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ANTITRUST AND INTERCHANGE
Lacey Plache
LECG
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Three Main Points
1. Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems.
2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
3. Contrary to antitrust concerns regarding price-fixing, the primary inefficiency claimed here is not that output has been restricted but rather that output is too high.
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In two-sided markets, competitive pricing involves balancing demand on each side of the market.
Closed-loop payment card systems balance demand by setting cardholder and merchant prices.
Open-loop payment card systems must use interchange fees to balance demand.
1. Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems.
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“Honor-all-cards” is required for all payment card systems.
Given “honor-all-cards,” a multiple issuer system must set default interchange fees.
Otherwise issuers will have the incentive to raise their individual interchange fees to acquirers/merchants, imposing an externality on the system.
1. Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems.
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2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
Interchange fees are used by open-loop payment card systems to competitively balance the two sides of the market.
Balancing led to lower interchange fees in the past and, since 1998, has led to higher interchange fees.
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Visa Interchange Fees(1971-2005)
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2.0%
2.2%
2.4%19
71
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
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Past declines in Visa interchange fees cannot be explained by decreasing Visa market power.
Recent increases in Visa interchange fees cannot be explained by increasing Visa market power.
2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
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Credit and Charge Card Shares(1974-2005)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%19
74
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Visa
MasterCard
American Express
Discover
Diners Club
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2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
Past declines can be explained by Visa’s efforts to achieve “universal acceptance.”
Recent increases in interchange fees can be explained by increasing competition between Visa and MasterCard for issuers.
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2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
Increasing payment system competition has been caused by increased cardholder loyalty to particular issuers, thereby increasing issuer ability to shift cardholders between payment systems.
Competition for issuers intensified after 1998, as MasterCard and Visa competed for dedicated issuance.
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2. The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.
Cardholders have received greater benefits (higher rewards and lower fees) from increased payment system competition and higher interchange fees.
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This inefficiency is not related to market power.
This inefficiency is not specific to the use of interchange fees, or even to payment card systems.
3. Contrary to antitrust concerns regarding price-fixing, the primary inefficiency claimed here is not that output has been restricted but rather that output is too high.