0 1114452 B E C 78 F I AYSYBASSY T?HRAN 10 S E C S T A T E hrASHDC N I A C T I M M E D I A T E 2140 R T

YO H F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12102

E.O. 12065: GDS 12-11-84 (NAAS.C.W.1 OR-M TAGS:, P I N S , P I N T , I R S U B J : S E C U R I T Y / P O L I T I C A L S I T U A T I O N R E P C R T , E E C .

C Y : C V \ A A S B

CLEAR: NONE D I S T R ~ O L - ^ ~ ^ ^ PCM

OR ADM SY-2 A F O S I PM S H I P T A B E DAO E C 2

1. A S O F 18B0, S I T U A T I O N . I N TEHRAN I S GENERALLY Q U I E T .

2. WE HAVE hUMBER O F R E P O R T S T N 4 T L E T T ARE 2 H O ' - E I N I F O R C E S I R R I - T A T E E AN! F R - J S T R A I E I BY P E A C E A B L E MATURE O F I E V O N S T S A T I O N S I E C . 11 ANDARE U R S I N ? T R I M DAY O F A C T I O f F0.1 D S C . 12 I N H O P E O? C A U S I N G C O N F R C K T A T I O N . SAME S O U R C E S HAVE T O L D US THAT L E A D I N G CLERGY F I G U R E S HAVE E I S A S S O C I A T E E T H E f S E L V E S FROM T H I S CALL T O A C T I O N AND A R E P A R T I C U L A R L Y ANNOYED BY A T T E M P T O F EXTREY! L E F T T O S T I P U P V I O I E N C E .

3. AMBASSADOR ZAKEDI T O L D AMBASSADOR T H A T HE DOUBTS E X T B E I I S T S W I L L B E A B L E T O G E T MUCH GOING ON E E C . 12. H E A L S O S A I I THAT A F T E R CURFEW T O N I G H T T H E M I L I T A R Y FORCES W I L L MOTE BACÇ I N T O T H E I R NORMAL P L A C E S I N T H E C I T Y . M I L I T A R Y S O U R C E .IAS COMFIRMED THAT T H I S I S CURBENT I N T E N T I O N O F M A R T I A L LAW A U T H O H I T I F S .

4. FMBASSY W I L L B E OPEN P E C . 12. V E A R E I S S U I N Z FOLLOWING A D V I S O R Y T O AMERICAN COMMUNITY:

' A . T O I A Y ' S EEMONSTRATIONS WERE P E A C E F U L , B U T T E N S I O N S ARE H I G H .

B. T H E R E MAY B E MORE P O L I T I C A L A C T I V I T Y TOMORROW.

C. E X E R C I S E EXTREME C A U T I O N I N ANY MOVE1ENT OUXSI -EE YOUR R E S I E E N C E S DURING COURSE O F T H E DAY T O M R 2 O W . S U L L I V A N B T #2102

NNNN C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12102

C O N P I D E N

0 1314012 DEC 78 FM AWEMEASST TEHRAN TO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DKABI 179 RUQMGU/AMEMEASSY ANKARA 4178 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0839 RUFHOL/4MEMBASSY BOhN 12'27 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL EHAHRAN 1908 RUQMOD/AMEMBiSSY DOHA 0638 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI RUSBQD/ACiEMBASST ISLAMABAD 3637 RUQMRA/AMSMBASST JIDDA 3866 RUSBLK/AMEPBASST KABUL 5024 RUQMKM/AMEMEASSY KHARTOUM 0264 RUQMSW/AMEMBASST KCWAIT 4753 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4065 RUQMAM/AMEMBASST MANAMA 1196 RUEHMO/AMEPBASSY MOSCOW 1301 RLIQMMI/AMEMBASST MUSCAT 0629

,RUSBAE/AMEMBASST NEW DELE1 3289 YRUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3495 RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0191 RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY HOME 1172 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0791 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT C 0 N N I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 12167

S.O. 12065: GDS 12-13-84 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PINS, PINT, IS SUBJECT: WHERE WE ARE HOW: OPPOSITION PROGRAM AND

CHPGE: APPRV : DRTTD: CLBAR :

DISTR:

ST4TE 12/12/78 DCI: CWNAAS POL;JDSTEMPEL;LA6 1. FOLiSBLAMSItK 2.ECON; CTHLOR(C~TB IB) 3. SRF(D3AFT) ¥EOt- AMB DCf ECOH-2 PM USICà OR ADMIN ST2 AFOSI DAO SMiR. 740R I S F A

RF//9

REP: TEHRAN 12096

SUMMARY: BOTH OPPOSITION AND 301 ASSESSING THEIR RESPEC- TIVE POSITIONS AMIDST M U D EUPHORIA OF RELIEF TEAT ASHURA D I D NOT PRODUCE EXPECTED VIOLENT CONFRONTATION. KEY QUESTIONS VILL BE HOW GOVERNMENT HANDLES ANNOUNCED REIN- STATEMENT OF MARTIAL LAW, AND WHETHSR OPPOSITION CAN A5RES AMONG SELVES ON CABINET PROPOSAL AND THEN REACH AGREEMENT WITH SHAH ON HI3 CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND CONTROL OF THE ARMY. OFPOSITIOK SI-ETING TO DEVELOP SITUATION WHERE IT COULD EISCRBETLT EISTAVCS ITSBLF ?R01 SHOMI-1141 WITHOUT E ~ S A V O W I ~ G ~ I M . POTENTIAL FOR VIOLEXE BY BISCONTENTED RADICALS REMAINS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. END SUMMARY.

1. SUMMART OF 17-POINT OPPOSITION PB03RAM GIVEN RSYTSL DOES NOT INCLUDE NUANCES OF TULL PRESENT.ITIOH, SOME O? WHICH MAT SE IMPORTANT IN SUtSEQUENT MANEUVSRIN5. MAN'IFSSTO WAS APPkRENTLT DRAFTED FOR DEC 10 MAICH. BUT WAS FULLY PROCLAIMED AT DEC 11 EVENT. TSANSLATION OF MAIN POINTS FOLLOWS: 1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS Oil!? LBADES, WHATEVSS KE ASKS WE WILL CAR9-f OUT. THIS PARCH IS A VOTE O? CO!!r"ir?vCE I N KROMEIII: 2. TH3APPAEATUS OF Ti-S GOVEBHt-iii!ii'4L DICTATC!R- SEI'P MUST EE OVEBTHROWN AVD POWER TIANSFERRFD TO THF ??0?LEi 3. THSRULE OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL AND I:J?I'/IDUAL JL'STICE ?',LIST BE ESTASLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTES OF ";?! PSOPI,?.

I

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1 2 1 6 7 / 1

(NOTE: T H I S I S NOT RPT NOT A CALL FOB AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PER REFTEL.) ; 4 . THIS I S HUMAM RIGHTS DAY. WE ASK FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH OUR STRUGGLE EAS SOUGHT; 5. THE IMPERIA ISM OF EAST AND VEST MUST BE REMOVED. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE KILL CONTINUE AND EXTIND THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS. ,(NOTE; T H I S DOES NOT CALL FOR ELIMINATION OF MILITARY

! OVEENMENT PER BEFTSL.)! 6. RELIGIOUS MINOSITIES AND C I T I - ENS OF OTHSR COUNTRIES MAY CONTIN'JS TO STAY IN IRAN I F HEY RESPECT ISLAMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS; 7. THE REAL

s RSECOM AND RIGHTS OF WOMEN WILL BE ESSPECTED. WE SHALL S E ALL THE POWER TEAT WOMEN IN IRAN CAN GIVE; 8. THE

BIGHTS OF WORKERS AND AGRICULfURAL WORKERS SHOULD BE RESPECTED AND THEY SHOULD BENEFIT FROM WORK IN IRAN; 9. PEOPLE SHOULD NOT MAXE MONEY FROM MONEY. THE EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN BEINGS BY OTHERS SHOULD BE STOPPED. THE COLLECT- ION OF WEALTH IN TH3 HANDS OF SOME PEOPLE AND THE PROPSRTY OF OTHERS SHOULD BE REDISTRIBUTED; 1 0 . AGRICULTURE MUST BE REFORMED AND IRAN'S ECONOMY MUST BE INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE; 11. WE SUPPORI THE STRIKERS BOTH IN THE GOVERN- MENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS. STRIKERS ARE A BLOW TO THE REGIME. THEY HAVE NOT DAMAGED L I F E IN IRAN; 1 2 . PEOPLE SHOULD COOPERATE FOR THEIR ESSENTIAL NEEDS AND TO PREVENT PRICE INCREASES AND SHORTAGES; 13. BRINGING THE ARMY INTO THE STREETS AND FLACING I T IN IRONT OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE I S HIGH TREASON. WE ASK THE ARMY TO BE WITH THE PEOPLE AND NOT AGAINST TEEM. (NOTE: NOTHING SAID ABOUT SHOOTING AT DEMONSTRATORS PSR REFTEL); 14. T H E PROPAGANDA AND CLAIMS O? THE REGIME ABOUT INTERNATIONNL COMMUNISTS INFLUENCING THE STRUGGLE 0 7 THE IRANIAN PEOPLE I S FALSE. THE RUINING OF PLACES WAS BEING DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT; 15. WE SALUTE THE MARTYRS 0 7 THE IRANIAN STRUSGLE; 16. WE DEMAND HELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RETURN OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY ESCAUSE OF LACE OF ?REEDOM; 17. WE WILL CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL VICTORY. (NOTE; IN THE ORAL

EXPLANATION WHICH ?OLLOWED THE MULLAH'S READING THIS LAST POINT. THE STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT THE STRUGGLE WOULD

2. DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT OF PAST TWO DATS I S NOT RPT NOT BT 0 2 1 6 7

NNNN C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1 2 1 6 7 / 1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

0 1314012 DEC 78 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN T O R U E H C / S E C S T A T E WASBDC I M M E D I A T E 2179 I N F O ,RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1800 RUOMGU/AMEMBASST ANKARA 4179 R U E H C R / U S I N T BAGHDAD 0640- ~ ~ P E O T . / A ~ . E M B A S S T BOMN 1208 ~UQMDH/AMCONSUL'DHAHRAN 190s RUOMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0639 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU H I OTSBQD/AMEMBASST ISLAMABAD 3638 RUQMRA/AMEMBASST J I D D A 3867 RUSBLK/AMEMBASST KABUL 5025 RUQMiiM/AMEMBASST KHARTOUM 0265 RUOMKW/AMEMBASST KUWAIT 4754 R U D T C / A M E M B A S S Y L O N D O N 4066- RUOMAM/AMEMIASST MANAMA 1197

MOSCOW MUSCAT

,RUS'BAE/AMEMBASST NEW D E L H I 3290 RUFNPS/AMSMBASST P A R I S 3496 HUMJPG/USLO P S K I N I 0192 SUFHRO/AKEMBlSSY ROME 1173 R U E K O / A M E M B A S S T TOKYO 0792

R U S N A A A / U S C I N C E U R V A I H I N G E N G E IT 'KO N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 TEHRAN 12167

Y E T P O S S I B L E . BUT I N I T I A L I M P L I C A T I O N S A R E C L E A R ; 4 ) AVOID- ANCE O F V I O L E N C E ON TWO MARCH DAYS I S D E F I N I T E T R I U M P H FOR T H O S E ON BOTH G O 1 AND MODERATE O P P O S I T I O N S I D E WHO COUNSELED R E S T R A I N T . BOTH S I D E S B E L I E V E THEY " W O N . B ) R A D I C A L F A C T I O N S WERE U P S E T T H A T T H E R E WAS V I R T U A L L Y NO V I O L E N C E AND MAY MOVE T O CREATE SOME. V I R T U A L S I E 3 E S T A T E I N I S F A H A N I S NOT R P T NOT ENCOCRAGING I N T H I S REGARD. C ) MASS

T E H R A N RALLY WAS NEARLY E N T I R E L Y P O L I T I C A L W I T H MERE L I P S E R V I C E TO R E L I G I O N . IT WAS IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF MASS ' O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L S K I L L S O F NATIONAL F R O N T ( I N F ) AND S U R P R I S E D IMOST OBSERVERS. D ) F A C T BLOODY CONFRONTATION D I D NOT R P T ' N O T OCCUR HAS BOUGHT T I M E F O R R E G I M E . G O 1 HAS S A I D I T W I L L E N F O R C E M A R T I A L LAW "WITH D E T E R M I N A T I O N . E ) O P P O S I T I O N I S NOW G O I X G BACK T O I N T E R N A L B A S G A I N I N G T A B L E T O TRY AND

'HAMMER OUT C A B I N E T AND REGENCY C O U N C I L P R O P O S A L S A S A B A S I S FOR N E G O T I A T I O N W I T H G O I . F ) ON T H E OTHER HAND, M A S S I V E

W H O WERE NOT AWARE OF BREADTH A N D DEPTH OF ANTI-SHAH F E E L I N G S . SOME O F T H E S E WERE A L S O D I S P L E A S E D THAT GOVT CHOSE TO P R O T E C T ONLY A P O R T I O N O F THE C I T Y W I T H T H E ARMY.

L E A V I N G O T H E R S T O T X E I R OWN D E V I C E S . I 3 . THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTIONS A N D "IFS" FOR THE I M M E D I A T S FUTURE. WILL GOI REINSTATE M A R T I A L LAW WITH H E A V Y HAND OR L I G H T TOUCH? I T I S C L E M G O 1 MUST MOVE T O G E T S T R I K E R S B A C I T O WORK, C H I L D R E N BACK I N S C V O O L S , AND R E G A I N CONTROL O F S T R E E T S . I ? T H I S CAN B E DONE W I T H F I R M - NESS A N D FINESSE. SHAH'S S E A R C H TOR COALITION C O M B I N A T I O N CAN GO FORWARD. MORE A Z G R E S S I V E A C T I O N COULD PROVEKE R A D I C A L S T O MORE V I O L E N T CONPRONTATIOM. MANY M I L I T A R Y MEN

TEHRAN 12167/2

0 131401Z DEC 78 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN T O RUEHC/SBCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDI INFO HUQMBI/AMEMBASST ABU DHABI RUQMGU/AMEMBASST ANKARA 4183 RUEHCR/USINT B A G H U D 3843 RUFHOL/AKEfBtSST BONN 1210 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL EHAERAN 1912

ATE 21 1805

RUQMKW/AMEMBASST KUWAIT 4757 RUDTC/AMEMBASST LONDON 4071 RUQHAM/AMEMBASST MANAYA 1200 RUEHMO/AMEMEASST Moscow 1304 RUQMMT/AMEMBASST MUSCAT a633 RCSBAE/AMEMBASST NEW DELHI 3292 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3500 RUMJPG/USLO PE<I Nd 51M RUFHRO/AMEMBASST ROVE 1176 RUEHKO/AMEMBASST TOKYO 0?9S RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VhIEINCEN GE BT C 0 N N I D E M T I A L SECTION 0 3 'TEHRAN 12167 COOL. EVEN IF THIS CAN BE DONE, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT ALLEVIATE SHORT RUN DISLOCATIONS, BOTH ECONOMIC (SEE SEPTEL) AND POLITICAL. STRIKES CONTINUE. BANIING SYSTEM IS IN SHAMBLES, OIL PRODUCTION REMAINS DOWN, AND EVEN IF OPPOSITION PUTS FORWARD PROPOSALS, FlIRLT EXTENDED NEGOTIA- TIONS WOULD HAVE TO ENSUE IF THEBE IS TO BE A FIT. SEEN I N ABOVE CONTEXT. OPPOSITION m o m n IS INTERESTING PROPOSAL. DESPITE RITUAL REITERATION THAT KHOMEINI IS LEADER, PRG3RAM ITSELF IS CLEABLT MODERATE DOCUMENT WHICH. WITH ONE EXCEPTION- DOES NOT RPT NOT CALL FOR EXTR!?.MIST

ACCORDING TO THREE DIFFERENT SOURCES, PROGRAM W A S DRAFTED BY INF COMMITTEE. AND BOTH PROGRAM AND MARCHES ACROSS IRAN BEAR MUCH STRONGER INF IMPRINT THAN RELIGIOUS INPUT. EXCEPTION ON EXTREMZ POSITION IS POINT TWO, WHICH CALLS FOR OVERTHROW OF APPARATUS OF GOVERNMEMAL DICTATORSHIP. ONE EMBASST SOURCE NOTES THAT THIS IS LESS EXTREfE THAN KHOMEINI'S CALL FOR EVD TO SHAH. WHILE NUANCE M A T ESCAPE MOST, IT DOES LEAVE SLIVER OF LIGHT FOR COMPROMISE, WHICH IS MAIN HOPE OF MODERATES. BASIC STRATEGY OF MOgE MODERATE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR LEADERS IS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED 3 Y "SUCCESS" OF PAST TWO BATS' RALLIES AND COME UP YITH CABINET LISTS T O PRESENT TO SHAH. WITHOUT DISAVOW- ING KHOMEIMI. THEY PAVE TO RENDER HIM ISCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT TO ACTUAL POLITICAL CHOICE. IF THIS PROCESS BREAKS DOVi. OR VIOLENT ACTIVITY DISBUPTS C O N F E E A C E TABLE WORI, PERSIAN POLITICAL NONSYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO LIMP ALONG, tITX PFOSPECT TEAT SHARP CONFP.O'lTP.TION V5ICH NSARLT ALL FEARED AT ASHURA PAT MERELY HAVE BEEN POSTPONED A FEW FATS OR WEEKS. SULLIVAN

- 7-

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WANT TOUGHER S T A N C E , W H I L E R A D I C A L C R O U P S WERE U P S E T T H A T MODERATES WOULD KOT L E T SOME O F THSM MARCH ON DEC 10 AND

E V E N 11, AND THAT PARADE O R G A I I Z P R S D I D NOT S E E K GREATER CONFRONTATION. COMBINATION O F TWO ?ACTORS COULD PROVE VERY V O L A T I L E , P A H T I C U L A R L Y I F ARMY MOVES F O R C E F U L L Y 1 G A I N S T CURREW V I O L A T O R S OVER NEXT FEW E V E N I N G S . ON T H E OTHER HANE, UiMY CANNOT B E TOO S O F T OR I M P E T U S T O C O M P I O M I S E W I L b SLOW AND O P P P S I T I O N W I L L RETURN T O EXTREME DEMANDS.

