Download - Building Capacities for Public Private Partnerships in India.pdf · India: Building Capacities for Public Private Partnerships 6 Most countries engaged in a broad-based PPP program

IndiaBuilding Capacities for Public Private Partnerships

June 2006

Energy and Infrastructure Unit andFinance and Private Sector Development Unit

South Asia Region

ContentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................... 5

Approaches elsewhere to developing capacities for PPPs ............................................................... 5PPPs in India ................................................................................................................................... 6Developing and strengthening capacities for PPPs in India ............................................................. 7

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 11Scope of this report ............................................................................................................... 11Outline of the rest of this report ............................................................................................ 12

2. DEVELOPING CAPACITIES FOR PPPs: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES ...................................... 13Public sector capacities needed for a robust PPP program ..................................................... 14

Policy frameworks ............................................................................................................ 14Legal frameworks ............................................................................................................. 14Human resources ............................................................................................................. 15Procedures and guidelines ................................................................................................ 16Organizations: the role of cross-sectoral PPP units ......................................................... 16Purely public versus public-private crosssectoral units .................................................... 17Possible conflicts of interest within crosssectoral units .................................................... 18The roles of national and sub-national agencies .............................................................. 19

3. PPPs IN INDIA: ISLANDS OF PROGRESS ..................................................................................... 21The role of PPPs so far ........................................................................................................... 22Institutional frameworks for PPPs in India ............................................................................. 24The development of policies and standardization of contracts ............................................... 26Training and other information dissemination initiatives ........................................................ 26Where are the gaps in India compared to elsewhere? ............................................................. 27Expanding the use of PPPs to meet basic services needs ........................................................ 27

4. DEVELOPING AND STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES FOR PPPs IN INDIA .................................... 29Strengthening oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs ................................................................ 30Policy frameworks .................................................................................................................. 30Legislative frameworks for PPPs .............................................................................................. 31Information dissemination ..................................................................................................... 31The development of guidance material for PPPs ...................................................................... 33PPP units to provide a pool of expertise ................................................................................ 34Project development funds ..................................................................................................... 35Funding of PPPs ..................................................................................................................... 36Recommendations: a role for the center in developing India’s PPP program .......................... 36

ANNEXES ........................................................................................................................................ 39Awarded Projects by States & Central Agencies ........................................................................... 39Awarded Projects by Sector .......................................................................................................... 46Project Pipeline by States & Central Agencies ............................................................................... 52Project Pipeline by Sector .............................................................................................................. 56Abandoned Projects ...................................................................................................................... 60Institutional Framework : Selected States & Central Agencies ....................................................... 62

India: Building Capacities for Public Private Partnerships

4

AcknowledgementsThis report has been prepared by Mark Dutz, CliveHarris, Inderbir Singh Dhingra (World Bank) and ChrisShugart (Consultant), at the request of Department ofEconomic Affairs (DEA), Ministry of Finance. The analysisof PPPs in India is supported by a short assignment byPwC involving a description of PPP projects undertakenin 12 states and 3 central agencies, together withsupporting capacity building measures. The databasewas assembled by PwC in January 2005, with updatesby the authors until March 2005. The Bank peerreviewers for the project were Alain Locussol,Mohammad Mustafa and Stephan van Klaudy. The reporthas benefited from feedback from the “Capacity BuildingWorkshop for Public Private Partnerships” which washeld in Delhi on February 7, 2005 in collaboration withDEA, and supported by the Bank’s Water and SanitationProgram. The report also has benefited from feedbackat an internal presentation to senior Ministry of Financeofficials held in Delhi on March 17, 2005.

Disclaimer

The policy note has been discussed with Government of India but does not necessarily bear theirapproval for all its contents, especially where the Bank has stated its judgments/ opinions/ policy

recommendations.

5

Both central government and the states are aimingto use public private partnerships (PPPs) moreintensively to help meet gaps in the provision ofbasic services. India has seen real progress overthe last 10 years in attracting private investmentinto the infrastructure sectors, first intelecommunications, and now in ports and roads,and in individual projects in other sectors. There isthe potential for PPPs to contribute more and helpmeet the infrastructure gap in India. But PPPs arenot a panacea. They represent a claim on publicresources that needs to be understood and assessedby the government, and are often complex and long-term transactions in which mistakes in design canbe costly.

The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) askedthe World Bank to provide recommendations onhow capacities for identifying, procuring andmanaging PPPs could be further developed inIndia. Of particular focus is the possible role ofthe central government in developing thesecapacities. We look at both organizational andindividual capacities, the former including policyand legal frameworks, and institutions andprocesses.

For the purposes of this report, we concentrateon projects where private investment has beenmade, and where the government is either thepurchaser of services under the project, or whereit provides a financial contribution through directinvestment or through risk bearing. The mainsectors of focus are transportation (ports,airports, roads, and rail), water and sanitationand other urban infrastructure (solid wastemanagement, light rail, bus terminals).

Approaches elsewhere todeveloping capacities for PPPs

In shifting from more traditional methods ofservice provision, governments need to adaptboth their skills and their processes to ensurethat PPP programs deliver what is expected ofthem. The cornerstone of this is ensuring thatPPPs that proceed are those which representpriority projects and are best done through thePPP route rather than through traditional publicprocurement. Governments embarking on PPPprograms have often developed new policy, legaland institutional frameworks to provide therequired organizational and individual capacities.New agencies are sometimes created to bring infinancial and contract design skills not present inthe government, and existing processes, forexample in planning and budgeting, need to beadapted.

Although not all countries have developed specificnew PPP legislation, nearly all have felt it necessaryto amend existing legislation, if only to clarify thatpublic entities have the needed powers to contractout services under PPPs. Comprehensive cross-cutting PPP legislation has been used moreextensively in countries that operate under the civilcode. Where used, it often covers aspects such asspecifying which sectors PPPs can operate in, howtariffs for PPPs are set and adjusted, the role ofdifferent institutions in a PPP program, procurementof PPPs, and dispute resolution procedures. Evenwhere not necessary, such legislation can consolidateexisting provisions into one act, clarify processesfor approving and procuring PPPs, and create newinstitutions that will play a key role in the PPPprocess.

Executive SummaryExecutive Summary


6

Most countries engaged in a broad-based PPPprogram have felt the need to develop a cross-sectoral pool of expertise in a dedicated PPP unit tosupplement capacities in the line agencies thatcontract for PPPs. These fulfill different rolesdepending on the needs of the situation. In somecases their role is limited to disseminatinginformation on PPPs and providing broad guidanceon good practices. In others they have an activerole in helping line agencies and ministriessuccessfully contract for PPPs, and in yet othersthey play a role in approving PPPs developed byother government agencies. Where they exist, thesecross-sectoral units are often located in, or attachedto, the Ministry of Finance or Treasury which mayreflect concerns about the need to strengthenunderstanding and monitoring of the fiscal costs ofPPPs. The functional nature of these units alsoreflects their roles. Units whose main focus istransactions are often established as companies, insome cases jointly owned by the government withthe private sector. Those that provide informationand guidance on PPP programs can functionadequately as units within an existing governmentdepartment.

There are risks of a conflict of interest in cross-sectoral PPP units that have multiple functions, evenwhere these are purely public sector agencies, forexample where a unit has a strong mandate topromote PPPs and increase deal flow, while at thesame time having the responsibility for screeningprojects. The potential for conflicts of interest maybe higher with respect to PPP units that are public-private joint ventures, and where success feesincentivize the closing of transactions. These haveto be recognized and dealt with.

The role of national agencies relative to sub-nationalones is often driven chiefly by basic legal and fiscal

relations between these levels of government, whichare often set out in the constitution. In Australia,the national government has virtually no role in statelevel PPPs. In Canada, the Federal Government’sP3 Office acts as a resource center and promoter ofthe benefits of rationale for using PPPs, rather thanacting in an advisory role. Other countries whichare more centralized have seen a stronger role fornational level agencies, for example in South Africawhere the Treasury’s PPP Unit plays a role in bothguidance and approval. Brazil intends to establishcapacities at the national level to offer detailedguidance to the states in the development of PPPs.

PPPs in India

In the 12 states and 3 central agencies surveyedthere are at least 86 PPP projects in our sectors offocus for which a contract has been awarded andprojects are underway (in the sense that the projectsare either operational, have reached constructionstage or at least construction/implementation isimminent).1 The estimated project cost of these PPPsis Rs 339.5 billion. There has been considerableinnovation in the design of these, with differentstructures now being developed to attract privateparticipation. But at the same time it is clear thatthis has been uneven – there are islands of progress,with some states having undertaken far more PPPsthan others, and a much heavier use of PPPs insome sectors (roads by number of projects andports by project size) than others. While there area number of successful projects, there have also beena number of poorly conceptualized PPPs broughtto the market that stood little chance of reachingfinancial closure.

Some states have made more attempts to develop abroad framework for PPPs, including cross-cuttinglegislation and the development of cross-sectoral

1 The 5 infrastructure sectors of focus where PPP contracts have been awarded in the surveyed states and federal agencies are roads& bridges, ports, airports, rail, and urban (water & sanitation, solid waste management, bus terminals, light rail, ferries and alogistics hub – although for the last 3 sub-sectors there have been preparatory activities but no contract awarded yet). There alsohas been activity in health & education and e-governance, in addition to sectors not covered in this report such as power, tourism,and other construction (convention centres, industrial, IT & biotech parks, SEZs, and housing). See the tables in the Annex for moredetails.

Executive Summary

7

units that play a role in the identification andpreparation of PPPs. While progress to date hasprobably been driven as much by fundamentals suchas political commitment, the lack of a cross-sectoralpool of knowledge makes it harder to transferexperiences across sectors.

Compared to other countries, some of the gaps inPPP frameworks and approaches in India are: thetendency for the policy rationale for PPPs to belimited to the use of PPPs as a source of investmentcapital when the public sector lacks funds; littlesystematic compilation and dissemination ofinformation, even within the public sector, on PPPsimplemented to date, including contractualapproaches and their results; and not much use ofrigorous ex-ante or ex-post assessments of theperformance of PPPs versus traditional publicoptions.

There is the potential for PPPs to play a greater rolein the provision of infrastructure services in India.A number of issues have to be addressed, however,including basic questions such as the extent to whichthese projects will be paid for by taxpayers or byusers, and if so whether the resources are available,and whether it will be possible, commercially andpolitically, to charge the required user fees.Improving capacities to identify potential PPPs willbe critical, to bring them to the market properlystructured, have them efficiently and competitivelyprocured, and to monitor their performance andcost.

Developing and strengtheningcapacities for PPPs in India

Both experience to date in India and internationallyshows that there is no unique formula fordeveloping a sound PPP framework. However,successful programs are characterized by clear policyand legal frameworks for PPPs, competent andenabled institutions that can appropriately identify,procure and manage PPPs, and efficient oversightand dispute resolution procedures. The center’s rolein developing capacities for sub-national PPPs needs

careful consideration taking into account the sizeof the country, center-state fiscal and other relations,as well as the variety of experiences so far, withsome states having made considerable strides andothers having made very little progress.

Oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs.Oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs.Oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs.Oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs.Oversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs. Regardless ofother actions, if there is to be an increase in the useof PPPs the center should work to strengthenoversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs. A priority needwould be for the development of guidance on howstates should approach the issues posed by PPPs.This should be supplemented by enhancing analysisof the fiscal costs of PPPs in central government,including the monitoring of the impact by PPPs onthe fiscal position of the states. Capacity-buildingefforts should be led by the Government of India(GoI) Finance Ministry, with involvement from theReserve Bank of India (RBI) as necessary.

PPPPPolicy rationale.olicy rationale.olicy rationale.olicy rationale.olicy rationale. A policy statement covering boththe rationale and also the limits to the use of PPPswould help to give the PPP program a clearer politicalmandate and could also be used to announce moreclearly the institutional framework for PPPs. Thesewould be useful at both the national and state level.While broad policies provide an important signal ofpolitical commitment, it may also be necessary totranslate this into action plans and policies forindividual sectors to provide a more preciseorientation to encourage line ministries and agenciesto pursue and implement PPP programs.

Legal frameworks.Legal frameworks.Legal frameworks.Legal frameworks.Legal frameworks. Cross-cutting PPP laws do notseem to be needed in India to permit central or stategovernments to enter into PPPs. Both the centerand many states have done so without such laws.Sector specific legislation has of course been usedto restructure industries and set up new institutionssuch as sector regulators. Cross-cutting legislationcould however be beneficial by consolidating relevantlegal provisions into one law, and legislating the useof certain processes for the procurement,development and regulation of PPP projects whichmay be better enforced if given the force of law.This might be more important at the state level, where


8

checks and balances and oversight are not as strongas at the center. The legislation already passed byGujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab providespossible models for other states. The developmentand passage of legislation also promotes an opendebate about the rationale for PPPs and theirexpected benefits, and thereby can help increase thepublic legitimacy of PPPs.

In formation disseminat ion and guidanceInformation disseminat ion and guidanceInformation disseminat ion and guidanceInformation disseminat ion and guidanceInformation disseminat ion and guidancematerials. materials. materials. materials. materials. Despite the fact that there are nearly 90PPPs in India under construction and operation,there is no publicly accessible database providingeven the most straightforward information on them.There is also relatively little available in terms ofinformation on the actual contracts used, and littleguidance available to government officers onappropriate clauses and conditions to be includedin PPP contracts. A number of practitioners in PPPsin India have argued that the lack of standardcontracts or standard clauses makes bureaucratsmore reluctant to sign off on PPP deals.

There is considerable scope for improving the flowof information regarding PPPs and for providingguidance materials to government officials on thedevelopment and implementation of PPPs. Guidancecould cover issues related to contract design,procedures for identifying, procuring and managingPPPs, and even model PPP legislation. Informationdissemination could cover a publicly-accessibledatabase on PPPs at the national, state and locallevels; training materials as well as workshops andother mechanisms to reach politicians, consumersand other stakeholders, so that they are betterinformed about the nature and structure of PPPs.Information on PPPs could be extended to analysisof successes and failures, case studies and a databaseon performance of projects.

Standardization and models have the potential toreduce transactions costs and diffuse good practices.There is however a risk that centrally sponsored modelcontracts could reduce the needed room for flexibilityand innovation even where these models are advisoryand not mandatory. This risk could be reduced by

having guidance provide a range of options whereappropriate and also by being guided by a public-private group containing representatives from stateas well as central agencies.

Information dissemination and guidance should beled from the center, given the public good nature ofthese activities. A single central ministry with cross-cutting responsibilities could take the lead in this.Specialized tasks would be contracted out and doneby others under the oversight of this unit – forexample the development and delivery of trainingmaterials would be undertaken by a specializedtraining institute.

A national PPP unit.A national PPP unit.A national PPP unit.A national PPP unit.A national PPP unit. Most countries engaged in abroad-based PPP program have felt the need to developa cross-sectoral PPP unit although the role that thisunit plays is sometimes restricted to informationdissemination and the preparation of guidance material.The design response to two key issues – the role of across-sectoral unit vis-à-vis line ministries and the roleof a national unit in sub-national PPPs – will be drivenby the business practices within governments and thefiscal, and other, relations between the center and thestates. This means that some models which are morecentralized, such as those in the UK and South Africawhere national level units have a prominent role insub-national PPPs, will not be workable approachesin India.

At the statestatestatestatestate level, a dedicated PPP unit can bothbroaden the PPP program by transferring lessonsand experiences across sectors, as well as improvethe quality of PPPs by bringing to bear bettertransactions skills. Particularly where there is not atrack record of PPPs, skills are probably best broughtin from the private sector to supplement availablecapacities in the state government.

At the nationalnationalnationalnationalnational level, a PPP unit could undertakethe information dissemination and guidance rolesdescribed above. It could also undertake atransaction advisory role by identifying areas wherePPPs could be undertaken by central agencies andministries, and working with these agencies to

Executive Summary

9

conceptualize and bring to the market individualPPPs. However, this role would not be well-suitedfor sub-national PPPs. A hands-on transaction rolein state and municipal PPPs would directly substitutefor the development of state-level capacity andwould be challenging to do for a large number ofdeals. Capacities should be developed at the statelevel, strengthened by the guidance and informationprovided by the national level unit.

A national level unit undertaking informationdissemination, guidance and transactions supportto central agencies could be established as a unitwithin a ministry or agency with cross-cuttingfunctions. This would allow it to be integrated intoexisting governmental processes of review, andneeded transactions skills could be contracted in byhiring consultants on long-term contracts.

If the center were to provide additional funding forPPPs (see para. xxvii below), then the national unitcould take on the additional mandate of reviewingthese PPPs to assess whether the contractualstructure proposed is robust, that risks are efficientlyallocated and that projects to be supported by thecenter are sound. The unit would need to provideclear guidance on what it viewed as being acceptablecontract structures, approaches to risk allocation,assessment of affordability and value-for-money, andprovider selection criteria.

Additional resources for PPPs.Additional resources for PPPs.Additional resources for PPPs.Additional resources for PPPs.Additional resources for PPPs. A catalytic role bythe center is likely to be needed to expand the usageof PPPs, particularly in states and sectors wherethey have been less used so far. This would consist,in addition to information dissemination andguidance, of financial resources both to develop PPPframeworks and contracts and to fund governmentcommitments under PPPs. This would help addressimportant constraints to further development ofPPPs in the country – namely, weak capacities toidentify realistic PPPs and bring them to the market;a lack of willingness to pay for project development;and a lack of creditworthiness on the part of statesto provide their financial contribution to PPPs.

