a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
a
Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science Licentiate thesis in Environmental Science
Broadening HorizonsThe FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
ISBN: 978-91-87427-48-0
Broadening Horizons
John Ohlson
Broadening Horizons
The FMECA-NETEP model, offshore wind farms and the permit application process
John Ohlson
Linnæus University
Sweden
2013
LICENTIATE THESIS
ISBN 978-91-87427-48-0
i
Licentiate thesis, 2013
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
Linnæus University
John Ohlson
Kalmar Maritime Academy
Linnæus University
SE-391 82 Kalmar
Sweden
ii
The seas are Europe's lifeblood. Europe's maritime spaces and its coasts are central to its
wellbeing and prosperity – they are Europe's trade routes, climate regulator, sources of food,
energy and resources, and a favoured site for its citizens' residence and recreation … on the
one hand technology and know-how allow us to extract ever more value from the sea … on the
other hand, the cumulated effect of all this activity is leading to conflicts of use and to the
deterioration of the marine environment that everything else depends on.
An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union
iii
Abstract
The permit application process for offshore wind farms (OWF) in Sweden conceivably
requires a comprehensive and transparent complement within risk management. The NETEP
framework (covering risks concerning navigation, economics, technology, environment and
politics), based on a futures planning mechanism (STEEP) has consequently been brought
forward as a structure for the application of FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality
Analysis) methodology to the permit application process of the Swedish offshore wind farm
sector. FMECA, originating from the aeronautical and automobile industries, presents a
systematic method for the prediction of future failure in a product, part or process, to
evaluate the consequences of that failure and to suggest possible measures for its mitigation
or eradication. Its application to attitude and acceptance, safety and environmental effect
remains, however, limited which creates the research gap for this thesis. Three Swedish
offshore wind farm (OWF) projects in the Baltic Sea area (Lillgrund, Taggen and Trolleboda)
were put forward as case studies for use in the evaluation of the proposed FMECA-NETEP
methodology, which was approached in two stages. The first evaluation stage results
showed that the model accommodates the precautionary principle, the consideration of
stakeholder viewpoints, the mitigation of negative effects, the analysis of alternative sites,
the observation of relevant legislation and the utilisation of contemporary research. In the
subsequent stage of evaluation, the factor for incorporation into the adapted model was
intra- and inter-sector cumulative impact. Results showed that positive cumulative impact
cannot be illustrated by the model whereas neutral and negative cumulative impact can.
The model’s added value is that it facilitates decision making by providing a rigorous,
transparent and structured methodology, the holistic approach of which provides a sound
basis for the incorporation of contemporary research.
Keywords
FMECA, cumulative impact, risk, offshore wind farm (OWF)
Photograph on cover page: Taken from Garpens fyrplats, a lighthouse off the coast of Bergkvara, looking south towards the proposed Vattenfall Trolleboda OWF site. Photograph: John Ohlson.
iv
Sammanfattning
Havsbaserad vindkraft och de olika parametrar som påverkar förutsättningarna för hållbara
etableringar ligger till grund för denna studie. Tillämpbarheten hos en riskvärderingsmodell
som ska kunna användas vid beslut om lokalisering av större vindkraftsparker till havs har
utvecklats och utvärderats. Den slutliga modellen framhävar en metodik och struktur som
gör det möjligt att väga in såväl sjöfartssäkerhet som miljömässiga, ekonomiska, tekniska
och politiska faktorer i en kartläggning och helhetsbedömning av de tänkbara riskerna som
finns. Detta kan göra tillståndsprocessen för vindkraftsetableringar till havs mer transparent
och heltäckande, samtidigt som bättre hänsyn kan tas till kumulativa risker än vad som är
vanligt med nuvarande metoder.
Nyckelord
FMECA, kumulativa effekter, risk, havsbaserad vindkraft
v
Contents
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
1.1 STEEP and spatial planning …………………………………………………………………………….……………….1
1.2 NETEP and maritime spatial planning ………………………………………………………….………………….2
1.3 FMEA and FMECA …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..5
1.4 FMECA-NETEP……….…………………………………………………………………………………………………..….11
1.5 Cumulative impact ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..12
1.6 Objective ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……..19
1.7 Outline for the study ………………………………………………………………………………………………….…20
1.7.1 Adoption of the ISO 31000:2009 as a framework ……………………………………………..20
1.7.2 Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Maritime Spatial Planning………………23
1.8 Contemporary research ………………………………………………………………………………………………..26
1.8.1 FMECA …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…26
1.8.2 STEEP ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….28
2. The testing ground…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30
2.1 Sustainable development ……………………………………………………………………………………………..30
2.2 The permit application process offshore in Sweden ……………………………………………………..30
2.3 International legislation of importance for the establishments of OWFs ………………………32
2.4 The territorial sea and legislation …………………………………………………………..…………………….33
2.5 The exclusive economic zone and legislation …………………………………………..……………………40
2.6 Case studies ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….43
2.6.1 Lillgrund ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………46
2.6.2 Trolleboda ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..48
2.6.3 Taggen ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..49
3. Falling in line with the model?..........................................................................................52
3.1 Stage One: Individual NETEP …………………………………………………………………………………………52
3.1.1 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………..………….….52
3.1.1.1 The reference group ………………………………..………………………………………..………52
3.1.1.2 The conduct of the study ……………………………………………………………..…………..53
3.1.2 Results ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….58
3.1.2.1 FMECA analysis by Stage One reference group ………………………………………….58
3.1.2.2 Observations made by the reference group during analysis ……….……………..62
3.1.3 Discussion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..64
3.2 Cumulative impact …………………………………………………………………………………………………….….65
3.3 Stage Two: Group NETEP ………………………………………………………………………………………………66
3.3.1 Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………………………………66
3.3.1.1 The reference group …………………………………………………………………..……………..66
3.3.1.2 The conduct of the study………………………………………………..…………………….……67
3.3.2 Results …………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………70
3.3.2.1 FMECA-NETEP analysis by Stage Two reference group ………………………….…..70
3.3.2.2 Observations made by the reference group during analysis………………….......77
3.3.3 Discussion…………………………………………………………………………………………….…………..78
vi
4. Concluding discussion………………………………………………………………………………….….……….………79
5. Future research……………………………………………………………………………………….………………….……80
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………………………….……82
Reference list……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….83
vii
Abbreviations
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management, used particularly within European Union
institutions, where it is administered by the European Commission’s Directorate
General: Environment. The terminology has become generic for integrated coastal
management issues since its inception in the Woods Hole (USA) Coastal Zone
Workshop 1972. Other variations include ICM (Integrated Coastal Management) and
ICOM (Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management)
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MSP Maritime Spatial Planning, (particularly within renewable energy concerns termed
Marine Spatial Planning). Within the European Union administered by the European
Commission’s Directorate General Mare
NETEP Navigational, economic, technological, environmental and political risk areas
OWE Offshore wind energy
OWF Offshore wind farm(s)
STEEP Social, technical, economic, environmental and political trends that should be borne in
mind when drawing up strategic plans particularly within spatial planning or
marketing. A STEEP analysis is customarily used to predict future conditions based on
present trends. Other variations include PEST or STEP (political, economic, social and
technological) STEEPLE (STEEP with legislative and ethical) and PESTLE (political,
economic, sociological, technological, legal and environmental)
STA The Swedish Transport Agency, (Transportstyrelsen) is a Swedish government agency
that operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and
Communications. It was formed on 1 January 2009 through a merger of several
government agencies, including the Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket),
the government agency which provides shipping lane and navigational routeing
services to the maritime transport sector
SwAM Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management
1
1. Introduction
This thesis concerns evaluation of the FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis),
risk model to areas of application outside its natural sphere. FMECA is a derivative of an
earlier model, FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), which is utilised without criticality
(C), an option which presents a means by which risk levels can be ranked in order of
importance. Whilst the thesis targets FMECA the two methodologies, FMECA and FMEA,
differ only in this regard and notwithstanding the criticality component are regarded as
synonymous. FMECA is adapted for evaluation of the permit application process for offshore
wind farms in Sweden by means of the NETEP framework, derived by the author from an
existing planning tool, STEEP. The combined model FMECA-NETEP can be considered within
a maritime spatial planning (MSP) perspective, an increasingly utilised planning mechanism
which deals with the central management of competition for sea use. The International
Organization for Standardization, International Standard ISO 31000:2009 framework for risk
management and related terminology section ISO Guide 73, 2009 have been applied to the
combined model FMECA-NETEP. American Psychological Association (APA 6th edition)
referencing has been used.
1.1 STEEP and spatial planning
Within planning operations the STEEP model has traditionally been used within trend
forecasting. It is a form of risk perception which looks at trends over given time frames that
could affect a project. It is used by government authorities within regional planning (United
Kingdom Government, 2009) and for noticing trends in consumer behavior and societal
development prior to the potential launch of a new product within marketing, thereby
gauging entrepreneurial opportunities (Ford Motor Company, 2013). As a backboard for
discussion around the five areas of external influence or trends that can have an effect on a
project or organization (social, technological, environmental, economic and political)
variations on its theme include STEEPLE (with legislative and ethical trends also added),
PESTLE (political, economic, sociological, technological, legal, environmental trends) and
STEP or PEST (political, economic, social and technological trends). A modification of the
latter is central to a contemporary marine renewable energy (wave and tidal) risk analysis
study. The consenting procedure is illustrated as a socio-political risk issue, accompanied by
2
finance, technology and grid risks. Event, likelihood of occurrence, potential impact and
possible mitigation strategies are presented as the opposing variables. Krohn et al. (2013)
believes that:
by understanding the risks impacting wave and tidal projects, the industry can work with other
stakeholders to develop viable strategies for overcoming them. Only by engaging with the
challenges together can they be conquered. In short, it is time to get real about risk. (p. 3)
1.2 NETEP and maritime spatial planning
In this thesis a navigation, economics, technology, environment and politics framework,
NETEP, has been adapted from STEEP with the modifications that navigation has substituted
the social issues category, which has been transferred to the politics sector. Here, political
issues are seen to operate as a collective term for developments that affect the citizen.
NETEP differs from STEEP and its counterparts in that potential risk rather than purely trend
is targeted. This however does not represent a given use for land-based spatial planning
methodology to areas within maritime spatial planning (MSP). The conceptual difference
between the two is based on the notion of property ownership and is too pronounced for
direct duplication of methodology from one to the other (Emmelin, 2013). Rather the
navigation (N) component offers an extension of a spatial planning tool (STEEP) to a
proposed maritime spatial planning framework (NETEP). With the perceived potential to
accommodate both air and maritime navigation the importance of its inclusion highlights the
need for cross-sector risk management within the permit application (licensing) procedure.
Contemporary international maritime research mirrors this stand point, Porathe as cited in
ACCSEAS (2013) states that:
(o)ne of the biggest problems is that there is no formal consultation programme with the
transnational shipping community when projects such as offshore wind farms are planned.
There needs to be much stronger collaboration and co-operation between industry
organisations and governmental administrations in order to achieve solutions that reflect the
interests of all parties … greater navigational accuracy from e-Navigation technologies will help
lead to safer seas but this alone cannot remove all risks associated with navigating in the
3
vicinity of offshore wind-farms. Responsible planning that avoids co-locating turbines in areas of
high shipping density is of paramount importance if the risks are to be minimised. (p. 1)
Research presenting a comprehensive analysis of international legislation with relation to
maritime spatial planning has been published in the EU funded SEANERGY 2020 synthesis
report, administered by the European Wind Energy Agency. Attention in the report is drawn
to the relocation of shipping lanes to accommodate increased offshore deployments such as
wind farms and the importance of sufficient analysis methods to accommodate this
situation. Possible negative ecological impacts such as greater fuel consumption and carbon
dioxide emissions are highlighted in this respect (Kreutzkamp, Jacques & Joseph, in European
Wind Energy Agency, 2012, p. 48). Attention to the emerging, interlinking structure of wind
power expansion in symbiosis with other sea uses is seen as a matter of priority. Cameron,
Hekkenberg & Veum (Ibid.) state that:
the cumulative effect of growing sea use and the strain this puts on the maritime ecosystem
also needs to be addressed. The cumulative pressures resulting from uses and how these will
evolve in the future is important, in particular for uses that include large expansion plans, such
as offshore wind energy. (pp. 56-57)
The body of legislation applicable to offshore wind power development spans international,
regional and national spheres. The main areas addressed within the NETEP framework
concern Swedish legislation with reference to international guidelines. This includes, but is
not limited to, the following;
• the Swedish Environmental Code Miljöbalken (1998:808), in particular,
Chapter 6 Environmental Impact Assessment: effects of planned OWF on environment (flora/fauna) and humans,
Chapter 9 Miljöfarlig verksamhet (environmentally hazardous activity) and,
Chapter 11, paragraph 9 Vattenverksamhet (water-based activity) permits applied for from MMD Mark och Miljödomstolen (the Land and Environmental Court) – this made possible by Chapter 21 paragraph 3 of the Swedish Environmental Code;
• the Swedish Environmental Ordinance regarding Environmentally Hazardous Activities and Public Health Förordning om miljöfarlig verksamhet och hälsoskydd (1998:899);
4
• the Planning and Construction Act Plan- och bygglagen, PBL (2010:900), Chapter 3 (Kommunens Översiktsplan) relates to the local authority general plan; also the Planning and Construction Ordinance Plan- och byggförordningen PBF (2011:338) Chapter 2 paragraph 5 relating to significant environmental effects; Chapter 6, paragraph 5, subsection 7 (valid until July 1, 2013 when superceded by subsection 8) in relation to the construction of new or significant alteration of existing wind turbines;
• the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance Förordning om
miljökonsekvensbeskrivningar (1998:905);
• the Electricity Act - Ellagen (1997:857); also the Electromagnetic Compatibility Act - Lag om elektromagnetisk kompatibilitet (1992:1512);
• the Heritage Conservation Act (1988:950) superceded by Lag om ändring i lagen (1988:950) om kulturminnen m.m (2013:548); • the Utility Easements Act Ledningsrättslag (1973:1144) in the drawing of power lines;
• the Protection of Landscape Information Act - Lag om skydd för landskapsinformation (1993.1742) relating to hydrographic surveys;
• Hinders to airborne navigation Transportstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd om markering av byggnader, master och andra föremål (TSFS 2010:155);
• the Maritime Traffic Ordinance Sjötrafikförordningen (1986:300) Chapter 2, paragraph 2 as regards hinders to maritime navigation. Permit allocations are considered by the Swedish Transport Agency after consultation with the Swedish Maritime Administration, also important are Recommendations provided by The International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) regarding the marking procedures for OWFs;
• the Act concerning the Territorial Waters of Sweden Lag om Sveriges Sjöterritorium (1966:374), the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act Lag om Sveriges ekonomiska zon (1992:1140) and Ordinance (1992:1226), and the Act on the Continental Shelf Kontinentalsockellagen (1966:314), and its Ordinance (1966:315) as regards sea bed exploration and the laying of underwater cables.
5
The subject areas of NETEP in this thesis can be broadly introduced as the following:
Navigational – whilst recognising inland waters, civil air navigation and the operations of the
armed forces the thesis concerns maritime navigation, in particular, commercial shipping;
Economic – the micro-economic effect of the OWF (on local industries), the effects of
government offshore wind energy policy on the project itself;
Technological – factors related to the laying of underwater cables, hydrographic surveys,
electromagnetism, the physical make-up of turbines including foundations, wind speed
considerations and related temperature maps, also maintenance considerations including
transport distances and proximity of the electricity network grid;
Environmental – effects on flora and fauna;
Political – public acceptance, consenting procedure, stakeholder participation, matters
relating to areas of historical and cultural importance including marine archaeology, effects
on public safety and the well-being of stakeholders and the public.
1.3 FMEA and FMECA
The development of the two intrinsically linked systems has been approximately parallel, the
delineation between them being use of the criticality mode. Failure Mode, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was developed by the United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) within aeronautical programmes, its use emanating from
military concerns. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has its home in automotive
applications. Whilst standards exist which define FMEA terminology, specify procedures for
performance and describe formats (Reliawind, 2007, p.25), spheres of application for the
two systems cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive.
The United States military has a well-documented use of FMECA. Within reliability studies
the military standard, MIL-STD 785A (1969) was superceded in 1980 by MIL-STD 785B, which
in Task 204 describes the purpose of FMECA as:
6
to identify potential design weaknesses through systematic, documented consideration of the
following: all likely ways in which a component or equipment can fail; causes for each mode;
and the effects of each failure (which may be different for each mission phase). (United States
Government, 1980, 204-1)
An earlier use of FMECA was in the United States Armed Forces military procedures of the
late 1940s as MIL-P-1629, updated in 1974 to a maritime variant, suffixed (SHIPS). As an
indication of the prominence of the 1629 system and to illustrate the connection between it
and MIL-STD-785B, procedure identification is outlined within Task 204 of MIL-STD-785B in
accordance with 1629 methodology (United States Government, 1980, 204-3.1b). MIL-P-
1629 was revised once again in 1980 suffixed A (United States Government, 1980b),
although both standards were subsequently cancelled, MIL-STD-1629A in 1998. Despite this,
MIL-STD-1629A remains on the public domain and can be regarded as one of the blueprints
for further development of FMECA risk methodology.
