does intuitive knowledge exist?

Does Intuitive Knowledge Exist?Author(s): Albert HofstadterSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 6, No. 6 (Dec., 1955), pp. 81-87Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318233 .

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PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES Edited by WILFRID SELLARS and HERBERT FEIGL with the advice and

assistance of PAUL MEEHL, JOHN HOSPERS, MAY BRODBECK

VOLUME VI Contents December 1955 NUMBER 6

Does Intuitive Knowledge Exist? by Albert Hofstadter COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Note on Carnap's Meaning Analysis by Roderick M. Chisholm BROWN UNIVERSITY

On Some Concepts of Pragmatics by Rudolf Carnap UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

Mr. Weiss on the Paradox of Necessary Truth by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel HEBREW UNIVERSITY

Does Intuitive Knowledge Exist?

by ALBERT HOFSTADTER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THERE is at present so widespread a tendency in empiricist circles to deny the existence of immediate intuitive knowledge in any form that it may not be without interest to try to offer an instance of such knowledge. In order to cite the instance as an instance I shall have to try to show that it is in fact an instance.

There are two senses of "intuition" which must be distinguished, namely, (1) intuition as immediate awareness or apprehension of an object, content, or subject matter, and (2) intuition as a mode of knowledge de- veloped on the basis of immediate apprehension.

Immediate apprehension is the direct presence of an object, content, or 81I



82 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

subject matter to the mind. It is direct awareness as distinct from judgment. Its cognitive function is to supply subject matter for knowledge. But it is not itself knowledge. It cannot be knowledge, for there is in it no act of affirmation or denial, no attribution or inference. It cannot be said to be true or false in the sense in which judgments can. It may con- stitute something else, like acquaintance or illumination, but not knowledge in the sense in which knowledge exists in the form of cognitive judgment. We may, of course, wish to speak of immediate apprehension as infallible; but it is infallible not as knowledge but only because it has not yet made a cognitive claim. There is no mistake possible because no assertion has been ventured.

Intuitive knowledge is an act of mind about, directed to, or regarding immediately apprehended subject matter. Hence it is an intentional and rational act, regardless of which phase of mind provides the subject matter judged about (sense, memory, conception, imagination, etc.). It is an act of discovery rather than an act of invention, a contemplative rather than constructive act of reason. Although in it the mind acts and even con- structs its judgment, what the judgment affirms is something about the subject matter which the judgment does not itself construct but finds given in immediate apprehension. Intuitive knowledge, further, is an act of mind for which there can be evidence. For, since intuitive knowledge is based on immediate apprehension, the subject matter is there in immediate apprehension for the mind which makes the judgment and finds the subject matter fulfilling the intent of the judgment. Because it is an act of judgment, an intentional act, and one in which there can be evidence, intuitive knowledge makes use of meaning, i.e., it has logical form. It distinguishes and relates subject and predicate, implicans and implicate, disjuncts, conjuncts; it makes use of concepts, of logical categories, of quantifiers. Hence its thought is ideally and in principle representable in language. It is, in this sense, discursive, even though it is immediate. Thus intuitive knowledge should not be contrasted with discursive knowledge. All knowledge in the form of cognitive judgment is discursive, whether immediate or not. The proper opposite of intuitive knowledge is nonintui- tive or mediate knowledge.

With this distinction between immediate apprehension and intuitive knowledge in mind it becomes possible to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an act of intuitive knowledge. These conditions are three in number:

1. I must have immediate apprehension of the subject matter of the judgment.

2. I must think understandingly the propositional content of the judgment.



DOES INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE EXIST? 83

3. I must validate the judgment by so connecting the immediately apprehended subject matter with the propositional content that the former is experienced as evidencing, or fulfilling the intent of, the judgment, and as evidencing it fully and without remainder.

A little reflection will show that these are both necessary and sufficient conditions for intuitive knowledge. I forgo the attempt to argue this ex- plicitly here.

There exist judgments for which these conditions are satisfiable. Con- sider, for instance, phenomenalistic judgments formulated by statements such as the following: "This is orange (in hue)," "T..hat is high (in pitch)," "This is sour," "That is smooth." Each such judgment is meant to predicate a phenomenally accessible attribute of a phenomenally apparent singu- lar subject, which is referred to by a demonstrative pronoun. (The pronoun is dispensable in favor of a proper name instituted for the purpose of the reference.)

That the conditions for intuitive knowledge are satisfiable for such judgments may be seen by the following considerations.

1. I can have immediate apprehension of the subject matter of the judgment. The subject matter of "This is orange (in hue)" is a phenomenally apparent object. Let it, for instance, be an orange cross which figures against a gray ground. The subject matter is then that orange cross, the perceptual figure. Of this I have, and therefore can have, immediate apprehension.

