North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Chair: Nicolette D’Angelo
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Chair: Nicolette D’Angelo
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Contents
Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3
Introduction to NATO.….………………………...……………………...…..3
Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic………….....……………..……………4
History of the Topic…..…………..………..……………………….……….…………6
Current Status/Key Issues……………………….……………..…………...…………9
Country Policy.....…………………………………………….……………………….13
Keywords……………………………………....………………...…………….…..….17
Questions for Consideration………..…………….………………...…….……….…...17
Bibliography……….................……………………………..……………………...…...19
Topic B: Counter-terrorism.……………....…………………..……………..21 History of the Topic..……………………..……………………….……….…………21 Current Status………………………………………………………………………....25 Country Policy.….…………………...……………...…..……………………………..29 Keywords………………………………………………………………………….......30 Questions for Consideration...........…………….……………………..………………..32 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..32
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Letter from the Chair
Dear Delegates,
On behalf of Princeton and the International Relations Council, welcome to
PMUNC 2016! My name is Nicolette D’Angelo, and I’m a sophomore from West Milford,
New Jersey majoring in the English department. My main focus of study is poetics and
antiquity, so I’m also pursuing certificates in Creative Writing and Humanistic Studies. And
while I did Model UN all throughout high school, this is my first time staffing a college
conference. It's both an honor and dream-come-true to be your chair!
When I'm not stalking Best Delegate, I'm also involved on campus editing the
Nassau Literary Review, singing with the Chapel Choir and working for the Princeton
Writing Center. Other hobbies include blogging, reading the Nass Weekly over brunch and
being woefully overdressed for class. But enough about me - I'm so excited to meet you all
and share our first PMUNCs together!
That said, if you have any questions about this background guide - or about MUN,
the committee or anything in general - please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forward
to seeing all of you in action very soon!
Sincerely,
Nicolette D’Angelo
Class of 2019
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Introduction to NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance
made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on
April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of the
Cold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically,
the rise of Soviet Union following WWII – and the widespread fear of the communism that
came without it, especially in Europe – necessitated some form of intergovernmental action
that would provide for the mutual protection of several allied nations in the North Atlantic.
As such, NATO’s primary purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members
through its most unique, enduring principle – the principle of collective defense.
In the North Atlantic Treaty, collective defense is established in Article 5, wherein it is
stated that “an armed attack against one or more [members]… shall be considered an attack
against them all.”1 However, Article 5 had never been formally invoked until the 9/11
terrorist attacks against the United States. In so doing, the North Atlantic Council – the
governing body of the organization – exhibited solidarity toward the US, as well as its power
to engage in collective action against counterterrorism. Among other things, this action
involved radar aircraft patrol, naval standing forces and efforts to “enhance intelligence-
sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies.”
The cooperation and sharing of NATO’s military assets follows both a civilian and a
military structure. Of the former, each member state has at its disposal a delegation of
permanent representatives, all of which are overseen by the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
1 "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
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Of the latter, NATO military operations oversee forces placed under the organization’s
jurisdiction by individual member states, along with associated command and control
structures. These forces are available for NATO operations once they meet a specific set of
readiness criteria, as well as rules of deployment that vary from country to country.
In civilian and military matters alike, however, a consensus is taken by common consent.
Since 1949, this principle of consensus has existed at every committee level, meaning that
any “NATO decision” passed is an expression of the collective will of the 28 sovereign
states participating in the Alliance.2 This system is interesting politically – and rather
idiosyncratic on the international stage – seeing as consensus decision-making means there is
no voting within NATO. Consultations instead take place until a course of action that is
acceptable to all is agreed upon. Surprisingly, this negotiation process happens rapidly since
members consult each other on a regular basis. They often can anticipate each other's
positions as a result.
2 Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.
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Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic
NATO was originally established to balance power between the Soviet Union and North
Atlantic nations, and today, many of the Alliance’s recent actions still concern the relationship
of its member states to Russia. Especially in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign
policy and the annexation of Ukraine, Russia’s use of unconventional tactics has been a
controversial military Frankenstein – otherwise known as hybrid warfare, its tactics of
international conflict (for which there is no universal definition) have only further
complicated the already-delicate geopolitical status of the Baltic region. And in NATO’s
tenure of dealing with this threat, hybrid warfare increasingly has delegitimized the Alliance’s
usual posture of deterrence.
