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Towards a New Approach to Global Drug Problems:
Regulatory and governance perspectives
Paper prepared for the 3rdAnnual Conference of the International Society for the
Study of Drug Policy, 2nd-3rdMarch 2009, Vienna
Abstract
The 'drug problem' - the constellation of issues and difficulties associated with the
production, distribution and consumption of illegal drugs - is complex, globalized and
cross-cutting. From a policy perspective, even conceptualising it is difficult, let alone
developing a coherent and effective response. One way forward may be to view it as a
governance problem in the broadest sense. This opens up the possibility of drawing on
a number of different social science perspectives on governance to develop new
approaches. In this paper, three specific bodies of scholarship will be utilised. First,
the work on regulation pioneered by Braithwaite and others at the Australian National
University; second, the nodal governance approach developed by Shearing and
colleagues; third, the work of Kingsbury and colleagues at the New York University
School of Law on global governance and global administrative law. It will be arguedthat by viewing the drug problem from the broad perspectives of regulation and
governance, a radical and new policy approach can start to be developed.
Dr Toby Seddon
Director Regulation, Security and Justice Research Centre
School of Law
University of Manchester
UK
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Introduction1
There is a powerful and pervasive mode of drug policy critique that highlights the
prohibition paradigm as the core of our contemporary difficulties in dealing with the
drug problem2. The solution, from this perspective, is to scrap the drug laws and
start afresh with a more rational and humane regulatory approach. For those with
slightly broader vision, the target is not just reform of national drug laws but the entire
edifice of international drug control administered by the United Nations.
I have a great deal of sympathy for this line of argument. Indeed, it is very difficult to
study drug policy for any length of time without coming to the conclusion eventually
that the prohibition paradigm is fatally flawed and in fact causes more problems and
more suffering than it alleviates or prevents. As I have now been researching in this
area for about 15 years, I have certainly seen plenty of evidence for this!
Nevertheless, despite this, something about this mode of policy critique worries me,
nags at me. In this paper, I want to attempt to articulate something of this nagging
doubt or concern.
At the heart of my concern is a worry that this way of identifying or pinpointing the
problem does not provide the analytic space necessary for finding and developing a
good solution to it. This is somewhat ironic, of course, as most drug law reform
campaigners tend to identify themselves explicitly as focused on policy matters, rather
than theoretical or philosophical ones. I think the fundamental difficulty is that the
implicit analytical frame is a Hobbesian one which assumes that the solution to the
problem must be located within a framework of state institutions (or supra-national
institutions like the UN or EU to which states sign up).
I am rather pessimistic about the prospects of finding answers or solutions within this
type of Hobbesian frame. And indeed, in my eyes at least, it is telling that one of the
weakest parts of the drug law reformers case is when it comes to making concrete
suggestions or proposals for what should be done after prohibition is dismantled. But
1 This paper is an abridged draft version of chapter 6 in: Seddon, T. (forthcoming, 2009)A History of
Drugs: Drugs and freedom in the liberal age, Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish.2
I use this term as a shorthand for the constellation of issues and problems associated with themanufacture, distribution and consumption of certain categories of psychoactive substances currentlyregulated within a predominantly criminal law framework.
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my paper is not a pessimistic or nihilistic one. Rather, I want to sketch out a different
analytical approach than can open up the space for developing policy approaches
capable of delivering better outcomes than the present regime. Before anyone gets
carried away, I should emphasise that I am not today claiming to describe a new drug
policy blueprint that we could hand over right now to the UN or to our national
governments for immediate implementation. What I am talking about though is a
different way of looking at drug policy that may provide new conceptual tools for the
construction of new policy directions.
In essence, the different way of looking at the matter that I am proposing is founded
on the idea that we can usefully frame the drug problem as a regulatory and
governance challenge, in the very widest sense of those terms. I will say more in due
course about what I mean by regulation and governance but before that there are a
couple of points I wish to highlight here. First, the scholarship on which I will be
drawing is fragmented and diverse and does not fall neatly within any single academic
discipline. I will be pulling together insights using a wide range of intellectual
resources. This means my endeavour is by necessity selective rather than
comprehensive. Second, governance is not synonymous with good governance
(Burris et al, 2008:3), nor regulation with good regulation. Simply to identify
something as a regulatory and governance challenge does not lead automatically to
the best policy solution. Choices still have to be made about the desired and
preferred values and goals to provide the yardstick for measuring and evaluating
governance processes, institutions and outcomes. For my own part, I am concerned
above all that good drug policy should promote social justice, ensure greater respect
for human rights and enhance relevant aspects of human security and well-being.