A number of PPP units manage funds which defray

some of the costs of developing PPPs. There are twoarguments for the use of these funds. The first is thatmany governments new to PPPs do not appreciatethe need to spend more on preparation of PPP projectsthan was spent on developing procurement documentsfor civil works projects in the same sector. The secondis that since PPPs are relatively new, the costs ofpreparing initial projects may be higher and that withlearning some of these will come down. One importantissue is the terms on which this fund would be accessed– a matching grant scheme which combines centralgrant funding with contributions from the stategovernment provides some form of commitment byboth parties and can focus resources on projectsviewed as priorities by the state government.

The use of PPPs for the delivery of basic services bystate and municipal governments would beencouraged by the provision of central funds tosupport their payments under PPPs. A substantialmatching contribution from the governmentcontracting for the PPP would also be importanthere to provide commitment to the project.

The detailed design of such a PPP fund is beyondthe scope of this report and a significant effort wouldhave to go into this to ensure that it is well targetedand efficiently used. It would be important both toensure that projects supported by the fund arepriorities, and that competition for subsidies is usedto reduce the demands on public funds. On thislast point, it would be far more difficult to sizesubsidies – and also less transparent – were projectsfirst awarded by state governments and thensubsequently the chosen developers approached thefund for support.

As noted above, project design, risk allocation,affordability and value-for-money should also beassessed for these projects to ensure that the centeris supporting well-designed PPPs and this could bedone by the national PPP unit. There might howeverbe conflict of interest concerns if this unit received asuccess fee from working on transactions, in whichcase the involvement of others would be necessaryin clearances.

11

1.1 India has had policies in favor of attractingprivate participation in the infrastructuresectors since economic reforms wereintroduced in 1991. These initiatives have metwith varying degrees of success, but realprogress has been made in some sectors, firstin telecommunications, and now in ports androads, and with individual projects in othersectors. The central government and thestates are hoping to build on this progress,both in sectors where few private projectshave been realized as well as scaling up theiruse in sectors where progress has already beenmade. Many of these projects will not becommercially viable on the basis of user feesalone and will require financial contributionsfrom the public sector in addition tosubstantial amounts of risk bearing. In somecases the government will be the purchaserof the services.

1.2 These public private partnerships (PPPs) canhelp meet the infrastructure gap in India, butare not a panacea. They represent a claim onpublic resources that needs to be understoodand assessed. They are often complextransactions, needing a clear specification ofthe services to be provided and anunderstanding of the way risks are allocatedbetween the public and private sector. Theirlong-term nature means that the governmenthas to develop and manage a relationship withthe private providers to overcome unexpectedevents that over time can disrupt even well-designed contracts. And they all involveservices for which, in the eyes of citizens, thegovernment ultimately bears responsibility,

even if service delivery has been contractedout.

1.3 Governments embarking on PPP programshave often developed new policy, legal andinstitutional frameworks to provide therequired organizational and individualcapacities. These go beyond that neededto originate and financially close PPP deals,as they must also ensure that these dealsare affordable to users and the public sectorand provide ex-post evaluation of thesuccess of PPPs in meeting their objectives.This framework needs to be in place in Indiato ensure a robust and successful PPPsprogram.

Scope of this report

1.4 This report is prepared at the request of theDepartment of Economic Affairs (DEA), whichasked the World Bank for recommendationson how capacities for conceptualizing,structuring and managing PPPs could befurther developed in India. Of particular focusis the role of the center in developing thesecapacities. Our review covers bothorganizational and individual capacities. Theskills of the individuals working on PPPs arecritical. However, organizational capacity –the policy and legal frameworks, institutionsinvolved and the processes developed – areas, if not more, important. While the focusis on the capacities required of thegovernments we also look at the need todevelop capacities in the private sector andother stakeholders

1. Introduction1. Introduction


12

1.5 Not all forms of private participation ininfrastructure should be considered PPPs.Though there is perhaps no standarddefinition of what a PPP is, they are generallyregarded to be contracts for servicestraditionally provided by the public sector thatcombine investment with service provisionand see significant risks being borne by theprivate sector. For the purposes of this report,we have focused on projects where privateinvestment has been made, and where thegovernment is either the purchaser of servicesunder the project, or where it provides afinancial contribution through directinvestment or through risk bearing.

1.6 The main sectors of focus are transportation(ports, airports, roads, and rail), water andsanitation and other urban infrastructure(solid waste management, light rail, busterminals). This represents the present areasof focus of many state governments in India.In consultation with DEA, it was decided toexclude the power sector from the analysis,given the complex issues involved in thatsector and the range of other efforts bothwithin the Bank Group and beyond focusedspecifically on power. We have also excludedmany sectors considered infrastructure bystate governments in India, including tourisminfrastructure, housing, and conventioncenters, but do provide some coverage of otherbasic services such as the social sectors(education and health) and e-governance.

1.7 There are several themes related to PPPs thatare not covered. We do not look in detail atthe successes and failures to date in individualPPPs. Although international experience

shows there are significant gains from well-designed PPPs, the report does not advocatethe use of PPPs in general nor particularapproaches to structuring PPP transactions.

Outline of the rest of this report

1.8 We first look at international experiences indeveloping frameworks for PPPs, focusing inparticular on two issues. The first is the roleof cross-sectoral PPP units vis-à-vis lineministries within a given level of government.The second is the role that nationalgovernment plays in overseeing or providingsupport to the PPP programs of sub-nationalgovernments. Although these solutions reflectcountry-specific conditions, they allow somegeneral lessons to be drawn and allow anassessment of the gaps in PPP frameworks inIndia.

1.9 We then provide an overview of the use todate of PPPs to provide infrastructure servicesin India. We present the results of a surveyof PPPs in 12 states and 3 central agencies/ministries in our sectors of focus, and alsoexamine efforts to develop PPP frameworks,particularly at the state level.

1.10 Finally, we look at what can be done tostrengthen and develop capacities for PPPs inIndia and in particular the role of the centralgovernment. This builds upon the survey andother analyses of the experience of developingPPPs in India. We present a range of optionsfor the role of the center, particularly where itconcerns possible steps to catalyze state andmunicipal level PPPs, and provide anassessment of these options.

13

2.1 An increasing number of governments areturning to the private sector to provideservices hitherto delivered by the public sector.The motives for pursuing public privatepartnerships (PPPs) vary from fiscalopportunism, simply seeking to replace publicfinance with private finance, to a genuinedesire to seek lower costs, both for taxpayersand consumers, or improved services.

2.2 There is no single accepted internationaldefinition of what a PPP is. In many countriesthe core of PPP programs are projects thatare for services traditionally provided by thepublic sector, combine investment and serviceprovision, see significant risks being borne bythe private sector, and also see a major rolefor the public sector in either purchasingservices or bearing substantial risks under theproject. PPPs are therefore more than servicecontracts although some would include thesein their definition of PPPs. A number ofgovernments have developed definitions ofwhat constitutes a PPP (Box 1). Developinga definition can facilitate the implementationof a process of oversight by clearly indicating

which projects should fall under a givenprocess, as was the case in South Africa.

2.3 In shifting from more traditional methods ofservice provision, governments need to adaptboth their skills and their processes to ensurethat PPP programs deliver what is expected.The cornerstone of this is ensuring that PPPsthat proceed are those which representpriority projects and that are best donethrough the PPP route rather than throughtraditional public procurement. Much of thiswill hinge on an assessment of the extent ofand benefits of risk transfer to the privatesector, and an understanding of the residualrisks and future payment obligations borneby the government. Once the project is underimplementation, the government then has tofulfill a contract management and oversightrole to ensure that services are delivered andboth sides live up to expectations.

2.4 Factors outside government are alsoimportant. A successful PPP programpresupposes that the private sector has theright skills and capabilities as well as access

Most countries embarking on PPP programs have attempted to provide some form of definition of what a PPP is. Brazil’snew PPP law defines, in its Article 2, that public private partnership contracts are agreements entered into betweengovernment or public entities and private entities that establish a legally binding obligation to manage (in whole or part)services, undertakings and activities in the public interest where the private sector is responsible for financing, investmentand management. Ireland defines PPPs as any arrangement made between a state authority and a private partner toperform functions within the mandate of the state authority, and involving different combinations of design, construction,operations and finance. In South Africa, a PPP is defined in law as a contract between a government institution and aprivate party where the latter performs an institutional function and/or uses state property, and where substantialproject risks are passed to the third party. The UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI), where the public sector purchasesservices from the private sector under long-term contracts is the best known component of that country’s PPP program.However, there are other forms of PPP used in the UK, including where the private sector is introduced as a strategicpartner into a state-owned business that provides a public service.

Box 1: PPPs – Some Definitions

2. Developing Capacities for PPPs:International Experiences2. Developing Capacities for PPPs:International Experiences


14

to long-term finance in local currency forprojects where this is needed. Effective disputeresolution procedures are also essential,including informal and rapid procedures forinterim adjudication backed up by arbitration.Moreover, decisions reached in this way haveto be respected by the courts.

Public sector capacities neededfor a robust PPP program

2.5 Governments embarking on PPP programshave often developed new policy, legal andinstitutional frameworks to provide therequired organizational and individualcapacities. New agencies are sometimescreated to bring in financial and contractdesign skills not present in the government,and existing processes, for example in planningand budgeting, need to be adapted.

Policy frameworks

2.6 A clear policy advocating the use of PPPs, aswell as the rationale for their use, providespolitical commitment and support for theprogram. This is vital particularly in the earlyyears of a PPP program. It is important thatpolicies stress that PPPs are being pursued toprovide better services, not simply to attractprivate sector resources to supplement thosethat the government lacks. Policies can alsoprovide clarity on other aspects, such as the

approach towards risk transfer, procurement,financing, and the need for transparency. Settingpolicy also encourages the discussion of keyissues among different stakeholders, furtheringan increased understanding of the maincharacteristics of PPPs, their advantages, andtheir drawbacks. In addition, it may be importantto look at other ways of developing anunderstanding of PPPs by policy makers,government officials and other stakeholders (seeBox 2).

Legal frameworks

2.7 Although not all countries have developedspecific new PPP legislation, nearly all have feltit necessary to amend existing legislation, if onlyto clarify that public entities have the neededpowers to contract out services under PPPs. Inthe UK, the Local Government Contracts Actwas passed in 1997 to more clearly set out theability of local governments to enter into PPPcontracts and related arrangements. Irelandpassed the State Authorities (PPPArrangements) Act in 2002 which defined thepossible range of PPPs that State Authoritiescould enter into, as well as the role of theMinister of Finance in providing directions toministries aiming to enter into PPPs. However,in the state of Victoria in Australia, PPPs havebeen executed without the need for newlegislation.2

Box 2: Encouraging policy-makers and government officials to use PPPs

At the federal level, the P3 Office, located in Industry Canada (a federal government department that promotes Canadianindustry), has played the role of promoter and resource center. One of the main purposes of the P3 Office, with six full-time professionals at the peak of its activity, was to actively promote the idea of PPPs among politicians and officials inthe provinces and to provide information – and counter misinformation – about PPPs. They do not engage in project-specific advice, as expertise about how to develop PPPs was expected to flow naturally to wherever it was demanded,diffused largely by consulting firms. The main obstacle instead was a lack of political will and the need for a new policydirection in some of the provinces, and this is where the P3 Office could play a useful role. In addition, they found thatthere was a demand for information about PPPs from the Canadian engineering industry, which wanted to preparethemselves well to compete in this market both in Canada and internationally. Another important role of the P3 Officehas been to educate federal officials about PPPs. The main responsibility for PPPs lies with the provinces, but federalpolicies can either hinder or facilitate PPP programs at the provincial level.

2 However, in the UK and Australia sector-specific legislation has been used to introduce competitive markets, restructure industriesand introduce new regulatory frameworks.

Developing Capacities for PPPs: International Experiences

15

2.8 Secondary legislation and regulations can bedeveloped to use existing laws as a frameworkfor PPPs. In South Africa the nationalgovernment developed new regulations underexisting public financial managementlegislation to impose central governmentoversight and approval of PPPs beingdeveloped and signed by the provinces. Thisaddressed the national government’s mainconcern, namely that the provinces were usingPPPs as a means of off-balance sheet financingto get round budgetary constraints.

2.9 Cross-cutting PPP legislation has been usedmore extensively in countries that operateunder the civil code. Where used, it oftencovers aspects such as specifying whichsectors PPPs can operate in, how tariffs forPPPs are set and adjusted, the role of differentinstitutions in a PPP program, procurementof PPPs, and dispute resolution procedures.

2.10 Even where legislation is not strictly neededto permit PPPs, it can be helpful in a numberof ways. It can for example define and limitthe processes used in identifying and procuringPPPs. Many PPP laws for example go intoconsiderable detail prescribing theprocurement procedures that must befollowed, and the form and content of a PPPcontract. Legislation can also create newinstitutions which will play a key role in thePPP process. Finally, new laws can help clarifythe overall legal framework for PPPs byconsolidating, or referring to, all provisionsneeded in connection with PPP arrangements.Generally older laws were enacted without

PPPs in mind, and it may not be clear howthey would apply in the new context. As aresult, a number of countries have passedbroad legislation relating to PPPs.

Human resources

2.11 The public sector needs individual capacitiesto be strengthened to provide the gamut ofskills required for an effective PPP program,not just transactions skills, but also thoseinvolved in selecting which projects to bepursued as PPPs, estimating the fiscal costsof PPPs, oversight and contract management,and ex-post evaluation and auditing of theperformance of PPPs. Developing thecapacities to design and execute transactionsmay be the most difficult for the public sector,since the legal and financial skills may not bepresent and given public sector pay scales itmay be difficult to attract skilled individuals infrom the private sector.

2.12 Sustaining capacities is made more difficult bythe rotation of staff out of positions oncethey have built up knowledge by closingtransactions. This problem is likely to increaseat the municipal or local level, where capacitiesare likely to be lower and the number of PPPsfewer, offering a reduced opportunity forlearning-by-doing. Consultants can play alarge role in providing specialist skills for publicauthorities in any PPP program. But certaincore skills have to remain with the publicsector or it will be impossible to make the bestuse of the consultants. Training will also help,and, as noted below, the development of clear

Box 3: Brazil’s new PPP Law

Brazil has recently passed a new national PPP law that applies to all levels of government and to all entities/enterprisescontrolled by governments within Brazil. This law sets out the main guidelines to be followed in developing PPPs; thebroad types of activities possible under PPPs; sets of clauses that PPP contracts must include; the bidding processrequired for procuring PPPs; the creation of an agency, under the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, thatestablishes procedures for contracting out PPPs; and a requirement for contracting entities to estimate the costs of PPPs,and to ensure that these costs are consistent with multi-year budget plans and relevant legislation on fiscal costs and donot lead to breaches of budgetary plans and relevant fiscal legislation.


16

processes and guidelines can accelerate thetransfer of knowledge and learning-by-doing.

Procedures and guidelines

2.13 Many PPP programs develop standardizedprocesses and approaches towardsstructuring contracts. The standardizationof common contractual provisions is alsorecommended as it firms up an acceptablepublic sector risk profile and creates certaintyin the market. It can also promote a commonunderstanding of the technical, operationaland financial risks that are typicallyencountered in PPPs, a commonunderstanding of how such risks should beallocated or shared, a consistent approach torisk transfer, risk sharing and value for moneyacross PPPs falling in the same sector, and areduction in time and cost of negotiations.Sector toolkits can be developed oncesufficient sector experience has been achieved.Guidelines are often developed which providespecific rules on how projects are to beselected for pursuit through PPPs, on contractdesign and procurement, and on contractmanagement. These can help ensure thatissues such as affordability of the PPP to thegovernment, value-for-money, overall fiscalcosts, and public legitimacy concerns areaddressed properly. Most countries thatdevelop guidelines and manuals developtraining courses on these for contractingauthority staff.

Organizations: the role of cross-sectoralPPP units

2.14 Most countries engaged in a broad-based PPPprogram have felt the need to develop a cross-sectoral pool of expertise in a dedicated PPPunit to supplement capacities in the lineagencies that contract for PPPs. These fulfilldifferent roles depending on the needs of thesituation. In some cases their role is limitedto disseminating information on PPPs and

providing broad guidance on good practices.In others they have an active role in helpingline agencies and ministries successfullycontract for PPPs, and in yet others they playa role in approving PPPs developed by othergovernment agencies, for example looking atthe quality of the PPP deal, affordability andexpected fiscal cost. Where developed, thesecross-sectoral units are often located in, orattached to, the Ministry of Finance orTreasury. This probably reflects concernsabout the need to strengthen understandingand monitoring of the fiscal costs of PPPs.

2.15 Line departments will usually retain theprimary responsibility for PPPs within theirmandate. The role that central units playdepends on a number of considerations. Themost important is the deal volume in the linedepartment. If a department develops a largenumber of PPPs, it may make the most senseto build up full capacity within the departmentto handle these activities. For example, in theU.K., the Prison Service and the HighwaysAgency both have their own dedicated PFIteams. However, many PFI projects forhospitals and schools are implemented byNational Health Service trusts and localeducation authorities, each responsible forone or two projects. It would not be costeffective for each trust or authority to set upa permanent dedicated PFI unit.

