Donald P.

Moynihan

REFLECTIONS ON CASES IN CONTEXT OF US EXPERIENCEPRESENTATION, JANUARY 9, 2014, COPRBM

Cases at micro level, move back to macro level adoption of performance systems

Relate their experiences to US context

Can you learn something from our experience and mistakes?

Please jump in with questions, comments and examples

MY ROLE

Background Creation of performance systemsPerformance management as interactive

dialogue Different types of performance information

useFactors associated with purposeful

performance information use

OUTLINE

BACKGROUND

OECD 2012 surveySeems to be less use of performance data than in past

Performance targets not consequential

General sense of disappointment: we have systems in place, have not delivered desired results

IS THE IDEA OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT RUNNING OUT OF

STEAM?

We define performance systems by the benefits we hope will occur (more rational budgeting, more effi cient management)

The gap between our aspirations and the observed effects of these rules are usually large, resulting in disappointment

More grounded and accurate description: performance systems are a set of formal rules that seek to disrupt strongly embedded social routines

EXPECTATIONS PROBLEM

GOVERNMENT-WIDE REFORMS

Government Performance and Results Act - GPRA (1993-2010)

 Program Assessment Rating Tool (2002-2008)

 GPRA Modernization Act (2010-)

State level variations on these models

GPRARoutines of strategic planning and measurement at agency level

Program Assessment Rating ToolEach program evaluated by central budget office, given feedback and ranked on scale from “ineffective” to “effective”

GPRA Modernization ActRecognition of problems with previous systems

GRADUAL CHANGE IN SYSTEMS

CREATION OF PERFORMANCE

SYSTEMS

Elected offi cials motivated by symbolic values (Moynihan 2008)

Managing for results has intuitive appeal for elected offi cials and international institutions

Limits of high-level design Your tools are procedural rules and incentives Create rules to measure and disseminate data Perhaps set up incentives Say you are doing performance management Diffi cult to design rules that change underlying beliefs,

organizational culture or leadership May be politically contentious – changing organizational

flexibility may be opposed by public sector unions

POLITICS OF ADOPTION

DOCTRINAL LOGIC FOR CHANGE

ACTUAL PATTERN OF CHANGE

We are constrained (and sometimes enabled) by high level designs and their characteristics

We are constrained about expectations of public sector and behavior of elected offi cials

How do you work within these systems? Minimize dysfunctional behavior Minimize transaction costs that do not provide

value Create environment where positive things might

happenHow do you know if you are succeeding?

FACTS ON THE GROUND

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AS AN

INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE

We fail to understand the nature of performance data

We assume data areComprehensiveObjective Indicative of actual performanceConsistently understoodPrompts a consensus

ONE BASIC REASON FOR CONFUSION

Examine same programs but disagree on data

Agree on data but disagree on meaningAgree on meaning, but not on next

action steps/resources

THE AMBIGUITY OF PERFORMANCE DATA

Actors will select and interpret performance information consistent with institutional values and purposes

Greater contesting of performance data and less potential for solution seeking in forums featuring actors with competing beliefs

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF PERFORMANCE DATA

DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERFORMANCE

INFORMATION USE

INATTENTION TO THE USE OF DATA

Performance data by itself does not do much

Implementation of performance management means using the data

Why focus on performance information use? Difficult to connect public actions to outcomes Intermediate measure of effectiveness Without it, good things we want don’t happen

There are different types of use

Passive – minimal compliance with procedural requirements

Purposeful –improve key goals and effi ciency

Political – advocate for programsPerverse – behave in ways detrimental

to goals (goal displacement and gaming)

THE FOUR TYPES OF USE

IMPLICATIONS OF DIALOGUE MODEL: POLITICAL USE

Performance data is socially constructed by individuals subject to

personal biases, institutional beliefs, and partisan preferences

These qualities make performance management likely to operate as part of political process, not as alternative to it

EVIDENCE OF ADVOCACY

“Spinning” (Hood 2006) Claim credit when things go well, deny

responsibility when things do notAdvocacy by agents seeks to avoid blame and

respond to “negativity bias” disproportionate citizen dissatisfaction with missed

target (James 2011) political offi cials pay more attention to high and low

performers (Nielsen and Baekgaard 2013) more bureaucratic explanations of failed performance

(Charbonneau and Bellavance 2012)

WHEN DOES PERVERSE USE OCCUR?

UK case provides example – managing the measure not underlying goal, don’t use pay for performance

Goal displacement – e.g. cream-skimmingData manipulation – including outright

cheatingBecomes more likely when

Complex tasks have simple measures High-powered incentives attached to measures

Can observe if agencies comply with requirements (passive use), but not other types of use

Performance systems encourage passive use, not purposeful (Moynihan and Lavertu 2012)

Cases: Passive use creates transaction costs

EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE REFORMS

Very little evidence of systematic attention by elected offi cials or performance budgeting

Variation in purposeful use seems to be shaped by agency, unit or individual level variables – how they respond to systems

Start a purposeful dialogue about performanceCases offer some insights that align with other research

IMPLICATIONS FOR PURPOSEFUL USE

LEARNING FORUMS DISCRETION

CULTURE

Part of the problems we have created routines to measure and disseminate data

Need to design routines to facilitate use of data

Australia: learning circles, practicums, learning teams learning conversations, future circles

UK: Implies ongoing discussion about system, how to improve, double loop learning

Belgium: spatial design to foster interaction, leave time for creativity and problem-solving

ROUTINES OF LEARNING

Create learning forums: routine discussions of performance data with supervisors/peers associated with use

