ANSO and our donors accept no liability for
the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
-Not for copy or sale-
The Afghan i s tan NGO Sa fet y Of f i ce
Throughout 2010 NGOs were involved in 126 incidents in which 28 people were killed and an additional 33 injured. 22
deaths were attributed to AOG, three to criminals and an additional three died collaterally in IMF/AOG clashes. While
these figures represent a 27% fall in the total volume of attacks from 2009 (172 cases) they also show an alarming 42%
increase in fatalities. Of the deaths, 20 were Afghan nationals and eight foreign nationals, all of the latter dying in a sin‐
gle incident. Ten of the Afghan nationals killed worked for demining NGOs. Abduction by armed opposition grew by 7%
with 74 persons taken in 30 separate cases. All of the victims were Afghan nationals and all of them were released
without harm, often within three days. We assess that the primary motivation in AOG abduction of NGO staff is infor‐
mation gathering. One foreign national was abducted, and released, but that case was assessed as criminal. Of the sixty
eight separate NGOs involved in all incidents ANSO noted no commonality or trend in their profiles (such as nationality,
sector of intervention, funding sources) with the exception of deminers. It is clear that AOG have an opposition to this
field of work, particularly in the southern provinces. In sum, a difficult year for NGOs in which deadly ambient violence
posed as much of a threat as direct and deliberate strikes. Despite this there remains no evidence to suggest that AOG
deliberately target NGOs (except deminers) or that we will not retain space for our operations. ANSO continues to ad‐
vise that transparent dialogue with all combatants is key to NGO safety going in to 2011.
The forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) fought a significant campaign in 2010 expanding the total volume
of attacks by 64%, the highest annual growth rate we have recorded, and securing new strongholds in the North, West
and East of the country. Their momentum would appear unaffected by US‐led counterinsurgency measures. The cam‐
paign grew increasingly complex with reports suggesting the deployment of parallel governance structures including
courts, judges and administrators. Attacks remained focused on the IMF and Afghan Government, targeting personnel,
resources and enablers (including hundreds of Afghan civilians) and expanded to include significant attacks on Private
Development Companies for their role in supporting the IMF. The IEA will enter 2011 in a very strong position.
The International military forces (IMF) pursued their three pronged exit strategy (security, governance, development)
with massive interventions in Helmand and Kandahar that achieved little other than to diversify and diffuse the insur‐
gency. New initiatives, such as the Afghan Peace & Reintegration Program (APRP), have resulted in a few hundred sur‐
renders but not enough to undermine AOG manpower. Village Stability Operations (the formation of irregular forces)
are exacerbating tensions in the North and may be contributing to a below‐radar process of factional remobilization.
The rapid recycling of APRP reintegrees in to irregular forces is of particular concern.
Looking ahead, we expect the impending IMF drawdown to stimulate further factional separation on all sides, as lead‐
ers jostle for the best starting position, however we do not expect this to result in significant conflict between factions,
it will simply be an insurance policy against State collapse. The IEA will press their military advantage, exploiting the
fractures that emerge with ‘transition’.
Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2011
SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT
J an 1s t— Dec 31s t 2010
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.4 2010
The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily re-flect the views of ANSO donors or partners.
Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 1 Tr e n d s i n K e y B a t t l e G r o u n d s
The US Strategy Review in December suggested the IEA’s momentum had been blunted in some areas and,
while not specifically mentioning Kandahar or Helmand, given that those are their focus areas it is reason‐
able to assume that they meant there.
Our quarterly attack rate figures for each province (above) do indeed show a substantial reduction of at‐
tacks in both between August and December. Kandahar dropping by 50%, in contrast to the usual 20%, and
Helmand dropping by 40% in Q.4, a trend not seen since 2006. This demonstrates that the IEA have turned
away from the battlefield earlier, and in greater numbers, than before but it does not provide an explana‐
tion as to why. The pressure of US operations could certainly be a factor here, anecdotal reporting suggests
many commanders felt the areas to be too hot and sought sanctuary in other provinces or Pakistan, but so
too could other more benign factors like the early onset of Ramadan and the normal seasonal downturn.