2. 1 can think understandingly the propositional content of the judgment. This condition must be discussed in two parts, one in regard to its reference to the subject, the other in regard to its predication of content.

The reference to the subject, which gets expressed by the demonstrative pronoun (or specially instituted proper name), may be called sheer reference. The thought-function served in such reference is that of selection of an item as subject matter appropriate for predication. Now such selection may be performed in various ways, some more and some less direct. Thus in the judgment expressed by "The tallest man in this room is stout" I attempt to select a subject by way of what is expressed in the descriptive phrase "the tallest man in this room." "This" exercises a selective function, but by way of the additional condition "room." And "the tallest man" fills out the reference by specifying attributive content belonging to "the," which latter also exercises a selective referential function though in an indirect way. We have in this instance a complex mode of referring-in- cluding two reference processes, "this," "the"-by way of joining attributive content to the movement of reference, so as to make the selection unique enough for our purpose.




In judgments like "This is orange" the reference occurs in a simpler way, for which reason I call it sheer reference. Being aware of a certain orange cross on a gray field, the orange cross is present for apprehension. The orange cross being given in apprehension, I am able to direct my thought to it. That is all I need to do to make it a subject for predicative thinking: I direct my thought to it as a subject, in the categorial form of subject. It-as it occurs as the terminus of my thinking regard-is my subject. But this direction of my thinking and this terminus as the subject for my judgment occur directly, without mediation through any attributive content. When I direct my thinking to it as subject I do not include in that function of direction any qualifying content (such as "orange" or "orange cross") by means of which, or through which as conceptual path, the direction of my thinking is led to terminate upon the object. I do not set out to find the subject and seek it through descriptive content. Rather, I have the object already in immediate apprehension, so that I do not have to set out to find it. It can become the terminus of my thought-regard just by the process of regarding it in a thoughtful way. The reference is therefore pure, sheer reference, without mediation through conceptual material (other than the logical category of "subject").

I am therefore able to refer to the subject in an understanding way. Before proceeding to consider the predicative aspect of the judgment,

it may be useful to eliminate a certain possible objection. It may be objected that this notion of sheer reference is sheer myth. For, the argument might run, I cannot ever merely select an object for consideration except by way of some descriptive content. Thus the reason I am able to direct my thinking to the orange cross is that it is an orange cross. It is not a bare "it," a bare "x" for predication. It is something more or less definite. And unless I am able to recognize it, distinguishing it from other items in the phenomenal field, I cannot hold on to it for purposes of reference. Hence, even when I say merely "this," my thought treats it as an orange cross and my reference occurs in fact through such descriptive contents as "orange" and "cross."^

To this objection we may reply that it is necessary to distinguish between what I think and the conditions necessary for my thinking that thought. It is true that I cannot refer to anything which is not somehow character- ized, which does not somehow possess describable (or indescribable) character. It is indeed because the object is an orange cross against a gray ground that it is something to which I can refer. Moreover, I have to apprehend it; and apprehension is impossible unless there is something- some quality, some character-which is capable of distinction from something else. But apprehension need not be thinking. When I apprehend



DOES INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE EXIST? 85

the orange cross I need not, so far as it is thus material of immediate apprehension, be making a judgment concerning it. Now in the judgment I proceed to a thinking act. I thinkingly refer to the orange cross. This function of reference could not, of course, be effected unless I were immediately apprehending the orange cross. But the reference is not identical with the apprehension. The apprehension is a necessary condition for the possibility of the reference, but it is not a part of or a content of the reference; it is not a thought-function. Thus, if "recognize" means "immediately apprehend," it is true that unless I can recognize the orange cross I cannot thinkingly refer to it as subject. But my thinking reference to it may still be a sheer reference. All I may intend as subject in my judgment is the orange cross not qua orange or a cross but simply qua something. Thus I do not have to know what orange or a cross is; I do not have to know that what I am considering is indeed an orange cross. I only have to apprehend the orange cross immediately. And then all I need do is direct my thinking regard toward it. This direction is sheer reference, unmediated by descriptive conceptual content.

To turn now to the predication of content in the judgment, the question is whether I can thinkingly and understandingly predicate a content of the item referred to, or whether there is not perhaps an element of defect or something merely implicit in the predicate which would hinder the possibility of intuitive knowledge. If I did not understand fully what I was predicating, I might not be able to have intuitive knowledge; for I might be predicating something false, not being able to know that it is false, because I would not be understanding what I was predicating.