By the early 1960s, NASA had introduced the risk methodology and was applying it to several
projects including the Apollo in 1966 (see for example Bolt in National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2009), and as the preferred reliability practice for the Viking, Voyager,
Magellan and Galileo projects which spanned from 1975 to 2003 (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2000). As its areas of application broadened, it was introduced into
aircraft engineering in the late sixties as the ARP 926 Fault/Failure Analysis Procedure, which
was upgraded to an A version in 1992 and later to ARP 926B in 1997 (Society of Automotive
Engineers International, 2013).
Within automotive applications, the Society of Automotive Engineers’ recommended
practice version of FMEA, SAE J-1739, was jointly developed by Daimler Chrysler, Ford Motor
Company and General Motors under sponsorship of the United States Council for
Automotive Research (USCAR) in 1994 (FMEA Infocentre, 1997, p. 61). Until 2009 there were
three revisions of the original published in 1994 (Society of Automotive Engineers
International, 2013b). Prior to this, FMEA had established itself as an integral part of Ford
Motor Company’s quality assurance regime by the 1980s, having been introduced as result
of the Ford Pinto project (Lindo, 2013, p.3), as well as a result of the questions raised against
7
risk-benefit analyses in the automobile industry in the 1970s (for example Friedman in
Encyclopedia.com, 2013). Its use by this time had become widespread throughout the USA
and European automotive industries. In the decade that followed, both FMECA and FMEA
were increasingly being used within a range of industries most notably perhaps healthcare,
and today have a broadening spectrum of applicability.
As regards standards outside the realms of the automotive and aeronautics industries,
FMECA plays an integral role in the International Standard Organization ISO 17359:2011
which are general guidelines for the condition monitoring of machines and is the successor
of 17359:2003(E). Procedures for FMEA are also laid out in in the British Standards Institute
BS-EN-60812:2006 relating to analysis techniques for system reliability. CENELEC (the
European Committee for Electro-technical Standardisation) uses the international version,
IEC 60812:2006, which has superseded the British Standard BS 5760-5:1991.
Of significance also is the fact that FMEA exists as one of the seven recommended risk
analysis measures forwarded in the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Guidelines
for Formal Safety Assessment (MSC/Circ. 1023; MEPC/ Circ.392) having been adapted for use
within a range of applications within the maritime industry since its original NASA, military
and industrial backgrounds. The International Marine Contractors’ Association FMEA
Management Guide of 2005 being one such example.
There are different variations of FMEA. System or Concept FMEA (S/C FMEA) is used to
analyse complete systems and sub-systems during the concept of the design stage of a
product. Design FMEA (DFMEA), is used to analyse a product design before it is released to
the manufacturing sector, and lastly Process FMEA (PFMEA) analyses the manufacturing and
assembly process. Another aspect is that of machinery and the MFMEA (see for example
Reliasoft Corporation, 2013). Although these variations exist the methodology remains
similar in all cases. This thesis, as a study of the applicability of FMECA to a permit
application process concerns itself primarily with the design aspects of the FMECA model.
FMECA is used for the analysis of potential failures in a system (failure modes). Its use
enables potential failure modes to be identified based on past history and discussion of
potential problems within a reference team. The acronym is divided into two parts; Failure
Mode which is a mistake, error or defect in a system and the manner in which it occurs, and
8
Criticality and Effects Analysis which is the process by which the consequences of these
failures by expert judgments of the reference team are prioritized and studied. The level of
effect of the consequences (severity) is registered, how frequently related causes of the
failure occur (occurrence) and finally how effective existing control mechanisms are at
detecting the failure modes or causes of them, in classical methodology, before they reach
the customer (detection). The methodology is thereby proactive, and the criticality level
provides a system by which risks can be prioritised, and further evaluation measures
introduced arriving at the second risk priority number.
In line with standards used for FMECA and FMEA analysis, e.g. EN-60812:2006 and MIL–STD–
1629A, there are ten major levels covered in an FMECA operation, for an FMEA version,
criticality is removed.
The major levels of an FMECA operation
1. Review the process
2. Brainstorm potential failure modes
3. List potential effects of failure
4. Assign Severity Rankings (1-10)
5. Assign Occurrence Rankings (1-10)
Criticality S x O (1-10 x 1-10)
6. Assign Detection Rankings (1-10)
7. Calculate the Risk Priority Number – RPN (S x O x D) also written as RPN (1)
8. Develop the Action Plan (Recommended actions)
9. Take action
10. Calculate the resulting RPN (incurs new S x O x D) also written as RPN (2)
9
Results of an FMECA analysis can be documented in spreadsheets as exemplified in Table 1.
Table 1. Spreadsheet depicting the stages of an FMECA analysis to RPN(1) via Steps 1-7 and to the
resulting RPN, RPN(2) via Steps 8-10
Steps 1-7
Steps 8-10
It is evident that a number of potential causes can be derived from the same potential
effects of failure (which, in turn, can be more than one). Each potential cause is designated
an occurrence rating and criticality levels are calculated. A detection rating is designated
according to how well the current process controls (tests, procedures, methods) can detect
either the cause or the potential failure mode.
Item Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
effect(s) of
the failure
Severity
1-10
Potential
cause(s)
of the failure
Occurrence
1-10
CRIT
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
1-10
RPN
Recommended
actions
Responsibility
and target
completion date
Actions
taken
Severity
1-10
Occurrence
1-10
Detection
1-10
Resulting RPN
10
Within the permit application process of an OWF there exist examples that important factors
have been omitted or insufficiently dealt with in permit applications, which have resulted in
a more time-consuming application processes and increased costs. Observance of
insufficiencies within the permit application process can be found in,
• court decisions1;
• government administration investigations (Swedish Energy
Agency, 20122; Swedish Environmental Protection Agency,
2005)3 and;
• government commissioned synthesis research reports4
Furthermore, from an offshore perspective, research within the ACCSEAS and SEANERGY
2020 (European Wind Energy Agency, 2012) projects suggests that greater coordination is
needed between industrial organisations and governmental administrations within OWF
planning. This should be carried out in order to ensure that solutions made are in the
interests of those parties concerned and that OWFs are not planned at locations where
conflicts of interest may occur i.e. heavily trafficked shipping areas, or, if conflicts do exist
they can be mitigated.
1 Examples can be found in the Trolleboda M-2415-06 (see page 48) and Taggen M-695-07 (see page 49) cases and which relate to a number of ‘Conditions to be met’ in each. 2 One of the major causes for the increase in lead times for permit applications, and the resulting revision of the permit application process by the Swedish Energy Agency, is given as the fact that many applications are regarded by the responsible authorities to be of inadequate quality and thereby require supplementation. See reference list: Swedish Energy Agency (2012) and section 3.1.3. in the corresponding report, written in Swedish. 3 Report 5513 describes a methodology for a complement to permit applications that would make more effective the presentation of alternative sites and dialogue with affected parties thereby improving the application process. See reference list: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2005), written in Swedish. 4 In Vindval Report No. 6545 The Effects of Wind Power on Human Interests (Henningsson et al). Recommendations that are put forward on wind power and socio-economy include the development of a general model for rapid follow-ups to ensure that conditions for the establishment of wind farms are complied with. Also mentioned is the need for the development of up-to-date templates in order to reduce the need for applications to be supplemented. In the section regarding knowledge gaps it is put that ``research on positive and negative cumulative effects of a wind farm as a whole should increase´´ (page 138). See reference list: Henningsson et al. (2012).
11
This thesis proposes that the present system of permit application does not encompass a
unified cross-sector analysis of risk and there is a need for a more effective, transparent and
holistic management of risk system within the permit application process. The underlying
query pertains to what extent an inward-looking risk methodology can be turned outwards
towards partly non-technical policy areas accommodated under the NETEP umbrella.
Moreover, FMECA risk methodology is interesting to employ in this regard because if proven
effective as an appropriate form of analysis within NETEP areas it could be considered as a
complementary model for use within the OWF permit application process.
Plausible spheres of use include as,
• an appendix-based supplement to a permit application, addressing the perceived risks
noted in the analyses carried out within applications involved in a planned site location.
Methodology would involve footnoting and coding the risks stated in existing analyses and
then administer an FMECA-NETEP analysis of each coded risk;
• a tool for state spatial planners to specify and quantify the risks involved in the siting of
planned OWFs;
• a means by which cumulative impact can be quantified within each individual NETEP sector
(intra-sector e.g. within navigation) and between sectors (inter-sector e.g. navigational risk
issues lead to environmental cumulative impacts); and,
• as a logical extension of this, between OWF project areas that are in close geographical
proximity of each other, either within boundaries of the same coastal state, or between two
or more coastal states.
Possible use of the model would thereby support governmental targets for the production of
renewable energy whilst simultaneously taking account of stakeholder viewpoints and multi-
sector considerations.
1.4 FMECA-NETEP
As international requirements exist for the production of renewable energy (see for example
the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC), and in conjunction with an emerging drive for
greater maritime collaboration within sea use (maritime spatial planning), pressure is
12
growing to `find the right place´ for offshore developments. Simultaneously, further research
into the communication problems that exist between wind power developers, (the
production logic) stakeholders (the political logic) and government institutions (the
administrative logic) within the application process is called for (Rönnberg, 2006). FMECA is
presented within a NETEP framework as schematically shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. FMECA adapted to NETEP (navigation, economics, technology, environment and politics)
1.5 Cumulative impact
Effects within each individual NETEP area (intra sector) as well as cumulative impact of that
NETEP sector upon another sector (inter sector) are addressed in this section. The term
cumulative impact is principally used to describe the effects of actions upon the
environment, this thesis however offers a broader definition which includes but is not
limited to environmental impact.
FMECA
Navigation
Economics
Technology Environment
Politics
13
Legislation in the form of the National Environmental Policy Act defines cumulative impact
as (United States Government, 1970):
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other action. Cumulative impacts
can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period
of time. (Section 1508.7)
Further analysis of cumulative effects has been addressed in which analysis techniques, tools
(United States Government, 1997, chapter 5, pp. 49-57) as well as a roadmap to incorporate
cumulative effect analysis within environmental impact assessment (Ibid., chapter 1, p. 10)
have been created in response to the legislation.
As regards a European approach, ‘Guidelines for the Assessment of Indirect and Cumulative
Impacts as well as Impact Interactions’ (the Guidelines) was published by the European
Commission DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection) in May 1999. It also
considers cumulative impact within the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process,
provides advice on approaching it at different stages of an EIA and suggests methodology for
the identification and assessment of indirect and cumulative impacts and of impact
interactions. For the purposes of this thesis, these three conditions are presented under the
same umbrella term as cumulative impact since they overlap to such a marked degree.
According to the Guidelines, indirect impacts are impacts on the environment which are not
a direct result of the project and often come as a result of a complex pathway. Cumulative
impacts are seen as results of reasonably foreseeable actions within the project whilst
impact interactions are viewed as reactions between impacts whether within one project or
between other projects in the same area (European Commission DG XI, 1999, p. iii). Despite
the definitions provided in the Guidelines, explanations that attempt to delineate between
the different approaches are problematic, since, as expressed in the literature, ``a key
problem identified in the study was how to define indirect and cumulative impacts and
impact interactions. The definitions of these three types of impact overlap, although there
are no agreed and accepted definitions´´ (Ibid., p. ii).
14
The inclusion of cumulative impacts within an EIA is viewed as a response to legislative
demands, a contribution to sustainable development and an aid to the decision making
process as well as a part of good practice (Ibid., p. 8). The methodology adopted should not
be complex, but should have as an objective the presentation of results that the developer,
the decision-maker and the general public can understand with ease (Ibid., p. 20), indicating
a high level of transparency which indicates openness, accountability and communication.
Four of the eight methods for assessing cumulative impacts according to the Guidelines are
covered by the FMECA-NETEP model, these relate to the construction of an expert team
(expert opinion), the use of checklists, of matrices and the use of models (Ibid., p. vii-x).
Development of various approaches to suit a particular project and the establishment of an
appropriate project team are also mentioned (Ibid., p. iii). Additionally, demands have been
expressed from industry to the government level calling for more international cooperation
towards collaborative planning so that, in particular, wind resources are managed in a
sustainable manner (E.ON, 2011, p. 65; European Wind Energy Agency, 2012), representing a
consideration of the importance of cumulative impact. The understanding of cumulative
impact in this thesis derived from the following sources;
• Guidelines for the Assessment of Indirect and Cumulative Impacts as well as Impact
Interactions. `Guidelines´
• ISO Guide 73:2009 Risk Management – Vocabulary. `Guide 73´
• FMEA/FMECA Standards. `Standards´:
• MIL-STD-1629A
• IEC 60812:2006
Guide 73 accompanies the International Standard ISO 31000:2009 for risk management and
provides the terminology to promote a holistic understanding of risk management concepts
and terminology among different functions, organisations, applications and types (p. viii).
Whilst Guide 73 does not address cumulative impact per se, it defines consequence in
Definition: 3.6.1.3, Note 4 as `` initial consequences that can escalate through knock-on
effects´´ (International Standards Organization Guide 73, 2009, p. 7).
15
As regards the Standards, a strict delineation must be made between the concept of effect
and that of cumulative impact. FMEA or FMECA deals with the effects of a failure mode. The
effect can be grouped under one headline with up to three different stages that constitute
that effect. MIL-STD-1629A (United States Government, 1980b) sees effects in terms of local,
next higher level and end effect (p. 4). Failure effect is the overlying category for the three
underlying classifications (local, next higher and end), and one severity ranking is given for
the entire category: failure effect (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Failure effect and underlying classifications as illustrated in MIL-STD-1629A
Another system of importance is TM 5-698-4 (United States Government, 2006) a technical
manual, issued by the United States Army which, similar to the other standards, addresses
both FMEA and FMECA structures. The FMEA structure as regards failure effects in TM 5-
698-4 is the same as MIL-STD-1629A, (United States Government, 2006, pp. 3-10 – 3-13).
Regarding SAE J-1739, it is silent on the issue of first, intermediate and end effects, and ISO
17359:2011, the relation of which to FMECA is incorporation rather than standardisation,
places FMECA in the monitoring process with no mention of levels of effect.
The international standard IEC 60812:2006 methodology considers events in terms of lower
and higher levels, the effects at a lower level becoming the causes at a higher level. Section
5.2.2.3 Levels of analysis (d) (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006) reads:
In the FMEA, the definitions of failure modes, failure causes and failure effects depend on the
level of analysis and system failure criteria. As the analysis progresses, the failure effects
identified at the lower level may become failure modes at the higher level. The failure modes at
the lower level may become the failure causes at the higher level, and so on. When a system is
broken down into its elements, effects of one or more of the failure mode causes make a failure
mode, which in turn is a cause of the higher level effect, a part failure. Part failure is then the
FAILURE EFFECT
Local - Next higher level - End
16
cause of a module failure (effect), which in itself is a cause of a subsystem failure. The effect of
a cause of one system level thus becomes a cause of another effect at a higher level. (p. 13)
IEC 60812:2006 refers to immediate (local), next higher and final (end) effects, all however
columned under a common title potential effect(s) of failure. Section A.2.3 Worksheet
entries reads:
A concise description of the effects of the failure mode on the item being analysed is entered
under ‘Local effect’. Similar information is entered in the ‘Final effect’ column to indicate the
effects of the failure mode on the end item. For some FMEA analyses it is desirable to evaluate
the failure effect at an intermediate level. In this case the effect on ‘Next higher assembly’ is
entered in an additional column. (Ibid., p. 36)
According to IEC 60812:2006 the severity rating refers to the final effect of a failure mode.
This is evident in the Figure 3 modified for the purposes of this thesis from IEC 60812:2006
(Ibid., p. 19) and presented below. The flow does not depict the criticality component since it
is designed for FMEA use. Emphasis added on points 5 and 6.
17
Figure 3. FMEA Analysis flowchart modified from IEC 60812:2006
Within IEC 60812:2006, FMECA is not considered suitable for cumulative impact calculation,
in section 4.1 it is stated that ``FMEA generally deals with individual failure modes and the
effect of these failures on the system. Each failure mode is treated as independent. The
procedure is therefore unsuitable for consideration of dependent failures resulting from a
sequence of events´´ (Ibid., p. 17). Other sources however may regard FMECA as potentially
capable of adaptation, as there exists, ``no definitive standard, nor is there any reason to
have a standard layout, providing that an organisation adopts a style and applies that style
consistently´´ (Roberts, 2001, p. 7). Within the NETEP framework, intra-sector means
18
cumulative impacts within the same NETEP sector e.g. environment: underwater noise
affects local Herring population which has a cumulative effect on the Cod population. Inter
sector means cumulative impacts across sectors e.g. environment: decrease in Cod
population has negative cumulative impact on economics: commercial fishing production.