However, regardless of which explanation one prefers when you put the quarterly data in its annual context,
which to us is a much more valid analytical period as it captures a full operational cycle rather than just the
tactical to & fro, it becomes completely irrelevant. Over the full year the IEA expanded their attacks in both
provinces, Helmand by a whopping 124% and Kandahar by a more conservative 20%, suggesting that in the
bigger picture their capacity to conduct attacks has improved substantially. In light of this the deep down‐
turn could just as easily be interpreted as an early winter reprieve, after an intense summer fight, and would
not represent any longer term degradation of capacity. If the 2011 spring offensives sustain, or build on, the
level of violence achieved this year then it will be a sure indicator that the surge operations achieved little. If
they do not then the US conclusions, in those provinces at least, will be validated.
To borrow a phrase from the global warming debate...keep your eyes on the climate, not the weather.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
46 47
124
143
348
28
60
132
218208
ANSO: AOG attacks in Helmand, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
113
164
239
321
400
109
143
178
246
200
ANSO: AOG attacks in Kandahar, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Page 3 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 2 I r r e g u l a r A r m e d F o r c e s
Irregular armed forces
(militias) continue to be
stood up in an uncoordi‐
nated and opaque man‐
ner and constitute an
emerging security threat
to NGOs. Two official pro‐
grams are active, the Vil‐
lage Stability Operations
(VSO) run by US Special
Forces and the Afghan
Local Police (ALP) led by
the Ministry of Interior
(see map for districts).
However, ANSO has re‐
ceived numerous reports
of other irregular groups
spontaneously forming
outside of these programs, for instance in Faryab, Balkh and Takhar (but there could be others), that then
seek retroactive sanction for their mobilization. While the subject is complex, the early concern is that ir‐
regulars are actually coalescing around political/ethnic leaders, in a low‐intensity arms race, stimulated by
the need to preposition ahead of the impending IMF withdrawal. If confirmed, which 2011 will show, then
this aspect of the COIN strategy will be deeply at odds with efforts to form a strong central State.
The phenomenon seems most acute in the North where we suspect the fractured ethnic landscape gives
rise to a more imminent sense of danger when the neighbor’s suddenly re‐arm and don a badge of State
legitimacy. In Kunduz recently, competing irregulars, loyal to opposing Jamiat/Tajik and Hezb‐i‐Islami/
Pashtun commanders, have engaged in armed conflict over territory and taxing rights. In other provinces
locals have reported being robbed or assaulted and some claim the Arbaki even have links to the armed
opposition. These developments are really of concern. The official response suggests that ultimately all
irregulars will be brought under the control of the MOI with the ALP program, however this seems highly
unlikely given the level of unauthorized mobilizations already occurring. The genie is out of the bottle.
In the short term the main risk to NGOs is simply that of the introduction of new armed actors to the field.
We have not yet seen an Arbaki kill an NGO worker (although we suspect we have seen some robberies
and maybe an abduction) but it will only be a matter of time. In the long run, irregular forces could pose a
significant obstacle to lasting peace in the country (by delegating State legitimacy) and leave NGOs negoti‐
ating a complex, and shifting, patchwork of competing authorities.
Qalay‐I‐ Zal
Archi
Imam Sahib
Chahar Dara
Ali Abad
Kunduz
Khan Abad
Nari
Pech
AsadAbadChapa
Dara
Chawkay
Narang
Khas Kunar
Sirkanay
Marawara
Qarghayi
Alingar
Dawlat Shah
Alishing