Deterrence
Historically, deterrence has always been a core element of NATO’s collective defense
strategy. It can be defined as “the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from
taking an unwelcome action.”3 The Alliance or a member state typically can deter an
adversary in two ways: by the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) and/or by
rejecting the validity of the adversary’s war aims (deterrence by denial).4 In both cases,
deterrence seems to be a matter of displaying military prowess – of putting one’s power “on
display.” In theory, then, deterrence should never fail to be effective according to a cost-
benefit analysis of both parties’ security and interests: if all parties were to act “rationally,”
3 Collective Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm. 4 Ibid.
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belligerence would often seem to be an unattractive option, especially when nuclear power is
involved.
Or at least one would think. Unfortunately, in the 21st century, conventional deterrence
techniques have often failed, especially in cases of hybrid warfare – that is, when an adversary
incorporates “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and
criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives,”
among other things.5
History of Hybrid Warfare
For NATO to both understand the threat of hybrid warfare and make strides to
neutralize it peacefully, it is necessary to fully explore how this tricky combination of
conventional and irregular war strategies has been used throughout history. In other words,
the serious security challenge now called hybrid warfare is not nearly as new as it seems.
As early as the Peninsular War in 1807, states have deployed hybrid warfare in the
following forms – through the use of regular and irregular forces, strong links with national
or transnational criminal groups, unclear distinction between civilians and soldiers, and finally,
military activities in the situation when war is actually not declared.6 For example, just as
regular militiamen joined forces with Spanish guerillas under the British Army in the
Napoleonic Wars, today’s hybrid tactics also involve a broad array of military, political,
5 By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On Not-So-New
Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/. 6 Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern Europe?"
October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-
become-the-main-security-challenge-for-eastern-europe_2025
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economic, information, and – now – even cyber instruments used by actors, be them nation-
states or non-state actors without strict allegiance to any one state or sovereign body.
This brings several salient examples of hybrid warfare to our attention, such as the 2006
war between Israel and the Hezbollah; the September 11th attacks; and the 2014 Islamic
State’s advance into Iraq.
The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a well-trod example of hybrid warfare for
several reasons. From 2000 to 2006, the Hezbollah – a militant Shia group supported by Iran,
also known as the “Lebanese Party of God” – conducted over 200 attacks on the Israeli
Defense Forces, culminating in a proxy war in Lebanon lasting 34 days. The Hezbollah was
surprisingly successful in the efficacy of its regular troops, guerrilla forces and mass-
communication disruption efforts – although Israel was ultimately able to deter further
Hezbollah attacks after the war, the group’s successful terrorist cells, Security Apparatus and
military units (all supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards) arguably make it the best
indicator of the direction of future hybrid conflicts, according to political theorist Marcin
Andrzej Piotrowski. He points out the Hezbollah’s success in its “simultaneous use of a
conventional arsenal, irregular forces and guerrilla tactics, psychological warfare, terrorism
and even criminal activities, with support from a multi-dimensional organisation and capable
of integrating very different sub-units, groups or cells into one united, large force.”7 As a
result, the Hezbollah has become a model not only for other terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda,
but also for actors employing hybrid strategies. To again quote Piotrowski,
“the Hezbollah case is of clear relevance to debates about the adaptation of NATO to
the new threats and hybrid warfare demonstrated by Russia in its conflict with
Ukraine… The Russian combination of well-trained and organised forces, support
7 Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19320.
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with weapons and equipment, psychological warfare and cyberwarfare … might
transform them into a very dangerous and long-term threat.”
Knowing this – and that, at its prime, the Hezbollah had within its capacities a missile arsenal
larger than all NATO countries combined, except the US – reminds that deterrence is no
longer a standalone method for NATO to ensure the strategic security of its members against
state and non-state actors alike.
Current Status
Recent developments in the deployment of hybrid warfare worldwide have largely
confirmed that NATO’s leverage and deterrence strategy must now adapt to transcend
military means alone. This has been especially true in the case of North Atlantic relations with
Eastern Europe, particularly with Russia. The ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine is thus
considered one of the greatest threats to the western world and the alliance of nations within
NATO, largely due to Russia’s illegal military intervention into Crimea as well as the support
it gives to separatist sentiment in the area.