4. SECOND MAJOR Q U E S T I O N I S WHETHER O P P O S I T I O N CAN GET I T S A C T TOGBTHER FOR A U N I F I E D APPROACH T O S H A H / G O I . T H E R E I S E V I D E N C E THAT L E A E E R S O F MARCH C A L L E D F O R TWO DAYS O F NO DEMONSTRATIONS. M E E T I N G S AMONG MAJOR O P P O S I T I O N F I G U S E S ARE G O I N G ON TODAY, DEC 12 AND DEC 13, T O TRY HAMMERING OUT P R O P O S E D C A B I N E T L I S T S AND NAMES TOR P R O J E C T E D REGENCY C O U N C I L . RUMOR H A E FLOWN AROUND T O d N THAT S A N J A B I R E L E A S E DEC 7 WAS R E S U L T O F DEAL OVER P R O P O S E D C O A L I T I O N C A E I N C T , BUT T H I S A P P E A R S F A L S E . B A S I C PROBLEM R E M A I N S THAT O P P O S I - T I O N S A Y S P U B L I C L Y I T DOES NOT WANT SHAH. EVEN I N C O N S T I T U - T I O N A L R O L E . P R I V A T E L Y , I N ? LEADERS A G R E E SHAH I S PROBABLY N E C E S S A R Y , BUT T E E N D I S C I i 3 S I O N S BREAK DOWN OVER WHO CONTROLS ARMY, S E A H OR P R O J E C T E D G O I . AT T H E MOMENT, D E S P I T E WHAT I S COMING T O B E CALLED "TIE M I R A C L E O F MOHARRAM, O P P O S I - T I O N AND G O 1 P O S I T I O N S S T I L L REMAIN MUTUALLY E X C L U S I V E . NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD O F F E R SOME H I N T S , HOWEVER, WHETHER EVENTS O F P A S T WFEKEND M I G H T NOT H A T E D E V E L O P E D MORE F L E X I B I L I T Y I N P O S I T I O N S O F BOTH S I D E S .

5 S I T U A T I O N FOR I M M E D I A T E F U T U R E T H E R E F O R E O F F E R S BOTH DANGER AND HOPE. DANGER I S THAT R A D I C A L S W I L L I N S T I G A T E V I O L E N T I N C I D E N T S V H I C H W I L L DRAW MODERATES A T T E N T I O N

VAT TROM RATHER P L E A S A N T F E E L I N G O F S U C C E S S AND PROVOKE E V E R E M I L I T A R Y R E A C T I O N . H O P E I S THAT O P P O S T I O N CAN G E T N I F I E D P R O P O S A L READY T O MOVE FORWARD T O C O A L I T I O N GOVERN- I NT REASONABLY SOON ANDALL ELEMENTS CAN M A I N T A I N T H E I R

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULATE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Isfahan, I ran

CONFIDiMtIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: M r . Ebrahim Peshavar, Director, NIKT Isfahan

David c. McGaffey, consul, Isfahan Date 6 Place: NIRT Isfahan; Dec.14.1978 Subject : Current Disturbances i n sfa ah an; Pro-Shah

M r . Peshavar i s newly assigned t o Isfahan; I cal led on him a t our e a r l i e s t mutual convenience. He appeared pleased t o meet me, and discussed f ree ly the current si tuation. He i s young (about 35-40); a graduate of ca thol ic u. a t Wash., D.C.;and has previously worked f o r B I R ~ i n Tehran. His English i s excellent, but a l i t t l e rusty.

He expressed h i s opinion t h a t the recent troubles i n Isfahan were well organized by a small group of Marxists, who managed t o confuse and enflame the unhappy population of Isfahan. When asked, he agreed thafa the general population are unhappy with conditions and with the regime, but not to the point of violence by themselves; when violence i s begun by the small groups, they are caught up i n mob fever and carry on the violence. He added," it i s these innocents who are caught when the troops a r r ive - the marxists are careful t o be gone well i n advance."

I asked about the pro-Shah demonstrations, one of which was passing our window a t the time. He commented they were mostly farmers and workera from the S tee l M i l l , brought i n fo r t he purpose, and excited about gettjjfc back a t the "snooty c i t y people", but sa id t h a t they were i n f ac t saying things many Isfahanis would say, i f they were not af ra id of repr isa ls . Even so, some Isfahanis have joined in , not only re la t ives of soldiers and government o f f i c i a l s . H e then dispatched a mobile TV-camera team t o cover t h e demonstration. I asked i f it was t rue t h a t h i s teams had covered demonstration toppling the shah's s ta tues , and had provided it t o secur i ty forces fo r investigation. He sa id t h a t it was covered, t ha t SIRr had decided not t o run it on te levis ion, and tha t such fi lms a re routinely shared with "other government agencies." He admitted, however. t ha t he was concerned about possible r ep r i sa l s on h i s camera men as t h i s becomes widely known, and asked tha t I not spread the word.

He then launched in to a broad discussion of the troubles, and asked, somewhat rhetor ica l ly , why the U.S., such a good friend of Iran, was not doing more t o help. He sa id tha t when he looks a t U.S. assistance, he sees words and mil i tary programs, but no assistance i n the soc ia l f i e ld , which is the fount of a l l I r an ' s current troubles. I provided a capsule h is tory of development assistance, and spoke of U.S. involvement i n Iranian education, f inancia l planning, planning fo r land reform, socia l reform theory, and s imi lar programs, and pointed out t h a t changes throgfiy

CONFIDENTIAL .+

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- these programs, which perhaps did not take the Iranian cul tura l constraints suff ic ient ly in to account, have contributed t o I r an ' s current turmoil. I s ta ted t h a t recent thinking emphasizes tha t each country and culture must determine i t s own solutions, and then ask for technology o r other assistance t o carry out t h e i r progrwr. "help" from outside the cul ture could,in fact , exacerbate problems. I assured him, however, t h a t the U.S. values Iran highly, and stands ready t o a s s i s t when I ran determines i t s needs. This argument appeared new to him, and appealing.

I then asked him about the f eas ib i l i t y of an English-language local broadcast, providing the t ex t o r a summary of Martial Law announcements, local news, and film f i l l e r s on a local basis. I pointed out t ha t with h i s command of English, he could maintain control over the contents, and provide a r e a l service t o the foreign community. After discussion, he agreed, and iiranediatly got telephone authorization from NIBT-Tehran, on condition he accept responsibil i ty. He asked that I nominate two persons, a man and a woman, t o do the actual broadcasting and correct the English t e x t for tdium and granroer only, and suggest a time. The program i s now planned t o begin on Dec. 16, a t 7:00 p.m. daily.

E m e n t : Mr . Peshavar was c lear ly speaking from a government position, blaming small groups, and searching for some outside responsibi l i ty , i f i n a friendly manner toward the U.S. H i s a t t i tude , however, was much more f lexible than h i s pkedecessor's, o r of other o f f i c i a l s I have spoken to , i n tha t he recognized the extent of the popular discontent, and appeared t o be groping toward solutions, ra ther than jus t relying on blame. This new a t t i t ude has been reported by others recently, and to the extent it i s representative of government figures, i s a healthy . development.

D i s t . Eaib. TEHRAN: POL I CA CONS DO*

Amconsul TABRIZ Amconsul shiraz Dept. of s ta te : NEA/IRU

I N ~ R N A I N ~ O I I J B

CONFIDENTIAL

-10-

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D C 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Dear Bill,

I'm afraid I've been completely caught up in the swirl of SCC meetings on Iran since my return. However, I did want to take advantage of this brief post-Ashura respite to thank you, your wife, and a l l the fine members of the Mission for the hospitality and support given to Bob Earl and myself during our few days with you i n Tehran. Although. the timing of the Shah briefing was quite fortuitous. it couldn't have come a t a better time for me to obtain some first-hand views of the situation.

My special thanks for your hosting the cocktail party, which enabled me to have some less formal conversations with several Iranian military and SAVAK people.

Warmest regards,

? ' 5 .*(

Robert R. Bowie

The Honorable William Sullivan American Ambassador Tehran, Iran

ACTION: S H I R - 3 I N F O : AMB D C M POL-2 EC-2 PH OR ADM I C A I S F T A B R CHRON 1 6 l G M H

E 0

SUBJECT: COitSUPTION I N IRAN I

SUMMARY: C o r r u p t i o n has become a major p o l i t i c a l -- - -- i s s u e . P e s p i t e n u b l i c i n d i g n a t i o n , however, t h e r e seems t o be l i t t l e mood f o r fundxmi.~nta l . re-form. R a t h e r , revenge a g a i n s t i h o s e p r c s i ~ r ~ e d t o b e g u i l t y ,

is uppermost j n mind, w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e p o t e n t i a l f o r an e v e n t u a l re-emergence and t o l e r a t i o n o f t h e k'Ind o f c o r r u p t i o n which has f i g u r e d s o promi- n e h t l y i n I r a n i a n economic a c t i v i t y h e r e t o c o r e . Ambit ious p o l i t i c i a n s , n o t cxc?ud ing t h e S h a h , ' may be tempted t o e x p l o i t t h i s s i t x a t i u n , b u t w h i l e t h e i s s u e u f c o r r u p t i o n i t s e l l ' imy p rove t r a n s i t o r y , i t i s n o t l i k e l y t o d i s a p p e a r w i t h o u t f i r s t p ro found ly shak ing I r a n ' s most b a s i c p o l i - t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n - - t h e monarchy. ESI) SUhftdARY

c o r r u p t i o n has become a ma jo r p o l i t i c a l i s s u e i n I r a n i n r e c e n t weeks, w i t h much o f t h e c r i t i c i s m of t h e Shah b e i n g couched i n ' te rms o f t h e c o r r u p t a c t i v i t i e s o f some o f h i s c l o s e s t a d v i s o r s und even :tiei:ibers of h i s f a m i l y . The o u t r a g e which h a s emerged a g a i n s t t h e phen- omenon i s c e r t a i n l y w idesp read , c u t t i n g a c r o s s - s o c i a l and economic c l a s s l i n e s , and i t a n p e a r s t o he d c e n l y f e l t . F u r t h e r , c o r r u p t i o n , a s t h e term is u s u a l l y de - f i n e d , h a s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y been a p e r v a s i v e f a c t of- I r a n - i a n l i fe , and t h e magni tude of some o f the, r i p - o f f s

C O N H D E N T I A I ,

S h i r a z A - 3 5

CONFIDENTIAL

h h i c h hiive been i n t h e neh5 o f l a t e s t a n d a r d . I t was pe rhaps i ~ i c v i t a b l e

i s i m p r e s s i v e by any t h a t t h e v a s t amounts

u f money invo lved i n many of t he g r a n d i o s e p r o j e c t s u n d e r - t a k e n i n I r a n d u r i n g t h e l a s t decade would c o n s t i t u t e temp- t a t i o n s f o r i l l i c i t g a i n s t h a t .could n o t be r e s i s t e d . Kone- t h e l e s s , t h e p r o s p e c t f o r fundamcnt:il change seems s l i g h t a l t hough the p o l i t i c a l consequences o f c u r r e n t a n t i - c o r r u p - t i o n s e n t i m e n t may indeed p rove f a r - r e a c h i n g .

I t i s a <iad f a c t t h a t i t h a s n o t t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e e x - i s t e n c e o f c o r r u p t i o n which prompted r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t it, b u t r a t h e i a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e f r u i t s o f c o r r u p t i o n have been uneven ly (and t h u s presumably u n j u s t l y ) d i s t r i b u t e d . t h a t many s e n i o r government o f f i c i a l s and businessmen had t h e i r hand'> i n t h e p u b l i c t ill was f o r y e a r s t a k e n f o r g r a n t - ed , b u t t h e r e was no s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a r r e a c t i o n t o such a c t i v i t i e 5 a s l ong a s t h e r e seemed t o be p l e n t y f o r e v e r y - one . J u s t a s t h e r e was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e i n t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s t o do something abou t t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y r o b b e r ba rons w h i l e t h e p o p u l a r myth t h a t anyone c o u l d h i m s e l f become a r o b b e r boron had c u r r e n c y , TOSI I r a n i a n s , h a r d l y immune t o t h e l u r e of a f a s t r i a l , w e w f o r l ong u n d i s t u r b e d by t h e q u e s t i o n - a b l e f o r t u n e s t h a t were bc ing made a round them. Indeed , t h e phenomenon more o f t e n t h a n n o t was r e g a r d e d a s a h o p e f u l one , and many I r a n i d n s took a k i n d of c h a u v i n i s t i c p r i d e i n some o i t h e i r . c o u n t r y m e n V s a b i l i t y t o g e t r i c h o v e r n i g h t .

The t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h i s r e g a r d occu red w i t h t h e growing r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t I r a n ' s wea l th i n f a c t h a s l i m i t s . Th i s be - came i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t toward t h e end o f 1977 -and i n e a r l y 1978 a s t h o n a t i o n a l economy s lowed a lmos t t o a h a l t . I t was b rough t home i n a v a r i e t y o f ways, b u t t h e p e r s i s t - ency w i t h which t h e s h a r e of most I r a n i a n s ' p e r s o n a l income r e q u i r e d L'or b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s t ended t o remain l a r g e o r even inc ' r za sc d e s p i t e s t e a d y s a l a r y increment : pe rhaps had t h e most t e l l i n g e f f e c t . At t h e same t i m e , t h e p r o c l i v i t y f o r consp i cuous consumption among t h o s e who had p r o f i t e d i i b so lu tu ly a s wel l a s r e l a t i v e l y d u r i n g t h e boom y e a r s drew p o p u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o a c e n t r a l f a c t o f r a p i d economic d e v e l - opment, i . e . , t h a t e v e r y t h i n g e l s e bc ing e q u a l , e conon~ ic i n - e q u a l i t i e s t e n d t o be e x a c e r b a t e d by such development . l fhere- as t h e o v e r n i g h t a c q u i s i t i o n o f p e r s o n a l f o r t u n e s had once beon r ega rded a s i n d i c a t i v e of I r a n ' s economic dynamism, such f o r t u n e s a r e now seen a s ev idence o f t h e s y s t e m g o n e 1-,rang; p r a c t i c e s fo rmer ly viewed a s no more thzn shr? i \d a n d * even p e r v e r s e l y 1 a u J a t o r y . and which o f t e n I i g u r e d promi- i e n t l y i n t h e in:~kin". o f t h e s e f o r t u n e s , a r e .1ow c a l l e d c o r -

S h i r a z A-35

CONFIDENTIAL 3

r u p t . While t h e p o p u l a r mood f o r t h e moment i s one o f r i g h t e o u s i n d i g n a t i o n , i t does n o t a p p e a r , however, t o be p a r t i c u - l a r l y ben t on r e v o l u t i o n : Popu la r demands a r e l e s s f r e q u e n t - l y f o r fundamenta l r e fo rm than f o r r evenge . Even a man such a s former Prime M i n i s t e r A l i \ m i n i a p p e a r s more i n t e n t on blood t h a n s o c i a l e q u i t y i n t h e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n of ecoiiomic wea l th . He r e c e n t l y sugges t ed t h a t i n view of t h e t housands of s choo l c h i l d r e n who had been k i l l e d f o r r e a d i n g p r o s c r i b - ed l i t e r a t u r e ( s i c ) , it. was n o t t o o much t o a s k t h a t a hun - drcci p l u t o c r a t s be hanged. The i m p l i c a t i o n o f h i s remark nab t h a t i t m a t t e r e d l e s s t h a t t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s a c t u a l l y be g u i l t y o f wrongdoing t h a n i t d i d t h a t t h e y be u e r c e i v e d a s be ing g u i l t y . In o t h e r words, t h e p r imary o b j e c t i v e o f such a n e x e r c i s e would n o t be t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f c o r r u p t i o n bu t r a t h e r p l a c a t i n g p u b l i c i r e . I ndeed , h i n i went on t o add t h a t c o r r u p t i o n , l i k e t h e poo r , may a lways be w i t h I r a n . He conceded t h a t even when he was Prime M i n i s t e r h e had been o n l y "50% s u c c e s s f u l " i n e l i m i n a t i n g i t , and sugges t ed t h a t i t might be n e c e s s a r y t o t o l e r a t e i t up t o a u o i n t . How e l s e , he a sked , cou ld peop le l i v i n g on t h e ecrnomic margin be expec t ed t o make ends meet?