Mihtarlam
Puli Alam
Charkh
Muhammad Agh
KhushiBaraki Barak
RodatHisarak
Achin
Lal Pur
Dih Bala
Goshta
Dur Baba
Kama
Surkh Rod
Kuz Kunar
Dara‐I‐Nur
Shinwar
Bati KotChaparhar
Jalal Abad
Nazyan
Chahar Burja
ChakhansurChakhansur
Khash RodKhash Rod
Kang
ZaranjZaranj
MandolMandol WamaWama
Bargi Matal
Nuristan
KamdeshKamdesh
GomalGomal
DilaDila
Wor Mamay
Waza Khwa
Barmal
Sharan
Zarghun
Shah
UrgunOmna
SarHawza
Ziruk
Mata KhanKhan
Gayan
Nika
Zurmat
Jaji
Gardez
Jadran
Lija
Mangal
Jani Khel
Shwak
Shamal
Hisa‐I‐Awali
PanjsherHisa‐I‐Duwum
Ghorband
Salang
Shekh Ali
Surkhi ParsaKohi Safi
Bagram
Jabalussaraj
Dara‐I‐ SufDara‐I‐ Suf
AybakAybak
Ruyi Du AbRuyi Du Ab
Khuram Wa Sa
Khuram Wa Sa
Hazrati Sultan
KohistanatKohistanatBalkhabBalkhab
Sari PulSari Pul
SayyadSayyad
SangcharakSangcharak
Sozma Qala WarsajWarsaj
RustaqRustaq
FarkharFarkharChalChal
TaluqanTaluqan
Bangi
KalafganKalafgan
Ab
Chah
Ab
Ishkamish
Khwaja Ghar
KhwajaGhar
ChoraChora
NeshNesh
DihrawudDihrawudTirin Kot
Tirin Kot
Khas UruzganKhas
UruzganShahidi HassShahidi Hass
Markazi Bihs
JalrezJalrez
Nirkh
Day Mirdad
Hisa‐I‐Awal
Wakhan
JurmJurm
ShighnanShighnan
KishimKishim
Darwaz
BaharakBaharak
RaghRagh
ZebakZebak
Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun
Fayz Abad
KhwahanKhwahan
Ishkashim
Shahri BuzurShahri Buzur
QalatQalat
ShamulzayiShinkayShinkay
ShahjoyShahjoy
MizanMizan
AtgharAtghar
Tarnak Wa Ja
JawandJawand
QadisQadis
MurghabMurghab
Ab KamariAb Kamari
MuqurMuqur
Qalay‐I‐Naw
KahmardKahmard
DushiDushi
AndarabAndarab
NahrinNahrin
Tala Wa BarfTala Wa Barf
Khost Wa Fir
Khinjan
Burka
Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad
Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori
BaghlanBaghlan
KhulmKhulm
KishindihKishindih
ChimtalChimtal
SholgaraSholgara
ShortepaShortepa
Nahri ShahiNahri Shahi
KaldarKaldar
Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad
Chahar Kint
Chahar Kint
BalkhBalkh
MarmulMarmulDihdadiDihdadi
Chahar
YakawlangYakawlang
WarasWaras
PanjabPanjab
BamyanBamyan
ShibarShibar
Day KundiDay Kundi
GizabGizab
Kajran
ShahristanShahristan
Anar DaraAnar Dara
GulistanGulistan
Pur ChamanPur Chaman
Bala BulukBala Buluk
Lash Wa JuwaLash Wa Juwa
FarahFarah
Qalay‐I‐KahQalay‐I‐KahBakwaBakwa
Shib KohShib Koh
Khak‐e Safid
Pusht RodPusht Rod
QaysarQaysar
AlmarAlmar
BilchiraghBilchiragh
KohistanKohistan
Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad
Shirin TagabShirin Tagab
QaramqolQaramqol
Pashtun Kot
AndkhoyAndkhoy
Khwaja SabzKhwaja Sabz
Khani ChaharKhani Chahar
MaymanaMaymana
NawurNawur
Nawa
GiroGiro
QarabaghQarabagh
GelanGelan
Andar
Ab BandAb
BandMuqur
Jaghatu
Bahrami ShahShah Dih Yak
Ghazni
Zana Khan
ShahrakShahrak
ChaghcharanChaghcharan
TulakTulak
SagharSaghar
PasabandPasaband
TaywaraTaywara
Lal Wa SarjaLal Wa Sarja
RegReg
GarmserGarmser
DishuDishu
Nad AliNad Ali
WasherWasher
BaghranBaghran
Naw ZadNaw ZadKajakiKajaki
Girishk
GahLashkar Gah
Sangin
BaraNaway i Bara
AdraskanAdraskan
GulranGulran
ShindandShindand
GhoryanGhoryan
ObeObe
KushkKushk
InjilInjil
KohsanKohsan
FarsiFarsi
KarukhKarukh
GuzaraGuzara
Zinda Jan
Zinda Jan Chishti SharChishti Shar
Pashtun ZargPashtun Zarg
HiratHirat
ShibirghanShibirghan
Qarqin
Darzab
Aqcha
Khwaja Du Ko
Mingajik MardyanMardyan
AbadFayz
Surobi
Dih Sabz
Khaki Jabbar
PaghmanBagrami
Kabul
Shakardara
Istalif
Chahar AsyabChahar
Musayi
GuldaraQarabagh
Mir Bacha Kot
RegReg
PanjwayiPanjwayi
MarufMaruf
DamanDaman
Spin BoldakSpin Boldak
ShorabakShorabak
ArghistanArghistan
MaywandMaywand
Shah Wali KoShah Wali KotGhorak
Tani
Tere Zayi
Sabari Bak
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Jaji Maydan
Nijrab
Tagab
Kohistan
Koh Band
Mazari Sharif
Kalakan
Alasay
Mahmud Raqi
Mando Zayi
Azra
Bolak
ANSO: Districts with official Irregular Force programs (VSO/ALP) plus ISAF “Key Terrain”, correct at Sept 2010 (last info available)
ISAF Key Terrain
VSO (former LDI/CDI)
ALP
Page 4 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Part 2.Part 2.
