dominican republic - social protection investment...

Dominican Republic - Social Protection Investment Project

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003930

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-74810IBRD-77980)

ON A

LOAN AND ADDITIONAL FINANCING

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$29.40 MILLION

TO THE

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FOR A

SOCIAL PROTECTION INVESTMENT PROJECT

October 4, 2016

Social Protection Global Practice Latin American and the Caribbean

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective -January 26, 2015)

Currency Unit = DR Peso

US$ 1.00 = DR Peso 45.33

FISCAL YEAR - January 1-December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADESSAdministrator of Social Subsidies (Administradora de Seguros Sociales)

AFAdditional Financing

APLAdaptable Programmatic Loan

CASCountry Assistance Strategy

CCCS Consultative Council of the Civil Society

CCTConditional Cash Transfers

CDDDocumentation Unit (Centro de Dotación de Documentos)

CECCentral Electoral Council (Junta Central Electoral)

CPSCountry Program Strategy

DAFDirectorate of Administration and Financial Management

DPLDevelopment Policy Loan

DRDominican Republic

FMFinancial Management

IABDInter-American Development Bank

ICVQuality of Life Index (Índice Calidad de Vida)

IEImpact Evaluation

IDIdentification Document

IRRInternal Rate of Return

GPSGlobal Practice Social Protection

MEPYDMinistry of Economy, Planning and Development

MOEMinistry of Education

MOHMinistry of Health

M&EMonitoring and Evaluation

NDSNational Development Strategy

NGONon-Governmental Organizations

NPVNet Present Value

OBDOutput-Based Disbursement

OMOperations Manual

PADProject Appraisal Document

PASSProgrammatic Performance and Accountability of Social Sectors Program

PIUProject Implementation Unit

PROSOLIProgressing with Solidarity –DR CCT Program (Progresando con Solidaridad)

QERQuality Enhanced Review

SCSocial Cabinet (Gabinete de Protección Social)

SENASANational Health Insurance (Seguro Nacional de Salud)

SIUBENUnified Beneficiary Identification System (Sistema Único de Identificación de Beneficiarios)

UNAPPrimary health care units ((Unidades de Atención Primaria)

Vice President:

Jorge Familiar

Country Director:

Sophie Sirtaine

Sector Manager:

Margaret Grosh

Project Team Leader:

Miriam Montenegro

ICR Team Leader:

Miriam Montenegro (coTTL)

Karla Mcevoy (CoTTL)

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SOCIAL PROTECTION INVESTMENT PROJECT (P090010)

Contents

List of FiguresvList of TablesvData SheetviA. Basic InformationviB. Key DatesviC. Ratings SummaryviD. Sector and Theme CodesviiE. Bank StaffviiF. Results Framework AnalysisviiiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsxiiH. Restructuring (if any)xiiiI. Disbursement Profilexvii1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design11.1 Context at Appraisal11.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators31.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification41.4 Main Beneficiaries51.5 Original Components61.6 Revised Components71.7 Other significant changes82. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes92.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry92.2 Implementation102.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization132.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance152.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase163. Assessment of Outcomes173.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation173.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives183.3 Efficiency213.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating243.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts243.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops264. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome265. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance275.1 Bank Performance275.2 Borrower Performance286. Lessons Learned307. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors32Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing34Annex 2. Outputs by Component35Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis57Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes70Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results72Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results74Annex 7. Summary of Borrower’s Contribution to the ICR75Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders90N/A90Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents91MAP92

List of Figures

Figure 1 Inclusion errors59

Figure 2 Exclusion errors60

Figure 3 Percentage of head of household and children without documents61

List of Tables

Table 1 Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return65

Table 2 Beneficiary Population66

Table 3 VPN and IRR for different scenarios of secondary education competition67

Table 4 Return of education67

Table 5 Estimated annual nominal disbursements (US$ Million)68

Table 6 Present Value of the cost in real terms base 2008 (US$ Million)69

Data SheetA. Basic Information

Country:

Dominican Republic

Project Name:

DO Social Protection Investment Project

Project ID:

P090010

L/C/TF Number(s):

IBRD-74810,IBRD-77980

ICR Date:

08/02/2016

ICR Type:

Core ICR

Lending Instrument:

SIL

Borrower:

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Original Total Commitment:

USD 19.40M

Disbursed Amount:

USD 29.40M

Revised Amount:

USD 29.40M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies: Social Cabinet

Co-financiers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process

Date

Process

Original Date

Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review:

06/20/2005

Effectiveness:

12/19/2008

12/19/2008

Appraisal:

03/13/2006

Restructuring(s):

09/17/2009

07/17/2012

11/06/2013

12/19/2014

04/08/2015

06/29/2015

08/27/2015

Approval:

08/02/2007

Mid-term Review:

02/10/2014

02/03/2014

Closing:

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes:

Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome:

Moderate

Bank Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance:


C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank

Ratings

Borrower

Ratings

Quality at Entry:


Government:

Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision:


Implementing Agency/Agencies:


Overall Bank Performance:


Overall Borrower Performance:


C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes

Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes

Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original

Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central Government (Central Agencies)

55

55

Other social services

45

45

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Child health

25

25

Education for all

25

25

Income Support for Old Age, Disability & Survivorship

25

25

Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services

25

25

E. Bank Staff

Positions

At ICR

At Approval

Vice President:

Jorge Familiar

Pamela Cox

Country Director:

Sophie Sirtaine

Caroline D. Anstey

Practice Manager/Manager:

Margaret Ellen Grosh

Helena G. Ribe

Project Team Leader:

Miriam Matilde Montenegro Lazo

Samuel C. Carlson

ICR Team Leader:

Miriam Matilde Montenegro Lazo

Karla Mcevoy

ICR Primary Author:

Maria R. Puech Fernandez

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

Improve coverage, targeting and effectiveness of the Borrower's social protection programs, through the provision of legal identity documents to poor Dominicans, Institutional Strengthening of targeting mechanisms, and increased monitoring and evaluation of social programs.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

N.A.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator

Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1:

Coverage: Percentage of households which have at least one member targeted by the Documentation Component who have been integrated into the PROSOLI Program

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 %

75 %

N/A

97.90 %

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (131 percent level of achievement): Name and the date of the end target were adjusted in the fifth restructuring, Original targets remained the same. End target was achieved by June, 2015. PROSOLI continues supporting documentation after closing

Indicator 2:

Coverage: The percentage of extremely poor heads of household (classified as P1 and P2 by SIUBEN) who lack identity documents. (Percentage, Custom)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

28%

10%

N/A

7.10%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (116 percent level of achievement). The name, baseline, and date of the end target were reset based on SIUBEN 2011 study in the fifth restructuring. End target was achieved by June, 2015. PROSOLI continues supporting documentation after closing

Indicator 3:

Targeting: Implementation of the 2009 national SIUBEN survey, including 1.8 million households located in poor areas. (Number, Custom)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0

1,500,000

1,800,000

2,161,587

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (120 percent level of achievement): The name, end target, and date of the end target were revised in the fifth restructuring. End target was achieved by Dec. 2011. Project continued supporting SIUBEN. New study will be carried out in 2017.

Indicator 4:

(Additional Financing Outcome Indicator) Targeting: SIUBEN updates the poverty status of 100 percent of registered households with poverty status (Poor I and II). (Percentage, Custom)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 %

100%

N/A

100%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2016

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). The name and date of end target were revised in the fifth restructuring. End target remained the same and was achieved by Dec. 2011. Project continued supporting SIUBEN. New study will be carried out in 2017.

Indicator 5:

(Additional Financing Outcome Indicator) Targeting: 85 percent of surveyed households certified by end of 2011. (Percentage, Custom)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0%

85%

N/A

100%

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). Included for the first time in the fifth Restructuring. End target achieved in June, 2015, when it was launched as a national process. PROSOLI continued supporting RC as social audit mechanisms after closing.