2.16 It may also be a matter of timing. It may beappropriate for a cross-sectoral unit toprovide assistance to a line department at thestart of its program, when the line departmentdoes not yet have sufficient experience. Theconverse may however also be true, with somepioneering line departments having morehands-on experience than a newly-created PPPunit. In these cases, it will be important for across-sectoral unit not to slow down thesemore experienced agencies, whilst at the sametime ensuring that critical issues (e.g.


17

affordability and value-for-money) areproperly addressed.

2.17 Cross-sectoral units can perform a broad setof functions, including: undertaking thedevelopment of PPP policies and legislation;the development of guidance material includingstandard contracts, manuals and processesfor identifying and developing PPPs; clearanceand approval functions during the PPPprocess; a source of expertise in one or moreaspects of PPP procurement andmanagement; development of trainingprograms; dissemination of information onPPPs; and assessment of the fiscal costs (directand contingent) of PPPs. Box 4 shows therange of responsibilities granted to the SouthAfrican PPP unit. Like units or agencieselsewhere, such as in the Netherlands andwith several of the agencies involved in theUK PPP program, they have developedtraining material to supplement or reinforcethe guidance material and contractual orprocedural approaches they have developed.

2.18 One important policy decision is whether thecross-sectoral unit will have the power toimpose mandatory requirements on the linedepartments – and in that case, what kind ofrequirements. This is often done by involvingthe PPP unit in approval of the PPPs. InSouth Africa, the Treasury relies on the PPPUnit to assess whether the expenditures

incurred by PPPs developed by line agenciesand provinces can be met within their futurebudgets. The PPP Unit is involved at threedifferent points: after the feasibility study,before issuing the bidding documents, andbefore signing the contract. In contrast, insome countries – e.g. Italy– the national cross-sectoral PPP unit plays only an advisory role.

Purely public versus public-private cross-sectoral units

2.19 Particularly where PPP units are to providetransactions skills and experience carefulthought needs to be given to the nature ofthe unit and its ability to buy in these skillsfrom the private sector. One option is toestablish a unit within a ministry and rely onlong-term consulting skills to supplementcapacities. Greater independence can beachieved by setting up the unit as anautonomous entity, attached to but not fullypart of the government bureaucracy as withthe Philippines BOT center. A third approachcomes from Canada, where PartnershipsBritish Columbia is a government-ownedcompany that works with line departmentsand other agencies to identify and procurePPPs in that province. This is overseen by apublic/private board and offers salaries outsidethe normal civil service ranges to attractpeople with relevant financial and transactionsskills.

Box 4: The role of the South African PPP Unit

In 2000, South Africa set up a PPP Unit to serve as the focal point for coordinating and managing the PPP program. ThePPP Unit reports to the Budget Office of the National Treasury. The PPP Unit in South Africa is a good example of acentral organization with a wide range of tasks, both advisory and mandatory, relating to PPPs. The key functions ofSouth Africa’s PPP Unit, which has 11 professional staff at present, are: formal approval at three different stages ofproject preparation to ensure compliance with Treasury regulations; in-depth technical assistance to departmentsthroughout the PPP project cycle; assistance to departments in appointing transaction advisors; development of policy,guidelines, and instructions, including the PPP Manual and the Standardized PPP Provisions (contract terms); trainingcourses and workshops, based round this Manual; promotion of public awareness of PPPs through the PPP Quarterlypublication, website, and conferences; and management of the Project Development Facility that provides funding forthe government’s transaction costs.


18

2.20 Another way is to set up a joint venturecompany that is owned in part by privatesector shareholders. This is usuallycomplemented by incentivizing the unit byallowing it to benefit financially from successfees to be paid by the winning bidder whenthe deal is closed. One example of this isPartnerships U.K. (PUK), established in 2000.PUK, 51% owned by the private sector,considers itself to be a bridge between thepublic and private sectors. It focuses onstructuring and negotiating the commercialaspects of the deal. PUK regards itself as aPPP “developer,” playing a more active rolealong with the public authority.

Possible conflicts of interest within cross-sectoral units

2.21 There are risks of a conflict of interest in cross-sectoral PPP units that have multiple

functions, even where these are purely publicsector agencies. A conflict of interest canoccur when the unit has a strong mandate topromote PPPs and increase deal flow, whileat the same time having the responsibility forscreening deals and ensuring that the projectsare affordable to the government. Conflictsalso arise if the same body promotes or assistsin developing projects and then is asked tocarry out ex post evaluations. The bestsolution in both cases may be to split thefunctions. In South Africa, the PPP unit faceda conflict of interest in providing transactionsadvice for projects and granting approvals.This was handled by seeking approvals onprojects from individuals from other groupswithin Treasury. In British Columbia, theTreasury retains approval powers, as theseare not granted to Partnerships BritishColumbia, as is also the case in the UK.

Box 5: Institutions involved in the UK’s PPP programs

The institutional system relating to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the U.K. began in 1992 with the establishmentof the Private Finance Panel and then, in 1997, the Treasury Task Force. Since then, the system has gone through anumber of changes. At present, the main organizations dealing with PFI, in addition to the line departments and localgovernments that have primary responsibility, are the following:

The PPPPPrivate Frivate Frivate Frivate Frivate Finance Unit inance Unit inance Unit inance Unit inance Unit in the Treasury is the body responsible at present for formulating policy and preparing policyand practice guidelines for PFI – e.g. concerning the preparation of a “public sector comparator.”

Partnerships UK (PUK)Partnerships UK (PUK)Partnerships UK (PUK)Partnerships UK (PUK)Partnerships UK (PUK) was set up in 2000 to handle the development of specific projects. The focus is on structuringthe contracts, managing the procurement process, and supporting negotiations. PUK is now 51% owned by privateinstitutions (e.g. financial services companies involved in financing PFI projects) and 49% by the government. Its role isto work closely with government departments to develop PFI transactions. It commonly takes a success fee when dealsare closed.

The Office of Government CommerOffice of Government CommerOffice of Government CommerOffice of Government CommerOffice of Government Commerce (OGC)ce (OGC)ce (OGC)ce (OGC)ce (OGC), an independent office of the Treasury reporting to the Chief Secretary,focuses on improving central government procurement in all its aspects, not just PFI. Specific PFI-related responsibilitieshave now been taken over by the Private Finance Unit in the Treasury.

The Public Private Partnerships Programme (4ps)Public Private Partnerships Programme (4ps)Public Private Partnerships Programme (4ps)Public Private Partnerships Programme (4ps)Public Private Partnerships Programme (4ps) was set up in 1996 to provide support and advice to local governments,especially about procurement matters but extending over the entire project cycle. Advice concerns PPPs broadly, not justPFI projects. (In U.K. terminology, “PPP” can refer to a broader category that encompasses a number of different waysthat the public and private sectors can work together.)

The National Audit Office (NAO)The National Audit Office (NAO)The National Audit Office (NAO)The National Audit Office (NAO)The National Audit Office (NAO), as auditor of central government expenditure, carries out ex post reviews of PFIprojects and programs as part of its mandate to evaluate whether government departments are achieving value formoney. These are placed in the public domain.

Select Committee on PSelect Committee on PSelect Committee on PSelect Committee on PSelect Committee on Public Accounts of the House of Commons (Public Accounts of the House of Commons (Public Accounts of the House of Commons (Public Accounts of the House of Commons (Public Accounts of the House of Commons (PAAAAAC)C)C)C)C), as the parliamentary watchdog, preparesreports on PFI projects and questions on selective basis.


19

Traditional oversight bodies also have a role— the U.K. National Audit Office hasundertaken a number of reviews of thegovernment’s PPP program.

2.22 There is a special risk of conflict of interestwith respect to PPP units that are public-private joint ventures, and where success feesincentivize the closing of transactions. Therisk of capture by private interests could behigh. Careful structuring of the arrangementsfor corporate governance is needed. Privatesector participation is added to orient the unitmore to the private sector’s mode of thinkingand working, but the unit still has to maintainthe policy perspective and objectives of thepublic sector. In the U.K, for instance, oneway that this is intended to be accomplishedin Partnerships UK is through an AdvisoryCouncil, made up exclusively of members fromthe public sector, which was established byTreasury to oversee PUK. The AdvisoryCouncil approves the selection criteria usedby PUK in deciding which projects to beinvolved in.

2.23 In general, it is clear that a public-private unitwould not be the right place to issue PPPpolicies, though they could play a role in theirdevelopment. Therefore, a public-private unitthat provided transactions support wouldneed to be complemented by the developmentof capacities elsewhere (typically in Finance)which could perform these functions. Thesetensions can mean that it may be useful tohave a number of different institutionsinvolved in different aspects of the PPPprogram (see Box 5), as is now the case inthe UK.

The roles of national and sub-nationalagencies

2.24 All the countries discussed so far haveundertaken many PPPs in areas whereservice responsibilities lie with sub-national

governments or agencies. The role ofnational agencies relative to sub-nationalones usually reflects legal and fiscal relationsbetween these levels of government,deriving from the constitution and existingbudgetary practices.

2.25 In the UK, there are many PPPs that havebeen entered into by Local Authorities. Theseaccess advisory support from national levelagencies, and all local government PFI projectsare approved by a central government inter-departmental committee chaired by Treasury.In South Africa, the oversight role of thenational PPP unit has already been mentioned.It has also played an important role indeveloping standards and procedures toimprove the quality of PPP transactions. Thelegislation recently passed in Brazil envisagesa role for a national level entity to establishprocedures for contracting PPPs and toidentify projects that should be taken up asPPPs as a priority.

2.26 Other countries have adopted a moredecentralized approach. In Canada, several ofthe provinces (for example British Columbiaand Quebec) have their own cross-sectoralPPP units. The federal government createdan agency, the P3 Office, to act as a resourcecenter and promoter of the benefits ofrationale for using PPPs, rather than in a morehands-on advisory role. This has included thedevelopment of information resourcesincluding a portal and guides and “self-help”tools.

2.27 The national government in Australia hasvirtually no role in state level PPPs and insteadhas largely focused on PPPs for services forwhich it, as national government, isresponsible. State governments have takenresponsibility for developi ng PPPs for theservices they are responsible for with very littleinvolvement by the national government. The


20

states have established their own information-sharing structures, with a PPP forum, forgovernment policy-makers, meeting annually,and a PPP working group, for the heads ofPPP agencies, which meets more often with amandate to coordinate over the projectpipeline, provide consistent (though separatefor each state) guidance, and try to develop

standards for contract principles and drafting.However, as noted in Box 3, Brazil is intendingto establish capacities in the center to offerdetailed guidance to the states in thedevelopment of PPPs. Table 1 summarizes themain functions performed by existing cross-sectoral PPP units in a number of differentcountries.

Table 1 – Functions of Cross-sectoral PPP Units

Frame- Nature Approval Intensive Role as Role in Resource PPP Fundingwork law of PPP power project project contract center guidance forenacted unit over specific develop- over- *** material prepa-

establi- PPPs** advice er (a)** sight** *** ration(b)shed

Australia: Victoria ① � �

Canada: British Columbia ③ � � (f) � �

Ireland � (c) (d) � �

Italy(h) � ① � � �

Netherlands ① � � � � (g)

Philippines � ② � � � � �

South Africa ① � � � � �

U.K.(i) ④ (e) � � (f) � �

Notes:Notes:Notes:Notes:Notes:

***** “PPP unit” in this table means a cross-sectoral unit. Legend for this column: ① = unit is part of ministry or department;② = autonomous or quasi-autonomous administrative unit; ③ = public authority or publicly owned company (outsidecivil service); ④ = public-private joint venture company; x = no distinct cross-sectoral PPP unit exists.

** Refers to the dedicated PPP unit.*** Might be provided by the dedicated PPP unit or by another cross-sectoral department or central ministry.(a) Greater responsibility than an advisor and charges fees that are based on some measure of performance (e.g. achievement

of milestones or close of deal).(b) Refers to funding (outside the normal budget) to pay for consultants working with the line department or local government,

not with the PPP unit.(c) In Ireland, Central PPP Unit (dealing with policy and general PPP procurement issues) is ① ; National Development Finance

Agency (giving advice about financial structuring, financing, and risk evaluation) is ③.(d) In Ireland, the National Development Finance Agency gives p roject-specific advice about financing and financial

structuring. The Central PPP Unit was involved in project-specific work for the pilot projects so that they could get hands-on knowledge to develop the policy and guidance material. But now, they do not become involved in specific projects.

(e) Partnerships UK prepares a report for each local government PFI project; the report goes to an interdepartmentalcommittee that has the power of approval.

(f) Can be requested by its clients (line departments and local governments) to play a role in oversight and monitoring, butthere is no obligation to use the unit for this purpose.

(g) EU provides grant funding for the transaction costs for some large-scale transportation PPPs (rail and roads).(h) This refers to the central PPP unit. There are also PPP units of various kinds in six of Italy’s regions. Certain regions have

considerable autonomy.(i) This row refers just to Partnerships UK.

Source: World Bank analysis

21

3.1 There is now over 10 years experience in Indiain the development and use of PPPs fordelivering infrastructure services. Policies infavor of attracting private participation havemet with varying degrees of success, but realprogress has been made in some sectors, firstin telecommunications, and now in ports androads, and with individual projects in othersectors. There has been considerableinnovation with different structures nowbeing developed to attract privateparticipation. But at the same time progresshas been uneven: there are islands ofprogress, with some states having undertakenfar more PPPs than others, and a much heavieruse of PPPs in some sectors than others. Andwhile there are a number of successfulprojects to the present date, there have alsobeen a number of poorly conceptualized PPPsbrought to the market that stood little chanceof reaching financial closure. In terms offrameworks for PPPs, some states have mademore attempts to develop this, includingcross-cutting legislation and the development

of cross-sectoral units that play a role in theidentification and preparation of PPPs. Othershowever have worked within the bounds oftheir existing organizational structure.

3.2 Given the lack of an existing database onPPPs in India, a survey was undertakenboth to provide information on the currentusage of PPPs as well as the frameworksdeveloped for their implementation. Themain sectors of focus are the basic publicservices excluding power: transportation(ports, airports, roads, and rail), water andsanitation, and other urban infrastructure(solid waste management, light rail, busterminals).3 This represents the presentareas of focus of many state governmentsin India. The survey covered 12 of the statesregarded to have been most active in thedevelopment of PPPs, as well as the 3central agencies undertaking PPPs in theareas of focus.4 The survey also providessome indication of the possible pipeline ofPPP projects in India.

3 We also provide some coverage of other basic services such as the social sectors (education and health) and e-governance, but theyare not reflected in the main text charts as the available data are not as comprehensive in their coverage. In consultation with DEA,it was decided to exclude the power sector from the analysis, given the complex issues involved in that sector and the range of otherefforts focused specifically on power both within the Bank Group and beyond.4 This analysis is based on a non-comprehensive survey of PPP activities to-date in 3 central agencies – National Highways Authorityof India (NHAI), Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (MOSRTH) and Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd. (RVNL)— and 12 statesacross basic infrastructure sectors, supported by PwC; although it does not cover the universe of PPPs, it reflects most projects inbasic infrastructure sectors in the most active states. The 5 infrastructure sectors of focus where PPP contracts have been awardedin the covered states and federal agencies are roads & bridges, ports, airports, rail, and urban, which in turn includes water &sanitation, solid waste management, bus terminals, light rail, ferries and a logistics hub (although for the last 3 sub-sectors therehave been preparatory activities but no contract awarded yet). There also has been activity in health & education and e-governance, in addition to sectors not covered in this report such as power, tourism, and other construction (convention centers,industrial, IT & biotech parks, SEZs, and housing). The states covered are Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala,Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal (though the survey did not include any awarded PPPproject in Orissa, only pipeline projects).See the tables in the Annex for more details.

3. PPPs in India: Islands of Progress3. PPPs in India: Islands of Progress


22

The role of PPPs so far

3.3 In the surveyed states and central agencies,there have been at least 86 PPP projects inour main sectors of focus where a contracthas been awarded and projects are underway– in the sense that they are either operational,have reached construction stage, or at leastconstruction/implementation is imminent.Over 70% of these are in the roads sector.The other transport sectors have seen muchfewer projects, with 8 ports (4 major and 4minor ports), 2 airport and 2 rail projectsunderway. In the urban infrastructure sector,11 PPP projects have been awarded, with 8solid waste management, 2 water andsanitation and one bus terminal projects.Outside of the sectors of immediate interestand hence not included in the main text totalsand charts, the survey found 6 PPP projectsin e-governance and 2 in education. Thoughthe coverage may not have been exhaustivefor these last two sectors, it is clear that thepotential use of PPPs in e-governance andhealth and education sectors remains largelyuntapped across India as a whole.

3.4 When looking at the total estimated projectcost of PPPs, we see that road projects

account only for 36 percent of the totalbecause of the small average size of projects.Ports, with a much larger average size ofproject, account for 56 percent of the total.It is noteworthy that if ports and central roadprojects are excluded from the total, there isin fact a relatively small value of deal flow, atonly Rs 30 bn in basic infrastructure PPPsto-date, suggesting a significant potentialupside for PPP projects across sectors wherestates and municipalities have primaryresponsibility.