NGO TRENDSNGO TRENDS
Page 5 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 1 G e n e r a l N G O Tr e n d s
A total of sixty eight NGOs were victimized in eighty eight separate AOG attacks this year (above), 14% down from the
previous year. 51 one these were rated as ‘serious’ including abductions and kinetic attacks. The rate of attacks per
month fluctuates significantly and with no obvious correlation to the rate of general conflict. A long term downward
trend remains visible, between the peaks of 2008 and 2010 for example, likely reflecting incremental changes in NGO
behavior rather than AOG intent or changes in demographics. The data still solidly supports the conclusion that NGO’s
are not broadly or routinely targeted by AOG otherwise this would be visible in this data set. Exposure to crime (below)
remains low, an additional 38 incidents, and has been dropping over time. Armed robbery is the main concern.
0
5
10
15
20
25
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 ‐ 2010(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006‐2010(Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic)
Page 6 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 2 C a t e g o r y o f N G O I n c i d e n t s 2 0 1 0
Abduction was the most com‐
mon form of AOG attack on
NGOs this year (right, 30
cases) accounting for 35% of
the total, significantly up from
21% of the total in the fourth
quarter of 2009. To date, all 74
victims have been released.
Small arms fire events (9
cases), mostly in the form of
roadside ambushes, also
dropped as a percentage,
down to 11% from 19% in
2009 but, as this category of
attack accounted for 12 NGO
fatalities, it remains a serious threat. The murder of 10 NGO staff in one incident in Badakshan is included
in this count. Four of the nine roadside ambushes targeted demining NGOs. IEDs (7%) continued to plague
NGO road movement with six strikes occurring, killing 10, with four of these being assessed as deliberate
and two accidental. Three of the deliberate IED strikes targeted demining NGOs. In 2009, IEDs made up 8%
of the total attack profile. Lesser events, like threats (15%) via phone or in person, theft of vehicles or sup‐
plies (11%) and the ransacking/burning of remote offices or project sites (12%) made up the remainder of
the annual profile. The data confirms what was laid out in greater detail in Q.3, that serious attacks on
NGOs by AOG are in decline. See page nine for discussion on motivations.
Armed robbery (10 cases) re‐
mained the most prominent
form of crime against NGO
(right) at 29% of the total but is
also down from 52% of the to‐
tal (25 cases) of 2009. Of this
year’s cases, seven occurred at
remote facilities and just three
on the road. An additional four
robberies were attempted but
failed. Criminal homicide (SAF)
remained a concern with three
killed and six injured in armed
attacks by criminals.
7%4%
11%
35%
15%
12%
11%5%
ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks on NGO, full 2010
IED
Rocket/Mortar
SAF/RPG
Abduction (cases)
Threats/Intimidations
Facility Arson/Ransack
Theft Vehilce/Supplies
Illegal Check Post
6%
26%
6%
9%24%
29%
ANSO: Composition of criminal attacks on NGO, full 2010
Handgrenade
SAF
Arson
Abduction (cases)
Threat/Intimidation
Armed Robbery
Page 7 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 3 N G O S e r i o u s I n c i d e n t M a p 2 0 1 0
The location of kinetic attacks against NGOs (see map) does not demonstrate any particular geographic concentration or trend. Attacks occurred in prov‐inces with dramatically different underlying levels of conflict (from safe to highly insecure) and with both high and low lev‐els of AOG presence. The un‐known variable is the population density of NGOs themselves. The number of people killed per attack type (right) shows that while deliberate targeting still accounted for the majority of deaths, collateral fatalities are a growing cause for concern.