The k ind o f c o r r u p t i o n Amini a p p a r e n t l y i s p r epa red t o con- done i s a common f e a t u r e o f many pre-modern economies. 1.t i s sometimes r e f e r e d t o a s prehendal isnt t o d i s t i n g u i s h it from t h e v e r s i o n more f a m i l i a r i n f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s . The prebend r e p r e s e n t s t h e d i f f e r e n c e . between t h e r e a l market v a l u e o f a good o r s e r v i c e and i t s nominal v a l u e a r b i t r a r i l y a s s i g n e d , u s u a l l y by t h e government. I n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , payment of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e f r e q u e n t l y de t e rmines whe the r o r n o t t h e good w i l l be d e l i v e r e d o r t he s e r v i c e r ende red a t a l l , and t h u s may be r ega rded a s aft i n d i s p e n s a b l e f e a t u r e o f t h e economy. I n many r e s p e c t s , t h i s ha s been t r u e i n I r a n where a r b i t r a r y , o f t e n u n r e a l i s - t i c p r i c e s de t e rmined by government f i a t r a t h e r t h a n market f o r c e s have c o n t r i b u t e d t o widespread " c o r r u p t i o n . " Under- t h e - h o a r d payments can and sometimes have been i n t e r p r e t e d a s m o r a l l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e a c t s , b u t t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e may have been p a r a l y s i s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n sys tem. Lacking a , more e f f i c i e n t mechanism, " c o r r u p t i o n " p r o v i d e d t h e l u b r i c a n t which enab led t h e I r a n i a n economic machinery t o f u n c t i o n .

'rhe impor tance of c o r r u p t i o n ' s once c a t a l y t i c r o l e i n t h e I r a n i d n econoi;} is n?h dppa rcn t I n t h e f a c e of t h e p u b l i c condemnation of i t t h e r e sponse of t h o s e iiho o t h e r w i s e

COXF TDLNl'HL

Shiraz A - .?5

CONFIDENTIAL 4

would be expected to be on the take has been to hunker down. Virtual cessation of entrepreneurial ventures (or in some instances transfer of such efforts out of Iran) and an even greater degree of bureaucratic unresponsiveness than form- erly pertained have been the inevitable results. Because few Iranians seem genuinely interested in a critical exan- ination of the function of corruption i n Iranian society, prefering retribution instead, the temptation to provide the public with symbolic culprits could prove irresistible to ambitious politicians. In fact, the Shah himself nay be susceptible to this temptation as indicated by his apparent willingness to sacrifice some of his closest associates and even to have the royal family's financial activities in- vestigated. The Iranian public may be placated, at least over the short term, by such an approach, but the problem for the Shah in it. given the highly personalized system of government in Iran, is that logic leads inexor- ably to the monarch himself in the assignment of ultimate blame. Thus, while corruption may prove a transitory issue, it is not likely to disappear without first profoundly shak- ing, if not actually overturning, Iran's most basic politi- cal institution. Ironically, in view ofthe current lack of popular sentiment for fundamental reform, even that prob- ably will not prevent corruption's eventual re-emergence as a prominent feature of Iranian economic activity.

TOMSETH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington. 0 C. 20520

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL SECRET EYES ONLY

December 19, 1978

The Honorable William H. Sullivan American Ambassador Tehran

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am sorry that the press of business here and in Tehran has reduced the movement of letters back and forth. A quiet moment has come and I'll use it to bring you up to date on some very sensitive matters that I cannot commit to the phone or cable. You, perhaps, know more about these matters than I do, but let me share with you.

First, there is real concern in this building about back-channel communications from the White House directly to the Iranians, notably the Brzezinski-Zahedi channel. Ben Read called me about a week ago to ask me what I knew of such communications and asked me to keep him informed when I developed any information. From what I hear from other sources, I gather that his concern reflects the feeling of Mr. Christopher and the Secretary. I am not really aware of very much about the channel and have to rely on my Persian-produced cynicism. I do understand that Brzezinski made a call to Zahedi last Friday or Saturday which induced the Ambassador to take off for Isfahan to see about his troops there.

I met with Brzezinski myself 2 or 3 weeks ago in a private session in which he queried me about Iran in general and my pessimistic views of the future. I did not tell him what I have since tried to convey through Gary Sick: That is that I consider Zahedi to be a-disastrous counterpart in dealing with the

b Iranian crisis. In my view he is utterly self-serving, lacks good judgment and is prone to act quickly on the basis of bad information. I regret that I believe his counsel has been one of the strongest factors working on opinion in the White House.

SECRET GDS 12/18/84 (PRECHT, HENRY)

As the Ball report was sent to the Department in one copy for Christopher's eyes only, no one else has seen it. I met a couple of times with Mr. Ball and I believe I understand his views fairly well. He doesn't seem to think that the Shah has much future and believes that we ought to begin to prepare our- selves for the unthinkable. For my own thoughts on that subject I enclose a copy of a memorandum I did for Hal Saunders. I have held these thoughts for a long time now but as we-ilfccome nearer to the day of investigations, I have decided to put a few of them down on paper. You may not agree with my outlook or analysis, but the task seems to me to be one of finding a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount of credit in doing so for the U.S. It doesn't strike me as an impossible task, but it is certainly one that must be carefully prepared, particularly with the Iranian military. I think we have consistently underestimated and not really evaluated our leverage with that group. I do not think we ourselves ought to name ministers, but our midwifery could be very active. We could, for instance, convoke a balanced (including Xhomeini rep.) 6-8 man committee of notables to work out a Persian solution which we would back. Whether that solution were a constitutional monarchy or a regency substitute, we should be prepared to endorse it.

I presume you are aware of the Top Secret list of questions that was sent out over theweekend for the Shah. I have not been shown the list, such is level of distrust that exists in the White House to- wards the State Department (and egotistically, I feel, towards myself). I am afraid that we are losing val- uable time and that events may sweep us by, depriving the U.S. of the opportunity to recoup its position in Iran.

SECRET

SECRET - - 3-

I have probably confided more than I Should to a piece of paper, but I doubt I have much of a future any way. I would ask you to protect me for the sake of the education of the young. Whatever the risks, I believe it important to give you my frank assessment of how things are shaping up on the Iranian front these days.

Sincerely,

Henry Pr 7 Enclosure:

Copy of Memorandum to Mr. Saunders.

SECRET -

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Waihlnxlan. D C. 10510

SECREH/NODIS

December 19, 1978

TO: NEA - Harold H. Saund rs

FROM: NEA/Im - Henry G SUBJECT: Seeking Stability in Iran

There is general agreement that the Shah has only a marginal chance of surviving as a constitutional monarch. No one, to my knowledge, believes he can return to the exercise of full power, the shah himself has acknowledged this privately. We have come to our conclusion slowly and reluctantly and more through erosion of our previous position than from a "zero- based" analysis of what the future might hold for Iran and U.S. interests.

I believe the Shah's position has eroded more rapidly than our perception of it. I do not think that it is now possible to salvage even a "king of Sweden" role for the Shah~certainly not over the long term, e.g. one year.

The assumptions behind our preferences for the Shah as a constitutional monarch are that: (a) his continued presence can best ensure stability in Iran; (b) he offers the best means of protecting U.S. interests there; (c) the civilian alternatives are dubious on both counts in the short run and probably only a stage to leftist instability in the long term; and (dl the de- parture of the Shah would be a shock to our friends in the region and a boon to our critics at home. I be ieve we should examine each of these assumptions and, if they are not as solid as we suppose, begin quickly 60 pr pare a new U.S. line.

I A. The Shah as a Force for Stability

This argument rests principally on "the premise that only the Shah can guarantee the unity and discicftine

of the Armed Forces. This is true, if we look at the Armed Forces as a static group. But how is opinion among key elements in the military likely to evolve if (1) the Shah as a constitutional monarch has substan- tially reduced powers, i.e., does not really lead the Armed Forces, and (2) remains the target of opposition rage that requires the army to suppress continued, large- scale demonstrations? while it is highly unlikely that General Azhari or General Oveisi would take any step against the Shah, the sane cannot be said of the lieutenant generals and lower ranks that have already ventured to express doubts to us. Some moderates in the military are not willing to see Iran suffer for the sake of the Shah; extremists are probably supporters Of Khomeini. Both are perceptive of the way the tide is moving.

If the military is apt to be restive, the civilian dissidents--strikers, the people who marched on December 10 and 11, and the terrorists-are apt to be even more assert- ive in their unhappiness. There is a profound distrust of the Shah and his sincerity in accepting a role of a monarch with power. Thus, the Shah in a constitutional role could fail to produce, tranquility and might lead to greater turmoil.

If this analysis has merit, it seems we should be doing three things:

1. Seeking to identify those officers (e.9.. General Djam) who can command the respect of their subordinates in a post-Shah Iran.

2 . Identifying those hardline officers Who would have to be dropped in order to produce a more tractable military establishment.

3. Designing a U.S. strategy whereby we Could in- fluence military opinion to follow (or at least not block) U.S. policy initiatives. This would mean formulating what we say and to whom and deciding how we apply the levers we have (i.e., military sales and services).

B. The Shah is the Best Protection for U.S. Interests -Iran

This assumption based on history does not reflect the radical changes that have occurred in Iran. A

SECRET/NODIS

weakened Shah, subject to continuing strong domestic pressures, may not be much different in his foreign policy orientation from an uncertain civilian govern- ment that might replace him. Both governments would be introspective; both, as OPEC results have shown, would push for higher oil prices; both would be more difficult for Israel (although a successor regime would be more difficult than the Shah); both will be careful with the Soviet Union (fearing an active Soviet effort to destabilize the Iranian system); both will be forced to cut military and large civilian contracts with the U.S. and our allies; and both will want some public distance between them and the U.S. so as to appear independent. Whether either will have any reason to be grateful or dependent on us will depend on events and, in large measure, what we do.

-

There is not much we can do to protect 'u.s. interests the Shah remains on the throne in a weakened position; will be effectively boxed in by his opposition and will

have little scope for responding in ways that we desire on important questions. To enable us to be in a stronger position with a successor government, we should take the following steps before such a government comes to be:

1. Enlarge our contacts with the opposition and independent Iranians with the object of assuring them that the U.S. Is interested in Iran and downplaying our interests in the future of the Shah.- should be quite clear about what our interests are in Iran and what we are not pushing e.g., we will want Iran to be free of Soviet influence, but we are not particularly interested in the quantity of arms that Iran purchases from us.

2. We should extend these contacts in a discreet way to the Khomeini factions. We should, however, keep the Shah informed about what we are doing because he will find it out anyway. We should not be too concerned about his reaction. We should impress upon the Shah that we both share the same objective, a stable and prosperous Iran, and that he has a responsibility to do everything possible to help bring this about.

3. We should move vigorously to promote with the Shah and the opposition a scheme such as the "Council of Notables" idea that will preserve a minimal role for the Shah as constitutional monarch. We should be prepared

to fallback fairly quickly from this position, acqui- escing in the departure of the Shah if we cannot obtain for him a "King of Sweden" role. We should be prepared in advance for a surprise abdication.

4. We should probably conduct our negotiations with the Shah and the opposition on the future of Iran through a special intermediary, e.g., George Ball, who would embody U.S. interest and evenhandedness in a way that would gain us substantial credit should the opposi- tion come to power. If the U.S. intermediary role were to fail, we would be no worse off than if we stood aside and trusted the Shah to work out.arrangements with his opponents.

C. The Alternatives to the Shah are Dubious and Possibly Destabilizing in the Future

No one can really predict how a successor govern- ment will "fit" with the Iranian public or as a com- bination of disparate interests. There is a growing conviction among analysts, based on conversations with leading oppositionists, that there are moderate and responsible groups which would be friendly towards the U.S. and could also govern. There is also a good pro- bability that if a civilian successor regime came in with the blessings of most key oppositionists, including Khomeini, it would be greeted with relief by an Iranian public terribly fatigued by the turmoil of the past year. Such a government could divert some energies towards the prosecution of the corrupt and unjust in the Shah's civilian and military hierarchy. Its biggest-problem would be in managing the economy but there it would probably enjoy an easier road than a government under the Shah which would continue to be afflicted by strikes.

In the past six weeks the military government has demonstrated failure in restoring order and restarting the economy. Under its present leadership the military is damned for its association with the Shah and for its harsh methods. It will not constitute a viablechoice for Iranian stability until its top ranks are purged.

We need a much clearer perspective on the players in the opposition--those we can count on and those who would serve only their own interests or interests that are hostile to the U.S. We should not, however, delude

ourselves that we know enough about Iran to pick all of the members of a.Counci1 of Notables or cabinet, but we should at least know the core group of foremost figures (independents and oppositionists) and have an idea of the likely orientation of those persons who might be selected in a future government.

D. The Departure of the Shah would Shock our Friends and Please our Critics

There is probably an inevitability in this assump- tion. It will be extremely difficult for the U.S., which has supported one man for three decades and daily reaffirmed that support in the strongest terms during the past three months, to claim victory when he is dumped. We may simply have to take our lumps on this one, but life will be easier for us if weproduce a successor government that is moderate, stable and re- sponsible.

There are certain steps that we can take to minimize the lumps:

1. We should begin now to educate the Saudis and others about the true nature of what the Shah's proBlen is, e.g., a loss of support and credibility because of corruption, harsh police methods, lack of political free- dom, etc. We should steer them away from the conununist- in-the-woodpile thesis for which there is little or no hard evidence. We should describe the problem of lack of support for the Shah, including military disaffection. In other words, we should educate those who are worried about the future in Iran about the real forces that are producing that future. We realize this is not an easy task and considerable doubt will remain, but we must make the attempt.

2. We should keep these states fully informed of our actions toward reaching a political solution that is protective of Western interests. We should enlist their support.

3. We should make the same effort with the Congress and the U.S. press.

4. We should not react in panic to bolster Turkey, Pakistan, or other states, but should proceed in a calm manner to do what is necessary under ordinary circum- stances to ensure that those states have adequate de- fenses and reasonable means for economic development.

