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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR0000714

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-34970 IDA-3497A JPN-53767)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR32.3 MILLION (US$ 41.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS

FOR A

COMMUNITY-BASED EDUCATION PROJECT

June 24, 2009

Human Development Management Unit Central America Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 05/08/2008)

Currency Unit = Lempiras 1.00 = US$ .05

US$ 1.00 = 19.14

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADEL Local Education Development Association (in traditional schools) (Asociaciones de Desarrollo Educativo Local) AECO Parent School Associations (in PROHECO schools) (Asociaciones Educativas Comunitarias) CAD Teacher Learning Center (Centro de Aprendizaje Docente) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCIE Community-based Pre-primary Experience Program (Centros Comunitarios de Educación Inicial) CCEPREB Community-based Preschool Services (Centros Comunitarios de Educación Prebásica) CEPENF Original Non-Formal/Community-based Preschool Centers (Centro de Educación Preescolar No Formal) CNB National Basic Curricula (Currículo Nacional Básico) DCNB Design of the National Basic Curricula (Diseño del Curriculo Nacional Básico) EFA-FTI Education for All – Fast Track Initiative EIB Intercultural Bilingual Education (Educación Intercultural Bilingüe) FID Pre-service Teacher Training (Formación Inicial de Docentes) FONAC Foro Nacional de Convergencia GOH Government of Honduras IADB Inter-American Development Bank ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IPDP Indigenous Peoples Development Plan IPP Indigenous Peoples Plan INE National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas) INICE National Institute for Research and Training (Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Capacitación Educativa) INPREMA Teachers’ Pension Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión del Magisterio)

MERECE External Donors Round Table Mesa Redonda de Cooperación Externa MIDE Integrated Program for Student Improvement - USAID Programa de Mejoramiento Integral del Desarrollo Estudiantil MOE Ministry of Education MOF Ministry of Finance MIS Management Information System NGO Nongovernmental Organization PAD Project Appraisal Document PFC In-service Teacher Training (Programa de Formación Continua) PEC School Education Projects (Proyectos Educativos de Centro) PROHECO Community Education Program for Honduras (Programa Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria) PRONEEAAH National Education Program for Indigenous and Afro-descendents Programa Nacional para Educación para las Etnias Autóctonas y

Afro-antillanas de Honduras SINECE Quality of Education National Assessment System (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa) SIAFI Ministry of Finance’s Financial Management System (Sistema de Administración Financiera de la Secretaria de Finanzas) SIARHD Human Resources Education Information System (Sistema de Información de Recursos Humanos Docentes) UAF Administrative and Financial Project Unit (Unidad Administrativa y Financiera del Proyecto) UEP Project Implementation Unit (Unidad Ejecutora del Proyecto) UMCE Office of Measuring Education Quality – University Francisco Morazán (Unidad de Medición de la Calidad Educativa) UPEG Office of Planning and Evaluation (Unidad de Planeación y Evaluación de la Gestión) UPNFM National Pedagogical University Francisco Morazán (Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán) UTEN Education Transformation Technical Unit (Unidad Técnica de Transformación de la Educación Nacional)

Vice President: Pamela Cox Country Director: Laura Frigenti

Sector Manager: Eduardo Velez Sector Leader: Laura Rawlings

ICR Team Leader: Andréa C. Guedes

HONDURAS Community-based Education Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 73. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 144. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 235. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 246. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 297. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 32Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................... 33Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 34Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................. 44Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 45Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 47Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 48Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 49Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................... 54Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 55

MAP

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A. Basic Information Country: Honduras Project Name:

HN COMMUNITY-BASED EDUCATION PROJECT

Project ID: P007397 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-34970,IDA-3497A,TF-53767

ICR Date: 06/30/2008 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 32.3M Disbursed Amount: XDR 32.3M

Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 06/27/2000 Effectiveness: 02/18/2002 02/18/2002 Appraisal: 12/11/2000 Restructuring(s): Approval: 04/10/2001 Mid-term Review: 02/14/2005 02/14/2005 Closing: 12/31/2006 12/31/2007 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 18 18 Pre-primary education 38 38 Primary education 38 38 Sub-national government administration 6 6

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Education for all Primary Indigenous peoples Primary Primary Participation and civic engagement Secondary Secondary Rural services and infrastructure Primary Primary E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Pamela Cox David de Ferranti Country Director: Adrian Fozzard D-M Dowsett-Coirolo Sector Manager: Eduardo Velez Bustillo Xavier E. Coll Project Team Leader: Andrea C. Guedes Joel E. Reyes ICR Team Leader: Andrea C. Guedes ICR Primary Author: Maria R. Puech Fernandez Andrea C. Guedes

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F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Improve the quality of preschool and lower basic education (grade 1-6 ) in targeted rural areas in Honduras, including the improvement of the quality of intercultural and bilingual education in indigenous communities. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increased enrollment rates in rural preschool and lower basic education by 5 and 8 percentage points respectively

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Primary GER in rural areas = 103.6 Primary NER in rural areas = 82.5 Preschool GER in rural areas = 23 Preschool NER in rural areas = 23

Preschool: increase by 5 percentage points Primary: increase by 8 percentage points

Primary GER: 116% Primary NER: 93.7% Preschool GER: n/aPreschool NER: 24.7%

Date achieved 12/01/2002 12/31/2007 03/07/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 2 : Reduce repetition and drop-out rate in rural schools


Repetition rate in rural schools: 9.8% Drop-out rate (not included in PAD): 3.4% Gross primary completion rate in rural areas: 68%

Not specified in PAD

Repetition rate: 8.9% Drop-out rate: 2.8%Gross prim completion rate in rural areas: 73.4%


Indicator 3 : Improved performance in standardized test scores in Spanish and Mathematics for 3rd and 6th grade students from mainly rural multigrade schools


Grade 6 Spanish: 40.7 Grade 6 Math: 37.5 Grade 3 Spanish: 36.1

not specified in PAD

Grade 6 Spanish Nat: 44 Grade 6 Span.

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Grade 3 Math: 41.6

Rural: 40.6 Grade 6 Math Nat: 39.2 Grade 6 Math Rural: 36.5 Grade 3 Span Nat: 39.2 Grade 3 Span Rural: 36.2 Grade 3 Math Nat: 43.5 Grade 3 Math Rural: 41.6


Indicator 4 : Increased early entry in rural schools Value quantitative or Qualitative)

50% not specified in PAD 62.6%


Indicator 5 : Improved teacher productivity measured by number of days worked --official calendar has 200 days.


110 days not specified in PAD

180 days PROHECO teachers 170 days official teachers


(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Creation of PROHECO Schools and Training of AECOs in 600 communities in rural areas and in 200 intercultural and bilingual communities

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0

600 PROHECO schools and 200 EIB PROHECO schools.

800 PROHECO schools 252 EIB PROHECO schools

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Indicator 2 : Hiring at least 720 new PROHECO teachers and 200 new bilingual PROHECO teachers


0 720 teachers 200 bilingual teachers

1,390 252 bilingual teachers


Indicator 3 : Establishing at least 200 new AECOS and PROHECOs in bilingual communities.


0 200 schools 252


Indicator 4 : Establishment and legalization of at least 2,800 ADELs in rural schools and 400 ADELs in bilingual schools


0

2,800 ADELs in rural schools 400 ADEls in bilingual schools

3,774 ADELS 407 ADELS in EIB schools


Indicator 5 :

Financing and implementation of: 1,400 PECSs in PROHECO schools 2,800 PECSs in official schools 800 PECs in bilingual schools


0 5,000 PECSs total 5,934


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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 10/23/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 05/24/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.50 3 11/25/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.72 4 06/02/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.54 5 11/13/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.49 6 05/05/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.50 7 11/23/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 29.07 8 04/29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 37.09 9 11/11/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.43

10 03/21/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.45 11 06/20/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 42.59 12 08/18/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 42.59 13 11/13/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 42.59 14 05/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 42.59 15 07/31/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 42.59 16 12/03/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 46.60 17 03/19/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.30

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal Sector information. At the time of appraisal, with a population of 6 million people and a GDP per capita of US$730, Honduras was one the poorest country in Latin American and the Caribbean region1. In 1999, total education expenditures amounted to 5.2 percent of GDP, or 21.4 percent of government expenditure, higher than the neighboring Central American countries. The country’s education sector had experienced gains in primary enrollment and in the number of years of schooling, with the expansion benefiting mainly the poor. Net primary education enrollment reached 95 percent in urban areas and 85 percent in rural areas, and years of schooling reached an average of 5.1 in 1999, compared to 4.7 in 1989. Despite progress, Honduras still faced considerable educational challenges, including unequal education outcomes, poor quality, limited access to pre-primary education, limited educational opportunities in rural areas, and institutional inefficiencies. Finally, the country was still suffering from the destruction caused by Hurricane Mitch (1998), which caused damage to the education sector estimated in US$28.1 million. The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS-19893 HO) targeted poverty reduction focusing on three development themes: (i) reducing poverty and enhancing social development to strengthen human capital and social safety nets; (ii) sustainability through macroeconomic stability, improved governance, and state decentralization and modernization; and (iii) reviving growth to ensure economic recovery and shifting the economy into a higher growth path. The Honduras Community Education Project supported the first two goals of the CAS by promoting better coverage and higher quality of education in the neediest areas, and by seeking to reduce inequalities between rural and urban communities. The Project also sought to deepen education decentralization strategies through the creation and strengthening of community-level education associations. IDA had been supporting Honduras’ efforts in the education sector through the Basic Education Project (PROMEB IDA/26940 – completed in December 2000) which focused on improving the quality of basic education services. Many lessons drawn from the implementation of PROMEB were taken into consideration during preparation of this credit.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The objective of the Community Based Education Project was to improve the quality of preschool and lower basic education (grades 1-6) in targeted rural areas in Honduras, including the improvement of the quality of intercultural and bilingual education in indigenous communities. The Project’s key performance indicators were the following:

1 By 2006 the Honduras population was estimated at 7.2 million and its per capita income at US$1,190.

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• Increased enrollment rates in rural preschools and lower basic education by 5 and 8 percentage points, respectively.

