tioneachtimeacompanyacquiresasetofpersonaldata.Incontemporarysociety,‘useful’informationandknowledgegoesbeyondtheindividualexchangeofasetofpersonaldata.In‘giving’hisorherpersonaldatatoacertainorganization,theindividualdoesnotprovidethesedataforuseinan‘objective’context.Today,theuseandthus‘value’ofpersonaldatacannotbeseenapartfromthespecificsofthecontextwithinwhichthesedataareused.Processingofpersonaldataoccurswithin,andisoftenstructuredby,social,economicandinstitutionalsettings,asisshownamongothersbyPhillipsinhisanalysisoftheimplicationsofubiquitouscomputingdevelopments.144

Thus,thequestionisnotsomuchwhetherpersonaldataareprocessed.Theyalwaysareandwillbe,whetherforlawfulorunlawfulpurposes.Itisanillusiontothinkthatvestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatawilllimittheuseofpersonaldata.Rather,theproblemishowpersonaldataareprocessed,inwhatcontext,andtowardswhatend.Therefore,thefocusofthediscussionshouldmoveawayfromentitlementsofsingledata.Whatweneedareinstrumentstoenhancethevisibilityofandourknowledgeabouthowpersonaldataareusedandcombined,onthebasisofwhatdataindividualsaretypified,bywhomandforwhatpurposes.InlinewithNissenbaum’stheoryofcontextualintegrity,‘itiscrucialtoknowthecontext–whoisgatheringtheinformation,whoisanalyzingit,whoisdisseminatingitandtowhom,thenatureoftheinformation,therelationshipsamongthevariousparties,andevenlargerinstitutionalandsocialcircumstances.’145Thisisamuchmorefundamentalissuewhichcannotbetackledbyvestingapropertyrightinindividualdata.Toillustratethisargument,Iwouldliketopointtowardsthedevelopmentofubiquitouscomputingenvironments.Ubiquitouscomputingwillcreateacontext-awareenvironmentinwhich,bymeansofthecoordinateduseofdatabases,sensors,micro-devicesandsoftwareagents,numeroussystemswillscanourenvironmentfordataandserveuswithparticularinformation,basedoncertainnotionsaboutwhatisappropriateforusasuniqueindividualpersonsgiven

144. Seeonthisargumentinfurtherdetail:D.J.Phillips,‘FromPrivacytoVisibility:Context,Identity,andPowerinUbiquitousComputingEnvironments’,23Social Text95-108(2005).

145. Nissenbaum,supranote143.

256 Corien Prins

theparticularsofdailylifeandcontext.Somethusarguethatubiquitoussystemswilltoalargeextentstructureanddetermineourdailylife,mediatingouridentity,socialrelationsandsocialpower.146Notonlywillourhomesandworkingofficesbecomepublicplaces,butoursocialidentitiesaswell.

Giventheseandotherdevelopmentsintheareaof‘pervasive’computing,thediscussionaboutprotectingpersonaldatamustbecomeadiscussionabouthowindividualsaretypified(uponwhatsocialontology,withwhatgoal?)andwhohastheinstrumentsandpowertodoso.147Inthissense,personaldataprotectionisnotaboutsomething(i.e.personaldata)thatcanbeowned.Ithaseverythingtodowithposition,socialordering,roles,individualstatusandfreedom.Therefore,protectionpersonaldatainourpresent-daysocietyassumesthecapabilitytoknowandtocontrolabouttypifyingpeople.148Itrequirestheavailabilityofinstrumentstoenableawarenessofthecontextinwhichpersonaldataareusedandtomonitorthedata-impressionthatindividualsareexhibitingtoothers.149Inotherwords,thediscussionontherelationshipbetweenthepublicdomainandthecommodificationofpersonaldatamustbeadiscussiononwhether,andtowhatextent,thestatisticalmodels,profilesandalgorithmsthatareusedtogenerateknowledgeaboutourindividualbehavior,socialandeconomicposition,aswellaspersonalinterests,belonginthepublicdomain.150Thecommodificationofouridentitiesandbehaviordoesnotneedapropertyrightsdebatewithrespecttoindividualandisolatedpersonaldata.Itrequiresadebateontheroleofthepublicdomaininprovidingthenecessaryinstrumentstoknowandtocontrolthewayinwhichouridentitiesaremade.151