Conclusion

This paper proposes that we begin to move now with definite steps towards a post-Shah future in Iran. To delude ourselves that we can get something better in the short run that will be useful for the U.S. in the long run could be seriously destructive to the remaining position we have in Iran. That position has been seriously weakened during the past three months because of our delayed perceptions, hesitancy to take hard choices, our unwavering support for the Shah and the anti-Americanism that has flourished. We must move fast to recoup our position.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COUNTRY TEAM 12/27/78

T H E AMBASSADOR O P E N E D T H E M E E T I N G B Y R E V I E W I N G T H E R A T H E R D I S T U R B I N G E V E N T S W H I C H TOOK P L A C E Y E S T E R D A Y I N I R A N . AGENCE F R A N C E PRESSE, A S W E L L A S OTHER SOURCES, R E P O R T T H A T A YOUNG U N I V E R S I T Y PROFESSOR WAS K I L L E D B Y A SHOTGUN WOUND. TROOPS H A V E B L O C K E D O F F E I S E N H O W E R A V E - ONTO SHAHREZA AVE. MR. L A M B R A K I S ADDED T H A T T H E PROFESSOR WAS SHOT FROM A L O N G D I S T A N C E B Y A S N I P E R W H I L E H E S P O K E T O CROWDS OF S T U D E N T S FROM A BALCONY. T H E AMBASSADOR F E E L S T H I S S H O O T I N G W I L L TOUCH O F F A L A R G E C O N F R O N T A T I O N B E T W E E N DEMONSTRATORS AND S E C U R I T Y FORCES. AMBASSADOR S U L L I V A N I S WORRIED ABOUT T H E S A F E T Y OF A M E R I C A N I N S T A L L A T I O N S I N T H E S E TROUBLED T I M E S . T H E A C A D E M I C C E N T E R I S P A R T I C U L A R L Y V U L N E R A B L E B E C A U S E I T IS LOCATED IN THE H E A R T O F THE UNIVERSITY A R E A . MR. SHELLENBEÈGE S A I D T H A T T H E C E N T E R H A S FOUR P O L I C E M E N * A S W E L L A S A C L O S E L O C A T I O N T O L A R G E TROOP C O N C E N T R A T I O N S . T H E ARMY I S S T R E T C H E D T H I N A T T H I S P O I N T AND T H E Y P R E F E R TO MOVE TROOPS ONLY WHEN T H E S I T U A T I O N WARRANTS I T . T H E AMBASSADOR P O I N T E D OUT T H A T OTHER F O R E I G N D I P L O M A T S H A V E A L S O B E E N ATTACKED, I N P A R T I C U L A R TWO WEST GERMANS AND T H E D A N I S H AMBASSADOR. T H E D A N I S H AMBASSADOR E S C A P E D S E R I O U S HARM WHEN HE D I S P L A Y E D P A P E R S P R O V I N G H E I S D A N I S H . AMBASSADOR S U L L I V A N SUGGESTED T H A T D I S P L A Y I N G OUR U.S. I D E N T I T I E S P R O B A B L Y WOULD N O T H E L P .

MR. S H E L L E N B E R G E R S A I D T H A T T H E R E I S ANOTHER C A S S E T T E A V A I L - A B L E NOW I N W H I C H K H O M E I N I M A K E S A P L E A T O P R E S I D E N T CARTER T O P U L L BACK FROM H I S STRONG S T A N D S I N SUPPORT OF T H E SHAH. T H E R E I S A C O N T I N U I N G S I T I N S T R I K E A T T H E U N I V E R S I T Y . T H E M I N I S T R Y OF E D U C A T I O N H A S B E E N COMANDEERED B Y OPPONENTS OF T H E R E G I M E . A L L SCHOOLS I N T E H R A N A R E NOW CLOSED. F I N A L L Y , MR. S H E L L E N B E R G E R R E P O R T E D T H A T HE, C H R I S SNOW A N D OTHERS H A V E CONCLUDED T H A T GARY G R A F F M A N ' S UPCOMING V I S I T TO T E H R A N I S I L L A D V I S E D .

A D M I R A L C O L L I N S D I S C U S S E D H I S LONG C O N V E R S A T I O N W I T H A D M I R A L H A B I B O L A H I ' I . T H E I R A N I A N N A V A L C H I E F ' S TONE WAS D E S P E R A T E A S H E E X P R E S S E D H I S D I S A P P O I N T M E N T W I T H T H E A Z H A R l GOVERN- M E N T ' S I N D E C I S I V E N E S S . H A B I B O L A H I I D I D S A Y HOWEVER, T H A T H E P E R C E I V E S T H E ARMED FORCES T O B E U N I F I E D ENOUGH T O P R O V I D E SOME SORT OF S T A B I L I T Y I N T H E E V E N T OF A T O T A L B R E A K - DOWN OF GOVERNMENT.

J O H N M I L L S S A I D T H A T OSC'O I S NOW READY T O S C A L E DOWN T H E I R O P E R A T I O N S T O S K E L E T A L L E V E L S . T H E AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED T H A T OSCO SEND A S E N I O R M A N T O AHWAZ. OSCO I S W I T H O U T S E N I O R L E A D E R S H I P I N T H E WAKE OF P A U L G R I M ' S D E A T H AND GEORGE L I N K ' S T R I P T O LONDON. MR. M I L L S A L S O R E P O R T E D T H A T I R A N A I R I S O N S T R I K E FOR A WEEK.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COUNTRY TEAM M I N U T E S t

GEORGE L A M B R A K ~ S GAVE A D E T A I L E D REPORT ON T H E P O L I T I C A L S I T U A T I O N . T H E HIGHLIGHTS OF C I S REPORT ARE A S FOLLOWS: SOME S O L D I E R S H E R E K I L L E D B Y GRENADES AND S N I P E R F I R E TN TFHRAN; ONE OF OUR FSN EMPLOMEES W I T N E S S E D A B R U T A L ATTACK ON A P O L I C E M A N B Y MOBS O f DEMONSTRATORS- I N MASHAD, ANOTHER POLICEMAN W A S BEATEN AND THEN MURDERED WHILE HE W A S I N T H E H O S P I T A L B E I N G TREATED FOR H I S WOUNDS.

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ACTION RSO-3 INFO: AM6 DCM ADM CRUZ 3lGMH

/Â¥ BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L STATE 327052

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 12/29/98 (MULTIPLE SOURCES-SI/CC/TAG)

TAGS: ASIC, PINS. IR

SUBJECT: (U) ALLEGED PLOTS TO &ILL U.S. CITIZENS IN IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 325494 (B) STATE 325479

2. QOOTED BELOW IS TEXT Of FBI CABLE RECEIVED 12/29/78 REPORTING INITIAL CONTACT WITH LAWYER AND CLIENT LISTED IN BETTELS.

BEGIN QUOTED TEXT.

ON DECEMBER 28, 1978. IN THE EVENING. JACK WARBRAND AND HIS ATTORNET, JOEL SCHWEIDEL WERE INTERVIEWED PERTAINING TO CAPTIONED MATTER.

BOTH OF THESE GENTLEMEN SPOKE WITH AMBASSADOR PETRI. USMUN. ON DECEMBER 27, 1978 AND SET FORTH THE FACTS"IN THE PLOT TO KILL AMERICANS IN ?OUR IRANIAN CITIES ON NEW TEAR'S EVE. 1978 AT VARIOUS PARTIES. MR. WARBRAND

PROVIDED TEE IDENTICAL INFORMATION TO INTERVIEWING FBI AGENTS AS HE HAD TO AMBASSADOR PETRI. EXCEPT THAT HE ADD-ED THAT THE SPECIFIC ANTI-AMERICAN ACTION TO TAKE PLACE IN ABADAN W O U L D B E A T " T H E BOAT CLUB" AND WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO POISON THE FOOD. ALSO BETWEEN JANUARY 5TH AND 15TH. THERE WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO BOMB THE ABADAN AIRPORT.

MR. WARBRAND THEN RELATED THAT THE INFORMATION FURNISHSD BY HIM ORIGINATES WITH TEE KBAIBAR KHAN, WHO IS LITINS IN EXILE IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA BUT WHO MAINTAINS A VAST NETW9Rt 07 CONTACTS THROUGHOUT IRAN STEMMINS FROM HIS FAMILY CONTA'CTS OF LONG STANDING. THE KKAIBAR KHAN'S

CONFIDENTIAL

-27-

PAGE-2 CONFIDENTIAL

MOTIVATION, AS EXPLAINED 3Y MR. WAR TOR IRAN AND DOES NOT WANT TO SEE T TALL INTO COM1UNIST C ~ ~ ~ T R O L .

u MR. WARBQAND THEN EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID NEEDLESS AMERICAN DEATFS AT THE HANDS OF ANTI-SRAK FORCES. HE FURTHER'EXPRESSED HIS STRONG OPINION THAT THE YFAIBAR KHAN IS AN ESSENTIAL CONTACT FOR THE UNItTED STATES GOVERNMEN* TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE VARIED FORCFS AT WORK WITHIN IRAN. AND SPECIFICALLY IN FURNISHING DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO CIPTION D PLOT AND OTHER PLOTS As THEY DEVELOP. MR. WBRANDJ 4 CONSIDERS THE RELIABILITY OF THE KRAIBAR KHAN AS- "IMPECCABLE.

IT IS THE OPINION OF THE INTERVIEWINO FBI AGENTS THAT THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MR. WARBRAND IS-UORTHT OF CONSIDERATION AND AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BEttApF TO FURTHER DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION.

THE KHAIBAR KHAN EXPRESSED THROUGH MR. WARBRAND THAT HE MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE INFORMATION HE FURNISBES TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NOT BE FURNISHED TO TEE IRANIAN GOVERNVENT.

FBI IS PLANNING BUILT INTERVIEW OF KHAN.

END QUOTED TEXT.

3. DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICER IS PROCEEDING THIS DATE TO LAS VEGAS TO JOINTLY INTERVIEW KHAIBAR KHAN (GOODARZIAN) TOGETHER WITH LAS VEGAS FBI FIELD OFFICE IN THE COMPANY OF LAWYER SCHWEIDEL. INTERVIEW WILL NOT - - - -- - - LL NOT

COMMENCE UNTIL EARLY A.M. OF DECEMBER 30. RESULTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. NEWSOK BT 1È705

CONFIDENTIAL

Following questions provided to Major General Gast by lit Rencral Smith, Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, via secure phone 18 Dccc-mber 1973. Questions from Admiral Turner to Mr. Duncan, who in turn asked for our inputs. Answers to be coordinated with Embassy (SRF).

1. what would prompt Shah to leave Iran temporarily?

2. What would prompt Shah to leave Iran permanently?

3. If the Shah were to leave pemanently which irilitary leaders would leave with him?

4. If internal security situation deteriorated badly are there likely to be attempts by the military to take control out of the Shah's - Azhari's hands? 5 . Is dissatisfaction within military more likely in flag officer rank or colonel ranks or below - comment for each service.

6. Who among retired military leaders are likely to be interested in lending their names as part of opposition coalition?

7. 1;hich military officers of stature already have linked with onposition? List by rank, tribal association, business or other category.

8. British saying General Azhari making all or most decisions exclusive of Shah. Do you see evidence of this?

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1 K.O. 12065: N / A ~ S U B J M T : THE U . S . IMSF I N I B A ~ ~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WMhinitoh. D C. aOsa0 E, RET January 2, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject : Improvements i n t h e Quali ty and Relevance of P o l i t i c a l Analysis

The Department b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e f o u r a r e a s where e f f o r t s can and should be made t o improve t h e q u a l i t y and relevance of p o l i t i c a l ana lys i s over t h e coming months :

(1) u a l i t Control: A p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e review l s Q i n p r k e s s f o r e i g h t key count r ies where our i n t e r e s t s would be s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by unexpected changes i n t h e p o l i t i c a l environment. A l l our diplomatic missions a r e working i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e geographic bureaus. Through t h i s process, we expect t o have much t i g h t e r c o n t r o l over both on t h e re levance and q u a l i t y of f i e l d repor t ing a s w e l l a s a c l e a r e r sense of the need f o r (a) s t reng then ing and augmenting of p o l i t i c a l repor t ing o f f i c e r s and a n a l y s t s i n t h e Department and overseas, (b) providing TDY a s s i s t a n c e t o p o s t s f o r s p e c i a l r e p o r t - i n g requirements and f c ) _ c a l l i n g on ou ts ide schola rs o r adv isors f o r supplementing information o r f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n conducting independent f i e l d surveys.

(2) Resource Avai lab i l i ty : Over t h e l a s t few y e a r s t h e r e has been a s teady dec l ine i n t h e number of p o l i t i c a l rev or tin^ o f f i c e r s i n t h e Foreiffn-'Service. t h e number o f a n a l y s t s i n t h e Bureau of I n t e l l i g e n c e and Research, and t h e funds a v a i l a b l e f o r l o c a l t r a v e l by p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s and a n a l y s t s abroad. At t h e same time; t h e requirements we have p laced on our missions f o r n o n - p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t - i n g and a n a l y s i s t a s k s have counted s t e a d i l y . I t w i l l n o t be p o s s i b l e t o i n c r e a s e both long-term and in -dep th r e p o r t i n g and a n a l y s i s without expanding t h e resources a v a i l a b l e . We w i l l look c l o s e l y a t our a b i l i t y t o r e - program w i t h i n p resen t resources b u t it may be necessary t o look at t h e requirements f o r a d d i t i o n a l resources a s

-well .

SECRET GDS 12/19/86 (KREISBERG. Paul H.1

SECRET

(3) Long-TedShort-Term I n t e l l i g e n c e Balance: Our p r e s e n t balance i n b a s i c i n t e l l i g e n c e repor t ing and anal- y s i s a s opposed t o immediately r e l e v a n t po l icy repor t ing and a n a l y s i s began t o t ake shape e a r l y i n t h e 1960s. At t h a t t ime p o l i c y relevance began t o t a k e increas ing pre- cedence over fundamental research . The r a t i o n a l e was t h a t t h e academic world could s tudy t h e longer-term i s s u e s and provide from outs ide a d a t a base f o r t h e p o l i c y a n a l y s t s and repor t ing o f f i c e r s I n the Department and elsewhere i n t h e Government. Th is approach has worked reasonably well. At the same t ime, t h e r e has been a s teady thinning out o f our information base wi th in t h e Government. Academic schola rsh ip has n o t always focused on those i s s u e s we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n a t c r i t i c a l t imes, nor i s t h e q u a l i t y of academic schola rs even. Research on a p a r t i c u l a r l y i m - p o r t a n t s u b j e c t may, there fore , e i t h e r n o t have been done at a l l ' o r done poorly. We need t o review on an i n t e l l i - gence community-wide b a s i s whether our ana lys t s have t h e experience, t r a i n i n g , and cont inu i ty of involvement on major count r ies and i s s u e s t o provide t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e and a n a l y t i c foundation necessary f o r both s h o r t term and longer t e r n a n a l y s i s . We w i l l a l s o be reviewing what f u r t h e r emphasis on b a s i c p o l i t i c a l , soc io log ica l , cu l - t u r a l and economic background information i s necessary, n o t only f o r our longer-term i n t e l l i g e n c e base, but s o we a r e a b l e t o a s s e s s t h e reasons f o r p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l turbulence when it occurs and make sounder judgments on where i t may l e a d a n d w h a t we might do about it. We w i l l address t h i s i s s u e i n reviewing our Embassies' s i x month. r e p o r t i n g programs described i n (1) above.

(4) Completeness of Information: We have f o r many years , i n many count r ies , and f o r many reasons, permit ted our Missions t o r e s t r i c t t h e c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e information from c e r t a i n s e n s i t i v e s e c t o r s of t h e l o c a l p o l i t i c a l environment. The b a s i c r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s has been a d e s i r e t o avoid jeopardizing r e l a t i o n s with Govem- ments i n power by meeting wi th ind iv idua ls o r groups op- posing t h e governments. Usually t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s have been concurred i n by respons ib le po l icy- leve l o f f i c e r s of the Department and elsewhere i n t h e Government and of ten they have been necessary. We should focus our a t t e n t i o n more sharp ly , however, on t h e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of such

SECRET

SECRET

self-imposed c o n s t r a i n t s and ensure t h a t wherever they e x i s t o r may i n f u t u r e be proposed, s e n i o r p o l i c y a t - t e n t i o n i s devoted t o considering whether -they should be continued o r not . The absence of r e l i a b l e information on t h e views, a t t i t u d e s , and -po l ic ies of major p o l i t i c a l segments of t h e populat ion of key count r ies can under some circumstances pose major problems f o r U.S. p o l i c y a n a l y s i s and i n t e l l i g e n c e evaluat ion. Me in tend t o con- duc t a review of such r e s t r a i n t s i n t h e nex t monih f o r a l l OUT missions.

P e t e r Tatnoff Executive Secre ta ry

SECRET

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

-36-

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. (C) This memorandum p-ovides the r e s s l t s of an k?f'ISP X4.G prel in inary

review of the 1Jnited Sta tes S%:-=3ty Asai6tmce & o g m f o r Ira% As a

resul t of recent I r an im econmic dcffL.u~t ies , cash flat problen5 must

be alleviated. Conzecpentlyy the ab,iectives of this rev5ew w:

a. To analyze th3 cwren~ . s ta tus of a l l R4S progrms Yo? 3 a n . with

par t icular a t tent ion t o major weapom systems.

Yl2C-J- b. To ident i fy feas ib le reprogramming actions fo r the new t e r n which

w i l l be consistent with GO1 f i x & resourses.

a. To maintain an IIAdF force posture cnnsis t?x~ d t h the curr:at/external

thres t and a t the same time reco@ze the need l o r a? acceptatie degree

of risk.

2. (c/XCFO?S) Recent in ternal str5.fe i n I ran necessitate& a ree-raluation

of the threat t o the sovernizy of Iran a s the f i r s t stepto ti?& review.