• Improved internal efficiency indicators in rural schools: (i) increased early entry and promotion; and (ii) reduced repetition and drop out rates in rural schools (baseline data 1999).

• Improved performance in standardized test scores in Spanish and Mathematics for 3rd and 6th grade students from mainly rural multigrade schools (baseline data 1999).

• Improved student evaluation results of social achievements and self-esteem (non-cognitive development).

• Improved rural school teachers’ productivity measured by attendance and days of work (baseline data 1999).

• Increase availability and relevance of education learning materials for rural schools. • Positive changes in perceptions, attitude and behavior of key school-based actors:

principals, teachers, students, parents and the community.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification There were no revisions to the Project’s Development Objective and key performance indicators during implementation. However, as explained in section 1.6 below, the scope of the Project was broadened, both to adjust to changing Government needs as well as to make use of additional resources resulting from the appreciation of the Special Drawling Rights (SDR) during project implementation.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries The Project’s target population included the following groups: (i) poor and marginalized rural communities; (ii) preschool students (ages 5-6); (iii) all of the nine indigenous and Afro-Honduran groups of Honduras; and (iv) overage and late-entry students. By expanding access to basic education services at the preschool and primary education levels (grades 1-6) the Project expected to directly benefit approximately 43,800 new school-aged children –including children from the nine ethnic groups-- in targeted rural areas. Additionally, around 4,000 rural communities, including 800 intercultural and bilingual groups, were to be organized to support and monitor school performance. The Project also expected to indirectly benefit all primary level students through the participatory reforms supported by it. Due to the expansion in project’s scope, many of the Project’s activities reached all primary education students. By Project completion2, the Ministry of Education reported a total of 211,824 students enrolled in preschools at the national level (of which 106,420 in rural areas), compared to 97,093 in 2003. At the primary level, the number of students enrolled in rural areas increased from 627,425 to 777,690 between 2002 and 2006. All students enrolled in preschool and primary level benefited from the new Basic National Curriculum (Currículo Nacional Básico - CNB) supported under the Project, and all primary level students received new textbooks in Mathematics, language, natural and social sciences. Additionally, all bilingual students in preschool through 3rd grade benefited from the adaptations for intercultural and multilingual

2 2006 data.

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students, and most received education materials and textbooks. Finally, teachers at both levels received training financed by the credit.

1.5 Original Components The Project had four components: Component 1. Local Application of National Curriculum (US$9.71 million equivalent of total Project cost). The component aimed to support the implementation of the national curriculum in rural multigrade, intercultural and bilingual schools, through the following sub-components and strategies: A. Validation of the National Curriculum for Preschool and Lower Basic Education (grades

1 to 6) by Rural Teachers. This sub-component was designed to support rural teacher’s feedback regarding: (i) national curriculum reforms, programs, methodologies and tools for its implementation in rural, intercultural and bilingual school; and (ii) pedagogical strategies to address learning disabilities. In addition, this sub-component would support the coordination of a teachers and education stakeholders’ validation process in poor urban areas not addressed by this project.

B. Effective Application of Curriculum and Appropriate Educational Materials for

Preschool and Primary Rural Schools. This sub-component was designed to: (i) support the integration and implementation of various rural multigrade teaching and preschool modalities in the country; (ii) provide the appropriate methodologies and didactic materials to implement multigrade pedagogical strategies in rural schools; and (iii) provide the appropriate methodologies and didactic materials to implement intercultural and bilingual education strategies in rural indigenous communities representing all nine ethnic groups in the country.

C. Student Learning Assessment and Education Quality Evaluation Strategies. This sub-

component was intended to: (i) support design and implementation of a validation learning assessment; (ii) develop and distribute student assessment guides for teachers in primary and preschool levels; (iii) disseminate the student learning results to districts and communities; (iv) finance external bi-annual standardized assessments for 3rd and 6th graders; and (v) evaluate innovative community-based education programs such as PROHECO, Community Based Preschool Services (CCPREB) and intercultural and Bilingual Education (EIB).

D. In-service Teacher Development and Training Programs. This sub-component was

designed to support: (i) in-service university training programs for rural teachers, district staff and teacher trainers; (ii) quality enhancement programs for community-based volunteers supporting teaching in preschool and intercultural and bilingual schools; and (iii) in-classroom training and follow up for rural teachers.

Component 2. Community-Based Provision of Preschool and Basic Education Services (US$14.49 million equivalent of total Project cost). The component aimed to expand PROHECO3, a community-based education program for preschoolers through 6th grade in rural

3 In March 1999 Honduras launched PROHECO – a community-based education program to attract teachers to rural isolated areas. The program formed parental committees (Community Education Associations-AECOs) to open schools, hire and pay teachers, and support school improvements and maintenance. During the first year, the program

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and remote communities, including areas with intercultural bilingual populations. It had two sub-components: A. Strengthening and Expansion of the Honduras Community Education Program

(PROHECO). This sub-component was designed to support: (i) organizing community education councils (AECOs) in 600 remote communities; (ii) creating new PROHECO schools in those communities; and (iii) attracting and retaining at least 720 new basic education teachers (grades 1-6) and 600 preschool volunteers in these new schools.

B. Creation of Intercultural and Bilingual Schools using the PROHECO Model for

Community Participation and Parental Involvement. This sub-component was designed to adapt PROHECO strategies to the education needs of the nine ethnic communities of Honduras. It would support: (i) creating new PROHECO schools in at least 200 intercultural and bilingual communities; and (ii) attracting and retaining 200-EIB trained lower basic education teachers, 400 preschool volunteers (200 of them in multicultural bilingual schools - EIB). Financial transfers, to be managed by parental committees, would support paying teachers, volunteers and purchasing non-durable school materials.

Component 3. School-Based Management for Rural Communities (US$9.96 million equivalent of total Project cost). This component aimed at creating a school organization strategy in rural areas through the involvement of principals, teachers, parents, and students to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their schools. It intended to adapt the PROHECO model to the needs and existing organizational structure of traditional rural schools. It had three sub-components: A. Development of a School-Based Planning and Community Participation System in the

Rural Sector. This sub-component was designed to: (i) support the organization of school councils in rural communities for traditional multigrade schools (called ADELs – Asociaciones de Desarrollo Educativo Local); and (ii) train school council members to improve school management capacity, education planning, and administration of financial transfers for school improvement activities.

B. School-Based Design and Implementation of School Improvement Projects. This sub-

component was designed to support: (i) planning of school improvement activities by AECOs and ADELs through the development of school projects (Proyectos Educativos de Centro - PECs); (ii) transferring financial resources to AECOs and ADELs to implement their PECs; and (iii) training on school improvement to teachers and parents through teachers’ self-help groups (Centros de Aprendizaje Docente) and workshops for parents (Escuelas para Padres).

Component 4. Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-Based Management Program (US$11.23 million equivalent of total Project cost). This component was designed to strengthen the Ministry of Education including its decentralized offices (Departmental Education Offices and School Districts) to guarantee

aimed to create 500 rural schools. In its second year, PROHECO enrollment grew and about 800 schools were functioning at the time of project preparation. The program was supported under the IDA financed Basic Education Project (IDA-26940).

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effective support for community participation and school-based management strategies for the rural education sector in Honduras. This component had three sub-components: A. Central Support of the Community Participation and School-based Management System

in the Rural Sector. This sub-component would: (i) strengthen the central units of the Ministry of Education which support school organization and community participation in the rural sector; and (ii) support the Unidad Técnica de Transformación de la Educación Nacional (UTEN), which would coordinate new education investment programs and manage the national Information, Education and Communication (IEC) campaign for education reforms.

B. Strengthening the Capacity of Departmental Education Offices to Plan Educational

Needs and to Monitor Community-Based Education Programs. This component would: (i) support the design and implementation of an information system for the programs financed by the Project (PROHECO, Multicultural Bilingual Education - EIB and Preschool Centers - CCPREB); (ii) finance the training, acquisition and installation of equipment to improve the administrative efficiency of departmental offices in monitoring and evaluating results of education programs; and (iii) establish a financial administrative system to monitor, legalize and audit financial transfers for school improvements channeled directly to schools, communities and education districts.

C. Strengthening Capacity of Education Districts to support Curricular Applications and

Community and School-Based Management. This sub-component would finance: (i) the completion of the basic infrastructure needs of the 86 school districts that have the largest percentage of rural, intercultural and bilingual schools; (ii) provision of equipment (computers, furniture and vehicles) to support these districts new role in the promotion, organization, training and technical assistance activities for community participation and school-based management; and (iii) activities to strengthen the school district professional teams so they could support multigrade teaching, intercultural and bilingual education, community involvement and school-based management.

A total of around US$2.41 equivalent was unallocated at the time of project approval.

1.6 Revised Components The credit agreement was not revised during the life of the Project but components had their scope changed. Component 1 had its scope widened. Originally designed to support the validation of the national curriculum for Grades 1-6, this component ended up financing most of its elaboration and validation as well as its adaptation to bilingual and intercultural contexts. During project preparation it was expected that the CNB would have been finalized by the time the Project was ready to be implemented. However, by the time the Project became effective, there was limited progress in the design of the new curriculum and the Government requested IDA’s support with it. The Project financed the finalization of the CNB including producing all the essential guidelines for specific areas (multigrade, intercultural and bilingual and special education) and adapting the learning materials and textbooks. It also financed the training of teachers on the new curriculum and textbooks and learning materials for all students grades 1-6. Component 2 also financed activities not originally foreseen at project design. In 2002 it was agreed that this component would finance the creation and operation of “preparatory” schools

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(Centros Communitarios de Pre-Básica – CCPREB) during the months of December and January every year to prepare preschool students who were to enter first grade. Additionally, due to the high demand by rural communities, the Project financed a far greater number (about 25 percent more) of rural schools and teachers than originally planned. Component 3 maintained its scope but financed a greater number of school development projects (PECs). This was due to a joint Government/IDA decision to allocate additional funds resulting from the SDR exchange rate appreciation to the PECs. Component 4 experienced changes as well due to the institutional changes introduced by the new administration in 2002. The UTEN – created in 2001 as an effectiveness condition and as a result of a popular consultation carried out in 2001 under the FONAC (Foro Nacional de Convergencia) – was disabled. The incoming administration considered UTEN’s functions an overlap with those of the main departments in the Ministry. The Government pursued the objective of improving the coordination among its programs and multilaterals and donors through the work of each technical unit in the Ministry. At the central level, there was strengthening of the human capacity through the hiring and training of coordinators for the technical units to support the implementation of the national curriculum. At the same time, there was less emphasis on the strengthening information systems at the departmental level since the IADB and the German Development Agency (GTZ) were also financing these interventions. Finally, there was an increase in the number of promotores (agents of change) at the local level to support the implementation of PROHECO schools, ADELs and EIB schools.