This thesis defines cumulative impact as, impacts (both intra- and inter sector) that result
from the end effects of a preceding risk issue. Cumulative impact (intra- or inter) can occur
from one OWF to another. Also, according to the Standards, within the Effect section there
are possibilities to carry out the following functions: have one effect; have one first effect
and one end effect; or, have one first effect followed by one intermediate effect followed by
one end effect. In all cases the severity is rated against the highest or final effect (end
effect). This is evident in Table 2 which illustrates an adaption of two original FMEA
templates which represent FMEA calculations for the same component at different stages in
production. Template 1 (ReliaSoft Corporation, 2013, p. 4) relates to the design stage i.e. a
Design FMEA, Template 2 (ReliaSoft Corporation, 2013b) relates to the production stage i.e.
a Process FMEA. The Potential Failure Mode in Table 2 thereby includes information from
both these levels of production. The FMECA-NETEP model structure in Stage Two of this
thesis is dependent on the potential effect(s) of failure with a marked significance of end
effect.
Table 2. Potential Failure Mode illustrating first, intermediary and end effect with severity ranking.
Potential Failure Mode Potential effect(s) of Failure Severity 1-10
Corroded interior lower door panels (Template 1) Insufficient wax coverage over specified surface (Template 2)
(FIRST) Deteriorated life of door leading to: 7
(INTERMEDIARY) Unsatisfactory appearance due to rust through paint over time.
(END) Impaired function of interior door hardware
19
1.6 Objective
The objective of the study on which this thesis is based is to examine the applicability of the
FMECA-NETEP risk model as a tool for use within the permit application process of OWFs in
Sweden. In this light the study seeks to answer the following questions;
Can FMECA be utilised in each individual NETEP area with reference to the permit
application process for OWFs i.e. is NETEP effective as a framework for FMECA
utilisation? (Stage One)
Can FMECA be utilised in a combined NETEP (reference group) framework with
reference to the permit application process for OWFs i.e. can FMECA accommodate
cumulative impact? (Stage Two)
The study is approached in two stages. Stage One evaluates the applicability of FMECA to
each of the NETEP areas individually. Stage Two draws upon the conclusions made and
extends the study to encompass a reference group approach, in which factors such as
cumulative impact (intra-sector and inter-sector) are examined. To evaluate the applicability
of FMECA-NETEP, case study material is provided regarding the permit application process
for three Swedish OWFs; Lillgrund, Taggen and Trolleboda. Throughout the study, expert
knowledge and opinion is utilised.
20
1.7 Outline for the study In this thesis a number of interlinked concepts are taken into consideration, within which the
FMECA-NETEP model finds its home. The emerging framework for integrated maritime
spatial planning based upon recent developments within the European Union relating to
integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and maritime spatial planning (MSP) is one
issue. Offshore renewable energy is one of many sea uses that compete for the same spatial
area that other uses may require. The role of environmental impact assessments in the
mapping of potential consequences of a project is another sector. Binding spatial planning
and environmental impact assessment together is the ecosystem approach to planning at
sea which takes into account the cumulative impacts that different sectors have upon each
other. Moreover, in order for the FMECA-NETEP risk model to be understandable to the
different approaches to risk management within each of the disciplines of the NETEP sphere
a universal standard, the ISO 31000:2009 risk management system is adopted.
1.7.1 Adoption of the ISO 31000:2009 as a framework
Ohlson (2011) offers a summary of risk approaches based on transparency and the
juxtaposition of a two-way, bottom-up approach to one-way, top-down risk management.
Approaches to risk are analysed in terms of their degrees of openness, which is defined as
the degree of ability of stakeholders to influence decision making. In this light, ``traditional,
technical, engineering or one-way forms of management of risk have a low degree of
openness and democratic, human relations, social science or two-way forms have a high
degree of openness´´ (p. 3). Figure 4 illustrates the relationship of different approaches to
each other and to the concept of transparency (degrees of openness). The term
management of risk is adopted as generic in order to avoid confusion between concepts
used by different fields for different stages in the risk process.
The concept of risk has been described as an awkward kettle of fish characterised by
different approaches with a universal terminology that has usage areas particular to each
field (Ibid., p. 4). This produces a situation whereby ´´risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk
management, risk communication and risk assessment overlap, superimpose and merge
with each other´´ (Ibid.) where the fields meet. Moreover, risk as a concept in itself is not
21
without its ambiguities, an understanding of its very meaning being the subject of much
debate (Frosdick, 1997, p. 165).
Figure 4. Degrees of openness within Management of Risk (Ohlson, 2011)
Relating this notion to the NETEP framework it is apparent that each sector has at least one
risk methodology and related usages of terminology that are particular to it. Within natural
science, the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS) risk assessment
methodology whereby the risk analysis process is divided into three stages; risk assessment,
risk communication and risk management is used (see e.g. Filipsson, 2009, p. 11), whereas
an environmental science risk study must exhibit the interplay between society and the
environment. Lundqvist (2005, pp. 14-18) focuses on the development of a risk assessment
guideline based on environmental impact assessment and highlights subjective and objective
views within the social science view of risk. Frosdick (1997), examines the meaning of risk
analysis, proposing a definition of it that encompasses risk identification, risk estimation and
risk evaluation and highlighting the range of approaches within the different levels drawn
from engineering, economics, behavioural science and politics (democratic and participative
techniques). A division is also drawn between between individual and societal risk.
Degrees of openness within the Management of Risk
Traditional Public involvement Stakeholder involvement
One-way Two-way Multi-level
Top down Bottom up Multi-level
Engineering Human relations
Natural science Social science
Technical Socio-political
Expert input Amateur input
Dissemination Audience orientated dissemination Dialogue
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
22
Risk itself can be categorised into different camps, creating a spectrum of what might
tentatively be termed risk ideology. Ekwall (2011), offers a view of risk proposing two
different approaches, that of engineering and human relations. The engineering risk
approach brackets risk as definite units, objectively measured and independent from societal
influences, technical factors are central whereby any management of the physical causes of
accidents (failure) is to the end of overriding the human factor. The human approach regards
risk as culturally based, manageable by dialogue and experience and thereby essentially
constructivist. Other distinctions delineate between engineering and social science
approaches to risk (Frosdick, 1997, p. 166). Technical and democratic schools have also been
documented within risk communication, drawing a parallel with one-way (dissemination)
and two-way (collaboration) communication (Hayenhjelm, 2006, p. 2). Discipline-specific,
juxtaposing understandings of and definitions for the various stages of the risk process
would lead to incongruence within the multi-disciplinary NETEP environment. It is for this
reason and in the interests of clarity and uniformity that ISO 31000:2009 has been adopted.
It is used to cover the use of risk terminology throughout the NETEP spectrum, providing a
generic approach. Its advantage is that it is not specific to any industry, sector or enterprise,
whether association, group or individual and is applicable to the life cycle of the organisation
as well as a wide range of activities, including projects (International Standards Organization,
p. v).
Central to the understanding of risk is the concept of hazard which is generally accepted as a
condition or situation which has the potential to cause harm to enterprises, property, human
safety or the environment (United Kingdom Government, 2001, p.16). The notion of harm
itself however is more elusive in the literature. Guide 73, provides the same definition of
hazard as a source of potential harm whilst harm is left undefined. According to the World
Health Organization’s International Programme on Chemical Safety - IPCS risk assessment
terminology harm is defined as a simplified term for adverse effect, (World Health
Organization, 2004, p.27) although ´´in view of the numerous general language connotations
for the word, it was proposed that it be deleted from the final (terminology) list´´ (Ibid.).
Reverting to a more generic source, the Oxford English Dictionary refers to harm as physical
injury and material damage as well as potential or actual ill effects or danger. For the
23
purposes of this thesis harm is be defined as adverse effect(s) and a hazardous condition can
be defined as a source of potential harm (adverse effects).
Within FMECA-NETEP, failure is defined as an issue that could cause harm (adverse effects).
Whilst uncertainty is dealt with as an overriding factor and a detailed analysis of it per se is
not approached, this thesis follows the Guide 73 definition of risk as the effect of uncertainty
on objectives (International Standards Organization, 2009b, p.1). The understanding of it is
epistemic as opposed to stochastic (variability) and is in line with the ISO definition
``uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding
or knowledge of, an event, its consequences, or likelihood´´ (Ibid., p. 2).
1.7.2. Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Maritime Spatial Planning
According to Ehler (2011) the emergence of ICZM (Integrated Coastal Zone Management)
and MSP (Maritime Spatial Planning) as separate concepts can be traced to the (US) Coastal
Zone Management Act (1972) after which the definition of coast as the interim area
between land and sea was generally accepted. The development of ICZM was affected by
the three nautical mile territorial seas of the USA at that time limiting sea use influence,
along with delegation of power to federal states thereby negating any central control over
sea use. The concentration of personnel trained within terrestrial planning and operative
within ICZM issues increased the land-based stance of ICZM, which was followed
internationally. In this void MSP began to develop separately and was more connected with
sea use issues. Added to this conceptual divide both ICZM and MSP are affected by a
duplication of terminology and the scope of MSP has not yet been clearly defined (Douvere,
2008). ICZM has a number of variations afforded to it (see Abbreviations) and MSP has both
a marine and maritime spatial planning identity. Maritime Spatial Planning is the term used
mainly within European level institutions, and the term preferred in this study, whilst
internationally marine spatial planning has become the term of art. Both terms however
refer to the same concept. Central to both ICZM and MSP is the ecosystem approach (ibid.).
McLeod et al., (2005) illustrates the interplay between the sectors inherent in its
management:
24
The goal of ecosystem-based management is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive
and resilient condition so that it can provide the services humans want and need. Ecosystem-
based management differs from current approaches that usually focus on a single species,
sector, activity or concern; it considers the cumulative impacts of different sectors. Specifically,
ecosystem-based management … integrates ecological, social, economic, and institutional
perspectives, recognizing their strong interdependences. (p. 1)
Maes (2008) writes that the increased prominence of fixed uses of the sea such as offshore
wind energy are gaining ground on the more traditional mobile activities such as shipping
and commercial fishing in terms of sea use. This along with the will and need to safeguard
the natural environment by the creation of marine protected areas as well a general regard
for the environment via nature conservation requirements creates a conflict of interests, and
MSP is regarded as an appropriate process and instrument to avoid user conflicts (p. 797), a
point introduced by the same author in relation to an earlier study on the Belgian territorial
sea (Maes, 2007, p. 185).
MSP is the mechanism by which the interests of actors involved in both sea use and
protection are consolidated and formed into decisions pinpointing those interests that take
priority in any given area. Its role is to a great extent mediatory since ``many interests are in
fact shared, such as in shipping, fishing, wind energy, tourism, defense, and material
extraction. The purpose of marine spatial planning is to prevent conflicts between various
interests and assist in solving conflicts that do occur´´ (Swedish Agency for Marine and Water
Management, 2011). Figure 5 illustrates the vertical competing actors involved in the
maritime arena, whereby decisions are reached through a process of discussion at the MSP
level.
In the case of Sweden the authority charged with coordinating the MSP task, in conjunction
with other governmental agencies and industry, is the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water
Management (SwAM), formed in 2010. It is presently involved in cooperation with Sweden’s
coastal municipalities and county administration boards with influence from environmental
NGOs and the public within maritime spatial planning issues in preparation for new EU
25
legislation regarding MSP (Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, 2012). Due
in late 2013 it is not yet known whether this is likely to take the form of a directive or
guidelines. Contemporary research (European Wind Energy Agency, 2012) however suggests
that the framework for European MSP should follow the same structure (constructed around
the European sea basins), as that for the Water Framework Directive regardless of its
legislative status. This opinion is shared in Sweden (Emmelin, 2013, Time: 13:23). Importance
is also placed on the role of trans-border MSP and a common framework for permitting
procedures as reflected upon in the SEANERGY 2020 project, (European Wind Energy
Agency, 2012, p. 4):
as highlighted by the project, panelists agreed on the need of regional cooperation to strengthen the
deployment of offshore renewables and to better coordinate with all other sea users. All stakeholders
agreed that they should be involved in the planning from the very beginning in order to avoid possible
conflicts. Moreover, it is necessary to spread consultation also with stakeholders in neighbour countries
who are using the same sea space. In order to reinforce international collaboration, it is first necessary
that Member States have put into place a national MSP, and it would be better to have a common
framework concerning permitting procedure.
The emerging framework of integrated MSP, the importance of the consideration of
cumulative impacts both within an OWF and between accumulated OWFs in the same
proximity, the ecosystem approach and a general risk management framework within which
different sectors can communicate are then the main concepts from which the present study
can be approached.
26
Figure 5. Decision making within the integrated maritime spatial planning system. Ehler (2011).
1.8 Contemporary research
1.8.1 FMECA
As regards FMECA and its use within the wind power industry, research has largely
concentrated on the application of the risk model to wind turbine reliability (Klein and Lalli
1990; Tavner et al., 2010; Das et al., 2011; Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al, 2010). Likewise, EU
synthesis reports indicate FMEA as a valuable tool within turbine reliability methodology
(Reliawind, 2007), and although the performance of an FMEA has a tendency to be tedious
and time-consuming, if a customised failure modes library could be constructed for the wind
turbine industry, future overall costs could be reduced (Reliawind, 2007b, p. 25). Greiner and
Seifert (2010) conclude the FMECA method is presently underutilised in the wind power
industry during the ``design, planning, construction, operation, and maintenance of wind
turbines and farms´´ (p. 86). Turbine maintenance (Rademakers & Brahm, 2001) is also
addressed. Also studied is the utilisation of FMEA to reveal potential failure components to
be targeted for reliability-centred maintenance (Fischer et al, 2011) using Elforsk failure data
for Swedish turbines from 1989-1995 (Fischer et al, 2012).
On the internal mechanism of the FMECA, research has concentrated on the relevance and
accuracy of the severity, occurrence and detection (SOD) 1-10 delineations. Wheeler, (2011)
27
advocates a 1-5 scale with representation of the SOD values in the form of S= 5, O= 4 and D=
3 which could then be compared to S= 4, O= 5 and D=3; the severity and occurrence values
thereby opening up discussion within the FMECA team. The weighting of SOD values in order
to increase validity has also been studied (Vallee in Wheeler, 2011), whereby 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
delineations are suggested.
Another area of research has been the risk priority number (RPN) and its potential
representation in monetary terms. Life Cycle Cost has been linked to FMEA whereby
incurred financial costs replace ranking scales, in this way FMEA is used to designate the
estimated cost of failures (Rhee and Ishii, 2003). Additionally, Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor
(2011) have found that risk-based FMEA can illustrate the cost of individual failures to the
total failure cost thereby providing the wind turbine owner with a suitable approach to
reduce the total failure cost. Moreover, a frequent observation is that an FMEA, whilst a
sound basis for fault management, is not enough in itself (Bidokhti, 2009) and that a number
of design activities are required both prior to and after the FMEA has been completed, the
issue of fault insertion testing (the intentional creation of faults within a system to test that
system) being of high importance. Moreover, the FMEA or FMECA system:
must be tailored to the design at hand. It is important to ensure the design team is clear on the
purpose of FMEA. If the team’s desire is to design a solid fault management architecture and
framework, then the content that goes into the FMEA should be mapped to this requirement.
The MIL-STD-1629 can be used as a starting point to create a FMEA template. Most
organizations develop their own FMEA template that is tailored to their specific application and
market requirements. (Ibid., p. 3)
The incorporation of FMEA with other techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Moss
and Kurty, 1983; Yu et al., 2011; Jain et al., 2010) has been advocated, primarily to maximise
the anticipation of as many failure modes as possible. FTA involves the assessment of causes
to a negative (top) event which is displayed in a logical diagram (Lundkvist, 2005, p. 16).
A recent application has been made of FMECA methodology to economic (cost),
environmental and political (local population) areas, on both a short and long term basis,
and within an environmental sphere. An FMECA study of the Giant Mine remediation project
28
in June, 2011 called for by the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board applied
FMECA methodology after an initial Failure Scenario Analysis (FSA), a fault tree mechanism
used to define potential items for FMECA study. The style of the FMECA used presents a
departure from what could be considered the norm in that a detection measurement is not
used and severity is gauged in terms of non-numerical values A-B-C-D-E, ranging from A
being Low and E Critical within Public Safety and Environment issues, and A as < 100,000 and
E > 50 M in terms of cost. These values are decided by means of reference to a risk matrix
format. Occurrence, present in a conventional FMECA, is not present and is measured in
terms of likelihood. It also has a five-point scale ranging in terms of events and years, where
Index 1 represents more than once every five years, 2 once every 15 years up to 5 which
represents once every 1,000 years. Interesting also is that a criticality level is absent
(criticality = severity x occurrence).
Additionally, the three main areas for study (public safety, environment and cost) are
measured within consequence severity rather than as separate items for severity,
occurrence and detection analysis, and the study starts from the component level e.g. drill
holes, Baker Creek channel integrity, and even public safety itself. Finally, as a result of these
factors, no RPNs are produced. The study also assumes that all required permits and other
approvals have been approved (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2011, p. 3).
Despite its departure from conventional FMECA design, the study illustrates that FMECA
applications are possible on an environmental issue affecting economic, political and
environmental areas, and that itemised spreadsheets could function as reference points for
a more detailed, written risk assessment. Also distinguished from FMECA but intrinsic to the
role of the severity rankings, Rechnitzer & Lane (1994) in research focusing on vehicular
safety and occupant injuries show that design changes can reduce injuries due to rollover
incidents.