Indicator 6:

(Additional Financing Outcome Indicator) Establishment of a social audit mechanism of monitoring and participation of social protection program with the participation of the community (Text, Custom)

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

No mechanisms in place

-

Social audit mechanism piloted, and expanded to national level

Pilot designed in 2010, evaluated in 2012, and expanded at national level in 2013. A second round at national level was conducted in 2014. PROSOLI continued carrying out national rounds in 2015.

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). Included for the first time in the fifth Restructuring. End target achieved in June, 2015, when it was launched as a national process. PROSOLI continued supporting RC as social audit mechanisms after closing.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator

Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1:

Coverage: The percentage of extremely poor households (classified as P1 and P2 by SIUBEN) covered by PROSOLI (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

68.40%

85%

N/A

86.10%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (101 percent level of achievement). Name, original baseline value, and date of the end target were modified in the fifth Restructuring. End target did not change and was achieved by Jun.2015. PROSOLI continues documenting the poor after closing

Indicator 2:

Targeting and Coverage: The percentage of poor households enrolled in SIUBEN database and subsequently validated for participation in PROSOLI (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

68.9%

50.0%

80.0%

94.9%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (119 percent level of achievement). Name, original baseline value, end target, and date of end target were adjusted in the fifth restructuring to use SIUBEN 2011. End target achieved by Jun.2015. PROSOLI continues with documentation after closing

Indicator 3:

Percentage of individuals provided with identity documents directly processed by the Documentation unit (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0%

25%

N/A

31.39%

Date achieved

03/25/2015

04/30/2016

N/A

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (126 percent level of achievement). This indicator was added in the fifth Restructuring to capture the efficiency of the Project field staff. The end target was achieved by Jun.2015. PROSOLI continues documenting poor after closing.

Indicator 4:

Targeting: Recertification of Solidaridad CCT program beneficiaries and updating of national database of poor Dominicans using proxy-means methodologies (% of the 1.8 million households surveyed) (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

70%

95%

N/A

100%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (105 percent level of achievement). Only the date of the end target of this indicator was adjusted in the fifth restructuring. The end target was achieved in Dec.2011. Project continued supporting SIUBEN. New study will be carried out in 2017.

Indicator 5:

Targeting: Expenditures of targeted social protection programs which use SIUBEN as a percentage of social assistance expenditures (Text, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

20%

RD$800M

60%

64.4%

Date achieved

12/31/2005

04/30/2015

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (107 percent level of achievement). Name, baseline, end target value, and the date of the end target were modified in the fifth Restructuring. Indicator calculated by SC with information from MoF. The end target was met by Dec.2014. Est. 2015:75%

Indicator 6:

Effectiveness: Relative to a baseline survey, conduct quasi-experimental social and economic impact assessment of provision of legal identity documents (Text, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

N/A

Impact Evaluation Study

Quasi-experimental social and economic impact assessment

Baseline data collected in 2011. Assessment data and impact evaluation report completed and disseminated by December 2014

Date achieved

12/31/2005

06/30/2012

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). The name was modified in the fifth Restructuring. End target achieved by Dec. 2014. The Project also financed other assessments for the Community Report Cards, the training, and documentation components.

Indicator 7:

(AF Additional Intermediate Indicator) Staff Capacity: By the end of the second year, at least 90 percent of the staff of the redesigned CCT Program is trained on the new operational rules of the CCT (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0%

90%

N/A

98%

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (108 percent level of achievement). Only the date of the end target was updated in the fifth restructuring. End target achieved by Dec. 2012. Project supported the strengthening of the staff at operational and administrative levels until closing.

Indicator 8:

(AF Additional Intermediate Indicator) Comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation System of CCT Solidaridad designed and implemented by second year of implementation. (Text, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

N/A

Monitoring and Evaluation System designed and implemented

N/A

Conceptual design of the System completed. Conceptual design of the Monitoring Module developed piloted and implemented

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). Name and date of end target were modified in the fifth Restructuring. The end target was achieved by Dec.2015. The new project financed by the Bank aims to continue supporting the development of the System.

Indicator 9:

(AF Additional Intermediate Indicator) Community Participation: 100 percent of beneficiary committees have been setup and trained in rights and obligations by the end of the third year. (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0%

100%

N/A

100%

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (100 percent level of achievement). Only the date of the end target was adjusted in the fifth restructuring. End target achieved by Jun.2014. After closing, PROSOLI continues implementing this financed with national resources and the Bank.

Indicator 10:

(AF Additional Intermediate Indicator) Social Oversight: Number of distributed community scorecards vs. Number of community scorecards that have been filled in. (Percentage, Custom)

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0%

N/A

85%

100%

Date achieved

12/19/2008

12/31/2013

04/30/2016

04/05/2016

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved (118 percent level of achievement). The end target was established and its end date was modified in the fifth Restructuring. It was achieved by Jun.2014. PROSOLI continues implementing this after closing.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.

Date ISR

Archived

DO

IP

Actual Disbursements

(USD millions)

1

12/11/2007


Moderately Unsatisfactory

0.00

2

06/07/2008

Satisfactory


0.00

3

06/24/2008



0.00

4

12/01/2008



0.00

5

05/01/2009

Satisfactory


0.50

6

06/09/2009

Satisfactory


0.50

7

11/21/2009

Satisfactory


1.21

8

06/16/2010

Satisfactory


2.87

9

02/06/2011



4.96

10

08/10/2011



7.52

11

03/13/2012

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

14.41

12

10/15/2012

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

17.93

13

05/16/2013

Satisfactory


20.38

14

01/04/2014



21.48

15

07/23/2014



24.48

16

01/30/2015



25.88

17

07/26/2015



28.93

18

01/22/2016

Satisfactory


29.38

19

04/28/2016

Satisfactory


29.38

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO

IP

09/17/2009

S

MS

0.51

The restructuring accompanied the approval of the Additional Financing (AF) in September 2009. The AF aimed to strengthen Solidaridad and scale up efforts in targeting and documentation of poor households. Besides these changes, it extended the closing date of the original Loan to December 31, 2013.

07/17/2012

S

S

17.93

A Level 2 restructuring was approved to reallocate loan proceeds from loans 7481-DO and 7798-DO. Under the AF loan, approximately US$348,394 was reallocated from category 3 to category 2. Under the original loan, US$48,365 from category 1 and US$600,000 from category 2 was reallocated to categories 3 and 4, respectively. The reasons for these reallocations were: (i) the higher than expected cost of the Social Economic Study (census) carried out by SIUBEN, due to including over 2 million households (versus an initial estimate of 1.8 million) in the poorest areas of the country; (ii) to finance the organizational structure and functioning of the implementing unit, which was not originally included.

11/06/2013

S

MS

20.83

A Level 2 restructuring was approved to reallocate loan proceeds between disbursement categories for both loans and to extend the closing dates of the original project and the AF from December 31, 2013 to December31, 2014. The extension of the closing date would allow for the completion of the following project activities: (i) provision of documentation to an additional 60,000 individuals; (ii) the completion of the construction of four civil registry offices and the compliance with safeguards (environmental and resettlement); and (iii) the development of a proposal for the use of the SIUBEN’s study and the expansion of the community report cards.

12/19/2014

MS

MS

25.88

A Level 2 restructuring was approved to extend the closing date of both loans to June 30, 2015 in order to carry out the institutionalization of the documentation component; and continue supporting critical activities for the strengthening of the Social Cabinet. The restructuring allowed the reallocation of resources across disbursement categories as the Project continued supporting: (i) documentation activities; (ii) improving the operational capacity of PROSOLI; (iii) strengthening SIUBEN in preparation of the new socioeconomic study; and (iv) strengthening the SC’s M&E capacity. This extension also allowed the Borrower to revise the end target of documented individuals to 239, 012 and to solve safeguards compliance issues that were overdue regarding the construction of the CEC offices (land regularization process of the four properties where the buildings were built). The Borrower also was pursuing a revision of the results framework but given the approval timing at Congress, this could not be processed under this restructuring. It was agreed that a new restructuring was going to be processed before the new closing date.