More specifically, the situation of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is comprised of several
simultaneously-occurring forms of antagonism: guerrilla and conventional warfare, as well as
economic, cyber and information warfare. It is important to note that this conflict is not
fueled by the pursuit of Ukrainian territory, but rather for the ends of exacerbating
preexisting weaknesses in the Ukrainian government and ultimately delegitimizing it.
Key Issues
Legal Intervention in Eastern Europe
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First and foremost, NATO is tasked with protecting the sovereignty and legal
autonomy of its member states in/around Eastern Europe from Russian hybrid warfare.
Those at risk today primarily include Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Albania, otherwise known as the member
states who joined the Alliance in 1999 and 2004 after previously holding membership in the
rival Warsaw Pact. What this means is that, while Ukraine does not hold membership in
NATO formally or otherwise, Russia’s hybrid warfare with and intervention into the nation
have direct ramifications into the wellbeing of NATO of nearby member states and their
western allies.
The successful March 2014 referendum in Crimea to join Russia was the legal pretext
of Russia’s hybrid warfare in the region. According to the referendum results, Crimeans
supported joining Russia by 96.77% of the vote with an 83.1% voter turnout.8 There have
been multilateral efforts to try and declare the referendum invalid in 2015, such as through
the EU and with a UN resolution, however Russia has vetoed these documents. Rather than
discarding the referendum results, Russia has used them as legal means for annexation.
Ethnic Divisions in the Baltics
A related broad security threat is the persistence of ethnic minority divisions in the
region. Generally speaking, there are four sizeable groups to consider: first, the largest ethnic
minority in every Baltic State is Russians; the second is Poles; and the third and fourth largest
are Belarussians and Ukrainians respectively.9 Especially in Estonia and Latvia, Russian
8 Seyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." 2015.
http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/gav/article/viewFile/5000159909/5000144268 9 Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre of Demography,
University of Latvia. http://epc2008.princeton.edu/papers/80280
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authorities have accused the Baltic countries of “denying their ‘compatriots’ human rights,
discriminating them on the basis of ethnic or linguistic differences, and restricted their civil
freedoms,” while, at the same time, endorsing a pro-Kremlin political party claiming to act in
the Lithuanian Poles’ favor.10 These machinations have only exacerbated existing tensions
among the different ethnic groups of the Baltic in the interest of advancing Russian interests
within Baltic parliaments and municipal councils.
Military Provocations
In addition to the prolonged threat of conventional military attack, Russia has repeatedly
provoked Baltic governments by air policing their territories, conducting multiple military
exercises, and arresting an Estonian security officer, among other things, thereby obstructing
domestic security in the Baltic, as well as international infrastructural endeavors (ex. the
NordBalt electricity link). Another hybrid military threat is the phenomenon of “little green
men,” or the unmarked Russian soldiers who are smuggled into Baltic territories.
As one of many countermeasures, NATO too has employed air policing as a “smart
defense” essential for safety in aviation and for the Allies. Especially since the 2014
annexation, extra air policing missions have been deployed as part of a NATO Quick Reaction
Alert (QRA) in order to guard the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However,
questions of missile defense system placement,
territorial disputes between the Baltic States and
Russia, and military training all bear the risk of
provoking Russia; meanwhile, economically, a
10 Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European Studies Centre.
September 2016. http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-EESC.pdf
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problem persists in that long-term prospects for the mission are dependent on increased
financial contributions and defense expenditures from struggling beneficiary states.
“The Weaponization of Information”
Another unique aspect of this ongoing crisis is Russia’s capacity for utilizing the
informational dimensions of hybrid warfare. NATO and much of the global community have
recognized that, through a remarkable capacity for propaganda, Russia has “spread lies among
its people and constructed alternative narratives and realities in cyber space which in turn
amplify the conflict.”11 Propaganda efforts of this kind – more specifically, shutting down
independent press, sponsoring rallies, referendum advertisements, and pushing misinformation
as well as oversimplified stories online and on television12 – all have been especially effective in
Russia and Crimea, where the public has limited exposure to alternative media outlets and
sources of information. Most notably, Russian TV channels in the Baltics and in Russia and
various pages, groups, and personal profiles on social media platforms such as Facebook have
also been successfully subversive.13
11 Ibid. 12 Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? | Alan Yuhas and
Raya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media. 13 Lucas, Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June 2015.
http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf
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Beyond the annexation of Crimea after the 2014 referendum, the consequences of this
“weaponization of information” has led NATO to consider "strategic narratives that lead to
aligned words and actions ... appropriately adapted and culturally attuned to resonate with all
audiences and counter opposing narratives."14 In other words, it is important that the Alliance
avoids countering propaganda with more propaganda.
