rchives
Dae I September 1989
Reply toAttn of cott E. Lewis
To
1?kcquisition of Apollo ll Press Kit
The File
Washington, DC 20408
The Nixon Presidential Materials Staff has acquired a
reproduction of the original Apollo XI press kit. It was
re-published on July 20, 1989 in commemoration of the
twentieth anniversary of the landing on the moon. It is
stored in the NLNP vertical file under the heading "Moon
Landing." To request the press kit, ask for assistance from
the archivist on duty.
National Archives and Records Administration
4
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- LexisNexis-Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company
The Boston Globe
January 15, 2004, Thursday ,THIRD EDITION
SECTION: NATIONAL/FOREIGN; Pg. A2
LENGTH: 750 words
HEADLINE: BUSH SEES US BACK ON MOON BY 2020 SEES 'NEW FOCUS' FOR NASATOWARD MARS, AND BEYOND
BYLINE: By Wayne Washington, and Bryan Bender, Globe Staff
BODY:WASHINGTON - Calling for a renewed spirit of discovery, President Bush said yesterday he wantsNASA to make a return trip to the moon by no later than 2020 and establish an "extended humanpresence" on the lunar surface that would serve as a steppingstone to more ambitious space explorationof Mars and beyond.
Bush's plan, outlined in an election-year speech at National Aeronautics and Space Administrationheadquarters in Washington, would have Americans living and working on the moon for increasinglyextended time periods.
"Inspired by all that has come before, and guided by clear objectives, today we set a new course forAmerica's space program," the president said. "We will give NASA a new focus and vision for futureexploration. We will build new ships to carry man forward into the universe, to gain a new foothold onthe moon, and to prepare for new journeys to the worlds beyond our own."
Bush's space plans call for the United States to complete its work on the International Space Station and
retire the space shuttle fleet by 2010, to be replaced with a new manned 'crew exploration vehicle'designed and tested by 2008 and used for the first time by 2014.
"We've undertaken space travel because the desire to explore and understand is part of our character,"the president said.
Bush's call for stepped-up space exploration comes at a time when NASA is struggling to redefine its
mission and justify its $15 billion annual budget in the face of shuttle disasters and criticism that the
agency has not reached high enough since the first man landed on the moon in 1969.
"No new technology has come out of NASA in 25 years," Eugene Cernan, the last man to walk on the
moon as commander of Apollo 17 in 1972, said in an interview yesterday. "Today NASA was changed.
We now have a goal in life."
Bush's plan calls for $12 billion over the next five years, the bulk of the money reallocated from within
NASA's current budget. Bush's plan calls for only $1 billion in new space spending over that period.
Funding the vast majority of the program - likely to reach well beyond $100 billion if humans head for
Mars - would fall to future presidents.
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But the excitement at NASA headquarters yesterday was palpable. "This afternoon we got a mandate,"NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe told reporters.
He said the agency will immediately reorganize to execute the president's vision, laying the groundworkfor the new family of space vehicles and new propulsion systems needed to power them. In the shortterm, NASA will place a "singular focus" on conducting research on how humans can live in space forlong duration, O'Keefe said. It will also invite international partners to participate.
The White House is selling the president's proposal as a beneficial and daring dream for relatively littleexpense. A fact sheet distributed by the White House highlighted the new technologies and discoveriesthat have sprung from the past 30 years of space exploration and have led to breakthroughs at home,including new MRI and other medical scanning processes, satellite technology, and fetal heart monitors.
But some of the president's critics raised doubts about whether the new expense is a wise move. SenatorJohn F. Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat running for president, said: "George Bush's space programis boldly going where we went 30 years ago at 20 times the cost. We've got 42 million Americanswithout health insurance, 12 million children in poverty, and have lost 3 million American jobs, andnow this president has the nerve to ask the American people for $1 billion to send people to the moon?"
At the same time, some scientists and astronauts have complained that the new investment is notenough.
"You can't go to the moon by the next decade for that," said US Senator Bill Nelson, a Florida Democratand former crew member of the space shuttle Columbia. "Unless the president gets behind it and pushesit and gives it adequate resources, people will try to pick it apart."
Others agreed it is highly uncertain whether the necessary support can be sustained. "There was thisenormous motivation for Kennedy in '61 - the Cold War and the need to get America mobilized," saidDavid Baker, a former mission planner for the Apollo program and editor of Jane's Space Directory."The big question is, 'Does the American public have the will to pay for it?'" SIDEBAR: SPACESPENDING PLEASE REFER TO MICROFILM FOR CHART DATA.
GRAPHIC: PHOTO CHART, President Bush laughed as he was introduced by Commander MichaelFoale, shown by video from the International Space Station.KRT PHOTO /
LOAD-DATE: January 16, 2004
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wyv I ,-.3‘," ekdil ruil text: Nixon's unused Apollo speech
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News in Video Newyddlon Hosocrvi ,NoticiasSaturday, July 10, 1999 Published at 13:39 GMT 14:39 UK
Sci/TechFull text: Nixon's unusedA olio s eech
In the event Nixon personally welcomed the astronauts back home
Recently discovered documents detail the stepsNasa and the Nixon administration would havetaken had the Apollo XI astronauts Neil Armstrongand Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin been unable to returnfrom the moon.
IIIRST1111 Sci/Tech Contents
The following is the full text of the unused speech,ominously entitled "In the event of moon disaster",which President Nixon would have given as theastronauts lived out their final hours:
A lonely view of a distant home
Fate has ordained that themen who went to the moonto explore in peace will stayon the moon to rest inpeace.
These brave men, NeilArmstrong and EdwinAldrin, know that there is nohope for their recovery. Butthey also know that there ishope for mankind in theirsacrifice.
These two men are laying down their lives in mankind'smost noble goal: the search for truth andunderstanding.
They will be mourned by their families and friends; theywill be mourned by their nation; they will be mournedby the people of the world; they will be mourned by a
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Relevant Stories10 Jul 99 I Sci/TechA silent death 10 Jul 99 I Sci/TechMoon walker dies in bikecrash
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Internet LinksNasa: Apollo XI
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In this sectionWorld's smallesttransistor
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1/28/2004
Mother Earth that dared send two of her sons into theunknown.
No-one knew whether themodule would successfullylaunch from the moon
In their exploration, theystirred the people of theworld to feel as one; in theirsacrifice, they bind moretightly the brotherhood ofman.
In ancient days, men lookedat stars and saw theirheroes in the constellations.
In modern times, we domuch the same, but ourheroes are epic men offlesh and blood.
Others will follow, and surely find their way home.Man's search will not be denied.
But these men were the first, and they will remain theforemost in our hearts.
For every human being who looks up at the moon inthe nights to come will know that there is some cornerof another world that is forever mankind.
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL AKU-IlVtb
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REP59P TUENATIOT,I47• .
A. WHERE WE STAND TODAY
As Opinion Research has pointed out, this issue has not had theenormous impact on the public that one would expect from theintensive press coverage. To the extent that the public isaware of it, they do not understand the issues very well. Ibelieve there are two perceptions:
1. We are against the press;
2. The government lies -- more specifically LBJ and theDemocrats lied us into Vietnam.
The heartland isn't really aroused over this issue. There isnothing like the Galley case here. People know there is a contro-versy; but they're not entirely clear as to what it is all about.Partisan Republicans don't quite understand why we are suppressinginformation that could be damaging to the Democrats; some people,I am sure, think that we are covering up our own failures and mostimportantly, no one is really excited about what they regard as theleak of "ancient" documents. They do not understand the securityissue (if on the other hand we prosecute Ellsberg and it becomesa notorious trial, this could spark a major readily understandableissue and a strong public reaction with our natural constituencyrallying behind us.
The Democrats are horribly divided on this issue. They are split,confused, angry and scrambling to get away from it. As of today,they are delighted that the issue is focusing on Nixon vs. the NewYork Times but most of them are very well aware that the majorthrust of the controversy will eventually become the Kennedy-Johnsonmishandling of the war as to which every possible Democratic candi-date except McGovern, McCarthy, Bayh and Hughes stand to losebadly.
B. NIXON VS. THE PRESS ISSUE
Over the short term, this will remain a hot issue, but it will pass.After the court decision (regardless of tl-E outcome) the vast majorityof the people will forget it. The liberal press will keep bringing itup and will keep trying to knife us with it, but is it not the kind ofan issue that will last. People just don't give a damn that we beatthe New York Times in the Supreme Court or the New York Times beat us.
2.Those who believe we are anti-press will simply have their viewsconfirmed even further, but most of those who believe we areanti-press aren't with us anyway. Those who believe the press isbiased and irresponsible will continue to think so.The prosecution of Ellsberg could have some positive benefits forus in that if he iSH really painted as a villain, the fact that he con-spired with the press and the press printed the documents that hestole, is bound to have a bad ruboff on the press. Once again,however, the issue is going to tend simply to confirm beliefspeople already have; it is not likely to switch very many people.As for the working press, as a result of this controversy, they willlike us even less and that is the case whether we win or lose inthe Supreme Court. The vast majority of the press are hostileto us; that is a fact, not just our paranoia. Yet we somehowmanage to continue to maintain a solid base of popular support;hence we will survive the continued -- yes, even aggravated --hostility of the working press.
On balance, therefore, I don't see any real gain or loss out of thepress issue. The only way in which it hurts us is that for the moment,it obscures what are the real issues;-that is, the Democrats' mis-handling of the government during the Kennedy-Johnson years andthe theft of classified documents. Hence, it is clearly in our interestto let this issue fade. The longer it remains around the longer itwill take to get into the public's mind what we want to be the continuingissues that emerge from this controversy.For these reasons, I would not recommend that we use the VicePresident; that would only escalate the press issue. I would notrecommend that we attack the press or that any Administrationspokesmen attack the press. I would not even recommend that oursupporters on the Hill start attacking the press because to do sowould only keep the press issue itself alive. Let me qualify thisby saying that I would prosecute any newsmen if it can be demonstrated(as in the case of Neil Sheehan perhaps) that they were conspiratorsin the theft of these documents or that they conspired in having themreproduced. It is worthwhile to paint an individual bad if it is partof the prosecution of a natural enemy like Ellsberg.
REP7iDUCE,C,67 THE lq.q101,1L ARCHIVES
3.There are two points that we must make with respect to the wholepress issue. We must make them through our most effectivespokesmen and make them often enough so that we're sure thatthey are reasonably clear in the public's mind. We can then letthe rest of the issue go away.
1. This Administration cannot allow stolen documents to be distributed, printed in the press, etc. Classified documents areclassified for a good reason. Admittedly the government mayoverclassify. But we cannot risk having anyone take the law intohis own hands to make that individual judgment, in effect to puthimself above the law because one document could endanger livesmany lives.
2. The Government has a duty to enforce the law. When once thepress was warned not to publish and then said that notwithstandingthat warning it was going to publish, the Attorney General had norecourse but to bring the action he brought.These two points need to be articulated very clearly, very crisply,very simply, very nonlegalistically. Several of our spokesmen canmake the point. Klein does it very effectively when he goes aroundthe country; Rogers is an excellent person to make the point (and wemight get him to once the issue quiets down); the Attorney Generalcan make this point as well. We should endeavor to get responsiblelawyers around the country making the point. Professor Freund'sargument in today's New York Times is very helpful. Finally the President should make these two points and just these two points,either in an address to the nation or in his next press conference.At the moment, I am very much inclined to think that an address tothe nation would over-escalate the press issue and involve us muchtoo deeply in the whole controversy. I think a press conference willprobably be a far more desirable opportunity.Over the long haul, we might well consider recommendations likeScali's that the President meet with a selective group of newsmen,perhaps the leaders of Sigma Delta Chi and the American Societyof Newspaper Editors. These are things that can be done once theissue is quiet. They should not be done while the issue is hot becausethey will only escalate it and give the appearance that we are dealingfrom a position of weakness. In the course this can be done, both
4.
to get a better understanding, face to face, with journalists and
also to demonstrate that we are not "anti-press. "
Further we can continue to push declassification and declassification
practices and procedures. For example, at the right time an
executive order or a clarifying memorandum pointing out the documents
should not be classified unless there is a real national security
reasons will help make the point with the public that we do believe in
the "right to know". Once again these should not be done now; they
would only escalate the issue and would only appear to be reacting.
We should over a period of time prove that we believe in the right
to know by what we do. It is more important than what we say.
C. CREDIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT ( AND THE DEMOCRATS IN
PARTICULAR)
In my opinion, most people do in fact associate the Kennedy-Johnson
papers with the Democrats. It is true that the issue is blurred; it
is true that people believe that we are covering something up; partisan
Republicans complain repeatedly that they can't understand why we
are covering up Democratic papers and, of course, finally this has
an impact on the office of the Presidency, its credibility and the
credibility of government, generally.
As for the credibility of government, a case can be made that it
has already reached its low point. This incident simply confirms
what many people think anyway. According to Lou Harris' theory
(and Howard Smith's interestingly enough) at least 50% of the
American people at least will always believe what any President
tells them because they want to believe what any President tells them.
If the President goes on television and makes a flatout statement,
people tend to want to believe it. They will still answer questions
in polls that the government is not telling them all that it should or
all that it knows, but they nonetheless will believe the President. I
question, therefore, whether this incident has caused any further
serious erosion of Presidential credibility -- maybe some but not
a great deal -- and there are ways we can rebuild President Nixon's
credibility. Indeed this incident may offer us an opportunity to do
so by deed rather than by words.
For example, if we were to release authentic documents that
demonstrate how the President arrived at his change in Vietnam
policy (for example, a study of decisions leading up to the November 3
speech) we would not have to say that we are being candid, that we
r.
5.
are not covering up, we would prove that we are n
ot. The more
we talk about the fact that we are telling the truth
, that there is
no "credibility gap", that we are not misleading the
people, the
more people tend to be suspicious. In other words, talking ab
out
the fact that we are telling the truth, may in actual
fact, be counter
productive. But doing things that demonstrate that we are tellin
g
the truth and that we have been telling the truth can
be very powerful.
The Kennedy-Johnson papers give us a real opport
unity in this
regard in that it permits us to do things that will be
in vivid, sharp
public contrast with the whole Kennedy-Johnson affair.
Further, we must make every effort to keep ourselve
s out of the
controversy over the Kennedy-Johnson era. We mus
t not attack
LBJ; we must not defend LBJ; we must subtley, but ve
ry effectively,
encourage and fuel the division within the Democratic
ranks without
getting caught, because that simply would inject us bac
k into it.
If we keep ourselves out of the fight over the Kennedy
-Johnson papers
and the issues they raise and at the same time demons
trate not by
words but by deeds, our own candor and credibility, th
en it is my
opinion that the President's credibility and indeed the
government's
credibility can be enhanced by this entire episode, rat
her than hurt
by it. We can be the ones that restored credibility, ho
nesty and
candor to government and the contrast with the prior Ad
ministration
is very dramatic and effective.
D. THE ELLSBERG PROSECUTION
There is another opportunity in this whole episode, tha
t is the
prosecution of Ellsberg. It could indeed arouse the heartland
which is at present not very excited over the whole issue.
First of all, he is a natural villain to the extent that he ca
n be
painted evil. We can very effectively make the point of why
we had
to do what we did with the New York Times; we can discredit t
he
peace movement and we have the Democrats on a marvelou
s hook
because thus far most of them have defended the release o
f the
documents. If we can change the issue from one of release of the
documents to one of the theft of the documents we will h
ave some-
thing going for us.
•
6.
Secondly, a prosecution of Ellsberg can .help taint the press (to the
extent that that in fact helps us). If he indeed conspired with members
of the press and he is painted black, they too ;will be painted black.
Third, this is a clear, clean, understandable issue. People can
relate to it.
Fourthly, the prosecution of Ellsberg protects the credibility of
our case against the New York Times. It will dramatize why we
had to go to court, it will make the case clear to the public that the
release of classified information can be harmful.
Fifth, it helps keep the whole Kennedy-Johnson papers issue very
much alive and on the front pages.
Finally, this is a motivational issue, particularly if the Democrats
are foolish enough to defend him.
E. KEEP THE DEMOCRATS DIVIDED AND FIGHTING
This should happen anyway but we would be foolish to simply lie
back and assume it. We should ensure in subtle ways that it
happens. This needs to be planned out with great thoroughness and
executed with utmost care. The greatest risk would be to get
caught in what we are doing or to have our efforts become obvious.
I have not yet thought through all of the subtle ways in which we
can keep the Democratic party in a constant state of civil warfare,
but I am convinced that with some imaginative and creative thought
it can be done.
Some examples do come to mind. The continued release of documents
will keep the issue very much alive. We might of course orchestrate
carefully and quietly a defense of LBJ; to the extent that his stock
rises those who have now disowned him lose a valuable constituency.
We could of course plant and try to prove the thesis that Bobby
Kennedy was behind the preparation of these papers because he
planned to use them to overthrow Lyndon Johnson (I suspect that
there may be more truth than fantasy to this. )
The Ellsberg case, if pressed hard by us, will of course keep the
issue alive. Developing the case factually of why the President
changed the policies will continually bring the papers themselves
back into the public spotlight.
411
7.
We should encourage, not discourage, the Hill from carrying on
intensive hearings and well publicized hearings over the Kennedy-
Johnson papers and over how we got into Vietnam. If the Hill
during the Fall makes a major production out of an investigation
of why we got into Vietnam at the same time the President is
winding the war down in Vietnam the contrast is once again very
vivid. We don't need to spell it out; the public is smart enough to
see on the one hand the horrors ;of how we got in and on the other
hand, the skill with which the President is managing to get us out.
I realize that Kissinger and others in the establishment at State
and Defense will fight hard against these hearings. In my view,
it can be in our political interest that they go on and be well
publicized.
We can, of course, play up the Humphrey and Muskie comments
of recent weeks which as time passes are going to look more and
more stupid.
We can encourage through our political operation resolutions in
various Democratic state conventions, damning the Johnson-
Humphrey Administration and denouncing the Humphrey-Muskie
ticket which ran in 1968 -- defending the Johnson Administration.
In short, there is a wide open political field which we can exploit
if we play it right and keep ourselves out of it.
F. CONCLUSION
In recent days, an interesting collection of people whose political
judgment I respect, have separately statedAhat they believe this
incident has re-elected the President. While this is an obvious
overstatement it does show how strongly people believe the politics
of this issue will cut. People who have said this range from Lou
Harris on one end of the spectrum to Bill White on the other, with
Dave Bradshaw and a few of my liberal congressional friends tossed
in the middle. (Bradshaw by the way is a very shrewd politician
with excellent political instincts, whose judgment I have always
found to be very close to the mark)
8.
In short, I think it is very clear that there are profound political
implications, that this offers us opportunities in ways we perhaps
did not initially appreciate, that we can turn what appeared to be
an issue that would impair Presidential credibility into one that
we can use by effective contrast to improve the credibility of this
Administration; and further, that it is a tailor-made issue for
causing deep and lasting divisions within the Democratic ranks.
For this reason, I feel that we must not move precipitously or
worry about tomorrow's headlines. We must keep our eye on
the real target: to discredit the Democrats, to keep them fighting
and to keep ourselves above it so that we do not appear to be
either covering up or exploiting.
The foregoing thoughts need a bt of refinement, need to be sifted
carefully through the staff, need a lot of creative input added and
then our strategy needs to be very carefully executed. While I
detest the term, this is one issue that calls for a full fledged,
carefully thought out "game plan" that we pursue to the hilt.
S?./JH3,1;" TO'
A
DRAFTCTWhitehead:jmJune 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: Meeting with Flanigan, Klein, Whitehead, and Six Broadcasters:Wr e Petersmyer, Madison, Harris,
Howell, 7Murpby
Purpose: To Inform high-level White House people of the economic problemsof the broadcast business and stations problems as opposed to network
problems
Their problems in order of priority were: (1) license renewal, (2) anti-
advertising movements, (3) cable television, particularly pay television, and
sports, (4) Fairness Doctrine.
Their recommendations for what should be done: (1) More speeches of
the type Whitehead has been giving to get the word out, particularly to a broader
audience than just broadcasters, (2) Appointments to regulatory agencies,
(3) Support of licenses renewal legislation, particularly the Griffen and Broyhill
Bills, and (4) If the FCC does not determine that the Fairness Doctrine applies
to product adds, then seek legislation to that effect.
They made the general point that in the last two or three years, regulation
and interference from Washington has become more intense and more interfering
and more burdensome on station owners. It is far worse in this Administration
than the last. It is worse than ever before. They understand that some of this
is beyond the control of this Administration (such as the Democratic majority
on the FCC and Democratic appointments to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court) but other than Whitehead and Klein, the-re is no sense that the
President or anyone else in the Administration understands their problems or
cares about them.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: Meeting with the President, Klein, Flanigan, Ziegler, Whitehead, and(list of broadcasters -- Brian will get)
The President opened the meeting by referring to meetings he has had with
broadcasting executives and said he wanted to have similar meetings with
individual station owners. He is aware of their concerns, cable television,
and the like. He wanted to start the meeting off by asserting some principles
First, was his belie in the private enterprise system -- particularly in the
media. It is in the interest of the country that we have a strong and
independent private enterprise broadcast system for two reasons: (1) Principles
of the First Amendment -- Free Speech, Free Press, dangers of government
control; (2) He has traveled abroad extensively .and seen what government-run,
or government-sponsored broadcasting is like, and in spite of the dowing reports
of many people that government-controlled broadcasting produces high-quality
programming, no commercials, etc. He stated that no one should be fooled --
that that was a bunch of crap.