Others may want to make different choices about the values and goals they would
prioritise but even for them my analytical approach should still be useful.
In the main sections of this paper, I am going to explore, in outline only, how three
related but distinct approaches to regulation and governance might be applied to the
analysis of drug policy. The first of these is the body of work on regulation that has
largely been developed by a group of scholars at the Australian National University
(ANU) and its Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet). Perhaps the leading figure
here has been John Braithwaite and I will refer particularly to his inspirational work.
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The second is the nodal governance approach which has been developed by several
scholars who have had links of various kinds with RegNet, notably Clifford Shearing
and Peter Drahos. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is an approach that complements and
overlaps the regulatory work of Braithwaite and his collaborators. The third approach
is the work on the emergence of global administrative law led by Benedict Kingsbury
at the New York University School of Law. This has developed largely independently
of the first two approaches, although it shares much in common with both,
particularly the nodal governance approach.
1. Regulation
Regulatory scholarship is diverse. Some strands adopt a narrow definition or
conceptualization which views regulation primarily as steering through state laws and
rules (e.g. Ogus, 1994; Black, 2002). Others take a much broader view, defining
regulation as all attempts to steer the flow of events (e.g. Braithwaite, 2008). I incline
towards the broader definition, as in my view it is the most fruitful analytically. Some
of you may already be thinking that such a wide and capacious concept cannot
possibly be of any use, either as an explanatory or a normative tool. But I think it is
precisely this breadth which renders it such a powerful framework as it allows and
encourages us to see the similarities in the task of regulation in diverse fields. So, just
to take the work of Braithwaite as an example, he has used his research in areas as
wide-ranging as coal mine safety (Braithwaite, 1985), restorative justice with
offenders (Braithwaite, 2002) and corporate tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2005) to
develop a theory of responsive regulation applicable across not only these but also
other fields. Empirical work in one field has shed light on research in others. It is very
difficult to imagine how this might have happened without deploying the cross-
cutting regulatory approach. Normally, tax law specialists, criminologists and health
and safety experts do not talk to each other. For regulation scholars like Braithwaite,
such cross-boundary and cross-disciplinary conversations are at the heart of their
work.
So how might regulatory theory and concepts help us in the area of drug policy? In
their groundbreaking bookGlobal Business Regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos
(2000) draw an important and original lesson from the history of regulation in this
area. They argue that rather than seeing the regulatory regime for illicit drugs as a
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special or unique case, it should be viewed instead as simply one regulatory branch
that has been created (and relatively recently, at that) out of a wider system for the
regulation of psychoactive and therapeutic substances. In fact, they identify at least
five regulatory branches (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000:360-398):
a (globalized) illicit drugs regime;
a (globalizing) prescription drugs regime;
national non-prescription (over-the-counter) drugs regimes;
national alcohol regimes and
national tobacco regimes.
They argue that what is required is an integrated explanation of both illicit and licit
drug regulation (Braithwaite, 2003:17). If the connections between these branches
seem somewhat tenuous, let me illustrate the need for an integrated explanation by a
brief detour into the history of diamorphine, better known of course to people in our
field as heroin. Diamorphine was first synthesised in 1874 in a laboratory in a West
London hospital, as part of a series of scientific investigations into morphine which
was by then a staple of medical practice. In the 1890s, further work on diamorphine
was conducted by the German pharmaceutical company Bayer & Co. It was finally
brought to market by Bayer in 1898 under the name heroin, advertised as a sedative
for coughs alongside Bayers other new wonder drug, aspirin. In Britain, it was not
until 1920 that heroin came under a prohibition regime; prior to that, it was essentially
freely available from pharmacists. Today, Bayer is one of the leading players globally
within Big Pharma and is the largest pharmaceutical company in Europe. Its history
demonstrates clearly some of the linkages between these separate regulatory branches.