3.5 Across states and central agencies, the leadingusers of PPPs by number of projects have beenMadhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, with 21and 14 awarded projects respectively, all inthe roads sector, and the National HighwaysAuthority of India (NHAI), with 16 projects.The other states or central agencies that havebeen important users of PPPs are Gujarat (9projects) and Tamil Nadu (7), Karnataka (4)and Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport andHighways (MOSRTH) (4). However, lookingat a breakdown by estimated project size, wesee that MP becomes significantly lessprominent due to the large number of relativelysmall-sized projects in its portfolio, falling to3 percent of total project costs. Gujarat

Figure 2: Project cost of awardedPPPs by sector (total = Rs. 339.5 bn.)

Figure 1: Number of awarded PPPsby sector (total = 86)

Source: PWC analysis Source: PWC analysis

PPPs in India : Islands of Progress

23

Figure 3: Awarded PPP projects bystates & central agencies (total = 86)

accounts for 48 percent of total project costsdue to its four large port projects. NHAI(17%) and MOSRTH (12%) are the othersignificant players. Karnataka accounts for 7percent of total project costs given that itsone awarded PPP project, the Bangalore-Mysore road corridor (currently underconstruction) had a reported project cost ofRs 22.5 billion.

3.6 In terms of main types of PPP contracts,almost all contracts have been of the BOT/BOOT type or close variants. While it maybe appropriate for central, state or municipalgovernments to promote PPPs that can bepaid for by users if they are priorities, theymay be missing out on other opportunitiesfor more efficient private sector service deliverysupported by ongoing public payments overtime. Some examples of such other types ofPPP contracts used to-date in India includethe annuity contracts awarded by NHAI forroads, a small number of affermage-type(O&M with private investment) contracts,and a long lease in Maharashtra for theMumbai-Pune expressway.

3.7 Anecdotal comments from the private sectorsuggest that a considerable number of un-

bankable and unrealistic PPP projects arebrought to the market by state governments.Data from the survey presented in the Annexshow that there were 15 projects that havenot moved forward past the award stageeither because they have been abandoned orremained dormant. Of these, several had nogood offers forthcoming in response tosuccessive requests for expressions of interest.Although this number is not obviously highcompared to the number of projectsunderway, it nonetheless suggests that theremay be significant benefits from capacitybuilding in identification and preparation ofPPPs to ensure that more bankable projectsare brought to market.

3.8 In terms of approach to provider selection,93 percent of the projects in the samplewere competitively bid (of which four-fifthsused national competitive bidding), withonly 7 percent procured either throughMemorandums of Understanding (MOUs)or negotiated. However, it is worth notingthat in value terms 42 percent of theprojects were awarded on a negotiated/MoUbasis.

Figure 4: PPP projects by states &central agencies (total = Rs. 339.5 bn.)

Source: PWC analysis Source: PWC analysis


24

Institutional frameworks for PPPsin India3.9 A wide range of institutional structures and

capacity approaches have been adopted forconceptualizing and procuring PPPs acrossstates and central agencies, different variantsof which have had some degree of success.At the state level, the three main approacheshave been: combining dedicated institutionswith cross-cutting legislation; establishing andusing cross-sectoral PPP advisory units tohelp line departments in the absence of over-arching legislation; and relying on linedepartments and sectoral agencies to buildcapacities. Table 2 provides a summary ofstate-level approaches.

3.10 Gujarat, AP and Punjab have developedspecialized institutions and legislation. Each

of these states has constituted an agency(respectively the Gujarat InfrastructureDevelopment Board, the AP InfrastructureAuthority and the Punjab InfrastructureDevelopment Board) and passed acts topromote private sector participation ininfrastructure projects across sectors. As anillustration, the Gujarat InfrastructureDevelopment Act, 1999, gives force of law tothe provision of entering into a concessionagreement with a private sector developer,provides transparent procedures for selectionof the developer, and provides for levying usercharges for the facilities provided by thedeveloper.

3.11 A second category of states, includingKarnataka, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal and WestBengal, have developed cross-sectoral

Table 2: Institutional Frameworks for PPPs in India

Framework Nature of Approval Intensive Resource PPP guid- Fundinglaw PPP unit power project- center ance mate- for PPP

enacted established over specific *** rial*** prepara-* PPPs** advice** tion (b)***

Gujarat � ② � � � � �

Andhra Pradesh � ② � � � � �

Punjab � ② � � � (b)

Madhya Pradesh (a) (b)

Maharashtra (b)

Tamil Nadu (b)

West Bengal ④ (b)

Karnataka ④ (b)

UP (b)

Orissa (b)

Delhi (b)

Notes:***** “PPP unit” in this table means a cross-sectoral unit. Legend for this column: ① = unit is part of ministry or department;

② = autonomous or quasi-autonomous administrative unit; ③ = public authority or publicly owned company (outsidecivil service); ④ = public-private joint venture company.

** Refers to the dedicated PPP unit.*** Might be provided by the dedicated PPP unit or by another department or ministry.(a) – sector specific, (b) – limited to some sectors/agencies/projects

Source: World Bank analysis


25

facilitation entities, but have not passedcomprehensive legislation. In Karnataka, theInfrastructure Development Corporation ofKarnataka (iDeCK) is a joint venture betweenthe state government and IDFC modeled onPartnerships UK, providing advisory servicessuch as enabling frameworks, projectdevelopment and structuring, andmanagement of a Project Investment Fund.The Rajasthan Project DevelopmentCorporation (PDCOR) is similar in structure,a joint venture between the state governmentand IL&FS to facilitate private investment ininfrastructure, including policy advisoryservices to the state government, andinstitutional support to structure andimplement PPPs. The ICICI – West BengalInfrastructure Development CorporationLimited (IWIN) is a joint venture betweenICICI Bank Group and Government of WestBengal formed with the objective ofaccelerating the development of infrastructure.

3.12 Finally, a third category of states, includingMP, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, have reliedon sectoral and line agencies to develop andimplement PPPs. In Madhya Pradesh (MP),for example, initially the MP Public WorksDepartment (PMMWD) and then thespecially-created MP Road DevelopmentCorporation (MPRDC) act as the agency fordevelopment of road projects on a BOT basis.In the process of developing projects, MPRDChas developed policy, guidance materials andskills. In Maharashtra, the State RoadDevelopment Corporation (MSRDC) andMumbai Metropolitan Region DevelopmentAuthority (MMRDA) have developed policiesfor infrastructure development through privatesector participation, including a “Policy onimplementation of Road & Bridge Projectsthrough private sector participation”.

3.13 At the central level, the NHAI has developedand modified standard concession agreements,

and has developed different approaches forextending government financial support forPPPs. The capacity building measures underway at NHAI focus on improving humanresources, financial systems, bid processmanagement and include internal training,study tours and the development of a robustMIS system. However, it is understood thata number of personnel are on deputation andthey leave once their tenure is over. Thoughthis is not an unusual situation for publicagencies, it does of course lead to a loss ofexpertise and knowledge. For the rail sector, aspecial purpose vehicle called Rail Vikas NigamLimited (RVNL) has been floated to develop,mobilize resources and implement PPPs. Thereare no obvious structures in place at thecentral level to transfer expertise andknowledge built up in one agency – forexample NHAI – to a second that is justembarking on PPPs.

3.14 There is no clear link between institutionalstructures and success in developing PPPs inIndia. It would seem clear from the experienceof MP and Maharashtra in the developmentof PPPs for roads that it is possible to developa PPP program in a single sector by buildingup capacities in line departments. However,these states are conspicuous by their absenceof PPPs in other sectors, no doubt at least inpart driven by the absence of platforms totransfer acquired skills to other departments.Gujarat, AP and Punjab have all developedcross-sectoral enabling legislation anddedicated agencies but have had very differenttrack records in terms of taking PPPssuccessfully to the market. Some other states– such as Tamil Nadu – have also developed afew PPPs across a wide range of sectors,without explicit cross-sectoral PPP units orlegislation.

3.15 Fundamentals such as political commitmenttowards the use of PPPs, sufficient trained


26

staff, and strong links between built-upcapacity and implementation responsibility inthe respective line departments are probablythe most important ingredients of success.

The development of policies andstandardization of contracts

3.16 Although some states have developed policiesthat advocate the use of PPPs, the underlyingpolicy rationale is by and large one of usingPPPs to substitute for capital investments bythe state. PPPs have therefore been used morein situations where substantial capitalinvestments are required, and where user feescan be accessed to defray much of the costs.To the extent that it is possible, user feesshould be used to pay for projects. However,purely seeing PPPs as a substitute for publicinvestment has drawbacks. It can be illusory,since many of these PPPs will have fiscal costs,as noted above. It can also lead toinconsistent signals to private developers, asarises when governments have reduced orscaled back PPP programs when additionalfunding – for example provided by multilateralagencies – has become available for publicinvestments.

3.17 In some cases, PPPs are overseen byregulatory agencies, such as in the portssector, where TAMP, the sector regulator setstariffs for port services for the major ports.In most cases however, the PPPs are regulatedthrough the contract between thegovernment agency and the service provider.Here the need will not be for a regulatoryauthority with substantial discretion, butrather for an efficient method for settling thedisputes between the contracting parties thatare likely to arise in even well-designedcontracts. Monitoring by consumer andstakeholder groups of the performance of PPPshas been tested in India and is one way ofsupplementing the capacities of the

government to oversee contractorperformance.

3.18 There have been some efforts by stategovernments and central agencies to developstandard contracts. At the state level, ashighlighted in the Table 2 above and in greaterdetail in the Institutional Framework table inthe Annex, Gujarat and AP have developedcross-sectoral model contracts and Punjab aswell to a more limited extent. Madhya Pradeshhas developed some standard documents inthe road sector. At the central level, NHAIhas developed model contracts and standarddocuments for the road sector.

3.19 There have not been systematic attempts todevelop and use methodologies to evaluatewhether particular projects are best donethrough a PPP route or through traditionalpublic procurement. Tools such as PublicSector Comparators (PSCs) have not beenused very widely in India so far, even on asimplified basis. The lack of an adequatebaseline on the actual costs of delivery by thepublic sector admittedly makes suchcomparisons more difficult, but undertakingthese comparisons would help ensure that thePPP route is best for the priority project.Moreover, anecdotal evidence from othercountries suggests that PSCs are useful inclarifying approaches to risk allocation, andthe expected benefits of this, in the contractingagencies.

Training and other informationdissemination initiatives

3.20 In terms of formalized individual capacitybuilding, the number of specialized coursesoffered on PPPs in India has been limited. Thereare some training programs at central or statelevel, as well as those organized industryorganizations such as Confederation of IndianIndustry (CII). Many of the government


27

organizations – both at the senior levels andmiddle levels – take part in these programs.However, with civil servant staff in generalshifting position every few years, most of thetraining imparted can be quickly lost.

3.21 Perhaps more importantly, there is relativelylittle information on PPPs either in the publicdomain, or commonly available togovernment officials developing PPPs. Thisincludes examples of contracts and clauses,and assessments of the success of differentapproaches both in terms of contractingstructures as well as institutional frameworksfor PPPs.

Where are the gaps in Indiacompared to elsewhere?

3.22 While some states in India have madeimportant progress towards developing theframeworks needed for broad and robust PPPprograms, others have developed policies andapproaches in a single sector only, and mostother states are yet to seriously commencePPP programs. As a result, there isconsiderable diversity in both the strength ofpolicy and legal frameworks in place, and thelevel of transactions capacities andexperiences.

3.23 Even taking this diversity into account, thereare some common areas where frameworksin India need to be developed. As noted earlier,the policy rationale for PPPs is often limitedto the use of PPPs as a source of investmentcapital when the public sector lacks funds.As a result, there is not much championingof PPPs on the grounds that they will lead tomore efficient service delivery and better valuefor consumers and taxpayers. There is limitedsystematic compilation, analysis and transferwithin the public sector of knowledge andexperiences between PPP projects, sectors and

different governments; to the extent that thereis a lack of confidence in civil servants toundertake PPPs, greater awareness of goodexamples and established procedures can helpmake it more acceptable to follow, with thebest antidote to inaction being precedence.Capacities for evaluation and oversight inparticular need to be built up: there is littleevidence so far that there has been muchprogress in developing capacities to decidewhich projects are best done through PPPs,and ex-post evaluation of the performance ofPPPs versus expectations has been limited sofar.5 Finally, the processes for identifying andprocuring PPPs are often not clearly laid out.

3.24 That there are gaps should not be surprising,in part because most state governments inIndia are at an early stage in the developmentof their PPP programs. Nonetheless it isimportant that the right frameworks andcapacities are further developed in the statesand agencies where PPP programs are goingto be pursued.

Expanding the use of PPPs tomeet basic services needs

3.25 The survey of state and central agenciesrevealed that, at present, they have 52 PPPprojects at various stages of development priorto contract award. Roads, rail and ports aremost prevalent, with 39 of the pipelineprojects in these sectors (13, 14 and 12 PPPs,respectively). In urban infrastructure, thereare 12 PPP projects in the pipeline, with 3 inwater & sanitation, 6 bus terminals, onewaste management, one light rail and oneferry project. Across states and centralagencies, the leading developers of thesepipeline projects are RVNL (12 rail), followedby Karnataka (9), Maharashtra (7), andOrissa (7).

5 The exception to this are reviews of the power sector, which in turn are largely focused on the Orissa distribution privatization andDabhol.


28

3.26 PPPs have the potential to be used more widelyin India for the delivery of basic infrastructureservices. But a set of policy, regulatory andcapacity issues will need to be addressed forthis to happen.

3.27 As noted earlier, PPPs have been used morein situations where substantial capitalinvestments are required, and where user feescan be accessed to defray much of the costs.This approach excludes projects where thegovernment remains the purchaser of servicesbut where efficiency gains can be achievedthrough going the PPP route relative totraditional public procurement. A clearer policyrationale, and one that does not rely largelyon the “substitution” rationale and more onthe role that PPPs can play in improving theefficiency and quality of service delivery willbe important in broadening their usage wherethey lead to lower life-cycle costs.

3.28 Political and regulatory risks involved in PPPsare still perceived to be substantial by theprivate sector. These risks are likely to beperceived as lower where a state governmentor a particular agency has developed a trackrecord of bringing well conceptualized PPPs

to the market and honoring contractualcommitments, particularly where stategovernments or state enterprises are notfinancially strong. Although there aredifferences within the country, these risksremain.

3.29 Some of these risks are manifested in slow andfragmented approval processes forinfrastructure projects that successful biddersmust negotiate. As well as increasing risks,the delays increase the overall cost to bidders,and hence the costs to taxpayers andconsumers.

3.30 Finally, a broader, but successful PPP programwill require the public sector to develop bettercapacities to identify possible PPPs, to developbankable contracts and bid them out, and tomonitor their performance and costs.Informal feedback from the private sectorsuggests that governments still float unrealisticPPPs, for example. Moreover, since PPPs arenot a panacea and entail costs to thegovernment, capacities must be strengthenedif these programs are not, down the road, tolead to substantial costs for the governmentsconcerned.

29

4.1 While progress has been made, both byhaving a substantial number of PPPs now inoperation, and by putting in place legislativeand institutional frameworks for PPPs in somestates, scaling-up the use of PPPs will requireaddressing the gaps identified in the previoussection. Many PPPs will be for services whichare state, and, in some cases municipalsubjects, and capacities have to be developedat this level, where service responsibilities lie.However, there are roles the center could playin developing capacities at the sub-nationallevel, in addition to developing capacities atthe central level.

4.2 Both experience to date in India, andinternationally, shows that there is no uniqueformula for developing a sound PPPframework. However, successful programs arecharacterized by clear policy and legalframeworks for PPPs, competent and enabledinstitutions that can appropriately identify,procure and monitor PPPs, and efficientoversight and dispute resolution procedures.We look at the following main steps that willbe critical to scaling up the PPP program inIndia and assess the actions that could betaken by the center in the following areas:

Strengthening the monitoring of theirfiscal costs;

Policy and legislative frameworks;

Information dissemination;

The development of guidance material;

Setting up a PPP unit to serve as a poolof expertise;

Project development funds for thepreparation of PPPs; and

Funding for PPP payments made by stategovernments.

4.3 The center’s role in developing capacities forsub-national PPPs needs careful considerationtaking into account the size of the country,center-state fiscal and other relations and thevariety of experiences so far, with some stateshaving made considerable strides and othershaving made very little progress. Its role alsodepends on the extent to which the centerwishes to proactively catalyze the increaseduse of PPPs by states and municipalities.Information dissemination and guidanceefforts can be expected to lead to results.However, a catalytic role by the center is likelyto be needed to expand the usage of PPPs,particularly in states and sectors where theyhave been less used so far. This would consist,in addition to information dissemination andguidance, of resources to develop PPPprojects and frameworks, and to fundgovernment commitments under PPPs. Thiswould help address important constraints tofurther development of PPPs in the country– namely, weak capacities to identify realisticPPPs and bring them to the market; a lack ofwillingness to pay for project development;and a lack of creditworthiness on the part ofstates to provide their financial contributionto PPPs. However, there are considerablymore risks in this catalytic role than in morelimited information dissemination andguidance roles.