The President then turned his attention to public broadcasting in this country.
He stated that this country would benefit from the public broadcasting system,
that most of his advisers disagreed with him on this subject, and urged him to
support the larger funds for broadcasting. He thought that the biggest danger,
however, was not that it be too lig, but that it be kept under very careful control
as to size and what it was allowed to get into because it would inevitably be subject
to Government control, and would inevitably become a political force in our
country. He felt that we had to give serious consideration to the fact that you //
-2-
never know who's going to be sitting in his chair next and that some presidents
might be inclined to use Federal support of public broadcasting to their advantage,
that that was a risk not worth taking; and, therefore, public broadcasting, particularly
the use of Federal funds, should be kept under the strictest of control and not be
allowed to become too large.
The President then asked to hear what the group had in mind.
Bill Michaels of Storer Broadcasting then talked for about 5 minutes identifying
some principal problems: license renewals (challenges, petitions to deny,
blackmail problems, agreements that they were forced to sign, the FCC condoning
of same) and the antiadvertising movement in the country, particularly the
Federal Trade Commission's proposals of counteradvertising.
The President said he has strong feelings about the anti-advertising forces
and again referred to travel abroad and the blandness of programming where
there was no advertising and the lack of brand-name competition that advertising
fosters. Regarding productiAt4 ads and the fairness doctrine, the President
stated he felt many people were using the fairness doctrine, using FTC procedures,
etc., not because they were interested in fairness advertising, but because they were
against the privat e enterprise system and wanted to promote their own philosophy.
He feels strongly that this should be fought not only on those grounds, but also
on philosophy grounds. He added we have to watch very closely to make sure
the camel's nose does not get under the tent, that once these kinds of precedences get
established, it is hard to contain them.
3
Mr. Michaels noted that manufacturers and distributers are also
seriously concerned because they do not want to pay directly or indirectly for
counterads and do not want the Government giving people free time to discuss
the negative aspects of their product.
The President communicated he understood and proceeded to
discuss public interest challenges to license renewals. He indicated the next
step is very clearly government censorship: Who's going to determine what
the public interest is?
Broadcaster No. 2 ( ) cited some
license renewal figures he thought would be of interest to the President.Since April 1967, there have been 167 petitions'to deny television licenses.
out of some 600 television stations in the country. 112 are pending, 17
have been decided by the FCC, 551 to payoffs to challenging groups.
Ward Quaal stated what we need is Presidential leadership, --leadership of the office of the President for legislation to deal with this
problem.. He talked about their Altr*istic end. In their Denver station, theylost money at first. Now they are beginning to make a little money, but arebeing challenged by chicanos who did not appreciate the public service theyoffilber. They find out because of license renewal problemsthat station was worth only 1/2 what he was offered for it three years ago.
-.4-
Broadcaster No. 3 (identified with Scripps Howard in some way). He
noted some of their stations in the South were being challenged by the white
groups who said there was too much black programming and challenged by the
blacks who said their was too much white programming.
The President asked the rhetorical questiort"There will be more of this
wont there; and it's basically blackmail." There was wide agreement around
the table.
Mr. Chapin told the President that several radio stations and all three
television stations in Omaha had had licenses pending for 24 months because
of challenges of petitions to deny by two old ladies who had left Omaha.
Crutchfield addressed his remarks to the group(?) more than the
President. It's ironical that we are here telling you our problems when we
watch the network news shows and we know that our industry is allowing the
networks, with possibly one exception, day in and day out to undermine the
President and what he is trying to accomplish. We broadcasters should go
to the networks and demand balance. Only then are we justified in asking
help from the President.
The President indicated he appreciated Crutchfield's remarks, but
the most important thing was the economic survival of the broadcast system.
He then indicated that we probably could do something with the networks,
but it was more clear whether we probably can or probably cannot do
something. He indicated the difficulty of helping is a problem. The people
in the news departments have their biases and they are typically Left and.
Liberals and they are likely to pass on what they believe.
-5-
Discussed the problems of newspaper editors in the past and made an
analogy to the problems of broadcasting then and their efforts to bring
balance and objectivity to the news situation.,
, The President noted that some of the most unbalanced programming
he had seen was in the interval between his announcement of the mining ofwere
Haiphong and his visit to the USSR. The predictions/that this would escalate •
the war and end the Summit talks. But yet not one reporter said they were
wrong. The President again stated he did not know what you can do about that.
Broadcaster No. 3 (unidentified)explained why the broadcasters are
asking for legislation is because the courts have interfered even when the
majority of the FCC is trying to make the right- decisions.
The. President nodded,indicating he understood.
Larry Israel cited the BEM case and the Court of Appeals decision.
He indicated that it is going to the Supreme Court and made some reference
to the decision being fundamental and involving paid access. Referred to
Whitehead's help and comments in this regard were that Whitehead understood
the problem and understood that the court decisions were crucial and that
legislation might be necessary.
The President seemed confused about the issue and asked him to
describe it more.
Israel gave a rather disjoiLd poltimic on the dangers of letting all
kinds of wierdo groups buy time.
6
Jack Harris brought out all public television sports, antis iphoning
rules and the problem with people having to pay for what we now see free.
After a rather disjointed discussion, the President asked if this means
football games will be like boxing matches (on closed circuit television).
The answer was "yes" and he indicated he would be against that. He took
some notes at this point. He commented that the only thing he liked on
television was sports and he would look into it.
The President proceeded to discuss Bakersfield, California, and his
visit there many years ago and the more recent visit in which he discovered
questioned
there are 15 radio stations. He/whether Bakersfield can support that many
many radio stations and if over-extension of licenses is becoming a problem.
He stated he is all for competition, but if there is too much -- if there are too
many licenses -- then no one makes any money and you don't get good service
for anyone. He indicated he had asked Burch to look into this when he came
into office. The President stated this used to be a problem and wonders if
it is a problem now.
The broadcasters indicated this was nota problem.
Bill Michael reiterated license renewal is the number one problem.
The FCC is using procedures originally designed for initial awarding of
licenses, and that is not appropriate for interval licenses.
Petersmyer brought up cable. Cable is making more channels available,
which is having the same effect. That this big danger is cable. He discussed
his experiences at Ft. Wayne.
The President asked how much capital investment is in broadcasting.
Ward Quaal indicated about $3.5 billion.
The President seemed somewhat surprised it was that much.
Ward Quaal stood and gave a rather lengthy discourse on how his
stations in Chicago, WGN, is probably the best independent station in the
country, had fought the importation of its own signal into other
where it would hurt another station, in spite of the fact that it would mean
more money for them. Localism is an important value that ought to be
preserved.
The President said a lot is to be said for that, particularly in view
of the makeup of the country. The opportunity -for local expression is an
important consideration.
Petersmyer noted the FCC is forcing broadcasters to give their
signals away for free, to be used in competition with other broadcasters in
unfair competition.
Leonard ReinIch and other broadcaster (unidentified) brought out the
side to cable. There are positive sides too in terms of service to the public.
Does not necessary compete with broadcasting. In many cases, people get
TV only from cable. In many cases, broadcasters can't afford competition.
Protection of public interest requires there be a balance between over-the-air
and cable.
The President recalled in his meetings with the networks, ABC
8-
wtt. '
climbed the walls over public television. CBS seemed ambivolant, perhaps
because they have interest in both sides.
Morton !Drought the subject back to license renewal. Said the fundamental
problem is still license renewal and not having license renewed is like not be
re-elected.
The President was noncommital on cable. There was a discussion
of license renewal terms. The President said he was completely in accord
with the broadcasters and against "nutty ideas" of the anti-advertising movements
He is very suspicious of their motives. The best regulation in advertising is
competition. If Ford does something wrong, you can bet GM will call it to
the peoples' attention. He stated that the steps being asked by the antiadvertising
people would lead to Federal standards and everything. Programming advertising
and inevitably gray production with bland names that you have seen in the
stores in countries where there is no competition or licenses.
The President noted he had spoken to Dean Burch when he came into
office and noted this was a problem. The President noted perhaps legislation
was need and was the answer. He called special attention to and emphasized
that his reason for agreeing was not so much the economics of the thing
because, after all, he has to consider the overall public interest. But his reason
was the motives of those who opposed licenses. The Government, of course,
must mediate these disputes and this leads inevitably to the public interest
standards and that is a short step from censorship, and that is the ultimate
danger. Stability of environment is an important criteria. The current chaotic
situation must be handled. Again, he must look at the overall public interest
and it is in fhe overall public interest that there be an overall public television.
-9-
He came back again to the motives of the people who challenge licenses
and who press counteradvertising out.
Bill Michaels again came back to license renewal procedures --
how they involve unfair comparisons, promise vs. performance.
The President asked how often licenses come up for renewal. Theevery
answer was/three years. Some general discussion followed and the President
made the off-hand remark that 3 seemed too short; 5 was perhaps about right.
Pete rsmyer cited Griffen and Broyhill and urged the President's support.
The President raised the question of where the burden of proof
lies -- is the licensee guilty unproven innocent, or innocent until proven guilty?
He seemed concerned the station owner having to prove he is doing a good job.
He indicated he thought it was fair for them to have their licenses revoked
from time to time, but that the locus of the burden of proof was a very
important issue.
Michael indicated that this was part of the problem. The courts have
knocked down the FCC so often that it feels it must take challenges and petitions
to hearings. This clogs the processes and encourages blackmail agreerre nt.
Leonard Reinch noted the role of the Ford Foundation and other
foundations in support of the challenges.
The President indicated he wanted this situation checked out. Seemed
concerned about the use of tax-free dollars for such purposes. Indicated this
is not the year to have legislation, but urged the broadcasters to talk to their
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Senators and Congressmen and have the groundwork laid.
Petersmyer noted that Sen. Pastore has indicated he would not do
anything until the Administration had made some proposals.
Broadcaster 2 discussed some of the problems of agreements. broadcasters
have been forced to make with minority groups, public interest groups, etc.
These limit their of programming, public interest hiring,
etc.
The President said this must be stopped.
Ward Quaal commented in spite of their problems about how much
the broadcasting industry is in debt to the President.
There was a wide round of applause.
The President particularly appreciated- the comment of his old
friend, Mr. Crutchfield. The President said the worstthing about license
renewal and an old problem is getting you into the censorship role. His
objection to license renewal and the advertising problem was the motives
of the advertisers. The motives of those who challenge licenses and
advocate counter-commercials, and the like. He inevitably
harm of the government must mediate these disputes, must make the
decisions. This is a very small step from the government using
its influence to deny licenses, on the basis of how well the licensee
treats the Administration. 4poikknows who will be setting in my chair in
the future. The Government and the broadcasters should not favor either
Liberal or Conservative views. The important thing is to have a balance.
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Bill clarified not asking for management of the news, but asking for
management control of the news departments.
The President then discussed Severeid, Brinkley, and the like. Cited
a column which said that it was ridiculous to have people espousing the
conservative point of view because after all, the network people presented
both sides of the story.
The President thought that was very funny. He said that Severeid
and the like do a deliberate and effective presentation of their point of
views. There are Liberal and they would be the first to acknowledge it.
The meeting adjourned.
DECLASSIFIED
Authorit oagq IBy ii ARA Date _Of*
CANDIDATE + MONEY + MEDIA = VOTES
by
Roger E. Ai les, President
Roger Al es & Associates, Inc.
Town Hall of California
June 8, .1971
Reproduced at the National Ai ChiveS
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Date 01111111111110111
Authority
By
We are well past the initial tremors of future shock described so vividly in
the recent book by Alvin Toffler, and our adaptability quotient as human beings is
challenged daily by events, which seem to signal the end of the traditional American
way of life. The core of our society, which is our political system, has undergone a
complete upheaval in the past decade. This was brought about by the introduction
into politics of that much talked about and much maligned, but little understood
medium, television.
Television has completely changed our .political process. It has changed who we
elect, how we elect and even why we elect someone. Like many technological advances,
the impact of political television has preceded the understanding of its meaning or
its uses. The natural human reaction to this lack of understanding is fear, and this
single emotion--fear--overrides much of American life today and has brought about a
national negativism which has wrapped around us like a shroud!
Being deeply interested in and involved in television and politics, I find it
difficult to divorce the two from the rest of our life. Therefore, today I'd like to
talk about the process of getting elected to an office in the government which is
responsible for our future, about the biggest problem we face as a nation, and about
how business is "missing the boat" in helping to insure the continuation of the
American way of life.
Let's start by discussing the title of this speech--CANDIDATE + MONEY + MEDIA .
VOTES. This title, of course, represents a vast oversimplification, but it typifies
the shorthand world we live in--a shorthand characteristic of the television medium
and in fact, developed to the ultimate degree by the very time-limited nature of
television, America's most popular news medium.
Since 1959 the Roper Organization has been taking a yearly national survey on
the media. In 1963 television bypassed newspapers as the people's major source of
news and has been widening the gap since. This year over 59% of those polled said
they relied on television as their major news source and about one-third of the people
said they relied on TV as their only news source. You might be interested to note
that this year TV was rated by 49% of the people as our most believable medium. That
is higher than newspapers, radio and magazines combined.
Keeping these figures in mind, consider that the average lead story on TV is
about 90 seconds in length and the average news item in a TV newscast is covered in
less than a minute. All of the facts of an earthquake, an invasion, or even a robbery
cannot be seen or told in this shorthand manner. Television is the best means of
communication ever devised by man, but it does have some limitations. We must never
believe that personal problems can be solved in 60 seconds and world problems can besolved in 60 m;nutes, as they seem to be on TV. In a world of everything frcm
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instant breakfast to instant sex we have come to want instant solutions to all Our
problems. Television rarely, if ever, tells the whole story. It is imperative
that v.e begin to understand what TV can and cannot do. This will determire whether
its future is to become an asset or a liability to us in the long run.
The title (Candidate + 'Honey + Media = Votes) presumes the candidi-tc is
credible, the media strategy is good and the money is limitless. However, this
isn't all it takes to get elected in America, and if you don't believe me, ask
would-be Senators Metzenbaum of Ohio, Bush of Texas, or Ott inger of New York.
It is estimated that Mr. Ottinger spent a million dollars in the New York
primary alone. This was spent almost entirely on spot announcements of 60 seconds
or less. Gang into the general election he was clearly the leader. Suddenly he
was faced with longer programs and televised debates, and he didn't look nearly as
good as he did in those "canned" commercials. Credibility is still the most
important factor in getting elected and no amount of money can buy it.
I said that the introduction of television into politics causes fear, and
it does. Again this is because we fail to understand the limits of the medium.
I emphasize limits because recently there has been much publicity about television
distortion. If distortion exists in television, it is the reporters themselves
and the selection of material that are responsible.
Last December, CBS Washington Correspondent Roger Mudd said, "The inherent
limitations in our medium.. .means a dangerous concentration on action, usually
showing violence rather than thought. And on happenings rather than issues,
on shock rather than explanation. Our broadcasts have not improved," Mudd declared,
"If anything they have declined."
The television camera by itself does not distort. TV magnifies but does not
exaggerate. Yes, it is a close-up medium and a nervous twitch will be seen by
40 million people, but exaggeration means to magnify beyond the limits of reality,
and that the camera cannot do. That is why I am for political candidates spending
more tire on television in program situations.
I would like to see less time and money spent on commercials, which represents
the ultimate in selective editing, and less time spent with reporters tellinc us
what they think or what we ought to think and more time spent with the candidate
himself on camera live. I have great belief in the public's ability to spot phonies
and repeated TV exposure showing the candidate in different situations will help.
However, because of the recent publicity about distortion, fear does exist.
The next logical step is overreaction which leads to control or repression. I an
not suggesting that some fair guidelines and limitations are not needed in the
political television area, but I am soggesting no, I am emphatically stating --
•
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that the recent publicity surrounding campaign spending is over-blown, that therighteous outcry of some would-be limiters is self-serving, that the evils oftelevision in the political process are exaggerated and oversimplified, and thatthe values and the accomplishments of television in politics are seldom if everpointed out to the general public.Let me give you some examples. I have witnessed or been directly involved inelections where the losing candidate lost primarily because 1) somebody in his ownparty inadvertently killed his credibility on a key issue, or 2) because thecandidate really didn't want to win, or 3) because the candidate failed to listento his advisers, or 4) because the opponent was more credible, had a better mediaplan, even though he had less money, or 5) because somebody in his own partydeliberately sabotaged him, or 6) because the volunteer organization failed to turnout the vote on election day, or 7) because the candidate's wife didn't want himto win, or 8) because a candidate, eight points ahead in the polls, dropped* hopelessly behind after a one-hour television debate. These are just a few examplesof haw to lose an election even if the candidate, the money, and the media are inorder.
Yes, a candidate must be credible. He must show a track record of success insomething, if not politics, and he must indicate his position on some issues. Ibelieve there is too much emphasis on where a candidate stands and not enough onthe direction in which he is moving. Is he leading the charge or reluctantlybeing dragged, kicking and screaming all the way? Is he consistent? There is nodoubt that television can help to establish a candidate's credibility, but itcan't do everything. In fact, it cannot create credibility, but it does reflectcredibility or the lack of it, thereby destroying some candidates. As long as welive in a free society where a candidate must face live television, the writtenpress, and vote on Issues publicly, I have no fear of electing a monster indisguise. I am in favor of limiting the number of commercials shown on TV duringa campaign, and in fact would favor a clause requiring no less than 35% ofbroadcast monies available to a candidate be spent on buying program time insteadof commercial time. Further, I would require stations to make several hours ofprime time television available in statewide elections to major party candidatesfree of charge. After all, these are the men we must rely on to lead this nationout of turmoil. To do this we need men of vision who can lead and men ofconscience who can act. We have a much better chance of finding those men closeup on live TV than we ever did watching a candidate wave from the back end of atrain or taking the advice of the "courthouse crowd."
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There has been much criticism recently of the media strategy used in political
campaigns. In my opinion, trying to censor a campaign from the advertising viewpoint
treats a symptom and not really the cause. A candidate and his campaign management
or consulting firm set the ethical level for the campaign. There are less than a
dozen capable campaign consulting companies in the country today. Most of these
belong to a new organization known as the American Association of Political
Consultants. That group is today working out a voluntary ethical code covering
truthfulness, fairness and accuracy to be followed by all campaign consultants. I
agree that each of these companies should register and should meet certain standards
to qualify as a legitimate camp3ign consulting firm. A good portion of the
responsibility for returning politics to an honorable profession lies in these hands.
Are these companies necessary? The answer is yes. Getting elected is extremely
complicated today and a candidate needs professional help in polling, organization,
research and media planning. No one will ever be elected to a major political office
again without the skillful use of television.
There is no doubt that money is needed to get elected today, however, few
candidates, even if they have it, spend their own. Usually it is raised by the Party
It's important to keep the outcry against campaign spending in perspective.
It is true, according to FCC records, that all candidates and parties spent
$89,000,000 on radio and television in 1968. This figure covers both time and
production charges.
So, $89,000,000 was spent to help us decide who to vote for and to tell us
something about each of the candidates. However, last year Procter & Gamble by
itself, one of hundreds of television advertisers, spent $179,276,100 on TV
advertising alone! Also, last year seven companies spent over $60,000,000 each, to
advertise products on TV! It's no wonder we know more about detergents than we do
about political life in America!
The Ed Sullivan program costs about $375,000 per show or more than 14 million
dollars a year. If you multiply the cost of that one hour by the number of hours in
prime time on three networks, you'll get some idea of what is spent on our
entertainment programming. 89 million dollars worth of television and radio for all
political candidates, nationwide, during an entire political year is dwarfed by
comparison.
The present bill limiting campaign contributions and expenditures which just
left the Senate Commerce Committee still has many loopholes in it. For one thiny, it
is specific in controlling business contributions to parties but establishes no
effective controls on labor unions. This relates back to my point about the
righteousness of people pushing this bill. in my opinion, it's more than a
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coincidence that this area has been overlooked. There is some danger of rushing
this bill through while there are still some serious questions about its
constitutionality with regard to freedom of speech
I believe the British use of television in elections has some merits. Of
course, their entire system would not work here, but at least one element is
particularly appealing. That is, limiting the amount of campaign tire allcwed to
three weeks. Three weeks is much too short for this country but, on the other hand,
the fatiguing situation we have now with seven semi-announced candidates a year and
a half away from the election running around the country Monday morning quarterbackine
is also going too far. In my opinion, if the news media would quit trying to create
false excitement by covering all potential presidential candidates in terms of a
popularity poll, which is meaningless at this stage, they would be taking a giant
step forward in journalistic responsibility.
Fear, then, has caused an overreaction in this and many other areas. Fear
eventually gives way to panic and panic to chaos. It's no wonder many of our people
are reacting to our system with rebellion or withdrawal.
There is great emphasis today on the negative aspects of our Republic. We all
are hypnotized into fanning the flames of negativism daily and we're losing sight of
the fact that the greatest asset in a free society is that we have the pcwer and the
means to cure our own ills.