This insight has some radical implications. It invites a much broader and more
thoroughgoing rethink of how we deal with the drug problem. Rather than just
drawing comparisons with, for example, alcohol or tobacco, as many drug law
reformers and campaigners do, it opens up for consideration and comparison the
entire panoply of substances that we consume for more or less therapeutic and/or
psychoactive purposes. In one sense, the possibilities and options for change here may
seem overwhelmingly large. With characteristic acuity, Braithwaite directs us to the
essence of the challenge: we need to find ways of flipping what he calls a market in
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vice into a market in virtue. By vice and virtue he means simply those things
regarded by large sections of the relevant community or society as bads or goods
(Braithwaite, 2005). The task of the regulator of any particular market is to create an
approach which minimises bads and maximises goods. Again, a bit like the
definition of regulation I discussed earlier, talk of flipping markets and of vice and
virtue may all seem too abstract and too simplistic to be of any analytical use. But
Braithwaites deployment of these terms, however glib they may sound to some, is
actually rooted in extensive empirical research in several different fields (e.g.
corporate tax cheats). Based on this work, he has even developed a set of general
design principles for flipping markets in this way, although he emphasises that
crafting a regulatory strategy in any specific field will require a full understanding of
its contextual distinctiveness.
There is not the space here to work through these design principles, nor am I claiming
that they would necessarily provide all the answers we are looking for. Nevertheless, I
hope I have conveyed enough of this approach to indicate how it may open up some
distinctive and new ways of looking at and responding to the drug problem. I
believe there is potentially a major programme of research and policy development
here.
But I think a regulation perspective has still more to offer to us. Let us imagine for a
moment that the prospect of instituting an entirely new regulatory regime is felt to be
minimal in the short or even medium term. That leaves an important question: what is
to be done now to address some of the major injustices and difficulties associated with
the drug problem and current attempts to deal with it? If we think, for example,
about some of the drug-related damage, in the widest sense, that can affect
communities and families, how might regulatory theory help us to construct a better
approach for the here and now, rather than requiring people to wait for some future
time when prohibition is swept away? I mentioned earlier, in passing, the theory of
responsive regulation developed by Braithwaite and others. This, I think, provides us
with an extremely powerful model for doing exactly this. The basic principle is that
regulators should be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in
deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed (Braithwaite,
2008:88). The famous (within regulation circles, at least!) regulatory pyramid
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summarises the essence of the model (Ayres and Braithwaite,1992). The idea is that
we begin at the base of the pyramid with the most restorative dialogue-based
approach we can craft for securing compliance (Braithwaite, 2008:88). Only when
these efforts fail should we move, reluctantly, up to the next level of the pyramid. As
we progress up the pyramid, interventions become more and more punitive and
demanding. At each level, the knowledge that we can escalate up the pyramid is part
of what helps to secure compliance. When we reach a level where reform or repair
starts to be achieved, we should de-escalate, moving back down towards the base
again to reward that positive response. The pyramid is in essence a method for solving
the puzzle of when to punish and when to persuade (Braithwaite, 2008:88). The
potential applications of responsive regulation in the area of drugs are plentiful. To
give just one example, the policing of cannabis use by young people is an area, in
Britain at least, where there is a complete lack of clarity currently about how
compliance with the law should be achieved. The result is that police practice tends to
be inconsistent, unjust and ineffective indeed, the legal framework itself has been
vacillating as the cannabis question has become a political football in the UK. The
crafting of a regulatory pyramid to be applied here could provide a much more
constructive strategy, avoiding unnecessary and damaging criminalization but whilst
providing a transparent, principled and consistent approach.
2. Nodal governance
Nodal governance is a way of looking at the world, an analytical lens, which has been
developed in recent years as part of an attempt to get to grips with some fundamental
changes that have taken place in the nature and patterns of governance (Burris et al,
2005, 2008). Put simply, according to this perspective, our conceptual tools for
studying and understanding how power and rule are actually exercised in the real
world have dramatically failed to keep pace with these transformations in governance.
This failure has, in turn, hindered our ability to develop better forms of governance.
The contention is that different ways of conceptualising and describing governance
can help us to deliver better results.