1.7 Other significant changes Education For All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI). Honduras became part of the EFA-FTI in October 2002. As the head of the donors’ cooperating round table (Mesa de Cooperantes), IDA played a crucial role in supporting Honduras to comply with the requirements to join the EFA-FTI initiative and be eligible for funds for its education sector. Through direct technical assistance and financing additional technical assistance, the IDA team closely collaborated with the Government and donors to prepare a sector-wide development plan (focusing on improving 6th grade completion in the country) and defining the alignment and harmonization guidelines for donors. The team also supported Government’s efforts to consult with key stakeholders and gain broad ownership of this plan. Finally, IDA was an important interlocutor among different donors, seeking harmonization and support for an education strategy. Implementation of EFA-FTI heavily relied on donors’ involvement and support, particularly as most donors have country offices and were more involved in providing on-going support to the Ministry. Implementation was not without tension, as donors frequently questioned why IDA funds were never part of the pooled arrangement, and donors strongly opposed to the use of consultants to implementation EFA. As IDA originally financed most of the start-up cost of EFA –including the establishment of an EFA unit and its staffing—donors perceived that IDA’s contribution was not favoring institutional development. In early 2007, when the Ministry renewed the contract of many consultants in the EFA unit--against a previous agreement with donors—donors incorrectly believed that IDA funds were being used for that purpose, creating further tensions. As an EFA-FTI country, Honduras committed to achieve a set of education goals by the year 2015. Given that those goals were consistent with the Project’s PDO, IDA agreed to the allocation of US$5 million equivalent in credit funds to EFA-FTI specific activities. About US$3 million equivalent of those resources were allocated to: training and workshops, technical

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assistance at all levels, furnishing and equipment of the EFA central unit, vehicles for supervision, materials for training, and consultants for the EFA unit. The remaining funds were allocated to the purchase of textbooks and school materials. EFA-FTI donor funds started financing some activities originally contemplated under the Project, thus freeing up resources to increase the scope of other activities. Appreciation of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in relation to the US dollar (US$). There was an increase in the amount of resources under the Credit due to the appreciation of the SDR in relation to the U.S. dollar. The original credit amount increased from US$41.5 million equivalent to US$47.3 million equivalent by Project completion. All of the additional Credit resources were spent by Project completion on: (i) textbooks and teacher guides for natural and social sciences for grades 1-6 for all schools in the country; (ii) school development projects (PECs); and (iii) activities that had their scope increased. Project Extension. The Project was extended for 12 months until December 31 2007, to allow for the carrying out of the International Competitive Bidding (ICB) process to purchase science textbooks and teacher guides with the additional funds resulting from the appreciation of the SDR.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Ownership and participation from the Government. The idea of involving the community in the delivery of education services in rural areas originated with the Government of Honduras (GoH) after interactions with the Government of El Salvador and getting acquainted with their EDUCO model. The Ministry of Education was looking for ways to reach remote rural communities, where it had difficulties in attracting and retaining traditional teachers. Furthermore, the community model enabled the Government to hire teachers without the benefits and cost of traditional teachers. Likewise, evidence from neighboring El Salvador showed that such model promoted accountability of teachers. The model was applied to Honduras starting in 1999 on a small scale and the Government later requested IDA’s support to expand it. The Government (i) nominated a team of specialists formed by Ministry staff and local consultants to design PROHECO, including carrying out the social, technical, institutional and economic/financial feasibility studies; and (iv) created the institutional infrastructure to manage the program at the central and local levels. The GoH also requested IDA’s technical assistance for the feasibility studies required to establish PROHECO, and later to finance its expansion. Preparation was highly participatory and included important background analysis. Project preparation included key analyses to better design intervention strategies. In addition to a social consultation carried out in 2000 under FONAC (Foro Nacional de Convergencia), the Government and IDA carried out multiple consultations with stakeholders. The feedback from consultations was incorporated into project design. A Rapid Rural Assessment was conducted in November 2000, a joint effort between the Government and IDA. Four teams of social scientists visited 9 communities in 11 departments. The objective of this assessment was to review the pertinence of existing pilots of PROHECO and EIB as well as the feasibility of expanding these to new communities. The focus groups organized in all communities included parent, teachers, indigenous federations, and students. Interviews with local representatives were carried out as well. During Project preparation the Government and IDA’s team prepared an Indigenous People Development Plan, based on the consultations with Honduran indigenous groups.

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Incorporation of the Indigenous People Development Plan into the Project (IPDP). Project design fully incorporated the IPDP agreed between the Ministry of Education and indigenous federations. Furthermore, each component was designed to ensure that ethnic communities benefited from Project interventions. Lessons learned from other projects were taken into account. IDA’s team looked for other experiences in the areas of education access and quality, community participation, and institutional strengthening. El Salvador’s community education model (EDUCO) was carefully reviewed during project preparation –both by the Government and IDA’s teams-- and lessons were adapted to Honduras. Likewise, experiences with transferring resources directly to school were examined (Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay) and incorporated into the Project. The Project was in line with the CAS (19893-HO) and with the Poverty Reduction Strategy (July 2000) for Honduras. The CAS identified poverty as its primary goal. The Project targeted poverty reduction and social development through basic education opportunities, especially in the most isolated and dispersed rural communities. While most risks were adequately identified, conflicts with teachers’ unions were underestimated as well as political commitment to decentralization of the sector. IDA’s team correctly identified most of the risks to the Project, except for the opposition of teacher unions to several aspects of institutional change, as well as their opposition to the student assessments and evaluations. Additionally, many teachers resisted integrating new education inputs into the learning process. Likewise, the team underestimated the required long-term commitment to decentralize education responsibilities (accompanied by financing) to local levels. Overly ambitious design of institutional strengthening interventions. While the institutional assessment carried out during preparation provided a good picture of the institutional strengthening needs required to improve the quality of education, the interventions proposed by the team were ambitious. This is particularly true given IDA’s previous experiences in Honduras. For instance, Honduras lacked an information system for education data and the team expected that such system could be developed and operational under the Project, which proved to not be feasible.

2.2 Implementation (including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable) Delays in declaring effectiveness. The Project became effective four months after the originally estimated effectiveness date. The delay was mostly due to the Congressional approval requirement for all IDA loans in Honduras. In addition to four other effectiveness condition –all met-- the credit included the hiring of independent auditors. This condition was waved once all other conditions had been met so not to cause further effectiveness delays. The firm Price Waterhouse Coopers was hired in the first semester of 2003. Change in Administration. Project preparation took place between 1998 and 2001 under one administration. However, in February 2002, shortly after the credit was declared effective, a new administration took office. In preparation for the transition, a joint IDA and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) team --also financing an education project at the time-- prepared a transition plan to guarantee information exchange about the Project. As such, during the first quarter of 2002 there were several workshops with staff from the outgoing and incoming administrations. This initiative was crucial in guaranteeing ownership of the Project

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by the new administration. At the same time, the incoming administration requested some changes in project activities to better support their education strategy, which were incorporated into the Project. Restructuring of the Ministry of Education (MoE). Immediately after its inauguration, the new administration reorganized the MoE, creating three vice-ministries. This reorganization caused a period of confusion and friction, particularly due to lack of definition of the roles and responsibilities of each vice-ministry. Delays in the definition of a decentralization law. The administration which took office in 2002, started to work on a decentralization program to empower local levels of government (including communities and schools). It was the Government’s intention to establish the parent associations of traditional schools (ADELs) within the framework of the new law. Therefore, ADELs ability to receive financial transfers for the PECs was delayed pending approval of the law4. However, by 2004 the law had not been approved and the Government proceeded to allow ADELs to receive funds. High turn-over of parents in AECOs and ADELs. AECO and ADEL members are elected every two years. This rotation was designed to increase the number of community members trained in school management and also to give the opportunity for a variety of stakeholders to be involved in the school. However, this rotation proved to be costly in terms of the training required for AECO and ADEL members. This was particularly true in the case of AECO members who had the additional responsibility of managing and paying teachers. Furthermore, it was observed that the initial training given to AECO members was not sufficient for them to carry out their responsibilities. Conflict with teacher unions. Teacher unions led strikes through most of the Project’s implementation, cutting the number of school days by as much as half –and hindering any possibility of real gains in learning. Additionally, unions opposed to the national student assessment system (SINECE) and the implementation on the national curriculum (CNB) prepared with credit support. By 2006 teacher unions had negotiated a salary increase that significantly limited the possibility of future Government-financed investments in the education sector. Overall, the conflict with the unions overshadowed many of the attempted changes in the education sector of Honduras. Implementation PHRD. In 2004 The Government of Japan approved an implementation grant (PRHD) in the amount of US$715,000 to support the Project objectives. The Grant was designed to finance technical assistance to: (i) build the Ministry’s capacity at the departmental and district offices; (ii) expand and strengthen the role of community promoters; (iii) support parent school councils to ensure they had the appropriate institutional capacity to carry their functions; (iv) support capacity building and institutional strengthening; and (v) finance audits. In June 2006 the PHRD was amended to replace some activities, as well as to cancel US$337,100. This cancellation was done after an IDA mission reviewed the activities that had already taken place, those that were still pending, and the estimated time to complete them. The Ministry and IDA agreed that some activities were no longer necessary and that others could not be implemented before the grant closed. Therefore, the grant was amended and partially

4 The legal status of traditional schools is granted by the Secretaría de Gobernacíon while PROHECO schools’ legal status is granted by the Ministry of Education. Therefore, this delay only affected ADELs.

