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Laurent STRICKERChairman of WANOOctober, 14 2010ENSTA, Paris
SFEN Young GenerationFirst & second Generation Reactors
“Feedback on 50 years of
nuclear reactor operation”
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Introductory RemarkNuclear Safety Responsibility
Support :
WANO&
INPO JANTI CAEA …
1st Responsible :
Operator
Control :
National Safety Authority
IAEA Euratom …
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SFEN Young generation
WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATIONWANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESEXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACKWANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
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1979 : TMI INPOKey factors :- CEO engagement- Focus on nuclear safety- Support from the nuclear industry- Accountability- Independence
WANO MissionImportance of Experience Feedback to prevent accidents
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1986 : Chernobyl WANOAfter the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the world’s nuclear operators realised that an event at one plant impacted every plant and that international cooperation was needed to ensure such an accident could never happen again.
WANO MissionImportance of Experience Feedback to prevent accidents
WANO was formed in May 1989. Today, every nuclear operator in the world is a member.
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WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATIONWANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMES
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACK
WANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
SFEN Young generation
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WANO ORGANISATIONNuclear Industry
WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATIONNuclear IndustryNuclear Industry
Current WANO membershipThirty-one countries (or areas)Company Members : 100Nuclear stations – 210Operating nuclear units – 436
Changes to the Industry 57 new units under construction 60+ countries have announced interest in nuclear
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WANO ORGANISATIONGeographical distribution
WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATIONGeographical distributionGeographical distribution
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* Regional Centres are responsible to their respective Regional Governing Boards for the delivery of high-quality activities within their regions.
** Regional Centres are responsible to the London office for implementing policies and programmes set forth by WANO’s Main Governing Board.
*** Each Regional Governing Board is represented in the WANO Governing Board
ELT Executive Leadership Team (WANO Managing Director + Regional Centre Directors)
General Assembly(1 member per company or
organization)
WANO Governing Board(Chairman+12 Governors+President)
WANO LondonOffice
Atlanta Regional Centre
Paris Regional Centre
Tokyo Regional Centre
Moscow Regional Centre
Moscow CentreRegional
Governing Board
Paris CentreRegional
Governing Board
Atlanta CentreRegional
Governing Board
Tokyo CentreRegional
Governing Board
* ** *
**
******
ELT
WANO ORGANISATIONStructure
WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATIONStructureStructure
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WANO ORGANISATIONGoverning Board
ChairmanL. Stricker
PresidentHE Yu
Most InfluentialUtility in Region
W.A.C W.P.C W.M.C W.T.C
Regional Chairman
CEO Nominatedby Region
J. Ellis H. Proglio S. Obozov M. Shimuzu
D. Hawthorne J. Bongers I. Pnacek Jong Shin Kim
Managing DirectorGeorge Felgate
Company SecretaryBob Cockrell
SK JainG. Gates B. Guthoff Y Nedashkovsky
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WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATION
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESEXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACK
WANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
SFEN Young generation
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WANO PROGRAMMES
Operating ExperienceOperating Experience
Peer ReviewsPeer Reviews
Technical development, Technical development, Support Support and Exchanges and Exchanges
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The programmes work together to drive continuous performance improvement
PEER REVIEW
ACTION PLAN
FOLLOW UP
ACTION PLAN
OPERATINGEXPERIENCE
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
TECHNICALSUPPORT MISSIONS