1.8.2 STEEP
Roadmapping can be defined as a process which provides a method to develop, organise and
present information regarding system requirements and targets that must be satisfied within
given time frames. It involves the identification of areas that need to be developed to meet
those targets and provides the information required for making trade-offs between different
29
alternatives (Garcia & Bray, 1997, p. 12). Furthermore, it is put forward by Phaal et al. (2004)
that:
roadmaps and the roadmapping process can provide a means for enhancing an organization´s
`radar´, in terms of extending planning horizons, together with identifying and assessing
possible threats and opportunities in the business environment. For example, roadmaps can be
used as a means for assessing the impact of potentially disruptive technologies and markets on
business plans and systems. (p. 49)
Research conducted by Carlsson et al. (2008) focuses on a demand profile analysis for
automobile material adapted to the future requirements of society and spans up to twenty
years into the future. Central to the research is the evaluation of roadmapping methodology,
and of importance in this respect is the Foresight Vehicle Technology Roadmap which
measures trends within social, technological, economic, environmental and political (i.e.
STEEP) as well as infrastructural sectors over given time frames spanning twenty years. The
Roadmap initiative represents a collaboration project between UK governmental agencies,
universities and the automobile industry, created as a forum to bring forward sustainable
solutions to road transport challenges. Studies are carried out in different phases; the trends
and drivers section includes the STEEP model framework plus infrastructural issues whilst
the performance measures and targets section includes industry sector issues. Objectives
include the sustainability within the UK road transport network by means of trend
forecasting and the potential realisation of environmental targets within an organisational
structure of industry collaborations, academia and networks (Foresight Vehicle, 2004, p.5).
Other applications of the STEEP model within research are within spatial planning and
sustainability research, notable recent projects include STEEP (2010) involving urban
development, energy concerns and land-use models and STEEP-RES (2009) which targets the
development of sustainable energy systems for increasing welfare.
30
2. The testing ground
2.1 Sustainable development
Concerns related to the effect of greenhouse gases, in particular carbon dioxide, on the
global climate have fueled the promotion and development of renewable energy sources
within Sweden, the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC (RED) playing a major part in
this drive. As part of this movement towards an increase in the production of renewable
energy wind power is playing a major role. From September 2011-2012 Swedish national
annual wind energy production reached 7 terawatt hours (TWh) (Swedish Energy Agency,
2012b), marking an increase in annual wind power generated electricity by approximately a
third compared with the previous year. In May 2013, annual production was over 7.5 TWh
and increasing (Swedish Energy Agency, 2013, p.2). The annual production target for year
2020 is 30 TWh, of which a third, 10 TWh will be generated offshore. On the European
sphere it is predicted that offshore wind could meet 4% of the electricity demand of the
European Union by 2020 and 14% by 2030 (COM 494 final, 2012, p.7). As this drive for an
increase in renewable energy gains momentum, steps are presently being taken by the
government to simplify the permit application process for OWFs.
2.2 The permit application process offshore in Sweden
The permit application process for offshore wind farms in Sweden is categorised by OWFs
within Sweden’s territorial seas (including the large inland lakes) and OWFs planned outside
the territorial seas (abbreviated TS) limit but within Sweden’s exclusive economic zone
(abbreviated EEZ). In this respect the notion of municipal (local authority) consent is a
guiding factor for establishments within the territorial seas. Local authorities have planning
responsibility in this sphere, and according to chapter 16 paragraph 4 of the Environmental
Code permits for OWF construction can only be granted if local authority consent is
provided, unless national interests prevail (in line with chapter 3 paragraph 8 of the same
Code). Due to the complexities of land use, sea use and legislation that binds these together
the process is characterised by overlapping responsibilities and legal requirements which
cover the spectrum of the NETEP framework. Figure 6 illustrates the division of
responsibilities and introduces Sweden’s maritime zones (note that one nautical mile
(abbreviated NM) corresponds to 1.852 km). The figure is a modification of the original
31
produced by SwAM from a maritime spatial planning perspective (reference provided in
Figure 6), the emerging structure of maritime spatial plans as well as the role of local
authorities in the planning process is of significant importance. The Ordinances presented
relate to the management of sea areas and water quality. Generally, these spheres (marked
amber) are in the process of becoming established concepts, not all coastal local authorities
in Sweden have for example yet developed översiktsplan, a general guidance planning
structure which can be used by the local authorities to express a stance on wind farming
within their territorial sea limit. Likewise, the maritime spatial planning structure is presently
being developed. The maritime zones (marked green) are established within Swedish
legislation.
Maritime spatial plan areas in Sweden begin one nautical mile from the baseline and stretch
throughout the territorial seas to the seaward limits of the exclusive economic zone. Within
the territorial seas, the maritime spatial plans overlap the local authority plans. The
continental shelf is also relevant from a maritime spatial planning perspective. As an
extension to Figure 6 below, Sweden’s three maritime spatial plan regions are illustrated in
Figure 11.
32
Figure 6. Swedish maritime zones and planning mechanisms. Modified by author from SwAM. Available in Swedish at: https://www.havochvatten.se/havsplanering/svensk-havsplanering.html.
2.3 International legislation of importance for the establishment of OWFs Legislative zones at sea are governed by the United Nations’ Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which
has been transposed into Swedish law (1966:374). From land, these boundaries are divided
between the baseline, the territorial sea (TS) and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
According to UNCLOS the continental shelf can extend beyond the exclusive economic zone
200 nautical mile limit and into the High Seas. However, in the case of Sweden, and its
particular geography, the EEZ or TS conjoins another state’s EEZ (or TS) by means of
international agreements, although laws regarding the continental shelf must be adhered to.
The territorial sea generally comes under coastal state jurisdiction notwithstanding maritime
law relating to foreign-flagged vessels transiting and operating in this zone on innocent
passage. The EEZ, puts control of the economic resources in this zone, for example oil
reserves, fishing and the establishment of wind farms in the hands of the coastal state.
Regulations regarding the continental shelf must also be abided by since this overlaps the
EEZ. International waters are areas seawards of the territorial sea whilst national waters
Internal
waters
Havsplan – Maritime Spatial Plan
Territorial seas TS Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ Limit with bordering
state EEZ or TS
Havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341)
Marine Strategy Framework Ordinance
Vattenförvaltningsförordningen
(2004:660) The Swedish
Ordinance for Water Management
Kommunal planering Local
authority planning
Continental shelf
Swedish maritime zones and planning mechanisms
Co
astl
ine
Bas
elin
e
1 nautical mile (NM)
equals 1852 metres
12 NM = 22 km 188 NM = 348 km
33
includes sea areas landwards of that boundary. The Swedish concept allmänt vatten (public
waters) is outlined in Act 1950:595 relating to areas bordering areas of private waters and is
manifested in the Swedish Continental Shelf Act (1966:314) via paragraph 1 of that law.
Within the context of offshore wind power and maritime zones the notion of public waters
connects the Continental Shelf Act to areas within the territorial seas. The limit of public
waters begins at least 300 metres from the baseline; if at that point it is not at least 3 metres
deep, private waters (enskilt vatten) extend until the three metre depth range.
2.4 The territorial sea and legislation
Areas within the territorial sea are to be included in the local municipal plan (översiktsplan),
which is central to local authority planning. In order to construct an offshore wind farm
within Sweden’s territorial sea a permit for environmentally hazardous activities (according
to chapter 9 of the Environmental Code) and activities that affect water (chapter 11
paragraph 9 of the Environmental Code) is applied for. Municipal consent, i.e. support from
the local authority also is an important, but not legally binding factor as national interests for
the development of wind energy can overweigh local resistance to wind farm establishment.
The permit for environmentally hazardous activities is ordinarily tried by the land and
environmental courts or alternatively issued by the county administration board
(Länstyrelsen), which operates as the next higher level of government from local authorities
and includes a number of local authorities within its jurisdiction.
When applying for the permit for activities that affect water it is considered most effective
to include the application for chapter 9 directly in the case that will be tried at the
environmental court. This is made possible by chapter 21 paragraph 3 in the Environmental
Code. Planning (construction) permission according to the Planning and Construction Act
(PBL) (2010:900), which entered into force on May 2, 2011, is not required to build an OWF
that has acquired a permit although an application in line with PBL chapter 6 paragraph 5
subsection 7 of the Planning and Construction Ordinance (2011:338) is required regarding
compliance with the detailed plan of the area in question. A permit in line with the Swedish
Continental Shelf Act (1966:314) is also required (Vindlov, 2012b). The process of application
follows the framework as illustrated in Figure 7.
34
Figure 7. The permit application process for offshore wind farms within the TS. Translated by author from Vindlov. Available from: http://www.vindlov.se/sv/Steg-for-steg/Svenskt-vatten/Provningsprocessen/
Regardless of whether the proposed wind farm is planned for the territorial seas or within
the exclusive economic zone at least the following three permits are required: a permit for
environmentally hazardous activities, a permit for activities that affect water and a permit
from the Legal Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet) regarding
disposition (rådighet). The right to disposition in public water (allmänt vatten) is a
prerequisite for obtaining an environmental permit and is linked to the notion of the public
good and of related socio-economic considerations (involving cost-benefit analysis). The
laying of underwater cables in accordance with the Environmental Code is also considered at
this stage.
The consultation stage also involves adherence to the Environmental Code (chapter 6
paragraph 4). At this stage, and as early as possible in the process, the project owner should
submit a consultation briefing to the county administration board and relevant local
authority organs if applicable. This dissemination, which involves a series of reports carried
out on the proposed offshore site relates to its localisation, planning, area, formation,
alternative sites for the site, a zero alternative if the site were not to exist and a non-
technical explanation of these factors well as expected environmental impact (Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency, 2003, pp. 46-47 in Vindlov 2012). This should be made
available to affected parties for example, those living in nearby coastal communities. If the
proposed OWF is considered to have potential to cause significant environmental effects this
consultation process is broadened to include environmental organisations and other
affected actors. The form of this consultation meeting is decided upon by the project owner,
and the viewpoints of affected parties are taken into consideration, recorded and
Permit for
activities that
affect water
Consultation
Permit
application
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
Decision or
Ruling
Local authority (municipal) consent
35
documented in the form of a report. The county administration board provides information
at this stage on the content and scope of the environmental impact assessment, abbreviated
EIA (Vindlov, 2012b).
The influence of the Environmental Code continues through the permit application stage
whereby permit applications are made in line with chapter 11, paragraph 1, which lays out
the content of the application. If the land and environment court regards the application to
be complete and can be used as a basis for further investigation, the case will be tried by the
court, and if an environmental impact assessment has been completed it accompanies the
application. The permit application stage is summarised in Figure 8. Of special interest to
potential use of the FMECA-NETEP model is the role of governmental agencies and boards in
steps 5 and 6.
36
Figure 8. Summarised structure of the permit application stage. Modified and translated by author from Vindlov original. Available in Swedish at: http://www.vindlov.se/Steg-for-steg/Svenskt-vatten/Provningsprocessen/Tillstand-for-vattenverksamhet/Ansokan-om-tillstand/
The next stage in the application process for offshore wind farms within the territorial seas
involves completion of the Environmental Impact Assessment, these requirements of which
can be arranged within an NETEP format as illustrated in summarised form Figure 9. Note
that an additional sector, uniform issues, has been added in order to accommodate areas
within the EIA that cannot otherwise be categorised within any single NETEP sector, the null
hypothesis (noll alternativ) in this section pinpoints the likely consequences if the OWF is not
constructed. Each factor relates to its corresponding sector i.e. shipping involves shipping
routes, maritime safety, maritime traffic and other matters related to Navigational issues.
Summarised structure of the permit application stage
1. The permit application is submitted to the land and environmental court (´the court´), a fee is set.
2. The court demands any additional information required to be presented (incomplete application).
3. The court makes public the application Notice and the EIA (MKB miljökonsekvensbeskrivning) in the local
press, a copy of the Notice is sent to parties affected by the application.
4. The court appoints a dossier manager.
5. A copy of the application and the Notice is sent to the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the Legal,
Financial and Administrative Services Agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the commercial
fishing unit within SwAM (formerly Fiskeriverket), the county administration board concerned, the local
authority environmental committee(s), the local authority (-ies) as well as any other government agency
affected (e.g. Swedish Maritime Agency).
6. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency, the
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) if required provide standpoints as regards protection of the
environment or other public interests.
7. Any objections to the application are forwarded to the project owner.
8. The court, after Notice is given tries the case and the main hearing is held.
9. The court accepts the EIA and the permit application receives its verdict.
10. Time frame for further objections is provided.
11. The verdict is made public.
37
Figure 9. Summary of the main areas to be focused upon in an Environmental Impact Assessment according to chapter 6 of the Environmental Code
In line with chapter 6 paragraph 3 of the Environmental Code the objective of an EIA is to
illustrate the direct and indirect effects of the planned OWF, particularly relating to
Navigational issues
Shipping
Service routes to and from OWF
Civil aviation
The Swedish armed forces
Economic issues
Commercial fishing and aquaculture
Sea bottom characteristics / valuable raw materials
Technological issues
Radio and telecommunications
Transport routes affected on land
Cable laying
Environmental issues
Natural environment
Air and climate
Flora and fauna
Waste products
Shadowing and reflection
Underwater noise
Political issues
Consultation
Cultural heritage
Recreation
The seascape
Uniform issues
Alternative sites and formation
Null hypothesis
Risk avoidance, reduction and mitigation
Non-technical summary
38
structures with significant environmental effects (which OWFs are). Within chapter 6
(paragraph 7, subsection 2) demands for explanations by the project owner as to how
damaging effects (interpreted as risk areas as illustrated in Figure 9) can be avoided, reduced
or mitigated against are laid out, a reference is made back to chapter 5 and the
environmental norms that should be upheld. References to EIA are also present in chapters 9
(environmentally hazardous activities) and 11 (activities that affect water) of the Code.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance (the `EIA Ordinance´)
Miljökonsekvensbeskrivnings Förordningen (1998:905) is adhered to as regards the
consultation process (Vindlov, 2012b). This Ordinance underwent a revision in 2013,
producing Ordinance 2013:505. The revisions mainly concern the chapters of the EIA
Ordinance dealing with international cooperation (the Esbo Convention) and the notification
of significant environmental effects of planned projects.
The consultation process should be carried out in line with chapter 3 of the EIA Ordinance
whereby the project owner shall inform the county administration board, the responsible
authority and other parties likely to be affected by the project. In the case of projects with
significant environmental effects (in effect all OWF projects) the public, local authorities,
state organs, stakeholders and organisations must be consulted. During the consultation
process the county administration board bears responsibility for ensuring that the EIA is
sufficiently hearing. The provision of comprehensive study of alternative sites and
formations is of importance in this regard (Ibid.).
At the decision stage the land and environment court holds a main hearing. OWF rulings
differ from other environmental applications due to the extensive nature and number of the
studies carried out within an OWF permit application. Therefore, complementary material
submitted prior to the main hearing is also considered. The main hearing takes into account
the following issues; the environmental impact assessment, government department reports
and standpoints, the viewpoints of affected parties, the results of investigations and
enquiries, the results of the proposed OWF site investigations and of issues raised in the
main hearing itself (Ibid.). Local authority (municipal) consent is an important, although not
a legally binding factor for applying parties to consider.
39
Of interest to territorial sea placements, the procedure of Swedish permit application has
undergone recent changes. Previously a system of double-testing was applied to applications
whereby they underwent both environmental and construction testing. Since this was
considered to have lengthened the application process unnecessarily a new system was
introduced as of August 1, 2009. Construction testing (Plan och bygglagen 1987:10)
withdrawn if the wind farm was covered by Environmentally Hazardous Activities (according
to chapter 9 of the Environmental Code) and activities that affect water (according to
chapter 11 paragraph 9 of the same Code).
Another change of relevance to offshore wind farms is that Sweden’s five environmental
courts located in Växjö, Vänersborg, Stockholm, Östersund and Umeå changed their
construction and became land and environmental courts on 2 May, 2011. The courts deal
with the earlier courts’ cases, the majority of the property court’s cases and the majority of
cases involving planning and construction. The third significant change to the system came in
June 2012 when the county administration boards’ judging of permit applications involving
environmentally dangerous activities was concentrated to twelve of Sweden’s 21 county
administration boards. Termed the MPD (miljöprövningsdelegationer) in Swedish, this
concentration of environmental testing administration boards (own translation) was also a
step on the way to greater effectiveness (Swedish Energy Agency, 2012, p.17).
As part of the 2009 revision, local authority power of consent was introduced (often termed
the municipal veto) to protect the rights of local populations in view of wind power
development. In territorial sea applications, local authority acceptance should be sought in
accordance with chapter 17, paragraph 6 of the Environmental Code, although permission
can be granted for an OWF within the territorial seas even if local authority acceptance has
not been received, and national interests are considered more important. This is evident in
case M-833-99 Utgrunden, also within a land-based case involving natural conservation
case M-7051-07 Tolvmanstegen. A clear and concise viewpoint from local authorities upon
the question of establishment of wind power farms is nevertheless desirable. Local authority
acceptance would be most likely if the application is in line with local municipal general plan
(översiktsplan) in view of wind power farm localisation. The localisation rule demands that
farms should be located in the least disturbing area for the local population.