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cancelled to reflect this agreement. By Project completion, among other studies, the implementation PHRD had financed: (i) manuals and guidelines in the use of preschool and primary school materials; (ii) the development of a textbook distribution strategy for the Ministry of Education, which enabled the quick and successful distribution of millions of textbooks in 2007 and early 2008; (iii) workshops and training of community education promoters; and (iv) a complete audit of PROHECO teacher pensions.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Design. Project design focused on developing the Ministry’s capacity at central, departmental and district levels to produce reliable education data, regular student assessments and, to a lesser extent, monitor and evaluate specific education interventions. Data collection and processing would be carried out in a decentralized manner, heavily relying on the department and district levels for collection. The PAD foresaw that the credit would finance: (i) the design and implementation of a learning assessment for 3rd and 6th graders in mathematics, language and science, including dissemination of results; (ii) evaluation of innovative community-based education programs; and (iii) design and implementation of an information system. Implementation and Utilization. Overall, while monitoring and evaluation was well highlighted and incorporated into the Project’s design, the actual implementation fell short of expectations, earning the Project a moderately unsatisfactory rating in this category. There were improvements in the information collection processes and practices since Project effectiveness. Nonetheless, by Project completion the Ministry of Education still did not have an information system which could provide timely and consistent data on the education sector. Likewise, the there were two student assessments of 3rd and 6th grade students, on a sample basis, between 2002 and 20045 . Once credit funds for this purpose ran out, the evaluation was discontinued. In 2007, with financing from USAID, another evaluation of a sample of 6th graders was carried out. Since 2006 the Ministry is producing national education data. Nonetheless, despite the credit’s financing of equipment, computers and personnel training to support the generation of education data, by Project completion the Ministry of Education was still manually collecting education data (enrollment, repetition, completion, attendance, etc) at the district level. Districts are responsible for transmitting data to the Departmental level, which consolidates the data electronically and sends it to the Ministry of Education. The data produced is still not reliable, as the ICR team experienced first-hand. The problem with reliability is believed to result from: (i) data collection problems, particularly human error and inconsistencies in reporting; (ii) lack of qualified personnel at the Ministry’s Statistical Unit; (iii) outdated technology at both departmental and national levels to process data; and (iv) internal conflicts between two units within the Ministry --Unidad de Infotecnología and Unidad de Estadística Educativa-- about their respective roles and responsibilities. It should be also noted that Project interventions in the MoE area tended to focus at the national level, rather than district and departmental levels where data is actually collected. As mentioned in section 1.6 of this document, as the IADB and GTZ concentrated its efforts in improving

5 Student assessments were carried out by the University Francisco Morazán (UMCE).

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information systems at the departmental level, IDA interventions focused at the national level. Notwithstanding, data collection and processing in Honduras depends on all three levels, as foreseen in original project design. Heavy collaboration among IDA, IADB and GTZ would be the least required to ensure the data collection and processing improved and that MoE ended up with an adequate monitoring system. The ICR team found no evidence that this took place. Another hypothesis for the lack of greater success in this area is that IDA’s team gave greater importance to the development of the student assessment system, both in terms of resources as well as supervision efforts. Thus, the MoE was under less pressure to improve its data collection/monitoring system. As a result of the difficulty in acquiring reliable data within the Ministry, certain technical units in charge of specific programs financed under the Project started gathering their own yearly information and using it for monitoring and decision making. This is true in both the PROHECO unit and the unit in charge of the intercultural bilingual education program (Programa Nacional de Educación de las Étnias Autóctonas y Afroantillanas de Honduras - PRONEEAAH). The Project did not anticipate rigorous impact evaluations – which were much less common at the time this Project was prepared—but specific studies about programs supported by it. There was a study on PROHECO, and an in-depth project evaluation at mid-term implementation. It does not seem like the results of these or other studies have been widely disseminated in the Ministry or the lessons incorporated into their programs.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Rating: Satisfactory Indigenous Safeguard. Highly Satisfactory. Representatives and community members of the nine indigenous and Afro-Honduran groups of Honduras were consulted during project identification and preparation. An Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) was prepared before project approval and agreed with the Government. According to the IPDP, the Project would support the Intercultural Bilingual Program (EIB) of the Ministry of Education, through financing specific activities agreed during preparation. By Project completion, the outputs for those activities had all been reached and/or surpassed, earning the Project a highly satisfactory rating under the safeguard category. Among the main achievements, it is worth noting the following:

• Reorganization, strengthening, and institutionalization of the unit in charge of intercultural bilingual education (EIB), called PRONEEAAH-EIB6. Departmental EIB units were also established and staff trained. That PRONEEAAH unit remains operational after Project completion, though it seems that some staff are still financed by donors.

• A national EIB curriculum for preschool through grade 6 designed based on the national curriculum (CNB). The CNB was adapted to the linguistic and socio-cultural characteristics of the different ethnic groups. Teacher guides were also elaborated and distributed.

6 PRONEEAAHH was created in 1994. It worked during 1994-1996, and it languished during 1996-2000. It was reinvigorated with the Project’s support. PRONEEAAHH had not worked properly due to lack of adequate funding, an excessive centralized functioning and a poor selection of its staff.

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• Textbooks and educational materials designed, validated, printed, and distributed to all EIB schools.

• 780 teachers trained for two years to get a teaching degree with EIB orientation. Another 172 pre-school volunteers trained in EIB teaching.

• 268 PROHECO-EIB schools and 60 PROHECO-EIB preschools created under the Project. By Project completion, these schools were fully funded by the Government.

• Approximately 1,000 ADELs created in indigenous communities served by traditional schools. Their members received training and funds to develop and implement school development projects (PECs).

• One-time collection of information on EIB student population, which served as input to print and distribute bilingual textbooks.

Fiduciary. Moderately Satisfactory. Overall, the implementation unit (UEP) did an adequate job in the fiduciary areas, earning a moderately satisfactory rating due to punctual issues that arose during implementation. Project audits were clean with little observations which were addressed by the UEP in a timely manner. In terms of financial management, the key shortcomings during implementation were: (i) at the UEP level there were problems in reporting and reconciling credit expenditures for over 12 months; and (ii) inadequate training in financial management for AECO and ADEL members, including insufficient supervision of PEC funds. This later led to incorrect procedures on the part of the ADELs and AECOs in two areas: (i) inadequate/incorrect book-keeping of the resources transferred to them for the school improvement projects (PECs), including a pending reconciliation of about US$200,000 by Project completion; and (ii) poor management by AECOs of the PROHECO teachers’ retirement contributions. It should be noted, however, that the earlier problem was very small in relation to the total amount of transfers7, and the later problem was exacerbated by the Ministry’s failure to give timely information to the AECOs on where to deposit these funds once INPREMA –the teachers’ retirement association—decided to no longer accept those deposits. This problem was detected during a supervision mission of a school. As a result, IDA’s management required a full audit of PROHECO funds, and held back the appraisal of the subsequent credit. On the procurement side, in general the processes were followed and completed in a satisfactory and timely manner. This is particularly true in the last year of implementation when the UEP successfully carried out a large ICB to purchase science textbooks. One noteworthy exception was a 2003 bidding process for printing textbooks, guides and materials that had problems with the technical specifications and the process had to be cancelled. There was, however, a lack of integration between of the procurement module into the financial management information system, which created limitations for a better management of the project resources.

7 AECOs and ADELs Schools received and managed about US$7 million equivalent in direct transfers financing 6,988 school development projects (PECs). Therefore, the pending reconciliation represents a tiny fraction of the total. At the same time, about one-third of all municipalities in Honduras failed to liquidate their transfers from the national government, as required by law.

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2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Most of the Project achievements –the establishment of over 1,000 PROHECO schools, hiring of over 1,500 teachers and 900 preschool volunteers, the PRONEAAH and PROHECO’s offices -- have already been incorporated into the MoE’s structure and budget8, ensuring their sustainability. By 2006 the PROHECO program was fully incorporated into the Ministry. The 2008 annual operational program (POA) of the Ministry of Education included all the funds for PROHECO schools. Furthermore, Honduras’s Congressional committee on education is currently working on a bill to make PROHECO an official government policy for education delivery in rural areas, ensuring their long-term financing, granting legal status to AECOs, and outlining rights for their teachers, including a pension system. The approval of this initiative as a law would be an important step to ensure long-term sustainability of PROHECOs, particularly as unions have strongly opposed them.9 On the other hand, community associations serving traditional schools (ADELs) had their role limited to managing funds transferred for PECs. As the MoE stopped those transfers after Project completion, the sustainability of ADELs is questionable. The EFA-FTI pooled fund will continue supporting efforts to improve the quality of education, mostly with the purchase and distribution of education inputs (particularly textbooks), technical assistance, and training for SE staff and teachers. The new IDA credit (US$15.37 equivalent) approved by the Board on January 24 2008 and expected to be effective on June 15, 2008 will focus on consolidating gains in the area of institutional strengthening (including monitoring and evaluation), and the application of the new curriculum at the school level. The EFA-FTI unit in the Ministry of Education will be responsible for continuing the implementation of its own activities as well as be in charge of the new IDA credit. That office relies mostly on the Ministry’s own staff, with the support of some specialized consultants in fiduciary areas. Long-term sustainability of purchase and distribution of learning inputs, including textbooks remains a serious concern. The MoE has relied on donors, IADB and IDA to finance textbooks, without ever developing a long-term strategy to finance those. In the context of fiscal challenges, including rising public wages in the education sector, education sector resources are expected to remain scarce. Under the Project, with financing of an implementation PHRD, a consultancy was carried out to develop a proposal of a textbook policy for public schools, including a maintenance and reposition plan. However, MoE authorities have not shown an inclination to adopting a textbook policy, nor undertaking the financial responsibility to replace textbooks. The institutional strengthening achieved under the Project is marginal, particularly compared to the sector’s actual needs. Therefore the follow-up credit will focus most of its resources in this area.