Believe it or not, many of our business and political leaders understand this,
but they have failed to communicate it to our people. In many cases companies are
outperforming their public relations departments. One of the major reasons is that
most PR people are still print oriented. Tom Shepard, publisher of Look Magazine,
has said that every corporate executive should have training in handling radio and
television.
We've all heard the question a hundred times. What's the biggest problem we
face in America today--poverty, equality, the generation gap? No, I believe these
are effects, and in order to turn this country around, we had better define and
treat some causes.
The biggest problem today, I believe, is communication on all levels. Before
print and before radio and television there was some excuse for this failure. Today
there is none. And the self-perpetuating sympton of this disease is a completely
negative attitude about ourselves and our system. America has a cancer. Cancer is
usually fatal, but it doesn't have to be if it is discovered and treated in time
Well gentlemen, we as a nation have it, we have positively identified it. There
may be time, but our national life depencs on our ability to use our technical
knowledge to cure the ills in our country and upon our refusal to be caught up in
this negative attitude about our system. In other words, we must exhibit and
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PAGE 6
communicate an unbending will to live. Without these things America will be nothingmore than a history lesson in a student-run college of the twenty-first centuryAmerica, the most progressive example of government in the history of mankind,will be summed up in the following quiz some semester end in the future:
Question: America lasted a little over two hundred years. Why is sheconsidered important to world history?
Answer: In the beginning, many learned people considered her Cre modelof societies to come and actually believed that peoplecould overcome internal problems and live in freedom.
Question: Why did America fail?Answer: Apparently, there was an inability of enough of her
business and political leaders to translate the ideals shestood for into practical everyday solutions. This causedan internal cancer which was most noticeable by its syrptomof a prevailing national negative attitude.
Question: When and why did America finally die?Answer: Sometime between 1970 and 1980 she became so burdened
down with negativism that everybody thougtifit futile toget involved, so she simply gave up her will to live.
If that is to be America's epitaph, everyone here in this room will be responsible.Many things contribute to this fatalistic attitude about America. Let me
cite an example of its growth. I realize that attacking Ralph Nader istantamount to heresy among most people, but if the President, the Church,Joe Namath and even CBS are not exempt from criticism --- neither is Nader.Ralph Nader, perhaps unbeknownst even to himself, is causing pollution. Nispollution is intangible but real. It prevades our lives and causes us to believethat because the Corvair was bad, General Motors is bad, that because some largecompanies have conspired against us that all large companies are greedy monolithicmonsters determined to squash the little man, that because some companies maketoo much profit and contribute to the destruction of our environment that there issomething inherently wrong with the profit motive. Fortune magazine says Naeerhas pit the corporation and the consumer as bitter enemies and in fact he has. Thisdoes not create a healthy climate in which to solve problems. I have great respectfor Mr. Nader. In fact when he first took on his cause of automobile safety a fewyears ago, I was producing a national television talk show. I sought him out tomake an appearance on that program. I agree with those who believe that he has madean enormous contribution as an individual citizen to our country. However I believehe is cynical when he says that Congress is "an anachronism but a good investmentfor corpol'ations." I have worked personally with many Congressmen and Senators in
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the past few years and that belief by Nader is not fair. If you believe everythingRalph Nader says, you'll start to believe that the American way of life is, "unsafe at any speed."I only use him as an example to show that even the good a Ralph Nader doescan have some negative effect if it is not perceived in perspective. Any doubthe has caused about the fundamental soundness of the capitalistic system couldhave been balanced if the business community had responded in a positive manner.However, here again enters our villain, fear! If fear in the televisionworld has caused overreaction, fear in the.business community caused underreactiolv.Where business was guilty, they usually failed to admit it and where they are right,they continually fail to communicate it.
There are many reasons why young people consider business another word for"the establishment." One is that our educators, who have what in effect amountsto a guaranteed annual income, do not understand and have failed to teach the basiclessons of the free enterprise system. Don Kendall, President of Pepsico,Incorporated, has called it economic illiteracy, and that's exactly what it is.He says, "economic illiteracy is the intuitive instinct that there is somethinginherently wrong with the profit motive. It is a simple fact that the poverty andinequalities which we face in this country today have a better chance of beingsolved, and in fact are being solved, by the free enterprise system." It is up tobusiness to get this simple fact across to the American people. Today there areover 500 bills pending in Congress aimed at controlling private industry. By notgiving the public a balanced view, companies are committing suicide. Governmentcontrol and loss of profits is not necessarily the answer to the consumers' prcblems.After all, the government has operated at no profit for years and look what thathas done for us. Business can no longer keep its head in the sand and every chiefexecutive officer in a corporation must revolutionize his thinking in terms ofinternal and external ccmmunications if he is to progress in the 70's.I wish to emphasize this need for communication because my own industry--thetelevision industry--has itself failed to get across its own values in many areasand particularly in politics. There is a creeping negative attitude abouttelevision in politics that somehow we are electing contrived images and not men.That simply is not tree! It is to the voters' and thus the country's advantage tosee and to hear a candidate. Television has revived political discussion in thiscountry on all levels--even in our grade schools. It has influenced more peopleto get involved in the political process than ever before. It is breaking dcwnbackroom bossism and will continue to do so. Television has made the viewers andthus the voters more kncwledgeable on the basic social issues that face this nation.
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And it has been primarily responsible for influencing the business and political
P
communities to do something about the environment in which we live.Yes, there are still some inequities in the use of TV in politics, however,I submit to you that we have a far better communication system with televisionthan without it and that the coming days of worldwide live television will make alarger contribution to peace in our time than any other single force. The daywill come when television will not only cover the signing of a peace treaty butworld communication through television will eventually make it impossible fornations not to negotiate peace.Thank you.
REPR9DQTI IIATIONAL AliGHIVt6
"EYES ONLY" PERSONAL & G-E3N-Ft-trEMITIcr-DR.'7.7.7.771 I" 137,
ADtIIIT'J;TiV VIA.7 .1170
Haldeman from Safire E. O. 12065, aection C-102
BY eeel 4A4.4.1 MRS, Date /- 2-Z -
Re: Scrapping the "Machinery" Idea April 8, 1969.
A bureaucrat once proudly briefed President Taft on "themachinery of government." When he left, the President sadly shookhis head and said, "You know -- he really thinks it is machinery."
Government, at the highest level, is a science and an art;but it is not a technology. Therefore, any self-effacing effort onyour part to portray yourself as a "technician" dbes this:
1. contributes to a cold, calaulating picture of menclose to the President;
2. accentuates the minutiae at the expense of the bigpicture;
3. stifles creativity;
4. worst of all, pictures the President as the captiveof an unfeeling machine.
I have put this in extreme terms so as to jolt you into carefulreconsideration of the public side of your own role. Like it or not,there is a public side to what you do. Your choice is not publicity orno publicity; it is either good or bad publicity. Cloaking your operationsin secrecy, or even in the guise of being "only a technician," meansbad publicity for the Office of the President.
Busting up some favorite shibboleths:
1. • "A passion for anonymity results in anonymity." Deadwrong. An unbridled passion for anonymity leads to an aura of secrecy;to the press, forbidden fruit becomes far tastier than the same fruitlying (-)bn the table. Thus, the "passion" leads but to greater publicity,usually unfavorable. The only way to be relatively anonymous is to berelatively available to the press; after the first flurry of interest, ifyou handle it right, you can keep press interest on a back burner.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
,
PERSONAL & COrTFTIDEN
-2-
2. "Recognition that the President is surrounded by brilliant
men detracts from the President's own billiance." Baloney. Nixon
isn't Johnson. The measure of a President's stature is partly the men
he trusts and surrounds himself with. That's been Nixon philosophy
from the start.
3. "A Presidential assistant should be too busy to afford to
take time on his own public relations." If he appears to be too busy,
then he seems not to be on top of his job; this puts the President in a
bad light as one who overloads people.
4. "But I really prefer to be unknown. I don't like the public
eye." There are a lot of other things a Presidential assistant prefers --
sleep, vacations, family time, security -- and he gives those up, too.
Who is an assistant to make decisions on the basis of what he prefers?
Nobody suggests that an assistant to the President become a spokesman
or a front man. He should stay in the background as much as he can.
But in this day and age, the best way to stay in the background is to
give occasional backgrounders to influential writers.
Let's assume you buy the idea that occasional exposure is the way to
avoid sudden bursts of overexposure. There are three ways to approach
the problem:
1. Defensive: (a) "I'm not really very important." Nobody
believes this; credibility problem. (b) "Any good executive could
handle this job." Then why you? Cronyism? President can't find a
really top executive? (c) "My job really isn't very interesting so
there can't be much to write about." If this is so, then the government
is not interesting, and dullness should not be our hallmark.
2. Offensive: "Hey, pay attention to me." This does not work,
and it is out of character for you anyway.
3. Missionary: The Assistant explains in a positive manner
those areas of his work that reflect well on the President's method of
operation. He develops a set of public missions, and each interview
he gives is a step in explaining one or more of those missions. In this
way, he is not selling himself -- he is helping sell an important facet
of the Presidency.
Here we are down to the short strokes. What clear impression should
H. R. Haldeman be leaving with interviewers? What messages can you
uniquely deliver publicly that will benefit the Administration?
REPRODUCED AT THE NMIONAL ARCHIVES
PERSONAL & oeNNfM-
-3-
1. Fermentation of Ideas.
Wrong way to present this: Haldeman's operation sees to
it that nothing reaches the President that has not been fully "staffed
out".
The President's time should not be wasted with half-baked ideas, or
thoughts that come in "out of channels."
This is bad presentation because it presents your operation as a barri
er,
"insulating" the President from work of genius or daring, watering down
provocative plans until they become bland committee recommendations.
It also suggests that the President is not discerning enough to recognize
an idea as half-baked, or wishes people to stay confined to rigid
departmental lines. Which is not so.
The right way to present this: This administration
regards nothing more valuable than a good idea. To make certain that
ideas are not flung around and forgotten, we have set up a process to
bring good minds to bear on good ideas, which stimulates further and
deeper thinking.
When an idea comes into the President's office -- whether it's a better
way to spend money, save money, or have the President do something
that costs nothing but makes a point -- Haldeman's staff starts the cross-
fertilizing.
When it reaches the President's desk -- fairly quickly -- it contains the
original idea as first presented, with back-up comments, objections,
amendments and further thoughts by those who should have an interest.
It is neither harmonized nor homogenized: the President is interested in
seeing conflicting views so tha t he can make decisions with ideas and
facts in context. And when the idea originates with the President, he has
a right to see it refined and thought through by his staff.
Result: a fermentation of ideas within the administration, not all good --
but even an idea that is off base can stimulate another that will work.
One of the Haldeman staff functions is to keep the idea pot bubbling.
Z. Using the Golden Bullets.
Each minute of the President's time is a kind of golden bullet,
too valuable to the nation to waste on scattershot meetings or premature
decisions.
REPR<JUMLU nt IVA I Ivry,
,
PERSONAL & CrE441+Thari,
-4-
Wrong way to present this: Haldeman the doorkeeper,
zealous protector
of the President from seeing "unimportant" pe
ople, super-efficient
organizer of the President's schedule.
The President is not a robot to be "programmed"
-- he is a man who
needs to make his time count.
Right way: Haldeman recognizes two responsibilit
ies to every meeting.
One is the responsibility of the visitor to the Preside
nt; the other the
responsibility of the President to the visitor.
Haldeman makes sure that when somebody needs to see
the President,
he is prepared to make his own appointment count. Excluding courtesy
calls and private chats, each appointment should have
a purpose: to
explain; to request action, to brief, to persuade. The
visitor is best
served when he has a clear idea what he wants out of th
e meeting.
The President's responsibility to the visitor or the coun
cil he chairs
is to be prepared for the meeting: to be able to think ab
out it in advance,
to marshal the facts, to know what questions he wants
answered. The
Haldeman staff helps the President do this. Result: Snap judgments
averted, sound decisions speeded up.
3. The Avoidance of Unnecessary Crisis.
There are enough crises that are an integral part of
the
Presidency without permitting predictable events foolzfe
come crises.
Wrong way: The President's schedule is meticulously pr
epared long
in advance, rigidly adhered to, with no room for a sudden
thought or
whim or deliberate change of plan.
Right way: When an appearance or event is scheduled, an
orderly
process of preparation must go into action. A series of d
eadlines is
set up, backdated from the appearance; staff has a chance t
o think about
it, to plan their work, and to submit ideas and material eno
ugh in
advance for the President to see if it is what he wants. The President
is not then forced to the wall of deciding on inadequate mat
erial or no
material at all.
REPFiODUOL), AT THE NATIONAL ARDIIVES
PERSONAL & et511711YETTTI
This averts the all-night, frantic state of mind that all too oftenhas occurred in the government -- which causes mistakes, exhaustion,reacting rather than acting, being dominated by events rather thanhelping to shape them.
4. Follow Through.
The Haldeman'staff's official flower is the Forget-Me-Not,which checks to see what is happening on ideas and decisions.
Wrong way: Nag, nag, nag. Right. way: reprE4ec of the ideas-are-valuable theme: We will not permit a plan or program to fall betweenstools. It can be killed, but by decision and not inaction or lethargy.
Upon leaving office, President Truman is reported to have said, "PoorLike. He's going to get behind that desk and push a button and expectsomething to happen, and it's not going to happen." Haldeman's job isto see to it that the button is connected to something that reports back.
This system also protects against phony deadlines. Too often, deadlineshave been set that make it impossible to do a job well; the Haldemanstaff, by checking before the actual deadline date, can "re-negotiate"zkadeadline to make certain the job is not just slapped together. This way,the President knows how far along many things are before they come tohim.
There may be a half-dozen other missions that you can think of; frankly,these are only those that appear to one man on the periphery.
But if you sell these, you will get across the message of good organization,intelligent planning, sensitive dealings with people, and a creativeprocess that permits the American people to have what amounts to aPresident and a half.
Which is why I urge you to drop the "machinery" metaphor, and the"input", "program", "print-out" computer jargon. The Presidency isnot a machine requiring your lubrication; it is the human brain of ourbody politic, and you are at the center of its nervous system.
DECLASSIFIED ----1 Authorit angst yABirRA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
A PLAN FOR PUTTING THE GOP ON TV NEWS
For 200 years the newspaper front page dominated public
thinking. In the last 20 years that picture has changed. Today
television news is watched more often
than people read newspapers.than people listen to radio.than people read or gather any other form of communication.
The reason: People are lazy. With television you just
2./14sit,-watch—listen. The thinking is done for you.40.1A:164Tif
As a result more than half the people now say they rely
pn television for their news, Fight out of 10 say they tune •in
radio or TV news at least once daily. °
fiu..sisot
Network television news is only half the s ory. People
AXT also concerned about their localities. As 4. result. TV newiizj./o
$4/ip one-half network, onerhalf local,
MunkTo make network TV news from Washington imust
have a story with national priority. Otherwise, ypi don't get on
TV
network and, therefore, you are not seen in any locality.
Tp date, local stations have not been able to carry Washington
news unless it made the network because, literally, they haven't
been able to get it there from here.
41111111111111.01111/Mmomm.mmiamminiM•DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Byal24S1
A RA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
This is a plan that places news of importance to localities
(Senators and Representatives are newsmakers of importance to
their localities) on local television news programs while it is
still news. It avoids the censorship, the priorities and the
prejudices of network news selectors and disseminators.
It will work because television is basically a local medium.
People think local. Local news shows like to identify with figures
of local importance — such as Senators and Representatives.
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THE PLAN -- Purpose, Cost
••t
DECLASSMEDReproduced at the Nauonal Archives
1. Purpose - To provide pro-Administration, videotape, hardnews actualities to the major cities of the UnitedStates.
A. In the top 40 population centers, *the two
freita,•;/,4 s access to 51% of the total, adult population013/ co -fwd.--
highest rated late evening TV Newscasts provide
of the United States.
41)se) (See attached market list of top 40 centers.)
AfidsfAa ./0B. To furnish these 80 stations daily will take
the following:
2. Cost - Equipment,
(1). Equipment(2). Technical & Professional help.(3). Processing & Delivery.
(Mobile Videotape Truck) $375, 000.
tt /04 Contains 2 Videotape Machines/alElectronic EditorTwo-Way Radio (Connected to Base)
..................-0Color Camera with Electronic Zoom. Independent Electric Power Supply
—1110ktad)
17) '1170.44-4'oy‘i ..A")
tFc/4l-- 00" r
cAJtaitA6 v't)/
reru
emdoutTechnical & Professional Help
1. Newscaster, Directs andEdits product; Sells
2. Broadcast Technician,Operates & Maintainsall equipment
ocessing & Delivery
1. Supplies, Raw Tape2. Technique
(a). Long Distance alertto News Director
(b). Matching feeds to all radiostations in area arnplicable
(Annual)
25, 000.
17, 000.
18, 000.17, 000.
o>
DECLASSIIIED
c _e Reproduced at the National Archives
Auth ly2.4sr _ . 1
- 4 -
THE PLAN
2. Cost -Processing & Delivery (Continued)
3. Air Freight
40 Markets, Daily10 Months Annually $ 50, 000.
Balance of Nationand Weekend Features
at Random Markets
4. Start-up Costs
60 Day rental ofequipment duringconstruction period
of customized truck 20, 000.
20, 000.
Total Cost, with equipmentless equipment
$542, 000.$375, 000.
First Year Operating Cost $167, 000.
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DECLASSIFIED
!Z4 5( Atithorit
'ARA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
PL.440A- 13t#4.46n, 4.44 1;4 Astumit „AA6 i-- --.]4 ,c,„,,,. +Zeo sclatila. :4444 f (1) i
( . a.••4.
CALe Cs4) HE PLAN -- Tyr NE OPERATION
OAAA:4010a WA, .
Videotape Truck
1. Shoots a Senator Talking (Departs)4° "i(trt„it 1.444!4;r4i 11.1tP;Art
ti).44.
2, Edits what he says
3. Duplicates several copies (-41.4.1,.0....074•2 e
. 4:844.4(4. Delivers to airport 4) , 1 .
All of this is done enroute. / / // 4
tout 444.41. Shoots a Senator Talking
Time is news. If an issue is hot in Washington, then it is
hot at home. But -- if your Senator says something on that
issue, the people at home should know about it while the issue
is hot.
Most GOP Senators represent geographical areas not just a
state. Their word is good in their area. Most areas are
connected by a common news base. They all share a major
center of commerce.
Usually 8 to 15 television markets comprise that "constituency."
While he may not directly represent all of the people they
know his word and respect it. One GOP Senator can be author-
atative in as many as 15 markets. Of course, depending on the
Senator and the issue, some will make news nationally.
2. Edits what he says
Television news is crammed. Politics, economy, tragedy,
human interest and weather are jammed into a half hour. Week-
days — one minute is the average length of time Washington
news gets. The host of the local television program is the anchor
man. He must appear informed and be attractive to be successful.
Attracting more viewers than his competition means higher
ratings for him, longevity in the job and the station can charge
more per announcement within the news segment. The key is
speed, pace, completeness.
--....,........,,.............IIMMIMIM...MMMIMII.......=.M•.
i
DECLASSIFIED
Audt0h4oriirr 6-024sr By ARA Date
IL /1A04644A-is.44 midA... 6 -Up to now, the local commentator has only been able to readwire copy of what happened. With Videotape Insert, he will beable to read the lead paragraph of wire copy -- and say, "InWashington, our Senator XXXXX told WXYZ-TV. . . ." and
the next thing you see is Senator talking. . . *IF HE HAS BEENEDITED DOWN TO THE REMAINING 40 SECONDS. This plan
Ie 4-11
L.darA;tPw_
a-C.9G •
•
Reproduced at the National Archives
4trIP01.41t
id-t)
includes this kind of_gdia,tj.ng.
771,C Pt' P 104
3. Duplicates several copies
Up to today, local televisio ould nc afford to hire a reporter,
send him to Washington, hire a film cameraman, process the•film and ship it home.
IP
It was not only the money the station could not afford, it wasalso the time factor. Days were needed.
Through Videotape and duplication and distribution by airfreight4•..M1••••1
-- the system works.
While the Videotape Truck is en route to the airport, thestatement is edited and duplicated. When it reaches the air --port, preaddressed Airfreight weighbills a a ed to tie box
•of tape minimize delay. •
4. Delivers to airport ta°116/1
Due to strategic Washington location, three major airportsserve enough major trunk airlines that a single Videotape
statement can be immediately dispatched. Most of the major
cities now receive non-stop or one-stop service from Washington.
Through a unique service arranged with Emery Air Freight
Corporation of Wilton, Connecticut -- the Videotape would be
handled at National Airport. At the receiving end it would be
picked up and driven to the television station.
This entire process can be accomplished in four to eight hours.