4. Developing and StrengtheningCapacities for PPPs in India4. Developing and StrengtheningCapacities for PPPs in India


30

Strengthening oversight of thefiscal costs of PPPs

4.4 Regardless of whether or not the other actionslisted in para. 4.2 above are taken, if there isto be an increased use of PPPs the centershould work to strengthen oversight of theirfiscal costs. PPPs can involve substantialcontingent liabilities as well as long-termpurchase obligations. Fiscal Responsibility Actspassed at the central level and by the statesof Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab andKerala all include statements on fiscal prudenceand treatment of contingent liabilities that arerelevant to PPPs. State legislation typicallylimits total liabilities as a percentage of GDPand includes provisions related to contingentliabilities. Karnataka’s Act breaks new groundby including off-budget borrowing and otherdebt-equivalent instruments within the annualborrowing (consolidated fiscal deficit) cap.Nonetheless, implementing this may not bestraightforward.6 More generally, while debtguarantees are often published, the values ofother kinds of guarantees are not. Nor is itclear that governments value or calculate in-kind support provided to many PPPs, forexample real estate development options,which can be a further source of fiscal costsas well as an important factor in decidingwhether a PPP offers value-for-money.

4.5 There are only emerging practices and modelsinternationally since this is also new for mostother countries. In general, reporting anddisclosing PPP contracts and governmentguarantees and reporting the stream of futurepayments under existing PPP contracts wouldbe good practice and, where a PPP programis of fiscal significance, a report on PPPscovering these areas should be included aspart of the budget documentation. Somecountries have started to implement enhanced

programs of disclosure. Chile, starting withthe October 2003 Report on Public Finances,now reports the contingent liabilities arisingfrom PPPs as well as the cash payments toand from concession firms. Monte Carlosimulations and option-pricing models areused to value minimum revenue guarantees,revenue sharing agreements, and the exchangerate guarantees.

4.6 The center should work to strengthenoversight of the fiscal costs of PPPs, includingassisting state governments in this area andenhancing analysis of the fiscal costs of PPPsin central government monitoring of the fiscalposition of the states. Capacity-buildingefforts should be led by the GoI FinanceMinistry, with involvement from otheragencies, such as the Reserve Bank of India,as necessary. This capacity building effortshould go forward regardless of any othersteps taken by the center.

Policy frameworks

4.7 Both the center and some of the states havehad in place for some time policies on privateparticipation for specific sectors: in ports, forexample the center issued “Guidelines onPrivatization” for the major ports in 1996 andGujarat preceded this with a ports policy in1995.

4.8 New policy initiatives would however be usefulin an effort to scale up and broaden the PPPprogram, both at the central and state level.Importantly, this would have the governmentconcerned set out clearly why PPPs are beingpursued and the benefits sought; and indicatethat they will only be pursued where thesebenefits can realistically be expected. As notedin Section 3, one of the gaps in PPPframeworks in India compared to many other

6 It is understood that the annuity scheme used to finance the expansion of the existing Bangalore-Mysore road has not beenincluded in these consolidated calculations even though it could be regarded as a “debt-equivalent” instrument.

Developing and Strengthening Capacities for PPPs in India

31

countries is the emphasis on PPPs as raisingadditional capital, rather than only beingpursued where services will improve andtaxpayers and consumers will get value-for-money. This could be addressed by a clearpolicy statement which would make clear boththe rationale and also the limits to the use ofPPPs. This would help to give the PPP programa clearer political mandate.

4.9 Broad policy initiatives would also enablegovernments to announce more clearly theinstitutional framework for PPPs. This couldinclude the regulation, oversight andevaluation of PPPs, all areas which needstrengthening, as well as the role of anynew cross-sectoral units in developing andimplementing PPPs. Another importantarea to be addressed would be proceduresfor the procurement of PPPs, in particularthe use of competitive processes, andapproaches to be adopted towardsunsolicited projects.

4.10 While broad policies provide an importantsignal of political commitment, it may also benecessary to translate this into action plansand policies for individual sectors. These couldprovide a more precise orientation toencourage line ministries and agencies topursue and implement PPP programs.

Legislative frameworks for PPPs

4.11 Cross-cutting PPP laws are not needed inIndia to permit central or state governmentsto enter into PPPs. Both the center and manystates have done so without such laws.Sector specific legislation has of course beenused to restructure industries, introducecompetitive markets and set up newinstitutions, such as sector regulators.

4.12 In Section 2 it was argued that one of thebenefits of cross-cutting PPP legislation is thatit allows the consolidation of relevant legal

provisions into one law, and also allows thegovernment to legislate the use of certainprocesses for the development, procurementand regulation of PPP projects. While notstrictly necessary, the use of new processesmight be better enforced if given the force oflaw. This might be more important at thestate level, where checks and balances andoversight are not as strong as at the center.

4.13 Particularly at the state level, therefore,consideration should be given to thedevelopment of cross-cutting PPP legislation.The legislation already passed by Gujarat, AndhraPradesh and Punjab provides possible modelsfor other states. One important aspect thatcould be addressed by such legislation ismechanisms for dispute resolution. The nationallegislation in telecommunications provides onemodel of how such as process and institutioncan be created that leads to a quicker and moreefficient process of settling disputes. Legislationcould also establish alternative disputeresolution procedures that could be used toefficiently settle differences between the parties.

4.14 The development and passage of legislationalso allows for consultation and open debateabout the government’s policy for pursuingPPPs, including the expected benefits andrationale. This could be an importantmechanism to help increase the publiclegitimacy of PPPs.

Information dissemination

4.15 Despite the fact that there are nearly 90 PPPsin India under construction and operation,there is no publicly accessible databaseproviding even the most straightforwardinformation on them. The database presentedin Section 3 could however provide thenucleus for this. There is no organized forumfor state level PPPs, or even central agencies,to share experiences, and it is difficult tocompare contracts for similar services since


32

these are not in the public domain. Improvingthe flow of information would helpgovernment officials planning and developingPPPs, the private sector interested inparticipating in PPPs, and stakeholdersinterested or concerned about PPPs.

4.16 One main component of an informationdissemination program would be a web-basedportal that would feature: a publicly-accessiblenational database that would contain on aproject level basis information on its basicstructure including sector, expected/actualcontract award date, capital cost, executinggovernment agency and private developer, andmethod of tender; links to websites of bothIndian and foreign PPP agencies and contactinformation for agencies in India developingPPPs; and PPP pipelines for different statesand municipalities. Sufficient resources forongoing maintenance of the database mustbe provided to ensure continued relevance.

4.17 A second major component would be thedevelopment of training materials. The maintarget group would be project teams incontracting authorities, but training could alsobe targeted at more senior governmentofficials, as well as those in other ministries,such as Finance, that interact with thecontracting authorities and have an oversightrole. The private sector may also benefit fromsuch training. Substantive evaluation efforts,for example analysis of successes and failures

of individual projects, and case studies wouldassist in the development of training materialsand help both in designing new PPPs andmanaging existing ones. Over time this couldbe broadened into the provision of data onthe performance of PPPs to improve decisionmaking on the use of PPPs versus traditionalpublic procurement.

4.18 Finally, efforts could also be made throughworkshops and other informationdissemination mechanisms to reach politicians,consumers and other stakeholders, so thatthey are better informed about the nature andstructure of PPPs. This would also be helpedby greater transparency including placing PPPcontracts in the public domain (see Box 6).There may be concerns over disclosure.However, there is relatively little that isgenuinely commercially confidential in PPParrangements, and though these are complexdocuments, this does not seem to be a validreason not to allow citizens to access them.

4.19 The public good nature of informationdissemination means that it would make sensefor this to be led by a unit located within asingle central ministry with cross-sectoralresponsibilities, such as Finance. Most of thework would be contracted out and deliveredby others, including the development andmaintenance of the portal and database onPPPs, and training material and case studiescould be developed by a national training

Box 6: Encouraging transparency in PPPs

Public disclosure of PPPs promotes consumer rights, helps enforcement of obligations, and reduces incentives forcorruption and special treatment of certain private providers. A number of countries have taken the initiative to placecontracts for public services in the public domain. In some situations, more general policies and legislation on access toinformation motivate this. In the UK, the Freedom of Information Act, now in force since January 2005, will allow peopleto access information on PFI and other PPP contracts, including provisions relating to payment terms, incentivemechanisms, performance standards, dispute resolutions, and other procedures. It will also be possible to obtaininformation on evaluations and compliance reports under PFI projects. To help promote the practice of routine disclosure,the World Bank maintains an Infrastructure Contracts & Licenses Database that provides links to government andregulatory agency web sites that contain the main instruments – contracts and licenses – used to regulate public andprivate provision of infrastructure services. This can be found at http://ppi.worldbank.org/icl/


33

institute and/or think tanks, with deliverysupported by a number of regional centersfor PPP training. These could also undertakeoutreach efforts outside of the government.

The development of guidancematerial for PPPs

4.20 Guidance material can offer a number ofbenefits, including more rapidly diffusing goodpractices and lowering transactions costs. Thestandardization of contract clauses can helpreduce both the complexity of PPParrangements and project preparation costs.A number of practitioners in India have alsoargued that the lack of standard contracts orstandard clauses that are approved by thecenter makes bureaucrats more reluctant tosign off on PPP deals.

4.21 Another possible role for the center wouldtherefore be to develop guidance materials tosupport the development and implementationof PPPs. This could cover issues related tocontract design, procedures for identifying,procuring and managing PPPs, and evenmodel PPP legislation.7 It could also covershort guidance notes on focused topics ofinterest. Such notes could be a helpfulcomplement to case studies, allowing for thediscussion of nuances and recommendationsfor differing local contexts.8

4.22 Model contract clauses, template contracts,guidelines and process-related tools have

however already been developed to varyingdegrees by some states and central entities.One option would be to rely on a morenatural diffusion of these approaches withstates copying other approaches held to besuccessful. Although there are examples frominternational practice of detailed guidancebeing provided by the national government –such as in South Africa, for example – in anumber of other countries (for exampleCanada and Australia), the center providesno guidance to sub-national governments.There are also risks that centrally sponsoredmodel contracts can reduce the needed roomfor flexibility and innovation even where thesemodels are advisory and not mandatory.

4.23 Despite these concerns, a central effort toproduce guidance material clauses could leadto the more rapid adoption of good practiceapproaches by states, reducing learning andtransactions costs for private companies andtheir advisors. This is probably true in mostcountries, but will likely be as applicable, ifnot more so, in India where the mechanismsfor sharing information and experiences arestill limited. Some of the risks associated withguidance being seen as mandatory could beaddressed by having guidance indicate a rangeof options wherever appropriate – for exampledifferent options for using particularformulations for contractual clauses, orprocesses or methodologies for estimatingaffordability to the government or value-for-money of a PPP.

7 Model contract clauses —for instance for force majeure, refinancing, termination and dispute resolution— can help injectinternational or national best practice, and avoid each contract re-inventing the wheel. Process-related guidance could concernstep-by-step directions on how to undertake a variety of the tasks required for project preparation, provider selection and contractmanagement, such as how to appoint and manage transaction advisers to the contracting authority, how to prepare an initialbusiness case (demonstrating affordability & market appetite, and the tradeoffs in choosing between traditional procurement andthe variety of PPP options), how to construct a public sector comparator (a benchmark on which to judge the value for money ofbids), how to prepare a value for money report (and clarifying the extent of risk transfer), how to undertake stakeholderconsultations, and how to conduct independent auditing of projects.8 Some of the possible topics that have been suggested as being relevant in India are: how to reduce time from pre-feasibility tocontract award; benefits of concurrent project review by government entities; why it may be better to award part-success fee toadvisers at financial close; how to design an effective first-step pre-arbitration dispute resolution; and why a state may benefit froma dedicated PPP unit and how to set one up.


34

4.24 This relatively limited role could be led by asingle central agency, though would benefitfrom input and oversight from a public-privateadvisory group to guide where this centraleffort could add most value, and what typesof materials are most needed. On the publicsector side, this should containrepresentatives from state governments as wellas the center. Much of the actual preparationof material should be contracted out toconsultants experienced in the field.

PPP units to provide a pool ofexpertise

4.25 As noted in Section 2, most countries engagedin a broad-based PPP program have felt theneed to develop a cross-sectoral PPP unitalthough the role that this unit plays issometimes restricted to informationdissemination and the preparation of guidancematerial. The design response to two keyissues – the role of a cross-sectoral unit vis-à-vis line ministries and the role of a nationalunit in sub-national PPPs – will be driven bythe business practices within governmentsand the fiscal, and other, relations betweenthe center and the states. This means thatsome models which are more centralized, suchas those in the UK and South Africa wherenational level units have a prominent role insub-national PPPs, will not be workableapproaches in India.

4.26 At the statestatestatestatestate level, a dedicated PPP unit canboth broaden the PPP program bytransferring lessons and experiences acrosssectors, as well as improve the quality of PPPsby bringing to bear better transactions skills.Particularly where there is not a track recordof PPPs, skills are probably best brought infrom the private sector to supplementavailable capacities in the state government.A number of states have done this through apublic-private company, for example

Rajasthan and Karnataka. While this may bea straightforward route for bringing inexpertise, the possible conflicts of interest (seeSection 2) have to be addressed and dealt with.

4.27 A nationalnationalnationalnationalnational PPP unit could undertake theinformation dissemination and guidance rolesdescribed above. It could also usefully playan active role in identifying areas where PPPscould be undertaken by central agencies andministries, and working with these agenciesto conceptualize and bring to the marketindividual PPPs. To do this, it would need theright transactions skills, most likely broughtin from the private sector. There might alsobe concerns that the line agency would, forturf reasons, not work or cooperate with thisunit in the development of its PPPs. Theseconcerns would be reduced both if the unitwas seen to be highly skilled and itscontribution valued, as well as if there wererequirement for the vetting of central agencyPPP proposals by this unit, prior to theirclearance.

4.28 It is not so clear that this unit should have anactive transactions advisory role with respectto state and municipal PPPs, in the manner,for example, that Partnerships UK does. Thiswould directly substitute for the developmentof state-level capacity. It may also bechallenging to do this for a large number ofdeals, and there might need to be some formof prioritization most likely for sectors thathave seen fewer PPP deals in India to date -given the number of PPP road projects doneto date, this might not be a major focus ofthe advice being provided by this unit. Thisunit would however build up state levelcapacities through information disseminationand guidance, and also by furthering thenational level PPP program.

4.29 However, if the center were to provide additionalfunding for PPPs (see below) then this unit could


35

review these PPPs to assess whether thecontractual structure proposed is robust, thatrisks are efficiently allocated and that projectsto be supported by the center are sound. Thisoversight role may eventually develop into aprescriptive role, with states interested inaccessing the central fund having an incentiveto use the national unit’s approaches andrecommendations to increase the likelihood ofacceptance of their project. It would beimportant therefore that if this clearance andoversight is done that the national unit makeclear its guidance and approaches on contractdesign, risk allocation, affordability and value-for-money assessment, and provider selection.

4.30 The two main options for constituting thenational unit are either as a cell or groupwithin an existing ministry or agency, or as acompany, either owned solely by thegovernment or a joint public-private company.The right choice depends in part upon whatrole the unit is to fill. The first option is likelyto be the best approach if it is to play primarilyan information dissemination and guidancerole. Within this set-up, whatevertransactions skills may be needed could besecured through hiring consultants on long-term contracts. The second option would bepreferable were the unit mainly to focus ontransactions and undertake a bigger volumeof deals, as setting it up as a company willfacilitate paying salaries to attract staff withfinancial and legal skills, and make it easier toprovide monetary incentives for closing deals.However, it is likely to take more time toimplement and establish compared to creatinga unit within an existing agency. There is athird possibility, a separate agency or authoritybut this would perhaps not offer the benefitsof speed of establishment and integration withexisting budgeting and approval processesthat a unit within an existing ministry wouldhave, nor the flexibility that a company wouldhave in terms of pay scales and incentives.

4.31 The need for such a unit, and the roles it willplay over the life cycle of PPPs, should beagreed and accepted by both line ministriesand Finance and Planning. Up-front agreementwould help ensure that it serves a well-definedpurpose and at its inception neither isperceived as a threat nor suffers fromunrealistic expectations.

Project development funds

4.32 A number of PPP units manage funds whichdefray some of the costs of developing PPPs(see Table 1 in Section 2). There are twoarguments for the use of these funds. Thefirst is that many governments new to PPPsdo not appreciate the need to spend more onpreparation of PPP projects than was spenton the procurement documents for civil worksprojects in the same sector. The second isthat since PPPs are relatively new, the costsof preparing initial projects may be higher andthat with learning some of these will comedown.

4.33 One important issue is the terms on whichthis fund would be accessed. A purely grant-based fund would maximize chances of uptake,but would bring with it risks that it was notbeing used for priorities. This could bemitigated to some extent by having cleareligibility criteria for accessing thesedevelopment funds – for example in particularpre-specified sectors, or sectors where the stateconcerned had done no previous PPPs, orprojects serving mainly the poor. Havingstates borrow these funds would reduce theneed for this but may negate the rationale forthe funds, as given above. An alternative maybe to have some form of matching grantscheme, with the states providing somefinancing to complement what comes fromthe project development fund. A national PPPunit could oversee the project developmentfund.


36

Funding of PPPs

4.34 The use of PPPs for the delivery of basicservices by state and municipal governmentswould be stimulated by the provision ofcentral funds to support their payments underPPPs. Any additional funding of PPPs shouldbe complemented by a more rapiddevelopment of capacities to monitor the fiscalcosts of PPPs.