Governance is defined within this approach as the management of the course of
events in a social system (Burris et al, 2005:30). There is a clear overlap here, of
course, with the definition of regulation I gave earlier and these two approaches are
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complementary. The idea of nodal governance builds on two rather different
intellectual sources. First, on Manuel Castells work on the rise of the network
society (Castells, 1996). Castells basic thesis is that the network has become the
basic unit of contemporary society. He locates this development in the context of the
coming of the information age, arguing that our key social structures and activities
are now increasingly organised around information-based networks. Second, and
perhaps a bit more surprising, on the sometime neo-liberal guru Friedrich Hayeks
work on the creation of order in complex social systems (Hayek, 1944, 1960, 1973).
The central Hayekian insight that the nodal governance scholars draw on is that
particular governance systems are highly complex and generally ungraspable by
central state authorities. Hayek uses this, of course, as an argument against socialist
state planning, which he suggests is doomed to failure because of this fundamental
epistemic problem for top-down central authorities of trying to understand local social
systems, but his analysis also provides a brilliant account of the complexity of specific
systems of governance.
Governance then is networked, that is, it operates through and across networks. The
nodal governance approach focuses attention on exactly how power is transmitted and
operationalised in specific contexts. Nodes are not just points or relays within
networks. They are institutional sites where knowledge, capacity and resources are
mobilised for governance. One crucial and distinctive feature of the nodal governance
account is that the state, or state institutions do not have any privileged analytic or
conceptual status. They are not a distinct category of node but rather an internal
characteristic of some nodes (Burris, 2004:344). It is an empirical question in any
given network of governance whether state institutions are predominant or not.
So how might we apply the nodal governance approach to the area of drug policy? I
will attempt to illustrate its usefulness with two quite different examples. The first
involves some lessons that might be drawn for drug law reformers from the story of
TRIPS that Burris et al (2005) describe. TRIPS was a multi-lateral agreement made in
the 1990s on minimum standards of intellectual property protection which is binding
on all WTO members. The details of this are not relevant here but TRIPS was an
agreement which greatly favoured the US and especially its pharmaceutical industry.
But rather than seeing the achievement of TRIPS as simply a story of US hegemonic
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power coercing weaker countries into agreement, Burris and colleagues provide a
nuanced and sophisticated account of how companies like Pfizer acted as governing
nodes in the TRIPS story in order to achieve their objectives. Pfizer mobilised
networks and created superstructural nodes (that is, nodal assemblages which bring
together and focus the power of multiple individual nodes) in order to steer events
towards the TRIPS agreement. State agencies were not the dominant influences in this
process at all, although they were critical nodes within the assemblages and networks
involved. The potential lesson here for drug law reformers is that viewing national
governments, government agencies and bodies like UNODC and the European Union
as the sole or even necessarily principal actors that need to be engaged with, may be
misguided. An awareness of the networked nature of governance might lead to an
alternative strategy that would be based on a more accurate understanding of the way
in which power is actually exercised. Reformers might want, first of all, to establish
and view themselves as governing nodes, that is, as places for mobilising relevant
knowledge, capacity and resources. Campaigning strategies could then be focused on
networking with other nodes, creating superstructural nodes, connecting networks
together and so on. No doubt UNODC and national governments would be critical
nodes within these networks but not sitting at the top of a pyramid of power and
influence (Burris et al, 2005:47).
The second potential application of the nodal governance approach is quite different
and involves what has been called microgovernance (Burris, 2004). This starts from
the premise that one of the problems faced by vulnerable groups is often that they
experience a governance deficit linked to their limited access to nodes. Strong
actors, in contrast, are much more likely to be able to access multiple nodes through
which they can achieve governance objectives. Accordingly, one strategy for
empowering weak actors is to help them to create and sustain new nodal
arrangements through which their collective knowledge, capacity and resources can
be mobilised. Drawing on this theoretical argument, Shearing and colleagues have
been developing over the last ten or more years a pioneering model of local security
governance in very poor communities in South Africa and elsewhere known as the
Zwelethemba model. The model essentially involves attempts to build new nodal
arrangements by creating local Peace Committees which seek to bring together local
capacity to provide a vehicle for articulating common interests and promoting security
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(see Shearing and Wood, 2003; Froestad and Shearing, 2007). In promoting
community empowerment, it also deepens democracy and social accountability
(Cartwright and Shearing, 2004; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). The possibilities
are great here for experimenting with adapting the Zwelethemba model of
microgovernance as a means of empowering local communities facing neighbourhood
drug problems.