HELMAND NIMROZ
KANDAHAR
URUZGAN
ZABUL PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
FARAH
HERAT
BADGHIS
GHORDAYKUNDI
BAMYAN
FARYAB
KHOST
BADAKSHAN
BALKH JAWZJAN KUNDUZ
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
WARDAK
KABUL
PARWAN
NANGAHAR
IED Strike
SAF/RPG
ANSO: Location of Significant Attacks Against NGO @ Q.4 2010
0 2 4 6 8 10
Pressure Plate IED (accidental)
Collateral (AOG fire)
Civilian Homocide
Gunfire on Deminer
Collateral (IMF fire)
Command Wire IED (accidental)
IED on Deminer
Targeted Killing
1
1
2
2
2
2
7
10
ANSO: NGO staff killed per cause, countrywide, 2010
Page 8 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 4 N G O A b d u c t i o n M a p 2 0 1 0
While Q.3 data indicated that abductions would sky
‐rocket in 2010, the last quarter rates slowed suffi‐
ciently to being the annual total in line with last
year, 74 cases compared to 69 in 2009. Still abduc‐
tion remained a major concern effecting many or‐
ganizations. The general profile remained consis‐
tent throughout the year with little violence dis‐
played in most cases, the average detention period
falling to just 3 days (down from 6 weeks in 2007)
and all victims being released unharmed. The soft
nature of most cases would suggest they are better
referred to as ’illegal detentions’ conducted for the purpose of information gathering rather than abductions for
political advantage. We expect ‘detention/abduction’ to remain a prominent risk for NGOs going in to 2011, as
AOG seek to control and understand new battle spaces, but, given the lack of violence this year, perhaps one that
could be reinterpreted as offering opportunities to open dialogue and encourage acceptance.
HELMAND NIMROZ
KANDAHAR
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
FARAH
HERAT
BADGHIS
GHOR
DAYKUNDI
BAMYAN
FARYAB
KHOST
BADAKSHAN
BALKH JAWZJAN
SAR‐E‐PUL
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
SAMANGANBAGHLAN
WARDAKKABUL
PARWAN
NANGAHAR
LAGHMAN
KAPISA
ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Province , full 2010
17
107
6 6
7
5
4
6
2 1
2
1
Province # NGO Staff Abducted in 2010
Faryab 17
Wardak 10
Herat 7
Kabul 7
Ghor 6
Baghlan 6
Sar‐i‐Pul 6
Kunar 5
Kandahar 4
Ghazni 2
Balkh 2
Takhar 1
Kunduz 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2008 2009 2010
51
6974
ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Year, 2008‐2010
Page 9 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 5 M o t i v a t i o n s
While not an area that lends itself to precise analysis, the question of AOG motivations in attacking NGOs needs unpacking. We assess that all serious incidents this year, meaning the 21 cases of kinetic attack plus 30 cases of abduction, have fallen in to one of the following four categories:
1.Information Gathering: We asses that at least 64% of serious incidents, including all of the AOG related abduc‐tions, have been committed for the purpose of systemic information gath‐ering, or in NGO parlance ’actor map‐ping’. This explains why 100% of victims have been released without harm and often within 48hrs. In this light, it would be more accurate to refer to most events as ‘investigative detentions’ rather than abductions and to see them as the IEA version of, albeit involun‐tary, civil‐military coordination offering an opportunity to open dialogue.
2. Accident/Collateral: We estimate that up to 12% of serious incidents (six of the 51 cases reviewed here) are sim‐ply accidents resulting from the volatile and fluid environment. Within this category you can find mortars and rock‐ets, fired by IMF or AOG, that fall short and hit NGO offices, command wire IEDs that mistake a target and pressure plate IEDs that simply blow up the first person that drives over them. All accidents illustrate the importance of avoiding combatants, both in terms of perception and location, even though some events would not have been mitigated by any measures. Increased IMF & AOG offensives have created more ambient violence.
3.Deliberate and Hostile: Without doubt the purpose of some attacks is precisely what it seems to be, to kill or in‐jure NGO staff. Of the 51 cases under review here we assess that eight (14%) fall in to this worst of categories but, more alarmingly, seven of these targeted demining organizations. This reflects a clear and direct opposition to the work of deminers. The eighth case involved the murder of ten NGO staff in Badakshan by a non‐local armed fac‐tion. In this case religious extremism, expressed as a desire to kill non‐Muslims, was assessed as an underlying cause essentially divorcing the murders from the surrounding political context. The common thread in all cases is that the NGO staff are killed for their direct characteristics with the attack being an end it its own right.