4.35 The detailed design of such a PPP fund,including the type of support, project eligibilitycriteria, selection mechanism and how thequantum of support for a project isdetermined is beyond the scope of this report.A significant effort would have to go into thisto ensure that it is well targeted and efficientlyused. There is considerable experienceinternationally with the use of subsidy fundsfor the expansion of infrastructure servicessuch as telecommunications and power,where government funds complement userfees. These are relatively straightforward, witha competition for funds typically being doneon a minimum subsidy basis, for example pernew connection to be made. A fund thatspans different sectors and also allows fordifferent structures (for example wheregovernments are the sole purchasers of PPPsunder contracts rather than governmentfunds being used to supplement user fees)would be more challenging to implement.Consultation with lenders, sponsors and stategovernments will be an important step inimproving the design whilst at the same timeensuring that key central government concernsare met.

4.36 It will be important to ensure that projectssupported by the fund are priorities for thecontracting governments. A substantialmatching contribution from the state/municipal government contracting for the PPPwould be important to provide commitmentto the project and indicate that the project

was a priority. It would however be importantto clarify what, out of different possible formsof government support (e.g. land grants, taxbreaks, risk-bearing, cash subsidies), wouldrepresent a matching contribution.

4.37 It will be equally important to ensure thatcompetition is used to reduce the demandsfor public funds. It would be far more difficultto size subsidies – and also less transparent– were projects first awarded by stategovernments on the basis of particular criteriaand then subsequently developers approachedthe fund for support. Otherwise a promotercould “low-ball” on the tariffs for a project tosucceed in getting a project awarded, and thenaccess monies from the PPP fund to make upthe difference.

4.38 Project design, risk allocation, affordability andvalue-for-money should also be assessed forthese projects to ensure that the center issupporting well-designed PPPs, as notedabove. This could be done by the central PPPunit – though there might be conflict ofinterest concerns if this unit received a successfee from working on transactions, in whichcase the involvement of others would benecessary in clearances.

Recommendations: a role for thecenter in developing India’s PPPprogram

4.39 There are a number of steps the center cantake to expand the role that PPPs play in basicservice delivery at both the national, state andmunicipal levels. The main components of astrategy to catalyze the broader use of PPPswould be:

A clearly articulated policy statement onthe use of PPPs at the national level,including their rationales and the benefitsexpected, backed up by concrete plans


37

and targets for increasing the use of PPPsin national programs

The creation of a national level PPP unitthat would undertake informationdissemination and guidance functions asdiscussed above, and provide advisorysupport to the central PPP program;

A project development fund to reduce thetransactions costs to state and localgovernments of preparing and bidding outPPPs; and

A fund to partly cover the cost of stateand local government commitments underPPP contracts.

4.40 The primary responsibility for developing stateand municipal level PPPs lies at those levels ofgovernment. The actions outlined above canencourage the development of capacities andPPP programs at sub-national levels, butshould not substitute for needed actions bythe governments contracting for these PPPs.Perhaps most importantly, the scale andquality of the national PPP program providesa model for state and local governments. Thisincludes not just the transactions themselves,but also commitments to disclosure ofagreements and transparency and also theregular ex-post review of PPPs to assess

whether the hoped-for benefits had beenrealized in practice.

4.41 The activities outlined above will need someform of coordinated effort. A PPP unit set upwithin a single ministry or agency with cross-cutting responsibilities, for example Financeor Planning, could readily undertakeinformation dissemination and guidance roles,given budget, staff and oversight. It couldalso provide transactions expertise to a limitedset of projects by buying-in expertise from theprivate sector on long-term consultingcontracts. However, a broader transactionsrole across a range of central agencies andministries and in particular developing sub-national PPPs will require more humanresources. Were these activities to be pursuedon a larger scale then this might better be donethrough a separate authority or companythan a unit within an existing ministry oragency.

4.42 Regardless of whether or not the steps outlinedin para. 4.39 are undertaken, the center shouldwork through existing approaches to improvethe monitoring of the fiscal costs of PPPsentered into by central agencies and stategovernments.

39

SectorSectorSectorSectorSector

UrbanInfrastructure

Airport

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Railways

Roads

Roads

Roads

Cost (Rs. Mn)Cost (Rs. Mn)Cost (Rs. Mn)Cost (Rs. Mn)Cost (Rs. Mn)

4500

14000

590

7

23418

55478

34415

34000

3730

3300

3780

273

StructureStructureStructureStructureStructure

BOT

BOO

Affermage

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

TTTTTenderenderenderenderender

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

Negotiated

Negotiated

ICB

Negotiated

Not Available

Negotiated

Negotiated

Domestic

Private contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developer

Larsen and Toubro

GMR and Malaysian AirportHolding Berhad

Subhash Projects and MarketingLimited for Central, City andSouth Zone, City Life Lineconsultants for west zone andAnthony waste management forKarol bagh and Sadar pahar GanjZone.

Exel Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd

Gujarat Adani Port Limited

SHELL-ESSAR Consortium; Bid onLand premium and concessionperiod

Petronet LNG Ltd.

Gujarat Pipavav Ports Ltd.(GPPL)and Ministry of Railways

JV of Punj Lloyd Ltd. & IRCONIntl., IL&FS

L&T Ltd.-ECCIL&FS

JMC-Bright-Bharat JV

AWARDED PROJECTS BY STATES & CENTRAL AGENCIES

Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency

APIIC

APTR&B

MunicipalCorporation ofDelhi

MunicipalCorporation ofDelhi

GMB

GMB

GMB

GMB

Ministry of Railway

R&B Dept

R&B Dept

GSRDC

Project NameProject NameProject NameProject NameProject Name

Andhra PradeshVisakhapatnamIndustrial Water SupplyProject

Hyderabad InternationalAirport at Shamshabad

DelhiDelhiDelhiDelhiDelhi

Collection andtransportation ofMunicipal Solid Waste

Compost Plant

GujaratGujaratGujaratGujaratGujarat

Pipavav Port

Mundra Port

Hazira LNG Terminal

Dahej LNG Terminal

Surendranagar MahuvaGauge Conversion(Pipavav RailwayCorporation Ltd PRCL)

Vadodara - Halol Road

Ahmedabad - MehsanaRoad

Deesa-Panthwada-Gundri Road

AnnexesAnnexes


40

GSRDC

KRDCL /PWD

Bangalore MahanagaraPalike (BMP) withassistance fromInfrastructureSecretary, Governmentof Karnataka

Karnataka RoadDevelopmentCorporation Ltd.

InfrastructureDevelopmentDepartment, Govt. ofKarnataka

Govt of Kerala

ThiruvananthapuramMunicipalCorporation

Public WorksDepartment,Government of Kerala/ Greater CochinDevelopmentAuthority

Railways

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

Roads

Roads

Airport

UrbanInfrastructure

Roads

270.6

22500

300

2300

200

3030

35

256

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOO

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Negotiated

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

NotApplicable

Domestic

Domestic

Ranjit Projects Pvt. Ltd.Mehsana [7 bidders were pre-qualified. 7 purchased RFPdocuments. 2 submitted thebids]

Consortium - NICE (NandiInfrastructure CorridorEnterprises Ltd) - The Kalyanigroup leading with 51 %, itsinternational partners SABInternational and VHBInternational 23 % and FIs ledby the ICICI Bank - 26%

Ramky Infrastructure Ltd.,Hyderabad

Nagarjuna ConstructionCompany Ltd., Hyderabad,RMC Constructions Ltd. &Maytas Ltd.

DS Constructions

10,000 private shareholders,mostly NRIs of Keralite originincl: (1) Geo ElectricalsContracting and Trading CoSharjah, (2) Emke Group,AbuDhabi,(3) Gulfar Group,Oman, (4) Majeed BukataraTrading Dubai


Cochin Bridge InfrastructureCompany Ltd./ Gammon IndiaLtd.

ROB - Chhayyapuri Rail

KarnatakaKarnatakaKarnatakaKarnatakaKarnataka

Bangalore-MysoreInfrastructure Corridor

Development ofIntegrated WasteProcessing andEngineered SanitaryLandfills in Bangalore

Four laning ofBangalore-Maddur StateHighway SH-17 underAnnuity Scheme

Development of BypassRoads for Sandur Town,Bellary District underdirect tolling scheme

KeralaKeralaKeralaKeralaKerala

Cochin InternationalAirport

Development ofEngineered SanitaryLandfill in Villapilsala inThiruvananthapuram

Development of NewMattancherry BridgeBuild – Operate –Transfer project inCochin

Project NameProject NameProject NameProject NameProject Name AgencyAgencyAgencyAgencyAgency SectorSectorSectorSectorSector Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.) StructureStructureStructureStructureStructure TTTTTenderenderenderenderender Private contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developerPrivate contractor/developer

Annexes

41


Madhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya Pradesh

Bridge on IndoreKhandwa stretch

5 Bridges on IndoreDhar Road

Bridge on BenarasNagpur Road

Bridge on ChindwadaMutkuli Road

Bridge of Satna NagrodBela Road

Bridge on ChindwaraNagpur Road

Bridge on BilaspurMandla Road

Bridge on BalaghatSiwni Road

Bridge on ChindwadaNarsingpur Road

Indore-Sanawad-Burhanpur-EdlabaadRoad

Ujjain-Agar-Susner-Jhalawad Road

Hoshangabad-Harda-Khandwa Road

Rewa-Jaisinghnagar-shahdol-AmarkantakRoad

Satna-Maihar-Tala-Umaria Road

Sagar-Damoh-JabalpurRoad

Jabalpur-Narsinghpur-Pipana Road

Bina-Siranj-Guna Road

Raisen-Rahatgarh Road

Scom-Balaghat-GondiaRoad

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

4.8

15.2

28

4.3

15.1

13.6

9.6

18.1

13.5

1230

651.9

810

1100

542.2

897

741.6

410

577.2

598

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Ayushyaraj constructions

Vinod Kumar ShuklaConstructions




Narmada Constructions

PD Agrawal Constructions


Not Available

M/s VIVA Highways Pvt. Ltd.Nasik

NVS Agroh Infrastructuredevelopers pvt. Ltd.

MSK infrastructure and tollbridge ltd.

Rewa Tollways

Rewa Tollways

MA Jabalpur Corridor India Pvt.

Tapti Prestressed products pvtltd

Bina Sinronj Toll Road Ltd.

MSK

AAP Infrastructure


42


Dewas-Ujjain-Badnagar-BadnawarRoad

Hoshangabad-Piparia-Pachmarhi Road

MaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtra

Maujhi Bridge +Karmala Norma bridge

Kharpada Bridge

Major bridge -Dharamtar Creek

Bridge across Waigangariver

Mumbai - PuneExpressway

Pune Ahmednagar road

Khambatki TunnelN.H.-4

Ahemadnagar KarmalaTembhurni road

Bhiwandi Ambadi Road

Nashik - Niphad -Aurangabad Road

ROB near villageNardana &strengthening existing2-lane pacement fromTapi Bridge

Ambadi - Wada Road

Chinchoti naka KamanPaygaon Bhiwandi road

Vadgaon - Chakan -Shikrapur Road

PunjabPunjabPunjabPunjabPunjab

Up-gradation, operationand maintenance ofAmritsar bus terminal

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

MSRDC

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PunjabInfrastructureDevelopment Boardwith Punjab PublicWorks Department

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

493

598.8

67.5

330

150

325.7

12180

1050

37.8

230

360

146.5

342.1

76.7

113.2

2.2

180

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Lease

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

ICB

RV Infrastructure engineers

NVs Chetak Enterprises

Nirman, Nashik

Ideal Road Builders

Patvardhan Infrastructure PvtLtd

Ashoka Buildcom

Ideal Road Builders

Ashoka Buildcom

Ideal Road Builders

Ideal Road Builders

Ideal Road Builders

I.S. Infrastructure & BuildingConstruction (P) Ltd, Nashik

Ayushajay Construction Limited

Ideal Road Builders

Ideal Road Builders

VCR Toll Services Pvt Ltd

Local Contractor (Rohan andRajdeep Builders Limited)

Annexes

43


TTTTTamil Naduamil Naduamil Naduamil Naduamil Nadu

East Coast Road

Karur Toll Bridge

Madurai Inner RingRoad

Coimbatore BypassRoad on NH47

Solid wastemanagement inChennai

Tirupur Water SupplyScheme

Alandur (AM)SewerageProject

Uttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar Pradesh

Delhi - Noida TollBridge

TNRDC

Karur Municipality(KM) & Tamil NaduUrban DevelopmentProject (TNUIFSL)

Corporation ofMadurai (COM) &TNUIFSL.

Ministry of SurfaceTransport (MoST) &GoTN

Corporation ofChennai (CoM) &TIDCO.

NTADCL. SPVformed by TamilNadu WaterInvestment Limited- ((TWIL),InfrastructureLeasing & FinancialServices Limited(ILFS) and TirupurExportersAssociation (TEA).

AlandurMunicipality & TamilNadu UrbanDevelopmentProject (TNUIFSL).

New OkhlaIndustrialDevelopmentAuthority (NOIDA),Delhi Government,Government of UP,Government of India.

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Roads

600

154.5

430

900

400

1850

400

3900

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Affermage

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

NotApplicable

Domestic

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

TNRDC awarded the contractthrough competitive bidding toAshoka Buildcon Ltd forconstruction & maintenance.The project engineers forsupervision and monitoringwere awarded on competitivetendering basis to SheladiaAssociates & Consultants.

East Coast Constructions andIndustries Private Limited(ECCI)

Not Decided

L&T TransportationInfrastructure Ltd (LTTIL)

C.G.E.A. Asia Holdings,Singapore was selected throughICB to implement the project.

Consortium - Mahindra, UU,WSA (USA), Design - Bechtel,HCC, L&T; Procurement-HCC,L&T – Construction - HCC, L&T;Supervision- GKW(Germany)/CES; Project Management -WSA (USA); O&M - UnitedUtilities (UK); IndependentEngineer-Pell Frischmann (UK/India

First STP Pvt Ltd, the companyfloated for the project by VATech Wabag Limited (erstwhile,Balcko Duo and WabagTechnologies Ltd., - BDWT) andIVRCL Infrastructures andProjects

Mitsui, Marubeni, KampsaxInternational (Denmark),Intetroll (SA)


44


Solid WasteManagement Initiatives

West BengalWest BengalWest BengalWest BengalWest Bengal

Solid WasteManagement

NHAINHAINHAINHAINHAI

Maharashtra Border -Belgaum Road

Nellore By-Pass

Nellore- TADA Road

Tumkur-NeelmangalaRoad

Nandigama - VijaywadaRoad

Mahapura - Kishangarh,6 lane

Satara - Kagal Road

Ankapalli- Tuni Road

Tuni- DharamavaramRoad

Dharmavaram -Rajahmundry Road

Panahgarh Palsit Road

Palsit-Dankuni Road

Vivekananda Bridge

Delhi - Gurgaon Road

Tambaram - TindivanamRoad

Greater New OkhlaIndustrialDevelopmentAuthority(GNOIDA)

Haldia DevelopmentAuthority (HAD).

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

13.5

540

3320

1432

6213.5

1550

1386.5

6440

6000

2832

2319

2060

3500

4324

6410

5550

3750

Affermage

BOO

Annuity

Annuity

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

BOT

BOT

Annuity

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Antony Waste Handling Cell isthe solid waste managementdivision of Antony MotorsPrivate Limited

Ramky Enviro Engineers Limited(REEL)

North Karnataka ExpresswayPrivate Limited (IL and FS andPunj Loyd)

Soma enterprises and NavayugEng co Ltd

CIDB ( Malaysia)

Jas Toll Road co Ltd (Consortiumof Jayaswals and - AshokaBuildcon SERI International

CIDB (Malaysia)

GVK International-BSCPL

MSRDC Ltd

GMR - Tuni - Ankapalli ExpressLtd

Andhra Expressway Ltd

Rajamundry Expressway Ltd -Gammon (JV)

Gamuda Malaysia - WCT(Malaysia)

Gamuda and WCT (Malaysia)

SVBTG Consortium of AIDCgroup (USA), STRADC(Phillipines)

Jaiprakash Industries Limited -DS Constt Ltd

Tambaram - TindivanamExpressway Pvt Ltd (consortiumof GMR and UE Malaysia)

Annexes

45


Pune - Khed Road

MOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTH

International ContainerTranshipment Terminal,Vallarpadam

JNPT - 2nd containerterminal

JNPT - 3rd containerterminal

Chennai ContainerTerminal

NHAI

Cochin Port Trust

JNPT

JNPT

Chennai Port Trust(CPT)

Roads

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

1276

21180

7000

9000

4000

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

ICB

ICB

ICB

Limited Tender

ATR Infrastructure Pvt Ltd

Dubai Ports International

P&O Ports

Maersk and Concor JV

CCTL is a special purposevehicle created by P&O to runthe Chennai ContainerTerminal (CCT) for 30 years.