WORKSHOPS/ SEMINARS, TRAINING
TECHNICALSUPPORT MISSIONS
WORKSHOPS/ SEMINARS, TRAINING
WANO PROGRAMMES
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WANO PROGRAMMESOperating Experience Programme
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESOperating Experience ProgrammeOperating Experience Programme
The objectives are: to report events promptly with a plant analysis
valuable to WANO members Alert members to events so they can take actions
to prevent similar events at their own plants Using operating experience is a proven method to
improve plant performance by applying the applicable lessons learned from past events
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Number of Event Reports0
167
167
171 338174 512
254
766
321
1087
470
1557
936
2493
1080
3573
1110
4683
1140
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
WANO PROGRAMMESOE: Events Reported to WANO (2000-2009)
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESOE: Events Reported to WANO (2000OE: Events Reported to WANO (2000--2009)2009)
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SER – an analysis of significant events to identify and communicate the lessons learned
SERs contain: Event description Causes Analysis Lessons learned ‘Prevent events’
Training presentation also provided on members’ web site
There are currently 33 WANO SERs dating back to 1999
WANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Event Reports
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Event ReportsSignificant Event Reports
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WANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Operating Experience Reports
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Operating Experience ReportsSignificant Operating Experience Reports
SOER – written to address significant events or trends, including recommendations requiring WANO members to identify and implement appropriate corrective actions
There are currently 12 WANO SOERs dating back to 1998
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SOER 2010-1 (Shutdown Safety)SOER 2008-1 (Rigging, Lifting and Material Handling)SOER 2007-2 (Intake Cooling Water Blockage)SOER 2007-1 (Reactivity Management)SOER 2004-1 (Managing Core Design Changes)SOER 2003-2 (Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation at Davis-Besse NPS)SOER 2003-1 (Power Transformer Reliability)SOER 2002-2 (Emergency Power Reliability)SOER 2002-1 (Severe Weather)SOER 2001-1 (Unplanned Radiation Exposures)SOER 1999-1 (Loss of Grid) inc 2004 AddendumSOER 1998-1 (Safety systems status control)
WANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Operating Experience Reports
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESSignificant Operating Experience ReportsSignificant Operating Experience Reports
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Created in 2006, the CEO updates describe important events and trends that utility CEOs are encouraged to discuss with their nuclear executives and oversight organisations.
9 CEO Updates were issued :
• Use of Industry Operating Experience• Rigging, lifting and material handling• Control of high risk outage activities• Reactivity management • Flow accelerated corrosion• Importance of control rods• Transformer failures• Intake cooling water blockage• Availability of emergency AC power
WANO PROGRAMMESCEO Updates
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESCEO UpdatesCEO Updates
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JIT briefings – help planners, workers and supervisors apply lessons learnedfor specific plant activities Each JIT includes 3-4 events Frequent or common causes are
discussed Open questions are provided
to the workers for them to consider what defences are available
JIT reports are specifically designedfor use during pre-job briefings Over 200 JIT reports available
WANO PROGRAMMESJust in Time Operating Experience Reports
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESJust in Time Operating Experience ReportsJust in Time Operating Experience Reports
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WANO PROGRAMMES
Operating ExperienceOperating Experience
Peer ReviewsPeer Reviews
Technical development, Technical development, Support Support and exchanges and exchanges
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The purpose of a WANO Peer Review is to compare the operational performance of a station to standards of excellence through an in-depth, objective review by an independent team
WANO Peer Reviews are performance-based and ask the question, ‘How can this be done better?’