••
•
8:00
9:009:3010:00
12:0012:301:00
3:00
3:304:006:00
isirsaw . , ,
DECLASSIFIEDA uthorit
By
- 7 -
Reproduced at the National Archives
ARA Date
PROPOSED TV NEWS DAILY SCHEDULE4„
-utet
J.try .14.44.41. Statement
enator Records
istia Example Between Home Market
aA44, Dole 8 - 9 AM Kansas City 4 PM 6 PM
10 -Noon 8 PM 10 PM
1 - 3 PM 11 PM No
&VI
Begins Videotaping, On Hill 60 Minutes
Departs Hill for National
Arrives National, Dumps Shipments
Begins Videotaping, On Hill 120 Minutes
Departs Hill for National
Arrives National, Dumps Shipments
Begins Videotaping, On Hill 120 Minutes
Departs Hill for National
Arrives National, Dumps Shipments
Begins Videotaping, On Hill 120 Minutes
Cease Opera4f. n; Dump Sh. rnents
44 OwNad 6 1/2 Hours
Production
•THREE SAME-DAY PARU
REIS a#44
VAouithr..1 &% 4440.14— 44.4044014 ,Toy 40 Markets .
..
Sample Arrival Makes The
Time TV News
Program At
. Tower 8 - 9 AM Dallas - FW 3 PM
10 Noon 6 PM
1 - 3 PM 10 PM
Murphy .8 -• 9 AM Los Angeles 4 PM
10 - Noon 8 PM
1 - 3 PM 11 PM
Griffin 6 - 9 AM Detroit 2 PM
10 -Noon 4 PM
1 - 3 PM 6 PM^
6 PM
6 PM
10 PM
6 PM
10 PM
11 PM
5 PM
6 PM
6- 10 PM
Other markets would also be serviced in this same time period; i.e.,
Dole tapes to Wichita, St. Louis, etc.
I Authorit __&612.45r
BY.Att:RA Date
TV NEWS COVERAGE BY MARKET
Market % of USA Number of Number ofCenter Population Stations Homes
New York 9.64 8 5.682Los Angeles 5.34 7 3.182Chicago 4.22 6 2.466Philadelphia 3.52 6 2.070Boston 2.45 5 1.432(Sub-Total 25.17)
San Francisco 2.35 7 1.372Detroit 2.34 6 1.368Cleveland 2.11 5 1.227Washington 1.67 5 .078Pittsburgh 1.65 4 _• .959
(ST 35.29)St. Louis 1.47 5 .834Dallas - FW 1.37 6 .798Minneapolis 1.22 4 .702Seattle 1.14 5 .634Indianapolis 1.12 4 .642
(ST 41.61)Houston 1.10 5 .633Baltimore 1.08 4 .638Atlanta 1.06 4 .615Cincinnati .97 4 .560Miami .97 5 .567
(ST 48.79)Hartford .93 3 .546Buffalo .93 3 .553Milwaukee .92 4 .545Kansas City .90 3 .514Memphis .89 3 .481
(ST 53.36)Sacramento .86 4 .504Portland .86 4 .473Tampa - SP .84 4 .488Nashville .80 4 .441Providence .79 3 .470
(ST 57.51)Charleston .75 3 .405Birmingham .73 3 .400Denver .73 4 .422Columbus .71 3 .412New Orleans .71 4 .398
(ST 61.14)Charlotte .70 4 .386Grand Rapids .68 3 .390Albany S-T .66 3 .387Syracuse .66 3 .388Louisville .65 3 .369(Total 64.119)
* No delivery available at this time.
Reproduced at the National Arcnives
Videotape Departurefrom Capitol
9 AM Noon 3 PMArrival time (PM)
at Destination
2 4 64 8 113 6 102 4 62 4 6
4 8 112 4 63 6 101 5 103 6 10
3 6 103 6 104 8 116 10 *4 8 11
4 8 111 5 104 8 113 6 103 6 10
3 6 102 4 63 6 104 8 114 8 11
5 10 *5 10 *4 10 113 6 103 6 10
4 8 112 4 64 8 115 10 *5 10 *
3 10 *4 10 *3 10 *5 10 *3 6 10
Videotape Truck
Costs:
Authorit'
Ampex Corporation Proposal
(Revised) #9423-0409B
17 June, 1970
Mobile Unit:
Reproduced at the National Archives
TRUCK2 VTR MACHINES
1 CAMERA
1 EDITOR
$375,000
Two Ampex VR-1200 13
Color Videotape Recorders
One Ampex RA-4000
Random Access Programmer
(Editor)
One Ampex BC-230 Color
(Camera)
Switching, Mixing, Intercom,
Monitoring, Connecting
System.
Built from Chassis in 60 Days:
Ford, GMC, or IHC Chassis
V8 Engine; 5 speedtransmission; air
conditioning.
Weight: 22,000GVW
Van Body; 18 ft-length,
3 ton air conditioning,
8 KW power system;
30 EK Series generator
with 25 KW capability.
FOB, Redwood City, California
($37,500 with order 7-21-70 would deliver 10-15-70).
(o.4) 44'14 444 401.1124a adAd
SadA
--te•-15atiu .4(Adikt.. /64-7
i..45giasimisksitatesiugumotiaraitatorkittaimproomigaims,,„,,,,;:i.,:ikatotittaialatikatittikkaill ----7---_________;
I
DECLASSIFIED
4 /Nut!writ / ,eolz4 sr 1By ARA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
41,thi gdelatA r le44
urojliouq- 44.0-t 444 v
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iierAJJ44 1wO1,74
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Excerpt from the President's Memo of February 26, 1973.
I had a long talk with John Ehrlichman with regard to some of thestatements that have been made by Whitehead and Phillips. Weboth agreed, and I am sure you will share this conclusion thatwhat they are doing is exactly what you want done but that theirrhetoric at times has created problems which make the accom-plishment of our goal much more difficult.
What I would like is for you and John to get them in, each separately.Be sure to emphasize to both that I have no disagreement whatsoeverwith their policy. This is particularly important with regard toWhitehead because I do not want pressures from Klein and Zieglerat all to push us off the policy of local control and local respon-sibility for TV stations, for TV programing, which I approvedsometime ago.
On the other hand, it is important for both of them to act effectivelyin carrying out the policy but to tone down the rhetoric in such a waythat we do not create unnecessary problems in executing the policy.
DE:CLASSWIED
A iithori;/.. alZ4 cr By Aa'ARA 7 it t Loin
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT - TELEVISIONPRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON
From Roger E. AilesNovember, 1968
Reproduced at the National Arcnives
. DEdA775:77--iBy;Au i , ebagcr
`ARA Date
Reproduced at he National archives
Television will play a major role in the Presidency of
Richard M. Nixon. Whether the administration acts or reacts to
it is entirely up to Mr. Nixon and his key advisors. To whatever
extent possible, they should make a conscious effort to control
Mr. Nixon's image on TV. When it is necessary to run for re-election,
it will be the public's composite impression of the President
(formed over four years) that will influence them. Television was
used well in this campaign, but in four years it will have to be
better.
Here are some of the thoughts I've had about the TV planning
which I feel should be implemented. I will be glad to elaborate
in person.
1 Study alternative solutions to TV's "Great Debate"format. (Surely Mr. Nixon will be challenged againand a substitute format can be found that is betterfor us.)
2. Shoot all film consistently with thought of how touse it in the campaign.
3. Record history on film. First administration to usefilm for history.
4. Celebrities for Nixon. This needs a complete reorgani-zation and now is the time to do it.
5. The same TV Director should be on hand every time thePresident is on TV (other than newsreel and pressconferences).
6. Organize party members (Senate and House) - buildlocal shows for distribution back home, between Nixonand Congressmen or Senators.
7. Day in the life of the President. (Tough Problems onfilm).
8. Experiment with new formats with President - one inone direct talk to camera. Give him a style of communi-cation.
9. Use of key administration people booked on TV shows.Use of TV to carry the administration's point of view.
0 , DECLASSWIED
-2-
i Authorit
By 11il
apaieZefitift
ngcrARA
Reproduced at the National Archives
10. Use TV as a political wedge with recalcitrantCongressmen for voting.
11. Develop young TV stars of the Republican Party.
12. TV can regain much support for Vice-President Agnew.
13. Progress reports to the Nation on specific problems.In effect, Mr. Nixon's own TV show giving the publicsomething to look forward to and the feeling he iskeeping them informed.
14. Series of dialogues with the President by specialinterest groups, i.e., newsmen, women, youth, seniorcitizens, even world leaders.
15. Use of TV to give background and enlist support forCabinet members. Work on their TV images.
16. Set up, to whatever extent possible, a consistentschedule for Mr. Nixon's use of TV.
These are a few of the things I feel should be done to use
the power of TV to enlist public support for Mr. Nixon and the
Republican Party and to aid in Mr. Nixon's re-election.
Any TV advisory group should include a TV production and
direction specialist who is successfully working in the television
industry. The person should also understand Mr. Nixon, his media
history and problems, and the aims of the administration.
•
MEMORANDUM
iiiaNONSINO
I DECLASSIFIED
Authorit
By
Reproduced at the National Archives
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: JON HUNTSMAN
STAFF SECRETARY
FROM: RONALD L. ZIEGLER
SUBJECT:
P-1950
MEMORANDA:
Log. No. P-1950
Nov. 30 memo on Pierpoint
Nov. 30 memo on Connally
On Rather, I have no idea where he obtained his information on visiting
other cities in China — if it was indeed mor than just speculation --
but it did not come from/ me or my office. 44,7oet, 76111 40eie 7/44-1
AA. he At A iOs a4 lCøV /
Predicting trip returns
On the subject of predicting trip returns, no hint or predisposition
was given from this office. If anything, we may have to tighten up
on others in the Administration who like to bandy about such specu-
lation in order to seem more informed. But in any case, I have
spoken with both Rather and Pierpoint on this and we will have to
continue to press the point.
Connally
It should also be noted that I have spoken with the President on both
the trip speculation and the Connally matters.
• .14:14161g ;
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(CONFIDENTIAL REPORT)
To: Bob Haldeman
From: Roger E. Ailes
Date: December 1969
Subject: White House TV
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In general, there are several areas that can be improvedregarding White House television. It is contingent upon youappointing a person to be responsible who can organize andsupervise it, who knows the answers and where to find the answersand who is always "thinking" and presenting ideas for you to use.If this is done well, it will be a tremendous asset to the imageof this Administration.
•
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lifEREM ROGER AI LES & ASSOCIATES, INC. 888 Eighth Avenue. Suite 7F New York, New York 10019
212-765-3022
011....mmilif
May 28, 1971
Mr. H. R. HaldemanChief of StaffThe White HouseWashington, D. C.
Dear Bob:
Yesterday I received a letter from Jon M. Huntsman, SpecialAssistant to the President, at the White House offering to accom-modate me with an office when I'm in to do consulting work.
I just want you to know that I appreciate it and I am veryhappy to know that our relationship is to continue. As you know,my personal and professional loyalty is with the President and Iwant to do everything I can to help get him re-elected in 1972.
As you pointed out, Bob, I have become somewhat of a politicalanimal now as well as a media adviser and I think this does giveme some added strength and in some ways makes me a double-threatman. I was used by Westinghouse Broadcasting as a trouble-shooterin trouble program areas and I think I could serve the same rolepolitically in some of the states where we have problems. I justthought I'd mention that for you to keep in mind. Because I'mknown somewhat now by political people, I always can find otherreasons on the surface for being in a state.
Thanks for your confidence in me. I hope to see you soon.
REA/lam
Best regards,
Roger E. ilesPresiden
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PRODUCTIONS INC. 888 Eighth Avenue. Suite 7F New York, New York 10019
New York 212-765-3022 Washington 202-544-6449
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
RE: White House Television--1971
To: Bob Haldemann
From: Roger E. Ailes
Date: November 25, 1970
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In my opinion, Richard Nixon is in danger of becoming a one-term
President. Further, he is in danger of leaving office, even if he
is re-elected, witli a stigma of leadership failure much as President
Johnson did: not because of what he has done--his accomplishments
are many--but because of what the people "think" he has done, and
because of the way he sounds and looks to them. To follow a leader,
people must feel that he is better than they are and not subject to
anger or hatred as quickly. This report is to suggest some ideas
and changes in strategy for upcoming television appearances by the
President.
It is important for you to know that I am not just echoing the eastern
liberals when I express my concern and that I spent twenty five years
in Ohio and know something about the silent majority. The silent
majority will au.tomatically back the President because it has no
place else to go. It will back the President unless the liberals
successfully convince these people that they are simply being used as
political pawns. Mr. Nixon has aroused the silent majority. Now
that he has its attention it expects to be led.
need to pursue these people as much as we have.
I don't believe we
I frankly think that
attention should be turned to Vice President Agnew's working day and
to the things that he has accomplished for the President. More action
and fewer speeches is needed. The people know that he is speaking for
the President and are beginning to wonder if the President is afraid
to say some of those things himself.
I do not believe we can win the 1972 election by outcampaigning the
opposition. Since Mr. Nixon has claimed a victory in 1970 he has
cancelled his excuses for no results by 1972. I honestly don't be-
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lieve there is any great advantage for the President to claim
victories. Victories are either apparent or they are not, and I
think that arguing over it only weakens the President's position.
(To guard our flank I would like to see us get one of our people
inside the Wallace organization immediately. I'll discuss this
in more detail in person.)
There are many internal political problems to be ironed out in the
Republican Party before 1972. Unless a single major event captures
the headlines close to that election we will not see a landslide of
any kind. It will not be enough to "not make any mistakes." We are
going to have to do a significant amount of things right and then
sell them. It will probably be a very close contest. There are those
who will not take me seriously because they will argue that an incum-
bent President has so much power and that the people just won't switch
horses. Well, the world is changing. The people are restless, loyal-
ties don't wears long as they used to, and convictions are shallow.
We are in a time when liberal New York will try Jim Buckley, not be-
cause it has suddenly seen the light, but because it has tried every-
thing else. If the public believes or is frightened into believing
that we might as well try dumping a President, we've got real problems.
And America is losing her patience. We have instant breakfast, in-
stant news coverage and instant sex--why not some instant solutions to
our problems? Too many of our people show either complete hopelessness
or a frantic concern for our future. America's position can be compar-
ed to a teenager who is experimenting with trouble, tempted to really
go bad, but still crying out for a father to step in and lead him home.
jr. Nixon must take on the father's role.
Our 1970 campaign strategy solidified the Dcmocrat Party, and the Demo-
crats still have a great res7)ect for and fear of !Ir. i:ixon as a politi-
cian. No sin:le democrat wants to take Ricr,ard !axon on in the political
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arenri, but together with the news commentators they will try to
make his greatest strength work against him. By allowing him to
play leolitics they will build their case, predict our moves, and
quietly tell the electorate, "See, I told you so." To counter this,
the President must actually convince people that he is bigger than
life, no longer concerned about partisan politics. They must believe
his decisions are based on true, deep, sincere convictions. He may
have to lost a couple of battles gracefully to win the war--the war
in this case being re-electioh in 1972.
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I believe the democrats will try to speak softly and come in under us
in terms of public rhetoric. The President's style should switch
from written speech as much as possible to conversation. TV must be
simply and masterfully used, not just frequently. In fact, the Presi-
dent should never do television again just for the sake of exposure
alone. He might even have to rehearse some to accomplish the needed
effect. I realitze that this suggestion will only make him angry, but
I honestly believe that he can be even more effective on TV than he
is, and too often in the past we have failed to sell at all or have
oversold. We have to spend more time concentrating on getting through
to people. And television is a very s-eecial medium. The President is
excellent at convincing people in simple, one-to-one conversation and
I. would like to work with him in making shorter appearances in person-
al conversation so that he can leave no doubt in the audience's mind
about his sincerity. It is a tricky line to walk because by trying
to appear sincere we sometimes come across as insincere. And someone
needs to evaluate and be absolutely honest with the President about
his performance. I believe we did lose credibility this time by talk-
ing about lowering voices and bringing us togcther and then doing just
the opposite, even though it may have been nclitically necessary. It
will fake the commentators out if this time we don't talk about it but
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just do it. The general public is bombarded daily by newsmen and
columnists who fail to look at the necessities of presidential action.
Therefore, the question is not one of whether we are right or wrong,
or even whether we did what we had to do, but whether the people con-
tinue to have confidence in the President. We must not be sidetracked
by anything except that. Regardless of theories like the "real major-
ity" our best hope is to strengthen the direct link via television
between the President and all of the people.
People won't necessarily re-elect Richard Nixon because of what he's
done for them in the past. Even if he ends the war with honor they
will vote for him only if they feel they need him in the future. A
slight variation of the theme Rockefeller used this election--"He's
done much--he'll do more"-is the kind of theme we'll need. As Nixon
the Peacemaker the President will have to take on the air of a quiet,
almost shy, cool, concerned leader of few words. People are fascinated
by predictionsLand tend to'make them come true. The President has a
good record of predictions. He would be President. He would get us
out of Asia. He would quiet the campuses. He would desegregate schools.
Once he sets and announces the direction of his policy (almost a pre-
diction of what is to come) the public should see the Presidential
power of persuasion in a warm, friendly, bi-partisan way that shows
tireless strength and belief in the principal he set forth. If this
is consistent, the people will not only feel they should go along for
their own good, but they'll want to.
e President should never hard sell. This would be playing into the
Democrats hancls.. They e:imect him to treat them e., the enemy and if he
fails to do that they'll be confused.
I think a good iscue to arive a wedge 11,..otween the Dernoeratic leaderchil;
and the news corrrnentators is Nixon's welfare plan. The olily ones more
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frightened by the welfare plan than the conservatives are the liberals.
If the President makes no major speeches but quietly visits Capitol
Hill to press for this and at the same time calls in a group of "liber-
al" reporters to discuss the plan, the commentators will be forced to
applaud him and point out Democrat obstructionism.
All administration nersonel making public appearances or statements
should be schooled weekly on administration accomplishments. We
should be careful not to comment or attack snecific Democrats being
mentioned to run against Nixon in 1972. Our standard answer should be,
"They've got a job to do on The Hill, this candidatitis is unfair to
the pconle." Let them overplay their hand and the President appear far
above the battle.
Now I'll outline some specific TV plans. Regarding nress conferences:
1. December 10th press conference--T would like to see him lengthen
it to an ho. A surprise announcement a few hours (or minutes)
before would be in keeping with his statement that he has them
for the people and the press. The press is complaining about in-
frequency and access so he gives them an hour.
If an hour in nrime time upsets the networks perhaps he Should
announce another press conference at this one to be held daytime
the following week.
Paul Keyes should be consulted on this because the attitude should
be super-relaxed, charming, emphasizing personal relationship to
the reporters. The press will be very critical of the campaign
and try to keep him on the defensive. The President, by not de-
fendinp: too strongly but by sayinz, "Look, the campaign is over.
NWOONEW
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Everybody fought hard in the American tradition. I'm looking forward to
working with some good men on both sides of the aisle" will disarm
them and take the sting out of the elections for the people.
I think he should use humor occasionally. If a reporter keeps
pressing him on something the President should smile and say something
like, "I believe I've answered that and if you ask me again I'm going
to give your home phone number to Martha Mitchell."
During the upcoming year I would like to see a few less formal
press conferences take place. Perhaps an impromptu one on the
road and one in California outdoors would help add drama to the
ones held in prime time from the East Room.
2. National Association of Manufacturers Dinner--Unless the President
is making e%startling announcement about the economy this probably
doesn't warAnt coverage on all three networks. If they don't
want to cover it, I don't think we should push for it. However,
maybe we can work out a deal to rotate the network coverage for
this type of speech. I don't think it is necessary for the
President always to make a speech to cheering crowds. People know
better than that and after a while it takes on a "staged" feel. He
did an excellent job on last year's speech at the U. N., and it was
just the President doing his job. Then when you see him make a
speech to cheering crowds it has more imnact. He may feel more
comforteble with the crowds beccuse he's s-ood at writing "cheer
lines", but a more digelified, businesslike arproach is needed and
expected occasionally. And it can still be inspirational if well
written.
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3. The Christmas Tree Lighting Cerem
ony--I went over the plans for
this with John Faust from Ron Wal
ker's office. Basically I agree
with Saphire's religious approach.
In fact, I suggested they drop
Santa Claus and big name stars alt
ogether. I went over the format,
camera positions, and the President
's part. I suggested that at
the end, instead of bringing a chil
d up to the President to light
the tree, he walk down to the childr
en seated in front, pick up
a small boy, stand him ,on his chair
and ask him to light the tree.
This simple gesture will do much to
humanize him with all parents.
Another suggestion along this line:
all people are curious about
the relationship between the Pres
ident and his wife. If he put
his arm around her in public or hel
d hands with her when walking
once in a while, it would do much
to endear him to women all over
the country.
4. I'm not sure, what takes. place at a
White House dinner such as the
Heath dinner However, we can probably get more
media mileage
out of them than we have. Once the specific
program and guest list
is set, send a copy to me and I'll
come up with some ideas. I as-
sume that some celebrities and VIP
s are involved, which makes for
good film. If it's handled right, it can come
off as an endorse-
ment for Mr. Nixon. Whenever people w
ith their own TV shows are
involved, it is the perfect time
and place to suggest to them an
idea for their shows. They are in the
right mood at that moment
to commit to returning the fav
or. Leading up to an election year
this can be very important.
5. As I suggested when we talked,
I would like to begin production
on a network film specinl to air
late in 1971 just prior to the
1972 election campaign, which wou
ld show a human, working Presid
ent
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with an incredible schedule. This should show some "behind the
scenes" footage that would stick in the audience's mind and give
them complete confidence in the man. This would require shooting
a little of the Domestic Council, Cabinet, and National Security
Council meetings, but could be done carefully and unobtrusively.