The SUfISK M.UG revised tnre3c assesment is provided below:

,-,~ernmsnt t o promote seemingly logical and beneficial progrcm3. Recent

hard-noskg of the government t o meet the Khomehi thi-eaz has caused f rac tures

Ln the N3tionol Front Crganizatim. Bahlbiar w i l l not relin@sh h i s p s i t i o n & dm-d, 6 f ~ Y * ~ - [ ~ L

t o & i f f s - n f A a + 3 k P + d ikm-md his entourage. Coupled with t h i s ?&owed neck" A

a t t i t ude i s the military position of bacldng the preser,t government w p CY(L @*

s d z i n g the s t a t2 until a solution can be made. It appears tha t t he mi l i tary 'k \d'

w i l l p i t i a l l y back the B a l h i a r regime .unt i l a c lear path t o s tabi l izy

can be found. Situated bmeath the contkuln,y unrest is subveraim by

l e f t i s t elements. These elemmts w i l l continue t o plant 3eeds of discontent

most probably re=,-?: & o $ ~ ~ ' ~ n f l i c t between pro and con elements. Such

a c o S l i c t w i l l f--< the

eta<,. A military takeover,

epoch of disorder, unrest and continuing communist b f l ~ ~ e n c e s . The nation we- ld < l p .

N nozt probably face years of In s t ab i l i t y u n t i l mutual agreements and

s u g p r t are applied t 0 . a all-out nation building effort .

- Vhile the I rmian .bed Forces have remabe6 t,he principal s t a b i l h i n g

im"1uence i n I ran , there are indications t ha t cent~nusd support by conscrj.pt

n i l i t a q personnel i s queshionable. 'lhe Iranian military i s faced with

conflictin2 l oya l t i s s t o the chain of command and religious t ies . This

i s m e i s camplicated by the confusion over the 12 8i.imacy of ths current

government. Continued nnified support by the n i l i i a ~ i s ess?nt:al t o

t f l M F l D E N T I A 1 overearnin2 the present in ternal s t r i f e i n Iran. NOFORN

b. In su reenc~ - There continues t o remain a problem of t r i b a l minor-

i t i e s within Iran. National movemmts ex i s t mocg the Kurds in the narth-

west and the Ekluchis in the southeast. I n eazh of these case$* the t r i b a l

groups are spread across national frontiers. Cther groups, while cohesive

a s a t r i b e l do not have the developed national ident i ty of the Kurds and

Baluchis, although many have regarded H. I. M. as a father figure. In a

s i tua t ion of continuing tumoil within the country, a r i s ing of national

aspi=at5ons could be expected, especially i f supported by an external power*

The Kurds w d d not l ike ly be expected t o be supported by the I ranis who

have onlyrecently defeat& a Kurdish national movement. The Baluchi

problem i s spread m e r areas of Pakistanl and Afghanistan as well as Iran;

therefore, it is unlikely t ha t e i ther of these countries would provide

r ~ t e r n a l support. m e Soviet Union has never been loath t o meddle i n

national movementsl but would problbly hesitate r.9 excite the Kurds who

a lso l i ve within t he i r borders. The Baluchis, hr**-?er, represent an excellent

wrge t f o r Soviet penetration. E-,~ablishment 02 a Baluchistan f r iendly t o

the USSR would go a long way toxard the Soviet goal of a penetration t o

the warn water ports in the Sea of Cman, including the developing pert of

Char Eahar.

c. Conventional attack -- In the near term l i t t l e likeljhood is

foreseen of a major icvasion of Iran by a foreign power. Continuing

i n s t ~ b i l i t ~ , however, creates an atnosphere wherein such action might be

tempting. Afghmistan i s s t i l l ha:ring d i f fu l t i e s i n sorting out its own

revolution. Fakistan, Smdi Arabia, and the %Crates are too weak mil i tar i ly

t o have a z ~ e s s i v e aims. The Soviet. Enion, bec~u~se of ?.ts role as a great

power, would be unlikely t o mosrel save i n s u p o r t or a !garxist. g o v e m m t

$flNSlI!FHTlbl i n Iran (perhaps by using the Cuban surrogates). I raq remains the #&?sFoRN threat t o Iran, short of world conflagration. Any attack by Iraq would

l r ~ e l y be limited, with the o i l f i e ld s as the target,. A decision t o mount

such an attack would require a weakened h n i a n military force and some

plausabls reason t o present t o world opinion.

3. (C) The methodology fo r t U s review is discussed below:

a. &sed upon the abwe threat assessment the following p r io r i t i e s

have been assigned t o assure maintenance of the r e q u i d d l i t q forces

consistent with Iranian fiscal resourses.

F'riority I: Mahtenance of in ternal s t ab i l i t y (for example: indigenous

population control, protection of l i nes of commmication and border

surveillants).

f i i o r l t y 11: Protection against an insurgency suppr ted by a t h i r d

cc >.try.

W o r t y 111: h t e c t i o n of national boundries against a conventionel

a t h c k by a major force.

b. Substantial reduction of GO1 FMS annual cash flow can be achieved

primarily by reprograming (deferment, suspension or cancellation) of new

pragrams with outyear aelivery. Consequently, program elements have been

fur ther subdivided in to the following d e l i v e q catagories:

Catagory Aa Followon s u p p r t of delivered weapons systms/programs

( L e a F-5, WJ).

Catagov B: F'rograms i n process with deliveries scheduled p r io r t o

2l March 19W (predicated on Iranian f i s c a l ear).

- -

~ ~ ~ N ~ I D ~ N T ~ ~ ~ J S J O F O R N Catagory C: Programs in process with deliveries scheduled after

21 March 1960. - (- -+k-- P~s. -L

">W While this analysis is oriented on major programs, the proposals will also consider significant individual TMS cases that may offer significant

cost savings.

d. The AEMISH MUG reconmended reprograming actions are predicated

upon maintaining a balanced force to counter each of the pet-ceived threats,

with the highest risk accepted for Briority I11 requiremento.

e. The ARMIS3 MAAG recommended reprograming actions are focused on

cost savings in the near term. In-country DOD and contractor levels of

personnel support have been reviewed to identify possible reductions and.

consideration has bsen given to reduction of stockage leve%to a minimum

consistent with tt J threat.

Reprogrannnfng Action

Program Service

Case

&in& Orizinal S's - Revised a

(a) Summary o f Proposed Changes by FHS case line numbers:

Cost reduction

(b) Revised program milestones and objectives ha3ed on proposed changes!

(0) Rational to Include threat risk factor:

(d) Implementation Plans

0 "9 "45'7 J t M 7 9 CONFIDENTIAL

FM FTCSTCTE VASHPC TO APKMDASSY TFHPPN IPMEDIATE 9 3 3 5 BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 8 1 O F 05 STATE W 5 3 6 6 / f l

S A P I S

F.0. 12065: GDS 1 / 8 / 8 5 (PPECHT, H E W )

TAGS: IR A C T I O N

SUBJECT: DPAFT HIPAN RIGHTS REPORT I N F O

1. FOLLOWING I S TEXT OF PPPTIALLY CLFARFD PPAFT VWW AM8 RTGHTS REPORT WHICH WE A':TICIPATE UILL B F DFLIVEPFP TO DCM CONGRFSS E W " F J A U W H I I'VC! P S S I F I F P FOP". WE W U L P PM PPPPFCIATF YOUP COPMENTS AID ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR CHAWFS E C O N BY OOB WASHINGTON TIME, JANUARY 11. C R U 2 M 8

2. BFCIN TEXT: OVER THE LAST 3 C YGPRS IRAN HAS ENGAGFD IN A PPOBPAP OF PAPID ECONOMIC POPrRNIZATIOY VHICH H f S TRAHSFOPf'ED THE L I V E S O F MOST C I T I Z E N S AMD SVAPPLY AFFECTVJ THE NATION'S SOCIAL STPUCTlIPE AND TPAPITIOHAL I N S T I T l ~ T I O N S . THF DFVELOPMFNT OF RFPRESENTATIVF POLITICAL INSTITIITIONS, HOKFVER, DID NOT KEFP PACE WITH THGSF S I G - NIFICANT CHANGES. AS A CPfSFPDE'JCE, AND PFCAIISF OF SKEWED ECONOVIC P R I O P I T I F S , T H I S YrAP HAS REFN PPPKI-" BY SFPIOL'S AND OFTEN VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS O F POPULAR DISCONTENT.

3. SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAF 11, THF IRANIAP C O V F R V M m HAS FELT ENDANGERED BY EXTERNAL THREATS AND INTERNAL St%- VEPSIOM. UNTIL ROUGHLY 1 9 7 7 THE GOVERNMENT RELIED ON A RIGID PATTERN O F CONTROLS TO DEAL WITH THE PERCEIVED DANGER OF IMTF-PNAL SI!RVERSION. THESE CONTROLS WCTE OFTEN IMPIS- CWIPIRATELY APPLICT AND, AS A CONSSOUENCF, VIOLATIONS O F HIMAN F I G H T S BY SECURITY FORCES WEPE A F P I P L Y COVON-PLACE OCCIPRFNCE. T H I S PATTEPt' PEBAN TO CHANGE GPAPllALlY I H RECENT YEARS AND PARTICULWLY S I N C E 1 9 7 7 , AS THC COVERWENT UNDERTOOK TO L I B E R b L I Z E THE POLITICAL SYSTFV. I N EARLY 1 9 7 7 -THE GOVER?lPE1lT ENPEP THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF TORTURE I I P P I S O N S AND LPTEP SUPSTANTIAL NIIYREPS O F POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE RELEASED. IJBTIL THE GROW1 MP UÈIPU LFP TO THE IMPOSITION O F f P P T I A L I N SEPTETPER STEPS W@E ANNOIIMCFD TO OFFER GREATEP DUE PPOCESS'PROT' : 'CTION~,TO L I F T CENSORS HI^' PND T.0 PERMIT CPEATER POLIT NAL EXPRESSION.

4. IN ADDITION, PL'RING 1 9 7 8 , PARTICULARLY 1K THE SFCOKD HALF OF THE YEAR, THE SHAH PEGAN TO SHARE WITH OTHER GROUPS H I S ALfOST EXCLUSIVE CONTFOl. OVER r<CiKIP GI?VFF'l"7.NX X C I S T P M S . 1NCREf.SINGLY. THS CAPI 'ET. THE P P L I A V E V T PVD V L I T A c Y YARTIAL LPW AlfTHOPTTIES APPECPCT TO PLflY A PAP? IN IWWPTfrMT GOVER'IVERT DECISIONS. Oà Al'GIIST 5 , 1.979, THE S W A"'IOPUCED THAT THE P L P L I A W T A P Y FLFCTIC.'JS ¥IF/ YFAP WOt!L.D F E IF54 PFRCEKT F P Z " AND P P n f I S F P F W F n O P R F THE PRESS, SPEECH, .W PEACEFUL A S S V S L Y . THY SPA!! PL?P P R O ~ I S ~ FURTHER R F F ~ P ~ s O F THE N P I C I A L FYSTFY. CONFIDEMTIAL

5 . OFSPIT17 T H I S COW'JTUEW?, AS I l fPEST rOh~TI"llFl ' , COVFFK- V * ~ T SFCUPITY FOPCSS POUETIFS L'SED FXTPFPF VIOLF'TF I N CON F ~ D E ~ ~ T I ~ HA'TLING llHfF^ED V Y O v S T P t - ' r a P S , ADBITPAI'Y A P P r q T P OCCURPFn A T PFSTPl"CTIOH1; OV YAlY C I V I L A'lP POL'TICAL I . IFrRTIFS CP'ITIVLlFD. THVSF TACTICS COHTRIBUTEP TO OH AT"O?PHFRE OF p 2, CONFRONTATIO?I AMP CONFLICT.

P I A 6. THE I P P O S I T I O N OF M U T I A L LAP I K q E P T F f B F P O'fn I T S a /u PfCO"PAWY1NG SEVFPF rOMTPOLS l^?E ROTH "PrCEPFD AMP FOL- L n I ' r P BY PFPIODS OF CPFATLY rrLAXSD F F S T P I C T I O P S ON "I 'qLIC PFPATE. VITH T F APPOIV "" "T OF A MILITARY-LFO COtJFPWFNT I N EAPLY VOVFWVP, & Y b P T I f i L LA14 CONTPOLS ON <LL POLITICAL ( T T I V I T Y (TAI'I E R E FNrORC?D, Rill WIPE- SPDrAD PPOTESTS PGAIKST THE P r G I l T HAVE CONTINUFP

7. THESE O F W S T P A T I O V S VEPF MET BY AriÈE FOPCF. AS THE SECURITY OPGPNS O F THF GOVE NPFMT SOUGHT TO BAN PUSLIC

PROTEST ACTIVITY. POSSIBLY SFVFUAL THOlFANP P F P c O W WERE: KILLED, SC-VFRPL T I Y F S THAT Nl 'WFP INJI1P'"D, ?UBSTANTIAL DAi-OGS DAS POKE TO PROPERTY--PV BOTH PPO- AMP AVTI-SHAH FOPCFS. CI.P'FROlIS APRFSTS WWF YAnE, AMP THFF!' WAS A RE- CIJPPEVCF O F REPOPTS OF P'ISTPFATKENT OF P E T A I W F S .

1. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY O F THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROY:

A. TORTURE

THC IRANIAN PFNAL COPE P F P H I P I T S TOFTCPE AND PROVIPES SFVEPE PFKALTIES FOP VIOLATOPS. HOW-VFR, T H I S PROHIBITION WAS FRFOIF'!TLY IGNORED BY SFCUPITY F-OPCES I N THE PAST. Al.^OST TWO YF.ARF WO, THF SHAH ANWI'VCFn THAT TORTURE VDHLDNP LONGER P E I'SEP 11 THE INTEPROPATION O F PRISOMERS. I T S SYST?fATIC IL'SE C1.Efr'i.Y EMPED 11 PPISOME. tIOWFVEP, CHARHES CRMTISIIE THAT TORTIIPE I S BEING HS?P D I P I T I t l I T I A l . PITFPPOGATTOMS I " POLICE STATIONS, "AWTIC1ILAPLY ? d T S I P F TI-"PA?). AYNESTY IPTEPMATIV'AL REPORTFP THAT A MISSION I T HW SENT TO IRAN I f '!OVE'-PF? YEAFD P r P O R T S O F "IWEROlfS Y'cfPLFS OF TORTI.F'E' I'SFD PllPI'IG I M T E P P O c A T I ~ ~ ~ OKD OS P'I'l1SHr"-'IT FOR PPI.ITICAL A C T I V I T I E S . THESF IMSTAICES OF TOQTIIRF ^ 0 TOT A P P W TO FAVF HIGH GOVER'!MENT SPVCTION AMP TU?IP OCCllFPEKCE f,4Y PFFLFGT A': FROSIO'J OF D I S C I P L I N E . T K ~ G O V F P Y Y F V T H A S n i w I s s v OFC-ICIALS O F S A V A K , THF SECFET POLICF, PFPORTEDLY FOR, USING TORTURE I!I THE PAST;

THrQF HPVE "FEN MLtwEPOLfS I'lSTARCES OF 'iAPSH, OFTSM PPIITAI TPTATirEi'lT PY SECI'PITY FOPCES O F DE^OMSTPATPPS PPPTESTIKG

- C - 0 N F I D S N T I A L SECTION a 2 O F f 5 STATE W 5 3 M / P 2

AGAINST TH'7 GOVEPWFFT. THEPE HAVE ALSO BEEN PPllTAL AS- 3 SftllLTS BY OpPOSITIOt! GPOUPS ON GOVERNYENT O F F I C I A L S . THESE KIÈD O F INCIDENTS, W I C H BECAUE 1'OPF FPEPHFNT AT THE END OF THE YEkP, OCCURREP VAINLY I N FTPFFT CLASHES,

WO SFTWEEP GOIIFPHVENT FOPCES A"? OPPOSITION SLIPPOPTEPS. NO' PPECISE ESTIVATE OF' THOSE KILLED I N SUCH CLASHES IS YET AlIAILAPLE; BOUGH EST!'-ATES FOP THE ENTIPE YFAP PANGE BE- T W E S OMf TWUSANO TO OVES SEVEN THOIlSAW KILLEn WITH A SIPSTANT1A.Ll.Y KIPHEP UUrABER OF PERSONS I N J [ l P T . THE IN- FORPATIOM t.VbLLAPL= TO THE DFPARTVENT OF STATE PFGAPPING THC CONPITIn ' iS IIHPE? WHICH FPLITICAL PPISONEP? hPE HELD IS SCANTY. TH?PE E P E P ' T O P T S (SOME OF THE" RASED 0 1 IHTER- VIF:VS WITH SFVFPCL FOPVER PRISONERS) THAT COVPITIONS S ~ S T A N T I ~ ~ L L Y IwFiov?:n D ~ I R I N G THE YEAP. NEVERTHELESS, A N EXTT'IDEP S T P I K E 11 T I E SPRING BY PEPSOHS HELP I N A PRISON 1FAP TEHRAN TOOK PLACE:, SUGCFSTIMB THAT THE PROCESS I S NOT YET COPPLTTF. PORFOVEP, AWNESTY INTERNATIONAL I N THE PFPOPT RASED OM I T S t1OVEMBEP YISSIOM NOTED "INDI,SCRIMINATE POl.1C.E RRIJTALITY FOl.LOVING APPEST OR DETENTION. T H I S APPFARS TO HAVE 9EEfI OFTEN THE CASE.