8 It should be noted, however, that the Ministry of Education still relies on consultants financed by donors to supplement their staff.

9 The education committee is expecting to submit this initiative as a law in September 2008.

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3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The relevance of the Project’s development objective was high at the time of preparation and remains high today, as listed in the CAS of November 2006 and the 2008 CAS Update (draft). The Project strove to expand access to preschool and basic education in remote rural areas as well as improve their quality. This was consistent with the Government’s priorities at the time of approval, and the priorities of the 2002 incoming administration. As such, the follow-up credit approved (IDA-43810) focuses on strengthening the education system with the objective of improving the quality of education for Honduran students, as well as sector governance. Furthermore, the Project remains consistent with EFA-FTI goals. Project design was relevant, identifying activities that responded to the needs of Honduras’s education sector and considering relevant experience in previous projects in Honduras and abroad. Furthermore, project initiatives laid the foundation for achieving EFA-FTI goals. The first component, Local Application of National Curriculum, was designed to answer to the need of having a relevant curriculum to the innumerous multigrade and bilingual schools, training teachers in the new curriculum, and regularly assessing student progress. This new curriculum is expected to serve as the basis for additional efforts to improve the quality and relevance of education in Honduras. The second component, Community-based Provision of Preschool and Basic Education Services, addressed the supply-side problems of education provision in rural and remote areas of Honduras by promoting the expansion of an existing community education model, PROHECO. Likewise, in order to promote early entry into primary school and student preparedness, this component also supported a preschool community model. Reaching universal primary education, still an unmet goal for Honduras will only be possible with the existence of PROHECO or similar models. The one area that the preparation team did not fully evaluate was the implication of having an education system with two distinct modalities of education management (traditional vs. PROHECO) and the difficulties that that would pose for education management. This was further complicated as the education system was going through some changes. Fortunately, the PROHECO model has generated support among legislators, who are pushing for its formal adoption. The third component, School-based Management of Rural Communities, attempted to improve school efficiency and teacher accountability by increasing parental involvement in their management. While the design and interventions of this component correctly responded to the needs of rural schools, and attempted to minimize the difference between PROHECO and traditional schools, the interventions proved insufficient to increase the accountability of traditional teachers. On the other hand, the direct transfer of resources to schools (PECs) proved to be a very successful strategy to quickly respond to school needs –including materials and minor infrastructure improvements. The last component, Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-based Management Programs, also correctly aimed to address the weak institutional capacity of the Ministry. However, in hindsight, the activities proposed for financing proved to be extremely ambitious given the frail institutional framework of the education sector, the high politization of the sector, and the powerful role of teacher unions. Additionally, the premise for these interventions to work was the decentralization of the system, which never fully occurred.

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As such, the gains in this component were far inferior to what was expected during project design and efforts will continue to be required in this area. Project implementation responded to the evolving needs of the sector in a timely and flexible way. This was facilitated by the fact that there was a consensus on the Project’s objectives and the ensuing changes were basically related to arising opportunities and the Government selecting new approaches. There was never a need to amend the Project, given its relevant objective and flexible design. Examples of such changes occurred when the 2002 administration took over and when EFA-FTI was introduced. The 2002 administration requested IDA’s support to change the scope of some activities, as well as to support the reorganization of the Ministry of Education. Second, the Project was asked to finance the development of the new curriculum and its adaptations, not originally planned. Then, with the launching of EFA-FTI, IDA’s team quickly agreed to reallocate funds to support some activities, all of which were consistent with Project objectives. Finally, with the appreciation of the SDR in relation to the US$, Honduras had additional resources available under the Project, which were quickly allocated to expand the scope of some activities and also to finance other activities not originally foreseen in the Project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives This Project presents challenges in terms of evaluation. First, as previously mentioned, the quality of education data in Honduras is poor. The IDA team worked at length with the MoE during the last 12 months to try to “clean up” the data as much as possible and ensure consistency. Notwithstanding, during the preparation of this document, the team still found discrepancies with the data presented. Second, two of the seven outcome indicators selected to measure project success are subjective—availability and relevance of learning materials, and changes in perceptions of key school-based actions. Third, most indicators did not have a baseline at the time of Project approval –though a baseline was collected in the first year of implementation—and 2007 data was not available at the time of this ICR. Finally, the issue of attribution or even contribution is pertinent when reviewing some outcome indicators, particularly as in 2004 EFA-FTI donors started financing many activities with objectives similar to the Project. This will be further discussed in the context of individual outcome indicators. Increase enrollment rates in preschool and primary education. The outcome indicator for this goal was to increase enrollment rates in rural preschools by 5 percentage points and in lower basic education by 8 percentage points. Between 2002 and 2006, preschool net enrollment rates in rural areas increased from 18.2 percent to 24.7 percent. At the primary level (grades 1 to 6), net enrollment in rural areas increased from 82.5 percent to 93.7 percent during the same period. Given that the growth in enrollment rates in rural areas is directly related to the expansion of PROHECO schools, the Project contributed to the achievement in this target. In terms of preschool enrollment, it is worth noticing that preschool enrollment rates increased nationally during the same period (from 24 percent to 28.3 percent), though at a slower pace. Therefore, there were likely other factors besides project interventions contributing to this increase. Improved internal efficiency in rural schools. It was measured by: (i) increased early entry and promotion, and (ii) reduced repetition and drop out rates. The outcome indicators for this objective have mixed results. In terms of increasing early entry into rural schools, the percentage of 6 year-olds entering 1st grade increased from 50 to 59 percent between 2002 and 2006. In urban areas that increase was more significant --46 to 67 percent in the same period. Thus, in absolute terms this indicator was achieved. Nonetheless, given that early entry increased nationwide –and at a much higher rate in urban areas— it is difficult to determine the Project’s contribution to this growth.

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Rural repetition rates improved slightly between 2002 and 2006, from 9.8 percent to 8.9 percent and nationally from 8.6 percent to 7.3 percent. It should be noted, however, that repetition rates have had slight up and down oscillations for the implementation years when data is available, without a consistent pattern. Overall, there is no clear trend in repetition rates to say this goal was achieved. Drop out rates in rural areas remained at 2.8 percent throughout implementation10. While the Project’s outcome indicator was to reduce this percentage, one should recognize that with the entrance of 32,250 new primary level rural students into the system, keeping this number constant is an achievement in itself. On the other hand, rural completion rates increased from 68 to 73 percent between 2002 and 200611. In addition to IDA-financed interventions, EFA-FTI donors have also focused on decreasing drop-out rates and improving completion rates –with complementary actions to the Project. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the extent that the above results are attributable to the Project. Improved quality. The outcome indicator listed in the PAD to measure education quality improvement was 3rd and 6th grade student performance in standardized Mathematics and Spanish tests. During project implementation, it was expected that the Ministry of Education would apply such evaluations in 2002 (baseline), 2004, and 2006. The Ministry carried out the assessments in 2002 and 2004. In November 2007 a sample-based evaluation of learning outcomes was carried out for 6th grade students. The assessment was partially based on the new curriculum, raising issues of comparison with previous assessments. The table below shows student performance in the 2002, 2004, and 2007 assessments. The 2007 results are preliminary. While there is a slight improvement in 2007, in general students failed to master the basic learning concepts, with all grades tested performing below 50 percent in Mathematics, Language and Natural Sciences. Whereas disappointing, this result is not surprising given the number of days schools were closed due to teacher strikes. During most of Project implementation, the actual number of classes taught in traditional schools was between two-thirds and half of the required 200 school days.

Mathematics Spanish Nat.3rd Rural 3rd Nat. 6th Rural 6th Nat. 3rd Rural 3rd Nat. 6th Rural 6th 2002 43.2 41.6 38.9 37.5 38.4 36.1 43.5 40.7 2004 43.5 41.6 39.2 36.5 39.2 41.6 44.0 40.6 200712 n.a. n.a. 38.8 38.4 n.a. n.a. 45.0 43.8

Source: Data provided by UMCE at University Francisco Morazán.

10 Rural drop-out rates experienced marginal improvements in some of the implementation years (2.3 percent in 2003 and 2.5 percent in 2003).

11 Rural completion rates increase to 76 percent in 2004 then dropped to 65 percent in 2005, again increasing in 2006. A similar pattern is found in urban schools. This pattern is difficult to explain and raises questions on the reliability of the data.

12 These are preliminary results of the evaluation carried out in November 2007 of a sample of 6th grade students from public schools. These results are not yet official.