With careful pre-production and explanation te the President, I
could guarantee good results. Which network would you like me to
approach about rutting this together?
If the network insists on further involvement, I suggest CBS with
Mike Wallace, and myself maintaining production control using the
correspondent just to introduce the program and do a little nar-
ration where necessary, letting the film speak for itself.
6. I suggest doing in January a one hour conversation with David
Frost, either at Camp David by the fireplace or walking around at
the Western White House. This could be done as a Group W Special
to be aired,Fimultandously in all of Frost's markets. He is re-
cognized internationally as the best in-depth, hUmanizing interviewer.
Also, I know him well and would approach him directly to set the
ground rules and production controls. He has enough clout with
Group W to dictate our agreement and I'm sure he'd follow my sug-
gestions since I've produced shows with David in the past. This
would be a low key, thoughtful, even casual President looking into
the new year, talking about the accomplishments of his first two
years in office, and projecting Richard Nixon's dream for America.
I would like to move on this immediately--just give me the word.
Incidentally, this could be aired in all the English-speaking
countries, and would help the president's image around the world.
During this program the President could announce that he intends
to occasionally visit with Americans via television for a few min-
utes to keep them up to date on his thinking al,L1 planninz. This
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will take the form of simple chats on specific subjects. Frost will
say something about, "You mean , similar to Roosevelt's radio re-
ports known as fireside chats." The President would answer, "Well,
yes, I think they were a good idea, but I may do some from Califor-
nia, so they might be more seaside chats than fire3ide chats."
7. I would like to come to the next "Evening at the White House" to
see what is being done as far as coverage is concerned, then make
suggestions on improvements. Also, I would like to be appointed to
the group planning these events because I know the talent business
very well and can be useful here.
8. Fireside Chats--I read the Keough memo on this and of course I sug-
gested doing this in my original 1968 TV memo. The style for these
goes back to page 4, paragraph 2, of this memo. We should actually
tape one (as a pilot) just to look, then do one whenever the occnsion
arises. I know how the President feels about rehearsing anything,
but it is a simple fact that everyone does a better job on the second
take than on the first unless the material is being read. Also,
since the mood and sincerity of this is critical I would like to have
him at least try it my way once, then we can discard it if it doesn!t
work. The President has a unique ability to communicate one to one,
and we've never reached our full potential on TV.
To turn around the country's feeling about the economy I think we
should do one of these a month for at least three months, dealing
with the economic program. A good time might be ten minutes on all
three networks following the eleven o'clock news, lerZeirg into
Carson, Cavett, etc. P-_,7rem one might deal with exactly tll-
Preejdent felt it neceseer-r. to dcwn infletion and w'ey this
course was chosen. It should bo simplified into la: terms. Pro-
gram two would 170 exectly whet his plan is, and number three where
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it is taking us. He would also be able to slip in his humaneconcern for unemployment and remknd the people he has an eye onthat, too. I believe this would do much to take the sting out ofthe newscasters' attacks on the administration and give the peoplehope. If they work the way I know they can, the Democrats willattack them and the President can ignore the attacks. Eventuallythe people will rally to the defense of the President and tellthe Democrats to get off his back, that he is sincerely trying tohelp all of the people. Let the people fight the Democrats ratherthan the President.
9. I'm not sure what rules have to be followed for the State of theUnion Address. In is always delivered to Congress in Washington?If so, variations are not needed, but the feel of the speechshould approach his acceptance speech in hiami. To take the stingout of the recent election a "work together" theme is probablycalled for and the feeling that two years in office have only re—emphasized his belief in the American people. The wildness of thesixties is coming under control and the seventies will bring aconcern for fellow man and a need to tap our Greatest natural re—source, the human potential, in each of us. Lost of all, he needsto reemphasize that disagreements are a sign of our strength inthis country, but that when the chips are down we come together.If variations in production or coverage are being considered, letme know and I'll add my imput.
This brings un up through January as far as major TV is concerned.I am working on a month to month rerort all the way through 1972.However, I thought by starting with this and putting it in motion,we can make additions and corrections along the way. In previousmemos I've mentioned several ideas and most cf them haven't beentried. By taking r. few at a time and runrlinr- with them we'll getmore done.
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Would it be possible to work out a longer range consultancy for
me so I can spend most of my time operating from T.ashington. By
signing a large yearly PR contract with the RNC or a "fat cat"
firm, I can include the full time man from my DC office and prodnce
the major things myself. This will allow me to long range plan my
company clear through the next election. Per diem work doesn't
allow the flexibility we both need.
6
LORANDUM
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Nov. 19, 1970
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CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD AND FOLLOW UP
RE: ROGER AILES
Haldeman met with Roger Ailes, Dwight Chapin and Larry
Higl-iy at approximately 10:45 a. m0 on November 19.
Ailes was asked to follow-up on the following items and to
have them ready by next Wednesday, November 25.
1. Election analysis done on a state-by-state basis.
2. Proposal for the use of media by the Presideni:
(TV) going by the calendar through 1971, taking
all the Presidential events and suggesting where
other Presidential events should be added.
3. A proposal for the First Family and how they could
be used, including Mrs. Nixon, David, Julie and
Tricia.
Ailes is to include events he feels we
have to do and then the events and how
we might make some headway with regard to them,
i.e. The Thanksgiving Proclamation.
In addition to this Ailes had many other ideas he wanted to comment
on, namely; the restructuring of the RNC and the scheduling, not
ctliP) A
)4-V
only of First Family members, but also of Cabinet people and other
Administration spokesmen. He also raised the subject of who
kki . the new communicaticn s man would be at the RNC and indicated
‘../'a
it was his feeling he could best serve the Administration by opening
an office here in Washington and making the head of that office
available to the White House on a full-time basis. In addition
we need to be building a base with local broadcasters and television
programs for 1972. What basically is needed here, Ailes feels, is
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a Game Plan that concentrates State-by State on those
states we will be working against and counting on in '72.
Ailes got into the problems we seem to have in really selling
what we are doing now. He cited for example our foreign
policy decisions - how brilliant they have been, but how we've
failed to really indicate this to the public at large.
Haldeman raised the question of the film library and our need
there to have someone continually reviewing the film and
building a Nixon documentary that we could run sometime
probably late 1971. This would take up the spare time
of Ailes' consultant down if here.
With regard to the news programming effort as proposed last
summer, Ailes feels this is a good idea and that we should
be going ahead with it. Haldeman suggested the name
"Capitol News Service" and Ailes will probably be doing more
work in this area.
Finally Ailes raised the question of his own future and what he
does long-range. Haldeman made no firm commitments to him,
indicating first he would like to see what his proposal would be
regarding the President's use of N. Ailes felt the best thing
to do would be to open an office down here and be staffed by
his man on a full-time basis.
Finally the question of the celebrities supporting the President was
raised. It was agreed we need to get something going here, parti-
cularly someone out lining up our people for '72. On e of our
strongest weapons is to use the White House interms of
scheduling in building celebrities and getting those people that are
basically neutral, committeed to us for 1972.
MEMORANDUM
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: LARRY HIGBY
There still appear to be a few questions concerning Roger Ailes'
employment that aren't clear to all concerned.
I. Reporting Responsibility
It is Roger's understanding that he is working here as a consultant
and reports to you. When his man is finally selected to work down
here, he will be working for Ailes rather than for Klein or Ziegler.
Apparently Ron Ziegler feels that Ailes' man will report to him.
Could—you please clarify this.
. Outside Compensation
We agreed to provide Ailes with some additional outside compensation.
I have told him that we were in the process of attempting to set up an
outside PR apparatus and that his payment will probably come from
there - something he says you indicated to him before. In light of the
way the Perot thing fell through do you want me to make other arrange-
ments for Ailes' payment or would you prefer to handle it.
I would propose that we tack on whatever additional expenses he might
be to our RNC fund. Perhaps you can give me an indication of what
the agreed on rate for Ailes would be. As you know, we presently pay
him $100/da4(plus expenses.
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,(15tice
1. Presidential Classification System:
1. Distribution to Principals on a strict need-to-knowbasis.
2. No Xerox
3. No oral sharing or "debriefing"
4. No off-the-record press contacts re: Their contents
2. Declassification and release of classified documentsre: Major historical incidents22: WWII (announced because of appropriation request)
KoreaLebanon ActionCuban incidents of Kennedy years
WWII - 160,000,000 pages1946-1954 = 300,000,000 pp
(some not classified)
per National Archives & Records Service
3. Rehnquist Committee promulgating recommended criteria fordeclassification - Roughly:
a) Not jeopardize current intell. sources
b) Not imperil our relations w/other governments
4. The President believes:
a) Government officials can no longer engage in off-the-record sessions with the press in which contents ofclassified documents are discussed or disclosed.
b) Documents are unnecessarily classified to a greatextent - too many people can classify. Declassificationprocedures should be more rapid, should put the burdenof proof on the classifier; more should be made public.
c) Distribution should be more strictly limited.
d) (1) The New York Times publication had potential fordooming HAK's efforts in China - An example of
2
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inability of Frankel, et al to know hazardsof publication in "An era of negotiation, notconfrontation"; an negotiator (even in privatelife) must be able to assure the other sidethat various aspects of bargaining will beprivate before and even after announcement ofan agreement.
(2) With a friend and, a fortion with a party withwhom no negotiation for 25 years the creationof a basis for agreement - mutuality of confi-dence - depends on willingness and ability tokeep a confidence.
(3) The Chinese (ie Chou) have no problems apparently.
e) We would hope to work out other problems by negotia-tion. Other parties must be assured their confidenceswon't be abused.
f) The President's success in conversations with over70 chiefs of state and heads of government has restedon firm principles of mutual confidence. He insistson:
1. He never debriefs2. He does not leak the substance of such
meetings.
g) Same in steel meeting - A need for parties to talkin candor - Mutual Trust.
h) That he (President) had to press for injunctions inTimes-Post cases.
1. Admit some of documents - must - should notbe classified.
2. This massive compromise of classificationraised questions in minds of nations withwhom we then were negotiating - some ofwhich you know about -
Foresight shown in the 1/15/71 NSSM to review classi-fication system and tighten needed secrecy whileclassifying fewer documents.
j)
I D ___ ,. ECLASSIFIED
Reproduce() at he National Alonives
I ;\ uthority autcr 1BY 'ARA Date
3
New system will deal with the Xerox problem -
Probably will prohibit such copying.
k) Diligent reporting is not wrong; the President
knows and respects it - And he knows how to keep
a secret when necessary - Any new system, if it
is to succeed, will take such given information
consideration.
1) He (President) has primary responsibilities in
two areas:
1. To inform the public.
2. To ensure the success of negotiations in
the conduct of foreign policy and preserva-
tion of the national security. Often
this involves secrecy, as stated above.
The press feels no such dual responsibility, appare
ntly.
Thus, the temptations to the press created by loose
government practices may result in frustration of
months
of laborious efforts in foreign policy or defense.
These obligations need not conflict.
At one time, press considered itself to have bot
h duties.
Now apparently has only one: to disclose; Thus,
tighter government practices, toughen laws, bet
ter
procedures are the only alternative.
•
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I N GTO N
March 12, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: .-•""T. 01DONNELLIinimadd=101.1"
SUBJECT: Meeting with Clay Whitehead
The President has asked you to meet with Whitehead, and you haveagreed to a meeting tomorrow afternoon. Ehrlichman will be present.The purpose of the meeting, based on the President's memo ofFebruary 26, is to point out that there is "no disagreement whatsoever"with Whitehead's policy, but at times, problems have been created bythe rhetoric which he has used. A secondary purpose is to discussthe Taylor/Paley meetings Wednesday so both you and Ehrlichmanwill take a similar stance.
The essence here is to get Whitehead to push the policy of local controland local responsibility for TV stations and programming withoutundue threatening and harassing of the networks.
Whitehead has some points which could be discussed, and whereapplicable, resolved tomorrow. The Indianapolis speech, whichdrew the most violent reaction from the media and the networks,was intended to do this. It was a one shot effort to draw fire andinterest. Also, Whitehead has a problem working with the WhiteHouse. He has Ziegler, Hullin, Ehrlichman, Cole, Sawyer andothers calling asking questions and getting into the act on a piece-meal basis. There should be one point of contact, and it shouldeither be Ehrlichman or Cole. Also, Whitehead has had problemclearing the Presidential Action memos here at the White House.They have taken too long. We have lost valuable time and the op-portunity to have Birch testify on the Hill.
You should solicit his views as to the meeting you are going to havewith Paley and Ehrlichman's meeting with Taylor on Wednesday.You have the talking points for the meeting in the Paley package,but he might want to expand on them.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
The President acted on the Telecommunications memo today.
The License Renewal Bill will be sent to Congress without a
Presidential statement. This will reduce FCC controls over
broadcast programming and it is aimed at making the affiliates
more responsible. The President approved a low-key OTP
position in favor of FCC repeal of a prime time access rule.
This maintains the President's commitment to Hollywood on the
rerun/unemployment issue. These issues are explained in detail
in the attachments to the Presidential Action memo enclosed.
Also enclosed, although it is not necessary reading, is a summary
of Telecommunications issues by Whitehead and his remarks at
Indianapolis, the New Republic's article of March 3, which typifies
the criticism of the Administration's position on these matters, and
an article from Newsweek on the documentary "Sticks and Bones,"
which will not be run on CBS, due primarily to the affiliates,
(Crutchfield, et al) exerting their authority and acting responsibly.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
•
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 6, 1973
THE PRESIDENT
JOHN EHRZICHMAN
KE LE
Telecommunications
Attached are two memoranda from Tom Wh
itehead which have been
circulated within the White House for
comment. The first is
on the Broadcast License Renewal Bill
(Tab A) and the second
deals with network reruns and the prime
-time access rule (Tab B).
In the first memorandum, Whitehead reco
mmends that we introduce
a License Renewal Bill which would red
uce FCC controls over
broadcast programming and is strongly p
ro-First Amendment, even
though the public does not perceive it
as such at the present.
Broadcasters, including network manageme
nt, badly want renewal
legislation and realize they need our su
pport to get it
through Congress. According to Whitehead, there are sig
ns
that network executives and key broadc
asters are willing to
take corrective action as long as they
are not pushed hard
publicly on the bias issue.
Whitehead recommends that the License
Renewal Bill be intro-
duced without an accompanying Presidenti
al statement. Ron
Ziegler and Dick Moore agree with this
position and recommend
further that this bill be sent to Cong
ress with an Office of
Telecommunications Policy (OTP) letter
of transmittal rather
than one from the White House.
Send Bill without Presidential Stat
ement
(Timmons, Colson, Ziegler, Moore, Bar
oody recommend)
Send Bill with Presidential Statement
Don't Send Bill
The second Whitehead memorandum deals
with the related topics
of network reruns and the prime-time
access rule.
In a September letter to John Gavin o
f the Screen Actors Guild,
you agreed that something had to be
done about the increase in
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
network reruns on prime-time. The networks have refused to
voluntarily reduce reruns, and Whitehead has concluded that
regulatory restrictions on rerun percentages would simply lead
the networks to lower program quality or to foreign production.
An OTP study has showed that, like reruns, the prime-time rule
is a significant factor contributing to Hollywood unemploy-
ment. Whitehead believes that, contrary to intent, the rule
has actually enhanced the network's economic power and resulted
in low program quality. The major Hollywood studios and
unions strongly favor recision of the rule.
Whitehead advocates a low-key OTP position in favor of FCC
repeal of the prime-time access rule which he believes would
keep the spirit of your commitment to Hollywood on the re-
run/unemployment issue. Dick Moore recommends against such
a position on the grounds that the industry itself is divided
on the merits of the rule, and he emphasizes that the rule has
been beneficial in that it has helped ABC become competitive
with CBS and NBC.
P (Op)
Attachment
Favor low-key OTP position (Colson, Baroody recommen
Take no position (Moore recommends)
Other
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 29504
March 2, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Clay T. Whitehead
DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Broadcast License Renewal Bill
The House Communications Subcommittee has scheduled hear-
ings on broadcast license renewal legislation for March 13.
We should aim, therefore, to submit the Administration
bill sometime before March 9.
You will recall the strategy Chuck Colson and I developed,
which you approved in December, prior to my Indianapolis
speech. In the speech, we took the initiative, tying
support for a pro-broadcaster renewal bill to a call for
the broadcasters to exercise more responsibility and more
local control over network programs, specifically including
news. The initial press coverage misinterpreted the bill
as imposing "censorship," but it is now being covered as a
pro-broadcasting "carrot" in return for which we expect
some greater balance in network news.
Our posture of reducing FCC controls over broadcast program
-
ming is strongly pro-First Amendment, even though the publi
c
does not perceive it as such at present. Broadcasters,
including network management, badly want renewal legislat
ion
and realize they need our support to get it through the
Congress. Moreover, there are signs that network executives
and key broadcasters are willing to take come corrective
action, as long as they are not pushed too hard publicly
on
the bias issue.
Our opponents find it difficult to box us in when we cou
ple
arguments for less Federal control of broadcasting wit
h a
call for exercise of more voluntary responsibility by br
oad-
casters. Furthermore, many congressional supporters, such
as Sam Devine and Bud Brown of Ohio have their own concern
s
about network dominance. They see that the mere presence
of our bill in the Congress gives them, as well as the
Administration and local broadcasters, leverage over t
he
networks.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-2-
A summary of our proposed bill is attache
d at Tab A. The
OMB clearance process drew FCC comments on
the bill, which'
were largely technical. While we have incorporate
d many
of the changes, the FCC will probably tes
tify in favor of
retaining more control over programming th
an our bill
would allow.
Justice opposes our bill's approach. Justice prefers
stronger authority for the FCC to set specif
ic criteria
for broadcast programming and seeks legisl
ative endorse-
ment of FCC rules to break up newspaper-bro
adcast combina-
tions. We believe such endorsements would be superfl
uous
in terms of existing antitrust mechanisms.
Moreover,
promoting a heavy governmental role in broad
cast content,
including standards for programming, is cont
rary to your
stated intent.
Unless you direct otherwise we are proceed
ing to make final
arrangements to submit our bill, taking a s
trong pro-First
Amendment stance in the publicity and testi
mony regarding
it. We should stress the reduction of governme
ntal controls
over broadcast programming and emphasize l
ocal control. We
should also point out the concomitant need
for more responsi-
bility to be exercised by local broadcaster
s and network
management, but further public pressure on
the networks
concerning the bias issue should not be nec
essary.
This bill could be introduced with or witho
ut a Presidential
statement. The advantages of a statement (draft at
Tab B)
are: (1) Our First Amendment image would be e
nhanced by
the greater visibility of the message, o
ffsetting some of
the recent anti-press image; (2) the gene
ral public would
be receptive to your call for more respons
ibility for pro-
gramming to be exercised by the local b
roadcaster and local
groups; and (3) the Administration's ini
tiative in this
matter would be firmly established.
On the other hand, taking this visible a
n approach might
reduce our flexibility in trading legisl
ative points for
broadcaster support in other areas. Moreover, there is
not that clear a Presidential dimension
to this issue.
You may wish to reserve your personal in
volvement in
communications for the more affirmative
and comprehensive
position on cable TV, which we will have
ready for you by
the end of this month.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-3-
RECOMMENDATION
I recommend that we introduce an Administration bill without
an accompanying Presidential statement, but that OTP
aggressively keep the lead on this issue. This approach
keeps the pressure on and keeps the initiative with us,
while preserving some room to trade as this and the many
other proposed renewal bills go through the hearing process.
We would also be in a position for you to make a statement
at a later time, or to veto legislation if things get out of
hand, as was necessary in public broadcasting.
APPROVE
Attachments
DISAPPROVE OTHER
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20564
March 2, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Clay T. Whitehead 4,2'
DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Reruns and Prime-Time Access Rule
In your September 1972 letter to John Gavin of the Screen
Actors Guild, you agreed that something should be done about
the increase of network reruns in prime time. You asked me
to study the rerun problem and to seek a voluntary solution
from the networks before exploring regulatory remedies.
A brief description of the television program production
industry is at Tab A. A copy of our rerun report is at
Tab B.
The study shows reruns and the unemployment they produce to
be merely symptomatic of the root problem facing the program
industry: the great economic power of the networks. CBS and
NBC refused voluntary action; ABC was more polite, but no
more forthcoming.
We have concluded that regulatory restrictions on rerun per-
centages would simply lead the networks to lower program
quality or to turn to foreign production. To be effective,
such direct restrictions probably would require government
rules on program quality, which we should not encourage.
Our rerun study also showed that of the overall decrease in
original program production for network prime-time, the
FCC's prime-time rule appears to be responsible for about
one-third. Thus, like reruns, the prime-time rule is a
significant factor contributing to Hollywood unemployment,
but it has stimulated some new business for some smaller
producers. My earlier memo on that rule, which you approved,
is at Tab C.
In addition to the pros and cons set out in my earlier memo,
you should also consider the following factors. Most views
on the prime-time rule depend upon whether the rule hasfinancially hurt or benefited the particular advertiser,
station, network or program production studio or union. The
rule has increased the networks' economic leverage over
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-2-
advertisers in the balance of prime time (8:00
- 11:00 p.m.),
because the supply of prime-time commercial
minutes has
decreased while the advertiser demand has rema
ined constant.