WANO PROGRAMMESPeer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPeer ReviewPeer Review
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The functional areas of Peer Reviews are: Organisation and administration Operations Maintenance Engineering support Radiological protection Operating experience Chemistry Training and qualification Fire protection
Each peer review includes at least one industry peer from each Regional Centre
WANO PROGRAMMESPeer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPeer ReviewPeer Review
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Safety culture Human performance Self evaluation Industrial safety Plant status & configuration
control Work management Equipment performance and
condition
The cross-functional areas of Peer Reviews are:
WANO PROGRAMMESPeer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPeer ReviewPeer Review
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WANO PROGRAMMESPeer Reviews (1992 – 2009)
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPeer Reviews (1992 Peer Reviews (1992 –– 2009)2009)
04 44 87 159 24
14 3824
6222
84
25109
28
137
25
162
22
184
28
212
36
248
30
278
36
314
42
356
27
383
37
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1892 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
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Station Peer Review Six-year frequency by full team to assess performance
Pre-startup Peer Review: Conducted either by WANO or IAEA prior to startup to
assess startup readiness
Corporate Peer Review To assess effectiveness of management and corporate
support
WANO PROGRAMMESPeer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPeer ReviewPeer Review
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Pre Start-Up Peer Review :60 reactors under constructionDedicated Pre Start-Up Team (French Team leader)
Look at everything needed to operate safely at the beginning of commercial operation
Review the important transition from a construction culture to an operating plant with nuclear safety the top priority
WANO PROGRAMMESPre - Startup Peer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESPre Pre -- StartupStartup Peer ReviewPeer Review
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How does the Head of the Company : develop a strong nuclear safety
culture ? set vision, goals, objectives ? provide resources, including human,
financial, engineering, etc. ? exercise nuclear oversight ?
British Energy, Ontario Hydro, EDF, TEPCO,EOn, Rosenergoatom, Slovenske Elektrarne
WANO PROGRAMMESCorporate Peer Review
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESCorporate Peer ReviewCorporate Peer Review
A corporate peer review takes a critical look at the interactions between the plant and its corporate organisation and how they impact performance and reliability
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WANO PROGRAMMES
Operating ExperienceOperating Experience
Peer ReviewsPeer Reviews
Technical development, Technical development, Support Support and exchangesand exchanges
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Information exchange forum,
Specific activities including workshops, seminars, expert meetings and training courses,
Technical Support Missions,
Supporting documents, …
WANO PROGRAMMESTechnical development, support and exchanges
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESTechnical development, support and exchangesTechnical development, support and exchanges
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Number of TSM
029
2943
7249 121
7419581
276
97373
126
499
147
646
168
814
217
1031
184
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1199 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
WANO PROGRAMMESTechnical development, support and exchanges
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMESTechnical development, support and exchangesTechnical development, support and exchanges
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WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATION
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMES
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACKWANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
SFEN Young generation
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EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK Health of Nuclear Safety
No Chernobyl-like accident Trend in performance Safety culture is widely discussed Transparency – reporting of operating
experience International benchmarking Margin management Improved investigative techniques Corporate peer reviews
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EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
29 September, 1957USSR – Siberia - Mayak
Pyroradiological explosion - 75 tonnes TNT equivalent(INES level 6)
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7 October, 1957U.K.
Partial Fuel damage at Windscale(INES level 7)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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22 February, 1977Bohunice - Czechoslovakia
Partial core meltdown of 150 MWe experimental reactor(INES : level 4)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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28 March, 1979Three miles Island - USAPartial core meltdown
(INES : level 5)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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13 March, 1980Saint-Laurent des Eaux - France
Partial meltdown of fuel elements(INES : level 4)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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26 April, 1986Chernobyl - USSR
Nuclear core explosion(INES : level 7)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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24 November, 1989Greifswald unit 5 – East Germany
10 fuel element damage, 24 days after commercial operation
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKPast Nuclear accidents
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21 September 2001Toulouse - FranceAZF (30 deaths)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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15 December, 2005Taum Sauk damMissouri - USA
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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17 August, 2009Sayano-Shushenskaya
Dam – Russia(75 deaths)
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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7 February, 2010Gas electrical generation plant
Kleen Energy, MiddletownConnecticut – USA
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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July, August 2010BP DEEPWATER HORIZON
OIL SPILLMexican Gulf, USA
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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4 October 2010Toxic Red Mud Spill from Aluminum Plant
Hungary
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKNon Nuclear accidents
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No Chernobyl-like accident Trend in performance Safety culture is widely discussed Transparency – reporting of operating
experience International benchmarking Margin management Improved investigative techniques Corporate peer reviews
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK Health of Nuclear Safety
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EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTrend in Performance
Unit Capability Factor
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Perc
ent
Unplanned Automatic Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Scra
ms
Unplanned Capability Loss Factor
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Percent
Yea
r
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No Chernobyl-like accident Trend in performance Safety culture is widely discussed Transparency – reporting of operating
experience International benchmarking Margin management Improved investigative techniques Corporate peer reviews
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKHealth of Nuclear Safety
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EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTransparency – OE : Nuclear incidents
- Loss of Primary circuit pressure - Criticity- Loss of electric grid- Hydrogen explosion- Loss of safety functions : reactivity, cooling.