40
2.5. The exclusive economic zone and legislation
According to chapter 5 of the Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1992:1140) permission
is required from the government for the commercial use of structures within the exclusive
economic zone, in applying for a permit chapters 2-4 and chapter 5 paragraph 3 as well as
chapter 16 paragraph 5 of the Environmental Code are be adhered to. An environmental
impact assessment in line with chapter 6 of the Code is also demanded. The county
administration board in closest proximity to the planned OWF holds responsibility for the
carrying out of a hearing for an OWF permit application according to chapter 6 of the
1992:1140 Act. A permit according to regulations regarding the Continental Shelf Act
(1966:314) chapter 15 subsection (a) is also required for cable laying and investigation of the
sea floor within the Swedish EEZ (Vindlov, 2012c). Figure 10 summarises the main bodies of
legislation.
41
Figure 10. Main areas of legislation concerning the permit application process for offshore wind farms within the Exclusive Economic Zone.
Swedish Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1992:1140)
Chapter 2. Protection of the marine environment
Chapter 4. Regarding natural resources
Chapter 5 (subsection 3). Government approval for permit (commercial purposes)
Chapter 6. Cross reference to the Environmental Code
Chapter 2. General conditions (location selection, responsibility for environmental damage,
human health and safety);
Chapter 6. Environmental impact assessment. The county administration boards in closest
proximity to the planned OWF bears responsibility for the EIA (relating to procedures,
requirements, plans and planning mechanisms).
Swedish Act on the Continental Shelf (1966:314)
Chapter 2 (a). Cross reference to the Environmental Code
Chapter 4. Conditions of permit issuance. Protection of public interest, health and safety, the
environment, sustainable management of sea uses
Chapter 9. The Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU) (via governmental delegation) monitors the
geological survey
Chapter 15 (a). Government approval required for permit (or governmental delegation to a state
authority)
Swedish Ordinance on the Continental Shelf (1966:315)
Chapter 4. The permit application is submitted to the Swedish Department of Industry
(Regeringskansliet: Näringsdepartementet). Particular requirements demanded.
Chapter 4 (4). Cross reference to the Environmental Code
Chapter 4 (a). Permit according to Act on the Continental Shelf (1966:314) Chapter 15 (a) issued
by the Government.
Chapter 2. General conditions (location selection, responsibility for environmental damage,
human health and safety).
Chapter 2. General conditions (location selection, responsibility for environmental damage,
human health and safety).
42
The Act on the Continental Shelf (1966:314) relates to exploration of the sea bed and the
laying of underwater cables. Governmental permission is required for the laying of cables
outside the territorial seas in accordance with chapter 15 (a) of the Act. Within the EEZ, the
government bears the ultimate responsibility for the issuance of permits for work to be
carried out on the continental shelf (according to chapter 4 of the Ordinance 1966:315),
preparation of the application is however partly delegated to the Geological Survey of
Sweden (SGU). Its powers are two-fold, within public waters and in dealing with sand, gravel
and pebble materials it bears full responsibility for decision-making on the issuance of
permits. Within EEZ continental shelf issues, the SGU carries out the survey and puts
forwards recommendations to the government whereby the final decision on permit
allocation is taken. Demands as regards the Environmental Code in view of environmental
impact assessments (chapter 6) are identical to those of the EEZ.
Protection of the public interest, health and safety, the environment, sustainable
management of sea areas and the maintenance of safety are the keystones of continental
shelf legislation. Particular demands are also laid out in chapter 4 of the Act on the
Continental Shelf. These are, provision of the OWF details; the area involved and the
planned time frame; a project plan; detailed consideration of chapter 2 of the Environmental
Code; measures regarded necessary by the project owner that should be taken in order to
avoid water pollution, disturbance of shipping, commercial fishing as well as other public
and private interests; detailed analysis of the project owners’ economic and technological
competencies required for completion of the project, and, chart work completed in line with
SGU recommendations showing the area to be covered by the planned OWF accompanied
by a written explanation.
References to areas related to the study of risk in legislation covering the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zone are to be found in; the Environmental Code (1998:808) in chapter 6
paragraph 3 (as regards direct and indirect effects of the planned project) and chapter 6
paragraph 7 subsections 2 (as regards damaging effects and avoidance, reduction and
treatment) and 3 (the provision of information regarding the predicted main effects on
humans and the environment) as well as the Act on the Continental Shelf (1966:314) in
chapter 4. In this respect the main objective is the maintenance of good environmental
order (miljökvalitetsnormer) as outlined in chapter 5 of the Environmental Code.
43
2.6 Case studies
To recapitulate on the objective of this study, it is to examine the applicability of the FMECA-
NETEP risk model as a tool for use within the permit application process of OWFs in Sweden.
To this end, three case studies offer a starting point from which the use of the FMECA
system can be evaluated by the reference teams with potential risk concerns within each of
the NETEP areas. Reference can also be made to other cases thought to be directly
applicable. The utility value of the FMECA-NETEP model is thereby evaluated by means of
the permit application process itself whether in the form of study, research or decisions
taken.
In order to afford the study a degree of uniformity the three case studies were chosen due
to the fact that:
• all sites belong to the same parent concern, Vattenfall and
• all sites are located within the territorial seas.
Lillgrund OWF is located is in the Sound, south of the Öresund bridge. The proposed
Trolleboda site is situated in the southern Kalmar Sound Kalmarsund spanning the separate
Torsås and Karlskrona municipalities. The proposed Taggen OWF is located in the Bay of
Hanö within the Kristianstad and Sölvesborg municipalities. Both the Taggen and Trolleboda
developments therefore involve the decision-making mechanisms of two local authorities
and the Lillgrund site lies within the planning jurisdiction of one. The parent company,
Vattenfall AB is a Swedish public limited company wholly owned by the Swedish state.
The Lillgrund OWF consists of 48 turbines and production of energy commenced in
December 2007. The OWF was constructed on commercial property at an investment cost of
approximately SEK 1.8 billion (210,000,000 Euro). As of information presented in 2003, it
produced approximately 0.33 terrawatt (TWh) per annum which is equivalent to household
consumption for approximately 60,000 homes (Vattenfall, 2013c).
The Trolleboda project is wholly owned by Vattenfall AB Nordic Generation, part of Business
Group Vattenfall Scandinavia. In 2005 Vattenfall received permission from the government
for a pilot study of five turbines, the organisation however decided to apply for
approximately thirty turbines in the same area, which was granted in 2008 (Case M-2415-06)
44
with twelve conditions to be met. If the project enters the production stage it will be able to
produce 0.5 terawatt hours per year providing electricity for 100,000 households (Vattenfall,
2013e, p.1).
Originally, Vattenfall AB held full responsibility for the Taggen project to construct a wind
farm in Hanöbukten the Hanö Bay, situated off the south-east coast of Sweden. The project
Taggen vindpark AB (TVAB) is the result of a merger between Vattenfall Vindkraft Taggen AB
(50%) and Hanöbuktens Offshore AB (50%), which itself is a co-operation between the
Triventus and Wallenstam concerns. TVAB wholly owns the electricity (grid) network sector
of the concern TVEAB Taggen Vindpark Elnät AB. The offshore wind farm is expected to
produce 1 TWh per year providing electricity for 200,000 households if production
commences (Taggen vindkraftpark, 2012, p.1). The project involves the placement of sixty
turbines.
In Figure 11, the approximate positions of the three OWFs addressed in the case studies are
given. The three maritime spatial planning areas are also provided. These are, from the
north, the Bothnian Bay administered by Västernorrland County Administration Board, the
Baltic Sea administered by Kalmar Administration Board and the Western Sea (an informal
description of the Skagerrak and Kattegatt) administered by Västra Götaland County
Administration Board. The Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM),
under the auspices of the Ministry of the Environment administers maritime spatial on the
national level whilst the three county administration boards administer on the regional level
(Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, 2013).
45
Figure 11. The Swedish maritime planning area in the Baltic Sea (Havsplanområde Östersjön). Approximate positions of OWFs Trolleboda (black), Taggen (orange) and Lillgrund (red) marked. The limits of the EEZ (ekonomisk zon) marked in blue line. Original chart retrieved from: https://www.havochvatten.se/havsplanering/havsplan-ostersjon.html
46
2.6.1 Lillgrund
As regards risk areas in the Lillgrund project, research both prior to and after construction
concentrated on navigational safety, potential avian mortality, marine flora and fauna,
archaeological conditions and visual effects (with related realty prices) of the OWF on
inhabitants living along the surrounding coastline (Vattenfall, 2013), illustrating the scope of
studies required within the permitting procedure. Within close proximity of the Öresund
bridge that links Sweden with Denmark navigational safety was a major concern at the
feasibility level. Navigational simulation exercises involving the location of wind farms in
Sweden and of the proposed Lillgrund site in particular were first carried out at Kalmar
Maritime Academy (Snöberg, 1998).
Figure 12. Navigational chart depicting the pattern of the Lillgrund site in the Öresund Sound. Courtesy of the Swedish Maritime Administration.
The decision allowing the Lillgrund project to go ahead was taken by the government and
the project received governmental grants in order to promote wind power, via reports which
were to be written in order to facilitate increased investment in wind power projects.
Reports covering subjects involved in the application involve; communication and
acceptance, technical description of the turbines and site, experiences from the construction
47
of the wind farm (offshore cable installation, testing and commissioning of the wind farm),
environmental aspects such as birds in the southern Öresund, marine flora and fauna,
archaeology and visual effects, service and maintenance, production analyses as well as
procurement, financial and legal issues:
Vattenfall AB has received a financial grant from the state for the construction of the Lillgrund
wind farm in Öresund. The overall objective of the support is to promote the development and
to make offshore wind energy more cost-effective. Vattenfall will, therefore, report knowledge
and experience generated from the Lillgrund project. (Vattenfall, 2009, p. 4)
The government was later to introduce a number of research programmes aimed at
increasing knowledge of the effects of wind power (Vindval and Vindforsk, also information
via Vindlov). The Lillgrund project was acquired by Vattenfall AB from Eurowind AB in 2004
(Ibid.) when consultations with the public had already been carried out. The main points in
the permit application process can be summarized as follows:
• in 1997 Örestad Vindkraft AB initiates the project,
• 1998 Eurowind AB submits application to the government;
• on 22nd March 2001 Government diary number: M1998/2620/Na provides the permit
for the construction of an offshore wind farm at Lillgrund in line with Chapter 4, Act
1987:12 on the management of natural resources;
• on 20th December 2002 in case M-416-01, the Environmental Court in Växjö grants
permission for the project to go ahead;
• February 12th, 2004 government’s final decision gives Eurowind AB permission to
initiate construction ;
• in 2004 Vattenfall AB purchases the Lillgrund project from Eurowind AB; and,
• all permits were received in 2005 (Vattenfall, 2008, p. 4)
The project developed throughout the application process not only in terms of ownership
but also within the type of turbines to be used. Initially, in the original permit application, 48
turbines of 1.5 MW were to be stationed in rows, however, due to the lengthy application
process a new model was chosen by Vattenfall, a larger 2.3 MW model, reducing the spacing
between the turbines and increasing the height allowance from 105 to 115 metres above sea
level (ibid., p. 5).
48
2.6.2 Trolleboda
Trolleboda has twelve conditions to be met before construction can commence, according to
the Environmental Court in Växjö, Case M- 2415-06, 17 April, 2008, which illuminates the
highest risk areas of the project. These include cooperation with the Swedish Transport
Agency as regards hinder marking for both maritime and airborne navigation, plans for
decommissioning and restoration of the site and financial guarantees for the same, the OWF
shall be formed in such a manner that the visual effect from Bergkvara hamn (Harbour) and
Kristianopel is of a linear arrangement of turbines thereby minimising visual impact in more
built-up coastal areas, and that sound levels do not exceed 40 dB (A), outside dwellings.
Figure 13. The planned Trolleboda site will be positioned within the shaded area, the horizontal bottom line of which is approximately in line with Kristianopel (marked EL on the chart). Bergkvara Harbour is situated out of picture to the north. Courtesy of the Swedish Maritime Administration.
49
2.6.3 Taggen
The Taggen application received negative comment from a number of government agencies
including the defence forces, national board of fisheries and the national planning and
building board. Sixteen conditions are required to be met in accordance with decision taken
on 10 June 2011, at the Environmental Court in Växjö, case number M-695-07. In summary
these relate in part to competing maritime spatial planning use with the Swedish defence
forces, requirements for guarantees of maritime safety in conjunction with the Swedish
Transport Agency and the visual impact of the OWF on coastal communities.
Figure 14. The chart shows the planned Taggen site south south-west of the Listerlandet headland. Courtesy of the Swedish Maritime Administration.
Of legal relevance here also is that Vattenfall AB and Hanöbuktens Offshore AB originally
submitted separate permit applications to the environmental court within the same area,
Hanöbukten. The applications were dealt with in M-3376-06 as well as M-695-07 mentioned
above. As noted, the two concerns later merged to form TVAB which now adhers to Case M-
695-07. Case M-3376-06 has been revoked. The Blekinge Offshore AB (BOAB) application (in
northern Hanöbukten), was judged along with Taggen in Case M-4234-10 at Växjö
Environmental Court on 5th May 2011. The case referred to Government Bill: prop.
1997/98:45 (page 168) regarding the total effects of the environmental consequence of
Planned establishment
50
BOAB’s proposed OWF. In M-4234-10, the high number of protected bird species in the area,
low levels of research in the effects of combined OWFs of over 150 turbines (BOAB had
applied for 700), an improved environmental impact assessment regarding bats and marine
mammals, a guarantee of financial security for the venture as well as improved research in
safety matters were laid down as conditions to be met.
As can be seen both Taggen and Trolleboda have a number of conditions that are to be met
before construction can go ahead. The application for Taggen offshore wind farm has been
further complicated by the notion apparent in Swedish Bill prop. 1997/98:45 regarding the
total effects of construction on the environment, birds migrating would have to pass two
separate wind farm areas thereby possibly increasing the risk of avian mortality. This
however, must be taken in the context of research within avian mortality/turbine blade
collision and migratory species which is introduced in Vindval Report 6467. Likewise,
Trolleboda is situated in an area of comparatively high density wind farm construction and
the southern Kalmar Sound (Kalmarsund) is considered ideal from a producer’s standpoint
for wind energy, with both Utgrunden I (commissioned) and II (permission authorised) lying
north-east and in relatively close proximity. As regards environmental aspects, Lillgrund can
best be viewed in retrospect, the main report issued on the subject indicating little or no
negative impact on the environment (Vattenfall, 2010). As regards financial considerations,
the main differences between Lillgrund on the one hand and both Taggen and Trolleboda on
the other is that Lillgrund received governmental support to essentially promote wind power
in Sweden.
Arguably, the Lillgrund project came at a time when the Swedish government was
particularly interested in creating a flag ship for renewable energy and related research, and
thereby urged the construction of the wind farm. Connected to this an interesting
relationship between the Swedish executive and judiciary unfolds. The Swedish government
approved of the Lillgrund project in 2001 although the application was not within the system
until late 2002, the Environmental Court dealing with the case in the same manner that was
afforded the construction of the Öresund Bridge (Eurowind, 2004). The Taggen and
Trolleboda projects are still on hold, partly due to the conditions that must be met and partly
because the Swedish market is not considered conducive to profitability. Vattenfall AB has
acquired concerns in the UK (see for example, Vattenfall, 2013b; 2008b) on which it is now
51
partly concentrating its investments whilst Lillgrund came at a time when Vattenfall was
committed to wind power development in Sweden. Reviewing the corporate literature, from
the perspective of Vattenfall AB the Trolleboda project is presently dormant due to
economic considerations;
`Though wind power has no fuel costs, total cost per produced kilowatt hour is high due to significant
investment costs and the need for network capacity investments for new wind farms. Therefore, wind power is
largely dependent on support systems … Vattenfall sees significant growth opportunities within wind power,
though profitability is dependent on support systems …´ (Vattenfall, 2013d)
Taggen however, partly owned by Vattenfall AB announces on its public domain portal
(Taggen vindkraftpark, 2012b) that construction work could ensue in 2014, and no mention
is made of the overriding economic climate. It would seem that the various conditions that
must be met by the project as well as the total effects consideration mentioned above need
to be considered before construction can commence. However, if Trolleboda were to act as
a precedent it would seem that economic conditions must improve before this can be
considered likely.
52
3. Falling in line with the model?
This level of the study evaluates the applicability of the FMECA-NETEP model by use of the
three case studies
3.1 Stage One: Individual NETEP
Objective revisited:
Can FMECA be utilised in each individual NETEP area with reference to the permit
application process for OWFs? i.e. is NETEP effective as a framework for FMECA utilisation?
3.1.1 Methodology
3.1.1.1 The reference group
The following representatives participated in a workshop/interview on FMECA and its
potential use within the different NETEP areas. The workshop/interviews proper
commenced in February and were finalised in September 2012. Names are omitted.