C. ARBITRARY APREST OR ~ ~ ' P R I ' S O N N E N T

TH? S E R I E S O F APHESTIES WHICH PECAN I N 1 9 7 7 CONT.INSED TK?OI!GH 1 9 7 8 . AT. THE BEGINNING O F 1 9 7 8 , / - , 3 5 8 . - 5 3 s 2,2'"? /5-53 3 : 7 4 8 5 6 PA89.34 43. -8 ,3$ 8 , - 8 ) . YOST FOR 2,?.?"' STATE SECURITY PRISOBEPS REGAINED I N J A I L , YOST FOR Hfl1'iDG COi-KITTFD CPIi>TS O F "IOLENCF OR FOP CONSPIRACY TO W I T VIOLF'ICEPC XAS TENSIONS GREZ W R I O T S PKCAKE PORE FREWIENT, LAPGE-SCA1.F ARPESTS WERE MADE. BUT, AT THE SAPE T i Y ? THERS ITCRF FPFPUFNi ANMOIlMCFi-FMTS O F THE RELEASE OF P B I W I E P S . FOLLOWI'IP THE I C P O S I T I O H OF MARTIAL LAW I N SEPTEfPEP, IJAPRPHTS TOR THE APREST O F l , tVPI PEFSONS WFPE ISSUED: YA'IY O F THFSE WFPE MITHPPAWN WITHIN A WEEK AND PY TK7 E'lD OF SI::PTEv^'l:-P ONLY If" b F THESE: R W A I N W UKDER DE- J T W I O N . IN DECEIVE?, THE GOVEPW'E?IT AtJMOllNCED THAT ALL < POLITICAL HRISOPEPS HAD BEEh' PELEASEP WITH THE EXCEPTION O F JIIST. OVEI? 2W PERSOKS lWO HAP REEN C O W I C T F W F C R I f E S OF I- V T ~ L E M C F , A AMY I N TPT COWISSION O F TTRPPRIST PCTS. CPPI- 2 VATc Hllf.1" FIGHTS P P 0 U P S RELIEVE THE MHwPFR TO P.F S I P P I I F I - ill C.È6'TL HTBHFP.) TIT. COVEPVEVT ALSO A!lYOll"CF? THAT I T WAS ?P'JIFVING THE F I L F S OF F W Y P ?CLITICAL P P I S O S E P S WITH A

0 - Vi?t, ' TO GPk"TIHG A Y F S T I E S AiD REHAPILITATING THEY. k - C ? S ? I T F TYF S T A T 9 1HTE:NTIOH C F THE oOYE'P'!YE>IT TO REINFOPCF J l 'PICIAL P?CTFCTIOh' O F ACCUSEPD"¥SSONS PAVAK PTI1.L APPFAPS TO f'OYBI?? THF F[!?!CTInNS OF PCTH POLICE /¥¥' F7AU1VI!10

0 0

?'.icISTR/iTF". P E T C I N F S HAVE PF""1) DEflJEn COl!?'FFl. FOP EX- T F ' T F P PFFIODS AHPSO'".?:TIr'ES P??i-ITTFn ONLY S r V U F L Y PFcT?ICTF"?O RBO COk'TAKT UITH FPVTLY )'ID FRIFI'IPS.

-46- $

CONFIDENTIAL C I V I L AND C P I W I \ I A L C P V S . WITH T U F FXCFPT Oh' OF THO^" I 'WOlVING S T F T F S 'TIJPITY, APF T P l ^ n 1'4 A f I V I L I A h 1 fClfRT CTSTFM I N WHICH C I V I L "IGHTS A"" FULLY ClIi?PCHT"Fn. "FP- 3 Ã ˆ ) CHAPGFP (.'.TTK POI I T I r f i L P W ""Cl'PITV P ' T F P S F " "$RF UN- TTL 1 9 7 8 T ? I r n I V P I 1 I T t P V COUPT?. TP=' ACCI'SFP HOP '10 FTTEDOM TO cHPOSE~ COIIMSl-L O W TKr PPOrFfnl"G1; TOOK PLCC'" IN CAWFPA. ^A?LV I N 117'5, THE rOVGPVMFVT AVUOU"Crn Q F - FOPWS WHICH I?ffLL!nEn T P I A I S 1'1 C I U I L I A V POIlPTS "0" P O L I T I - CAL OFFFNDEPS fh'D FAVF GPFPTFP FRi-rPCY I N Ti"- CHOJCf O F COUNSEL. WKILF W T FIILLY I P H L E P V I T E P , TH?: W R E P OF POLITICAL OFFCWANTS T P I F P AND Sli!7SFPl!FMTLY ICPl l ITTFri I N - CREASED. TKF EFFECTIVENESS O F THE REFOPYF I S O P P I TO =ME OIIESTIOM, HOVEVEP. I N PAHAQAD DlWIfG THF SllV"'l-?, 38 PERSONS WFPE APPESTED FOP A POLITICAL O F F F f ' F , T P I r I l I N A C I V I L I A N COURT AND ACRI'ITTED. TPFY WEPE Sl!ESF~llF'!TLY SEIZED PY SAVfK AND PPDEPFO TO STA'lD TPIAI. I I A " I l . ITARY COURT. FIFTFEN O F THOSE APPESTF!) APPEAR TO P V A I V I N DETENTION. It1 PDDUTIOS. THE I'iTFP'lATIOtJPL. I.KAGIIE OF KIW'AP F I G H T S REPORTED THAT I T S f " I S ? l n " TO ?PA&' H W REVFAl.V THAT POLITICAL OF'FFWERS CONTIKIIE TO BE: TRIED "" fI121TA?Y CODPTS, THE PrFClRP'S WTl ,~ITKSTAMPI YG. WOnFOVFR, NlRI ' lC THE STRIKE O F O I L F A C I L I T I E S W I C H OCCI'RPF'P I N THT FALL, THE G O V E R H W T ANNOUNCW THAT S T P I K I W !dORVFPS VHO PFFIIRTO TO PETURN TO KIRK W011LD PE CHWCER ftJIT!i RAnOTAPF. At1" TPIFI' BEFORE A "SPECIAL TRIRUHPL"; THK DEPAPTWMT OF' STATE HAS

NO FURTHER INFOR1"ATIOY REPAPOIKG T H I S nEVELOP'-'ENT.

E. INVASION O F HONE

I P A I ' S COt'STJTlITIONAL I AW O F 19*7 STATI-'I, "VFPYO'IE'S HOIl?F KW DWFLLIKC I S PROTFCTEP A W SAF'-GllPPPrn?" NO Of"- PAY FN- TFP FORCIPI Y INTO ANY D Y L L I N G V C F D T PY OPPi-P OF AND I N CONFORMITY IIITH THF LAV. I N NOPYPL PPACTICI-, "OLI(Â¥' "IIST APPLY TO A LOCAL P'AGTSTPATE FOR A VAQPAUT I F THEY WISH TO SFAFCH A HOUSE.

SECURITY S - L T E V T S HAVE ACTED I N W E ISFTA'ICFS WITHOUT A ';'AWANT. IN FAY, FOi? EXAPPLE, !?AN! At' S O L P I F P S FORCED THEIR HAY IMTO A RELIGIOUS LEP,OFP'S HOf1: A W K1LI.T' TWO PERSONS S E E K I W REFUGE THERE. THE GOVFPt,lr'FYT I V F n T A T F L Y APOLOGIZED FOP THIS A C T I O N A W A S S E P T E ~ T K A T I T W ~ S c e m m OUT BY IKKXPERIEtfCE9 TPOOPS WHO WERE D I P C I P L I N T FOR T H I S VIOLATION O F HUMAN RIGHTS.

EARLIFR I N THE YEAR, B W ? S WERE PLACCTi Ol lTSlPE THF H O W S

PT CORFIDERTIAL f 5 366

. . ,-- ,.ATE SFPVICF ~ ' 3 w CONFIDENTIAL. - ij 3 - - . .-+ L! &

0 " 9 W 4 8 Z .!AM 79 7' X C S T A T F IJASHPC TC AMETRASSY TEHRAN Ir ' t 'E@IATE 93.37

A T

0'- P I S S I P E H T LEADERS ASD S!=VEPAL VFRF SEATED P P THPFATEWD 1'TTH VIO1.FMCF. W I L E THE YALSFftCTOPS t!ER!? NEVEP I P S M T I - FTFP, THTY VFRE SIISPKCTED TO RE LINKED TO THE PECIIPITY POLICE.

2. GOVEPNYFVT P O L I C I E S RE1 A T I W TO THC FULFILLPFÈI OF S'lCH VITAL NFEDS AND FOOD, SHELTER, HFALTH CARE AND EDITATION

THE IRANIAN POVEIWENT HAS EI"PHPS1ZFD PPCGPAPS RESIGNED TO FULFILL THF ECONOPIC A'lD SOCIAL NEFPS OF THC JRCKIAM PEOPLE, P V n K I S T PAPTICULAPLY THE POOP, FOP POPE THAI' TWO D E M P E S , LAQGl; SCALE FCOWlVIC AND SOCIAL PFVFLOPfOIT PLA'IS HAVE PEEN PURSUFD SINC? THE EARLY 1 9 1 W . BL'T THE f/i,lOR IMPETUS TO PWFLOPYEHT HAS COMF S I V C F 1 9 7 ' IWHEl THE DRAPAATIC IWCPEASE I n O I L P R I C E S EMAQLFP THE GOVFPKMEMT TO I f l E S T YORF HEAVILY I?! D E V F L O P W T M . A C T I V I T I F S . THE GOVXPiWEf'T HAS ALLOCATED THO-THIRDS O F PUPPETAPY OUTLAYS TO ' - C O W I C P?VKLOPYE.'IT ANP SOCIM. I~IELFPF'E PPOGPAMS. PEP. CAPITA INCOÈ- HAD ?=ACHED ATCHIT I:?,-'""' PY THC PEGIN- N I W O X 7 9 7 ~ . T H E r'b,lpR LA^ PI-FORM P R O P R A P P F G N V THE 19';-S TOT RMLY EHDFP I P A I ' S FF 'TAl . TF?IItPTAL S Y S T P OUT

? ! ? F F J T T S P A THIPD O F T H F PPPllLATJOH "IPt-?TLY AVP A'lPTHER 3" P'TCEfJT IUnIRECTLY. HEALTH S T V I C E S H4VF PE!?H = x ~ ~ B n r n TO PI'RAL AREAS AtlD FEPIC'1'S FFFOPTS TO P T l ' C V ILLITFRACY H A F ?!?El2 Il^'@"-PTAK':Â¥'l L I F E FXPI-CTANCY HAS B P E S RAISED .TO%' 4 1 TO 5 3 YFARS.

T W ACHIEVtT-F'lTS TO nATF HAVE MOT YFT 3F"! SIIFFICTEVT

IVF^!.!iTIFS I N ITALTH, I'ICOME A % OPPPFTC'!TTY HAVE .".LI=K-

t ATFP YOUTH W THE I *T5l.l.IPE:'~TS? A. P?F?U?S COQ?!~PTIOf! HBS PO"? AS YIICH AS AYY OT1J7R FACTnFi TO EPCr"" THE A P V P L I S H - W " T S OF PV'FI-OPMFNT. P'AKY IQA:!JflMS QFl.TFVE THfT I T HAS ?7?'! l.lIDYSPPFflO, PFf,C!?T"G INTO TV? HIGtJrST l.F\l':LS OF THE (-rÈlFY(!MFMT THEPS HAUF PF?' S@P7STS T F FC?VFP CPcTçlC' !'T"ISTZPS. T H r IMPACT C F COERUPTIOH CMP?PTS LER THF SHAH

I TO ISSHF A COnF O F CO?!P11CT FTP T-lF POYOl. FAfILY WHICH RAfNEO THEIR INVOLVE!"K'!T I N A;!Y I H S I P F S ? OP CHARITY.

3. PESPFCT FOR CIVIL Am!@ POLITICAL L I P E P T I F S , ItJCl.ll!'Ih'G:

A. F¡F?DO O F THOL'GHT, SPEECH, PRFSS, PFLIGION P T O ASS'-vP1.Y

ll 0 B9r"248Z JAN 7 9 m TCSTCTE WPSHDC CONFIDENTIAL f TO t,'"ECBASSY TEHRAN I f fEDIATE 9 3 3 8 BT

^ ^ F 7 1 C 0 N F I D E N T I 4 L SECTION 04 OF 05 STATE C'(?S.W/C t

t RADIO AND TFLFVISIOM PPF GOVERNWIT-OWMFD, PND TWIS GOVPNPENT-CONTPOLLED. HOWCVER. DUPIW THF COUPSr OF 1178 ,

1 THEY WERE ALlOWD TO CAPPY COMPFVT CRITIC?! OF THF GOVERN- f S F T - FOR INSTANCE THE PARLIAWKTAPY DERATF IV SFPTWBER

! W I C ; WAS H I G H L I G H ~ E P PY HIGHLY DFROGPTOPY CHAPOF'? ACAINST t THE GOVERNMENT. WEN EFFORTS TO RE'IlT'OS^ TICHTEP CONTROL

WERF fADE IN NOVEMBER. STAFF AT THF RADIO AND T'^LrVISION 6 FACILITIES STRUCK IN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CENSORSHIP.

STRIKES I N IRAN ARE ILLEGAL. BUT A SUBSTANTIAL MIPRFR OF WILDCAT WALKOUTS OccuPPEn, A N D I N THE LAST QUAPTEP OF 1978 1-UCH OF THF COUNTRY WAS PARALYZED BY STRIKFS IN ALL SECTORS.

THE SHI'A SFCT OF IS1 AM PRFDOCIVATES I N IRON PUT THE COUMTWY HAS H A D A i n k HI'STOPY OF RELIGIOW T O L E P ~ J T I O N WHICH HAS ALLOWFO SUCH PFLIGIBLlS " I W P I T I E S AS CHPISTIANS, JWS, ZOPOASTPIANS AN1 MECPERS OF THE BAHA'I SFCT TO PFACTICE THEIR P E L I F r S OPrULY AMn TO PAPTICIPATE FUL1 Y IN PUP1 I C LIFE. ON? C O à ˆ ' S E ~ ~ ~ ' C ~ OF THF FTQIFF I M 1 9 7 8 HAS f T M PRFSSUPF FPOf CONS'WATIVF SHI'A PFLIGIOl"; LXADFRS AGAINST QAHA'IS WO APE VIElJFD BY THF FHI'AS AS HFRFTICS. AS A RrSIILT OF THIS PPESSURE, THE GOVEPWEPT PFCOVFR SRVCTfL OF IT'S OFFICIALS WHO AWE PAHA'IS. THEPF StVE "FEN INSTANCFS OF PVSONAL ASSAULTS W1IMST 9<ÈHAWI BY V'nPS, ESPECIALLY IM SHIPAZ. OTHFR W O F I T I F S CONTINU^ TO FNJOY OFFICIAL PROTECTION AMP TOLEPATIOM: 'JFVFPTHFLESc THFY FFAt PFRSFCUTIC"'1 UNDER C O W I T I O T OF DISOPDFP AM1 SOME

, EAP PFRSFCUTIOt; UNDER CO'lnITIONS OF DISOPnFR AND W f F

W S K BENFFITTFD SIGNIFICANTLY FFCP GOVEPWEMT PPOT'TTIOI AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PPOPPAPS DURING THE PAST SO YEARS.

SUPVERSION, VIOLENCE OP CCWUIIST POCTPP!FS. THESE RE- STPTCTIOIS HAVE flFEN PARTICULARLY TIGHT ON l!UVFPSITY CAP- PUSFS AND HAVE LED PfRIO9ICALLY TO CLASHES RETW-M SFCIJRITY FORCES AID ST'!F!:T ANO OTHER D1SSID':MTS. THF. PPOVTH OF POPULAR DISCOh:TEVT DURItlG 1978 HAS, HOWEVEP, "APE I T ItfCRYASINGLY DIFFICULT FOP THE GOWERWEMT A!'? I T S SECllPITY FORCES TO PREVENT, PUCH LESS CONTROL, UMA!!TilOPIZED A S c O ^ ~ p j o ~ , !LIES.