GPRA Modernization Act: quarterly performance reviews

Cases: not just routines, also learning culture (Moynihan 2008) Tolerates error – allowance for making mistakes Rewards innovation and experimentation Brings together multiple perspectives – cannot exclude those who

know processes best and must implement change Gives discretion to users – more likely to use data Mix exploration and exploitation – look for new ideas while

improving what you are doing Needs continuity

CONTINUING CHALLENGE: HOW TO MAKE USE OF PERFORMANCE DATA

When people feel they have discretion, more likely to use data (Moynihan and Pandey 2010)

Formal limits to discretion in public sector, but Sometimes overestimate constraints Organizational culture can overcome these

tendencies (Pandey, Coursey and Moynihan 2007)

DISCRETION AND CULTURE

GOAL CLARITY

FOSTER GOAL CLARITY

Cases: clarify purpose – what are you doing here?

Clear goals increase performance information use (Moynihan and Pandey 2010)

May not be easy if:Service has many different aspectsTension between:

Few enough measures to generate attentionEnough measures to avoid encouraging workers to ignore unmeasured aspects

APPEAL TO ALTRUISM

Cases: Be wary of the demotivating effects of targets Create work environment where workers feel like

they are making a difference Celebrate achievement

Extrinsic direction can create crowd out intrinsic desire to help others Removes sense of moral judgment

CROWDING OUT EFFECTS

Not an option to get rid of measurements

Appeal to altruistic motivations, not extrinsic reward (Moynihan, Pandey, and Wright 2012)

Select goals that motivateClear line of sight between goals and actions Celebrate achievementConnect to beneficiariesEasier for some tasks than others (you have customers, and your job is to help them)

APPEAL TO ALTRUISM

LEADERSHIP

Cases: Importance of leadershipLeadership matters in a variety of ways

Political leadership needed for adoption Leadership commitment needed for implementation (Dull 2009; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012) Performance system aligns with their goals Authenticity: more than talk

Do they devote time and resources to goals? Do they model the behavior they ask of others?

THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

Transformational leadership: Frank Van Massenhove Stimulates creativity, shapes culture, models

behavior, make goals inspirational

Leadership creates environment where performance information use is more likely to occur (Moynihan, Wright and Pandey 2012)

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Goal Clarity

Transformational Leadership

Developmental

Culture

Purposeful Performance Information Use

INDIRECT EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP

0.31*

0.60*

0.67

0.13*

0.55

0.22*Reported

Performance Information

Use

E

E

0.15*

Goal

Clarity

Developmental

Culture

TransformationalLeadership

0.60*

0.13* Performance

AvailabilityInformation

0.64

E

0.84

E

Leader Tenure

Number of Employees

NS

NS

0.07*

NS

FollowerTenure

External service providing agency

NS

0.14*

0.07*

0.16*

NS

0.11*

0.99*

E0.28*

FollowerGender

STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL WITH CONTROLS

Goal Clarity

Transformational Leadership

Developmental

Culture

Purposeful Performance Information Use

INDIRECT EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP

How do you create commitment?GPRA Modernization Act (Moynihan

2013)Reputation: public commitments and responsibility (high priority goals)

Create leadership positions with oversight for performance (COOs, PIOs)

Each goal has a goal leaderSelect leaders based on ability to manage

performance

INDUCE LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT

Welcome your feedback and questions

Performance Information Project: http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publicservice/performance/

index.html

dmoynihan@lafollette.wisc.edu

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

 Charbonneau, Etienne, and François Bellavance. 2012. Blame Avoidance in Public Reporting. Public Performance & Management Review 35(3): 399-421

Dull, Matthew. 2009. Results-model reform leadership: Questions of credible commitment. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 19(2): 255–84.

Hood, Christopher. 2006. Gaming in targetworld: The targets approach to managing British public services. Public Administration Review 66(4): 515–21.

James, Oliver. 2011. Managing Citizens’ Expectations of Public Service Performance: Evidence from Observation and Experimentation in Local Government Public Administration, 89 (4), 1419-35.

 

Moynihan, Donald P. 2008. The Dynamics of Performance Management. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Moynihan, Donald P. 2013. The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the New GPRA Modernization Act. Washington D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government.

Moynihan, Donald P. and Stéphane Lavertu. 2012. “Does Involvement in Performance Reforms Encourage Performance Information Use? Evaluating GPRA and PART.” Publ ic Administrat ion Review 7(4): 592-602

Moynihan, Donald, and Sanjay Pandey. 2010. The big question for performance management: Why do managers use performance information? Journal of Publ ic Administration Research and Theory 20(4): 849–66.

Moynihan, D., Pandey, S. , & Wright, B. (2012). Prosocial values and performance management theory: The l ink between perceived social impact and performance information use. Governance , 25(3), 463–83.

Moynihan, Donald P. , Wright, Bradley, and Sanjay Pandey. 2012. “Sett ing the Table: How Transformational Leadership Fosters Performance Information Use.” Journal of Publ ic Administration Research and Theory 22(1): 143-64.

Nielsen, Poul A. and Mart in Baekgaard  2013. Performance Information, Blame Avoidance, and Pol i t ic ians’ Att i tudes to Spending and Reform: Evidence from an Experiment. Journal of Publ ic Administration Research and Theory doi: 10.1093/jopart/mut051

Pandey, Sanjay K., David Coursey and Donald P. Moynihan. 2007. “Overcoming Barr iers to Organizational Eff ectiveness and Bureaucratic Red Tape: A Mult i -Method Study” Publ ic Performance and Management Review 30(3): 371-400