Navigation aspects were dealt with at the Swedish Transport Agency (STA), Norrköping (14 –
1615), Friday 27th January, 2012. Two representatives from the Maritime Department, and
two from the Aviation Department of STA were present at an introduction meeting. Contact
was maintained with the representative responsible for navigational hinder marking in line
with International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
(IALA) Recommendation 0-139, The Agency’s Guidelines for Wind Power Projects and the
Agency’s Recommendations for Hinder Marking from whom a Background for Discussions
booklet was received by e-mail on Wednesday 4th April. The booklet included navigational
charts and potential risk matrices for the three OWFs. A second workshop/interview
(including use of the booklet) was held with the same representative on Wednesday 23rd
May (12-1330) at the Kalmar Conference Centre (Kalmarsalen) during the Swedish National
Wind Conference.
Economics and Technology aspects were considered at Vattenfall AB, Malmö, Thursday 16th
February, 2012 (11-13). The representative was the Senior Project Manager for Vattenfall
Offshore Wind within the Quality and Coordination Department with extensive experience
of wind power developments in Sweden and the UK, and a member of the Reference Group
53
for official reports on Lillgrund working in close co-operation with the Project Manager for
Taggen and Trolleboda.
Economics and Technology aspects were also dealt with at Linnaeus University, Kalmar on
Tuesday 18th September, 2012 (14-16). The representative was the E.ON Regional Manager
for Stakeholder Management and Political Affairs, responsible within this position for the
Kårehamn development, on the east coast of Öland.
Environment aspects were taken into account by a consultant (Energy sector) in Kalmar,
Thursday 24th May, 2012 (1305–1345). The consultant has extensive, and in-depth
experience of wind power development and its effects in Sweden. The representative was
the Programme Officer at the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency until 2012, and held
responsibility for the VKK programme 2001, Vindforsk 2002- 2004 and Vindval until 2012
(see Totalförsvarets förskningsinstitut, 2003; Elforsk, 2008).
Politics aspects were the subject at a meeting at the Swedish Energy Agency, Eskilstuna,
Monday 7th May, 2012 (11-1410). The representative has extensive knowledge of wind
power developments in Sweden and has worked in close co-operation with the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency within Vindval. Presently active as Market Development
Officer (MDO) within the Market Development Department of the Swedish Energy Agency’s
Wind Power Unit. Also present at the workshop/interview for a shorter period due to time
constraints (25 minutes) was a second MDO from the Wind Power Unit.
3.1.1.2 The conduct of the study
The individual workshop/interview for each representative consisted of the following. The
objective of the study was explained, after which the FMECA risk model was introduced by
presenting a detailed explanation of the ten stages of each FMECA study for Stage One of
the study as shown in Figure 15. The application of FMECA to the ISO 31000:2009 risk
management framework as illustrated in Figure 16 was also discussed. Examples were used
from past OWF applications to illustrate the possible use of FMECA within each of the
individual NETEP areas and during the individual workshop/interview observations were
noted of the comments, viewpoints, reflections and actions of each representative. These
observations were later sent to the representatives for verification. The procedure for the s
54
A consultancy team is assembled within the specific NETEP i.e. navigation experts (maritime) or navigation experts (air). As an example Navigation (maritime) can be taken here - N (MAR)
1. Identify the scope of the FMECA. How detailed should the scope of the FMECA be? At this stage the use of relevant flowcharts may be useful to identify the scope.
2. For each item in relation to Site X, the ways in which failure could occur should be listed. Failure is defined as an issue that can cause harm (an adverse effect). These are the potential failure modes.
3. For each failure mode, the potential effects of failure should be listed. Ask the question “What happens when this failure occurs?”
4. The next step is to determine how serious each effect is. This is the severity rating, or SEV (S). Severity is rated on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very low and 10 is dangerously high. Decimals are used – if failure is seen as midway between 5 and 6, 5.5 is the correct failure level. For each failure mode, determine and list all the potential causes using the knowledge and experience of the team.
5. For each cause, determine its occurrence rating, or OCC (O). This rating estimates the probability of failure. Occurrence is rated on a scale from 1 to 10, including decimals where 1 is remote and 10 is very high. On the FMECA table, list the occurrence rating for each cause. Criticality is calculated after the OCC stage. Criticality = SEV x OCC.
6. The detection rating, or DET (D) valuates how well the cause related to its failure mode can be detected. Detection is rated on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that detection is absolutely certain and 10 means any control is almost certain not to detect the problem (or no control exists) – with an extremely remote chance of that occurring. On the FMECA table, list the detection rating for each cause related to its failure mode.
7. Calculate the risk priority number, or RPN, which equals S × O × D. 8. An action plan is developed to as far as possible reduce the potential failure modes. 9. Action plan is carried out. 10. A new S x O x D calculation is calculated. The resulting RPN is compared to the original
for improvement.
Figure 15. The FMECA–NETEP procedure for Stage One of the study
55
Figure 16. FMECA adapted to the ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework
The representatives were then requested to attempt to carry out an FMECA study of at least
one Item of potential risk within each of the case studies making use of ranking criteria
provided in Figure 17 and document the results of their efforts in accordance with the table
shown in Table 3. Each representative was provided with accompanying literature (relevant
case proceedings as well as the modified ranking criteria of FMECA and explanations), a
questionnaire covering potential use of the FMECA and further participation in the study.
Establish the context
Site X for OWF position
Mo
nito
ring an
d review
Co
mm
un
ication
and
con
sultatio
n
Risk assessment
FMECA within each NETEP area
Risk analysis
4. Assign Severity Rankings (1-10)
5. Assign Occurrence Rankings (1-10)
Calculate Criticality S x O (1-100)
6. Assign Detection Rankings (1-10)
7. Calculate RPNs (S x O x D) (1-1000)
Risk evaluation
8. Develop the Action Plan
9. Take action
10. Calculate the resulting RPNs
Risk treatment
Risk identification
1. Review the process
2. Brainstorm potential failure modes. List PFMs
3. List potential effects of failure
56
Figure 17. The ranking criteria utilised in the case study evaluations. Decimal divisions were adopted within rank in Stage One (i.e. 1.0, 1.1, 1.2… 10)
Table 3. The FMECA-NETEP model for Stage One of the study. In the headings of an FMECA spreadsheet RPN means Risk Priority Number; SEV means Severity, OCC means Occurrence and DET means Detection.
NETEP AREAS
Issue/Item in relation to the site
Potential failure mode PFM
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause of the faiilure
OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Steps 1-10
Planned actions Action taken SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
Steps 11-16
57
In this stage of the study the following procedure applies (here, use of the present tenses is
prevalent); for each item in relation to Site X, the ways in which failure could occur to that
item or issue should be listed. Failure is defined as an issue that can cause harm (an adverse
effect). These are the potential failure modes (PFM). For each failure mode, the potential
effects of failure should be listed. The question is asked “What happens if this failure
occurs?” The next step is to determine how serious each effect is. This is termed the severity
rating, or SEV also S. Severity is rated on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very low and 10 is
dangerously high. For each failure mode, and particular to Stage One, the expert is asked to
determine and list just one potential cause as to why or how that failure mode can occur
although more than one cause is generally regarded as common practice within FMECA. For
the cause, an occurrence rating, (or OCC, also O) is determined. This rating estimates the
probability of failure. Occurrence is rated on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is remote and 10
is very high. On the FMECA table, the occurrence rating for the cause is entered.
The next stage is the criticality level, C, and is a result of severity multiplied by occurrence. It
provides a means by which perceived higher risks can be targeted before the detection
stage. The detection rating, (DET or D) evaluates how well the cause and related failure
mode can be detected, with respect to current control mechanisms, if they exist and if
legally accessible i.e. how well the control systems enable detection of cause or failure
mode. In this stage of the study, although a topic for discussion, it was decided that the
notion of current control mechanisms would not be presented in a column. Detection is
rated on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that detection is absolutely certain and 10
means possibility to detect the problem is extremely remote. Figure 18 summarises the
relationship between severity, occurrence and detection factors and stages of analysis.
Figure 18. Severity, occurrence and detection and related analysis stages
Particular to Stage One is that decimal gradations are used for the severity, occurrence and
detection levels – if failure is seen as midway between 5 and 6, then 5.5 could be regarded
as the correct failure level. The risk priority number, or RPN, is the figure that is used to
58
compare different Issues or Items in relation to the site. A high RPN on Item X would be
considered more important, a higher risk, than a lower RPN for Item Y. It is calculated by
multiplying S × O × D (severity x occurrence x detection). After this first RPN an action plan is
developed to as far as possible reduce the highest RPNs (risk priority numbers) of the highest
risk PFMs (potential failure modes). Once action has been planned and undertaken a new
RPN is calculated (S x O x D) and the resulting RPN is compared to the original RPN for
improvement. The ranking criteria for severity, occurrence and detection scales (shown in
figure 16) are designed for potential use within the range of NETEP areas.
3.1.2 Results
3.1.2.1 FMECA-NETEP analysis by Stage One reference group
Table 4 shows a summary of FMECA actions that were possible to fulfill within the NETEP
system using the same FMECA-NETEP table structure as that used in the individual NETEP
studies. For each column a figure is presented within each NETEP area and within each case
(LIL means Lillgrund, TAG means Taggen, TRO means Trolleboda). This figure represents the
number of occasions that the various stages of FMECA (from Item in relation to the site to
Resulting RPN) were completed within each NETEP area and within each case study
(Lillgrund, Taggen and Trolleboda). The figure 0 means that no FMECA action was made, 1
means that one FMECA action was made related to the issue considered, 2 means that
FMECA actions were made related to the two issues considered and 3 means that FMECA
actions were made related to the three issues considered.
59
Table 4. Summary of FMECA actions that were possible to fulfill within NETEP. LIL means Lillgrund; TAG means Taggen, TRO means Trolleboda. In Economics and Technical NETEP areas: E denotes E.ON AB and V denotes Vattenfall AB., each covered both Technological and Economic sectors
NETEP AREAS Issue/Item in relation to the site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause of the failure
OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1 Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
NAV LIL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
NAV TAG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NAV TRO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ECO LIL E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 E2 V3 ECO TAG E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 ECO TRO E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3 E1 V3
TEC LIL E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3
TEC TAG E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 TEC TRO E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3 E0 V3
ENV LIL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
ENV TAG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
ENV TRO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
POL LIL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
POL TAG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
POL TRO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Within the NETEP area Politics for Lillgrund and for Taggen, no second RPN value was
obtained as a result although a value for the first RPN was given. Time constraints may have
played a role in the omission.
An FMECA analysis was possible to fulfill in at least one case study within all NETEP areas. In
two thirds of the cases a second RPN value was reported. Some selected results for each
NETEP area are provided in Tables 5 – 10.
60
Table 5. Navigation
NAV
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL OWF site adjacent fairway 202
Risk: allision with OWF with one bridge officer on watch
Fatal injury
9.7 Fatigue 5.5 53.3 4 213.2 Increase bridge watch passing OWF. Increase rest periods. OWF site in shallow waters.
Increased bridge watch (2-3 officers)
9.7 3 2 58.2
TAG OWF site adjacent fairway 245
As above
As above
9.7 Fatigue 5 48.5 4 194 As above As above
9.7 3 2 58.2
TRO OWF site adjacent fairway 301B
As above
As above
9.7 Fatigue 5 48.5 4 194 As Above
As Above
9.7 3 2 58.2
Table 6. Economics
ECO V-fall
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL Landfall Nearest landfall Bunkeflo not possible
Longer off/onshore cables required
6 Increased costs
6 36 2 72 Clarify Bunkeflo cable landfall
Desk top study
6 6 2 72
TAG Foundations Unforeseen geotechnical conditions
Drilling required
8 Increased costs
6 48 2 96 Geotechnical studies
Geophysical studies
8 3 2 48
TRO Boat docking areas
Docking areas damaged due to ice
Landings need to be replaced
6 Increased costs
6 36 2 72 Statistical analysis of met ocean
None 8 4 2 64
Table 7. Economics / Technology
ECO/ TECH E ON
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL Gearbox Renewed twice within 25 years
Invest- ment 100% increase
5 Gearbox – no guarantee of life length
3 15 6 90 Increase mainten-ance operations
More engineers on site
5 2 3 30
TAG Cable Corrosion due to contact with salt water
Product-ion stop
8 Effect of salinity on cable
2 16 7 112 Divers on site for mainten-ance and checking operations. Also, a self-control on the cable (mantel checks)
- 8 2 3 48
TRO Wind strength
East coast prevailing winds not reliable and steady
Wind speed major effect. 1 m/s in 10 years. Wind speed in 20-24 years?
7 Climate change
3 21 3 63 Alternative site further out at sea would provide less turbulence.
- 6 3 3 54
61
Table 8. Technology
TECH V-fall
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL Wind speed
Production is overestimated
Less production
8 Reduced revenue
7 56 3 168 Detailed climate analysis. Met mast
Preliminary climate estimate; onshore data
8 4 3 96
TAG Met ocean conditions
Overestimated availability
More down time
7 Reduced production/ revenue
7 49 3 147 As Above
Preliminary climate estimate
7 4 3 84
TRO Met ocean conditions
Weather delays during installation
Longer installation
7 Increased costs
7 49 3 147 As Above
Preliminary climate estimate
7 3 3 63
TECH E.ON
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL REGARDED UNNECESSARY (TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS ARE INCORPORATED IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS)
TAG
TRO
Table 9. Environment
ENV
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL Pygmy bat population
Collision with turbine rotor blades
Decrease in pygmy bat population
7 Turbine rotor blades operational simultaneously with bat flight
6 42 7 294 Install bat mode
- 7 1 7 49
TAG Herring population
Herring species stops spawning due to disturbance from OWF
Fishermen’s incomes decrease
8 Noise emanating from the turbine foundations
8 64 3 192 Reduce turbines installed at OWF
- 6 6 4 48
TRO Migratory birds – migration path
Migratory birds collide with turbine rotor blades
Decrease in those species of migratory birds
5 Collision with operational rotor blades
8 40 5 200 Turbine layout to suit migration routes
- 5 5 5 125
Table 10. Politics
POL
Issue or Item in relation to site
Potential failure mode
Effects of the failure
SEV 1-10
Cause OCC 1-10
CRIT DET 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions
Action taken
SEV
OCC DET RPN 2
LIL Real estate prices
Residential property (real estate) prices in adjacent coastal communities decrease
Reduction in acceptance
6 Attitude that residential property prices will decrease in conjunction with the construction of the OWF
5 30 3 90 Offer subsidized electricity or part ownership -shareholdingof the OWF
- - - - -
TAG Siting and layout of the OWF
OWF has a negative visual effect
Local tourism is negatively affected
7 The attitude that the OWF is experienced as a disturbance by tourists
7 49 3 147 Distribute attitude to wind power studies. Conduct tourist attitude study
- - - - -
TRO OWFs layout
Public concern – no ‘straight lines’ visible from shore
Planned layout decreases accept-ance
5.5 Layout of OWF experienced as visually disturbing (NB: not a NIMBY issue)
5.5 30.25 5 151.25 Re-design OWF layout. New consultation process.
New consult-ation -new layout.
5.3 5.3 5 140.45
62
3.1.2.2 Observations made by the reference group during analysis
All observations that were made during the workshop/interviews were verified by the
representatives. The main issues that were noted are the following;
(i) the ranking criteria functioned adequately; although,
(ii) an observation was made that the decimal divisions in the ranking criteria create more
uncertainty and should therefore not be used (as part of the same observation it was
mentioned that a ranking scale of 1-4 is ordinarily used in risk assessment);
(iii) economic and technical issues could be regarded as one unit;
(iv) a project must be economically/technologically viable to proceed to the application
phase. Economic considerations are vital at the decommissioning stage by means of
guarantees by developers that the area can be restored after 20-25 years;
(v) all risk involves a monetary value, the cost of an adverse effect can therefore be
measured in financial terms; if technical aspects do not function properly this has a direct
effect on the economy of the project;
(vi) within the detection stage, technical issues can be considered within political issues and
overlaps between NETEP areas can therefore exist. Other risk models can be integrated into
the FMECA- NETEP system and likewise;
(vii) contemporary research can be integrated into the model at all S-O-D (severity,
occurrence, detection) stages (e.g. within the environment sector and avian populations – if
an entire species is threatened this results in a high ranking criteria, if local populations are
threatened then a lower ranking criteria for severity can be utilised). Within navigation,
research focusing on fatigue could be utilised at the occurrence level, likewise research on
turbine foundations could be used within the detection phase (relating to underwater sound
and Cod stocks);
(viii) the precautionary principle outlined in the Environmental Code (Chapter 2, paragraph
3), can be utilised within FMECA, whereby if there is any doubt of the level of risk posed to
humans or the environment then the highest risk possible should be considered; and,
63
(ix) RPN 2 could be used for improvements within the confines of a project, whereby new
calculations could be made, allowing for ongoing risk assessment of issues thought to be of
importance, this behoves items with the highest criticality level being given more attention;
(x) the RPNs of alternative sites by the use of different spreadsheets can be compared.
The results from the questionnaire covered functionality, user-friendliness, potential of the
model for use within the permit application process and further participation in the study.