04/08/2015

MS

MS

26.75

A Level 2 restructuring was approved which revised the Project’s indicators: to update the definition of some of the indicators, to better reflect the changes in the social protection context in the DR; and to drop some indicators which had become irrelevant. The revision of the indicators started in the second half of 2013 and could be processed until this restructuring as the approval process in Congress of the proposed changes took longer than estimated. The Borrower was still experiencing delays in complying with all the safeguards issues regarding the four CEC buildings and also wanted to include the corresponding amendment to the legal agreement but this was not possible due to the approval timing in Congress.

06/29/2015

MS

MS

28.20

The Bank unilaterally requested the extension of the closing date until April 30 2016 to allow the Borrower time to request an amendment of the Loan Agreement to revise the Project description to include new constructions instead of rehabilitation and conclude the land regularization process of the four properties. This restructuring allowed time for the Borrower to obtain the Congress’ approval of these changes and request the restructuring to the Bank. All other activities under the Project were completed by June 30, 2015.

08/27/2015

MS

MU

29.23

A Level 2 restructuring was approved to amend the Loan Agreements for the original Project and its Additional Financing, to make formal provision in the Project for construction activities which were not part of the original design, but carried out under Component 1 of the Project. The Borrower completed the land regularization process for the four properties where the CEC offices were built, in an acceptable way to the Bank before the Project closed in June 30, 2016.

I. Disbursement Profile

xvi

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Country. The Dominican Republic (DR) experienced a period of sustained growth between 1997 and 2002, followed by an economic/financial crisis in 2003-2004. This crisis resulted in a dramatic deterioration of real incomes and an increase in poverty levels. Between early 2003 and mid-2004, about 15 percent (around 1.4 million people) of the Dominican population became poor and about 6.5 percent (around 600,000) became extremely poor. By the end of 2004, about 49.7 percent of the population was poor[footnoteRef:1]. Despite stabilization and strong growth during 2005-2006, poverty declined only slightly and income inequality remained unchanged, reaching a Gini coefficient of 0.52 by the end of 2007. [1: Toward More Evenly Shared Prosperity in the Dominican Republic. Policy Notes 2015. World Bank.]

2. Sector. The changes in structural poverty mentioned above stressed the need to improve social protection services, which led to the development of a social protection policy focused on building human capital and increasing risk management capacity of the poor, to reduce their vulnerability to shocks. This was to be accomplished through: (i) institutional strengthening of the overall sector; (ii) inclusion of the “excluded” – those Dominicans with no legal identity; (iii) continued development of targeting mechanisms (Unified Beneficiary Identification System, SIUBEN); (iv) transformation of the program providing monetary transfers to the poor – the Solidaridad Program– into a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Program[footnoteRef:2]; (iv) rationalization of poorly targeted social assistance programs; and (v) improved measurement of social impacts. The key elements of the social protection system were administered by the Cabinet for Coordination of Social Policies, referred here as Social Cabinet (SC), whose mandate included responsibility for planning, administration, and budgetary execution of social protection policies and programs. The SC was comprised of a triad of institutions: the SIUBEN, the first targeting mechanism to identify potential beneficiaries of social protection programs; the Administrator of Social Systems (ADESS), the agency to unify and coordinate the payments for social protection programs; and the aforementioned social protection program known as Solidaridad. [2: The Solidaridad Program was created in September 2005 by Presidential Decree as an amalgamation of two existing CCT programs, “Comer es Primero” and “Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar.” Originally, co-responsibilities were not efficiently measured until the Program evolved into a full-fleshed CCT program with support of three DPLs supported by the World Bank during 2010-2012. In the last administration the Program was unified with another social program, Progresando, and became the current Progresando con Solidaridad Program (PROSOLI).]

3. Targeting. In late 2004, the Government launched the SIUBEN, a single central database for beneficiaries of social assistance, and a targeting mechanism that could be used across programs in education, health, nutrition, housing, and energy. The first Socio-Economic Study was collected in 2004 with over 1.2 million households surveyed (4.4 million people, or 56 percent of the total population) in all areas identified as poor or extreme poor by the National Poverty Map (based on the 2002 Census, and 2003 Demographic and Health Survey). A proxy-means test (known as the quality of life index – ICV in Spanish) was then applied to identify and rank households in need of social assistance. SIUBEN identified 400,000 poor individuals who were eligible for social assistance programs, but who had been excluded from access to these programs due to lack of legal identity documents (i.e., a birth certificate or national identity (ID) card). In addition, the 2006 Household Survey (ENHOGAR), conducted by the National Statistics Office, indicated that 22 percent of children under the age of 5 had no birth certificate. Birth registration is directly related to education and poverty: 30 percent of children under 5 born to women with only primary education were unregistered, versus just 4 percent of those born to women with higher education; and 40 percent of children born to women in the poorest quintile lacked birth certificates, versus just 3 percent of children in the highest quintile. Not only were these individuals prevented from participating in social protection programs, neither could they open a bank account, own title to land, vote, obtain a driver’s license or passport, or attend school beyond 7th grade.

4. Social Protection Program. The Social Cabinet undertook a mapping of the social assistance sector and an evaluation of all major programs in 2003. This effort culminated in a Presidential Decree (1504-04) approved in 2004, enabling fiscal space for a Social Protection Program as the core of the Social Protection System. But it was only in September 2005, through Presidential Decree 536-05, that the country established the Solidaridad Program, the first conditional cash transfer program merging two weak social programs (Comer es primero and Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar) that provided monetary transfers to the poor. As part of the social protection system, the Government created the ADESS as the institution to carry out the payments for social programs. Solidaridad used SIUBEN to select beneficiaries and then issued debit cards that were used in local grocery stores (colmados). Colmados were already part of the network used to pay public subsidies. At the time the Project was prepared, Solidaridad lacked basic institutional capacity and clear operational procedures for working with the ministries of health and education, to establish and verify co-responsibilities.

5. Rationale for Bank Assistance. The Bank Country Assistance Strategy 2005-2008 stated as one of its pillars the improvement of social equity (through human development and social protection investments). Under this pillar, the Government requested the Bank’s technical assistance and lending to support the transformation of its social protection system. The Bank had previously supported the Government through the Social Crisis Response Adjustment Loan (SCRAL, 7215-DO), which focused on social sector reform priorities. This Project was designed to build on the SCRAL and to complement other operations, including the IADB’s Social Management Reform Development Policy Loan and the Bank’s series of Development Policy Loans (DPL) called the Programmatic Performance and Accountability of Social Sectors Program (PASS).

6. The PASS series was initiated in the context of the wave of 2009 crises (food, fuel and financial). The Government seized the opportunity to promote long overdue reforms in both social policy and the quality of public expenditure. Reforms supported by the first PASS operation (US$150 million), were combined with other instruments and able to preserve the human capital of the poor in the short-term. PASS1 established the conceptual, institutional, and operational revamp of the safety net framework, particularly the Solidaridad program and also explored synergies between the safety net revamp and the creation of new budget planning mechanisms to improve the targeting of the fiscal resources dedicated to social transfers and the progressive coverage of supply-gaps in education, health, and nutrition. PASS2 (US$ 150 million) advanced deeper into the reforms initiated by the first operation and strengthened the institutionalization of reforms to move beyond the preservation of human capital during the crisis to enhance the human capital assets of poor households. PASS2 developed the necessary governance arrangements and institutional strengthening to effectively administer the redesigned CCT Solidaridad across social sector ministries and agencies and to gradually introduce performance agreements to orient an institutional focus on results. PASS2 also supported the creation of the first Medium-Term Public Expenditure Framework to increase predictability, transparency, and rationalization of the budget, including critical inclusion of projections for social protection budget envelopes, entitlements, protected programs, and financing sources through 2013 and initiated the first social accountability mechanism of the Solidaridad program, the Community Report Cards. The third PASS operation PASS3 (US$ 70 million) reflected the Government’s effort to consolidate and expand beyond the reforms of the key social protection initiated under the first and second operations and ensure their sustainability.