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Student assessment results were supposed to measure students’ improvements in learning once the new national curriculum (CNB) was in place. However, as previously explained, the elaboration of the CNB suffered delays and the new CNB reached schools shortly before Project completion13. Thus, the student assessment did not measure student learning of the CNB. Non-cognitive development. Another outcome indicator of the Project was improved results of student social achievements and self-esteem evaluations. This was to be measured through standardized tests for self-esteem, leadership, civic and citizenship training, in parallel to the aforementioned achievement tests. In 2002 and 2004 UMCE carried out a survey for a cohort of students in 3rd and 6th grades which looked into the factors influencing learning achievements (Factores Asociados al Rendimiento Académico 2002-2004). The main results were consistent with research in other countries: (i) family context (i.e., books available in the household, level of education of the mother, etc.) highly influences learning achievements, particularly language skills; (ii) student academic history is highly correlated to future achievements (i.e., the best students in 2002 were still the best in 2004); (iii) school attendance and school environment influence learning outcomes; and (iv) need to work was one of the main reasons offered for dropping out of school but not the only one. Problems with teachers and students or unhappiness with the school was mentioned as well. This assessment was discontinued after 2004, offering no comparison. Availability and relevance of learning materials for rural schools. This outcome indicator was to be measured by the: (i) number of work guides per student; (ii) number of textbooks in the library per student; (iii) number of notebooks per student; (iv) availability, situation and use of learning materials in science, Spanish and Mathematics; and (v) relevance of the curricular content and application to the community context. By Project completion, all rural and urban schools in Honduras had received copies of the national curriculum and the studies program (Diseño del Currículo Nacional Básico – DCNB) and the National Basic Curriculum (CNB), and the textbooks for Mathematics, Language, and teacher guides. The Natural and Social Sciences textbooks and teacher guides were under distribution in the first quarter of 2008. Textbooks, teacher guides, and some reading books were produced in the seven ethnic languages of indigenous and Afro-Hondurans and distributed throughout the country. Preschools received the new curriculum and learning materials as well. The credit directly financed all these materials, including making available for the first time in Honduras bilingual textbooks and social and natural science ones. All the targets were substantially surpassed. It should be noted, however, that most of the textbooks reached the school during the last year of project implementation, some after Project completion, therefore not influencing the quality of learning during its implementation. Improvement in rural teacher performance and productivity. This was measured by the number of days worked per month and the length of the work day. The official school calendar in Honduras is 200 days of 4 hours per day. Due to severe teacher strikes during project implementation, traditional schools closed as many as half of those days, never complying with

13 All primary schools across the country received copies of the basic national curriculum (DCNB). All primary level teachers received training (starting in 2004) of the new curriculum and on the use of textbooks. Training of the new curriculum was interrupted and affected by the conflict with the teachers’ unions. Training was initially carried out in cascade, with lower than expected success in reaching teachers. Training practices were modified in June 2007.

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the official calendar. On the other hand, PROHECO schools were mostly exempt from the strikes, possibly because of their remoteness as well as the fact that teachers pay is linked to attendance14. A baseline was not collected for PROHECO school teacher attendance; therefore a comparison with traditional schools closings is used as a proxy to demonstrate the achievement of this target. While traditional school teachers worked an estimated 170 school days in 2007 (compared to about 110 in 2002 and 120 in 2006), PROHECO schools remained open approximately 180 days of the school year. This differential demonstrates that the community education model was successful in ensuring attendance. The final outcome indicator for the Project was changes in perceptions, attitude and behavior of key school-based actors (principals, teachers, students, parents, and the community). This was to be measured through a survey of parents in AECOs and ADELs. The survey was not carried out as planned and therefore this indicator could not be measured as part of the ICR. However, in November 2007, as part of preparing a final progress report on the Project, the Ministry of Education surveyed a non-representative sample of schools to try to capture information on this indicator. The results are detailed in section 3.6 below. Overall, perceptions of PROHECO schools were positive. Parents attribute to them the increased access to education; they also stated that school infrastructure has improved and parents have contributed to create community involvement in the schools supporting teachers and principals and fostering greater accountability.

3.3 Efficiency An economic analysis was not carried out for this ICR. Nonetheless, the team reviewed the economic analysis prepared for the follow-up operation in late 2007--Honduras Education Quality, Governance and Institutional Strengthening Project (IDA-43810) -- and included the relevant information in this section of the ICR. The premises of the economic analysis is that greater education attainment, measured by years of schooling, leads to higher wages and, therefore, increased standard of living. Furthermore, it cites that most gains in schooling have resulted from increased primary school enrollment. In particular, the analysis states that one additional year of schooling in rural areas, even without quality improvements, could lead to a 12.2 percent increase in wages. Furthermore, if the quality of rural schools were raised to the level of urban ones, wages would also increase. In terms of the interventions financed under this credit, the economic analysis offers the following pertinent information: Increase in preschool enrollment. During Project implementation, approximately 7,000 new students were added to preschools –early entry increased by 9 percent. The economic analysis of the follow-up credit (IDA-43810) argues that preschools increase preparedness of children for first grade where high repetition rates have historically been a problem, and leads to higher attainment. “In 2004, only 60 percent of 7 year-olds and 35 percent of 6 year-olds were in primary school…by drawing students into the school system at an earlier age, a year of preschool will induce them to enroll in first grade by age 6.”15 Since a large share of students leave school

14 PROHECO teacher salaries are below those of traditional teachers and they are not eligible for the same labor benefits. This gap has increased during the last five years. Still, strikes have not affected PROHECO schools.

15 Project Appraisal Document (IDA-43810), page 86.

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when they reach the legal working age, enrolling earlier means additional years of schooling. Greater school attainment leads to higher average earnings. Specifically, one additional year of schooling for Honduran males would amount to somewhere between US$2,100 and US$2,400 (2004) during a lifetime. A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the above information shows that by keeping these 7,000 children in school for one additional year could lead to about US$15 million in increased earnings over their lifetime. Increase in primary school enrollment. Approximately 32,000 new students were added to primary schools established under the Project –another 8,000 students to pre-primary schools-- and completion rates increased by 6 percent. According to the hypothesis and conclusions of the aforementioned economic analysis, one could assume that these additional students will also benefit from greater earning potential by attending school. PROHECO and Governance. While traditional schools were negatively impacted with teacher strikes, PROHECO schools were generally unaffected by them. In 2002 traditional schools held about 110 school days (compared to the 200 official days), a trend that remained somewhat consistent until the end of 2006. PROHECO schools, on the other hand, had an average of 180 school days per year throughout project implementation. So, relative to traditional schools the students were getting more education per dollar spent on salaries. In addition to the speculated economic benefits of the project, its social impact is also expected to be positive. The Project supported the provision of schooling to population groups without previous access, as well as supporting an increase in the years of schooling. By improving enrollments in rural areas, including indigenous ones, the Project has contributed to increasing equity in education opportunities at the preschool and primary levels, decreasing the gap between rural and urban school-aged children. Likewise, the community model empowered communities, leading to greater accountability in PROHECO schools. The financial burden of Project cost over the country finances was manageable. The Government’s counterpart funds added to US$5.7 million equivalent (compared to US$6.3 million equivalent envisioned at appraisal). The disbursement of counterpart funds was spread over 5.5 years. The Project generated recurrent costs for country’s budget due to the salaries of new PROHECO teachers, and preschool and EIB volunteers for the new created schools. The country’s education budget gradually absorbed the cost of new teacher and volunteer positions and by 2007 the full cost had been incorporated into the MoE’s budget. Project/Component Cost Component 1: Local Application of the National Curriculum was estimated to cost US$9.71 million equivalent. By Project completion it had cost 126 percent of the appraisal estimate. This differential is consistent with the increase in scope of the component activities, including the additional financing the Project provided for the development of the national curriculum, the production and distribution of materials for national coverage, and the number of teachers trained. Component 2: School-based Management for Rural Communities, on the other hand, ended up costing about 85 percent of the estimated US$14.5 million equivalent estimated at appraisal time. This information is not consistent with the fact that this component significantly surpassed its output indicators, but it results from how the accounting for the Project expenses was organized by the implementation unit (UEP). The UEP included many administrative costs related to this component under component IV.

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Component 3 School-based Management for Rural Communities closed at 97 percent of the original estimated cost of US$9.9 million equivalent. This component financed the training of ADEL members and the implementation of school development projects (PECs) in PROHECO and traditional schools. The costs are consistent with the output indicators. Notwithstanding, similarly to the previous component, this final cost is underestimated as some of the administrative expenses behind these interventions were accounted under component IV. Component 4 Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-based Management Programs cost 67 percent more than the original estimate of US$11.2 million equivalent. This is due to the way the UEP accounted for the expenditures related to the implementation of the previous three components (i.e., PROHECO and EIB units, and ADEL and PEC management units). Of the US$18.8 million equivalent spent under this component, only US$3.2 million went toward financing the project’s implementation unit (6% of the total final cost). The costs of the EIB unit, PROHECO unit, management units for ADELs and PECs and EFA together add up to US$4.5 million equivalent. These are expenses that should have been included under the other three components. Likewise, component IV includes US$3 million equivalent in expenses related to the implementation of EFA, including training, technical assistance, furnishing and equipment for its office, short and long-term consultants, cars, etc. Together these costs add to US$7.5 million equivalent, accounting for most of the cost over-run under component IV.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The Project’s overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory as it is responsible for important achievements, including meeting many of its expected outcomes. Project interventions have laid the foundations for improving the education sector in Honduras. At the same time, not all activities were consolidated by Project completion, leaving a sector ripe to be propelled forward but with fragile accomplishments that will need further political and financial commitment to make them sustainable. This is particularly true of the institutional strengthening interventions, where outcomes and outputs fell short of expectations. The relevance of the Project’s development objective was high at the time of preparation and remains high today. Project activities responded to the needs of Honduras’s education sector and were consistent with the CAS. The Project strove to expand access to preschool and basic education in remote rural areas as well as improve education quality. Project activities addressed the shortage of preschool and primary schools in rural areas, and the lack of a relevant curriculum to the innumerous multigrade and bilingual schools. The Project also sought to improve school efficiency and teacher accountability, and attempted to address the weak institutional capacity of the Ministry. Overall, many of the Project’s interventions and accomplishments laid the foundation for achieving EFA-FTI goals. The Project partially achieved its development objective and made a significant contribution to rural school-aged children in Honduras16. As a result of its interventions,

16 When measuring Project achievements, two important issues deserve attention. First, is the reliability of Honduras education data. Second, many of the outcome indicators listed in the PAD (i.e. repetition, drop out, completion rates,