On the other hand, some smaller producers
, some TV station
officials and the ABC network favor retention
of the rule.
Furthermore, some minority group members belie
ve that re-
tention of the rule will encourage more mino
rity-interest
programs. Recently, Broadcasting magazine has also suppor
ted
retention.
Some proponents of the rule, however, seem to
fear that re-
cision of the rule and a return to the status
quo prior to
its adoption would mean that the government
had given up
dealing with the network dominance issue.
I believe we should consider the following opt
ions:
1. Make the rerun report public, with no call
for FCC action. Take no public position
on repeal of the prime-time rule.
2. Send the rerun report to FCC for appropriate
review, but make no recommendations as to
their action. Take a low-key public posture
that the prime-time rule should be repealed
for this fall's TV season.
3. Send the rerun report to FCC, with a high
visibility call for action on the rerun
problem. Call for repeal of the prime-time
rule at the same time.
Discussion:
Option 1 would bury the rerun issue and mini
mize pressure on
the networks, since we cannot come out force
fully for per-
centage restrictions. It avoids the image of intruding in
the FCC's reconsideration of the prime-time
rule, which has
been in effect for only one and a half years
-- a trial
period which some believe is too short. However, there is
a risk that Administration credibility may be
jeopardized
on these issues, given your commitment to Ga
vin, the net-
works' recalcitrance on the rerun issue, and
the importance
of prime-time rule repeal to the major Hollyw
ood studios and
unions.
We have made prior commitments to the major s
tudios to support
recision of the rule. If we do not take a public position to
this effect, we will alienate the major stud
ios, which consti-
tute the strongest group on our side in favor
of reducing
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-3-
network dominance of programming. In addition, I have
publicly criticized the rule as a failure and have pri-
vately advised Dean Burch that we favor repeal following
your approval of our position on this matter.
Option 2 defers the rerun issue by having the FCC study it,
while still keeping the spirit of your commitment to the
Hollywood unions. The mere existence of an FCC review
would keep the pressure on the networks at least to avoid
future rerun increases. The major producers would be re-
assured by our taking a public position in favor of the
prime-time rule's repeal, although some smaller producers
may assert that the Administration has not given the rule
a fair shake.
Moreover, since repeal of the rule would enhance the net-
works' power over programming, its repeal would lay the
basis for a further FCC inquiry into network dominance.
The unions, however, want more vigorous action on reruns,
and this option seems to duck somewhat our rerun commit-
ments. The press may see any action on reruns as Adminis-
tration economic pressure to achieve political ends.
Further, some may argue that it is unwise for the Adminis-
tration to generate ill will on the part of the networks
over the rerun issue, particularly when there is no easy
solution in sight.
Option 3 has the same advantages as Option 2, but the
higher visibility exacerbates the negative side of that
option. Even though CBS and NBC are on record for repeal
of the prime-time rule, calling attention to our involve-
ment in both issues could lead the press to see this as a
serious intrusion into network program content. While
this would keep the pressure on the networks, it could
unnecessarily fuel the criticism of the Administration as
being anti-First Amendment.
Recommendation:
On balance, I recommend that we follow the low-key, public
position approach of Option 2, which keeps the pressure on
the networks. We would implement this option by forwarding
the rerun report to the FCC, at the same time we send it
to you. This way it would appear that OTP, and not the
President was asking the FCC to study the report. Our
letter to the FCC would also state OTP's conclusion that
the prime-time rule should be repealed.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE OTHER
REPRODUC T THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
STRAIGHT WIRE JA,INTUARv15 J7L
>4
Honorable Tom Whitehead
Direct;lr, Office
of Telecommunications Policy
c/o The Anchorage Weetwara Hotel
Anchorage, Alaska
The official transfer of the ownership and operation of the
Eria7aviiiVE,
F
7.2..
- Fityr I
Alaskaom-e t
=tun/cation System fro= the Department of the Mr Force to RCA Alaska
Cemmunicae.ons, 12 in the finest traclitjon of American free enterprive.
I welcome the opportunity peoliciy to acknowle.h.dge GA this Occasion the
aseistance and advico which I received in the summer of 1969 from former
•Governor Ser„z.,tora Tod ''"tevens anti •Mike ?Tavel, and Congre3zmatt
Iloward Pollock when I approv J. this trz,,atlfer.
I share their pride and tlult of thoir PAlow ,Alashans j this'Ir..4jor 1.s.ndraark
in the building •of efficient, modern communication services :fdlly integrated
with, and comparable to, those in the "lower forty-eight" and Hawaii,.
My congratulations to all the agencies, organizations and iridiViduals w
hose
work has made possit-ge this significant milizstone in Alaskit's
cornrn,anication history.
RICHARD NIXON•
RN:Hasok;c1:
cc: IL M. Woods (FYI)) Mb A. Pas small/M. White /M. Chotiner /Z. 1.Ias
ek/CF
EVENT: JANUARY 16, 1971
Requested by Tom Whitehead.
Approved by Pat Bachan3.1:-
-
_
t
NMEN110111"1
APPROVED OR IG1753:11, COPYTO r_PLF, T CBON__/Ar •
."OrrY.7.rri.17,7,7474'.'47"rrT"7" 7"— •":',Irs7r4TPTI".. *
REPR9DYGP„AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
•
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have to do mote to make this a viable" positive Issue.)
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2. McGovern would increase taxes puticularky of the working middle
class in order to pay for the WOO baby bonus and other unre
alistic
and extravagant 114thernies.
•-•
•
REPRODyCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2.
3. MsGovern's proposals imperil the security of the Ignited Statos.Irresponsible defense eats would snake the U.S. second best.give Russia superiority in the world and invite aggression andfarther war. He would bug out of Vietnam without or prisionerssand gras* amnesty to draft dodgers.
11,44Ktavern lacks inperience„ competence, judgment and stabilityto lead the nation. He is dangerously erratic (can you trust him?);he has demonstrated a lack of sccomplishment in the Senate, a lackof decisiveness in everything he has done since being nominated
S. Metelorears fever. forced busing.
If I were running McGovern'. campaign, I would build it along the followinglimit
I. Nixon defends the status quo, big business special interests -- isfor the big guy and against the common man.
2. Our tax system is Unjust and we need a radical set of reforms.
3. Guarantee a job for every American, promise to end the Nixoninflation by strong, more equitable price controls. Corporationsare malting record profits and can afford to hold their profitsback.
4. End the war, I would spy that I have been assured that if electedall prisoners will be returned before the 90 days is which ourmilitary operations would be terminated. I would save thatbombshell, however, for midsOctober.
These are the major positive and negative themes, but there are a wholeset of subsidiary issues that need to be dealt with in specific geographicareas and with specific constituent groups. In addition to amnesty, wehave two or three selected veterans issues that are very good. With theCatholics, of course, we have abortion and aid to parochial schoolsissues. With labor, we have a good point of attack on McGovern's anti-**bar ratOrd• les not that differessf* from ours, but he professed to be apremieber candidate and took their money. With aglig. we have atremendous record and can really do a positive selling Job. Withretired military officers, we have a particular appeal on the recomputation
.r
4.
issue, To the mealtime isterests we home a good record; theDemocratic Platform was silent while we have dose more than aWfother Adatdaistratioa in history. With the Jaws, of we havethe Middle East. A ye,' large part of our efforts should he devotedto •these speolfic targets of appeal.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By A• A Date f 4644
CEG29 1969
AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
nC. K. McWHORTER
212 393-4459
December 23, 1969
John -
I think you might want to keep
an eye on this matter.
Best always,
(
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
DETERMINED TO BE ANADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By told- NARA, Date a 4419,2,
Memorandum
To: Messrs. Peter (. Flanigan and Clay T. Whitehead"\„
From: Chai.lie McWhorter
r.
December 23, ,)69
Re: Reorganization of the Office of the Director of Telcommunications
Management
This memorandum is submitted by me in order to express to you my
personal thoughts and concern with regard to the proposed changes for re-
organization of the ODTM within the Executive Office of the President. The
views expressed herein are my own and are not presented on behalf of A.T.& T.
since their comments have been expressed separately. My comments deal with
only two aspects of this matter. First, in my opinion, there is a failure
to provide adequately for the two problems which almost everybody admits
exist in this area, namely:
1. To coordinate the effective use of the frequency spectrum.
2. To develop the necessary policies for the government in connection
with its acquisition of communications facilities for its own needs.
If the Administration could take the initiative in providing
leadership and developing the necessary policy and internal structure to
deal with these two problems, there would be widespread approval within
the communications industry. This in turn should provide some political
benefits to the extent that "good government is good politics."
The other point, however, which troubles me .-st derpJy the
suggestion that a policy making group for telecommunications matter be set
up within the Executive Office which would "initially" have up to 3 people.
This proposal does not make sense to me either on the merits or politically.
The implicit suggestion that there is no present policy making group withf
the Federal Government for communications is simply not true. The Congres-
itself in the Communications Act of 1934 delegated to the Federal Communic--
tions Commission a broad policy role in communications matters. This policy
role of the FCC has been sustained by the courts and expanded to cover new
situations in many instances. It could reasonably be expected that 'ongress
would strongly resent any effort by the Administration to preempt this policy
making role that Congress has delegated to the FCC.
To the extent that the White House feels it is necessary or
politically advantageous to take on the responsibility for resolving policy
disputes, this could be handled on an ad hoc basis as was done in the matter
of domestic satellites. I question, however, whether it is politically wise
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
0/1#1rBy A A Date /WIT
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
. . •
-2-
for any Administration to attempt to resolve most such "policy questions"since many are really a contest between various economic interests. Politi-cally, it would be much better to let the FCC carry out its responsibilitiesin this area, particularly where we have a strong chairman to represent anyviews of the Administration.
If the Executive Office has to maintain an initial staff of some
30 policy making people for telecommunications matters, it would inevitably
result in the employment of a group of theoretical and academic types who
would attempt to use their status as White House policy makers to restructure
and meddle with the industry in competition with the FCC. This would
inevitably drag the White House into the middle of unnecessary disputes.
Politically, there is no way you can win with this approach. Rather, it is
my opinion that the White House staff should attempt to discourage theirinvolvement in economic controversies which are a healthy and vital part of
our private enterprise system.
In my view the Nixon Administration staff procedures which call
for the use of special task forces as needed to deal with a specific problem
and then go out of existence seems to be the best approach. If you have 30
policy makers showing up for work every morning trying to justify their
existence and providing a basis for larger appropriations and staff the
following year, the Administration would be stuck with a trouble-making
aparatus that would inevitably create unnecessary political problems.
Rather, I would strongly recommend that this suggestion for such a policy
making group be rejected and that the Nixon Administration rely on either
Dean Burch as Chairman of the FCC or the special task force approach where
that seems to be the best alternative.
cc: Hon. John D. Ehrlichman
DECLASSIFIED
Authority I
By A A Date jAd_64
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
_1-vS
4//7L -
Deeember 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HUGHES
Attached for your information is a copy of the final vera too of
our Recommendation on Executive Branch Organisation for
Telecommunications Matters. You will note that / have adopted
many of your suggealleas. I have. however, emitted *Ay
reference to the White HMSO Communitatioas Ageacy since
feel that this is stet a matter appropriate for discussion and
comment throughout the Adminietration.
agree only in part with your OW that WHCA should be totally
outside the purview of the new Office of Telecommunications
Policy. Neither the Director of Telecosomuniestions Polley nor
his *WI should be Involved in WHCA operetiens in any way.
However, It is important that the Director be the President's
principal adviser on telecommunications matters. It is essential,
therefor*, that he personally be fully informed about the needs,
capabilities, and activities of WHCA.
I believe that the appropriate way to handle this very confidential
matter is through an understanding between the President his
Immediate stall, his Military Aide, and the Director of
Telecommunication. Policy. This is more appropriately bandied
through a sneraosundum from the President outlining bow that
matter is to be handled than in an Easscutive Order establishing
organisational responsibilities throughout the executive branch.
Such a procedure would provide more flexibility and more
confidentiality.
I would welcome any further views you have on this document,
since it is now being circulated for corm:neat among the various
Federal departments and agencies.
Clay T. Whitehead
Rail Assistant
Attachment
fI DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By 1I2iA Date JAM
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
cc: Mr. rbutiganMr. Kribegamsa
WitimissaelCentra Moo
Cr Wbitalleadjmied
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
A A Date ±Arigi
11!
.f7
INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE PRESIDENT
Remarks by John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to the President
Access to information within the government is determined in
certain instances on the basis of a "need to know". The President of
the United States has the unique informational requirement of a "need
to know" everything. As a result of his vast informational requirements
coupled with the constraint that there are only twenty-four hours in a
day we find that the President's time is at a premium and it is imperative
that each hour be used as productively as possible.
It is the responsibility of the White House staff to insure that the unique
informational requirements of the President are satisfied and to insure
that maximum utilization is made of the President's time.
In fulfilling these responsibilities the White House staff serves five major
functions:
1. To relieve the President from routine matters which do not
require his attention by following through on these matters in
accordance with policies established by the President.
REPRODUCED Al TTE NAIIONAL ARCI JIVES
,2144'
-2
2. To collect and analyze data, both from within and outside
the government, and make carefully considered recommendations
regarding new ideas, plans and formation of policy.
3. To review and follow-up on major policy decisions by acting
as liaison and helping the Department heads to interpret these
-decisions.
4. To help coordinate the work of the different Departments and
Agencies.'
5. To undertake special assignments.
The results of the performance of these functions are as follows:
1. To expedite the flow of information into the President's office.
2. To expedite and insure compliance with the flow of requests
and decisions emanating from the President's office.
3. To provide the President with more time for the function which
is uniquely his: the decision.
In order to insure maximum utilization of the President's time it is
imperative that when bringing a matter to his attention:
a. All pertinent facts must be presented in a brief and concise
manner.
b. All alternate courses of action must be clearly presented.
c. It must receive the proper lateral coordination and the
recommendations of all Departments, Agencies, and staff
members who have an interest in the matter must be clearly
setforth.
d. It must be presented to the President with enough lead time that
the President is able to thoroughly review the material without
being pressured into a snap decision.
The importance of proper lateral coordination cannot be emphazised
enough. The submission of material which has not been properly
coordinated results in the following:
1. If the President makes his decision based on the material that
is presented, then he has made his decision without the
assurance of full knowledge of all pertinent information.
2. If the President reviews the material and determines that it
has not been fully coordinated, then we have cctused the President
to waste a portion of his valuable time reviewing material
which he will have to review again at a later date.
In the one case we have wasted a portion of the President's limited time
and, in the other case, the President has made a decision without full
RE.P,ry:pLICEZ) AT THE NATIONAL AlieHIVb
•
4
information, thereby resulting in a greater probability that the decision
may be incorrect. In either case we see that it is imperative that
all matters receive complete lateral coordination before being presented
to the President.
The staff expedites the flow of requests and decisions emanating from
the President's office by insuring:
1. That they are communicated quickly to the right individuals.
Z. That those who must take action fully understand what is requested
or required.
3. That the matter is completed on time.
This results in the President not having to concern himself about the
follow-up of his decisions and requests.
Although the staff can provide the President with more time to spend on
items of major importance and expedite the flow of information to him, it is
imperative that the President maintain his direct lines of communication with
Department Heads, Agency heads, and others in order to insure that he
has the opportunity to discuss matters with those who are meeting the
problems at the "grass roots" level. This is accomplished in part by the
than theetings at which the President is.in attendance. In order
5
to get maximum benefit from the meetings the President must be
provided in advance with background information on the subject
matter that is expected to be covered. This gives the President the
opportunity to review his thinking on, and to prepare himself for
discussion of, the subject matter.
The overall recommendations and decisions which result from these
meetings are part of the normal way of getting things done, but they
have their pitfalls. They are apt to lead to:
1.
Z.
3.
Inadequate lateral coordination.
Uncertainties concerning the specific details fo the decisions.
Improper follow-up action.
Members of the staff insure that matters discussed at meetings are
fully recorded, properly coordinated and followed up to insure that all
necessary actions are completed.
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of any organization is directly
dependent upon the executive who assumes the leadership and makes the
decision. In our case it is the President who assumes the ultimate
responsibility of weighing the alternative courses of action and deciding
on a single definite course of action. All of the aforementioned staff
REPRODUCLD A,T THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
6 -
efforts have been aimed towards that one goal: to serve the informational
needs of the President as the decision maker of the Executive Branch
of the government.
a
ef''.4e1N4‘4"44-.-440,01.A0d -
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
•
FEBRUARY 4, 1970
Fop DIRECTOR MAYO
Attached for your comment is a draft of the President's
Message to Congress on Telecommunications
Reorganization. We would appreciate having your
confluents by Noon. Thursday, February 5.
For your information. I believe that Howard Schnoor
of Dwight Ink's office is already reviewing the Message.
Attachment
!
DECLASSIFIED
! Authority
By TA ZA Date
Ken Cole
111XECUTIVE
.)46,
•Aftifo," Ate, 'a
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
(Huebn- .1K February 4, 1970
IL Messav--Telecommunications Reorganization
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
We live in a time when the technology of telecommunications is
undergoing rapid change which will dramatically affect the life of
our whole society. As the largest single user of the nation's tele-
communications facilities, the government must establish intelligent
and effective policies and procedures in this area. It has long been
recognized that telecommunications policies should be integrated
more fully into the policy processes of gover4ment and that the
executive branch should be better equipped to deal with the issues
which will arise as telecommunications grow in quantity'and quality.
As a step toward realizing these goals more fully, I am today
sending to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. of 1970, pre-
pared in accordance with Chapter 9 of Title 5 of the United States
Code. This plan would establish a new Office of Telecommunications
Policy in the Executive Office of the President, and would eliminate
the present position of Director of Telecommunications Management.
In addition to the functions which are transferred to the new office
by the Reorganization Plan itself, it would perform certain other
duties which I intend to assign to it by Executive Order as soon as
the Reorganization Plan takes effect. The Office of Telecommuni-
cations Policy would be assisted in its research and analysis
Authority
iBy
—
By A A Date JALUII
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-2-
, f71 7'
responsibilities by the agencies and departments of the Executive
Branch including another new office, located in the Department of
Commerce and reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Science and Technology.
The new Office of Telecommunications Policy would play three
essential roles:
1. It would serve as the President's principle adviser on tele-
communications policy, helping to formulate government policies
concerning a wide range of domestic and international telecommu-
nications issues. The speed of economic and technological advance
in our time means that new questions concerning communications
are constantly arising, questions on which the government must be
well informed and well advised, The new Office will enable the
President and all government officials to share more fully in the
experience, the insights, and the forecasts of government and
non-government experts.
2. The new Office of Telecommunications policy would help
formulate the policies and coordinate the operations for the Federal
government's own vast communications systems. It would, for
example, set guidelines for the various Departments and agencies
concerning their communications equipment and services. It would
evaluate the ability of government communications systems to
DECLASSIFIED
I
ft Authority
By,eatZIZA Date I kfiet
tODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-3-
meet ,ecurity heeds of the country and to perform effectivelyin time of emergency. The Office would direct the assignment of'those portions of the radio spectrum which are reserved for govern-ment use. It would carry out responsibilities conferred on thePresident by the Communications Satellite Act, advise state andlocal governments, and perform other related duties.3. Finally, the new Office of Telecommunications Policy wouldenable the executive branch of the Federal government to speakwith a clearer voice and to act as a stronger partner in discussionsof communications policy with both the Congress and the FederalCommunications Commission. This action will take away none ofthe prerogatives or functions assigned to the FCC by the Congress.It is my hope, however, that the new Office and the FCC willcooperate in achieving certain reforms in telecommunications policy,especially in our procedures for allocating portions of the radiospectrum for government and civilian use. Our current proceduresmust be more flexible if they are to deal adequately with problemssuch as the growing spectrum shortage.
The public interest requires that government policies concerningtelecommunications be formulated with as much sophistication andvision as possible. This reorganization plan — and the executiveorder which would accompany it — are necessary instruments if the
DECLASSIF-1ED IAuthority
By A Date I k/Of
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-4-
government is to respond adequately to the challenges and opportu-
nities of the continuing communications revolution. I hope that the
Congress will allow this plan to become effective so that these
necessary reforms can be achieved.
1.---"*DEc
Authority
By ;A Date 14/4
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
orreurnm" 1-?6,- 6 -
December IS, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR WC WARD
The following people, all coincidental/7 from California,have been suggested for the new Teleceminnunications job.If you know any of them. I woad appreciate hearLeg youropinion of their qualifications for this position.
Dr. Bernard OlisPer, Vise Prealiteist, Researchand Devalopment, llewlett-Packard• Palo Aldt*
Dr. Mateo lza R. Curry. Vise President, Directorof Research, liedrinan Inittementes Fullerton
Dr. Allen Peterson. Professor of ElectricalEngineering, Stanford University
cc: Mr. KriegamanMr. WhiteheadCentral Facet,'
CrArbitehead:ed
I DECLASSIFIED
Authority • LBYASitizA Date
Clay T. WhiteheadSlag Assistant
RECEIVED
DEC 2 3 1969CENTRAL FILES
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
•
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
Summary
Objectives: More diverse TV programming and less biased T
V
news; reduced regulatory control of broadcast programming.
Principal problem: Concentration of power over programming in
the three networks and lack of management control over news
departments.