Similarly, NATO’s prime directive is not to isolate or weaken Russia. Since signing the
Founding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997, and organizing the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, the Alliance is committed to working together with
Russia in areas of mutual interest -- from counter-terrorism to mechanisms for emergency
planning – all in the service of ensuring security and peace for a free Europe.
Country Policy
Note: These policies often vary even within regional blocs, especially given the lack of both
unilateral and multilateral stances on the topic of unconventional tactics.
1) The Baltic States
The majority of government responses to Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic have been
unilateral. Multilaterally, a defining achievement on the part of NATO was establishing the
NATO Centers of Excellence in Estonia and in Lithuania, thereby enabling better-coordinated
European action (especially in the realms of energy and cyber-security) as well as giving the
14 Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat Russian Propoganda.” January 27, 2016. Accessed September 30, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-nato-looks-to-combat-russias-information-weapon-document-2016-1
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Baltics a platform to speak about hybrid threats.15 However, these nations continue to feel
deep insecurity in the face of hybrid threats (given their failure to neutralize Russian threats in
the past) and know that any marked attempts to build up their defensive capacities will
necessarily result in a negative military response from Moscow. As such, a security dilemma is
delaying multilateral action – which, coupled with ethnic issues, economic insecurities, unequal
access to EU resources, and suspicious attitudes toward politicians and national parties in each
nation – all combine to create a geopolitically destabilizing and disillusioned attitudes in the
Baltic region as a whole.
Policy recommendations have pointed to utilizing the OSCE (the Organization for Security &
Cooperation in Europe) in order to improve conflict prevention mechanisms, border security
management, combatting propaganda and corruption, and foster the inclusion of
minorities/easing ethnic tensions, in addition to NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, nations such
as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have received a considerable amount of foreign assistance for
the aim of building security infrastructure and defense capacities through bilateral partnerships
with the US. In the East, these nations have also become proponents of the EU’s Eastern
Partnership countries, cooperating with the US in order to provide other methods of
assistance through the Emerging Donors Challenge Program.
2) Western Europe/EU States
While a united position on hybrid warfare has yet to be established by NATO member
nations in Europe such as France, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom (et al.), it’s always
in the vested interest of these states to maximize the collective security and defense of other
15 http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-EESC.pdf
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Alliance members without using Article V, the collective defence clause. Nonetheless, a larger
security presence has been demanded of these nations by the Baltic bloc.
Financially, the money and resources needed to effect such a security presence would be a
strain on many European economies, especially given the opportunity costs involved in the
use of sanctions against Russia following the Crimean annexation. The EU sanctions
announced in September 2014 targeted Russia's state finances, energy and arms sectors,
excluded Russian banks from raising long-term loans in the EU, banned EU-Russia arms
deals, and the limited the export of oil industry technology, among other things. At the same
time, dozens of senior Russian officials and separatist leaders are now subject to Western
asset freezes and travel bans.16 The tendency of the EU to pursue these exclusionary policies
has received both praise and criticism – domestically, much of the latter stems from the loss
of Russia as a trading partner in various departments during an economically fragile period.
It is also relevant to note that several NATO states in Europe are part of intergovernmental
insitutions and coalitions aside from the OSCE, and have various degrees of leverage in those
settings (for example, the OSCE).
Eastern European member states (such as Turkey) have openly vowed to tighten cooperation
against the hybrid warfare of which Russia has been accused,17 imploring the EU and other
intergovernmental institutions to adopt complementary strategies while sharpening their
knowledge-sharing capacities.