THG LAPGF P-bJOPITY O F IPA'lIAfiIS HPVF HOPwALLY F'J-IOYFn EXTZ'ISIVF F P F T O Y O F VOVFPEHT 'b'ITHIN IRA>! AN@ /iDQPAD. ''0'-F 037 P r W F F S O^ T 1 F OPPOSITIOY, HOtTVFP, PCPHbPP AS "AMY Aq IP" ,

I w r w t - n i i ~ ~ i - n TO P P O I N I N V I L ~ ws A m 0 7 H F P PPI ' ITS RE- IW FPOY T H E I R HOP-FS. T H E GOlFPWFM? HAS O N O C C P S I O P DC'JIED PASSPORTS TO PEPSONS WWM I T PUSPFCTFD WODLP, WHILE ABROAD, ENGAGE I N ANTI-GOVERKPEtIT ACTIVITIES.

DURING 1978, C FSH CPPOSITIO'! FIGGURES W- P F N I F P V I T P^P^ITS. PUT OTHFDS VV FPEE TO LEAVF: S n i F P A L I N THE LATTFR G R O U P V I S I T E ? THE UNITED STATES Aft0 COUNTPIFS I N E W O P E WHERE THEY PUR1.TCLY C R I T I C I Z E D THF IRAtlIAH GOVERN- PENT.

THE: ABILITY O F THE AVWAGE CITIZEN TO TPAVFL ARPOAP WAS P W T P I C T E D ONLY BY H I P ABILITY TO PAY A $350 EX!? TAX AND. 11' THE CASE OF WIVES AND CHILOPEN UNDER I? , THE NEED TO OQTAIN PEPf!ISSIOP FROI- THE HLISPAMO OR FATHER. T H I S LATTER PPO"ISI0N O F LAW REFLECTS THE STRONG I S L A P I C HFPJTAGE O F IRAN.

TPP'IIAN LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ElfIGPATION. HOVFVER. IoANIANS WHO ACOUIPF C I T I Z E N S H I P IN ANOTHI-R ?CUh'TRY V ~ ~ T H - OUT PREVIOUSLY INFOPPIVG THE GC'VfRNriEh'T O r IFAH WAY APPLY TO THE G O V F P W N T FOP R"COGh!ITION O F T H T I P MEW C I T I Z F N S H I P STATUS. ADDROVAL O F SUCH APPLICATIONS I i NOPI-ALLY 1-XTEND- ED. ALSO, IPAMIAN C I T I Z E N S OVER 25 YFAPS OLD WHO HAVE

THF COUNCIL O F MINISTERS.

C. FREEPOP TO PARTICIPATE I N THE POLITICAL PPOCESS

IPAK I S A CO~'STIT1ITIC""AL YONAPCHY. I T HAS A R I C A F Q A L L F P I S I ATUPF; THE P E W E R R O F THF LOWER KOllSF, TH'- "AJLIP, APF '"LFCTCn PY FULl ("WIT S l l F F ? b r C AS b P r OMF-HALF O F THF WP'QFPS O F THC S F I A T F : I W RFYAIVING Of '^-HtLF APE CHOSFN "W T H F SHAH. THE Prima O F THF I F G I S L A T H P ~ A R F 1 IVTFD. AND POKER PVD DECISION-PAKING HPVF BFFH P R I W F I L V V F S T F ~ WITH THF SHAH.

IH 1 9 7 6 , A SINGLE POLITICAL PAPTY U?ESIIPGFMCE), E M W - PASSING ALL I R A P I A t ' S , llAS CPFATEP PY F I A T AM!) L1"TIL 1 9 7 8 W5 THE ONLY POLITICAL PARTY P E W I T T E P TO OPERATE I N IRAK. PFS'TOEMCF Vt-S SEEN AS A FEAMS TO MO?ILIZ- SIIPPOPT FOR THE ( M W W I ' Y T * S PEVELPPI-EMT AMP r ' o n r P w I n T I n M PPOGPAVS. I K P!r81ST, THF W W , It1 THE FACf O F G R O I i I V I'VREST, L I F T K P T K P P O H I R I T I O f l 0 " OTHFR P O L I T I C b L PAPTI'"'-. T><G FOPVPTTON

C'O N F I D I? N T 1 A L FINAL SFCTIOM O F ?5 FTATS f'p5SSg/P5 Ip^.

A C T I V I T I E S .

4. G0VFRt'"EVT ATTITIJr-P A,"" FFCOPP P r P A ? D I f T IÈITrRMfiTIOk'A ATO WM-GflUFPNfE'TAL IÈIVESTIPATIO Or ALLFGEO VIOLATIPÈ' OF HIICAN F I G Y T S

THE IPAVIA'! GOVF??lFEMT COOPEPATEP PIfRINP THE YEAR WITH THE INTERtlATIO'iAL COY'ITT'?!: OF THY RED r P O S F AVD THF IN'TEPNA- TIO'lAl, fO'"YISSIO!l O F JIIWISTS, BOTH Of !,lHICH SFUT S F P F F - SENTATHITS TO I P P " TO INQtJJPF: IHTO HIPAP R I P P T S COWIT7OÈ1S THE GOWRSMFtJT HAS V J - EXHIRITE@ THY SPY? ? P I P I T OF COOP- F.RATIOM T O ' W P S ^"¥"MYST It!TTh'ATIPDAL. HOWSlTP, A D AMNESTY Ik!T'eRMATIfl?IAL' MIFPIPH V I S I T T I R A N It! W F Y R E P <iW WAS AQLE TO COt.4DUCT W P O l I S IVTERVI'"',!S WHICH L?." TO CHARGES O F CO!~lTIflITflG TORTIIF": AND I P H T A L I T Y P Y IBAWIAM SECURITY F-LF-YSHTS. A TTO-?"EWER TEA;" FROM THY IMTEPNA- TIONAl. LFfiGIJ? FOP >!lP'P.M RIGHTS h,LSO V I S I T E P IRAM I N N0VFYPF.R Wit.? I T FClll!lP r ' ISc?EPA?lCIFS P E G A P P I W THE PK- LEASF OF POLITICAL PRISONERS A W THC FIGHT OF POLITICAL OFFXNDERS TO B E T R I F D PY C I V I L I A N COURTS. VA".CE

, '.US l / , / ' . j (P;.:;-.I, .-.;-"(.:) A C T I O N

PC*; a 2 ; ; ^ ¥i. , 1

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CONFIDENTIAL

Country Team Minutes - Jan. 10, 1979

Tho Arnhassadorhep.an the mcoting by noting that this morning's sensational headlines on a c11.1nge in U.S. policy are not exactly accurate. By the same token Bernard Gwertzman's New York Times piece is not the truth either. At any rate, the Anl?a;:.?actpr is now coiiiniiinicating by secure telephone with W;~shii>gton 1:ithor thiin by cable.

The Ambassador said that the oil and pipeline businos's is very strange of late. It is difficult to determine which pipelines and which refineries are open. The British 11.n-e a ship >;oing iiilo CI'.;ih Bahar which is wi 1 1 ing lo helo ::one *¥à ihe I ;i:ri~ifn workers depart Iran. Mr. Bannerman said that the British had made this offer, mainly to Brown and Root, who politely declined. Brown and Root has its own t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y .

.4.-ibnssador Sullivan said that he has heard many stories that Martial Law will he lifted in Isfahan. The Amhassaodr fears that if Rakhtiar moves too fast on this the consequences could be very serious.

Mr. Shellenberger commented that the word "anarchy" keeps cropping up lately. Yesterday the NIRT Director and numerous key deputies resigned. An editor at Ka~han told Mr. Shellcnberger that there is virtually no control on the stories being run in that newspaper. The Technical University of Tehran may open in the next couple of days, but only for rallying and demonstrating. Many "Khomeini stores" are springing up in south Tehran. These sometimes mobile outlets give away kerosene for free and sell foodstuffs for half- price.

Mr. John Mills said that the Eeon/Commercial section is trying to get a reading on industry in Tehran. Out of a sample of 30 companies, only 15 answered their phones. Of this IS only four were operating (mainly food and construction entities).

Mr. Lambrakis said that ~achtiar has asked for two months in which to get Iran on the move again. POL heard report that massive demonstrations are planned for January 19 and 27. 266 other political prisoners are being released.

Mr. Neeley reported that the Austrailians delivered a shipload of live sheep. They are probably walking to Tehran.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

J SP T E h R 4 N '263471 C O N F I D E N T I A L / L I M X

0 l n l Z l l Z JjSf 79 C J i " v : S T h T B 1/9/79 TV P 7 " E A S S Y T i B R J i N A ^ P Q V S MIN:C iMAAS T O S i C S I A T 1 ' WAS1DC N I A C T I M V E E I A T E 2 8 E 7 L'J?:?: Pl)T,:SSLP.Â¥-iiQA'IS:B I I C L F i " : NO., , C 0 U F I E E N T I A L T E H t A N " 0 4 7 1 D I S T i : POL-> Wl DCM

ECOq ? FIY OR L I K D I 5 C H Q O N / l Z

E.O. 12065: KDS-4 1/9/09 (LAMBRA-CIS, 5 E 0 3 S E 3.) 7R-P TAGS: P I N S , I R STTSJECT: F T L I G I O U S LT'ADERS F E A R D E P A R T U i r Ow SEAu

1. 'BVBbSSY " R E P S G 'BTTING R S P O R T S FROV V A S I O C S S I C R C B S R A T KCIYRAT? R E L I S I O i J S LEADSRS ARB VEBY COÈIC'ZR!dE -BY SIT'J!.TION IFiT I S L I . O L Y TO A l I S E V d E N S H I H L E A V B S TEE COVNT5Y. T.-'.ESE P.?E NOT V l R Y COHERENT OR % E L L REASONED, AND TI!? KU'CI'IVS 11VOLVF.T) H i 5 NOT 4 L à ˆ A Y CLSHR. "iNBRAL T E A E S T E 1 S TO SF, FOWEVEE, TEAT C O D F S A T E S INFLU'iNC1'; - ! ILL 5 E S T f S P T AWAY T I I Y Z F i BY I I L I T A R Y TA.;SOV?Q. 03 'BY VICTORY O F C3"?'11MS I A H 3 LEFT-WI NG F0P.CF.S .

t 0 1 1 1 6 1 4 2 JÇ. 7 9 '"'.:Â¥ STATE 1 - 1 1 - 7 0 ? ? A A M S ~ ' , B A S S Y TEHRAV A P P P V ~ D C ~ : C à ‡ N A A 1 TO SECSTATT WASHDC IVMEDIIT'J Y4"? 7 5 ' ~ ~ : POL: J X T T > p ^ '  ¥ L : T . ' Â

CL'AR: POL:GSLA%EA : I S DISTR: Y M B Cr'4

hCON PI-, S:{I3 1 STADIS DUMMY/CHROI/4

E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 1-11-85 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P 1 TAGS: SKUM, I R , SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

1 REF: STATE 5366

I 1. GIVEN EXTREMELY CHAOTIC SITTIATION I N IRAN. EMBASSY

I! COMMENDS AUTHORS OF DRAFT REPORT ?OR HANDLING COMPLEX PPOBLSMS IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. WE HAVE ONLY TWO LANGUAGE CHANGW TO SUGGEST, BUT WOULF ALSO OFFER A I COCPLS OF OBSERVATIONS WHICH MIGHT EITHER BE IVCOaPOR4TED INTO REPORT I F SOME EVENTUALITIES COME TO P A S S , OR USED 9 AS BACKGROUND FOR TSSTIMONY OR OT3ER PRSSWTATIONS.

x l

2. SUGGESTED LANGUAGE CHANGES: IN PARA S I X , LAST SENTEICB, STRIKE OUT WORD STRICT. MARTIAL LAW CONTROLS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE IN THEORY VEIY TIGHT, BUT IN PRACTICS Q U I T E LAX. IN FACT, MARTIAL LAW 3EGI-ME I T S E L F HAS BEEN SO MILD AS TO ALMOST BELIE THE Â ¥ H f E DESPITE OPPOSITION CHARGES TO TEE CONTRARY AND SOMF NOTABLE EXCEP- TIONS TO THIS F L E X I B I L I T Y I N MASKAD AND 0 4 Z V I N OVER PAST TWO WEEKS. UNDER PARA 7 ( 1 ) C, A R B I T ~ H 3 Y ARREST, ?INU SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: MOWOVER, DURING THU S T R K E OF O I L F A C I L I T I E S WPICH OCC'JIRED I f 1W FALL OF 1978, THE GO1 ANNOUNCED THAT S T R K I N G WOR<'iRS WHO REFUSED TO SETURN TO WON WOULD BE CHARGED WITH SABOTAGE AND T R I E S BEFORE A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. T H I S WAS I N F4CT NEVER DONE. GO1 ANNOUNCEMENT I N T H I S CASE TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN PSYWAR, AND WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF BtZARIAN AGRSEMENT I N EARLY JANUARY, 1978, ALL PARTIES AGREE THEPE WILL -BE NO TRIALS UNDER EARLIER ANNO'JNCEMEMT.

SEPORT OF COURSE DOES NOT GO INTO D I S I I T f d t A T I O N OF ' t 6 C I A L FABRIC WHICH HAS TAXEN PLACE IN IRkU OVEa P4ST I TFREE--FOUR MONTHS. NOR S*OUL? I T . NEVI">TFELFSS. ETFFCT 01- U N Q A V E L I N G ' O F AUTHORITY HAS R E E N ERBA<DOWN I N A D W I N - ! ISTEATION OF J U S T I C E ANF SOME INEVITABLf KAPHAZARDUZSS

1 IN JL'DICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF A SYSTEM <HICK WAS AL'?l lM U M 2 R STVFHE STRAIN.. LARGSLY DUE TO EFFORTS 0 7 RECENT S T MINISTER MAJAFI, S I T i U T I O N H I S P t E N R0UGrl.Y CONTROLLED. NFW BAYHTIAR J U S T I C E MINISTER. YAhYA SHDEO-

I V A Z I R I , ALSO A RBSPZCTED J U R I S T , WILL HAV! INEVIT4Bl.T 1 PROPiTMS GETTING H I S 1CT ORSANIZED IN S?VI-RE11OLUTION4RY . SITUATION--IF HE LASTS IN O F F I C E LONG ENOUGH TO TRY.

. 0 I L L EE COMPLICAT-iD BY FACT I K 4 T CAMPAIGN % $ 4 I N S T FTION I S SINGLE BIGGEST POLITICAL I S S U E TACIh'G CO'JNTRY, I L L P7 F I P S T ONE PRIM3 MINISTER B l ' H T I l I P S S'lTE:)

TAC'Ll: WHFN C O M F I V F E . 1 0 0 3 OF ( Â ¥ ? I V T Q Y ACCORDING '?Y LAVYWRS AID LE1AL TI;.iCÂ¥'"-:S "'I IT 5 PlJ5 ' ;!)I 1 \ 7 1

S h W TRIALS & POLITICAL REPRSSENTATITES O?. FOBMSR REGIME I 01 CORPWPTION AND OTHER CHARGES. NUMBER OT IRANIANS WHO 1 ITAVll 3SEN CH-ITICAL OF IMPÈC OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

i WILL' BE WA~CHING VERY CASE?ULLY TO SEE IT usc AS STRONG IN DEFENSE OF PIGHTS OF EX-ESTABLISHMENTARIANS3S IT WAS 1 FOR'IESLY IN DEFENSE Of OPPOSITIONISTS. 5. FORTUNATELY. LOW-tEY USG APPROACH TAKEN TO DATE IN IRAN ON HUMHN RIGHTS QUESTIONS WILL LEND ITSELF TO PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF CONCSRV, SHOITLD THIS BECOME NECESSARY, IN OOARTVS WBIC3 MAY BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING OR AT LEAST PUTINS EXCESS 3. CONVERSELY, SINCE PRIVATE GROUPS HtVE PREVIOUSLY ddN VOCAL.IN SUPPORT OF RJGHTS FOR OPPOSITION FIGURES. IT WOULD 3E USEFUL TO irf IF T1EY KEPT UP INT'TSST IN IRANIAN DUE PROCESS. REGARDLSSS 0; 'fflO DEFENDANTS MIGHT HAPPEN TO BS. GIVSN SOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITIOV SENSITIVITY TO THEST GROUPS THIS COULD ALSO EXESCISE CONSTRUCTIVE PRESSURE AGAINST LEGAL FXTRE~ISW. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MItHT BE MOI,ED T1AT COMMITTEE TOR DSTEVS"'; O? HUMAN RI5HTS AND FREEDOM (CMRF) HIS NO&' IGRXED TO "COOPERUTE WITH" JUSTICE M.INISTRT IN ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL JUDICIAL RIGHTS FOR PEOPLE. SULLIVAN IT #?'574

NNNN CONFIDENTIAL/STADIS TEHRAN

S E C R E T

P O S T S

S 2 C R E T STA'!C: 0 1 0 7 1 1

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c.0. i 2 J 6 5 : G D S 1 - 1 3 - 8 5 ( N A R T I I I , R O B E H ~ )

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-- i P i i I r ' i L 1'1 i+ISTl;?f B A K H T I A R ; - P R E S I D E N T O F 1 1 1 2 S E N A T E S A D J A D I ; -- S P E A K E R O F T E E M A J L E S S A I D ; - I?.,J^~?I.~L C C U R T MINISTER A R D A L A N ; -- MGHAiiWiD V A R ) S T E H , A F O S i S R ~ M I M I S T E R ; - Y + Y Y C 9 J A L L A L r  £ H E R A N I A F O R M E R S E N A T O R ; - W i G C P u L S I D E N T E l i T E Z A M ; + S C S ~ A X E . F G E N E R A L G H A R A 3 A G I ; A N D - D R t ~ { ~ B D O L H O S Z Y N A L I A B A D , A JUDGE.