All questionnaires (5) were completed and returned. In response to the question: Can
FMECA-NETEP be considered as a complement to an OWF permit application, 3 of 5
respondents were positive, 1 of 5 respondents was uncertain, and 1 of 5 was negative. The
main comments were that a more concise definition of the different levels of likelihood and
consequence is required and that financial cost should be used as the common denominator
within the ranking criteria 1-10 (where 1 = 10,000 financial units, 2 = 100,000 etc). It was also
noted that the present ranking scale of 1-10 with decimal points (essentially 1-100) is too
broad, implying a more exact analysis than is actually the case (it is evident that the use of
decimal points was not consistent throughout the study). The point was also made that
some risks areas could be measured twice, a navigation risk could for example also be seen
as an environmental risk, the working environment was used as an example. Additionally,
the scope of each NETEP section must be strictly defined, an FMECA study demands strict
definition and planning of each section. Generally, the FMECA was regarded as easy to use.
64
3.1.3. Discussion
The main objective of Stage One of this study was to evaluate, by means of
workshop/interviews and practical application, whether FMECA methodology could be
applied to all NETEP areas. Secondary objectives of the study were to ascertain whether the
FMECA-NETEP model could be considered for use as a complement to OWF permit
applications, this factor measured by the attitudes of the experts. Observations were also
made of the comments and actions made during the workshop/interviews on the possible
use of the FMECA in respective NETEP areas. Stage One thereby covered the applicability of
FMECA by means of practical usage by experts and attitudes on its potential as a
complement to permit applications.
Conclusions regarding economic considerations are that firstly, economics could perform a
role within ranking criteria and secondly, that economics has a possible role as a cumulative
effect without an independent section, thirdly that within guarantees for the
decommissioning phase economics plays a vital role, and that lastly economics and
technology could be considered together as one sector.
The FMECA model’s possible utilisation within the OWF permit application process was
undocumented before the onset of this study, but after Stage One can be considered
possible. Uncertainty could be reduced with a revision of the ranking criteria, a reduction to
a 1-7 or 1-5 scale may prove more effective. Legal demands such as the provision of
alternative sites can also be accommodated, as can reference to contemporary research and
thereby transparency. Other demands such as respect for the precautionary principle can be
integrated into the model. The NETEP system exhibits an interdisciplinary character and
therefore the possible registration of cumulative impact within the model is considered
worthwhile, a further discussion of which is presented below.
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3.2 Cumulative Impact
For transition from Stage One to Stage Two of the study construction of a system capable of
registering cumulative impact within FMECA-NETEP was necessary. To this end, alterations
were made to the existing model framework in line with the results from Stage One of the
study. The prototype FMECA-NETEP was presented to the Stage Two reference group for
analysis (see Table 11). The main modifications were the inclusion of expected cost and of
cumulative impact variables. Note that Effect (which replaces Effects of the Potential Failure)
is set to one stage. Other modifications included the replacement of the terminology for
variable,
• Potential Failure Mode with Risk Issue;
• Effects of the Potential Failure with Effect;
• Cause with CAUSE for CUMULATIVE IMPACT related to RISK ISSUE; and,
• exclusion of the variable: Action taken.
Table 11. The Prototype FMECA-NETEP for evaluation of Cumulative Impact as presented for analysis in Stage Two. This version divides the spreadsheet into three sections.
NETEP Item in relation to the OWF
RISK ISSUE Effect Cumulative impact
Cost A – high E - low
Severity 1-10
CAUSE for CUMULATIVE IMPACT related to RISK ISSUE
Occurrence 1-10
Criticality Present controls Detection 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions Severity 1-10
Occurrence 1-10
Detection 1-10
RPN 2
66
3.3 Stage Two: Group NETEP
Objective revisited:
Can FMECA be utilised in a combined NETEP (team) framework with reference to the permit
application process for OWFs i.e. can FMECA accommodate cumulative impact?
3.3.1 Methodology
3.3.1.1 The reference group
Invitations to participate in the study were distributed to potential reference group NETEP
members at the latest 30 days prior to the arranged date of the workshop. The request
included a brief explanation of the model as well as summaries of court decisions involving
the three case studies Lillgrund, Taggen and Trolleboda. Contact had previously been made
with two of the group members at the CWE 2013 Conference in Stockholm 5-7 February
2013 at which the FMECA-NETEP model was exhibited. CWE 2013 was managed by the
Swedish Energy Agency and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency under the
auspices of Vindval, a government commissioned research network disseminating scientific
knowledge of the effects of wind power impact on humans and the environment.
The following representatives agreed to participate in this stage of the study which was
organised as a workshop on FMECA-NETEP for the evaluation of cumulative impact. The
workshop took place at Kalmar Maritime Academy, Linnaeus University, Kalmar on 21
March, 2013 (1300- 1615).
The expert on Navigation issues was a Senior Research Coordinator from the Research and
Innovation Group, Sjöfartsverket, the Swedish Maritime Administration.
Expert on Economic issues was Enterprise and Business Development Manager at the Wind
Power Unit within Regionförbundet i Kalmarlän, the Regional Council in Kalmar County.
The expert on Politics issues was the same Market Development Officer from the Wind
Power Unit at Energimyndigheten, the Swedish Energy Agency that took part in Stage One of
the study.
67
The Environment issues expert was an Environmental Officer from the Permit Applications
and Regulations Unit, Spatial Planning Division at Naturvårdsverket, the Swedish
Environment Protection Agency. This representative was not able to be present within the
group workshop but was interviewed independently at a later FMECA-NETEP meeting held
at Kalmar Maritime Academy, 3 May 2013 (1000- 1245).
For sake of clarity, the term workshop group is defined as those representatives of the
reference team from the navigation, politics and economics sectors, whilst reference group
refers to all representatives. A specific representative for technical issues was not attainable.
The representatives were chosen for their in-depth and specialised knowledge of offshore
wind power matters ranging from maritime spatial planning, ship traffic management, wind
power permit application procedures, market development and involvement in government
committees on planning within wind power related matters. Names are omitted.
3.3.1.2 The conduct of the study
Navigation simulation of maritime traffic in vicinity of Lillgrund OWF
The workshop group conducted a navigation simulator (Navsim) exercise which involved
observation of maritime traffic movements of vessels in proximity of the Lillgrund OWF. Two
simulators were utilised. Navsim 1 was programmed with restricted visibility conditions
involving heavy precipitation and radar interference. Navsim 2 was programmed with good
visibility conditions. Identical routes for an identical vessel were programmed, the vessel
under main observation was typical for Baltic Sea coastal trade with a level of competency
for command of Deck Officer Class 7 according to IMO (International Maritime Organization)
requirements. The notion of fatigue was introduced as a factor for consideration and the
timeframe for passage of the vessel was set at sunrise.
The objective for this methodology was to observe the divergence in levels of visibility
(including radar interference) of the Lillgrund OWF in the two different conditions simulated.
Other important variables included the type of vessel, the level of competence required for
command of the vessel type, potential levels of fatigue of bridge watching personnel
apparent in the command of the type of vessel, interaction with other vessels in vicinity of
the Lillgrund OWF including the action of a rogue vessel involved in a crossing situation
68
forward of the target vessel in contradiction of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs).
The navigation simulator exercise was designed and administered in collaboration with a
Navigation lecturer at Kalmar Maritime Academy in capacity as Master Mariner/navigation
simulator instructor. The workshop group was briefed on the exercise, administered
throughout and de-briefed by the lecturer. A research assistant employed at the Academy
was also present for documentation and recording purposes.
Evaluation of the Prototype FMECA-NETEP
The structure of the model and the ranking criteria were explained and the objective of the
exercise defined. The workshop group was tasked with providing ITEMs in relation to the
OWF that could be used to evaluate the model, in particular cumulative impact. Background
reference included but was not restricted to the earlier navigation simulator exercise and
the conditions that were set in court decisions that had been distributed, which were,
• for Lillgrund, Diary number (Dnr) 443-244/2006 Ansökan om tillstånd enligt
kontinentalsockellagen för arbeten i samband med uppförandet av en vindkraftpark på
Lillgrund i Öresund Permit application for planning permission according to the Continental
Shelf Act and in connection with the construction of an offshore wind farm at Lillgrund;
• for Taggen, Case M 695-07 Ansökan om tillstånd för att uppföra och driva vindkraftverk i
Hanöbukten i Kristianstad och Sölvesborgs kommuner Permit application for planning
permission in connection with the construction and maintenance of an offshore wind farm in
the Hanö Bay within the Kristianstad and Sölvesborg municipalities;
• for Trolleboda, Case 2415-06 Ansökan om tillstånd enligt miljöbalken att uppföra och driva
en gruppstation för vindkraft m.m. inom det s.k. Trollebodaområdet i Kalmarsund,
Karlskrona kommun, Blekinge län och Torsås kommun Kalmar län Permit application for
planning permission in connection with the construction and maintenance of an offshore
wind farm in the Trolleboda area in the Kalmar Sound within the Karlskrona and Torsås
municipalities.
69
The spreadsheets presented in Tables 13, 14 and 15 were constructed as a result of
workshop operations and of consultation with the reference group. The work was carried
out in two steps. The first step was within the workshop group. This involved analysis of the
prototype and entries being made, input at this level led to construction of the Stage Two
FMECA-NETEP in line with Table 12 and the entries specified as NAV 1 and TEC 1. At this level
colour-coding was used on the prototype and any alterations thought necessary to its
structure were noted. The second step focused on environmental issues and was based on
the Stage Two FMECA-NETEP. It is identified by entries specified in the column NETEP Ref.
No. with the INDIV notation. Colour-coding is used to depict NETEP areas. This occurs both
within the reference number (NETEP Ref. no.) column and prior to the corresponding
cumulative impact (NETEP), see Figure 19.
NETEP area Colour code
navigational aspects
blue
economic aspects
yellow
technical aspects
grey
environmental aspects
green
political aspects
red
Figure 19. Colour-coding for reference number and for cumulative impact.
70
The sequence of analysis from Stage One (Individual FMECA-NETEP) and through Stage Two
(Group FMECA-NETEP) can therefore be summarised as follows;
• Stage One is finalised. Stage Two commences;
• Stage Two: Prototype (Table 11) is constructed based on the results from Stage One;
• workshop group (politics, economics, navigation representatives) analyse the prototype,
suggest possible alterations to its structure and make entries to the model based upon
observations made during the simulator exercise, specialised knowledge and the distributed
case study material;
• the prototype is altered in line with workshop group analysis and views of the author. The
Stage Two FMECA-NETEP in line with Table 12 is constructed;
• the Stage Two FMECA-NETEP is used for analysis (regarding both structure of the model
itself as well as providing input) by the environment representative;
• entries on Stage Two FMECA-NETEP, based upon work within the reference group
(navigation, economics, environment, politics) including modifications by author are made;
• the finalised Tables 13, 14 and 15 are distributed to the reference group for approval, tacit
acceptance is highlighted with a deadline set;
• approval is assumed.
3.3.2. Results
3.3.2.1 FMECA-NETEP analysis by the Stage Two reference group
Based upon suggested alterations and entries made by the reference group to the prototype
spreadsheet and observations made during analysis, the FMECA-NETEP spreadsheets,
divided into short (construction phase), middle (production phase) and long term
(decommissioning phase) sections were constructed. The spreadsheets were distributed to
the reference group. All representatives (4/4) concurred with the information presented on
the basis of tacit agreement i.e. a deadline was set for any alterations to be made. No
alterations were suggested. The final spreadsheet layout – the Stage Two FMECA-NETEP is
presented in Table 12 in four sections. The workshop group concentrated on the design of
71
the prototype and issues depicted by NAV 1 and TEC 1. The environment representative was
tasked with making any necessary alterations to the Stage Two FMECA-NETEP structure and
made environmental entries, which underwent modification by the author, in line with TEC 1
INDIV.
Table 12. Layout of the Stage Two FMECA-NETEP model after revision in line with Stage Two (workshop group) suggested alterations, spreadsheet entries and observations. This version divides the FMECA spread into four sections.
NETEP Reference no.
ITEM in relation to the OWF
RISK ISSUE in relation to the OWF
First Effect Intermediary Effect
End Effect
NETEP Cumulative impact Cost A –high E–low Severity 1-10
CAUSE for Cumulative Impact related to RISK ISSUE
Occurrence 1-10
Criticality Present Controls Detection 1-10
RPN 1
Planned actions SEV 1-10 OCC 1-10 DET 1-10 RPN 2
The spreadsheets depicting short term/construction phase (ST), medium term/operational
phase (MT) and long term/decommissioning phase (LT) are provided overleaf.
72
Table 13. Construction phase entries upon which the Stage Two reference group concurred
NET
EP
Re
f.
no
.
ITEM
in
rela
tio
n t
o
the
OW
F
RIS
K
ISSU
E in
re
lati
on
to
OW
F
Firs
t Ef
fect
In
ter.
Effe
ct
End
Ef
fect
NETEP
Cu
mu
lati
ve
imp
act
Cost A – E
SEV 1-10
CA
USE
fo
r C
um
ula
tive
Im
pac
t re
late
d
to R
ISK
ISSU
E
OCC 1-10
CRIT
Pre
sen
t
Co
ntr
ols
DET 1-10
RPN 1
Pla
nn
ed
ac
tio
ns
SEV 1-10
OCC 1-10
DET 1-10
RPN 2
ST
TEC
1
Tech
no
logy
Fo
un
dat
ion
P
ile
dri
vin
g
-
-
No
ise
C
od
m
igra
tio
n
away
fro
m
site
C
7
Dis
turb
ance
d
uri
ng
spaw
nin
g p
erio
d
5
35
U
nd
erw
ater
re
cord
ing
dev
ices
. V
ind
val
rese
arch
1
35
P
ile d
rivi
ng
du
rin
g n
on
-sp
awn
ing
seas
on
2
2
1
4
ST
TEC
1
IND
IV
No
ise
Dam
age
to
aud
ito
ry
syst
em o
f h
arb
ou
r p
orp
ois
es
(Ph
oco
ena
p
ho
coen
a)
C
7
Un
der
wat
er
vib
rati
on
/ ex
cess
ive
no
ise
exp
osu
re
7
49
R
epo
rt 5
84
6
(NV
V).
Se
ism
ic
stu
die
s,
CP
OD
s –
EU
Sam
bah
p
roje
ct.
2
98
P
orp
ois
e cu
rtai
n
evac
uat
ion
of
rem
ain
ing
po
rpo
ises
fro
m
site
du
rin
g p
ile
dri
vin
g
7
1
2
14
ST
TEC
1
IND
IV
No
ise
Gre
y se
al
mig
rati
on
aw
ay f
rom
si
te
C
7
Dis
turb
ance
6
4
2
Res
earc
h.
Rec
ord
ing
2
84
P
ile d
rivi
ng
d
uri
ng
low
sea
l p
op
ula
tio
n
per
iod
s
7
2
2
28
ST
NA
V 1
N
avig
atio
n -
Sh
ipp
ing
OW
F u
nd
er
con
str-
u
ctio
n
crea
tes
risk
to
sh
ipp
ing
Alli
sio
n
vess
el
agai
nst
O
WF
or
par
ts/
serv
ices
th
ereo
f
Hu
ll d
am-
age
Oil
leak
- ag
e
T
raff
ic r
e-ro
ute
d o
r su
spen
ded
d
uri
ng
clea
n-u
p
B
7
Lim
ited
m
ano
euvr
ab-
ility
of
vess
els:
n
arro
w
chan
nel
s/
fair
way
s b
esid
e O
WF.
Als
o
fati
gue,
rad
ar
dis
turb
ance
an
d
bad
vis
ibili
ty.
4
28
Sh
ip t
o s
ho
re
con
tact
6
1
68
San
d b
ank
pro
tect
ion
. O
WF
area
: In
crea
se V
HF
S2
S an
d b
rid
ge
wat
ch. D
ou
ble
-h
ull
vess
els
on
ly. A
lt.
fair
way
s p
oss
ible
.
7
2
2
28
N
avig
atio
n -
Sh
ipp
ing
Lim
ited
m
ano
eu-
vrab
ility
Hig
h d
ens-
ity
traf
fic
- co
llisi
on
Hu
ll d
am-
age
Oil
leak
- ag
e
A
s ab
ove
B
7
A
s ab
ove
4
2
8
As
abo
ve
6
16
8 A
s ab
ove
7
2
2
2
8
N
avig
atio
n -
Sh
ipp
ing
Rad
ar
dis
turb
-an
ce
Co
nfu
sio
n-
colli
sio
n
Hu
ll d
am-
age
Oil
leak
- ag
e
A
s ab
ove
B
7
A
s ab
ove
4
2
8
As
abo
ve
6
16
8 A
s ab
ove
7
2
2
2
8
D
amag
e to
w
ildlif
e,
seab
ed a
nd
co
astl
ine.
B
8
Ref
er t
o
Pla
nn
ed
acti
on
s ST
N
AV
1
N
eg. l
oca
l p
ub
lic o
p.
on
pro
ject
.