16 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218 17http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/05/14/nato-eu-work-together-hybrid-warfare/27333967/
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3) North America
Similar to the EU nations in NATO, the United States and Canada occupy a similarly
complicated position in relation to hybrid warfare in the Baltic, and also lack a cohesive
strategy for neutralizing it. Nonetheless, the Pentagon has stressed its concern about
combatting specifically the aspects of hybrid warfare which involve “stealth invasion, local
proxy forces and international propaganda that Russia used to annex Crimea and destabilize
eastern Ukraine.”18
In 2015, to combat these unconventional threats, the US announced that it would be
contributing troops and “enabling capabilities” to NATO’s new Spearhead task force that
would include surveillance aircraft and additional Special Operations forces; more specifically,
American defense personnel stated that “the task force would be augmented to help counter
cyberthreats and other dangers.”19
Economically, the US has also enacted sanctions against Russia, in addition to asset freezes on
banks, businesses, and notably wealthy individuals. The EU still conducts considerably more
business with Russia than the US does; however, the American security assistance provided to
the Baltic region is rather extensive. According to the White House Press Office, the US
provides millions annually “to improve Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian defense and security
infrastructure, strengthen national resilience, and build defense capacity through programs
such as the European Reassurance Initiative, Foreign Military Financing, and International
Military Education and Training programs (…)This assistance helps increase NATO
18https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html 19 Ibid.
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interoperability and build national resilience in the face of both traditional and nontraditional
hybrid threats.”20
Key Terms
Hybrid Warfare
Deterrence Strategy
Article V/Collective Defence
Cyber Warfare/Propaganda
Ethnic Minority Divisions
Security Dilemma
Multilateral VS Unilateral Action
Non-State Actors
The Kremlin
Annexation
Little Green Men
Questions to Consider
There is currently no agreed-upon definition for hybrid warfare. How should it be
defined internationally?
To what extent has your country experienced hybrid warfare and/or its consequences?
20 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/23/fact-sheet-united-states-and-estonia-latvia-and-lithuania-%E2%80%93-nato-allies
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How can the security of the Baltic be reconciled with the collective security of NATO?
What limits exist in NATO’s jurisdiction?
How should political disturbances in Ukraine/Crimea be addressed by the Alliance,
given that Ukraine is not a member state?
How should propaganda and cyber warfare be thwarted on an international scale?
How should non-state actors be addressed in their role in this conflict, if at all?
What readiness action plans can be put into effect during ‘peacetime’ or proxy wars, if
at all?
How should NATO utilize its standing forces/other military means in relation to the
Baltic situation? How will this (or any other resolutions) be funded?
Consider revisiting the North Atlantic Treaty once more. What changes could be made
to the existing institutional framework of the Alliance to better adapt it to the threats
of hybrid warfare?
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Bibliography
By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On Not-
So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015.
Accessed September 29, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-
political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
"Collective Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.
Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat Russian
Propoganda.” January 27, 2016. Accessed September 30, 2016.
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-nato-looks-to-combat-russias-information-weapon-
document-2016-1
Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed
September 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.
Lucas, Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June 2015.
http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-
%20(2).compressed.pdf
Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European
Studies Centre. September 2016. http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-
EESC.pdf
Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19320.
Seyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." 2015.
http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/gav/article/viewFile/5000159909/5000144268
"The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
Weitz, Richard. “The US Faces Rival Powers Waging Hybrid Warfare.” YaleGlobal.edu.
January 12, 2016. Accessed July 2016. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-faces
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Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? |
Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media.
Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre of
Demography, University of Latvia.
Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern
Europe?" October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-become-the-main-security-
challenge-for-eastern-europe_2025
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Topic B: Counter-terrorism
Introduction
Countering terrorism is, and always has been, an enduring security priority for NATO
and its constituent nations. From the 1972 hostage situation at the Olympic games in Munich,
to the infamous Lockerbie attack that killed over 200, terrorism has remained embedded in
the psyche of the western world.21 However, although the intimidating specter of terrorism
has always remained a constant, such cannot be said for the the structure, tactics, and goals of
the organizations that perpetrate terrorism. In the past two decades, the nature of terrorism
has evolved dramatically. Modern terrorist organizations are decentralized, diffuse, and play
by a different set a rules than those of the 20th and early 21st centuries. In order to combat
these emergent threats, NATO will need to entirely rethink the way it approaches terrorism.