PAGE TWO 6 S E C R E

- A F ? ?ROi1 T HRAM R E P O R T S T H E F O R M A T I O N O F t L S O , B U T H A S f i h F E R E N T N I N T H NAME, T H A T O F c o i i r i r c ! i S:: J U S T I C E Y E G n A N E H , I l m E A D O F DR. c o : ; m r J ~ o ~ if / D O E S I w E E D C A L L F O R I N C L U S I O N o J U S T I C E

T H E C O U N C I L S U P R E M E

A L I A B A D . T H E IF T H E C H I E F -

A S S Y J U D G E S A C O U N C I L O F T H I S C O M P O S I T I O N V O U L D : P I A B L E TO. I W O R T A U T E L E M E N L S O F T H E O P P O S I I I O N ,

Xi U S Did- N A T I O I I A L F R O N T A N D T H E L I 3 S R A T I O N PiOVEMENT ( L t i I ) , E L A U S E I T C O S T A I N S T O O MANY " E S T A B L I S ' i ! 4 E N T n F I C U i ? S 1 I T H E O P P G S I T I O H WAS A S K E D A B O U T F I L L I N G P O S T S O N YhL C I U t l G I L B U T H A D T U R N E D DOWN T H E I N Q U I R I E S -

CFi J-i'$T;OS WOULD S E E K TO. R E P L A C E OR M O D I F Y T!lE C O U N C I L Ii!l'O A i C O U N C I L O F N A T I O N A L R E C O N C I L I A T I O N " W H I C H W O U L D ~ ~ > . ' l B ~ h i i A C A B I M E T A C C E P T A B L E T O K H O M Z I N I , S U P E R V I S E A n E F E R E N D U i ' 1 O i l T H E P A K L A V I D Y N A S T Y . A N D O V E R S E E i L E C H O N S FOR A NEW C O S S T I T U T I O N A L ASSEMBLY.

-- K H O : ~ I N I A N N O U H C E D TODAY THE F O R M A T I O N I N RAN OF A N 13L.A:':!! 1 ' V O L U T I O H A R Y C O U M C I L , W I T H O U T REVEAL TI!^ NAl 'ES, A..D T E R h Z i l T H E S H A H ' S R E G E N C Y C O U N C I L " I L L E G A L . "

- KKCI."::!i H A S B E E N I N T S R V I Â £ W E F O R C B S ' ? " F C C T H E N A T I O N " [ ' K I A W I L L A P P E A R J A N U A R Y 14. E X C E R P T S W E R E C A M I E D c'f C H S J f i ' i U A R Y 12. K K O M C I N I S A I D :

AH IS1 ::/if. S T A T E I N I R A K IS V E R Y C L O S E ; /\ M.' ' J O V E R H ~ G N T WOULD 3E A N N O U N C E D " P R O B r t V L Y I N A *,....

..G,! 'SAYS"; - ti; V O ' J L D A P P O I N T T H E G O V E R N M E N T ; -- & I'!..IULD " S U P E R V I S E A N D D I R E C T T H E G0VER;lMC:IH"; - 1 1 ; EF.::.C'C H i WOULD B E T H E S T R O N G M A N O F 1 R A : l ; - IF 11 C A i Z T O A C I V I L WAS I t l E M A S S E S WOULD F I G H T F o r t I . ' . L I ' $ L L A T I G N O F AN I S L A M I C R E P U B L I C .

- AN OFFICSR Or' T H E IWZRIAl. I R A N I A U iAVY (1 r 4) HAS 1 OLD OUR UAO THAT I F THE W R O W G G O V E R N M E N T ~ S R E TO T A K E POVR T H E I I H f c3ULD TAKE I T S S H I P S AND DEPART I R A U , 1.1; THi:l:GS PAGE THREE 8 CA; T C i ? i I S P A S S , T H E NL!I~BER O F S H I P S I N V O L V i J UOULD BZ S E C R E T ASOUT 25. I F T H E FORMER I FALIAN L I H E R I Z C H E L A I ' ~ E L O iOhI iEDi ,A t lD B E I N G U S S D BY T H E U N T O P R O V I D E N&L'ED

B I L L E i I i . ' G S P A C E A T BANDAR A 3 3 A S ) WERE I M C L U D E O A C O N S I C E R - ABLE NUHJ&R O F U N P E R S O N t l E L COULD BE I N C L U D E D .

- THE d ~ < ) F U R T H E R R E P O R T S THE RECENT C A N C E L I . A l I O N BY 1'HE - F O R I H C Q ~ ~ I , N ~ ~ UNSCHEDULED AT S E A P E R I O D . A D D I T I O N A L L Y , A L L

I I N H A ~ P O MISSILES HAVE B E E N LOADED ON T O LAUNCHERS W A R D ajjl AND EXTRA HEAVY S E C U R I T Y HAS B E E N n z P o R T E D I N T H E P O H I A S O F BANDAR A B 3 A S AND BUSHEHR. A S I G N I F I C A N T

(STAINED VISAS FOR THEIR FAMILIES TO TRAVEL TO T H E U.S. I d O F F I C E R S HAVE B E E N T R A I N E D I N OXHI':''! F O R E I G N UCH A S T H E UK AND I T A L Y , FOR WHICH E N r R Y E I R W I V E S AND C H I L D R E N A R E S O T R E Q U I H E D . VANCE

3r 571 1 S E C R E T

NFO -- - I

FROM: 12065

E.O. 11652: TAGS:

SUBJECT:

DEPARTMENT OF S w à ‘

AMCONSULS ISFAHAN AND TABRIZ (VIA iNTERbAL POUCH),

GDS-1/17/85 (SKUD, TIMOTHY E.) OR-M PINS, PINT, SEDU, IR EDUCATION VS .. REVOLUTION

Public schools throughout Iran have been closed vir- tually since the beginning of the academic year four months ago, and tionsequently the Community School may have been the only school open in the country. Security considerations (rumors were that the school was "tar- geted" because it alone was onen) and the inpending loss of some expatriate teachers who will be departing Iran prompted a recent Parent-Teachers* Association neeting to decide the fate of the school.

I Shiraz's International CcanmunitySchool is affiliated with Pahlavi University, with classes for grades kinder- garten through twelve. Instruction is in English. The school is intended to provide education for the Eng- lish-'speaking children of the staff at the university. Approximately 4 0 % of the,children are the products of marriages between Iranian professors at the university and foreig-crs (predominently American). The rest are. sons and daughters of Iranians who either have been exposed to English from a very early age, usually be- cause their parents were pursuing degrees aoroad, or whose parents wish them to be educated in English. Many want eventually to send their children-abroad to study and feel that an early start in English will give them a leg up.

C O W :L YTIAL 2

The first speaker was a dean of one of the faculties at the university, and he emphasized three points: The first K.IS security. tie argued that since the school was the only one in Iran remaining o p n and because of the foreign influences it exhibits, it was a logical target for demonstrations or even terrorist attacks. His second point concerned the qual- ity of education. Because the school had maintained only a partial schedule in recent weeks and the departure of some of the staff was imminent, he felt it possible that the qual- ity of instruction could suffer further if the school was kept open. His third point dealt with solidarity. He won- , dered if the Comnunity School's students should not show their support for the "cause" by closing the school. After all, he contended, every other school in Iran was closed, and nearly every business and industry was idled. It would s e e m a slap in the face of the movement for their school to remain open.

One mother rose to ask about partial refund of the sizable tuition (over $2,000 per year) if the school closed. Her question was met with general contempt as being irrelevant.

The next speaker, a medical doctor and professor at the school of medicine, readd'ressed the security question. He said, "There are now guerrillas in town who are trying to discredit the revolution. An attack on a school would be an ideal way to paint an unfavorable picture of *he movement in the eyes of the international press." A small minority greeted his remarks with disapproval.

The American wife of an Iranian professor suggested that t o keep the school open it be held in various homes, thereby re- ducing the threat to the children's security. Another parent protested that theanti-cause guerrilla operations were so pervasive that they would soon learn where each class was being held.

An Iranian mother then rose. She said that the kids could learn more from participation in the revolution than by attending school. She felt that the children should be out in the streets with the people. This mother, whose own brood is enrolled at the Community School, also complained that by attending an English-language, international school, the children could never get to know their own culture (sic)!

An Iranian father, a medical doctor, then took the floor. He felt that they would be holding back both the revolution and

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDF'ITTAL

Tehran, I r a n January 24 , 1979

Lt. General Anir Hossein Rabii Comander Imperial I ran ian A i r Force

Dear General Rabii:

I aro deeply concerned by t h e apparent f a i l u r e of Southern A i r Tranmor t t o o b t a i n nropcr c learance f o r i ts f l i q h t i n t o Khittami Air Force Base on January 21. A t my requ-st , t h e Oepartnent of S t a t e has urgent ly looked i n t o t h e matter and it appears t h a t Southern A i r Transport believed-- i n c o r r e c t l y , a s it turned out - - i t i n f a c t had clearance. Southern A i r Transport Company, unfortunately, d i d no t check w i t h us on t h i s matter so t h a t i t could be informed t h a t f l i q h t s t o Khatami A i r Force Base a s well a s e l s e - where i n t h e country a r e now cont ro l led by t h e IIAF. The company has assured us t h a t it had no i n t e n t i o n s t o v i o l a t e c learance r u l e s and procedures.

I s i n c e r e l y r e g r e t t h e problems t h i s f l i g h t has caused you and wish t o assure you t h a t we a r e doing everything poss ib le here t o work with you and your colleagues t o lessen t h e burden and t o provide f o r the smooth and order ly opera t ion of a i r c h a r t e r s .

Sincerely,

William H. Sul l ivan Ambassador

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A L L A D D E C S T A K E F O R A C T I O N I M M E D I A T E

1. ( S - E N T I ? S T E X T ) . T S n R A . ' S A I R P O R T WAS C L O S E D T H I S I O R V I N G 3 Y T H E RIL:- U d Y . l h E I d L I i A ' i Y i.JVl.Bf<OB dF T E r i f i A t ~ AH'i0U;JCl.D C H A T T H E

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D I S O R D E R A'ID T R O U 3 L E . " T H U S , T H E A I R P O R T WAS C L O S E D T O i T H E H E S P O A S I S I L I T Y OF H A I H T A I N I I J G O R D E R A N 3 CALM. I T

4 A S A L S 3 A.lNOU.'!CSO T H A T " A S A R E S U L T O F B A D W E A T H E R A L L FLIGHTS TODAY WILL BE CANCELLED U N T I L FURTHER H ~ T I C E . " /->;%'/d

, - 3. T H E EMBASSY H A S H E A R D T H A T T H E O P P O S I T I O N I N r E N D E D T O / -5 HAVE A N I R A N A I R P L A N E L E A V E T H I S M O R N I N G F O R P A R I S T O P I C K U P K H O N E I N I . A S P A R T O F T H I S A G E N E R A L I N V I T A T I O N WAS E X T E N D E D F O R P E O P L E T O J O I N A Y A T O L L A H T A L E G H A N I T O S E E T H E P L A N E O F F . I T S E E M S MOT U N L I K E L Y T H A T T H I S WAS T H E " D I S O R D E R " T H A T T H E M I L I T A R Y A C T I O N T O C L O S E T H E A I R P O R T WAS I N T E N D E D T O A V O I D .

4. T H E E N G L I S H L A N G U A G E P R E S S I N T E H R A N T H I S N O R N I N S C A R R I E S C O W E T I H G I N T E R V I E W S W I T H P M i A K H T I A R ( H E IS D E T E R M I N E D T O R E M A I N ) A N D L I B E R A T I O N K O V E N E N T L E A D E R B A Z A R G A N C B A K H T I A R A N D T H E GOVERNMENT MUST R E S I G N ) W H I C H

C O N T I N U E T O U N D E R S C O R E T H E C O N F R O N T A T I O N / N O D E A L S I T U A T I O N

5 . TWO S I L L S WERE I N T R O D U C E D I N T H E N A J L I S , O N E T O A B O L I S H S A V A K A N D T H E O T I E S T O E S T A B L I S H S P E C I A L C O U R T S TO TRY THOSE B E I N G HELD FOR P o s s I a L E C O R R U P T I O N .

6. T H E E D I T O R O F E T T E L A ' A T , W H I C H WAS R E C E N T L Y V I S I T E D B Y i 4 . i S L I M S T U D E N T S P R E S S I N G T H E N E E D F O R P R O P E R R E P O R T I N S A B O U T T H E V I C T O R I O U S R E V O L U T I O N , H A S C O M K E H T E D T H A T I T IS D I F F I C U L T T O P U T O U T A N E W S P A P E R U N D E R P R E S S U R E F R O M T H E K H O K E I N I F O R C E S .

7. T H E E L I T E B R I G A D E O F T H E I M P E R I A L G U A R D P U T O N A H I G H L Y P U 3 L I C I Z E D D E M O N S T R A T I O N O F I T S M I L I T A R Y S K I L L S AND T O U G H N E S S Y E S T E R D A Y . T H E COMMANDER MADE A S T A T E K E N T T H A T E V E R Y MAN WAS P R E P A R E D T O S H E D T H E L A S T D R O P O F H I S B L O O D F O R T H E S H A H .

8. OUR CCINSIII I N I S F A H A N T A L K E D W I T H T H E K H A T A M I A F S

9. S C A T T E R E D G R O U P S O F C L U B B E R S H A V E B E E N A F O O T A R O U N D I S F A H A N T H I S H O R S I N G . MANY RUMORS A R E A L S O A F O O T T H E R E , I M C L U D I N G O N E A B O U T A MAJOR P R O - G O V E R N M E N T D E M O N S T R A T I O N L A T E R T O D A Y . P A R T O F T H A T L A T T E R RUKOR I N C L U D E S T H E P O I N T T H A T T H E H O M O F A R - L E D G R O U P T H A T C L O S E D K H A T A M I Y E S T E R D A Y MAY L E A D T H E R U h O R E D P R O - G O V E R N K E N T D E M O N S T R A T I O N I N TOWN TODAY. V A N C E B T 9262 S E C R E T

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3. VW.V S : ' .E.?OZT D I D R E O P E N T O D A Y A1:D R E S U M E D C C f l M E R C I A L A ' i l ~ ' ~ ! ' ? V 1 T l J . A JAL F L I G H T .

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6. S E C Z I T Y OF A!l 'RICANS: T O D A Y ' S MAC F L I G H T S WERE USED G Y C E P A i . i -i:\:C A ^ h I C t l ' S TO C A P A C I T Y . TOKORROV T H E R E W I L L EE A H EVS:; L W G E R l.ijtIEEfi O F MAC F L I G H T S .

7. I S Â ; ; I L I i A t ? Y (TWO GEHEKALS) HAVE Fii 'OVIDED A S S U R A N C E S A 3 0 U T It!? E G C U d I T Y O F T H E E K A S S Y COi 'TOUND A?:D ASKED F-r ' - iSOW. 1.Y T O B E ALE:?TED I F THERE ARE AW PRULLEMS. OUR COXSUL I;! I S F A H A N A J I T H E B H I EMPLOYEE Y E R E EADLY P S A T E N i Y T H E C;;C','DS FOLL@'..'IKG Y E S T E R D A Y ' S I N C I D E N T E U T ARE f .LL R I G K T . T H E COMSUL I S T H Y I C G T O V C R X OUT A v ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ E ~ ~ . V A t.'CE DT -. S E C R E T

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