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ANALISYS OF CONSEQUENCES OF A
DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE FOR
THE REGION AROUND A NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT
András Vilimi
Senior Technical Advisor, MVM Nuclear Power Plant Paks Ltd, Hungary
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Design concept for NPPs
• Evaluation of the external hazards,
• Characterization of the hazards with a specific parameter
which can occur with a probability,
• Define the probability level which should be taken into
account in the design basis (for normal civil structures 0,1
non-exceedance probability, for nuclear power plants 0,005
which means 475 years return period time for normal building,
10.000 years for old NPPs and 100.000 years for new NPPs),
• Proper design, which ensures the structural integrity and
function,
• Quantification of the margin above the design basis loads.
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Design basis loads for external hazards (10-4/a)
External hazard Design loads
Wind 41,5 m/s
Snow 1,5 kPa
Rain 10-minute rainfall event 42 mm,
60-minute rainfall event 93 mm,
24-hour rainfall event 132 mm
Maximum temperature momentary temp. 45,3 °C
Minimum temperature momentary temp. -47,9 °C
Lightning 200 kA
Danube flooding (dry site!) Icy flooding and ice-free flooding levels are
96.07 m and 95.51 m respectively. The site level
is 97.15 m while the Danube East-bank dyke
crown height is 95.9 m. (Height given above
Baltic-sea)
Low water level 84.65 m
Earthquakes 0,25 g horizontal, 0,2 g vertical acceleration
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Could it happen in Hungary?
Stormy wind on the Hill
Kab 165 km/h (45 m/s!)
and 100 km/h at low-
lying areas.
The temperature
decreased to -180C in
Vásárosnamény which
was the lowest data
ever measured.
Date: 15th March 2013.
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Could it happen in Hungary?
Date: 11th June 2013. Báta, Hungary
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Could it happen in Hungary?
Date: 8th July 1911. Kecskemét, Hungary
Magnitude: 5,6 ; Maximum intensity: VIII;
28% of the buildings (1269 pieces) damaged
Nobody died
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Date: 12th January 1956. Dunaharaszti, Hungary
Magnitude: 5,6 ; Maximum intensity: VIII;
90% of the buildings (3144 pieces) damaged
Some casualties
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Date: 28th June 1763. Komárom, Hungary
Magnitude: 6,3 ; Maximum intensity: IX;
30% of the buildings destroyed
63 casualties, more than 120 injuries
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Seismic zone map
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Intensity scale
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What if an EQ like in Komárom would happen?
Number of EQs in Hungary due to magnitude Of course the
probability of a given
magnitude EQ at a
given place is much
lower. (For example
the occurrence of
M=6,3 EQ at Paks
NPP has 10-4/a
frequency)
BUT!
The nature of the random events are, that the 10-4/a frequency event can
happen in the next second.
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The scenario
The radius of VIII
and VII intensity
areas are:
RVIII ≈ 10 km,
RVII ≈ 20 km
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European Macroseismic scale (EMS)
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EMS to different structures
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Consequences in Bács-Kiskun county
Affected approximately 5000-7000 people. The
infrastructure is damaged to a similar extent.
Walling In the radius of EMS
VIII
Damaged
(%)
Damaged
(number of buildings)
brick, stone, masonry
hand 1018
moderate structural damage
at 50%, heavy structural
damage at 20%
713
medium or large
block, cast concrete 151
moderate structural damage
at 50% 75
panel 2 Not significant 0
wood 7
Adobe, mud with
foundation 826
heavy structural damage
≈80%,
very heavy structural damage
(total or near total collapse)
≈20%
826
Adobe, mud without
foundation 450 450
others 34 Not significant 0
In all: 2487 2064
Data by the census 2011.
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What happens to the infrastructure?
Pylons
not
designed
for EQ!
Designed
for wind
and ice
loads.
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Conclusions
• The nuclear power plant withstand the examined earthquake
event, no damages at the critical safety infrastructure.
• The grid connections at Paks nuclear power plant fails with
high probability.
• The failure of the grid cause the network crash.
• Because of failure of the roads the work of the disaster
management is more complicate.
• The affected people and their relatives and interested people
with the huge number of phone calls will cause the crash of
the mobile communication systems.
• The psychological effects with these consequences give a
huge work and responsibility on the disaster management
people in the country.
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András VILIMI, László TÓTH, Tamás János KATONA, Analysis Of Consequences Of Design Basis
Earthquake For The Region Around a Nuclear Power Plant, POLLACK PERIODICA, An
International Journal for Engineering and Information Sciences, DOI: 10.1556/606.2016.11.2.4; Vol.
11, No. 2, pp. 43–54 (2016); www.akademiai.com;