• Remedy I: Cable TV: Probably the most effective and most lasting
approach, but ten years or so for significant impact.
Remedy II: Creation of new networks: Improving the network anti-
trust suit and/or launching an FCC inquiry into network econo
mic
power might bring results in the five-year time frame. Having
the
"network dominance" issue actively alive in the meantime woul
d help.
Remedy III: Prime time rule and reruns: Rescinding the rule would
improve Hollywood employment more than rerun restrictions
and
appear to lessen regulation. Network intransigence on rerun
s and
failure of the rules give the opening for Remedy II.
Remedy IV: Support license renewal legislation lessening FCC
program control: Gives us credibility on First Amendment
issues
to soften political overtones of II. Degree of support can
depend on
getting affiliate involvement in network news per upcoming
invocation.
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•
10
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Broadcasting Policy and Network Power
Our two principal objectives with respect to the broadcast
industry have been (1) less biased and more diverse TV news
coverage and (2) reversing the growth of regulatory inter-
vention in the private enterprise broadcasting system. These
objectives have occasionally conflicted, but they are not
incompatible. So far, we have mostly temporized--it is now time
for an effective strategy in both areas to accomplish some
lasting change.
Politically, economically, or philosophically, the barrier to
progress on either front is the concentration of power in the
three networks. This power arises from the limited number of
TV stations and the practice of exclusive network affiliatio
ns--
making more than three full-time national networks uneconomic.
With only three networks, it is not surprising that they are
uncompetitive, if not anticompetitive, in entertainment pro-
gramming and advertising; and cliquish, if not incestuous, in
news and public affairs.
This memorandum outlines several policy options available for
dealing with this problem over the next few years. There are
two major areas in which we can take affirmative action: cabl
e
television and encouraging new networks. Moreover, there are
a number of broadcasting issues pending before the FCC and t
he
Congress on which we will have to take positions and which
can
be used to further our objectives: license renewal legislatio
n,
Fairness Doctrine, the FCC prime time rule, and reruns.
I. Cable Television
There is no technological limit on the number of cable TV
channels. The number of channels actually available will depend
on supply and demand in programming, advertising, and direct
viewer payment. Properly structured, cable is likely to bring
more diversity in entertainment, news, and public affairs
programming, and new national and regional television n
etworks
(not unlike the diversity found in the magazine business t
oday).
Unless restricted, cable would bring about two new revenue
sources
for programming—specialized advertising and direct viewer
pay-
ment. Cable TV could reach about 50 per cent of the nation's
homes by 1980, depending on the policies we decide to fol
low.
There is Currently great confusion and uncertainty about t
he
proper direction for cable growth and the regulatory autho
rity
of the FCC.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-2-
Option 1. Introduce legislation next year followin9
the recommendations of the Cabinet committee
on cable television
Effect: Positive Presidential recognition of cable tele-
vision as an exciting new TV medium for the future, expanding
viewer choice and diversity, would have direct political benefits.
Unlike FCC rules, our approach provides for broadcaster parti-
cipation in cable#and for fair copyright protection that should
help soften expected broadcaster opposition. Hollywood would
support this, and the cable industry would have little choice
but to do likewise, although they will oppose certain provisions
of our policy. The most volatile political issue will be "pay
TV," which must not be overly restricted if cable is to provide
the revenues to support the diversity we seek. Congress has
consistently avoided dealing with cable, and it will take some
effort to overcome Congressional inertia.
Option 2. Publish the report of the Cabinet committee
and seek to implement it through the FCC
Effect: The FCC would likely bastardize the policy and
dissipate its effectiveness, although pay TV may well suffer
fewer restrictions there than at the hands of Congress. As
cable investment grows under FCC rules, cable system owners
will become stronger and increasingly committed to the status
quo, making it very difficult to correct the FCC by legislation
later on. Further, the FCC is likely to restrict the growth
of cable channels in order to protect broadcasting profits.
. II. Encouraging New Networks
This has been tried many times before and it has never worked
because of the need to reach a national audience. It cannot be
done without a significant expansion of TV stations or a
mandatory reduction of the number of hours a network is allowed
to affiliate with the stations in each city.
Option 3. Expand the number of television stations
in each market
Effect: Although one or two new stations could be added
in many major cities without significant technical problems,
the FCC proceedings would be protracted and bitterly contested
by broadcasters. Even if achieved (5 years minimum), resulting
in one or two new networks, the TV advertising dollar would
ncr-rwUUUtL) AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-3--
have to be spread over mo
re programming. "Quality" as t
he
networks define it would
be reduced, and there would b
e fewer
profits available for sp
ecials and news programming.
Option 4. Expand the time denied to th
e networks
by the FCC prime time rule a
nd require
them to make their interconn
ection
facilities available to othe
rs during
that time
Effect: Broadcasters, particularly n
etworks, would oppose,
but Hollywood producers m
ight go along if access to
national
network facilities did not
increase their financial r
isks. This
would have little effect o
n national news coverage, bu
t could
result in as many as three
new part-time national netw
orks for
entertainment programming.
Option 5. Correct deficiencies in the
network antitrust
suit and begin FCC proceedi
ngs on network
affiliation rules to -create severa
l new networks
Effect: The antitrust suit as drawn
does not deal effec-
tively with network dominan
ce. Moreover, there are ample
grounds for the FCC to laun
ch an inquiry into network
monopoly
power with the aim of creat
ing new competitive nationa
l networks
by providing realistic acc
ess to national audiences.
This can
be combined with efforts to
reduce ATT charges for pa
rt-time
network interconnection. Broadcasters w
ould oppose and
Hollywood would have mixed r
eactions. Congressional committees
probably would become seriou
sly concerned, and this wo
uld be
viewed by many as the "other
shoe" after Agnew. If accompli
shed,
there should be no noticeabl
e effects on the "quality
" of
entertainment shows, but i
t is likely there would b
e more
diversity (or#at least more
competition) in entertai
nment shows.
Option 6. Initiate FCC and/or antitru
st actions
to divest the networks of
the stations
they own
• Effect: If successful would weaken
the financial power
of the networks, but proba
bly would result in lower
program
quality. The quantity of news and p
ublic affairs would probabl
y
shrink. Success is highly uncertai
n, and the principal effec
t
would be punitive.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-4-
III. Prime Time Rule and Reruns
Several attempts have been made to correct or alleviate specific
symptoms of the problem of network power. The FCC prime time
rule was designed to increase diversity in programming by
requiring affiliates to obtain one-half hour of programming
nightly during prime time from non-network sources. The rule has
not worked because only very low budget shows are profitable
without access to a nationwide audience. Rerun restrictions have
been proposed because of the steady decrease in original network
programming and the resultant decrease in Hollywood employment.
Option 7. Repeal the prime time rule
Effect: Restoring the half hour nightly to the networks
would increase Hollywood employment, and only a few independent
producers would oppose. Most broadcasters will support repeal
of the rule on principle. Because the half hour now taken away
is a loss-leader for the networks, ABC, as the weakest network,
apparently is content with the rule. Repeal of the rule could
be conditioned by a prohibition of network ownership of prime
time entertainment programming.
Option 8. Change or expand the prime time rule
without reouiring the networks to make
their interconnection facilities avail-
able to others
Effect: Returning more time to the local stations without
access to interconnect facilities for a nationwide audience
would result in lower quality programming, lower network
revenues, and lower Hollywood employment. It would hurt the
networks and Hollywood, and local broadcasters would also oppose.
Option 9. Press for reduction of network reruns
Effect: NBC and CBS have stated they will not make any
such commitments voluntarily. ABC will do so only if the others
do and if the Hollywood unions and producers also make concessions.
Even. if successful, the network reaction might well be the
substitution of lower cost programming. Thus, an FCC rule would
be effective only if accompanied by rules on program "quality"
or national production.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-5-
IV. Other Broadcasting Issues
Broadcasters have serious problems with existing license renewalprocedures and the Fairness Doctrine. Fairness Doctrine enforce-ment has become increasingly detailed, and its scope has steadilyexpanded. Activist groups have been using both procedures togain free broadcast time or to blackmail broadcasters into makingprogramming and employment concessions. There is considerablepressure to expand the Fairness Doctrine's application in thearea of product advertising.
Option 10. Support a license renewal bill that extends the license term and prohibits FCC establishment of program standards
Effect This approach is consistent with the idea of privateenterprise broadcasting without Government control of content.Broadcasters would much prefer a simple extension of the licenseterm. This does little directly to counter network power.Support for this kind of bill would significantly improve ourcredentials as opponents of programming controls and supportersof the First Amendment. (Further legislation to abandon case-by-case Fairness enforcement would round out our policy. However,it would unduly burden this legislation and can await moreevidence cLE broadcaster responsibility.)
Option 11. _q_t_ip_port the broadcaster-endorsed license renewal bill
ffect: With appropriate compromises in the Congress, abill providing for simple extension of the license renewal termand putting the burden of proof on the license challenger ratherthan the incumbent might well pass. There would be considerableopposition to this bill, and many would view it as a sellout tothe broadcast industry. It would not provide the statesmanlikeimage we need to accomplish the network objectives and wouldinvite more extensive FCC program regulation.
V. Discussion
Cable television is the most effective means of achieving ourobjectives. Properly structured, cable could provide a multitudeof channels, numerous networks, more opportunity for viewerchoices, in entertainment programming and news and public affairsdiscussion. However, this is a long-term solution, since it willnot have a significant effect for about 10 years.
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••
/11611.11111111111111111111-• •
•
-6-
The creation of new television networks as described in Section IIabove could be an intermediate step. Anything that appearedpurely punitive against the three networks would probably becounterproductive. An approach predicated on the establishmentof neW networks and more competition, together with a goodrenewal bill and recision of the prime time rule, might wellsucceed. Even if that approach were to get bogged down in theFCC or the courts, the explicit action and public attention tothe network power issues should make the networks more consciousof news objectivity and anticompetitive exercise of theireconomic power.
All broadcasters would, no doubt, oppose any serious attack onnetwork power simply because they profit from it. Even if wefully supported the broadcasters' positions on everything else,they would oppose us on the network issue. Moreover, the pressand the Congress will question our motives. The best approach,therefore, is likely to combine some -(but not too much) actionon the "broadcast freedom" front with a clear signal that thingscan get rough in other areas if there isn't more exercise ofmanagement responsibility over programming and news.
One approach for combining all these factors might be as follows:
1. Support cable television legislation next year as anexciting new initiative. It is coming anyway, so get it startedright and get the President associated with its future in apositive way.
2. Introduce a license renewal bill like that describedabove (Option 10). Make clear to networks and key affiliatesthat vigorous support depends on real evidence of newsobjectivity. Endorse eventual removal of case-by-case Fairnessenforcement, but only when broadcaster responsibility hasimproved sufficiently to offer hope of Congressional passage.
3. Call public attention to the responsibility of stationand network managers for the objectivity of their news depart-ments. Privately urge key affiliate stations to press networkmanagement on this issue. Make clear that progress (.11 thisfront is a prerequisite to vigorous Administration support of alicense renewal bill next year.
4. Use the networks' intransigence on the rerun issue tocall attention to network power. Propose that the FCC rescindthe prime time rule (to improve programming and reduce Hollywood
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-7-
unemployment) and immediately issue a Notice of Further Inquiryinto all aspects of network monopoly power, including thedesirability and feasibility of establishing additional networks.Action by February.
5. Sharpen and/or expand the pending network antitrustsuit against the networks and their affiliates to parallel theFCC action and press it more vigorously.
6. As a diversionary tactic, release the InterdepartmentRadio Advisory Committee's conclusion that 100 or more new VHFTV stations could be added in the top 100 markets withoutsignificant interference. Send to the FCC for comment, suggestingthey initiate proceedings to add stations in a few major cities.Because of the short-run effect new stations would have onbroadcaster profits, they would have to devote considerable effortto opposing this action.
7. Trust that concerned citizens will point out to thenew management of the two largest networks that exercise ofmanagement responsibility for network news operations cannotbut have an effect on the FCC inquiry into network power.
8. Push the FCC harder on radio deregulation to establishour stand on principle and as a "carrot" for television broad-casters.
i DECLASSIFIED .
I Authority .Eim2451r IBy 'ARA Date
Republican Media Consultants
Reproduced at he National Archives
Consultant - age Campaigns Result
1REA Productions, Inc. Sargent. Gov. Mass. Won(New York) Lukens Gov. Ohio Lost (Primary
Roger E. Ailes - 29 Meskill Gov. Conn. WonRobert Ailes - 31 Olson Gov. Wisc. LostPeter Finley - 28 Roudebush .Sen. Indiana
2W 2L
Robert Goodman Agency Taft Sen. Ohio Won(Baltimore, Maryland) Eckerd Gov. Fla. Lost (Primary)
Robert Goodman - 41 Eggers Gov. Texas Lost liRonald Wilner - 38 Jenkins Gov. Tenn. Lost (Primary)
L;Ralph Elsms - 50 Prouty Sen. Vt. Won
2W 3L
2Campaign Systems Cloud Gov. Ohio Lost
(Washington, D. C.) Gross Sen. N. J. LostJohn Deardourff - 36 Milliken Gov. Mich. WonDouglas Bailey - 36 Broderick Gov. Pa. LostJohn E. Bowen - 38 DuPont House Del. Won
Danforth Sen. Missouri Lost
2W 4L
3Earle Palmer Brown & Assoc. Hogan House Md. Won
Earle Palmer Brown - Gude House Md. Wonabout 45 Beall Sen. Md. Won
3W
Spencer-Roberts & Associates Reagan Gov. Calif. Won(California) Bentley Gov. Ga. Lost (Primary)
Stuart Spencer - 43 Harman Gov. Kansas Lost (Primary) —William Roberts - 45 Porteus Gov. Hawaii Lost (Primary)Dick Woodward - 30 Murphy Sen. Calif. Lost Dave Liggett - 28 1W 4L
Robert-Lynn Associates, Ltd. Weicker Sen. Conn. Won(Washington, D. C.) 1W
Robert F. Bonitati - 31I Lynn Mueller - 30
Gordon Knox - 29Cary W. Sully - 26.
AtWitilitOkAtikv,4 Vdetiftlii$104324***61#1111DLCLASSIFIED
i Author-it
By_Er612461
'ARA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
onsultant - age Campaigns Result
Treleaven Associates Brock Sen. Tenn Won(New York) Bush Sen. Texas Lost
Harry Treleaven - 42 Cramer Sen. Fla. LostKen Rietz - 29 Rentschler Sen. Illinois Lost (Primary)
Kleppe . Sen. N. D. Lost,
Romney Sen. Mich. Lost
Domenici Gov. N. M. Lost
1W 6L
Stephen Shaddegg Associates Williams Gov. Arizona Won
(Phoenix, Arizona) Fannin Sen. Arizona WonStephen Shaddegg - Carter Sen. N. M. Lost
Jack Tinker & Partners
2W 1L,
Rockefeller Gov. New York Won
(New York) 1W
3Civic Services, Inc. Wold Sen. Wyoming Lost
(St. Louis, Missouri) Burton Sen. Utah Lost•Brad Hayes - Beall Sen. Md. Won
Ed Grefe - 1W 2L
Roy Pfautch -
Walsh Advertising
(Wilmington, Delaware)Roth Sen. Delaware Won
Jones & Thomas Inc. Smith Sen. Illinois Lost(Chicago, Illinois) Goodell Sen. N. Y. Lost
F. Thomas Bertsche 2L
L Released by Jim Allison, Deputy Chairman of the Republican NationalCommittee in February, 1970 following statement made by Roger Ailesthat REA would offer its services to Democrat as well as Republicancandidates.
2. Name has been changed to Bailey, Deardourf and Bowen, Inc.
3. Earl Palmer Brown responsible for media in Beall campaign.
Civic Services, Inc. responsible for management, polling and advertising.
I A utitoritDECLASSIFIED
ByqilARA Date ___Zildarp
Democrat Media Consultants
Reproduced at the National rcnives
Consultant - age Campaigns Result
Communications Co. *Burns Gov. Hawaii Win
(Washington, D. C.) *Mandel . Gov. Md. Win
Robert Squier - 35 *Carr Gov. Alaska Win
Mike Pengra - 31 Grossman Sen. Arizona Loss
*Mu s kie Maine Win.Sen.4W 1L
Saturn Pictures Corp. Goldberg Gov. N. Y. Loss
(New York, New York) 1L
William Wilson - 40
Tom Sternberg - 32
Alec MacKenzie - 37
Astrafilms, Inc. McGee Sen. Wyoming Win
(Washington, D. C.) Burkick Sen. N. D. Win
Leonard Grossman - 50 Cannon Sen. Nevada Win
3W
Garth Associates *Gilligan Gov. Ohio Win
(New York, New York) Ottinger Sen. N.Y. Loss
David Garth - 40 Stevensen Sen. Ill. Win
Jeff Greenfield Tunney Sen. Calif. Win
3W 1L
Lester M. Goldsmith Productions Unruh Gov. Calif. Loss
(Los Angeles, California) 1L
Lester M. Goldsmith - 36
SA Films, Inc. *Muskie Sen. Maine Win
(Hillsdale, New Jersey) 1W
Sidney Aronson - 35
Hal Pulchin Productions *Mandel Goy. Md. Win
(New York, New York) 1W
Tony Schwartz
DECLASSIFIED
Authorit
RA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
Consultant - age Campaigns Result
Guggenheim Productions, Inc. Hart Sen. Mich. Win
(Washington, D. C.) Moss Sen. Utah Win
Charles Guggenheim *Gilligian Gov. Ohio Win
Kennedy Sen. Mass. Win
Metzenbaum Sen. Ohio Loss
Gore Sen. Tenn. Loss4W 2L
Joseph Napolitan Associates, Inc.*Mandel Gov. Md. Win
(Washington, D. C.) *Carr Gov. Alaska Win
Joseph Mapolitan - 41 *Burns Gov. Hawaii Win
Michael Rowan - 283W
Rives-Dykes Agency Bentsen Sen. Texas Win
(Houston, Texas)1W
Take One, Inc. Chiles Sen. Florida Win
(Miami, Florida)1W
Shelby Storch & Co., Inc. Symington Sen. Missouri Win
(St. Louis, Missouri)1W
* More than one firm is listed as being responsible for media wor
k
-Jor
DECLASSIFIED
Authorit
By
_ ani4g 'ARA Date
Reproduced at the National Archives
•
MEMORANDUM Z'OR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG
SUBJECT: Security Clearance Review
In response to your inutructiona to cut down on the number of peoplewith TOP SECRET and special category clearances, with particttlaremphasis en dravtically roducinl the nu...-1-Lber of such clearances forrica-govcrilment employees, I have directed that:
The heads oLf all departmerts and agencies oubrnit a reportby noon Saturday, July 10, 1971 p.roviding 01;2 number of employee,including conzuttarlts, and thQue czriployed by private firms engaged incovernment contract, who bold clearance.% for access to TOP SECRETand other high level cpeeial catcgory material.
-- Each department and agency immediately review thoseindividuals and orgQ,zilzations outaide the government now retainingTOP SI;2•Cii,ET or special category ;material within exihiting regulatanswith the airi of drastically reduckng such non-goverrarient holdings.
-- Each responsible cleparilment and agency also !Initiate atonce a review and screetting of Ciah TOP SrCIZET and special categoryclearance within oxinting r giaions presc3ntly held by individuals with-in and etthilde the government viith a vicw to effecting immediatereductions of all uch clearances.
The magnitude of this review can be judged by the fact that the Depart-ment of Defense estimates that presently more than. 230, 000 individualsemployed by firms outside the government have TOP SECRET clearance3and at least 500,000 more within the Departznent of Defense alone havesuch a clearance.
-- During the review process, the legal implications will haveto be kgpt in mind of the need for firms competing for defense contractsto have sufficient employees with clearances in order to be competitive.
1 DECLASSIFIED
I1 AL;thority amzqs-r ByAfrA Date
,
- 2 -
Reproduced at the National Archives
I have also rectuested a memorandum from the Department of State toprovide the following inf,-,rznation on government-sponsored researchdone outside the' governraents
-- organizations and individuals currently doing such research;
-- the subject matter of such research;
the amount of money the government is spending on eachproject;
the level of dassification of each project; and
the department or agency sponsoring each project.
All the obove actions are being takon within the framework of existingregulations. .As part of our effort to improve toe regulations, I moton June 29 with the irteragency group which hats been reviewing clasa-fication and declaRsificat;on procedures and inntructed them to includeIn their report 2..ecorarnentlations on reducing the number of TOP SECRETand other special category clearanccts.
Per your instructiono, I also directed the intertgency group to developLuandiingpeciaygenzative inwrm43),tioll, Like taccess
to htchmutt be restrictiad nore tha,n the present Gystem vdillThe interagency group expects to have specific recommendations nextweek as a result of their study.
30/71
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCnIVES
111•11011111111
nr-. Yr,- • -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
Summary
Objectives: More diverse TV programming and less biased TV
news; reduced regulatory control of broadcast programming.
Principal problem: Concentration of power over programming in
the three networks and lack of management control over news
departments. oot
•
Remedy I: Cable TV: Probably the most effective and most lasting
approach, but ten years or so for significant impact.