46


AirportsAirportsAirportsAirportsAirports

Hyderabad InternationalAirport at Shamshabad

Cochin InternationalAirport

PortsPortsPortsPortsPorts

Pipavav Port

Mundra Port

Hazira LNG Terminal

Dahej LNG Terminal

International ContainerTranshipment Terminal,Vallarpadam

JNPT - 2nd containerterminal

JNPT - 3rd containerterminal

Chennai ContainerTerminal

RailwaysRailwaysRailwaysRailwaysRailways

Surendranagar MahuvaGauge Conversion(Pipavav RailwayCorporation Ltd PRCL)

ROB - Chhayyapuri Rail

APTR&B

Govt of Kerala

GMB

GMB

GMB

GMB

Cochin Port Trust

JNPT

JNPT

Chennai Port Trust(CPT)

Ministry of Railway

GSRDC

Airport

Airport

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Railways

Railways

14000

3030

23418

55478

34415

34000

21180

7000

9000

4000

3730

270.6

BOO

BOO

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

ICB

NotApplicable

Negotiated

Negotiated

ICB

Negotiated

ICB

ICB

ICB

LimitedTender

Not Available

Domestic

GMR and Malaysian AirportHolding Berhad

10,000 private shareholders,mostly NRIs of Keralite originincl: (1) Geo ElectricalsContracting and Trading CoSharjah, (2) Emke Group,AbuDhabi,(3) Gulfar Group,Oman, (4) Majeed BukataraTrading Dubai

Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd

Gujarat Adani Port Limited

SHELL-ESSAR Consortium; Bidon Land premium and concessionperiod

Petronet LNG Ltd.

Dubai Ports International

P&O Ports

Maersk and Concor JV

CCTL is a special purpose vehiclecreated by P&O to run theChennai Container Terminal(CCT) for 30 years.

Gujarat Pipavav Ports Ltd.(GPPL)and Ministry of Railways

Ranjit Projects Pvt. Ltd. Mehsana[7 bidders pre-qualified, 7purchased RFP documents, 2submitted bids]

AWARDED PROJECTS BY SECTOR

Annexes

47


RoadsRoadsRoadsRoadsRoads

Vadodara - Halol Road

Ahmedabad - MehsanaRoad

Deesa-Panthwada-Gundri Road

Bangalore-MysoreInfrastructure Corridor

Maujhi Bridge +Karmala Norma bridge

Kharpada Bridge

Major bridge -Dharamtar Creek

Bridge acrossWaiganga river

Mumbai - PuneExpressway

Pune Ahmednagarroad

Khambatki TunnelN.H.-4

Ahemadnagar KarmalaTembhurni road

Bhiwandi AmbadiRoad

Nashik - Niphad -Aurangabad Road

ROB near villageNardana &strengthening existing2-lane pacement fromTapi Bridge

Ambadi - Wada Road

R&B Dept

R&B Dept

GSRDC

KRDCL /PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

MSRDC

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

3300

3780

273

22500

67.5

330

150

325.7

12180

1050

37.8

230

360

146.5

342.1

76.7

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Lease

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Negotiated

Negotiated

Domestic

Negotiated

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

JV of Punj Lloyd Ltd. & IRCONIntl., IL&FS

L&T Ltd.-ECCIL&FS

JMC-Bright-Bharat JV

Consortium - NICE (NandiInfrastructure CorridorEnterprises Ltd) - The Kalyanigroup leading with 51%, itsinternational partners SAB Intland VHB Intl 23% and FIs led bythe ICICI Bank – 26%

Nirman, Nashik

Ideal Road Builders

Patvardhan Infrastructure PvtLtd

Ashoka Buildcom

Ideal Road Builders

Ashoka Buildcom

Ideal Road Builders

Ideal Road Builders

Ideal Road Builders

I.S. Infrastructure & BuildingConstruction (P) Ltd, Nashik

Ayushajay Construction Limited

Ideal Road Builders


48


Chinchoti naka KamanPaygaon Bhiwandi road

Vadgaon - Chakan -Shikrapur Road

Bridge on IndoreKhandwa stretch

5 Bridges on IndoreDhar Road

Bridge on BenarasNagpur Road

Bridge on ChindwadaMutkuli Road

Bridge of Satna NagrodBela Road

Bridge on ChindwaraNagpur Road

Bridge on BilaspurMandla Road

Bridge on BalaghatSiwni Road

Bridge on ChindwadaNarsingpur Road

Indore-Sanawad-Burhanpur-EdlabaadRoad

Ujjain-Agar-Susner-Jhalawad Road

Hoshangabad-Harda-Khandwa Road

Rewa-Jaisinghnagar-shahdol-AmarkantakRoad

Satna-Maihar-Tala-Umaria Road

Sagar-Damoh-JabalpurRoad

Jabalpur-Narsinghpur-Pipana Road

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

113.2

2.2

4.8

15.2

28

4.3

15.1

13.6

9.6

18.1

13.5

1230

651.9

810

1100

542.2

897

741.6

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Ideal Road Builders

VCR Toll Services Pvt Ltd

Ayushyaraj constructions





Narmada Constructions



Not Available

M/s VIVA Highways Pvt. Ltd.Nasik

NVS Agroh Infrastructuredevelopers pvt. Ltd.

MSK infrastructure and tollbridge ltd.

Rewa Tollways

Rewa Tollways

MA Jabalpur Corridor India Pvt.Ltd.

Tapti Prestressed products pvtltd

Annexes

49


Bina-Siranj-Guna Road

Raisen-RahatgarhRoad

Scom-Balaghat-GondiaRoad

Dewas-Ujjain-Badnagar-BadnawarRoad

Hoshangabad-Piparia-Pachmarhi Road

Maharashtra Border -Belgaum Road

Nellore By-Pass

Nellore- TADA Road

Tumkur-NeelmangalaRoad

Nandigama -Vijaywada Road

Mahapura -Kishangarh, 6 lane

Satara - Kagal Road

Ankapalli- Tuni Road

Tuni- DharamavaramRoad

Dharmavaram -Rajahmundry Road

Panahgarh Palsit Road

Palsit-Dankuni Road

Vivekananda Bridge

Delhi - Gurgaon Road

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

PWD

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

NHAI

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

410

577.2

598

493

598.8

3320

1432

6213.5

1550

1386.5

6440

6000

2832

2319

2060

3500

4324

6410

5550

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Annuity

Annuity

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

Annuity

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Bina Sinronj Toll Road Ltd.

MSK

AAP Infrastructure

RV Infrastructure engineers

NVs Chetak Enterprises

North Karnataka ExpresswayPrivate Limited (IL and FS andPunj Loyd)

Soma enterprises and NavayugEng co Ltd

CIDB ( Malaysia)

Jas Toll Road co Ltd(Consortium of Jayaswals and- Ashoka Buildcon SERI Intl

CIDB (Malaysia)

GVK International-BSCPL

MSRDC Ltd

GMR - Tuni – Ankapalli ExpressLtd

Andhra Expressway Ltd

Rajamundry Expressway Ltd -Gammon (JV)

Gamuda Malaysia - WCT(Malaysia)

Gamuda and WCT (Malaysia)

SVBTG Consortium of AIDCgroup (USA), STRADC(Phillipines)

Jaiprakash Industries Limited -DS Constt Ltd


50


Tambaram - TindivanamRoad

Pune - Khed Road

East Coast Road

Karur Toll Bridge

Madurai Inner RingRoad

Coimbatore BypassRoad on NH47

Delhi - Noida TollBridge

Development of NewMattancherry BridgeBuild – Operate –Transfer project inCochin

Four laning ofBangalore-MaddurState Highway SH-17under Annuity Scheme

Development of BypassRoads for Sandur Town,Bellary District underdirect tolling scheme

Urban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban Infrastructure

VisakhapatnamIndustrial Water SupplyProject

NHAI

NHAI

TNRDC

Karur Municipality(KM) & Tamil NaduUrban DevelopmentProject (TNUIFSL)

Corporation ofMadurai (COM) &TNUIFSL.

Ministry of SurfaceTransport (MoST) &GoTN

New Okhla IndustrialDevelopmentAuthority (NOIDA),Delhi Government,Government of UP,Government of India.

Public WorksDepartment,Government of Kerala/ Greater CochinDevelopmentAuthority

Karnataka RoadDevelopmentCorporation Ltd.


APIIC

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

3750

1276

600

154.5

430

900

3900

256

2300

200

4500

Annuity

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Not Applicable

Domestic

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

ICB

Tambaram - TindivanamExpressway Pvt Ltd (consortiumof GMR and UE Malaysia)

ATR Infrastructure Pvt Ltd

TNRDC awarded the contractthrough competitive bidding toAshoka Buildcon Ltd forconstruction & maintenance. Theproject engineers for superv. &monitoring were awarded oncompetitive tendering basis toSheladia Associates &Consultants

East Coast Constructions andIndustries Private Limited (ECCI)

Not Decided

L&T Transportation InfrastructureLtd (LTTIL)

Mitsui, Marubeni, KampsaxInternational (Denmark), Intetroll(SA)

Cochin Bridge InfrastructureCompany Ltd./ Gammon India Ltd.

Nagarjuna ConstructionCompany Ltd., Hyderabad, RMCConstructions Ltd. & Maytas Ltd.

DS Constructions

Larsen and Toubro

Annexes

51


Collection andtransportation ofMunicipal Solid Waste

Compost Plant

Up-gradation, operationand maintenance ofAmritsar bus terminal

Solid wastemanagement in Chennai

Tirupur Water SupplyScheme

Alandur (AM)SewerageProject

Solid WasteManagement Initiatives

Solid WasteManagement

Development ofEngineered SanitaryLandfill in Villapilsala inThiruvananthapuram

Development ofintegrated WasteProcessing andEngineered SanitaryLandfills in Bangalore

MunicipalCorporation of Delhi

MunicipalCorporation of Delhi

Punjab InfrastructureDevelopment Boardwith Punjab PublicWorks Department

Corporation ofChennai (CoM) &TIDCO.

NTADCL. SPV formedby Tamil Nadu WaterInvestment Limited -((TWIL),InfrastructureLeasing & FinancialServices Limited(ILFS) and TirupurExportersAssociation (TEA).

Alandur Municipality& Tamil Nadu UrbanDevelopment Project(TNUIFSL).


Haldia DevelopmentAuthority (HAD).

ThiruvananthapuramMunicipalCorporation

Bangalore MahanagaraPalike (BMP) withassistance fromInfrastructureSecretary, Governmentof Karnataka

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

590

7

180

400

1850

400

13.5

540

35

300

Affermage

BOT

BOT

Affermage

BOT

BOT

Affermage

BOO

BOT

BOT

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

ICB

Subhash Projects and MarketingLtd for Central, City and SouthZone, City Life Line consultantsfor west zone and Anthonywaste management for Karolbagh and Sadar pahar Ganj Zone.

Exel Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Local Contractor (Rohan andRajdeep Builders Limited)

C.G.E.A. Asia Holdings,Singapore was selected throughICB to implement the project.

Consortium - Mahindra, UU,WSA (USA), Design - Bechtel,HCC, L&T; Procurement-HCC,L&T – Construction - HCC, L&T;Supervision- GKW(Germany)/CES; Project Management - WSA(USA); O&M - United Utilities(UK); Independent Engineer-PellFrischmann (UK/ India

First STP Pvt Ltd, the companyfloated for the project by VA TechWabag Limited (erstwhile, BalckoDuo and Wabag Technologies Ltd.,- BDWT) and IVRCL Infrastructuresand Projects

Antony Waste Handling Cell isthe solid waste managementdivision of Antony MotorsPrivate Limited

Ramky Enviro Engineers Limited(REEL)




52

Project NameProject NameProject NameProject NameProject Name AgencyAgencyAgencyAgencyAgency SectorSectorSectorSectorSector Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.) StructureStructureStructureStructureStructure TTTTTenderenderenderenderender Likely Private contractor/Likely Private contractor/Likely Private contractor/Likely Private contractor/Likely Private contractor/developerdeveloperdeveloperdeveloperdeveloper

Andhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra Pradesh

Gangavaram Port

Krishnapatnam Port

Development ofHyderabad InternationalAirport Rail link


Positra Port

Mundra-PortGandhidham MissingLink (Adipur MundraPort Railway Link AMPL)

Himmatnagar Bypass

Kim-Mandvi Road


Bangalore InternationalAirport

Development of AirportRail Link to newBangalore airport

Development ofToranagallu Roads

Rehabilitation,Operation andManagement of WaterSupply in SelectedDemonstration Zones inBelgaum, Gulbarga andHubli – DharwadMunicipal Corporationsunder World Bankassisted KUWASIP

Development of ModernPrivate Bus Terminal atKalasipalyam, Bangalore

APIIC

APTR&B

Government ofAndhra Pradesh,Ministry of Railways

GMB

Ministry of Railway

GSRDC

GSRDC

KSIIDC

Government ofKarnataka, Ministryof Railways

InfrastructureDevelopmentDepartment, Govt.of Karnataka

Government ofKarnataka KUIDFC /World Bank

BangaloreMahanagara Palike

Ports

Ports

Roads

Ports

Railways

Roads

Roads

Airport

Railways

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

16000

10000

To be finalised

38880

1600

83.5

270

16000

5300

100

620

300

BOT

BOT

To befinalised

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOO

BOT

BOT

Affermage

BOT

ICB

ICB

To be finalised

ICB

NotApplicable

Domestic

Domestic

ICB

To be finalised

Domestic

ICB

Domestic

Selection of Bidder on ICB basis: DVS Raju, Dubai PortInternational

NATCO Pharma

GPPL

Gujarat Adani Ports Limited(GAPL)

Not Decided

Not Applicable

Siemens Project Ventures,Germany 40%, Unique Airport,Zurich 17%, L&T 17%, KSIIDC13% and AAI 13%

To be finalized

Technical Studies underway

Compagnie Generale Des Eaux,France

Ramky Infrastructure Ltd.

PROJECT PIPELINE BY STATES & CENTRAL AGENCIES

Annexes

53


Development ofInertisation and Landfillfacilities in Urban LocalBodies in 8 towns

Development ofModern Private BusTerminal atChannapatna

Development of anIntegrated Bus Terminalat Shimoga

Development of TruckTerminal at Toranagallu,Bellary

KeralaKeralaKeralaKeralaKerala

Vizhinjam PortInternational

Capacity Augmentationof Kottayam-Nedumbassery Road

Madhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya PradeshMadhya Pradesh

Dewas Industrial watersupply project

MaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtra

Multi-Purpose Terminal

Rewas Greenfield Port

Dighi Port

MTHL Road

Thane - Ghodbunderroad

Andheri - GhatkoparELRT

DMA / RespectiveUrban Local Bodies

KUIDFC

DMA, Shimoga CityMunicipality, KSRTC


Ministry of Ports,GoK

PWD, Kerala

Madhya PradeshState IndustrialDevelopmentCorporation Ltd.

MMB

MMB

MMB

MSRDC

MSRDC

MMRDA

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Ports

Ports

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

200

23

100

To be finalised

40000

800

Not Available

250

43230

6070

39999

50

12000

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

NotApplicable

Negotiated

Negotiated

ICB

Domestic

ICB

Bidding in progress

Bid process to commence

Documentation for bid processunderway


7 private palyers in the fray: Hili(Malta), Beckett Rankine (UK),Port Cons International (SAfrica), Afcons(Mumbai), L&TChennai, Adani Ports(Ahmedabad) and GammonIndia (Mumbai).

To be finalised

Not Decided

Great White Marine Services,Mumbai

Amma Lines

Balaji Leasing & Financial Ltd

Currently at RFQ stage

Not Decided

Not Decided


54


Water TransportServices - Mumbai

OrissaOrissaOrissaOrissaOrissa

Dhamra Port

Gopalpur Port

Paradip port iron oreberth

Palaspanga-BamberiRoad

Joda-BamberiRoad(Expressway-II)

Narangpur-Pandapara-HarichandanpurRoad(MDR-12A &ODR)

Tomka-Mangalpur Road


Road projects on BOTbasis in the state ofPunjab

Up-gradation,operation andmaintenance ofLudhiana bus terminal

TTTTTamil Naduamil Naduamil Naduamil Naduamil Nadu

Sea Water DesalinationPlant

MSRDC

Department ofCommerce andTransport, GoO


Paradip Port Trust

Works Deprtament,GoO




PunjabInfrastructureDevelopment Boardwith Punjab HealthSystem Corporation


ChennaiMetropolitan WaterSupply & SewerageBoard (CMWSSB)

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Ports

Ports

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

6000

17000

12000

4499

223

241

152

271

Not available

Not available

NotApplicable

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

Negotiated

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

Satyagiri Shipping

L&T had floated an SPV (ISPL)along with 2 foreign promoters.However, due to delays bothPrecious Shipping of Thailandand SSA of the USA havewalked out and now Tata Steelis joining hands with L&T todevelop the project.

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not Decided

Annexes

55


Uttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar PradeshUttar Pradesh

Taj Expressway highway


Kulpi Port

Logistics Hub

MOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTHMOSRTH

Ennore terminal

RVNLRVNLRVNLRVNLRVNL

Delhi - Rewari Rail

Ajmer-Phulera-Ringus-Rewari Rail

Vallarpadam - IdapallyRail

Hastavaram-Krishnapatnam Rail

Surat- Hajira Rail

Bharuch – Samni -Dahej Rail

Cuddalore–Salem viaVridhachalam Rail

Tuglakabad – Dadri ICD

Thanjavur - VillupuramRail

Jn. Cabin-Palwal Rail

Haridaspur-ParadeepRail

Hospet-Guntakal Rail


Bengal Port Limited(BPL)

KolkataMetropolitanDevelopmentAuthority (KMDA)

Ennore Port Trust(EPT)

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

Roads

Ports

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

16500

17000

Not Applicable

3500

1400

3520

1030

3900

800

1300

1990

5720

2310

2100

3450

1540

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

ICB

Negotiated

Domestic

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

The Jaypee Group (earlier knownas Jaiprakash Associates).