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18 June, 1999Shika, Japan
During an outage, the control rods were pulled up making the reactor critical while the containment and the reactor pressure vessel were open.
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTransparency – OE : Nuclear incidents
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7 March, 2002Davis Besse, USA
2002 : Reactor pressure vessel head corrosionUndetected leak of boric acid in control rod drive mechanism. Problem was discovered by ultrasonic inspection when the metal layer was only few mm thick. (cavity of 15 cm wide in RPV)It could have occurred a LOCA of 5 inches.
In 2010, lack of in-depth periodic ultra-sonic controls led to discover new cross-over cracks and leakages.
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTransparency – OE : Nuclear incidents
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10 April, 2003Paks, Hungary(INES level 3)
Inadequate cooling of the fuel elements, which were heated due to the radioactive decay of short-lived fission products. These were kept cool by water circulated by a submerged water pump. The incident led to 30 fuel element cladding broken
The Cleaning vessellocated in the pit
water level
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTransparency – OE : Nuclear incidents
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EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKTransparency – OE : Barriers to Using Operating Experience
Language barrier
Our technology is different, therefore the event does not apply to us
Cultural – we would never operate that way
Workload – other higher priority work
Leadership does not place high value on the use of operating experience
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No Chernobyl-like accident Trend in performance Safety culture is widely discussed Transparency – reporting of operating
experience International benchmarking Margin management Improved investigative techniques
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKHealth of Nuclear Safety
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WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATION
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMES
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACK
WANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
SFEN Young generation
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WANO CHALLENGESChallenges to Nuclear Safety
Dramatic growth in our industry Ageing of the current fleet Complacency Shutdown safety Reporting / use of operating experience Workforce experience
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WANO CHALLENGESWhat can operators do?
When an event occurs, what questions do you, should you ask as engineers, leaders or experts?
What is the root cause? Was there operating experience available that
could have prevented this event? If so, why wasn’t OE used?
Does this event need to be shared with the nuclear community?
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No nuclear safety issue should remain if the solution exists elsewhere
in the World
WANO CHALLENGESWhat can operators do?
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If we do not use operating experience, we are destined to repeat events : Use OE
Transparency is fundamental in nuclear safety We are only as strong as our weakest link –
“hostages of one another” One single accident anywhere in the world may
jeopardise the whole nuclear industry. The transfer of operating experience to the next
generation of operators represents one of the greatest challenges we face
WANO CHALLENGESTake-Aways
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WANO ORGANISATIONWANO ORGANISATION
WANO PROGRAMMESWANO PROGRAMMES
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACKEXPERIENCE FEEDBACK
WANO CHALLENGESWANO CHALLENGES
WANO MISSIONWANO MISSION
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
SFEN Young generation
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An individual responsibility
but also …
A collective responsibility
CONCLUSIONNuclear Responsibility
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World Association of Nuclear Operators
Thank you for your attention
Don’t forget to visit our website :www.wano.info
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Member ObligationsMember Obligations
“Accept their individual responsibility for nuclear safety, and accept their collective responsibility”
Actively participate in the governance of WANO Safeguard WANO confidential information Support WANO with membership fees and human resources Host peer reviews and technical support missions (TSMs) Share operating (and construction) experience Provide “experts” for workshops, seminars, other member’s
peer reviews and TSMs Strive for EXCELLENCE in all aspects of plant operation Take timely action to correct performance weaknesses