The organization will need to develop a different set of principles and strategies to ensure that
NATO remains a relevant and effective security coalition for years to come.
History of the Topic
The word terrorism dates back to the mid-18th century, when Maxmilien Robespierre
instigated a “Reign of Terror” immediately following the French revolution. Robespierre
believed in the use of terrorism as a way to carry out dramatic societal reforms.22 This idea of
using violence as a form of ideological control was novel at the time, and laid the basis for the
modern conception of terrorism.
However, terrorism under Robespierre’s formulation is carried out by a state actor,
whereas modern perpetrators of terrorism are overwhelmingly non-state actors. This
21 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Pan Am flight 103 disaster", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Am-flight-103-disaster. 22
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transition from state to non-state actors did not occur until the mid 20th century, when ethnic
nationalism, combined with the rejection of European colonialism and the rise of differing
ideologies such as communism led to the increasing use of guerilla tactics and other forms of
rebellious violence. For example, the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) employed
terrorist tactics in Turkey in an attempt form an independent Kurdish State. The Irish
Republican Army (IRA) carried out bombing and assassinations in Ireland with the purpose
of separating from Great Britain, and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers used suicide bombings
to wage an ethnic war against the incumbent Sri Lankan government.23 It was clear that
terrorism had evolved beyond its roots in the 18th century. It had become an instrument for
political usurpation; no longer a tool to be used by the state, but rather a tool to be used
against it.
Terrorism took on another new dimension with the advent of mass-air travel in the
mid 19th century. The 1960’s saw the rise of new forms of terrorism such as hijackings,
airplane bombings, and attacks on foreign territory. Terrorist organizations were no longer
relegated to the domestic affairs of any individual country: their attacks were often carried out
overseas, and with motivations that transcended national boundaries. The infamous Munich
Massacre encapsulated this transformation perfectly. In the midst of the 1972 Munich
Olympic Games the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September infiltrated the
Olympic village, taking nine Israeli hostages.24 The terrorists demanded the release of a
number of Palestinian political prisoners, and when their demands were not met, proceeded
to massacre all of the Israeli hostages. Many contend that the German police, unprepared and
23 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Irish Republican Army (IRA)", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army. 24 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291
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ill-equipped to properly handle a terrorist situation, committed a number of tactical blunders
that directly led to the tragic ending of the standoff.25
The tragedy of the 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed moment for the
international community. First, the massacre served as a reminder that terrorism had become
a truly global phenomenon. Terrorists now had the capabilities to make dramatic and
symbolic statements on the most prominent of global stages. It wasn’t until the Munich
Massacre that the world regarded terrorist attacks as theatrical or dramatic in nature, and this
shift in perspective would set the precedent for future high-profile attacks such as the 1988
Lockerbie bombing and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. But the
Munich Olympics didn’t just highlight the rapidly evolving capabilities of terrorist
25 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm
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organizations, it also revealed how ill-prepared the international community was to check
these new capabilities. The words “counter-terrorism” and “international terrorism” were
never in the political lexicon of the United States until the Munich Massacre.26 Germany
lacked an official counterterrorism unit at the time of the Munich Massacre, and its local
police forces were woefully underprepared to face a terrorist threat. The massacre directly led
to the creation of an official German counterterrorism agency: GSG-9, and other countries
quickly followed suit.27 The late 20th century was when countries started taking the terrorist
threat seriously- as not just isolated domestic guerillas, but as ideologically motivated and
dangerously capable transnational organizations.
Throughout this dramatic evolution of terrorism, NATO had remained relatively
stagnant. Even as the terrorism threat further evolved at the turn of the century to include
religiously motivated groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, the organization was sluggish
to respond. In 1999, NATO adopted a strategic concept that identified terrorism as a risk
affecting its member nations. However, no formal measures to combat terrorism were agreed
upon at the summit.