3. Global administrative law
One of the distinctive features of the drug control system is that not only is it
international but this has been so for around 100 years, going back to that famous
meeting in Shanghai in 1909. The global character of this system means that we can
potentially consider it through the lens of the growing literature on the nature of
global governance. There are lots of different strands within this literature and I am
going to focus on one only. There are other lines of enquiry that might be fruitful here
too.
Benedict Kingsbury and colleagues at the New York University School of Law have
been exploring how globalizing processes and global governance systems are
transforming international and administrative law (see: Krisch and Kingsbury, 2006;
Kingsbury et al, 2005). Their central thesis is that:
We are witnessing the emergence of a global administrative space: a space in which
the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has largely broken down, in
which administrative functions are performed in often complex interplays between
officials and institutions on diffrent levels, and in which regulation may be highly
effective despite its predominantly non-binding forms. (Krisch and Kingsbury,2006:1)
They argue that this transformation is raising important new questions about
accountability, not least because of the prominent roles for non-state actors in many
areas. The most critical insight though for my purposes is nicely illustrated by
Meidingers (2006) study of the regulation of forestry. He describes how the
regulatory regime was the outcome of a complex iterative process involving NGOs,
industrialists, environmentalists, state governments and consumer groups, operating at
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levels from the local right through to the global. In many respects, the concept of
global administrative mirrors the account offered by the nodal governance approach,
in its emphasis on complexity, networks and multi-level governance. It differs, of
course, in its focus on law and administration and in the way that it problematises
questions of accountability.
So how might we use this approach in our study and analysis of drug policy? Firstly,
in terms of basic descriptive work, it provides a framework for holding in view at the
same time the entire drug control edifice, from UN conventions, to domestic laws at
national level, to local law enforcement practice. We can develop an analytical
description of the operation of the system which can sweep across levels as required.
The pioneering edited collection by Dorn (1999) entitledRegulating European Drug
Problems, which has been rather neglected by drug researchers to date, attempted
something similar in its descriptive account of an emerging new regulatory space for
addressing drug problems in European states. The contributors map what is termed a
new control space in which administrative, civil law and criminal law measures
intertwine and cut across local, municipal, member state and EU levels. Drawing on
the conceptual and theoretical tools of the global administrative law approach, the
preliminary mapping work contained in Dorns collection could be considerably
extended. Secondly, by examining the ways in which non-criminalmeasures in
particular can be used in drug control, it offers some potential for extending their
deployment and for the minimising of the use of criminal law in this sphere. In other
words, it may provide a rigorous, technical and detailed step-by-step route to the
dismantling of prohibition. Drug law reformers ought to be interested in exploring
that potential! Thirdly, in its focus on issues of transparency and accountability, it
gives a much-needed reminder of the need to ensure that any transformations in the
drug control system are compatible with, and indeed enhance, the upholding of rights
and justice. Indeed, Kingsbury has devoted considerable attention to this question and
to the elaboration of tools and mechanisms for ensuring this (see, for example, Krisch
and Kingsbury, 2006:3-5). Again, this literature could be extremely useful here.
Conclusions
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In this short paper, I have only been able to sketch the outlines of my argument and to
illustrate it fleetingly with one or two examples. In forthcoming work, I will be
elaborating the account I have summarised here3. Nevertheless, I hope I have been
able to persuade readers of the strength of my basic thesis: that there is considerable
analytical merit in viewing the drug problem as a regulatory and governance
problem. In making that case, I have considered in brief how three particular
approaches to governance regulation, nodal governance, and global administrative
law might be utilised in such a project.
It is my belief that this project offers the most productive route to the future
development of better approaches and strategies for dealing with the drug problem.
As I argued in the introduction, existing modes of drug policy critique are in my view
fundamentally flawed in their framing of the problem and consequently in the way
they go about creating solutions. Ultimately, of course, such claims will stand or fall
by their ability to deliver better results than other approaches and that will require
some imagination and courage in experimenting with new ways of doing things, by
researchers, campaigners and policy-makers. The ultimate prize a way of dealing
with the drug problem that enhances justice, rights and well-being should make
these risks worth taking.
3 See footnote 1.
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