146. Seee.g.thedifferentpaperspresentedattheworkshoponSocially-informedDesignofPrivacy-enhancingSolutions,4thInternationalConferenceonUbiquitousComputing(UBICOMP02),Göteborg,Sweden,September2002.Availableat:<guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2002/pri-vacyworkshop/>

147. See:Phillips,supranote144.148. See:J.E.J.Prins,‘ThePropertizationofPersonalDataandIdentities’,8.3Electronic Journal of

Comparative Law(October2004),<www.ejcl.org/83/art83-1.html>149. SeePhillips,supranote144.Also:D.H.Nguyen,E.D.Mynatt,‘PrivacyMirrors:Understanding

andShapingSocio-technicalUbiquitousComputingSystems’,Georgia Institute of Technology Technical Report(2002)Availableat:<quixotic.cc.gt.atl.ga.us/~dnguyen/writings/PrivacyMirrors.pdf>

150. Moreover,individualsshouldbeabletocontestthatcertaindeterminationsaremade,toobjecttocertainuse,andtoaskforalternativeuse.

151. Earlier,Vedderhassuggestedintroducingthenewconceptof‘categoricalprivacy’.Thisconceptislargelybasedontheconceptofindividualprivacy,butincludesprivacyasregardsinformationthatisnolongeridentifiabletopersons,becausesuchinformationmaypossiblystillhavenegativeconsequencesforgroupmembers.A.Vedder,‘MedicalData,NewInformationTechnologiesandtheNeedforNormativePrinciplesOtherThanPrivacyRules’,inM.FreemanandA.Lewis(eds.),Law and Medicine,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2000,pp.441-459.


10. CONCLUSION

Inconclusion,letmerepeatthemainfindingsofthischapter.First,Ihavesuggestedthatalthoughitisalltoooftenarguedthatthecreationofapropertyrightisnotinlinewiththecontinentalhumanrights-basedapproachtoprivacy,theEuropeansystemcertainlyoffersleewayforapropertyrightsmodel.ThereareclearopeningsunderEuropeanlawforautilitarianperspectiveonpersonaldataprotection,anditevencouldbearguedthattheEuropeandataprotectionsystemismorereceptivetowardsapropertyapproachthantheAmericansystem.

Second,inreflectinguponthepossibilitytovestsomeformofpropertyrightinpersonaldata,Ihavetoucheduponseveralconsequencesofthepropertyrightsapproachthatdoseemtohaveacertainappeal.Furtheranalysisreveals,however,thatdoubtsriseaboutwhethersuchanapproachwouldindeedoffertheclaimedprospectsofachievingahigherlevelofpersonaldataprotection.Also,vestingapropertyrightinpersonaldatawoulddiffertoaconsiderableextentfromwell-knownpropertyrights,suchascopyrights.Oneofmykeyargumentswasthattheuseofpersonaldatacannotbeviewedintheisolatedperspectiveofonesinglepieceofinformationtobeusedbyoneorganizationforaveryspecificpurpose.Givendevelopmentssuchasubiquitouscomputing,theuseofpersonaldatawillincreasinglyoccurwithin,andbestructuredby,social,economicandinstitutionalizedsettings.Ihavesuggestedthatdataprotectionmechanismsmustthereforebestructuredalonglinesofcontrolandvisibilityinrelationtoidentities,insteadofownershipofindividualdata.Forinorderforindividualstoeffectivelyprotecttheirdata,theyshouldbegiventheinstrumentstoknowandunderstandhowtheirsocialandeconomicidentitiesareconstructed,influencedandused.152Thisrequiresadebateontheroleofthepublicdomaininprovidingthenecessaryinstrumentsforusetoknowandtocontrolhowour‘lives’are‘created’.

152. AlsoPhillips,supranote144.

Download - Chapter x Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and ... · like intellectual property thieves, what they steal is information rather than material objects. What they are stealing

Top Related