4.Influencing Populations: Also known as ‘effects based operations’ (or EBO), these are the types of attacks where the NGO is not targeted for its own sake but rather acts as a means through which to influence the surrounding population. Essentially the inverse of winning hearts and minds. We estimate that just 10% of the attacks (5 cases) fall in to this category with most of these being non‐fatal attacks on schools or health care facilities where the pur‐pose was to punish the community (by denying access) for supporting ‘un‐Islamic’ activities and drive them to‐wards a condition more favorable to AOG presence. The fact that the schools were run by NGOs was irrelevant, that they offered free education to young women was not.
In conclusion we suggest that deliberate attacks on NGOs, for who they are and what they do, are actually ex‐tremely rare, with the notable exception of deminers. However, even benign scrutiny by AOG, whether deliberate or mistaken, can easily leave an NGO bloodied or worse.
12%
14%
10%64%
ANSO: Assessed motivation of AOG attacks on NGOs
Accident/Collateral Deliberate & Hostile Seeking Influence Intel Gathering
Page 10 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Part 3.Part 3.
State of the ConflictState of the Conflict
Page 11 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 1 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k — C o u n t r y w i d e
Consistent with the five year trend (above) attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were
64% higher than 2009, the highest inter‐annual growth rate we have recorded (see inset graph above). If averaged,
the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per
day, every single day of the year. In September this rate jumped to more than 50 attacks per day, or 1,541 opera‐
tions, as they ramped up their efforts to disrupt parliamentary elections that month. The year followed a familiar pat‐
ter with Jan/Feb starting slow, as AOG remobilize from the winter retreat, followed by seven solid months of expan‐
sion and a rapid de‐escalation back to December. The final month closing out at 47% higher than December 2009.
Although provincial level data (p.12) shows that each province per‐
formed differently, taking the national data as a whole we consider
this indisputable evidence that conditions are deteriorating. If
losses are taken in one area they are simply compensated for in an‐
other as has been the dynamic since this conflict started.
More so than in previous years, information of this nature is sharply
divergent from IMF ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting
improvements. We encourage NGO’s to recognize that, no matter
how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of this na‐
ture are solely intended to influence American and European public
opinion, ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an
accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
335
405
634
1093
533
1541
786
ANSO KEY DATA: Monthly Attacks by Armed Opposition Groups, 2006 to 2010(Significant kinetic attacks only, does not include criminal activity. Includes all AOG cooperating under the IEA umbrella (HiG, LeT, HQN, TTP, IMU etc) )
48%53%
41%
64%
2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010
ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010
48%53%
41%
64%
2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010
ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010
Suicide Attacks1%
Close Range54%
Indirect Fire45%
ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks, 2010
Page 12 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 2 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — P e r P r o v i n c e
PROVINCE 2009 2010 % ChangeSAR‐E PUL 23 81 252%
GHAZNI 461 1540 234%
PAKTYA 180 491 173%
PAKTIKA 379 897 137%
HELMAND 620 1387 124%
BAGHLAN 101 222 120%
TAKHAR 65 140 115%
FARYAB 137 293 114%
SAMANGAN 10 21 110%
BALKH 88 182 107%
KHOST 478 906 90%
URUZGAN 196 356 82%
NANGARHAR 295 504 71%
PARWAN 52 83 60%
FARAH 162 256 58%
JAWZJAN 48 74 54%
BADGHIS 239 356 49%
LOGAR 188 263 40%
ZABUL 259 353 36%
LAGHMAN 149 195 31%
WARDAK 414 511 23%
KUNDUZ 292 355 22%
DAYKUNDI 19 23 21%
KANDAHAR 970 1162 20%
HERAT 227 254 12%
KUNAR 1318 1457 11%
KAPISA 116 126 9%
GHOR 83 84 1%
KABUL 177 146 ‐18%
BADAKHSHAN 43 35 ‐19%
NIMROZ 135 108 ‐20%
NURISTAN 85 64 ‐25%
BAMYAN 22 4 ‐82%
ABOVE AVER
AGE GROWTH
AVER
AGE GROWTH
DECLINE
ANSO: AOG Attacks Per Province, 2009 to 2010 comparison and % of change.