P&O Ports is the world leaderin cargo handling and portmanagement servicesthroughout the world.

Not Decided

Project is yet to awarded

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable


56


AirportsAirportsAirportsAirportsAirports

Bangalore InternationalAirport

PortsPortsPortsPortsPorts

Gangavaram Port

Krishnapatnam Port

Positra Port

Vizhinjam PortInternational

Multi-Purpose Terminal

Rewas Greenfield Port

Dighi Port

Dhamra Port

Gopalpur Port

Paradip port iron oreberth

Kulpi Port

KSIIDC

APIIC

APTR&B

GMB

Ministry of Ports,GoK

MMB

MMB

MMB



Paradip Port Trust

Bengal Port Limited(BPL)

Airport

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

16000

16000

10000

38880

40000

250

43230

6070

17000

12000

4499

17000

BOO

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

NotApplicable

Negotiated

Negotiated

Negotiated

ICB

ICB

Negotiated

Siemens Project Ventures,Germany 40%, Unique Airport,Zurich 17%, L&T 17%, KSIIDC13% and AAI 13%

Selection of Bidder on ICB basis :DVS Raju, Dubai PortInternational

NATCO Pharma

GPPL

7 private palyers in the fray: Hili(Malta), Beckett Rankine (UK),Port Cons International (SAfrica), Afcons(Mumbai), L&TChennai, Adani Ports(Ahmedabad) and GammonIndia (Mumbai).

Great White Marine Services,Mumbai

Amma Lines

Balaji Leasing & Financial Ltd

L&T had floted an SPV (ISPL)alongwith Precious Shipping ofThailand and SSA of USA to takeup the development of theproject. Howvere, due to delaysboth the foreign promoters havewalked out and now Tata Steel isjoining hands with L&T todevelop the pr

Not Decided

Not Decided

P&O Ports is the world leader incargo handling and portmanagement servicesthroughout Europe and UnitedStates, South America, Asia,

PROJECT PIPELINE BY SECTOR

Annexes

57


Ennore terminal

RailwaysRailwaysRailwaysRailwaysRailways

Mundra-PortGandhidham MissingLink (Adipur MundraPort Railway LinkAMPL)

Delhi - Rewari Rail

Ajmer-Phulera-Ringus-Rewari Rail

Vallarpadam – IdapallyRail

Hastavaram-Krishnapatnam Rail

Surat- Hajira Rail

Bharuch – Samni -Dahej Rail

Cuddalore–Salem viaVridhachalam Rail

Tuglakabad – DadriICD

Thanjavur - VillupuramRail

Jn. Cabin-Palwal Rail

Haridaspur-ParadeepRail

Hospet-Guntakal Rail

Development ofAirport Rail Link tonew Bangalore airport

RoadsRoadsRoadsRoadsRoads

Himmatnagar Bypass

Ennore Port Trust(EPT)

Ministry of Railway

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

RVNL

Government ofKarnataka, Ministryof Railways

GSRDC

Ports

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Railways

Roads

3500

1600

1400

3520

1030

3900

800

1300

1990

5720

2310

2100

3450

1540

5300

83.5

BOT

BOT

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

BOT

BOT

ICB

NotApplicable

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

To be finalised

Domestic

Africa and Australia. They areheadquartered in London with27 container terminals andlogistic operations in over100 p

Project is yet to awarded

Gujarat Adani Ports Limited(GAPL)

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

To be finalized

Not Decided


58


Kim-Mandvi Road

MTHL Road

Thane - Ghodbunderroad

Palaspanga-BamberiRoad

Joda-BamberiRoad(Expressway-II)

Narangpur-Pandapara-HarichandanpurRoad(MDR-12A &ODR)

Tomka-Mangalpur Road

Road projects on BOTbasis in the state ofPunjab

Taj Expressway highway

Capacity Augmentationof Kottayam-Nedumbassery Road

Development ofToranagallu Roads

Development ofHyderabad InternationalAirport Rail link

Urban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban InfrastructureUrban Infrastructure

Andheri - GhatkoparELRT

Water TransportServices - Mumbai

Dewas Industrial watersupply project

GSRDC

MSRDC

MSRDC





Punjab InfrastructureDevelopment Boardwith Punjab HealthSystem Corporation

Greater New OkhlaIndustrialDevelopmentAuth.(GNOIDA)

PWD, Kerala


Government ofAndhra Pradesh,Ministry of Railways

MMRDA

MSRDC

Madhya PradeshState IndustrialDevelopmentCorporation Ltd.

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

270

39999

50

223

241

152

271

Not available

16500

800

100

To be finalised

12000

6000

Not Available

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

To befinalised

BOT

BOT

BOT

Domestic

ICB

Domestic

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

To be finalised

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

Not Applicable

Currently at RFQ stage

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not Decided

Not applicable

The Jaypee Group (earlierknown as JaiprakashAssociates).

To be finalized


Not Decided

Satyagiri Shipping

Not Decided

Annexes

59


Up-gradation,operation andmaintenance ofLudhiana bus terminal

Sea Water DesalinationPlant

Logistics Hub

Rehabilitation,Operation andManagement of WaterSupply in SelectedDemonstration Zonesin Belgaum, Gulbargaand Hubli – DharwadMunicipal Corporationsunder World Bankassisted KUWASIP

Development ofModern Private BusTerminal atKalasipalyam,Bangalore

Development ofInertisation and Landfillfacilities in Urban LocalBodies in 8 towns

Development ofModern Private BusTerminal atChannapatna

Development of anIntegrated Bus Terminalat Shimoga

Development of TruckTerminal at Toranagallu,Bellary


ChennaiMetropolitan WaterSupply & SewerageBoard (CMWSSB)

KolkataMetropolitanDevelopmentAuthority (KMDA)

Government ofKarnataka KUIDFC /World Bank

BangaloreMahanagara Palike

DMA / RespectiveUrban Local Bodies

KUIDFC

DMA, Shimoga CityMunicipality, KSRTC


UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Not available

NotApplicable

NotApplicable

620

300

200

23

100

To befinalised

BOT

BOT

BOT

Affermage

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

BOT

ICB

ICB

Domestic

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Not applicable

Not Decided

Not Decided

Compagnie Generale Des Eaux,France

Ramky Infrastructure Ltd.

Bidding in progress

Bid process to commence

Documentation for bid processunderway



60

Project NameProject NameProject NameProject NameProject Name AgencyAgencyAgencyAgencyAgency SectorSectorSectorSectorSector Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.) StructureStructureStructureStructureStructure TTTTTenderenderenderenderender Reason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonment

Andhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra PradeshAndhra Pradesh

Development of SpecialTransport Corridor

Sewage , Urban RoadManagement, WaterSupply Management

Krishna Water SupplyProject


Maroli Port

Dholera Port

Simar

Mithivirdi

Vansiborsi

Bedi

Jamnagar - Vadinar Road

Bharuch - Dahej Road

Savli ROB

APIIC

VisakhapatnamMunicipalCorporation

HMWSSB

GMB

GMB

GMB

GMB

GMB

GMB

GSRDC

GSRDC

GSRDC

Roads

UrbanInfrastructure

UrbanInfrastructure

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Ports

Roads

Roads

Roads

Not available

Not available

8,200

10378

7500

20720

5034

2749

29050

2200

2400

130

BOT

BOT

NotApplicable

BOOT

BOOT

BOOT

BOOT

BOOT

BOOT

BOOT

BOT

BOT

NotApplicable

NotApplicable

Domestic

ICB

NotApplicable

ICB

ICB

ICB

ICB

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

The project is connected withSEZ development and will takeoff only after SEZ development

Change in the Commissioner(the lead implementingposition)

Private operator offered muchhigher price (Rs42/k. litre) whilethe price of HMWSSB wasabout Rs. 3/ k. litre domesticand about Rs. 10/ k.litre forindustrial customer at that time

LOI has been forfeitted. The porthas been put up for rebiddingand EOI has been invited. Localagitations be fishermen createdproblems for the project

No good offers received in 2004





None submitted bid. Due toRPPL deciding to transportusing pipelines, the liquid cargotraffic was gone. Along witheconomic recession, this proveddisadvantageous to the project.

Private developers found it nonprofitable

Concession period quoted in therange of 21.5 years to 23 years,which was found to be too high.Therefore, bidding cancelled andproject development to beexplored again when traffic levelgoes up.

ABANDONED PROJECTS

Annexes

61

Project NameProject NameProject NameProject NameProject Name AgencyAgencyAgencyAgencyAgency SectorSectorSectorSectorSector Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.)Cost (Rs. Mn.) StructureStructureStructureStructureStructure TTTTTenderenderenderenderender Reason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonmentReason for abandonment


Elevated Light RailTransit System


Privatisation ofS u p e r r s p e c i a l i t yfacilities in Amritsarand Bhatinda


Vivekanand FlyoverProject

BMRTL

ExecutingGovernmentAgency

Department ofTransport, Govt. ofWest Bengal

UrbanInfrastructure

Health

Roads

25,000

Not available

650

BOOT

BOT

BOT

ICB

ICB

Domestic

Project not functional - UBTransit Systems Team has beenasked to opt for VRA

Lack of political support andagitation from the public ledto withdrawal of two bidders.

Problem in evacuating the landbelow the flyover which in theconcession agreement was tobe given to the operator fordevelopment


62

INST

ITU

TIO

NA

L FR

AM

EWO

RK

: S

ELEC

TED

STA

TES

& C

ENTR

AL

AG

ENC

IES

Stat

e/ a

genc

ySt

ate/

age

ncy

Stat

e/ a

genc

ySt

ate/

age

ncy

Stat

e/ a

genc

y

Guj

arat

And

hra

Prad

esh

Mad

hya

Prad

esh

Mah

aras

htra

Tam

il N

adu

Wes

t Ben

gal

Lega

lLe

gal

Lega

lLe

gal

Lega

lFr

amew

ork

Fram

ewor

kFr

amew

ork

Fram

ewor

kFr

amew

ork

Guj

arat

Infra

stru

ctur

eDe

velo

pmen

tA

ct, 1

999

AP

–In

frast

ruct

ure

Deve

lopm

ent

Enab

ling

Act

2001

For s

elec

tse

ctor

s, e

g- M

.P.H

ighw

ay B

ill20

01;

Gove

rnm

ent

Ord

ers

for R

oad

and

Port

Sec

tors

.M

IDA

S A

ctaw

aitin

g Ca

bine

tA

ppro

val

X X

Dec

isio

n M

akin

gD

ecis

ion

Mak

ing

Dec

isio

n M

akin

gD

ecis

ion

Mak

ing

Dec

isio

n M

akin

gRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

GID

B &

Dep

artm

ents

Infra

stru

ctur

eA

utho

rity

Dep

artm

ents

Dep

artm

ents

Dep

artm

ents

Dep

artm

ents

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Dev

elop

men

tD

evel

opm

ent

Dev

elop

men

tD

evel

opm

ent

Dev

elop

men

tRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

GID

B

API

IC (a

s a

noda

lag

ency

)

Dep

artm

ents

and

agen

cies

suc

h as

MPR

DC

and

MPP

WD

Dep

artm

ents

and

agen

cies

such

as

MSR

DC

Dep

artm

ents

and

agen

cies

such

aTI

DCO

, TN

RDC,

TWIC

Dep

artm

ents

and

agen

cies

such

as

KMD

A

Stat

e Su

ppor

tSt

ate

Supp

ort

Stat

e Su

ppor

tSt

ate

Supp

ort

Stat

e Su

ppor

tFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

g

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis;

API

IC/IA

isin

volv

ed.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

cas

e ba

sis.

Mod

elM

odel

Mod

elM

odel

Mod

elC

ontr

acts

Con

trac

tsC

ontr

acts

Con

trac

tsC

ontr

acts

� � X X X X

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Doc

umen

tD

ocum

ent

Doc

umen

tD

ocum

ent

Doc

umen

t

� � X X X X

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Proj

ect

Prep

arat

ion

Prep

arat

ion

Prep

arat

ion

Prep

arat

ion

Prep

arat

ion

Gui

delin

esG

uide

lines

Gui

delin

esG

uide

lines

Gui

delin

es

� � X X X X

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Regu

lato

ryRe

gula

tory

Regu

lato

ryRe

gula

tory

Regu

lato

ryA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

y

X � X X X X

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

on

GID

BSu

ppor

t;Ca

se to

case

basi

s

Conc

iliat

ion

boar

d

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Con

flict

Con

flict

Con

flict

Con

flict

Con

flict

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onw

ithi

n G

ovt

wit

hin

Gov

tw

ithi

n G

ovt

wit

hin

Gov

tw

ithi

n G

ovt

GID

B

Infra

stru

ctur

eA

utho

rity

X X X X

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Annexes

63

Punj

ab

Karn

atak

a

UP

Oris

sa

Del

hi

Nat

iona

lH

ighw

ayA

utho

rity

ofIn

dia

Rail

Vik

asN

igam

Lim

ited

Punj

abIn

frast

ruct

ure

Deve

lopm

ent

Act

199

8

X X X X Nat

iona

lH

ighw

ays

Aut

horit

y of

Indi

a A

ct, 1

988

Crea

ted

unde

rN

atio

nal R

ail

Vika

s Yoj

ana

(NRV

Y)

Punj

ab In

frast

ruct

ure

Dev

elop

men

t Boa

rd

Dep

artm

ents

and

gove

rnm

ent a

genc

ies

Dep

artm

ents

and

gove

rnm

ent a

genc

ies

Dep

artm

ents

and

gove

rnm

ent a

genc

ies

such

as

Oris

saIn

dust

rial

Infra

stru

ctur

eDe

velo

pmen

tCo

rpor

atio

n (ID

CO)

Dep

artm

ents

and

gove

rnm

ent a

genc

ies

such

as

DSI

DC,

DTTD

C

Nat

iona

l Hig

hway

sA

utho

rity

of In

dia

and

Min

istr

y of

Roa

dTr

ansp

ort a

ndH

ighw

ays

Min

istr

y of

Rai

lway

s,RV

NL

Punj

abIn

frast

ruct

ure

Dev

elop

men

t Boa

rd(a

lso

othe

r age

ncie

ssu

ch a

s PU

DA

)

iDeC

K

Dep

artm

ents

Stat

e A

genc

ies s

uch

as ID

CO

Dep

artm

ents

and

gove

rnm

ent

agen

cies

Nat

iona

l Hig

hway

sA

utho

rity

of In

dia

RVN

L

Punj

abIn

frast

ruct

ure

Ince

ntiv

e Fun

d(P

IIF)

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

case

basi

s.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

case

basi

s.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

case

basi

s.

Dep

artm

ents

;ca

se to

case

basi

s.

Cent

ral R

oad

Fund

and

Aid

from

Don

orA

genc

ies

Min

istr

y of

Railw

ays

Exec

utiv

eCo

mm

ittee

of P

IDB

X X X X

MoR

TH

Min

istr

y of

Railw

ays

� X X X X � X

� X X X X � X

� X X X X � X

X X X X X

MoR

TH

X

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

Cont

ract

ual

X

Stat

e/ a

genc

ySt

ate/

age

ncy

Stat

e/ a

genc

ySt

ate/

age

ncy

Stat

e/ a

genc

yLe

gal

Lega

lLe

gal

Lega

lLe

gal

Fram

ewor

kFr

amew

ork

Fram

ewor

kFr

amew

ork

Fram

ewor

kD

ecis

ion

Mak

ing

Dec

isio

n M

akin

gD

ecis

ion

Mak

ing

Dec

isio

n M

akin

gD

ecis

ion

Mak

ing

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tD

evel

opm

ent

Dev

elop

men

tD

evel

opm

ent

Dev

elop

men

tD

evel

opm

ent

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

yRe

spon

sibi

lity

Resp

onsi

bilit

y

Stat

e Su

ppor

tSt

ate

Supp

ort

Stat

e Su

ppor

tSt

ate

Supp

ort

Stat

e Su

ppor

tFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gFu

ndin

gPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

ojec

tPr

epar

atio

nPr

epar

atio

nPr

epar

atio

nPr

epar

atio

nPr

epar

atio

nG

uide

lines

Gui

delin

esG

uide

lines

Gui

delin

esG

uide

lines

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Esta

blis

hed

Regu

lato

ryRe

gula

tory

Regu

lato

ryRe

gula

tory

Regu

lato

ryA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

yA

genc

y

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Dis

pute

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onC

onfli

ctC

onfli

ctC

onfli

ctC

onfli

ctC

onfli

ctRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

Reso

luti

onRe

solu

tion

wit

hin

Gov

tw

ithi

n G

ovt

wit

hin

Gov

tw

ithi

n G

ovt

wit

hin

Gov

t

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Gu

ida

nce

Ma

teri

als

Mod

elM

odel

Mod

elM

odel

Mod

elC

ontr

acts

Con

trac

tsC

ontr

acts

Con

trac

tsC

ontr

acts

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Stan

dard

Doc

umen

tD

ocum

ent

Doc

umen

tD

ocum

ent

Doc

umen

t

Download - Building Capacities for Public Private Partnerships in India.pdf · India: Building Capacities for Public Private Partnerships 6 Most countries engaged in a broad-based PPP program

Top Related