Counter-terrorism momentum picked up in the organization after the September 11
attacks on the United States. In the days following the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 –its
mutual defense clause- for the first time in its history. Under Article 5, any attack on a NATO
member is an attack on the entire alliance, compelling the entire coalition to come to the
assistance of the United States through security operations such as Operation Eagle Assist and
26 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm 27 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291
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Operation Active Endeavor.28 In 2002, NATO adopted the “Prague Package”, aimed at “adapting
NATO to the challenge of international terrorism”. The package adopted four pillars that
constituted NATO’s comprehensive response to the emerging threat of terrorism: anti-
terrorism (reducing the vulnerability of civil and military elements to terrorist attacks),
offensive counter-terrorism, consequence management, and military cooperation. Subsequent
summits have served to reinforce these themes. For example, in 2004 NATO launched the
Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) initiative, which utilized technology in helping NATO
develop countermeasures for asymmetric terrorist threats.
Current Status
The evolution of terrorism did not stop at the conclusion of the 20th century. The
terrorist threat continues to evolve today, and has taken on a number of unique
characteristics that did not exist in the 9/11 era.
First and foremost, the balance of power between the major Islamist terrorist
organizations has changed dramatically. Fourteen years ago, al Qaeda was the “undisputed
heavyweight among jihadist groups”. Now however, the organization faces increasing
competition from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Hezbollah. In
2014, al Qaeda released a video lecture that railed against ISIS, claiming that they do not
acknowledge ISIS’ Caliphate as the true Caliphate of Islam.29 This very fact that this video
was made demonstrates the dynamic between the jihadist organizations has shifted: al Qaeda
28 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 29 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/
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is being put on the defensive, while ISIS is becoming recognized as the primary jihadist
organization.
Map of ISIS Territorial Holdings
Tangentially related to ISIS’ rise to prominence is the fact that it has organized itself
into a de-facto state entity. Though the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda have historically
controlled limited swaths of territory in the Middle East, none have controlled as much land,
and administered it in the organized and institutionalized way that ISIS has. Within its
territory, ISIS provides utilities, basic social services, courts, and enforces the rule of law.30
Though the international community largely refuses to recognize ISIS as a state, for all intents
and purposes, the group is indeed running one. This behavior marks a substantial departure
30 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism
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from the terrorist organizations of the 20th century, which were predominantly non-state
actors, and provides ISIS several key advantages. Nick Rasmussen of the United States
National Counterterrorism Center contends that ISIS’ creation of a de-facto state provides it
the necessary ingredients to develop substantial “external operations capability”. The creation
of a state provides a “save-haven” for terrorists and provides them with valuable manpower
and financial resources. Developing proper countermeasures to meet the enhanced
capabilities of a state-based terrorist organization will be of crucial importance for NATO.
The basic structure of the terrorist organization has changed as well. Once highly
centralized and hierarchical, the chain of command has become highly diffuse and
decentralized.31 For example, from an operational standpoint, ISIS operates not as one
coordinated body, but as a series of independent nodes. These nodes are self-financing, self-
directed, and granted a large degree of autonomy by ISIS’ governing body.32 This allows
individual operations to be conducted across the broad swath of ISIS territory at an
alarmingly fast pace. It also makes ISIS particularly difficult to destabilize, as eliminating a
high-level official, or degrading the capabilities of one node leaves the rest of the organization
completely unaffected. This decentralized system of authority allows ISIS to be flexible,
adaptable, and resilient to the sustained counterterrorism efforts of the international
community.
Also worthy of note is the evolving nature of terrorist attacks against NATO member
nations. The previously discussed attacks of the late 20th and early 21st centuries all involved a
substantial amount of planning and coordination. However, in response to the
31 McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”, Print. May 12, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016. 32 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism
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comprehensive counterterrorism security measures mandated by NATO agreements such as
the “Prague Package”, terrorist organizations have been forced to evolve. In recent years, they
have become less reliant on heavily-coordinated attacks such as Lockerbie and 9/11, and
more dependent on so-called “inspired” or “lone-wolf attacks”.33 ISIS in particular makes
extensive use of social media to encourage overseas converts to conduct their own
homegrown attacks. The transition towards using these attacks has significant implications for
the nature of terrorism: attacks are now far more frequent and less spectacular. ISIS is now
able to leverage media channels to inspire self-radicalized people from all over the western
world.34 Admittedly, these new attacks are not as well-planned and often lacking in resources,
but they are frequent and extremely difficult for national intelligence services to anticipate.