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preschool and lower primary education access have been expanded in remote rural areas, including areas serving indigenous populations. Repetition, completion, and drop out rates, and student performance remained almost constant, despite the increase in enrollment. This is an achievement in itself given the almost 40,000 new preschool and primary school students entering the education system in the last four years. The credit also financed the completion of a new national curriculum for preschool and basic education, the purchase and distribution of millions of textbooks for the entire preschool and primary education systems, and the development, printing and distribution of bilingual education books to all bilingual indigenous schools. For the first time ever, Honduran primary level students have natural and social science textbooks available to them, and bilingual populations have textbooks in their native languages. Teacher productivity in traditional schools, measured by the actual number of days worked, increased from about 110 in 2002 to 170 days in 2007. However, this improvement is the result of a teacher salary raise agreement reached between the Government and teacher unions in 2006, and cannot be attributed to the Project. On the other hand, PROHECO school teachers attended an average of 180 days of the 200 day calendar during all the implementation period. The Project, through the PROHECO modality, mobilized parents, involved them in school management, and contributed to greater teacher accountability. The Project contributed to close the urban-rural gap in education and will likely lead to future higher average earnings for rural students. By raising preschool and primary school enrollment in rural areas, students will likely reach higher education attainment. Greater school attainment leads to higher average earnings. By improving enrollments in rural areas, including indigenous ones, the Project has also contributed to increasing equity in education opportunities at those levels, decreasing the gap between rural and urban school-aged children. Finally, as PROHECO schools had a higher average of open school days per year throughout project implementation, relative to traditional schools the students were getting more education per dollar spent on salaries.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development The Project did not include any specific impact measurement on poverty or gender. Notwithstanding, the Project targeted the poorest and most remote groups in Honduras, particularly by making pre- and primary schools accessible to them. During project implementation, about 40,000 new students in pre-school through 6th grade were added to the system, increasing rural preschool net enrollment rate by about 6 percentage points and primary gross17 enrollment by almost 25 percentage points. Additionally, about 1,600 new teachers –many from those communities—were hired and trained to serve in the new schools. The community education model empowered community members by making them responsible for their school administration, including hiring and firing of teachers. Furthermore, beneficiaries

teacher attendance, student assessment results) are affected by various inter-linked factors that are outside of the control of the Project which makes attribution difficult.

17 Net enrollment rate data not available.

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included indigenous and Afro-descends, many of whom without previous access to education and/or appropriate bilingual materials. At the same time, some of the Project interventions financed a larger group of the population. For instance, the distribution of textbooks ended up covering all government schools. Teacher training also covered a larger group of teachers than those allocated to rural areas. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening As most education Projects prepared in early 2000, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not include specific outcome indicators to measure its institutional impact. Therefore, the ICR team based the following observations on Project supervision documentation and a review of the Project’s component that focused on institutional strengthening. On the positive side, the Project contributed to strengthening the fiduciary functions within the Ministry of Education. Once Honduras joined EFA-FTI, IDA’s team agreed to provide on-demand technical assistance on the fiduciary aspects of managing the pooled funds. IDA staff provided extensive procurement and financial management training to the staff of the Ministry’s EFA-FTI technical unit, while donors worked more closely with the departmental and district levels. On the technical area, the Project also contributed to strengthening some of the Ministry’s units. The units working on curriculum and pedagogy were strengthened through training. The unit responsible for bilingual and multicultural education (PRONNEAHH) was mainstreamed into the MoE, with strong technical staff who worked closely with consultants to produce bilingual textbooks in the seven indigenous languages. This unit is now working toward producing a bilingual education policy for the Ministry of Education. Likewise, the technical unit in charge of PROHECO was also completely mainstreamed into the Ministry of Education. The Project, with support from an implementation Japanese grant (PHRD), also financed the design of a textbook distribution system, successfully using it to distribute over three million textbooks and teacher guides in less than two months – after the previous process took over two years. At the same time, the Project did not achieve many of the expected outputs of in the area of institutional strengthening, leading the Association’s team to rate Component IV –which focus on this area-- as unsatisfactory. By Project completion there were no integrated institutional databases to monitor the community-based education program (PROHECO), the bilingual education program (EIB), the community preschool program (CCPREB), and the school grants (PECs). Most of the monitoring is still being done by isolated groups, sometimes manually. As a result, there is no unified information system to guide decision-making at the highest levels. Likewise, accounting and financial management systems, even at the Project level, were deficient and did not link expenditures to outputs. More importantly, the decentralization to departments and school districts was not completed. About one-third of the expected district and municipal offices were refurbished and district directors given training but little autonomy was granted to them. The updating of information systems and institutional capacity building is a core focus of the new education project in Honduras. Overall, it is fair to say that the Project failed to promote visible institutional development during its implementation years. At the same time, it is reasonable to recognize that some isolated institutional gains were achieved, such as those highlighted above, which will serve as the foundation for future progress.

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(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops As part of preparing its completion report, the Ministry of Education carried out a beneficiary survey on a sample of fifteen rural schools in the Departments of Francisco Morazán, Atlántida, El Paraíso and Copán. While the survey is not statistically representative, it provides a glimpse of beneficiary perceptions of Project interventions. For that reason, the results are listed below18.

• Teachers, parents, and students reported improvements in the school infrastructure and/or availability of materials and resources for learning activities.

• Teachers and principals perceived greater involvement of parents and of communities in the school, contributing to physical improvements and better management of human and physical resources (i.e. teachers’ attendance, merienda escolar supplemented by the mothers).

• Teachers and parents mentioned they perceived improvements in self-esteem by students in rural areas (PROHECO). Self-esteem was measured according to students’ participation in school functions and students’ aspirations. This trend was emphasized in the case of the indigenous populations, with the teaching of the maternal tongue in the schools.

• Teachers perceived more dedication on the part of 6th grade students, as well as greater desire to continue their education.

• Parents perceived that enrollment opportunities had improved as well as teacher attendance.

• Parent associations (AECOs and ADELS) do not feel that they are formally kept informed about the evolution of the quality of teaching and learning.

• PROHECO parents showed appreciation and respect for their schools. Parents felt that PROHECO schools have overcome the initial stigma of lower quality of education.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High The assessment of risk to development outcome is rated as high. The Honduras’ education sector faces several challenges, many of which can directly or indirectly interfere with the development outcomes of this Project. First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, many of the gains achieved under the Project are “fragile” and require continued political and financial commitment to ensure long term sustainability. In a context of an increasing wage bill which not only threatens Honduras’ fiscal sustainability but severely limits the future capacity to invest in the education sector, the Government will remain dependent on external financing to sustain education improvements. In the short and medium terms that should not be a problem as many EFA-FTI donors remain committed to financing EFA activities, all consistent and supportive of project interventions, until 2015. However, in the next eight years the Government needs to find efficiency gains both

18 It is important to note that not all achievements and shortcomings mentioned by beneficiaries are directly related to this Project, as communities do not distinguish the source of financing for the interventions.

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within the education sector and outside of it, to be able to continue investing in education, as well as absorbing recurrent costs such as textbooks and materials that have been traditionally financed by donors. Additionally, the education sector in Honduras remains highly politicized, and unions have exerted their influence in ways that have been detrimental to improving the quality of education. For instance, teacher strikes have substantially reduced the number of school days for the last five years and this pattern only changed last year when the Government agreed to an increase in teacher wages, which threatens sector sustainability. Reposition of missing days was never negotiated by the Government for fear that teachers would prolong the strike. Project interventions are also subject to political changes. Luckily, none of the key interventions financed under the Project (PROHECO, CNB, bilingual schools, textbooks) have been associated with any one particular administration, therefore standing a good chance of survival. For instance, the science textbooks that were purchased and distributed did not include the names of the Minister and his team on the inside covers, as is typical in many countries, so an incoming team would not feel tempted to replace them –as has happened in the past. At the same time, there is work underway in Congress to make PROHECO and their teachers an official Government policy, to ensure its long-term financing and support. Institutionally, the low administrative and management capacity of Ministry of Education and the absence of strategic planning and accountability, also pose a risk to the sector and to the gains achieved by Project. In terms of specific Project outcomes, the ICR team believes the risk to enrollment is moderate, particularly as the PROHECO law is underway. However, translating enrollment gains into improvements in the quality of learning is a high risk. To achieve improvements in quality, Honduras will require focusing efforts on implementing the CNB and in training its teachers to use it correctly –this is particularly difficult as the “quality at entry” of teachers is already deficient. Adequate learning materials and schools offering minimum infrastructure standards are also important components. Currently, the education budget does not support these recurrent expenses without external assistance from donors and multilaterals. In terms of decentralization and greater school management, it is unlikely that most ADELs will “survive” without being assigned a formal responsibility and/or resources to manage. Between 2006 and 2007, when PECs were discontinued, many ADELs became inactive. At the same time, the MoE does not have resources to continue financing PECs as in 2006 it opted to eliminate enrollment fees and allocate funds previously earmarked for PECS to schools to make up for their loss of enrollment fees.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory IDA’s team worked closely with the Borrower during the preparation phase, jointly identifying key sector issues, defining a strategy to best address them, and designing interventions. IDA financed technical assistance to help the Government carry out an indigenous plan, and

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appropriate consultations with the nine ethnic groups. The preparation team benefited from a diverse group of professionals, all with practical experience in similar type interventions. Furthermore, the team reviewed lessons from other projects and/or other countries and applied them to this Project. As a result, the Project’s goals and interventions appropriately responded to the needs of the sector. IDA’s performance at entry is considered satisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory IDA’s supervision is also rated as satisfactory. During early implementation, the team carried out frequent missions to ensure that implementation could start as soon as the Project became effective. The team worked with the outgoing and incoming administrations to ensure a smooth transition in the sector. Project management on IDA’s part was flexible to respond to the demands made by the incoming team. This ensured that the Project was embraced by the new administration. Furthermore, a local operations officer was hired in the country office to support the Human Development (HD) portfolio, enabling faster response to Government needs and greater support to the Ministry of Education’s implementation team. During Project supervision there were three different team leaders. The transitions in task team leaders seemed to be smooth and not have caused any delays in project implementation. Team leaders were pro-active in responding to arising issues, and in bringing necessary technical expertise as part of supervision missions. IDA’s team frequently carried out field visits, visiting schools and meeting with stakeholders. Aide memoires show that some of the Project’s key deficiencies were identified during such field visits and then addressed at the national level. During the last 18 months of implementation, IDA’s team also provided strong support in the process of purchasing and distributing textbooks, making procurement and textbook experts available to help the Government. IDA’s team closely supervised compliance of OP 4.10. Progress under the indigenous people policy was monitored during most missions by a specialist. There was great support to multi-cultural bilingual interventions, including ensuring that indigenous representatives were satisfied with the process. More importantly than IDA’s traditional supervision efforts, was the role its staff played to help ensure that Honduras became part of the EFA-FTI initiative. IDA lent support to the Government both (i) to prepare its sector-wide development plan (focusing on improving 6th grade completion in the country) and (ii) to define the alignment and harmonization guidelines for donors--including donors to contribute funds to a pool (e.g., Germany, Canada and Sweden), donors only wishing to harmonize strategically through an agreed set of education policies and indicators for primary education (e.g., US and Japan). Specifically, IDA’s team designed and implemented a workshop in Bolivia, where all four EFA-FTI LAC countries participated to identify the processes, technical inputs, and Government’s leadership role needed for a sector-wide plan and to provide incentives for donor harmonization. A network was also created among these four countries to share lessons learned on designing and implementing the EFA-FTI program. Following the Bolivia Workshop, IDA facilitated a series of strategic planning workshops among donors and the GoH to define the needs, goals, and comparative advantages of each actor supporting EFA-FTI. Also, IDA’s team provided support to the Ministry of Education, especially the Planning Department, to prepare the sector wide plan for primary education, including