7. Rationale for Additional Financing. The Project was approved in August 2007, but only became effective in December 2008 due to a period of presidential elections and the time it normally takes to obtain Congressional approval for loans in the DR. During that period, the 2007/2008 food, fuel, and financial crisis took hold[footnoteRef:3]. Consequently, the Government requested Additional Financing (AF) for the Project, which was approved in September 2009, to strengthen Solidaridad, which had contributed to buffer the effects of the crisis on poor households, to improve its impact by strengthening the compliance with conditionalities, and scale up efforts in targeting and documentation of poor households to ensure the achievement of the PDO. [3: Disbursements of the original loan were low at the time of approval of the AF (US$0.51million). ]

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

8. The Project’s PDO was to improve the coverage, targeting, and effectiveness of the Borrower’s social protection programs, through the provision of legal identity documents to poor Dominicans, institutional strengthening of targeting mechanisms, and increased monitoring and evaluation of social programs.

9. The key outcome indicators were the following: (1) Coverage: At least 75 percent of households which have at least one member targeted by the documentation component have been integrated into a social protection program; (2) Coverage: The percentage of poor households with members who lack identity documents decreases from 26 to 10 percent; (3) Targeting: Implementation of the 2009 national SIUBEN survey, including 1.5 million households located in poor areas; and (4) Effectiveness: Adherence to and completion of the Inter-Institutional Agreement between the Social Cabinet and Consultative Council of Civil Society (CCCS) for Monitoring and Evaluation of public social protection programs. Additionally, six intermediate outcome indicators were defined to measure performance on coverage, targeting, and effectiveness of social programs (For details see Annex 2).

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The PDO was not revised during Project implementation. However, the key indicators were revised twice in the lifetime of the Project. The first was in September 2009, when two additional key performance indicators were introduced as the AF for the original Project was approved: (1) Targeting: SIUBEN would update the poverty status of 100 percent of registered households with poverty status (classified as Poor I and Poor II – P1 and P2) and (2) Targeting: 85 percent of surveyed households would be certified by the end of 2011. In addition, four intermediate indicators were included as part of the AF to measure staff capacity, M&E, community participation and social oversight (For details see Annex 2). The second time was in April 2015, when the Project was restructured for the fifth time to revise the indicators to reflect a more precise methodology for their calculation, adjust some names and targets, and add one outcome indicator[footnoteRef:4] to better capture project results. The revision of the key indicators was initiated late in 2013 after: a new (which is the current) administration took office, the Solidaridad program was transformed into PROSOLI, and the second SIUBEN socio-economic study was made public. These revised indicators have been used to monitor the Project ever since. [4: Related to the Additional Financing activities on social oversight.]

11. During the fifth restructuring of the Project, approved in April 2015, the original PDO indicators were adjusted to read as follows: (1) Coverage: Percentage of households which have at least one member targeted by the documentation component who have been integrated into the PROSOLI Program; (2) Coverage: The percentage of extremely poor heads of household (P1 and P2) who lack identity documents[footnoteRef:5]; and (3) Targeting: Implementation of the 2009 national SIUBEN survey, including 1.8 million households located in poor areas.[footnoteRef:6] In addition, the indicator on social accountability was dropped since this activity had become irrelevant given the social audit work the Project was doing in this area.[footnoteRef:7] [5: The indicator’s baseline was changed from 26 to 28 percent using the SIUBEN 2011 study. The data used to calculate the indicator updated the population to be included in the calculation of the indicator. ] [6: This made the indicator consistent with the name stated in the original PAD and the one recorded in the World Bank system.] [7: Specifically, the Project had developed a social audit mechanism for the evaluation of public social programs through community report cards, and the Project monitored the progress of its implementation through an additional results indicator and two intermediate indicators under the Additional Financing Loan.]

12. With respect to the PDO indicators of the Additional Financing, the indicator “Establishment of a social audit mechanism of monitoring and participation of social protection program with the participation of the community” was added in the fifth restructuring to measure community participation and social oversight. In addition, the names of the following indicators were adjusted to read as follows: (1) (Additional Financing Outcome Indicator) Targeting: SIUBEN updates the poverty status of 100 percent of registered households with poverty status (Poor I and II); and (2) (Additional Financing Outcome Indicator) Targeting: 85 percent of surveyed households certified by end of 2011.[footnoteRef:8] The adjustments to the intermediate indicators of both the original loan and the Additional Financing are described in Annex 2. [8: The names of these key outcome indicators were revised to reflect that they were indeed outcome indicators, not intermediate ones as had been previously recorded in the Implementation Status Reports in the World Bank System]

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. The 2004 socio-economic SIUBEN study identified approximately 415,000 beneficiaries to be documented (195,000 Solidaridad family members who did not have documentation; 170,000 family members deemed as eligible for enrollment to Solidaridad, by SIUBEN, but excluded due to lack of identification; and 50,000 undocumented children), the majority of whom lived in extreme poverty. The original PAD had the expectation that the loan would assist a total of 400,000 individuals.

14. The number of targeted beneficiaries to be documented was modified in December 2014 as part of the fourth restructuring to reflect: (a) the results of the second socio-economic study, carried out by SIUBEN in 2011-2012, that improved the estimations of extremely poor undocumented and eligible individuals; and (b) the long period of time it took individuals to complete the documentation dossier to request identification documents at the CEC offices (see Section 2.2). With respect to (a), the SIUBEN database, as of June 2011, showed that 497,342 individuals were undocumented, representing 6.6 percent of the total number of individuals in the database, but only 279,578 were eligible individuals for the program, representing 3.7 percent of the total number of individuals in the database.[footnoteRef:9] With respect to (b), the Project had been able to document close to 230,000 individuals by the end of 2011 given that the process was more complex and longer than originally estimated (see Annex 2 for details). Therefore, the target was revised downward to 239,012 beneficiaries instead of 400,000[footnoteRef:10]. Although the number of individuals to be documented was reduced, the Project would still cover a high percentage of undocumented extreme poor. [9: SIUBEN’s Report on Project implementation dated October 16, 2015. Undocumented means (i) an individual, 16 years or older, who does not have a national identity card or birth certificate; or a (ii) a child younger than 16 years of age who lacks a birth certificate. Eligible means an extremely poor individual.] [10: Project had been able to document around 230,000 individuals by June 1, 2014 against the 400,000 individuals promised in the original PAD in 2007.]

1.5 Original Components

15. Component 1: Provision of National Identity Documents to Poor Dominicans. (US$12.86 million). This Component aimed to improve access of poor households to basic social services and economic opportunities. It had three sub-components: (i) Nation-wide Information, Education and Communication: intended to finance a large scale, nation-wide information and education campaign; (ii) Targeted family support: intended to assist undocumented households identified by SIUBEN to obtain their national identity documents through the provision of para-legal support; and (iii) Support to the National Civil Registry: intended to finance the rehabilitation and automation of 50 civil registry offices, the modernization and technical assistance for the Late Birth Registration Office of the Civil Registry, and three mobile civil registry offices and para-legal support to the Attorney General’s Office and Supreme Court (which must ratify late certificate claims). In addition, the Project would finance out-put based disbursements to reimburse the Central Electoral Council (CEC) for costs incurred to issue late birth certificates and national IDs, based on an agreed unit cost formula set at US$5.00 per documented individual but could be revised periodically as needed. This cost formula covered average staff time and costs at each stage of the documentation process including the processes carried out by the Civil Registry Office, the CEC, the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court, all of them were identified to participate in the provision of identification documents (late birth certificates or ID cards). The first two sub-components aimed to stimulate a strong demand-side response from undocumented poor Dominicans and the third one to strengthen the supply-side.

16. Component 2: Strengthening of Social Protection Services (US$5.19 million). This Component aimed to improve the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the SC and SIUBEN, and consisted of three sub-components: (i) Institutional development of the SC: to finance technical assistance to strengthen social programs planning, budgeting and inter-institutional coordination; (ii) Capacity building of the SIUBEN: to finance the 2009 nationwide survey, incorporation of additional ICT hardware and software for secure and dynamic data management, and technical assistance to develop a refined proxy-means targeting formulae to incorporate income data and allow responses to household requests to be introduced at a decentralized level; and (iii) Social Policy monitoring and evaluation: to enhance transparency and capacity for impact assessment of all major social protection programs, but in particular for the documentation component. This Sub-component included the following activities: (a) social audit mechanisms of Community Report Cards which included beneficiaries, service providers and civil society; (b) monitoring and evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy; (c) research and targeted studies of social programs and issues; and (d) impact evaluation (IE) of the documentation program that also included an assessment of the evolution of the social protection policy and programs in the country.

17. Component 3: Coordination of Loan Implementation (US$1.35 million). The Loan originally planned to finance a Project Coordinator, two component coordinators, a secretary and one M&E specialist, who would be integrated into the Technical Unit for Coordination of the Social Cabinet (TUCSC), and financial management and procurement specialists integrated as part of the Technical Directorate for Administration and Finance (DAF) of the Social Cabinet. Instead a technical coordinating unit or implementing unit (PIU) was created inside the Social Cabinet for the execution.[footnoteRef:11] The Project financed its operational expenses and provided training, technology and equipment to its staff. [11: The PIU developed a solid operational management capacity, and during implementation, it started to manage other projects financed by IADB, in support of the country’s social protection policy.]

1.6 Revised Components

18. Two of the Project’s components were revised under the AF as follows. Component 3 was not modified:

19. Component 1 (US$ 14.16 million): was revised to include additional funding to carry out Targeted legal aid campaigns/targeted family support to cover the higher than estimated cost for contracting paralegal staff and supervisors, the provision of training, and equipment and operational expenditures for such staff. Later this support was deemed unnecessary as the Project evolved to the contracting and training of community promoters and supervisors.

20. Component 2 (US$ 13.86 million): was revised to provide increased funding and ICT equipment to improve targeting performance. The AF allocated more resources to cover higher than expected costs for the new SIUBEN socio-economic study. The higher costs were due to an increase in the target population, as well as increased salaries of staff hired to carry out the fieldwork given the time elapsed since preparation. Additionally, the AF financed technological improvements including an update of the poverty map and digitalization, and mobile devices, equipped with geo-referencing systems, to improve the quality of the data captured.

21. Aligning the CCT Managerial and Staff Capacity to the New Operational Rules: The AF provided funds to technically support the transformation of the Solidaridad Program into a full-fledged CCT program, by enabling the verification of compliance of households with their responsibilities and coordination with the Ministries of Health and Education, which had not been carried out before. The activities included the training of managers and technical staff at central, regional and local levels given the need for strategic alignment between health/education priorities, protocols and co-responsibilities.

22. Enhancing the Results-orientation and the Transparency of the Redesigned CCT Program: provided funds to develop a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation System for the redesigned CCT mechanisms to strengthen community participation. In particular, it created beneficiary committees and trained them on beneficiary rights and obligations under the program; and developed and implemented Community Report Cards prepared by the community with care and services providers.

1.7 Other significant changes

23. In total the Project was restructured seven times: one to design the Additional Financing Loan, four for the reallocation of expenditures and/or extension of closing dates, one to revise the results framework, and one to amend the legal agreement to include new construction of CEC offices. In the flow of work, the Bank never waited to process a restructuring as a proactive response to the evolution of implementation.

24. Two major implementation shortcomings drove these restructurings in addition to the rationale of the Additional Financing mentioned in the section 1.1. The first one was the insertion of the construction of four new offices of the CEC instead of the rehabilitation of 50 existing ones. Since the Project was approved in 2007 and its implementation begun almost two years later, the scope of this component had to be adjusted as the CEC, during that period, prepared and implemented a National Rehabilitation Plan for the digitalization of its offices financing it with national resources. This new plan included the construction of four new offices where services were in highest demand. The Project financed these works, but had to amend retroactively the Legal Agreement to do so. Later, the Project had to ensure compliance with environmental and resettlement safeguards before closing.

25. The second change was the adjustment of the estimated number of beneficiaries under the documentation component as explained in sections 1.4 and 2.2. Using SIUBEN’s 2004 data, the Project encountered challenges in locating beneficiaries in the field and had to introduce a re-certification process, new approaches to target poverty concentration using updated data, and the design of tailored community awareness campaigns and trainings, which took time to develop, thereby postponing the achievement of documentation targets. The Project had to decrease the end target for documented beneficiaries, estimating the new target based on the SIUBEN 2011 data, and to extend the closing date to continue documenting poor individuals while solving the safeguards issues related to the new constructions as explained in detail in section 2.4 and Annex 2[footnoteRef:12]. [12: Although the last four restructuring could have been merged into one single process, the teams had to launch them independently given the different approval processes each change had to go through at SC, Ministry of Finance, and Congress level; and the time it took to ensure the safeguards compliance. ]

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

26. Preparation. The Original Project’s preparation began in 2005, and the Bank Board approved the loan in 2007. Significant time was allotted to dialogue that was crucial to agreeing on the Project’s design, which was complex as the operation was intended to support the social protection strategy that was still being articulated. Much time was needed to agree on the role of the CEC in the Project; since this was the first time the CEC would perform an active search of the poorest beneficiaries and implement an output-based component. In addition, the Bank and the Government had to align their views on the verification of co-responsibilities and the participation of the line ministries, as opposed to the civil society, in carrying out this work[footnoteRef:13]. Finally, the original Project’s focus was on the operational aspects of the national social protection strategy and not on the Solidaridad Program itself; however, four years after Project preparation, when the AF loan was approved, the institutional needs had changed and the Government required more resources for strengthening the Social Cabinet, the Solidaridad Program itself, and the social policy monitoring work. Lessons from sector work (2005 Poverty Assessment) and similar projects (the Social Crisis Response Adjustment Loan –SCRAL) were critical to project design, particularly the importance of strengthening SIUBEN and the need to provide documentation to the poor. [13: The Government and the Bank had different approaches to the verification of beneficiaries’ co-responsibilities. During preparation, it was agreed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Social Cabinet to improve M&E, to ensure that the co-responsibilities were monitored frequently instead of having the civil society carrying out these activities. Later, a new mechanism for civil society participation on the program oversight was introduced with the approval of the AF. ]

27. Design. The Project was designed to support the Government’s vision and complement the support provided by other donors. There were consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), civil society, and beneficiaries during preparation, specifically with regard to the documentation component, to explain its intentions and benefits. Component 1 had a complex design, largely because of the number of implementing institutions involved and the innovative approach to document the most marginalized members of society. Component 2 had a simple design as it supported the institutional strengthening of the SC, and despite the complexity of the procurement and contracting processes for carrying out the SIUBEN study the design proved to be very strong.

28. Quality at entry. The rationale for the Bank’s involvement was sound at appraisal and throughout the life of the Project since it supported social sector reforms identified as priorities in the Bank Country Assistance Strategy and under the Government’s National Plan, coordinated this support with other donors and supported a Bank DPL series later in 2009. The components and activities were adequate to achieve the PDO. The changes after the Project was designed in the dimension and type of activities, and the implementation arrangements, followed the evolution of the government program and social policy, and had to be addressed in the restructurings throughout the lifetime of the Project.

2.2 Implementation

29. The Project was implemented over an almost nine-year period during three political cycles, two of them under the same President. The Project was approved in August, 2007, but only became effective a year and a half later, in December, 2008. The AF Loan was approved a year later in 2009. After a slow start, implementation took off in early 2009, accelerating after the AF’s effectiveness (September 2009). Several of the issues mentioned below affected the Project throughout its implementation.

30. Shortly after effectiveness of the original loan, December 2008, minor challenges led to implementation delays. The revisions and updates of the CEC National Rehabilitation Plan related to the activities to be financed by the Project, and the updates of costs of the second SIUBEN’s socio-economic study,[footnoteRef:14] led to the preparation of the AF. In addition, at appraisal, the Project envisaged to carry out a re-certification of households included in the 2004 socio-economic study to locate beneficiaries of the documentation component. [14: Costs were higher mainly because: the number of families to be included in the study increased, the study included additional poverty areas, which had not been considered for the study, the costs of digitalization and the quality control of the information had to be re-estimated.]

31. In parallel to the launch of the original Project and the approval of the AF, the 2008 international financial crisis took hold, spurring further reforms supported by Bank-financed Development Policy Loans (DPL).[footnoteRef:15] The DPLs supported the Project’s goal of reforming Solidaridad, through its support for structural reforms and the protection of the budget for social protection. The IADB supported the reforms with the financing of the Management Information System (MIS) and resources for Solidaridad transfers. The Bank’s Project also drew on other health and education operations financed by the Bank that were supporting the creation and strengthening of the health management system, and training of personnel. By strengthening primary health care units (Unidades de Atención Primaria –UNAPs) and schools, the DPLs were also supporting the improvement of the CCT program in the DR.[footnoteRef:16] [15: Three Performance and Accountability of Social Sectors (PASS) Development Policy Loans (DPLs) were approved by the Bank in the period 2009-2012 as a series of budget support operations to promote long overdue reforms in both social policy and the quality of public expenditure.] [16: Health Sector Reform Support Project (First Phase APL 2003-2009), Early Childhood Education Project (implemented during 2002-2011), and the DPL PASS series. ]

32. In addition to this, the Project’s organizational arrangements evolved very quickly. While the PAD suggested that a PIU would not be created, a de-facto one was created within the Social Cabinet’s Technical Directorate (SCTD).[footnoteRef:17] As the social protection sector evolved, the SC became not only the coordinator of the country’s social policies but also the institution responsible for fiduciary matters for social protection programs. The Project ended up supporting the renting, refurbishing, and equipping of office space for this unit. In addition, a documentation component Unit (CDD) was created inside the PIU. The main implication of this arrangement was that documentation was not included within a permanent government structure, and therefore the work remained part of the Project. The arrangements with the CEC were reviewed and adapted to focus on strengthening the Documentation Unit in the SC and line units inside the CEC instead of hiring paralegals or promoters. Finally, the Civil Society Consultative Council (Consejo Consultivo de la Sociedad Civil, CCCS) did not function as foreseen in the PAD, performing a key role as a supervisor of civil society’s participation in Solidaridad. Monitoring effectiveness and accountability of the CCT program was fostered by increased community participation and the introduction of a social audit mechanism (Reportes Comunitarios) to work with civil society ensuring social oversight. [17: This unit managed the IADB social protection projects as well. The IADB had multiphase loans (2010-2013) to support social protection in the DR. ]

33. After the AF’s effectiveness, implementation accelerated. Some areas proved more complex than anticipated in the original design and others were facilitated as the social protection policy developed. Among the factors that facilitated the implementation of the Project was the strong leadership of the SC. The SC had been the institution responsible for the solid and successful changes in the DR’s social protection policy since 2005, and continued to do so as a high quality technical team was designated in the SC by the Vice-Presidency to lead the development and implementation of the social protection policy. Key in this strong performance was the creation and functioning of the inter-sectoral arrangements between the Social Cabinet, the Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Health (MoH), and the National Health Insurance (SENASA), and other financing partners such as the IADB, through the creation of an Inter-Sectoral Committee. This Committee was responsible for the successful reforms and restructurings in the social policy and programs (such as Solidaridad) and promoted the coordination of the social programs among ministries. In addition, the Social Cabinet created the Regional Technical Sub-Committees as an additional coordination level. Regional representatives of the MoH, the MoE, SIUBEN, Solidaridad, and ADESS met regularly to coordinate the implementation of activities at local level.

34. Another factor that contributed positively to implementation was the continuity of Social Policy and the consolidation of social programs during several electoral cycles. In August 2012, Solidaridad merged with Progresando, and became known as the Progresando con Solidaridad Program – PROSOLI, which placed emphasis on socio-educational interventions and potentiated the provision of integral services. The purpose of the new program was to provide beneficiary families with: i) conditional cash transfers; ii) socio-educational mentoring through volunteer family liaisons; iii) access to Community Technological Centers and Progresando Training Centers; and iv) connections with other public programs and services, particularly health and education services.

35. Despite these developments, there were numerous challenges during the implementation of the documentation component that took time to overcome: (i) the national communication campaign envisaged in the PAD experienced difficulties during the procurement process as several bids were declared deserted [footnoteRef:18]. In the end, a smaller campaign (radio ads) was carried out, diminishing the level of early–on awareness of poor Dominicans about the Government’s documentation campaign; (ii) there were difficulties in locating undocumented individuals included in the SIUBEN’s database. As explained before, this affected the work of the CDD and triggered a change in strategy to locate undocumented individuals, considering geographical poverty areas. By doing so, the Project included poverty pockets which existed as enclaves within other areas not classified as poor, thereby better capturing potential beneficiaries – a positive development, but one which took time; (iii) the teams carrying out the field work for the CDD to document poor Dominicans faced many obstacles to gather background documents from ancestors required to provide an ID. These difficulties resulted in more time and resources spent by the CDD team supporting the families; (iv) there was a need to develop standard procedures to define the roles and responsibilities of the different actors and institutions to document poor individuals; (v) the CEC declared the impossibility of verification of birth certificates, which was one of the strategies originally thought to help get national documents to undocumented individuals. This technical difficulty also contributed to delay of the approval of processing national identity documents; and (vi) strengthening the CEC civil registry offices took longer than expected. The PAD foresaw minor upgrading to existing offices to enable them to incorporate information and technology (IT) equipment; however, the CEC took a long time to prepare and send a proposal for rehabilitation of its infrastructure. A further complication was that many sites were not the property of the CEC, but rented. Consequently, the Bank and Government agreed to carry out the construction of four new offices under the Project while the Government would finance the upgrading of the rest of the offices[footnoteRef:19]. The Government and Bank worked closely to adjust the Project, finding alternative options to reach the sought results. The Bank provided technical assistance to overcome difficulties in all the above-mentioned challenges. [18: The communication campaign was prepared in two stages (first, design and then implementation), instead of opting for a single process. The design phase was challenging, facing difficulties to find companies interested in carrying out the proposed activities and meeting the technical requirements. ] [19: As mentioned in section 1.7 and explained further in section 2.4.]