B
7
As
abo
ve
73
Table 13 illustrates the (short term) construction phase, within which the ST TEC 1 entry
relates to pile driving. The same considerations were central in the Skotterevet case (M-294-
08) whereby environmental and commercial considerations were weighed against each
other, with pile driving, Cod population and commercial fishing interests in the centre of
debate and in which risk levels were expressed in qualitative terms such as very serious
(mycket allvarliga) and strong (betydande) (Svea hovrätt, p.4). A possible mitigation of this
potential risk is to conduct pile driving operations with respect to the spawning ground i.e.
outside of the spawning season, the RPN in this case shown to have fallen from RPN 1 = 35
to RPN 2 = 4, integral to which is a decrease in severity levels from RPN 1 to RPN 2 in line
with a design change as is evident in vehicle design studies undertaken by Rechnitzer and
Lane (1994, p. 6).
Other environmental issues registered in this stage of the model include conditions for the
Baltic harbour porpoise (Phocoena phocoena) and the grey seal (Halichoerus grypus) both
critically endangered species as Baltic Proper subpopulations. The cumulative impacts upon
these species can be evaluated with reference to contemporary research (see for example
Elforsk, 2008) with possible mitigation measures if necessary. Whilst not made as an entry
on the spreadsheet other research concerns could be taken into consideration under the
present controls variable (specifically see for example, Johansson, 2012). Additionally, as
regards research input within environmental impact as a whole, homepage-accessed Vindval
material is a major resource, and conference proceedings are also available (see for example
Conference on Wind Power and Environmental Impacts 2013, in Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency, 2013).
As regards navigational issues, the construction of the Lillgrund OWF creates a number of
possible risk scenarios involving traffic movements, restricted manoeuvrability in a high
traffic density area and possible radar interference from the turbines. Planned actions or
mitigation measures include increased S2S (ship-to-shore) contact and possible provision of
alternative fairways. These measures however must be taken with respect to flag state
concerns in line with international maritime legislation. It is evident from Figure 13 that
navigational risk has a cumulative impact in other sectors.
74
Table 14. Operation phase entries upon which the Stage Two reference group concurred
NET
EP
Re
f.
no
.
ITEM
in
rela
tio
n t
o
the
OW
F
RIS
K
ISSU
E in
re
lati
on
to
OW
F
Firs
t Ef
fect
In
ter.
Effe
ct
End
Ef
fect
NETEP
Cu
mu
lati
ve
imp
act
Cost A – E
SEV 1-10
CA
USE
fo
r C
um
ula
tive
Im
pac
t re
late
d t
o
RIS
K IS
SUE
OCC 1-10
CRIT
Pre
sen
t
Co
ntr
ols
DET 1-10
RPN 1
Pla
nn
ed
act
ion
s
SEV 1-10
OCC 1-10
DET 1-10
RPN 2
MT
TE
C 1
Te
chn
olo
gy
Fou
nd
atio
n
No
ise
thro
ugh
tu
rbin
e fo
un
dat
-io
ns
No
ise
-
U
nd
er-
wat
er
dis
turb
-an
ce
Ef
fect
on
C
od
p
op
ula
tio
n.
D
3
Po
pu
lati
on
d
ecre
ase:
M
igra
tio
n a
way
o
f C
od
. In
crea
se:
Co
d n
ot
affe
cted
. O
WF
-pro
tect
s C
od
fro
m f
ish
ing
2
6
Vin
dva
l re
sear
ch
No
act
ion
MT
TE
C 1
IN
DIV
As
abo
ve
Ef
fect
on
h
arb
or
po
rpo
ise
po
pu
lati
on
(P
ho
coen
a
ph
oco
ena
)
D
8
Po
pu
lati
on
d
ecre
ase
–M
igra
tio
n a
nd
st
ress
. Po
siti
ve is
th
at O
WF
pro
tect
s h
arb
or
po
rpo
ise
– n
o
fish
ing
zon
e (b
y-ca
tch
/dro
wn
ing
red
uce
d)
2
16
R
esea
rch
N
o a
ctio
n
MT
TE
C 1
IN
DIV
As
abo
ve
D
istu
rban
ce
to g
rey
seal
C
5
U
nd
erw
ater
d
istu
rban
ce.
Hab
itat
d
eter
iora
tio
n.
1
5
Res
earc
h
No
act
ion
MT
N
AV
1
Nav
igat
ion
-
Ship
pin
g C
olli
sio
n
allis
ion
d
ue
to
OW
F
-
-
O
il le
ak-
age
Tr
affi
c re
-ro
ute
d o
r su
spen
ded
d
uri
ng
clea
n-
up
B
7
C
lean
-up
o
per
atio
ns
bo
om
s et
c
2
14
A
ctio
n t
aken
ST
NA
V 1
2
2
8
No
act
ion
D
amag
e to
w
ildlif
e se
abed
an
d
coas
tlin
e
B
8
A
s ab
ove
N
o a
ctio
n
Neg
ativ
e p
ub
lic
op
inio
n c
an
affe
ct o
ther
p
roje
cts
B
7
A
s ab
ove
N
o a
ctio
n
75
The main observation that was discussed for the operation phase, see Table 14, comes as a
result of MT NAV1 and the cumulative impacts that can be related to environmental damage
and socio-economic (economics and politics) effects of negative opinion on other projects. It
illustrates a degree of flexibility within the NETEP framework and the possible
accommodation of other combined sectors. Both this cumulative impact and the
environment cumulative impact (i.e. damage to wildlife, seabed and coastline) are
terminated at the severity stage due to the risk issue in relation to the OWF (collision or
allision due to OWF) having been mitigated in ST NAV 1. It is the decision of the reference
team if it considers further evaluation on a particular risk issue and the cumulative impacts
worthwhile. Commercial fishing exclusion might serve as a positive effect for fish stocks at
this stage although positive registration within the model is not possible. Maintenance and
operation duties are also major risk factors during this phase, which would increase activity
with navigation (supply and service traffic) and technological sectors (turbine maintenance
and general operation duties). Relevant research results should be referred to with regards
to in particular the present controls level.
76
Table 15. Decommissioning phase entries upon which the Stage Two reference group concurred
NET
EP
Ref
. no
.
ITEM
in
rela
tion
to
the
OW
F
RIS
K
ISSU
E in
re
lati
on
to O
WF
Firs
t Ef
fect
In
ter.
Effe
ct
End
Effe
ct
NETEP
Cum
ulat
ive
impa
ct
Cost A – E
SEV 1-10
CAU
SE fo
r Cu
mul
ativ
e Im
pact
rel
ated
to
RIS
K IS
SUE
OCC 1-10
CRIT
Pres
ent
Co
ntro
ls
DET 1-10
RPN 1
Plan
ned
acti
ons
SEV 1-10
OCC 1-10
DET 1-10
RPN 2
LT
TEC
1 Te
chno
logy
Fo
unda
tion
N
oise
th
roug
h tu
rbin
e fo
unda
t-io
ns a
nd
thro
ugh
deco
m.
acti
ons
Noi
se
-
U
nder
-w
ater
di
stur
b-an
ce
Ef
fect
on
Co
d po
pula
tion
D
6 Te
mpo
rary
di
stur
banc
e of
si
te a
rea
duri
ng
deco
mm
issi
on-
ing
acti
viti
es.
3 18
V
indv
al
rese
arch
1
18
Dec
omm
isio
n -in
g du
ring
non
-sp
awni
ng s
easo
n.
Leav
e fo
unda
tion
s w
hich
act
as
reef
en
cour
agin
g Co
d -
impr
ovin
g bi
otop
e.
2 2
1 4
LT
TEC
1 IN
DIV
As
abov
e
Har
bour
po
rpoi
se –
in
crea
sed
stre
ss,
mor
talit
y
C 7
As
abov
e 5
35
Rese
arch
2
70
Ada
pt d
ecom
. op
erat
ions
to
pres
ence
of
porp
oise
or
guid
e po
rpoi
se a
way
fr
om s
ite
(bla
nket
s)
7 2
2 28
LT
TEC
1 IN
DIV
As
abov
e
Gre
y se
al –
in
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77
Table 15 illustrates the (long term) decommissioning phase. It is evident that as in
construction (short term), noise and turbidity considerations affect marine wildlife,
underwater fauna and vegetation. Technological issues leading up to decommission involve
noise generated by the turbine which permeates to the sea bed foundation level.
Contemporary research provides the information base for the present controls for this issue.
Local economic effects involve a downturn in related industries to the site including
maintenance and surveillance service industries. Navigational risks are related to increased
maritime traffic and the use of specialist vessels for deconstruction. The flow of the model
accommodates the first RPN calculation, mitigation measures and the second RPN.
The model is deemed as functional at all stages i.e. construction, operation and
decommissioning.
3.3.2.2 Observations made by the reference group during analysis
The following observations relate to discussions involved within the workshop group on the
Prototype (Table 11) and include;
• strict delineation between Effect and Cumulative Impact is required;
• a cumulative impact from the same NETEP area can be registered from the preceding
effect (intra-sector);
• more than one cumulative impact is possible from the same Risk Issue; and,
• more than one NETEP area can be registered within the same cumulative impact (i.e. a
socio-economic issue involving both politics and economics);
• the Cost A – high, E-low variable functions adequately;
• the NETEP reference number and cumulative impact colour-coding functions adequately.
The environmental representative concurred with the structure of the Stage Two FMECA-
NETEP. Environment related entries are designated INDIV in Tables 13, 14 and 15.
78
3.3.3. Discussion
Utilisation of an existing framework (End Effect)
As discussed with reference to the FMECA Standard ISO IEC 60812:2006 and also inherent in
MIL-STD-1629A (local, next higher and end effect variables), the severity rating of an FMECA
analysis refers to the final effect of a failure mode. The Stage Two model incorporates a
similar structure i.e. first effect, intermediate effect and end effect. This sequence of effect
occurs as a result of the preceding risk issue (potential failure mode in more traditional
usage).
Connection of Cumulative Impact to the End Effect
In the Stage Two model cumulative impact occurs due to the end effect of a risk issue.
Cumulative impact can either occur as a result of a NETEP area upon itself (intra-sector) or as
a result of the end effect of one NETEP sector upon another or others (inter-sector).
Cumulative impact is registered and possible mitigating action (planned action) is taken i.e.,
Intra-sector: the entire FMECA process is followed if deemed necessary;
• after the end effect has been registered and,
• after criticality values are compared.
Inter-sector: as regards cumulative impacts that receive a high severity ranking, they should
be either;
• further evaluated if the team considers that there exists good reason to study the
likelihood of occurrence and the ensuing FMECA in its entirety (including mitigating or risk
reduction measures) of that cumulative impact, or,
• the FMECA for that cumulative impact is terminated at the severity stage. If severity is
considered high for the cumulative impact in focus, its root cause is addressed i.e. the risk
issue in relation to the OWF, which if inter-sector will involve the evaluation of an issue
within another (the originating) NETEP area.
By definition, FMECA is a risk management tool dealing with potential failure (i.e. adverse
effects) measured according to the ranking criteria, registration of positive outcome is
79
therefore not possible. The FMECA potential failure methodology is based upon risk and
registers potential negative effect, therefore an RPN of 1 although possible, is not realistic
since risk issue is introduced into the model as a potential threat.
4. Concluding discussion
FMECA can accommodate cumulative impact within risk management and be applied to all
NETEP areas with reference to the permit application process for OWFs. It can thereby be
concluded that the FMECA-NETEP model is capable of accommodating factors central to
environmental impact assessments and the demands set by the permit application process.
Disadvantages of the model, apart from those inherent in FMECA itself, include the fact that
the boundaries of NETEP sectors can become diffuse when a closer evaluation of cases is
carried out. The limits of the NETEP sector politics, for example, become blurred when
institutional considerations are incorporated, and it would seem that the term stakeholder
itself requires more precise definition. The interplay between different governmental
bodies, themselves stakeholders, is therefore a field for future parallel research bordering
the scope of this model. Study of the relationship of those bodies with other non-
governmental stakeholders for example, the commercial fishing sector, is of interest in this
respect of which case M-294-08 (regarding the permit application from Falkenberg Energi
for construction of an OWF with up to thirty turbines on an offshore site, Skotterevet, on the
west coast of Sweden, Falkenberg) offers a starting point. Likewise, as evident from the
results of Stage One of the study, economic considerations are inherent in other sectors than
economics. The addition of a cost variable in the Stage Two model offers a stop-gap to this
phenomenon. Moreover, for a structured framework, adherence to the content of each
NETEP sector in line with Figure 9 is considered good methodology although the applicability
of FMECA to all considerations within the uniform sector is not practical.
FMECA risk methodology has been evaluated within a decision-making system involving
environmental legislation and the required assessments (both possible to address under the
risk issue section), advocacy of the precautionary principle (in the use of the ranking criteria
the highest plausible ranking should be set), the mitigation of risk with calculation of
following results (within planned actions and RPN 2), and the consideration of stakeholder
80
viewpoints (risk issues). Importantly, the utilisation of contemporary research (within
present controls) enables incorporation of external evaluations such as specialised risk
assessments (present controls) within its evaluation mechanism. This is the very stuff of its
input. Its structured methodology, utilising generic risk terminology is applicable to the
range of sectors apparent in the process, thereby offering a framework for transparent and
holistic evaluation.
As a risk model accommodating the measurement of potential negative outcomes, it could
serve as a framework for consideration and mitigation of potential project risk and provide
evidence that potential negative effects of a project have been identified, undergone
rigorous analysis and mitigated against.
5. Future research
Suggestions for future research include a concept that this thesis has failed to address. The
notion of `no net loss´ was intrinsic to the proceedings of the Conference on Wind Power
and Environmental Impacts held in February 2013 (Swedish Environmental Protection
Agency, 2013b) and its inclusion in relation to the planned actions prior to RPN 2 needs to be
considered.
There are other potential modifications to the model. Firstly, within NETEP the inclusion of
an additional sector that would include the registration of uniform issues, as illustrated in
Figure 9 is considered worthwhile. Also with reference to roadmapping methodology (within
STEEP) it is evident that a risk model would benefit from consideration of expected or
predicted future factors not specifically set out in legislative demands of the permit
permission process but nevertheless central to the risk management process. Use of trend
forecasting is therefore considered worthwhile.
Providing a structure for these issues, inclusion of uniform issues (UN) added to the NETEP
acronym affords the term NEPTUNE. Departure from the failure mode designation evident in
the Stage Two analysis can be complemented by a continued inclusion of the term effect
analysis. Research into possible development of a model based on the resulting concept: the
81
NEPTUNE Effect Analysis model, computer-based and on two-levels combining both present
legislative demands and future trends is considered of importance.
Secondly, within the FMECA-based side of the model, a modification to include a ranking
criteria of 0 is a possible modification. This expression of (absolute) epistemic uncertainty
(i.e. no knowledge of the subject in hand) is presently not included in the FMECA ranking
criteria generally since FMECA is used to identify potential failures in an established system.
With risk issues that cannot be ranked according to the criteria i.e. there is no sufficient
knowledge presently available on that particular parameter (severity, occurrence or
detection) a value of 0 should be possible on the first level (RPN1). This results in an RPN1 of
0. This does not indicate a non-existent risk issue, rather an issue that demands prioritised
further investigation. This would affect the utilisation of the criticality level and its use as a
prioritising mechanism, since 0 values would require the highest priority of all. Thirdly, study
focusing on the possibility of registration of positive outcome is considered worthwhile.
Areas to be considered for inclusion in a potential NEPTUNE effect analysis model include,
• consideration of future trends (in line with roadmapping);
• registration of (absolute) epistemic uncertainty in the ranking criteria (i.e. a zero option);
• registration of positive cumulative impact.
The development of such a model would require its application to collaborative research
within a multidisciplinary and international environment displaying inherent cumulative
impact. The navigation component of the present model prepares it for use within both land
and offshore developments and processes, addressing both airborne and water-based
navigation, alongside socio-political, environmental, technological and economic
considerations. Future research should target the construction of an analytical tool capable
of being tested for dealing with foreseeable risks, predicted effects of present trends and
quantifying these in both positive and negative terms.
82
Acknowledgements
I would like to offer my gratitude to all those that have enabled me to complete this thesis.
Firstly, the Head of Kalmar Maritime Academy, Captain Jan Snöberg for organising the
funding of my Licentiate studies and making the whole thing possible. To the invaluable
contribution made by the participants in the various stages of the model’s development who
although they remain anonymous are all out there working within the offshore industry and
in Sweden’s governmental agencies. To the help that I have received from my fellow
students at Linnaeus University, from my own students and colleagues at KMA that have
offered advice and help along the way and to the personnel at the Faculty of Health and Life
Sciences for their friendly help and excellent tuition. Thanks goes especially to my daughter
Louise for putting up with me and to my mum for always sounding interested.
Finally, sometimes, if you´re lucky, people will walk into your life and guide you in the right
direction. I would like to offer a very special, huge thank you to my supervisor, Professor Bo
Carlsson. His support, guidance, and encouragement have enabled me to gain the beginning
of an understanding of what life as an academic writer could entail. Rarely do we come
across individuals in life with such patience, intelligence and humility and pure joy for what
they do. Thanks Bo for everything. And to Celia, thank you, and in answer to your ever
recurring question. I think, hope, that maybe, I can relatively safely say:
And they think it’s all over. It is now.
83
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