But I can predicate in an understanding way when I am dealing with some attributes of phenomenally apprehended objects. It is possible for me to achieve a clear judgmental thought. I can form concepts of orange, sweet, high-in-pitch; and with such a concept in mind I can understandingly predicate concerning an entity referred to by sheer reference. These concepts are phenomenalistic. They do not refer to latent processes but only to overt appearances. I am, for instance, able to concentrate on the hue of the orange cross, as distinct from the orange cross in its role as object of reference (subject of the judgment in process). Innate ability, previous experience and training have given me the power to discern in this way, to conceive in this discriminating manner. I am able to think that hue as an attribute belonging to the cross. Similarly, by concentrating on the color's value, I am able to conceive lightness or darkness of color and to think such an attribute as belonging to the cross's color; or I can think about the color's saturation, thinking it to be high or low. To be sure, I must have had much experience comparing colors, seeing them ar-




ranged as, for example, they are according to the Munsell system. But having had all this experience and training, just as after a pianist has prac- ticed many etudes, sonatas and concertos he achieves the ability to play the C major scale with smooth legato, I now have the capacity to conceive such attributes, understanding what I am conceiving, and I have the capacity to predicate them in an understanding way.

It may be objected that such concepts of attributes of phenomenal objects are vague, and that therefore one cannot really conceive them in an understanding way with sufficient determinacy to make intuitive knowledge in a strict sense possible. Thus "orange" is a vague concept. There are many borderline cases, between orange and yellow and between orange and red in the circle of hues as well as between a clear orange and its neighbors in the color cone's interior, in which the concept does not enable one to decide whether the hue is or is not a case of orange. Hence there is a certain "defect" in the concept, preventing one from thinking in a fully determinate way. Where there is such conceptual vagueness, the objection continues, one has not in fact achieved a fully intelligible concept, but rather a concept failing in just the kind of intellectual determination which makes predication possible. And where predication fails, the possibility of strict intuitive knowledge fails.

To this we may answer that even if the concept is vague, there are cases to which it definitely applies. Thus, while the concept is indeterminate "around the edges," when one moves "inside" far enough it becomes determinate. In other words, there are clear cases of orange, in which there is no question whether or not the case falls under the concept, and there are clear cases which definitely do not fall under the concept. I am not maintaining that every judgment of color attribution can be known in- tuitively in a strict way, but only that under the right conditions, strict intuitive knowledge is possible. Thus if I have a decidedly orange cross in apprehension, I can judge truly that it is orange, and my concept of orange, being highly determinate for cases of decided orange, is such that the predication of the hue can be made in an understanding way.

But further, suppose that the concept is vague. The vagueness of the concept is no doubt a certain kind of defect, but it is not a defect that stands in the way of the possibility of predication effected understandingly. For I can think a vague concept clearly. By this, the concept remains vague, but its very vagueness is understood. I realize, in predicating by means of the concept, differences between the determinate and the indeterminate cases. Thus, apprehending an object with a hue between definite orange and definite yellow, I am able to judge that it is a fringe-instance of my concept of yellow. I could not do this unless I were employing my concept



CARNAP'S MEANING ANALYSIS 87

of orange in a thinking and understanding way, unless I were quite skillful in my conceptual know-how.

I am able, therefore, to predicate skillfully, judging the subject to possess the attribute. And, being able to refer to the subject understandingly and to predicate the attribute understandingly, I am hence able to think understandingly the propositional content of the judgment, thus fulfilling the second condition for intuitive knowledge.

3. I am able to validate the judgment fully and without remainder. The question here is whether I am able to find in the subject matter which I immediately apprehend full and sufficient evidence to validate my judgment with the strictness necessary for intuitive knowledge. And the answer is that, at least sometimes, I am.

Thus, in the judgment expressed by "This is orange (in hue)" I am able to (a) concentrate upon the orange cross referred to by "this," (b) discern a hue in immediate apprehension, and (c) determine whether this apprehended hue agrees with the intent of the judgment in predicating "orange." There is in this process nothing which is relevant to, or necessary for, determining the truth of the judgment which is lacking. Every aspect of the subject matter with which the judgment is concerned is present and open to observation. The predicated content is understood, and its presence or absence in the subject matter is determinable without inference. Hence I am able to validate my judgment fully and without remainder and with the strictness necessary for intuitive knowledge.

All three conditions for intuitive knowledge are thus satisfied, and I am able to conclude that, at least in a case of this sort, intuitive knowledge is possible.

Received April 24, 1955

A Note on Carnap's Meaning Analysis by RODERICK M. CHISHOLM

BROWN UNIVERSITY

I SHALL offer a reason for saying that the pragmatic meaning analysis, in Carnap's "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages," requires the addition of a psychological, or semantical, term which cannot be defined in the terms which Carnap allows himself.'



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