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

36. Design. The Project design placed emphasis in strengthening the M&E systems in the Social Cabinet and the National Department for Social and Economic Development of the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (MEPYD), in order to allow the Social Cabinet to track all of the indicators of the Results Framework in collaboration with sector ministries and government agencies and move towards results. It foresaw carrying out a baseline survey and an impact evaluation, to assess the impact of providing legal identity documents to poor Dominicans. Furthermore, the original design included periodic process evaluations to be conducted by qualified civil society organizations, in collaboration with the Consultative Council of Civil Society (CCCS) to monitor and evaluate social programs [footnoteRef:20]. This design led to improvements deemed as satisfactory as evaluated in beneficiaries’ surveys of services in health, education, and those provided by the “colmados”. The AF further focused on: (i) providing PROSOLI with technical strengthening and the development of a community monitoring and evaluation scheme (through the Community Report Cards); (ii) developing a management information system for the Social Cabinet; and (iii) supporting the SIUBEN 2011 socio-economic study, as an instrument to provide accurate information for policy making. The original Results Framework did not include a strong indicator to measure the improvement of the effectiveness of the social protection programs. The original indicators measured more outputs than outcome until in the fifth restructuring when a proxy indicator for effectiveness was introduced to assess the development of the Community Report Cards. [20: Process evaluations were not carried out as such under the CCSC, due to the evolution of the new accountability mechanism, the Community Score cards. This mechanism ensured the gathering of feedback from beneficiaries and introduce changes in the program’s processes to overcome shortcomings identified by beneficiaries. ]

37. Implementation. Within the Technical Directorate in the Social Cabinet, the M&E systems were strengthened to ensure the monitoring of the Project and the progress towards the achievement of the PDO as well as the development of an information system for the social policies implemented by the Social Cabinet. For the Project, the PIU was the focal point, gathering information from the SIUBEN, PROSOLI, the CDD and ADESS, to monitor Project activities, to update the intermediate and outcome indicators of the Results Framework, and to prepare monitoring reports. The PIU used the integrated financial management information system for monitoring disbursements (SIGEF), used the information systems of PROSOLI and SIUBEN, and created a subsystem to supervise the documentation component.

38. Despite the continuity of technical staff in the PIU there were some changes in coordinators in the lifetime of the Project. Monitoring and reporting were not always rigorous. However, the indicators continued to be relevant and since 2013 were adapted according to changes in implementation, until they were formally revised in 2015. The Bank and the PIU team dedicated substantial efforts to prepare the revision of the indicators and process the restructuring.

39. In addition, the M&E unit of the Technical Directorate used the multiannual programs and the integrated management information system, known as RUTA, for the transmission, interaction and management of information regarding the contribution to the multiannual plan from the Social Cabinet. In addition, an integrated M&E System (SIME – Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo y Evaluación) was developed to systematically monitor and evaluate the implementation of the social policies led by the Social Cabinet as well as the PROSOLI itself. PROSOLI originally used an independent monitoring system that was gradually connected to the SIME to evaluate the effects and outcomes on beneficiaries and to report at the macro level.

40. Furthermore, the Project supported piloting a community M&E system through the Community Reports Cards as a participatory mechanism to involve beneficiaries and their communities in providing feedback on the functioning of the PROSOLI, and on health, education, and payment mechanisms. By project completion, it was institutionalized, with the inclusion of targets and indicators in PROSOLI’s annual plan and expanded at national level. The Community Report Cards involved a wide range of professionals in several areas (health coordinators, school principals, ADESS personnel, representatives of community organizations, PROSOLI field staff (enlaces de campo), local providers, etc.). The Social Cabinet undertook an evaluation of the Community Report Cards in 2014 showing that they were recognized as spaces for beneficiaries of the program to express their opinions on it and identify the problems affecting the program and the related services (health and education). Beneficiaries perceived as satisfactory the improvements of services in health and education, and those provided by colmados (the neighborhood stores).

41. Finally, a baseline and impact evaluation (IE) census on the documentation component was carried out in 2011 and 2014 respectively. The IE compared the main changes of the provision of legal identity documents on poor and very poor households and included an analysis on the main characteristics of these individuals and households (Annexes 2 and 3 explain further the results and details).

42. Utilization. The Project experienced different intensities and quality of M&E throughout its life. While there could have been more effort to monitor data and adjust the Results Framework earlier, specifically with respect to the estimates on undocumented poor, the Project was still able to adapt implementation based on indicator tracking. For example, monitoring of the re-certification process showed the need to change the strategy to include a geographical strategy to complement the census-based approach. This was also the case of the review of the output-based disbursement unit cost in 2014 that used information from the 2011 SIUBEN study. The information gathered through the Community Score Cards was used to address challenges and shortcomings identified by beneficiaries. These were, for the most part, addressed within a year after this exercise was carried out, allowing improving the effectiveness of the program[footnoteRef:21]. The SC used the information and data to influence policy decisions related to expansion of coverage and co-responsibilities, informing the work of the inter-sectoral commissions. [21: Challenges and shortcomings referred to the performance of Colmados, the functioning of the electronic cards and the timely arrival of funds to beneficiaries, among other issues. They also referred to community basic services such as water and sanitation, access to sanitation in the schools, school infrastructure improvements, whose improvements could be coordinated through the program with the corresponding authorities.]

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

43. Safeguards. The Project originally planned rehabilitation of fifty existing civil registry offices to permit the installation and security of essential ICT equipment as part of the CEC modernization program. Minor works were allowed but no safeguards were triggered and the Project was rated category C. As previously discussed, the Project ended up constructing four new civil registry buildings instead of rehabilitating the fifty existing civil registry offices. Given these changes, the team conducted an environmental assessment in 2014. Upon analysis of the characteristics, locations and potential impacts of the buildings, the safeguards team kept the environmental category, but worked closely with the Government (with the Technical Directorate of the Social Cabinet and the CEC) to ensure that there was compliance with the Bank’s environmental policy as well as with new seismic regulations in the DR, which were enacted in 2011. The Loan Agreement had to be amended to include new construction instead of rehabilitation without affecting either the disbursement categories or the loan allocation.

44. Regarding resettlement, the Government and the Bank worked together to ensure that there was no involuntary resettlement as a consequence of the new construction. The main operational issue with regard to the new construction derived from the delayed land regularization during implementation. While compliance with environmental safeguards was swiftly ensured, more time and effort were required to ensure the titling of the land where the new buildings were erected. While three of the four plots were donated to the CEC, there was due diligence pending to register the donations and record these under the name of the CEC. In one of the parcels, the owner was an individual who requested compensation for ceding the property of the land to the CEC. The Borrower compensated the owner before Project completion, duly resolving this matter. The Project had to be extended to allow the Government to obtain the Congress approval for the loan agreement’s amendment and for duly solving all the cases of land regularization.

45. Procurement. Overall, procurement was intense and the procurement capacities of the PIU varied during implementation. In addition to the regular support offered by the Bank both parties worked on innovative and successful efforts to carry out procurement of the 2011 socio-economic study and the PROSOLI’s training activities implemented at regional levels. At the end of the Project, the PIU and its procurement team were well trained and technically capable, and absorbed by the new Bank operation.

46. Procurement was rated Moderately Satisfactory at some points in the implementation period, but at closing, was rated Satisfactory. Issues were identified during a post-review supervision mission regarding contracts for consultants (mismatching of names and TORs, inappropriate hiring of an individual working for two public institutions), but the Borrower addressed them before Project closing.

47. Financial Management. Financial arrangements were rated Satisfactory at Project’s closing. The quality of the FMRs was good and the audit reports were regularly carried out and submitted to the Bank, although with some delays. The audit reports at times found issues that were addressed by the Social Cabinet through corresponding action plans. There were some issues with the FM information country system but these were duly resolved and the reconciliation of the counterpart funding[footnoteRef:22] was achieved in 2014 under the documentation component. [22: The original PAD reflected that there was a US$2.6M counterpart contribution for the original loan and the AF Paper showed US$0.72 million as counterpart funds for the AF. Both were fully accounted for and audited before Project’s closing. ]

48. An output-based disbursement (OBD) mechanism was activated to recognize documentation expenditures incurred by the CEC to target the poorest individuals identified by the Project. It financed personnel expenditures incurred by the National Civil Registry in the provision of national identification documents. The reimbursement was based on a unit-cost formula for each late birth certificate and national document issued by the National Civil Registry. The initial unit cost was agreed at US$5 per document issued, which was then revised to US$7.