Nick Rasmussen believes that these evolving tactics provide law enforcement “far less time to
disrupt or mitigate potential plots”, and this presents a great challenge for NATO’s future
anti-terrorism efforts.35
NATO has also identified a number of emerging threats posed by terrorist
organizations. In a report prepared by the Assistant Secretary-General, NATO identified
several areas of global infrastructure and development that it believes will become key
terrorist objectives in the future. For example, NATO believes that the rising demand of
strategic resources such as energy will compel terrorist organizations to disrupt of seize
control of such infrastructure.36 NATO also believes that shipping lanes, particularly narrow
33 Ibid 34 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/ 35 Gordon, Phillip H, “NATO’s Growing Role in the Middle East.” The Brookings Institution, March 1, 2006, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing-role-in-the-greater-middle-east/ 36 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016,
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bottleneck straits such as The Strait of Malacca will also become high-value targets for
terrorists.37
Beyond the social media capabilities of organizations such as ISIS, NATO also
believes that terrorist organizations are looking into more advanced forms of technological
warfare. Namely, NATO believes that cyber-terrorism and cyber-attacks could fit in
extremely well with the “strategic-level objectives of terrorists”.38 Though it is currently
estimated that terrorists do not have the capabilities to conduct large-scale cyber attacks as of
yet, this situation may quickly change in the future as terrorist organizations develop more
advanced technological capabilities.
Though a comprehensive NATO framework for meeting these evolving threats has
yet to be developed, nearly all agree that any course of action must involve the organization
evolving beyond its original mission as a reactive security coalition. The NATO Assistant
Secretary-General noted that in order to afford its member states credible and effective
protection, the organization must become “more of a team player”.39 This means that NATO
must transform from a defense alliance into a “multi-faceted security organization”.40 It
cannot sit idly waiting for one of its member nation to be attacked, it must take proactive
steps to ensure that such an attack is never allowed to happen in the first place. This may
include initiatives such as intelligence sharing, multilateral consultations, preventative social
programs, and coordinating with other international partners or coalitions.
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Ibid
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Country Policy
Economically Advanced Western Democracies (e.g. France, United States, U.K.)
With substantial economic and political clout, these countries are at the forefront of NATO,
and as such are prime targets for potential terrorist attacks. From the Pulse shooting in
Orlando, to the truck massacre in Nice, France, the most high-profile attacks are often
perpetrated against these countries. Hence, this bloc of highly developed countries would be
more willing to commit significant financial resources in evolving NATO’s capabilities and
developing it into a proactive security-based organization.
Eastern European and Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, etc.)
Most of these countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, and many suffer from
chronic economic and political instability. It is important to consider that though
transitioning NATO into a more proactive organization would likely have security-related
benefits, it would also be expensive, dramatically expand the organization, and mandate
certain actions that might be seen as compromising national sovereignty, such as intelligence
sharing. Because high-profile terrorist attacks seldom occur in these Eastern European
countries, they may be less willing to transition the organization into an enhanced security
partnership.
Key Terms
Terrorism
Decentralization
“Lone-wolf” attacks
Al-Qaeda
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Hezbollah
ISIS
Taliban
Article 5
Prague Package
Defense Against Terrorism (DAT)
Assymetric warfare
Questions to Consider
In what ways has terrorism evolved since the 20th century?
The United States has set a precedent for invoking Article 5 in the event of a
terrorist attack, even if it is perpetrated by a non-state actor. Should this precedent
continue?
What are some of the specific terrorism-related policy proposals that NATO
adopted after the September 11 attacks? How effective have they been?
Can you anticipate other valuable strategic targets that terrorists may be inclined to
attack in the future?
How will terrorism capabilities evolve in the future? Where will they be at five years
from now? Ten years? How can NATO best anticipate and meet these enhanced
capabilities?
Should every country maintain a specialized counterterrorism police force?
How can NATO best degrade the capabilities of decentralized and diffuse
organizations such as ISIS?
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Should NATO evolve into a proactive security-based coalition? What competing
factors are at play, and how do these factors align with the priorities of your country?
Which non-NATO countries would be strategically valuable for NATO to work
with?
Bibliography
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1, 2006, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing-role-in-
the-greater-middle-east/
Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges
and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016,
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The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportuniti
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8476291
NATO PMUNC 2016
33
Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN,
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McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”,
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the-corporatization-of-terrorism
Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016,
accessed September 30, 2016,
http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm