doe-std-1189-2008, i ntegration of s afety into the d esign p rocess dr. richard englehart, epsilon...

DOE-STD-1189-2008, INTEGRATION OF SAFETY

INTO THE DESIGN PROCESS

Dr. Richard Englehart, Epsilon Systems Solutions

Pranab Guha, HS-21

John Rice, Epsilon Systems Solutions

SAF-280 Integration of Safety into the Design Process, DOE-STD-1189

EXPECTATIONS

I expect safety to be fully integrated into design early in the project. Specifically, by the start of the preliminary design, I expect a hazard analysis of alternatives to be complete and the safety requirements for the design to be established. I expect both project management and safety directives to lead projects on the right path so that safety issues are identified and addressed adequately early in the project design.

– Deputy Secretary of Energy, December 5, 2005

2


PURPOSE

DOE Standard 1189 has been developed to show how project management, engineering design, and safety analyses can interact to successfully implement the Deputy Secretary’s expectations

This course provides the central ideas and themes of 1189 and conveys lessons learned from project implementation of the Standard

3


OVERVIEW OF COURSE

• Safety-in-Design Concepts• Applicability • Project Integration and Planning• Design Process• Hazard and Accident Analyses and Inputs to the Design

Process• Appendices A – C • Facility Modifications• Lessons Learned• Q & A• Case Study

4


INSTRUCTIONAL GOAL

Upon successful completion of this lesson, students will be able to demonstrate a familiarity level knowledge of the background, philosophy, and contents of DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process

5


LESSON OBJECTIVES(SLIDE 1 OF 5)

Lesson Objectives

Explain why DOE-STD-1189 was developed.

Identify the “drivers” that require the use of DOE-STD-1189 for integrating safety into design.

Identify and explain the key concepts introduced by DOE-STD-1189.

Identify and explain the guiding principles for integrating safety into design.

6


LESSON OBJECTIVES (SLIDE 2 OF 5)

Explain the purpose of the DOE Integrated Project Team.

Explain the purpose of the Contractor Integrated Project Team.

Explain the purpose of the Safety Design Integration Team.

Explain how the Safety Design Strategy is developed. Describe its scope, preparation, format, and approval process.

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Describe how the requirements and deliverables identified in DOE-STD-1189 relate to the Project Lifecycle as described in DOE Order 413.3A.

Explain how the Critical Decision Process can be tailored based on project type, risk, size, duration, complexity and selected acquisition strategy.

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Identify and explain the key safety-related activities in each of the phases of a project:

Discuss the purpose and content of the following documents:

– Conceptual Safety Design Report.

– Conceptual Safety Validation Report.

– Preliminary Safety Design Report

– Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

– DOE Safety Evaluation Report

9



Identify common lessons learned from implementing

DOE-STD-1189.

State the purpose of the following appendices in DOE-STD-1189 and explain how each is used in the design process:

– Appendix A, Safety System Design Criteria

– Appendix B, Chemical Hazard Evaluation

– Appendix C, Facility Worker Hazard Evaluation

– Describe the facility modification process using DOE-STD-1189 10


STD-1189 ROADMAP (SLIDE 1 OF 6)

• For all audiences:

– Preface, with the key concepts and guiding principles upon which the Standard was developed,

– Chapter 1, Introduction (background, applicability, must and should) ;

– Chapter 2, Project Integration and Planning; and

– Chapter 3, Safety Considerations for the Design Process, which provides an overall perspective of the Safety-in-Design process through the Critical Decision stages.

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STD-1189 ROADMAP(SLIDE 2 OF 6)

• Project safety personnel and DOE safety reviewers

– Chapter 4, Hazard and Accident Analyses

– Chapter 5, Nuclear Safety Design Criteria

– Chapter 6, Safety Reports

– Appendices A through D,

– Appendix F, Safety-in Design Relationship with the Risk Management Plan

– Appendix G, Hazards Analysis Table Development guides this basic safety-in-design input

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STD-1189 ROADMAP(SLIDE 3 OF 6)

• Project management, both federal and contractor

– Chapter 7, Safety Program and Other Important Project Interfaces

– Appendix E, Safety Design Strategy

– Appendix F, Safety-in-Design Relationship with the Risk Management Plan

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• Project design personnel

– Chapter 5, Nuclear Safety Design Criteria

– Chapter 7, Safety Program and Other Important Project Interfaces

– Appendices A through D, which address safety design classifications for Safety Structures, Systems, and Components (Safety SSCs)

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• Safety Document Preparers and Reviewers

– Appendices H and I provide format and content guidance for the preparation of the Conceptual Safety Design Report (CDSA), Preliminary Safety Design Report (PDSA), and Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA)

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• Project teams for potential major modifications of existing facilities:

– Chapter 8, Additional Safety Integration Considerations for Projects

– Appendix J, Major Modification Determination Examples

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SAFETY-IN-DESIGN BASIC PRECEPTS

• Appropriate and reasonably conservative safety structures, systems, and components are selected early in project designs

• Project cost estimates include these structures, systems, and components

• Project risks associated with safety structures, systems, and component selections are specified for informed risk decision-making by the Project Approval Authorities

17


DEVELOPMENT OF STD-1189 (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Designed to be guided by and consistent with the principles of ISM and the requirements and guidance of DOE O 413.3A

Correlates with the DOE O 413.3A Critical Decision stages and safety design requirements of DOE O 420.1B and associated guidance documents

18


DEVELOPMENT OF STD-1189 (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

• Specifically references 413.3A guidance on

– Mission Need Statements

– Integrated Project Teams

– Project Execution Plans

– Risk Management Plans

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CORRELATION TO ISM CORE FUNCTIONS

Define the work: Mission Need; Alternatives Definition

Analyze the hazards: Conceptual Design and follow on stages, hazards analysis, and design basis accidents

Identify safety controls: Follows from HA and safety classification

Perform the work: Integrate safety in the design process

Feedback and Improvement: Iterative process between design and safety

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SUMMARY OF KEY SAFETY-IN-DESIGN CONCEPTS

(SLIDE 1 OF 4)

Establishment and early involvement of Integrated Project Teams (IPT) and their coordination

Federal and Contractor IPTs; Contractor Safety Design Integration Team (SDIT)

Defining the overall strategy for the project, including how safety integration is to be accomplished, and obtaining DOE approval of the strategy

Safety Design Strategy, derived from DOE safety expectations defined in the pre-conceptual phase, is formalized and approved during conceptual design phase

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(SLIDE 2 OF 4)

Identifying CD-1 as the key point in a project when major safety systems and design parameters should be defined

Focus on high potential cost safety implications: Hazard Category; building and major components seismic design categories; building confinement strategy; fire protection and power supply system classification

Establishing objective criteria for the designation and design of safety structures, systems, and components

STD-1189 Appendices A, B, and C (seismic design basis; collocated worker SSC safety classifications; in-facility worker safety classifications)

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(SLIDE 3 OF 4)

A conservative front-end approach to safety-in-design that is reflected by a “risk and opportunities” assessment

Conservative approach early-on based on assumptions and incomplete information: input to project risk management plan (Risk and Opportunities Assessment) and information for cost estimates

Identifying key project interfaces (physical and programmatic) that affect design decisions

Project Interfaces: e.g., site infrastructure, security, waste management, emergency preparedness, DNFSB

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(SLIDE 4 OF 4)

Ongoing involvement of DOE in safety-in-design decisions

Safety Design Strategy (SDS)

Conceptual and Preliminary Safety Design Reports (CSDR, PSDR)

Preliminary Documented Safety Design Analysis (PDSA)

Related DOE reviews and approvals

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GUIDING PRINCIPLES (SLIDE 1 OF 3)

Derived from DOE O 420.1B, DOE O 413.3A, and their associated Guides

1. Use of O 420.1B and clearly articulated strategies to satisfy requirements

2. Control selection strategy order of preference

3. Following the design codes and standards in O 420’s associated Guides

4. Use of risk and opportunities assessments

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5. Conservative early project safety decisions input to cost/schedule

6. CD packages describe safety decisions

7. Project team includes appropriate expertise

8. Safety personnel involved from onset of project planning

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9. Important safety functions addressed during conceptual design

10.SDIT invokes the safety-in-design process

11. All stakeholder issues identified early and addressed

12.Bases for safety related decisions are documented

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APPLICABILITY

The Standard applies to the design and construction of:

– New DOE hazard category (HC) 1, 2, and 3

nuclear facilities

– Major modifications to DOE HC 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities (as defined by 10 CFR 830)

– Other modifications to DOE HC 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities managed under the requirements of DOE O 413.3A

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SAFETY AND DESIGN INTEGRATION

Project Integration and Planning

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KEY COMPONENTS OF PROJECT INTEGRATION AND PLANNING

• Federal Integrated Project Team

• Contractor Integrated Project Team

• Safety Design Integration Team

• Safety Design Strategy

• Risk and Opportunities Assessments

• DOE and Contractor Roles and Responsibilities

Saf

ety

Des

ign

Pro

ject Man

agem

ent

Interfaces

Safety-in-Design

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SAF-280 Integration of Safety into the Design Process, DOE-STD-1189 31

RELATIONSHIPS OF MAJOR PROJECT ENTITIES

Acquisition Executive

DOE SBAA/SBRT

Contractor IPT

Engineering

Design

Safety Analysis

SDIT

Contractor ProjectManager

DOE Program Manager

Federal IPTFederal Project

Director

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FEDERAL INTEGRATED PROJECT TEAM(SLIDE 1 OF 3)

FPD leads an IPT with representation necessary for project success

FPD and IPTs must aggressively lead the project (not passively monitor and review)

IPT formally established at CD-1 (really needs to be established at the beginning of Conceptual design)

Roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Federal IPT are provided in DOE G 413.3-18, Integrated Project Teams Guide for Use with DOE O 413.3A

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FEDERAL INTEGRATED PROJECT TEAM (SLIDE 2 OF 3)

From DOE G 413.3-18: The IPT is the primary tool for breaking down the

walls that can exist between different organizations, different professions, and different levels within the different organizations’ command structures. A successful IPT brings these diverse elements together to form a unit that willingly shares information, balances conflicting priorities and ideologies, and jointly plans and executes the project mission. (¶ 2.2)

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FEDERAL INTEGRATED PROJECT TEAM (SLIDE 3 OF 3)

From DOE G 413.3-18 (Continued): The initial requirement imposed upon the IPT by

DOE O 413.3A is to support the FPD by providing individual expertise to fill the voids in his or her knowledge base in the areas of planning and implementing the project… (¶ 2.4.1)

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WHAT IS THE CONTRACTOR INTEGRATED PROJECT TEAM?

Standard 1189 encourages the formation of the Contractor IPT; similar makeup to Federal IPT

Comprised of personnel who ensure integration of mission need, safety analysis, and design

Diversity of expertise is essential

Project process understanding very helpful

Strong upper management support to IPT members

Need consistency and longevity of team members

Team formed after approval of CD-0

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Typical Contractor IPT Representation

Facility Owner/Operator

Funding Organization

Project Management

Health, Safety, and Radiation Protection

Nuclear Safety

Engineering

Waste Management

Procurement

Safeguards and Security (as needed)

Quality Assurance

Computing, Communications and Networking

DOE Representative

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CONTRACTOR IPT KEY POINTS (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Parallel management functions as the Federal IPT, but from the contractor’s perspective

Safety Design Integration Team (SDIT) directly supports the CIPT, and through it, the Federal IPT

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CONTRACTOR IPT KEY POINTS (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Lesson Learned:

Biggest challenge for the CIPT/SDIT is to assure active and effective communications between engineering design activities and safety analysis activities

Especially true when they are not collocated

Failure to support the iterative interactions between safety analysis and design is equivalent to failure to implement the processes of STD-1189

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WHAT IS THE SAFETY DESIGN INTEGRATION TEAM (SDIT)?

• Provides working-level integration of safety into design for the project

• Usually composed of subset of Contractor IPT plus other specialties as needed

• Core team

– Safety

– Design

– Operations (including maintenance)

• Additional composition depends on the hazards, safety, and security issues

Operations

SafetyDesign

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SDIT OBJECTIVES

• Ensure integration of safety in design by adherence to the key concepts and guiding principles of DOE-STD-1189

• Document the bases for all safety in design decisions

• Maintain consistency of and configuration management between safety and design work

• Resolve initial uncertainties and assumptions for safety in design

• Achieve consensus and approvals for direction of safety in design progress

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SDIT FUNCTIONS (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Timely communications with and support to CIPT and IPT

Conduct Risk and Opportunities Assessment (input to RMP)

Draft safety documents (CSDR, PSDR, PDSA)

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SDIT Functions (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Ensure the iterative safety/engineering design process is effective and that the identified safety functions:

Lead to selection of controls that are adequate to serve the safety functions and are consistent with operational needs

Are classified appropriately

Are accommodated in project cost and schedule estimates

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SDIT Best Practices

SDIT should have a charter

– Define membership (core team and SMEs)

– Designate lead

– Define roles and responsibilities

– Specify required training for members

SDIT should use formal processes

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SAFETY DESIGN STRATEGY (SDS) (SLIDE 1 OF 3)

“…must be developed for all projects subject to this Standard.” (¶ 2.3)• Developed from CD-0 definition of DOE

expectations for execution of safety during design

• Prepared by SDIT; reviewed by DOE Safety Basis Review Team (SBRT); approved by Federal Project Director and Safety Basis Approval Authority (SBAA)

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SAFETY DESIGN STRATEGY (SDS) (SLIDE 2 OF 3)

• Is a living document, updated throughout the project stages as needed

• Provides the mechanism by which all elements of the project and approval authorities can agree on basic safety in design approaches

• Single source for project safety policies, philosophies, major safety requirements, and safety goals to maintain alignment of safety with the design basis during project evolution

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SAFETY DESIGN STRATEGY (SLIDE 3 OF 3)

Addresses:

– Guiding philosophies or assumptions to be used to develop the design

– Safety-in-design and safety goal considerations for the project

– Approach to developing the overall safety design basis for the project

– Significant discipline interfaces affecting safety

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SDS UPDATES

Focus is on those major safety decisions that influence project cost (e.g., seismic design criteria, confinement ventilation, safety functional classification, and strategy)

Provide a means by which all parties are kept informed of and agree with important changes due to safety in design evolution between Critical Decision points

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SDS FORMAT(SEE APPENDIX E)

1. Purpose

2. Description of the Project

3. Safety Strategy

3.1 Safety guidance and requirements

3.2 Hazard identification

3.3 Key safety decisions

4. Risks to Project Decisions

5. Safety analysis approach and plans

6. SDIT – Interfaces and integration

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Risk Assessment

DOE O 413.3A CD-1 requirement: “Prepare a preliminary Project Execution Plan, including a Risk Management Plan (RMP) and Risk Assessment… “ (Table 2)

Risk management strategies must address

- All technical uncertainties (including schedule and cost implications)

- Establishment of design margins

- Increased technical oversight requirements

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RISK AND OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT

(R & OA) (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

DOE-STD-1189 Risk and Opportunities Assessment is:

Required by the Order and the Standard and

Provides the safety-related input to the Project Risk Management Plan

Purpose is to recognize and manage risks of proceeding at early stages of design on the basis of incomplete knowledge or assumptions regarding safety issues

50


RISK AND OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT (R & OA)

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

SDIT prepares R & OA and updates it throughout the project phases

Reviewed by IPT and DOE Safety Basis Review Team and approved by the Federal Project Director

Discussed in DOE STD-1189 Appendix F

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EXAMPLE RISK AREAS (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Technical

Uncertain seismic requirements (seismic geotechnical investigation)

SSC classifications (safety and seismic)

Interfaces with site infrastructure and boundaries of safety SSCs with them

Undefined, incomplete, unclear safety functions and requirements

New or undecided technology

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EXAMPLE RISK AREAS (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Programmatic Level:

Interfaces with other facilities (inputs and outputs)

Coordination between design and safety organizations (if different)

Implications of less than optimum dedicated IPT support for FPD

Including ability to actively manage risks, including programmatic

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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Product/Document

Responsibility Interface with

Other Documents/

ProductsPrepare Review Approve

SDS SDIT IPT and SBRT FPD and SBAADOE

expectations in Mission

Need Statement

R&OA SDIT IPT and SBRT FPD Input to RMP

CSDR SDIT IPT and SBRT Via CSVR CDR

CSVR SBRT IPT SBAA with FPD Concurrence

CSDR and CDR

PSDR SDIT IPT and SBRT Via PSVRPreliminary

Design54


ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Product/Document

Responsibility Interface with

Other Documents/Produ

ctsPrepare Review Approve

PSVR SBRT IPT SBAA with FPD Concurrence

PSDR

PDSA SDITIPT and SBRT

Via SER Final Design

SER SBRT IPT SBAA with FPD Concurrence

PDSA

DSA and TSR

SDIT and Operations

Team

IPT and SBRT Via SERPDSA

TSR is based on the DSA.

SER SBRT SBAA DSA and TSR55


WHAT PARTS OF THE STANDARD ARE MANDATORY?

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Originating with STD-1189– Safety Design Strategy

– Risk and Opportunities Assessment

– CSDR and PSDR (and DOE reviews)

– Appendix A seismic design basis and collocated worker safety significant SSC criteria

– Major Modification Determination (documented in SDS)

– Key Concepts and Guiding Principles (for full implementation of STD-1189)

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WHAT PARTS OF THE STANDARD ARE MANDATORY?

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Derivative 10 CFR 830.206: PDSA; design criteria of O 420.1B

DOE O 413.3A Chg. 1: requires implementation of STD-1189

DOE O 420.1B: nuclear safety, fire safety, criticality, NPH

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Safety and Design Integration DOE-STD-1189-2008

Design Process by Project Phase

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PROJECT LIFECYCLEP

re-P

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Pla

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re-C

once

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Con

cept

ual

Pre

limin

ary

Des

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Fin

al D

esig

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Con

stru

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rnov

er/A

ccep

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Ope

ratio

ns

CD-0 CD-1 CD-2 CD-3 CD-4

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PRE-CONCEPTUAL PHASE

• Objective is to identify and assess a program gap and then to propose a project to close the mission related performance gap

• Analysis focus:– Special Safety Requirements– New facility or modification– Available technology– Process material inputs and outputs– Upper level facility functions

– Results in the development of Mission Need which becomes a baseline document in the project if CD-0 is granted

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SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN PRE-CONCEPTUAL PHASE

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Assign project safety lead (establishes continuity)

Initial assessment of project safety issues

Identify top level hazards (including process inputs and

outputs)

Determine preliminary hazard categorization

Identify unique constraints affecting project safety

approach

Develop DOE expectations for safety activities

61


DEVELOP DOE EXPECTATIONS FOR EXECUTION OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Examples:

Anticipated safety issues/hazards and goal (if any) for hazard category

(Can affect process capacity through MAR limits; can affect issues regarding criticality hazards; could affect siting)

Potential need for improvements in site infrastructure to support facility safety systems (an interface issue that might expand scope of the project)

62


DEVELOP DOE EXPECTATIONS FOR EXECUTION OF SAFETY ACTIVITIES

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Potential need for geotechnical studies

Expectations regarding confinement strategy

Project tailoring (e.g., PDSA only for a major mod)

Anticipated need for exceptions to O 420.1B and associated guides

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SAF-280 Integration of Safety into the Design Process, DOE-STD-1189 64

PRE-CONCEPTUAL PHASECD-0, Establish Mission Need

Pro

ject

E

ngin

eerin

gP

rogr

am a

nd P

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ct

Man

agem

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Saf

ety

Des

ign

Bas

is Identify Safety Hazards

3.1Pre-conceptual

Hazards Analysis and Categorization

3.1

Safety in Design Tailoring Strategy

3.1

DOE Expectations for Safety in

Design3.1

Mission Needs Statement

Program Requirements

Document (NNSA only)

Mission Requirements

Initial Alternatives

Analysis

CD-0 Approval

A


Identify Important Project Interfaces

Criticality

Quality Assurance

Fire Protection

Emergency Management

Human Factors

Site Infrastructure

Worker Safety and Health (10 CFR 851)

Radiological Protection

Hazardous Waste Management

Safeguards and Security

Transportation

Environmental Protection

Coordination with the DOE SBRT

65


CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PHASE

Goal for safety-in-design in this phase is to evaluate alternative design concepts, prepare the SDS, and provide a conservative design basis for the preferred concept

Perform sufficient analysis to make informed safety decisions for this phase

Document risks and opportunities for selections including cost and schedule range impacts

Begin considerations of quality requirements, Quality Assurance Program (QAP) established

(This phase is the best opportunity for safety analysis to cost-effectively influence design)

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CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PHASEPre-CD-1, Conceptual Design

Proj

ect E

ngin

eerin

gSa

fety

Des

ign

Basi

sPr

ogra

m a

nd P

roje

ct

Man

agem

ent

Identify Project Functional and

Operational Requirements

Safety in Design Considerations

3.2

Project Alternative Analysis

Recommended Alternative(s)

DOE O 420.1 Nuclear Safety Design Criteria

5.0

CDR

Safety Design Strategy

2.3

Preliminary Hazards Analysis

4.2CSDR

4.2

Facility-Level DBA Unmitigated

Analysis4.2

Specify Safety Functions &

Classifications4.2

Conceptual Safety Validation Report

Preliminary Security

Vulnerability Assessment

Risk Management Plan

Project Cost/Schedule Range

Estimates

Conceptual Design Package Submittal

Alternative Selection Approval & Cost/Schedule

Range Established

Project Risk Considerations

Safety in Design Risk and

Opportunities Assessment

3.2

Required Technical Studies

Identification

Conceptual Design for Recommended

Alternative(s)

Design Reviews (Fed and/or

Contractor, as appropriate)

CD-0 Approval

Update SDS, as needed

2.3

A

CD-1 Approval

B

B


KEY SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES(SLIDE 1 OF 3)

Form Integrated Project Teams (both DOE and Contractor) and SDIT

Develop Preliminary Security Vulnerability Assessment

Develop Preliminary Fire Hazards Analysis

Develop Safety Design Strategy

Establish Configuration Management

68


KEY SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES (SLIDE 2 OF 3)

Evaluate alternatives and provide recommendations

Assess risks and opportunities as input to the Risk Management Plan

Develop preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) for recommended alternative

– Define safety functions

– Identify high-cost safety systems

– Initiate hazard analysis data capture (Appendix G)

69


KEY SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

(SLIDE 3 OF 3)

Identify facility-level design basis accidents (DBAs)

– Bounding consequences

– Safety and seismic classification

Commit to nuclear safety design requirements (DOE O 420.1B) and place under design control

Develop Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR)

Maintain project interfaces focus (see Ch 7 of STD-1189)

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CONCEPTUAL SAFETY DESIGN REPORT (CSDR)

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Document and establish a preliminary inventory of hazardous materials

Establish a preliminary hazard categorization

Identify and analyze facility-level DBAs

Assess the need for facility-level hazard controls (safety SSCs)

71


CONCEPTUAL SAFETY DESIGN REPORT (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Preliminary assessment of appropriate seismic design bases (facility structure and SSCs)

Evaluate security hazards that can impact the safety design basis

Commitment to nuclear safety design criteria

Format and content of CSDR in Appendix H

72


CONCEPTUAL SAFETY VALIDATION REPORT (CSVR)

CSVR prepared to confirm an appropriately conservative basis to proceed to preliminary design, based on:– preliminary hazard categorization of the facility– preliminary identification of facility DBAs– assessment of the need for SC and SS facility-level hazard

controls– preliminary assessment of the appropriate seismic design

bases– position(s) taken with respect to compliance with the safety

design criteria of DOE O 420.1B

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PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE

Pre- CD-2, Preliminary Design

Saf

ety

Des

ign

Bas

isP

roje

ct E

ngin

eerin

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rogr

am a

nd P

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Man

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CD-1 Approval

Initiate Preliminary Design

Update Security Vulnerability Assessment

Update Risk Management Plan

Establish Technical, Cost, & Schedule Baseline

CD-2 Preliminary Design Package

Identify Detailed Nuclear Safety Design Criteria DOE O 420.1

5.0Validate Design

vs. Desired Control Functions

& Criteria3.3

Develop Design Output Documents

Design Reviews (Fed and/or

Contractor, as appropriate)

Hazards Analysis4.3

System Level DBA Unmitigated

Analysis4.3

Update Safety SSC Functions

and Classification4.3

PSDR4.3

Preliminary Safety Validation Report

DOE Approves Technical, Cost, & Schedule Baseline

Update Safety in Design Risk & Opportunities Assessment

3.3

Baseline Validation

Independent Review

Updated SDS, as needed

2.3

Update Project Risk

Considerations

CD-2 Approval


PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE

Advance conceptual design toward final design

Evolve the Hazard Analysis (HA) to include process level HA

Develop design-specific solutions based on safety design requirements

Prepare for final design

Complete NEPA documentation by end of design phase

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SAFETY ACTIVITIES IN PRELIMINARY DESIGN

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Update Security Vulnerability Assessment

Update hazard analysis (HA) to address process level hazards based on the selected design

Evaluate and apply DOE O 420.1B and associated guides

Evolve system-level DBAs with appropriate added specificity based on selected design

76


SAFETY ACTIVITIES IN PRELIMINARY DESIGN

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Update Risk and Opportunity Assessment

Update SDS reflecting design and safety evolution

Develop the Preliminary Safety Design Report (PSDR)

77


PRELIMINARY SAFETY DESIGN REPORT(PSDR)

Developed to demonstrate safety adequacy of the preliminary design effort

Limited to the extent that design information is also limited

Format and content guide in DOE STD 1189 Appendix I

DOE prepares Preliminary Safety Validation Report (PSVR) to approve PSDR, similar to (CSVR) in purpose and scope

78


SAFETY ACTIVITIES IN FINAL DESIGN

Update and finalize preliminary safety in design analyses, information and documentation

Update Risk and Opportunity Assessment (as needed)

Update SDS reflecting design and safety evolution (as needed)

Develop Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

DOE prepares a Safety Evaluation Report

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FINAL DESIGN PHASE Pre - CD -3, Final Design

Safe

ty D

es i

gn B

asis

Pro

ject

Eng

inee

r ing

Prog

ram

and

Pro

ject

M

anag

em

ent

CD- 2 Approval

Initiate Final Design

Update Security Vulnerability Analysis

Update Risk Management Plan

Baseline Management

CD-3 Final Design Package

Validate Design vs. Desired

Control Functions & Criteria

3. 4

Develop Design Output Documents

Design Reviews ( Fed and/ or Contractor, as appropriate )

Update Hazards Analysis

4.4

Mitigated Accident Analysis 4 .4

Update Safety SSC Functions

and Classification4.4

PDSA4 .4

Safety Evaluation Report

DOE Authorizes Procurement ,

Construction , & Final

Implementation

Update Safety in Design Risk & Opportunities Assessment

3 .4

Execution Readiness

Independent Review

Updated SDS, as needed

2 .3

Update Project Risk

Considerations

CD- 3 Approval

Construction, Transition , &

Closeout7 .0


FINAL DESIGN PHASE

Finalizes HA and DBAs (mitigated analysis)

Evolves the preliminary design to the point where

– Specifications are developed

– Security Vulnerability Assessment is finalized

– Procurement and construction can be accomplished

– Test, inspection, and commissioning requirements are developed and detailed

– System Design Descriptions (SDD) and Facility Design Description (FDD) are completed

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PRELIMINARY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS (PDSA)

Evolves from the PSDR

Completes the analysis of the design

Format and content covered in Appendix I

– Based on DOE-STD-3009 format

– Minimizes need to rewrite for DSA

Provides the basis for design adequacy with respect to safety

Change control of PDSA is established

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CONSTRUCTION ,TRANSITION, AND CLOSEOUT PHASE DESIGN RELATED

ISSUES

Field Changes

Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and other equipment not part of primary design

Revisions to PDSA

Changes to comply with readiness review issues

Input to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR)

83


CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PDSA REVISION

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

The change:

- alters a safety function for a safety SSC identified in the current PDSA

- results in a change in the functional classification, reliability, or rigor of the design standard for an SSC previously specified in the PDSA configuration baseline

84


CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PDSA REVISION

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

• requires implementation of new or changed safety SSC or proposed TSR controls

• significantly alters the process design or its bases, such as increased material at risk, changes to seismic spectra, major changes to process control software logic, new tanks, new piping, new pumps, or different process chemistry

85


Safety and Design Interactions

Hazard and Accident Analyses and Inputs to the Design Process

86


Hazard and Accident Analysis:Initial Information Needed

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Facility site/location

General arrangement drawings

MAR estimates or assumptions and material flow balances

Sizing of major process system containers, tanks, piping

87


Hazard and Accident Analysis:Initial Information Needed

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Process block flow diagrams for:

– Ventilation

– Electrical power

– Special mechanical handling equipment (e.g., gloveboxes)

– Instrumentation and control (I&C) system architecture

Summary process design description and sequence

Confinement strategy

88


Hazard and Accident Analysis (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

At conceptual design stage (facility level analyses)

- Building structure

- Building and process confinement

- Power systems, including Safety Class single failure criteria

- Fire protection provisions

- Special mechanical equipment (e.g., gloveboxes)

Initial focus on high-cost safety functions and design requirements

89


Hazard and Accident Analysis (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

At preliminary and final design stages

- Update and refine conceptual design analyses

- Extend to process and activity level and safety functions and SSCs

90


Hazard and Accident Analysis:

Accident Types to Consider

Fires

Explosions

Loss of confinement/containment

Process upsets (starting in preliminary design)

Natural Phenomena Hazards

Design basis accidents (for the accident types)

Beyond design basis accidents (starting in preliminary design)

91


Hazard and Accident Analysis:Outputs to Engineering Design

For Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs), based on DOE O 420.1B safety design requirements

- Performance Categories (wind, flood, etc.)

- Seismic Design Basis

- Safety Class functions

- Safety Significant functions

- Defense in depth /Important to Safety (ITS) safety functions

Design codes and standards from Guides associated with DOE O 420.1B

92


HAZARD ANALYSIS AND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS (DBAS)

AT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN

Simple DBAs are postulated based on facility level upsets involving limiting quantities of MAR and facility layout

Unmitigated consequences are assessed to help establish both needed safety function and safety classification of that function

These accidents are analyzed for both collocated workers and public impact; they are to help define safety functional and design requirements

DBAs are refined and expanded upon in later stages of project

93


HAZARD ANALYSIS (HA) AT THE PROCESS LEVEL

HA and design iteration– HA activities support identification of safety functions and

selection of DBAs– Includes consideration of in-facility workers– DBAs and safety functions support design selection and

associated design criteria– Design selection / criteria support development of a refined

HA for the PSDR– Several iterations may be necessary as preliminary design

progresses– Hazard Analysis table updated as necessary

94


Design Basis Accidents in Preliminary Design

The Design Basis Accidents (DBAs):– Refined from Conceptual Design based on system design

– Provide input for new or revised design criteria

– Establish system-level safety classification

DBAs are selected based on safety function and magnitude of hazard– Consider public and collocated worker consequences

95


SAFETY INTERFACE WITH DESIGN (SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Assist designers in understanding and addressing

– Safety requirements from hazards and accident analyses

– Safety implications associated with design alternatives and trade studies

– Safety interpretation of DOE O 420.1B and DOE G 420.1-1 requirements and recommendations

96


SAFETY INTERFACE WITH DESIGN(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Safety input into System Design Descriptions (SDD)

– System boundaries

– Safety functions and requirements

– Supporting analyses (safety SSCs can provide safety function when called upon)

Project design reviews

– Include safety design basis information and information included in design products (e.g., SDDs)

97


WHEN TO COMMUNICATEBETWEEN

DESIGN AND SAFETY

Factor Engineering Design Safety

Potential Accident Scenarios

• Changes in facility or process layout• Barriers to accident propagation established, changed, or

removed (e.g., fire barriers, separation of hazardous materials)

• Introduction of new sources of energy or hazard (e.g., chemical, mechanical, kinetic, potential, flammable, explosive)

Effect of any design factor where change:

• Introduces a new accident scenario

• alters a safety function for an SSC

• results in a change in safety functional classification, reliability, or design standards

• requires a new safety SSC or implies a new TSR control

• significantly alters process design or its basis

Material at Risk (MAR)• Tank Size• Process details (e.g., inventory in gloveboxes)• Total facility inventory, including all hazardous materials

Damage Ratio (DR) Facility and/or process layout, including fire barriers

Airborne Release Fraction MAR material type and form (gaseous, powder, solid)

Leakpath Factor (LPF)• Physical barriers to release of hazardous materials• Building seismic design basis (SDB: Seismic Design

Category/Limit State (SDC/LS))

Chi over Q (X/Q) • Location change• Definition of site boundary

98


QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMACTIVITIES FOR DESIGN PROCESS

Establish formal work processes (document control, verification processes, configuration management)

Training on standards, requirements, work processes

Periodic assessments of documentation

Independent design verifications, validations, assessments

Controlling documents and drawings and changes to them to approved processes

Identifying and controlling design interfaces

99


SAFETY AND DESIGN INTEGRATION DOE-STD-1189-2008

Appendix A – Safety System Design Criteria

100


Purpose of Appendix A

Provides objective criteria requirements for specification of the seismic design basis and for safety classifications of safety SSCs

Seismic design basis includes specification of seismic design category (SDC) and limit state (LS) for a safety SSC based on radiological hazards

Adds collocated worker Safety Significant radiological classification criterion along with Safety Class criterion for the public

101


Seismic Design Basis

Applies recently published national standards for seismic design of non-reactor nuclear facilities

ANSI/ANS 2.26-2004, Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems and Components for Seismic Design; and

ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities.

102


Seismic Design Standards

ANSI/ANS 2.26 provides seismic design bases (SDC and LS) for safety SSCs based on unmitigated radiological dose (as modified by DOE) to collocated workers and to the public and on the safety function of the safety SSC.

ASCE/SEI 43-05 provides the design criteria to use with the seismic design basis (SDB)

103


Seismic Design Criteria

* Using the safety classification methodology for public and collocated workers

** If the public dose for SDC-3 is exceeded significantly for any project (between one and two orders of magnitude), then the possibility that SDC-4 should be invoked must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Unmitigated Consequence of SSC Failure from a Seismic Event

Category Collocated Worker* Public*

SDC-1 Dose < 5 rem Not applicable – Defaults to SDC-1

SDC-2 5 rem < dose < 100 rem 5 rem < Dose < 25 rem

SDC-3 100 rem < dose 25 rem < dose**

104


LIMIT STATES (EXAMPLES FROM ANS 2.26)

SSC Type Limit State A Limit State B Limit State C Limit State D

Building structural components

Substantial loss of SSC stiffness; some margin against collapse

Some loss of SSC stiffness; substantial margin against collapse

SSC retains nearly full stiffness and strength; passive components will perform normal and safety functions

SSC damage is negligible

Structures or vessels for containing hazardous material

Low hazardous material; vessel not likely to be repairable

Moderate hazardous liquids; cleanup and repair expeditious

Low pressure vessels with worker hazard if contents released; damage minor

Leak tightness must be assured; moderate to high hazard gases/liquids

Other SSCs covered include: confinement barriers (glove boxes, ducts), equipment support structures, filter assemblies and housings, etc.

105


COMPARISON OF SDB TO PERFORMANCE CATEGORY

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8

1A

1B

1C

2A

2B

3A

3B

3C

3D

4A

4B

4C

4D

5A

5B

5C

5D

Sei

smic

Des

ign

Bas

is

Seismic Ruggedness Factor

PC-4

PC-3

PC-2

PC-1

106


SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE FOR ANS 2.26 WHEN SELECTING SDCS

AND LIMIT STATES (SDB)

Safety analyst, seismic design engineer and the equipment design engineer evaluate the functional requirements for the safety SSC and its subcomponents to determine the appropriate Seismic Design Basis (SDB).

If the safety functions of a safety SSC include confinement and leak tightness, a Limit State C or D must be selected.

Guidance is provided for an SDC-1 or SDC-2 SSC having safety functions requiring Limit States A, B, C or D.

107


SAFETY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY:

PUBLIC PROTECTION

The guidance of DOE G 421.1-2 and DOE-STD-3009, Appendix A, should be used in classifying SSCs as Safety Class (SC) for radiological protection

– The words “challenging” or “in the rem range” in those documents should be interpreted as radiological doses equal to or greater than 5 rem, but less than 25 rem

– In this range (5 to 25 rem), SC designation should be considered, and the rationale for the decision to classify an SSC as SC or not should be explained and justified

108


SAFETY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY:

COLLOCATED WORKER PROTECTION

Use unmitigated accident analysis source term guidance in DOE-STD-3009, Appendix A, Section A.3.2 and DOE G 420.1-1

Use dose of 100 REM TEDE at 100 m

Use ICRP 68 dose conversion factors

Apply X/Q value at 100 m of 3.5E-3 sec/m3 for the dispersion calculation

109


BACKFIT FOR MAJOR MODIFICATIONS

For major modifications of existing facilities, Appendix A criteria are applicable

Backfit analyses should examine:

– The need to upgrade interfacing structures, systems, and components in accordance with these criteria, and

– Whether there should be relief for the modification from the design requirements that application of these criteria in design would imply

110


ADDITIONAL NOTES

ANS 2.27, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments, and ANS 2.29, Probabilistic Seismic Hazards Analysis, have been completed and approved

DOE plans to adopt them and to update DOE G 420.1-2 (Natural Phenomena Hazard guide)

111



Appendix B, Chemical Hazard Evaluation

112


PURPOSE OF APPENDIX B

DOE is not invoking mandatory classification of safety SSCs or specifying nuclear design requirements based on chemical hazards alone, but the Standard does provide advisory chemical safety criteria.

The guidance provides a sense of scale as to what is meant by a “significant exposure” in the criterion for classifying SSCs as safety significant.

Note: DNFSB has advised DOE to consider the need to effectively implement controls for chemical hazards, including guidance on the design of hazard controls (ref. letter dated 2/22/08, Dr. Eggenberger to Mr. Sell).

113


CONTENT OF APPENDIX B

Guidance for consideration of Safety Significant designation of SSCs for significant chemical exposures is based on a process of:

– Screening chemicals (hazardous materials) to determine those that may have the potential to immediately threaten or endanger collocated workers or the public and

– Evaluating the severity of potential exposures against advisory classification criteria for collocated workers and the public

Note: Chemical exposure for facility workers is addressed in Appendix C.

114


APPENDIX B METHODOLOGY

Methods for estimating chemical exposures are detailed in Appendix B

Unmitigated chemical consequence analysis should use reasonably conservative values for the parameters related to material release, dispersal in the environment and health consequences

It is desirable to reduce any tendency toward over-conservatism to achieve the risk-informed balance in the design of the SSCs

115


ADVISORY CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SIGNIFICANT CLASSIFICATION

Public – Exposure > AEGL-2/ERPG-2/TEEL-2

(Potential for irreversible or serious long-lasting health effects)

Collocated Worker– Exposure > AEGL-3/ERPG-3/TEEL-3

(Potential for life threatening health effects or death)

Hierarchy– AEGL, ERPG, TEEL

116


ADDITIONAL NOTES

DNFSB issue on design guidance for Safety Significant SSCs is being addressed:

– in a new draft DOE standard implementing ANSI/ISA-84.00.01(ISA-84), Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector,

– by a revision to DOE G 420.1-1.

NNSA and EM each have issued guidance for Natural Phenomena Hazard (NPH) classification based on chemical hazard levels to the public and to workers

117


EM CHEMICAL HAZARD NPH GUIDANCE

Reference: 4/15/09 memo from Owendoff on Implementation of DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process for Environmental Management Activities

– Note: also addresses non-seismic NPH

– For chemical hazards, use Appendix A X/Q unless heavy gases or high wind/tornados are involved

– Criteria of Appendix B will be applied for safety significant designation and PC-3 designation, subject to cost/benefit analysis and consultation with EM HQ

Consult the referenced document for details

118


NNSA CHEMICAL HAZARD NPH GUIDANCE

(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Reference: 7/9/2009 memo from D’Agostino to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs (and others), Guidance and Expectations for DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, Natural Phenomena Hazard Design Basis Criteria for Chemical Hazard Safety Structures and Components

– Note: also addresses non seismic NPH

– Guidance mandatory for projects not yet in preliminary design (July, 2009)

119


NNSA CHEMICAL HAZARD NPH GUIDANCE

(SLIDE 2 OF 2)

– Appendix B criteria suggested for use for safety significant classification and initial categorization of SDC-3 or PC-3 (rad and non-rad)

• SDC-2 or PC-2 may be justified based on technical or cost/benefit considerations with approval of Acquisition Executive

– Similar guidance for in-facility worker protection (SDC-3 or PC-3) when it is necessary for them to remain in the facility after an accident for safety related purposes

– Appendix C criteria suggested to be used for safety significant classification for in-facility workers

Consult the referenced document for details

120



Appendix C – Facility Worker Hazard Evaluation

121


HAZARD ANALYSIS

A qualitative evaluation of unmitigated consequence to the facility worker (FW) considering:

- energetic releases of radiological or toxic chemical materials where the FW would be unable to take self-protective actions;

- deflagrations or explosions where serious injury or death to a FW may result;

- chemical or thermal burns to a FW that could reasonably cover a significant portion of the FW’s body; and

- leaks from process systems where asphyxiation of a FW normally present may result.

122


SIGNIFICANT EXPOSURE

For radiological consequences, the suggested evaluation criterion is 100 rem TEDE.

For chemical exposure, the evaluation criterion is AEGL-3 or equivalent (e.g., ERPG-3, TEEL-3).

123


QUALITATIVE RESULTS

By comparing the qualitatively derived FW radiological or chemical consequence to these evaluation criteria, an assessment can then be made about the need for SS preventive or mitigative controls.

Where the qualitative consequence assessment yields a result that is not clearly above or below the evaluation criteria, then the need for SS FW controls shall be more closely considered by the project.

124



Facility Modifications

125


Facility Modifications

The process for integration of safety into the design of facility modifications is similar to that for new facilities, but it is tailored to the scope, magnitude, and complexity of the modification.

126

127

FACILITY MODIFICATION PROCESS

Facility Modification

Evaluate Need For PDSA

Major Modification Involved?

YN

Develop SDS

- Address need for CD phases/CSDR/PSDR- Graded PDSA- 420.1 Design Criteria- Interface with existing facility /construction

Does 413.3 Apply?

Y

N

Tailor Per 413.3

Integrate With Existing Facility

Does 413.3Apply?

Y

N

Tailor Per 413.3

Change Control Process

- SDS-Safety Documentation- CSDR/PSDR/PDSA not required

- Possible SB Amendment

Screening CriterionDesign & Implementationof Physical Modification?

Execute SDS

Execute SDS

Simple Modification?

Y

N

- New / revised HA not required- New / revised accident analysis not required- New / revised controls not required- Changes to SB, if needed, are descriptive only


MAJOR MODIFICATION DEFINITION AND IMPLICATIONS

As defined by 10 CFR 830.3, major modifications are those that “substantially change the existing safety basis for the facility.”

A major modification requires the development of a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) (830.206) and approval of the PDSA by DOE (830.207) prior to procurement or construction of the modification

128


EVALUATING MODIFICATIONS(SLIDE 1 OF 2)

Simple modifications - existing hazard analysis is adequate for the modification; hazard controls adequately address the modification and associated activities; implementing the existing change control processes is adequate to support the proposed change.

129


EVALUATING MODIFICATIONS (SLIDE 2 OF 2)

Note that a simple modification or a less-than-major modification might invoke DOE O 413.3A, and therefore STD-1189, under cost criteria. In those cases, a Safety Design Strategy (SDS) is required, wherein the bases for the modification classification must be described. The SDS also provides the mechanism for tailoring the application of STD-1189.

130


DETERMINING A MAJOR MODIFICATION

It is important to determine the need for a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) as early as feasible in planning for a modification.

In many situations, the need for a PDSA may be readily discernable with little or no detailed evaluation required.

The Standard establishes criteria for evaluating the need for a PDSA. If a PDSA is warranted, the facility modification is a Major Modification.

131


MAJOR MODIFICATION CRITERIA(SLIDE 1OF 2)

Add a new building or facility with a material inventory > HC 3 limits or increase the HC of an existing facility?

Change the footprint of an existing HC 1, 2 or 3 facility with the potential to adversely impact any SC or SS safety function or associated SSC?

Change an existing process or add a new process resulting in the need for a safety basis change requiring DOE approval?

132


MAJOR MODIFICATION CRITERIA(SLIDE 1OF 2)

Utilize new technology or Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) not currently in use or not previously formally reviewed and approved by DOE for the affected facility?

Create the need for new or revised Safety SSCs?

Involve a hazard not previously evaluated in the DSA?

133


Safety Design Strategy for Major Modification

Where a major modification is found to exist, an SDS should be developed that addresses:

- The need for a CSDR or PSDR (as well as the required PDSA) to support project phases

- The graded content of the PDSA necessary to support the design and modification

- The application of nuclear safety design criteria

- The interface with the existing facility, its operations, and construction activities

134


SUMMARY OF MAJOR MODIFICATION DETERMINATION PROCESS

Determine whether the modification is a major modification

Determination involves qualitative evaluations of six criteria

No one criterion is determining

Process relies on judgment based on consideration of all the criteria evaluations, on balance

Process and criteria are described in Ch 8 of the Standard

Specific examples are in Appendix J of the Standard

135



Lessons Learned

136


SOURCES OF LESSONS LEARNED

DOE Project Reviews

DNFSB Project Reviews

Project Implementation Experience

Implementation Questions from Field

Questions During 1189 Training Sessions

137


LESSONS LEARNED (SLIDE 1 OF 5)

Need for detailed training on STD-1189 for FPDs, safety leads, engineering leads

– Surface level review of the Standard; focus on products (SDS, CSDR, PSDR, etc. instead of understanding the integrating process approach)

– Project management, safety, and engineering design personnel should have a level of familiarity with the requirements and guidance relevant to the other disciplines

138



Issues missed in application:

– Level of HA as function of design stage;

– Nuclear criticality safety not included in HA/control identification;

– Risk and Opportunity Assessments not carried into Project Risk Management Plan;

– Security not included in SDIT

139



Need for formality in establishment and activities of Safety Design Integration Team (SDIT)

Project management commitment; designation of an SDIT lead (forcing function for effective communication between safety, design, and engineering)

140



Importance of a requirements management system

(e.g., Dynamic Object Oriented Requirements System)

– Need flowdown of functional requirements to design documentation [System Design Descriptions (SDDs)]

– Need management of change

– Don’t let development of SDDs get out of sync with safety input and documentation in CSDR, PSDR, PDSA

Need to assess/validate ability of safety SSCs to provide the safety function indicated by hazards analysis

141



Role of the Safety Design Strategy (SDS) document

– Tailoring of CD phases and safety documentation

– Revising conservative safety assumptions with better information as design proceeds

– Real time mechanism to achieve consensus on safety in design approaches (living document)

142


FAQs

Does commitment to O 420.1B criteria mean commitment to the associated guides as well?

- Means for choosing/justifying alternative safety design criteria.

Level of detail of DOE review of safety design documents (CSDR/PSDR/PDSA) in meeting O 420.1B safety design requirements.

How to modify early conservative safety design assumptions/approaches. Considerations.

What is Code of Record?

143


COMMITMENT TO DOE O 420.1B GUIDES

Does commitment to O 420.1B criteria mean commitment to the associated guides as well?

– Guides are not requirements (unless committed to by contract)

– DOE expectation is that guides will be followed

Considerations?

– Cost

– Schedule implications

– Equivalent or better outcomes/demonstration thereof

144


LEVEL OF DOE REVIEW OF SAFETY DESIGN DOCUMENTS

What is the level of detail of DOE review of safety design documents (CSDR/PSDR and PDSA) in meeting O 420.1B safety design requirements?

– A function of the stage of design

– Sufficient to identify issues that need to be addressed in the next stage

– Sufficient to determine acceptability of safety-in-design approaches

145


How to Modify Early Conservative Safety Design Assumptions/Approaches

Potentials for this should be identified in the Safety Design Strategy (SDS, Risk & OA, and the Project RMP)

Modify the SDS and get approval of the update

Considerations

– Refined design inputs (process design, MAR, new information…)

– Cost and schedule impacts of redesign(e.g., redesign of building structure for lower Seismic Design Category/Limit State (SDS/LC)

146


WHAT IS THE CODE OF RECORD?

Set of design codes, standards, and other requirements that are the bases for design and operation

Originates at CD-2 (preliminary design approval) and is important to cost basis

Documented through design documents and PSDR/PDSA

Can be added to or modified throughout the life of a facility

147


SUMMARY (TAKE AWAYS)

1. The importance of the SDS as a consensus document for planning the path forward.

2. The importance of the SDIT and timely communications in the iterative nature of feedback and improvement between safety input and design outputs

3. The importance of the CDSR and PSDR and their approvals as timely communication documents to provide the safety-in-design basis for proceeding to the next design stage

148


SUMMARY (TAKE AWAYS)(CONTINUED)

4. Management support and utilization of the 1189 process; utilization of the R &OA; conformance of the project to the Key Concepts and Guiding Principles of 1189

5. The importance of a proactive approach in identifying and addressing safety in design issues in a timely fashion

149