49. The cost of the documentation component decreased slightly (from US$12.97 million to US$11.73 million) but the cost of Component 2 increased to US$15.64 million, almost three times what was expected in the PAD (US$5.19 million). The cost of Component 3 slightly increased from US$1.3 to US$1.94 million.

50. As of as of August 26, 2016, a total of USD 26,143,124.41 was advanced to the designated account, of which USD 26,101,249.08 was documented in Client Connection. The last request for documentation in the amount of USD 19,808.85 was processed by the Bank on August 26, 2016. The Designated Account outstanding balance of USD 41,875.33 was refunded to the Bank by August 31, 2016. The team did not expect any major issues with this refund as the outstanding balance has been accurately accounted for by the client.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

51. The Bank approved the “Integrated Social Protection and Promotion” Project in February 2015, which became effective on October 28, 2015. The new project supports area-based transformative interventions aiming to address the multi-dimensionality and regional disparities of extreme poverty and improvements in the social protection system to ensure sustainability and success of PROSOLI’s area-based integrated service provision approach.

52. To continue with the tasks performed by the Documentation Unit, the Borrower arranged an institutionalization plan for PROSOLI to absorb CDD’s staff and operational knowledge, acquired through the Project [footnoteRef:23] . While the CEC continued to be the main institution responsible for the provision of documents, the PROSOLI team inherited the task of providing guidance and support to individuals on the process to obtain an ID. In order to facilitate the transition, the Project financed a full-day training workshop for 1,800 PROSOLI supervisors; the CDD web portal and geo-referenced maps transition to PROSOLI’s website; training on CDD’s operational manual to carry out “operativos”, the systematization of experiences, and the transfer of equipment in CDD’s regional offices to PROSOLI’s. [23: The PIU continued to exist after the completion of this Project’s activities. The PIU is responsible for managing other social protection programs and projects under implementation in the DR.]

53. In addition, the country has made substantial efforts to lock and protect social expenditures annually since it started the multiannual budgeting exercise in 2010. Some challenges remain at Project’s closing, including strengthening the institutionality of the social protection sector and the development of a sustainable and integrated social protection policy with both contributory and non-contributory aspects. As the country faces a political transition, the continued efforts on strengthening the building blocks of the social protection system also become highly relevant.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

54. The relevance of the Project’s objective is rated Highly Satisfactory. The PDO remained highly relevant after Project closing, in terms of the Bank’s priorities, of the Government’s priorities, and of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). Specifically, the PDO is in line with: (i) the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2015-2018 (Report 89551-DR), in terms of the Pillar “Strengthening Social Service Delivery”; (ii) the country’s National Development Strategy (NDS)’s goal to “build an effective and efficient social protection system” (2010-2030) and (iii) the Government’s National Development Plan (2012-2016), in particular the goal to reduce extreme and moderate poverty.

55. The relevance of the Project’s design is rated Satisfactory. The design of the components reflected a proper diagnosis of a development priority that remained relevant. By supporting poor undocumented individuals to obtain national identity documents, the Project addressed a key obstacle to access and expanded coverage of key social programs. The design incorporated innovative elements such as the active search of undocumented individuals that required multi-sector coordination and the output-based disbursements for CEC documentation results. The rating is Satisfactory because at the beginning the Bank was not clear of the complexity of the active search; therefore, the targets were overestimated and the time and costs underestimated.

56. The relevance of implementation is rated Satisfactory. The following Bank decisions support this assessment: (i) the approval of additional financing to scale up key project activities, and (ii) the Project restructurings to adapt the operation to changes in the implementation context --this was the case in merging of Solidaridad with the program from the First Lady’s office to create PROSOLI, and the extension of the project implementation period and the reallocation of funds to back the implementation of key activities to achieve the PDO. The Bank remained flexible and supportive throughout the Project’s life. The Bank also worked with IADB to find complementarity in each other’s projects and with the DPL series, in support of the DR’s social sector policy.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

57. The Project succeeded in achieving its PDO and is rated Satisfactory. The end targets for the PDO indicators were met and the intermediate indicators also performed well. Overall, coverage of the main social protection programs has expanded, targeting eligible beneficiaries has measurably improved, and the effectiveness of the main social protection program, PROSOLI has increased. The PDO was maintained throughout the lifetime of the Project; and although changes in the indicators were introduced in the fifth restructuring, because the Project was rated Satisfactory or Moderately Satisfactory throughout, and it had disbursed 90 percent at the date of the fifth restructuring, applying split ratings would not yield a significant result in terms of changing the Project’s rating; therefore, split ratings have not been applied.[footnoteRef:24] [24: The fifth restructuring of the Project allowed minor revisions to reflect a more precise methodology for their calculation and to use the SIUBEN 2011 data. Supervision and assessment of the achievement of the PDO was done using these revised PDIs, though they were formally revised until this restructuring was approved in April 2015. By then Project had disbursed US$26.8 million.]

Improve coverage of the Borrower’s social protection programs

58. Theory of Change. The Project aimed to improve coverage of the Borrower’s social protection programs. Under this Component the Project financed the CEC to support the Government's effort to reach out to undocumented Dominicans and then provided targeted family support to those who wished to apply to ensure they had all the documentation required and actually received the identification documents. It also provided investments in the creation of a specialized unit to ensure smooth processing, resulting in an increased number of eligible beneficiaries covered by social protection programs. The component included an output-based mechanism to reimburse the National Civil Registry inside the CEC for the emission of the documents.

59. Performance. This dimension of the PDO is rated as Satisfactory. The percentage of extremely poor households covered by PROSOLI increased from 68.4 to 86.1 percent; the percentage of poor households enrolled in SIUBEN database and subsequently validated for participation in PROSOLI increased from 68.9 to 94.9 percent; and the percentage of individuals provided with identity documents directly processed by the Documentation unit increased to 31.5 percent. Component 1 contributed to an increase in the coverage for the extreme poor who were recently documented. A total of 255,265 undocumented poor individuals received ID documents or birth certificates with Project support, achieving the restructured target. The number of beneficiaries target was downsized from 400,000 to 239,012 in 2014, to reflect changes in the Project context. The two associated PDO indicators’ end targets were achieved. The percentage of households which have at least one member targeted by the documentation component who have been integrated into the PROSOLI Program reached 97.9 percent at Project’s closing, compared to its end target of 75 percent. Likewise, the percentage of heads of households without documentation decreased dramatically (from 28 to 7 percent) and met its end target of 10 percent, even though the SIUBEN database incorporated almost twice the number of individuals during the implementation period.[footnoteRef:25] [25: The original SIUBEN database using the 2004 study and certified as of June 2008 registered 1.5 million of households. This was used for the Project’s design. The database, after the second study in 2011, certified as of June 2011, registered 2.2 million households. The database certified as of February 2014 registered 2.5 million households.]

60. The impact evaluation showed that in addition to the increased coverage in PROSOLI, there was a significant change in access to social security between 2011 and 2014 for documented households. In 2011, 72 percent of these households did not have access to social security but by 2014, only 33 percent remained without access. In contrast, 92 percent of undocumented households lacked access to health insurance by 2014.

Improve targeting of the Borrower’s social protection programs

61. Theory of Change. The Project aimed to improve targeting by strengthening SIUBEN, the single targeting mechanism in the country, contributing at the end with the certification and update of the poverty status of registered households in the database. Under Component 2, the Project provided financial and technical assistance to improve the targeting instrument and carry out the national SIUBEN survey covering 2.2 million households compared to the original end target estimated at 1.8 million.

62. Performance. This dimension of the PDO is rated Satisfactory. One hundred percent of Solidaridad beneficiaries were re-certified and their information updated in the national database of poor Dominicans using proxy-means methodologies, and expenditure