This table provides raw AOG attack rate data per province for 2009 and 2010, plus the percentage growth
rate, per province. The average referred to is the 64% overall growth rate countrywide. Notable is that of the
10 provinces in RC‐North six of them saw above average growth from 107%‐252%. As a bloc, the provinces of
P2K (Paktya, Paktika & Khost) plus Ghazni saw the sharpest deterioration with an average 158% increase of
attacks across all four. Only five provinces saw less violence than last year with one being the capitol.
Page 13 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 3 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — I n s e c u r i t y R a t i n g
The most important and notable trend of the year was the AOG offensive in the North which concen‐
trated on disrupting main supply routes, killing Government personnel and exploiting ethnic and political
tensions to obtain a foothold. The offensive was initiated in early February from strongholds in Dahana‐i‐
Ghuri and Baghlan‐i‐Jadid but soon spread to encompass large areas of Kunduz, Takhar and even Badak‐
shan. Today Kunduz district is the focus of the most sustained attacks. On the western flank, AOG devel‐
oped an impressive campaign in Faryab which by now has established resilient pockets in Jawzjan and Sar
‐E Pul. In the East Paktya, Paktika & Khost dramatically destabilized with two of the three seeing triple
digit growth rates. The reported relocation of the Haqqani headquarters from Waziristan to Kurram no
doubt supporting this trend. Ghazni surprised by surpassing Helmand, Kandahar and Kunar in attack
rates, the majority of which occurred in just two districts Andar and Ghazni. This will be critically con‐
tested terrain in 2011. No surprises in the South as AOG put up a respectable resistance to the enhanced
US pressure, doubling the attack rate in Helmand although mostly in the form of victim operated IEDs. In
the West displaced AOG turned up in Farah and Ghor bringing instability, particularly to Pasaband and
Taywara in the latter province. Going in to 2011, the AOG position looks strong.
HELMAND 1387NIMROZ 108
KANDAHAR 1162
URUZGAN 356
ZABUL 353
PAKTIKA 897
GHAZNI 1540
FARAH 256
HERAT 254
BADGHIS 356
GHOR 84
DAYKUNDI 23
BAMYAN 4
FARYAB 293
KHOST 906
BADAKSHAN 35
BALKH 182 JAWZJAN 74
SAR‐E‐PUL 81
KUNDUZ 355 TAKHAR
140
SAMANGAN 21 BAGHLAN 222
WARDAK 511KABUL 146
PARWAN 83
NANGAHAR 504
LAGHMAN 195
KAPISA 126
ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, December 2010(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG
attacks for 2010 indicated in map)
Extremely Insecure
Highly Insecure
Moderately Insecure
Deteriorating
Low Insecurity
Page 14 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 4 C o n f l i c t R e l a t e d F a t a l i t i e s
Conflict related civilian fatalities grew by 18% this year
(above left), to a total of 2,428 persons killed, with 17% caused by IMF and 83% caused by AOG. The lead‐
ing cause of death was roadside IED strikes (below) with 820 people dying this way, 58% of them in the
Southern provinces. This reflects the increased volume of ‘pressure plate’ (VOIED) devices utilized as AOG
sought stand‐off strike capability against overwhelming IMF numbers. The IMF have succeeded in reducing
both the volume and percentage of fatalities caused by them, although IMF airstrikes killed a comparable
number to AOG suicide attacks. Within the security forces*, the ANP still account for the majority of fatali‐
ties (above right) with a roughly 5:1 ratio against ANA/IMF deaths. (*ANSO’s ANSF/IMF fatality figures indicative only)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2008 2009 2010
465 464 401
12901590
2027
ANSO: Conflict related civilian fatalities, by AOG/MF, 2008‐2010
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2009 2010
15471612
ANSO: ANA, ANP, IMF fatalities, 2009 ‐2010
IMF
ANP
ANA
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Roadside IED (AOG)
Ground Op (AOG)
Suicide Attacks (AOG)
Airstrike (IMF)
Ground Op (IMF)
Indirect Fire (AOG)
EOF (IMF)
820
687
230
213
149
98
39
ANSO: Leading causes of civilian collateral fatality, 2010
Page 15 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
REPORT ENDS
For fur ther informat ion
© ANSO, January 2011
This document will be stored in the public domain at www.afgnso.org
It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without permission for non-commercial purposes only and with
written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted elec-tronically a link should be provided to ANSO website
www.afgnso.org
Acronyms:
IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)
AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, Taliban); Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH/HiG), Lashghar-e-Taihba (LeT)
IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)
IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)
IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)
CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)
EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)
SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)