Remedy II: Creation of new. networks: Improving the network anti-
trust suit and/or launching an FCC inquiry into network economic
power might bring results in the five-year time frame. Having the
"network dominance" issue actively alive in the meantime would help.
Remedy III: Prime time rule and reruns: Rescinding the rule would
improve Hollywood employment more than rerun restrictions and
appear to lessen regulation. Network intransigence on reruns and
failure of the rules give the opening for Remedy II.
Remedy IV: Support license renewal legislation lessening FCC
program control: Gives us credibility on First Amendment issues
to soften political overtones of II. Degree of support can depend on
getting affiliate involvement in network news per upcoming invocation.
4„, pDA-td,
—
14ThvidthRtzo
6./ -7-7
//.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
•
•
irk-C 81969THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 6, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. John Ehrlichma-n
Attached are:
(1) A discussion of the executive branch organization
for telecommunications and a recommended reorganization.
(2) A description of the responsibilities of a new
X Office of Telecommunications Policy.
Both the Bureau of the Budget and the staff of the President's
Advisory Council on Executive Organization have assisted
in the preparation of this recommendation. We would like to
have your comments before submitting a final recommendation
to the President. I would appreciate having your comments by
December 13.
Attachments
71t)A,AP 'tfriiigan
Assistant to the President
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By A A Date ii_wo
'RODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATIONFOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
In spite of the rapidly growing importance of telecommunicationsto the Nation and for the government's own missions, there is noeffective policy-making capability for telecommunications in theexecutive branch. The Administration is therefore largely unableto exert leadership or take initiatives in spite of vulnerability tocriticism for FCC policies. Government-wide coordination of itsown telecommunications activities has not been adequate. Theseproblems have been manifested in several ways:
I. There is a serious lack of effective machinery fordealing expeditiously with domestic telecommunications issues.The government has been grappling for several years, with onlylimited success, with such issues as "foreign attachments" to thepublic telephone network, cable TV and pay TV, the possible usesand industry structure for a domestic satellite communicationssystem, and policies for computer communications. There is acurrent tendency to resolve such issues by past precedents and bycompromises between the FCC and various agencies in the executivebranch, but the increasingly /rapid rate of technological change and
rz, introduction of new services makes policy-by-precedent increasinglyless relevant, more restrictive, or counterproductive. Neither theFCC nor the executive branch has a significant capability forsystematic economic and technical analysis.
2. Efforts to coordinate the procurement and use of tele-communications facilities and services by the Federal governmenthave had limited success. The current coordination arrange-ments, embodied in the National. Communications System (NCS)structure, have achieved certain desirable interconnections andoperating procedures, but have not Produced the desired assurancesthat the government is procuring the services needed in an efficient
.manner. Although present policies call for a "unified" NCS, thereis little agreement on what further unification is needed, or whatit would cost or accomplish.
3. The current procedures for spectrum allocation arehighly inflexible and arc increasingly creating a spectrum shortagecrisis. The shortage is especially severe 3.n the land mobile radioallocations, which are becoming increasingly important to localpolice and fire protection services, among many other Claimants.
DECLASSIFIEDAuthority
By J A A Date
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-mor
"eee-2-
Current organization for communications policy-making and coordination
The Director of Telecommunications Management (DTM) in the Officeof Emergency Preparedness .is now charged by Executive Order andPresidential mem or andum with the responsibility for coordinatingtelecommunications activities in the executive branch. The DTMalso is designated Special Assistant to the President for Telecom-munications.. However, the history of the organization reveals thatattempts by the DTM to exercise leadership in communications policyhave been largely ineffectual. The responsibilities and authority ofthe DTM are questioned by agencies with operating responsibilities.This situation results from a number of factors including organizationallocation, inadequate staff, and lack of clear authority.
There is now no office in the executive branch with the responsibilityor the capability to review the whole range of national telecommunicationspolicies as expressed in legislation and in FCC policies. The Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice has occasionally filedbriefs on the competitive aspects of decisions before the FCC, butthese derive largely from antitrust considerations rather than fromfamiliarity with. communications issues. The Department of Commercehas a telecommunications research capability, but no responsibilityor familiarity with communications policy. Neither the Council ofEconomic Advisers nor the Office of Science and Technology areequipped to address the fundamental economic and institutionalproblems of the communications industry and its regulation by theFCC, or the problems of the government's own telecommunications.
Studies of Federal organization
Since World War 11, there have been a number of studies of Federalcommunications organization and a number of reorganizations andshifts of responsibilities within the executive branch. None hasproved particularly satisfactory, and, indeed, there is no ideal 'solution. This is due in part to the quasi-independence of the FCCfrom the executive branch and in part to the conflicting individualagency mission responsibilities within the executive branch.
The study of the Federal government communications organizationcompleted in December 1968 by the Bureau of the Budget provides
1—**'--- -DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By j A Date I 14/01
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-3
a good statement of the shortcomings of our current organization.The Bureau of the Budget reported a need for:
(1)
(2)
a strengthened organization for policy planning,formulation and direction of Federal communicationsactivities.
a reorganized and strengthened National CommunicationsSystem (NCS) within the Department of Defense.
(3) an improved procurement and technical assistanceeffort in communications on behalf of those Federalagencies which do not now have adequate resourcesin this field.
(4) a unified frequency spectrum management process.
(5) a coordinated technical assistance program for Stateand local government in this area.
The recently released report: of the Government: Accounting Officefocused on the government's communications and evaluated theprogress toward establishment: of a unified National CommunicationsSystem as directed by the President in 1963. The GAO found a needfor stronger coordination of government: telecommunicationsplanning, and recommended a single entity be responsible forpolicy direction and control of the Government's telecommunicationssystems. The GAO also recommended clarification of what a"unified" NCS is intended to be.
Reorganization issues
The Budget Bureau study of Federal communications organizationmade. a number of major recommendations and was recentlydistributed to the departments concerned. Agency views on thisstudy have the common themes (1) that stronger coordination fromthe top is required in establishing Government policy for its owntelecommunications requirements, and (2) that the Federal governmentshould take a stronger role in the evolution of national telecommunica-tions to deal with the increasingly rapid rate of technological changeand industry growth. There is also agreement that a much strongeranalytic capability within the executive branch is needed to achievethese goals.
' DECLASSIFIED
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-4-
There are a variety of possible ways in which telecommunicationsresponsibilities could be reshuffled or strengthened. As a start-ing point, there is widespread agreement that a single officeshould bear ultimate responsibility for:
(1) analyses and formulation of overall, telecommunicationspolicy for the executive branch.
(2) policy-level, coordination of Federal governmentprocurement and use of telecommunications servicesand equipment.
(3) allocation and assignment of spectrum resources togovernment users.
There are several further issues.
The first is where such a single office should be located. Thereare two competing sets of considerations. Further expansion oftelecommunications activities within the Executive Office of thePresident would force undesirable growth in the size of theExecutive Office of the Presieent, while telecommunications doesnot require the frequent direct Presidential attention implied bya location within the Executive Office. On the other hand, placingthe central office within an executive department (e.g., Comma ccor Transportation) raises serious questions about the impartialityof frequency allocation and assignment among government usersand assurance of vital national security interests. Both sides ofthis issue have considerable merit, but from the standpoint ofpracticality and the need to minimize even temporary disruptionsof our policy machinery, the policy functions should for the timebeing remain in the Executive Office. However, as much of theoperational and research responsibilities as possible should becarried out in the departments and agencies.
Another issue is whether the authority to allocate and assignfrequency spectrum to nongovernment uses,, now vested in theFCC, should be transferred to the central, executive branch policyoffice.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By Date I w off
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Consolidation of spectrum allocation authority would permit
greater flexibility in assignment policies and eventually, even
more efficient spectrum use. However, such a move requires
legislation, it raises concerns about political interference in
the assignment of frequencies, and it would inundate the new
office with a highly routine workload. (The FCC now processes
800, 000 applications yearly, compared to 37, 000 now handled by
the DTM, ) For •these reasons, immediate consolidation of these
responsibilities is not recommended, but planning for eventual
consolidation should be started.
A third issue concerns organizational arrangements for management of
Federal communications networks to implement policy guidance. This is
currently done through the National Communications System (NCS) structure.
Both the BOB and GAO studies concluded that changes should be made in
the NCS arrangements. However, the issues involved arc too detailed
and too complex to be settled in the context of reorganization of policy
machinery. Therefore, the NCS arrangements should not be changed at
this time, hut should be studied as a priority matter by the new central
policy office as soon as it is established. The study would review the
objectives, system concepts, organizational arrangements, and
effectiveness of the NCS structure, .and should include a thorough
examination by the. National Security Council of national securityobjectives for telecommunications. Recommendations should be
developed for the President regarding the best objectives and
management arrangements for overall coordination of Federal
telecommunications activitiesto'
Recommendation
An Office of Telecommunications Policy should be established as
an independent entity in the Executive Office of the President.
The Director of this office, appointed by the President, would
have 'primary executive branch responsibility for both national
telecommunications policies and Federal administrative telecom-
munication operations. The responsibilities of the Office of
Telecommunications Policy would include:
economic, technical and systems analysis of
telecommunications policies and opportunities in
support of national policy formulation and U. S.
participation in international telecommunications
activities.
developing executive branch policy on telecommunications
matters including, but not limited to, industry organization
and practices, regulatory policies, and the allocation and
use of the electromagnetic spectrum for both government
and nongovernment use.
DECLASSIFIED — I
Authority Z."
By.40,7"tui Date iMet
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-6-
advocating executive branch policies to the FCC, and
through the President to the Congress; and representi
ng
the executive branch in FCC proceedings.
exercising final authority for the assignment of
the spectrum to government users, and developing
with the FCC a long-range plan for improved
management of the total radio spectrum.
reviewing and evaluating the research and developm
ent
for, and planning, operation, testing, procurement,
and
use of all telecommunication systems and services
by the
Federal government; developing appropriate polici
es and
standards for such systems; and making recomme
ndations
to the Bureau of the Budget and responsible depa
rtmental
officials concerning the scope and funding of com
peting,
overlapping, or inefficient programs.
- exercising the function.s conferred on the Presi
dent by
the Communications Satellite Act.
under the policy guidance of the Director, Off
ice of
Emergency Preparedness, coordinating plans a
nd
programs for testYng of and preparing to
the use of telecommunications resourCes in a s
tate
of national emergency.
test, review, and report to the President, th
rough
the National Security Council, on the ability of
national communications resources to meet e
stablished
national security requirements efficiently an
d
responsively.
— coordinating Federal assistance to state an
d local
governments in the telecommunications field.
In performing these functions,. the Director, Off
ice of Telecommunications
Policy, will be assisted by a small staff, augme
nted as. required by:
(1) ad hoc, interagency and nongovernment task g
roups, (2) independent
consultants, (3) contract studies, (4) a new Te
lecommunications Research
and Analysis Center, (5) the Interdepartment Ra
dio Advisory Committee,
and (6) a new Telecommunications Advisory C
ommittee composed of
experts from outside of the government.
So long as the NCS structure
is retained, he will also be assisted by
the Executive Agent of the NCS.
DECLASSIFIED i; Authority "
Byd440,111A. Date IALOtt
EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-7-
A .Telecommunications Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) shouldbe established in the Department of Commerce, reporting to theAssistant Secretary for Science and Technology. The TRAC would pro --vide a centralized research, engineering, and analysis capability in,support of spectrum management and such other areas as may berequired. Specific functions of the TRAC would be to:
"7 conduct research and analysis in the general field oftelecommunication sciences in support of other govern-ment agencies or in response to specific directivesfrom the Office of Telecommunications Policy, withparticular emphasis on radio propagation, radiosystems characteristics, and operating techniquesleading to improved utilization of the radio resource.- develop and operate a national electromagneticcompatibility analysis facility under the generalpolicy guidance of the Director, OTP.
provide the administrative and technical supportrequired by the Interdepartment Radio AdvisoryCommittee. Thisasupport will operate inaccordance with policies and criteria laid down bythe OTP, and will be responsive to OTP requestsfor information and special frequency assignmentactions.
The Office of Telecommunications Policy should be established withan initial strength of up to 30 professionals, including up to 15 at super-grade levels. The position of Director, Office of TelecommunicationsPolicy should be established at executive pay level III. Provisionshould be made within the budget of the office for adequate consultingfees.,and contractual support; and for administrative support to, andspace for, task groups and personnel on short-term detail.The Office of Telecommunications Management in the OEP should beabolished. All policy functions of that office not directly related toemergency preparedness should be transferred to the Office ofTelecommunications Policy, along with appropriate emergencyplanning functions, final spectrum management authority, and NCSresponsibilities. The major portion of the Frequency ManagementDirectorate of the OTM should be transferred to the Department ofCommerce to provide the technical and clerical. support functionsdescribed above. The position of Special Assistant to the Piesidentfor Telecommunications should be abolished.
DECLASSIFIED
! Authority
By IA Date f nef/01
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The Office of Telecommunications Policy will exercise the policyfunctions of the Executive Office of the President with respect to the
planning, integration, and emergency use of the telecommunicationssystems of the executive branch, subject to general policy guidance
on appropriate matters from the National Security Council and theDirector, OEP. This function will continue to be exercised through
the mechanism of the National Communications System (NCS). until
such time as changes in that mechanism are suggested by the policyreview recommended above and approved by the President.
a—..—.......---.......—__.________I DECLASSIFIED i1 1Authority iZ., !By /A Date 1 Ne/01
*mommesammiumimilmmillill.10
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF
TELECOMMUNIC.A.TIONS POLICY
The Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy develops
the executive branch position on national telecommunications
policy, coordinates the planning and operation of the telccomunica-
tions systems of the Federal government, discharges responsibilities
assigned to the President in the areas of spectrum management and
satellite communications, and performs emergency planning and.
control functions for te3.ecommunications.
The Director serves as the President's principal advisor on
telecommunications policy, including:
(1) The organization, practices, and regulation of the
U. S. domestic and international communications
industry.
(2)
(3)
The allocation, use, and management of the radio
spectrum resource for government use, and prepara-
tion of recommendations to the FCC on spectrum
allocation for civilian us e.
The preparation. of U. S. positions for international
communication conferences, conventions, and
organizations.
(4) Federal research and development programs in
support of the above.
The Director assures that the executive branch position
on.
telecommunication policy issues is effectively presented to th
e
Congress and to the Federal Communications Commission
In the
form of legislative proposals, recommendations, and
testimony as
required.
The Director's responsibilities for the planning and o
peration of
Federal government telecommunications systems include:
(I) Development of government-wide standards for
equipment and procedures, as required. in the
interest of economy. or effectiveness.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority 2..fBy
Date jjkiLvT1/4
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
-2-
(2) Evz-duation of the ability of national communicationsresources adequately and efficiently to meet estab-lished national, security and emergency communicationsrequirements.
(3) Recommendations to the Bureau of the au.dget con-cerning the funding of communications systems andresearch and de.velopm.ent programs.
(4) Preparation of guidelines for the most economical.procurement of Fedela 1 telecomm.unications services.
The Director exercises the authority, delegated by the President,to assign radio frequencies for use by the government. He isassisted in this responsibility by the Telecommunications Researchand Analysis Center to be established in the Department; of Commerceand the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee. He carriesout the responsibilities conferred on the President by the Com . 1T) . unica-tion.s Satellite Act. The Director coordinates the development ofplans and programs for the mobilization and use of telecommunicationsresources in an emergency, and prepares to administer nationaltelecommunications resources in the event of war under the overallpolicy guidance of the Director, OEP,
The Director coordinates assistance in teleconummications mattersprovided by the Federal government to State and local governments.He appoints scientists, engineers, and economists from outsidegovernm.ent to advise on telc:communications matters.
To carry out these responsibilities, the Director must have thefollowing qualifications:
I DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By A A Date I I (II 01
(1) A thorough grasp of the social, economic,engineering, and national security. factors whichmust be considered in formulating telecommunicationspolicies and standards.
(2) Familiarity with telecommunications needs andopportunities of government, industry; and thepublic, and with the structure of private andg,overnm.ental telecommunications institutions,both national. and international.
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
(3)
-3-
The ability to initiate and coordinate telecommunications
policy matters on an interdepartmental basis in
cooperation with industry and public interest groups,
and to define and analyze those key policy issues
requiring Presidential involvement.
(4) The ability to direct studies utilizing systems analysis,
'systems engineering, and economics needed for the
systematic analysis of telecommunications policies
and opportunities, their irnpact, their effectiveness,
and their costs.
DECLASSIFIED
; Authority
By ,j A A Date _Lmo
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_Authority a/14g I
AlcBY 'ARA Date
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DECLASSIFIED
Au;:ittyrr __CAVZ4ST
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DECLASSIFIED
Author jt'
By 'ARA Date
Reproaucea al !he Nationai ArcniveS
Ce1)7ta 721z4- ..4.4e
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2L1-50,AL-ae/A
TALKING PAPER
Re: Roger Ailes' Meeting
A. Why we are here?
DECLASSIFIED
Authority &Dag cr By 'ARA Date
Reprocucea at he Natwal Arcnive.,
Roger, I want to be completely honest with you. As youknow, we have felt the need for a full-time man here atthe White House for a long time - to supervise our TVon a daily basis - and our efforts here have met withlittle success. I don't see anything developing on thisneed in the near future.
The President has told me to completely reorganize ourtelevision operation - not only to change the peopleinvolved - but to change some of our thinking and find afull-time man. This has been done and starting nextweek we are bringing in a new man to handle this job.
You and your operation have developed into a TV politicalconsulting business. It is obviously successful, but itis a different animal than what we need here.
We have not been able to build the relationship betweenyou and the President which we had hoped to see. It isno one's fault. We face this sort of thing everyday.There are different directions that we can go which Ithink you can explore and which will continue to reapyou rewards.
B. The President wants to try a new direction ,and feels weshould not only have a new approach, but new people.
We are going to try a procedure very similar to what yourecommended. It is our hope to get a man for the dailyroutine events on a full-time basis. In addition, we havea producer-type who is not involved in politics in any way,nor is his company.
B. (Con't)
C.
1 Autitorit i ai 246( BY,ortt:RA Date 111"",
,
DECLASSIFIED
2
Reproduced at be Naticral
I would imagine that you would want to continueto grow in the area of a political TV concernand we would very much like to encourage this.What I specifically have in mind is developingthe appropriate relationship between you and theRNC. This is of course up to you, but we wouldwant to do everything to encourage this if youare inclined in this area.
We could, for example, make you the mediaconsultant to the RNC ... something that willprobably be far more lucrative than yourarrangement here. It would allow you toconcentrate far more on developing Senate andCongressional campaigns. In addition, itwould give you the opportunity to work first-handin restructuring the RNC Communicationsapparatus.
D. Larry talked with me about the Martha Mitchellshow idea. That may work and is surely sone thingwhich should be followed up on with the people atJustice. However, there are undoubtedly a numberof good show ideas which could be developed andplaced on the air. This is in an area where we wantto work with you and will cooperate completely.
1) a new type news panel2) talk-interview type show3) development of a TV series with pro-
Administration plot
Summary
A. I would be wrong if I didn't indicate to you how much we haveappreciated your help in the past -
,,4tramlen.Reproduced at the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED
1 A uthorit et12451r I
BY 'A RA Date 7,414110 I # 464411444
41111111111111111.1111111111
December 1, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
I think last week illustrated my point that we need a part or full-time TV man on our staff for the purpose of saying that my TVappearances are handled in a professional basis. When I thinkof the millions of dollars that go into one lousy 30-secondtelevision spot advertising a deodorant, it seems to me un-believable that we don't do a better job in seeing thatPresidential appearances always have the very best professionaladvice whenever they are to be covered by TV. Over the lastweek, for example, I signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty at mydesk, I announced the the Germ Warfare Proposal on Tuesday inthe Roosevelt Room, and then signed the Draftilfigi/ Reform Billin the Roosevelt Room on Wednesday. On Thursday, I made anappearance at the Thanksgiving luncheon in the White House. Ineach of these cases, I had excellent background briefing as to howmany people would be present and how many pens I should use. Ihad, however, no professional advice as to where the cameraswould be and how I could make most effective are of the TVopportunity. I should add to this list, even more importantly, thetelephone call to the Astronauts. Even the question as to whetherI should have held the phone with my right hand or my left hand isquite pertinent.
I think that each of these TV shots probably came off adequately. Mypoint is that they should always be absolutely top-rate in every respect,and I should spend at least five or ten minutes with whoever is theTV producer to get his suggestions as to how I should stand, wherethe cameras will be, etc. In any event, give this some thought andperhaps we can come up with either a man or an idea to deal with theproblem.more adequately. I feel it is really worthwhile if we canget even a relatively godd young man who doesn't come at too high aprice and have him available for only one two-minute shot a week,If that is all I happen to be on that week. Letts be sure that two minutesis the very best that can possibly be. The President should never bewithout the very best professional advice for making a television appearance.
1 eolZ441 IAuthorit ,By 'ARA Date 1444'
DECLASSIFIEDReproduced at the National Archives
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As a matter of fact, the advice for the two-minute shot is probably
more important than for the 30-minute appearance. Over a period
of 30 minutes. the audience will forget the technical difficulties
if the subject is engrossing enough. In 2 minutes. the impression
of the picture is fleeting but indelible.