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indicators, targets, and education and management strategies needed to increased 6th grade completion and gender parity. During the implementation of the EFA-FTI program, IDA’s team was the leading technical donor supporting the design of a pool-fund, required by donors wishing to pool their resources in favor of EFA-FTI. IDA’s technical assistance included legal, procurement, financial management and alliance building support. IDA continue to provide technical support in implementing and revising agreed procedures such as harmonized supervision missions, technical studies, institutional building, and monitoring of the EFA-FTI plan and indicators, alignment and harmonization goals, and fiduciary support. It should be noted, nonetheless, that many EFA-FTI donors resented the fact that IDA resources were never included in the pooled fund, creating some tensions during implementation. Originally, IDA funds were not pooled because they were channeled through this Project. During the preparation of the follow-up operation, IDA’s team concluded that MoE’s fiduciary systems still did not comply with IDA requirements so that credit resources could not be pooled with donors until fiduciary deficiencies were corrected. It was agreed that during the first half of implementation of the new project there would be additional efforts to improve MoE’s fiduciary systems; pooling of funds would be re-evaluated during the project’s mid-term review. Finally, during the last year of project implementation, IDA’s supervision team participated in the preparation of the follow-up operation, ensuring that the new operation continued supporting areas that required technical and/or financial support. As such, the new project continues supporting many activities started under this credit and building upon them. Additionally, the Credit Agreement for the new operation includes a couple of covenants that are linked to this Project – to ensure that PROHECO teachers receive the pension fund they contributed under this Project. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory The overall Bank performance is rated as satisfactory based on the following:

• Thorough project preparation, based on good quality sector work, considering inputs from stakeholders, and close collaboration with the Borrower.

• Serious supervision of and support to implementation of indigenous plan. • Local operations officer expediting IDA’s response time and providing direct support to

Ministry’s implementation team. • Frequent and well staffed missions during supervision, and follow-up to issues identified

during missions. • Leadership in coordinating Government and donors in preparation of EFA-FTI initiative. • Strong technical support to the Government in preparing and supervising EFA-FTI

proposal. • Strong fiduciary technical assistance, particularly in carrying out the large ICB for the

purchase of textbooks. • Frequent field visits to schools and meeting with stakeholders, to identify implementation

problems at the “receiving end” of the interventions. • Close coordination with team preparing follow-up operation.

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5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory The Borrower’s performance during preparation and implementation is rated as satisfactory. The three administrations in power during project’s preparation and implementation showed commitment to the Project’s main development objective. More importantly, the Government’s education sector goals remained unchanged, even with changes in administration. In addition to the Ministry of Education’s support, IDA’s team had the support of the Ministry of Finance, both in terms of ensuring that budget was available to finance project activities–particularly the payment of PROHECO teacher salaries—as well as close follow up of Project progress. When the Government requested a one year closing extension, it readily made resources available to cover the cost of the staff in the implementation unit. The exception to this was the financing of the school projects (PECs), which were discontinued by the Government due to lack of funding. As previously stated, there was a strong ownership of the PROHECO model, originating from interactions between the governments of Honduras and El Salvador. The design of PROHECO originated at the GoH, who later asked for IDA’s technical and financial support to expand its implementation. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The Project was implemented by the Ministry of Education, through an implementing unit (UEP- Unidad Ejecutora del Proyecto). Overall, the MoE’s implementation performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. They were able to implement the Project, surpassing many of its output goals, with disbursement reaching almost 100 percent despite having about 10 percent more in resources due to the exchange rate differential. At the same time, there were some shortcomings in implementation that led to team to assign this rating. As already stated, the Ministry of Education was highly involved in project preparation. Their technical personnel worked on the conceptualization of the Project, with the support of the Ministry of Education of El Salvador. Ministry staff participated in the preparation of the social assessment and the indigenous development plan. Project implementation was under the responsibility of the UEP, which handled daily administration, punctual decision-making, served as IDA’s counterpart, liaising with different technical units of the Ministry, and dealing with fiduciary issues. Overall decision-making remained the responsibility of the line staff of the Ministry, normally the Minister or Vice Ministers. In the case of PROHECO and the EIB interventions, the offices responsible for those areas worked closely with the UEP to ensure satisfactory implementation. This arrangement had the advantage of keeping important technical decisions under the responsibility of line people of the Ministry while “protecting” the Project from internal inefficiencies of the Ministry. On the negative side, this arrangement did little to build institutional capacity of the Ministry. Both the Ministry in general and UEP in particular had a high turnover of staff, both preceding and following administration changes, leading to some delays or temporary stagnation in implementation. During the three months following the November 2005 elections, project implementation almost halted while UEP staff were waiting for new appointments. The UEP was particularly subject to political interference in the appointments, leading IDA’s team to establish a staffing ceiling in 2005 and to object requests to hire more staff after that.

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Another failing of the implementing agency was their inability to satisfactorily implement the Japanese Grant (PHRD). Between August 2004, when the Government signed the grant agreement, and June 2006, the only funds used were those allocated to training and workshops –about 5 percent of total grant. The remaining PHRD funds remained untouched for almost two years, when half of it was cancelled. By Project completion, about one-third of the original grant had not been spent. This was a waste of much needed resources, particularly as the grant focused on providing technical assistance for institutional strengthening. At the same time, it should be mentioned that UEP members informed the ICR team that they were not involved in preparing the grant proposal –not even consulted-- and only became aware of it once the grant signed. Furthermore, UEP’s staff mentioned that in 2005 they submitted a few proposals to IDA on the use of the resources –after the grant was already approved and signed—but the Association did not grant them the no objection. Other shortcomings include the fact that some of the institutional debilities that plagued the Ministry of Education affected the Project, causing delays. Decisions that needed to be taken by high level Ministry technical personnel – types of learning materials to purchase, purchase of new textbooks vs. more of the existing ones, etc—were delayed, causing procurement delays. Furthermore, neither MoE nor UEP ever managed to develop a satisfactory and/or comprehensive monitoring system linking financial and physical implementation. Finally, the Ministry never prioritized the maintenance of the student assessment system, allowing years of work to be put aside until another donor decided to finance it. On the fiduciary side, as described in section 2.4 above, procurement and financial management oscillated between satisfactory and moderately satisfactory. The financial audits were clean and without major observations. While in general the UEP did a satisfactory job in procurement and financial management, IDA’s supervision team identified punctual but recurrent problems in those areas. In financial management, the UEP was unable to reconcile its expenditures for over one year. The problem originated when the UEP moved from using SOEs to FMRs as a disbursement mechanism, and continued until IDA’s financial management specialist dedicated a supervision mission to reviewing all FMR applications previously submitted and providing hands-on support to the UEP’s team. Several mistakes were found, including duplication of information, application of wrong counterpart percentages, and others. Another problem encountered with financial management was the lack of sufficient training of AECO and ADEL members to carry out their financial responsibilities. This was particularly important as AECOs were responsible for managing the transfers for teacher salaries and for the school project grants (PECs). ADELs were also responsible for managing PECs. This problem became more apparent toward the end of Project implementation when field visits identified two problems. First, it was determined that some of the PROHECO teachers’ pension contribution had not been properly managed, to a degree due to delays on the Government’s part in providing correct and timely guidance to AECOs on how to manage those resources. Once alerted to this problem, the Government swiftly provided guidance to AECOs on how to proceed with the pensions. On the other hand, it took more than six months for the Government to satisfactorily respond to IDA’s requests that a full audit of these funds be carried. Second, in the reconciliation of PEC expenditures, auditors found that some ADELs and AECOs did not maintain the proper documentation and by project completion the UEP was still trying to reconcile those expenditures.

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(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Given the many achievements but also the shortcomings, the ICR’s team rated overall borrower performance as moderately satisfactory. On the positive side there was:

• Borrower’s ownership and commitment during preparation. • Commitment to Project’s PDO, through three administration changes. • Borrower’s ability to implement the Project in a reasonable period with almost full

disbursement, meeting most of its output indicators and some of its outcome indicators. • Sustainability of PROHECO schools and their teachers after project completion. • Strong commitment to Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP), surpassing all

targets. • Availability of counterpart funds throughout most of implementation, despite severe

fiscal constraints in the country. • Institutional strengthening and integration of the PROHECO and PRONEEAAH offices. • Commitment to EFA-FTI.

On the shortcomings, the following affected the team’s decision:

• Staff turnover and political appointments of UEP. • Lack of commitment to continue supporting and financing the student assessment system. • Inability to develop a comprehensive monitoring system for the Ministry of Education. • Punctual fiduciary problems, including the delay in prioritizing the audit of PROHECO

teacher pension and taking actions to address the issue when it was first identified. • Inability to satisfactorily implement the PHRD, causing a return of half of it to the

Government of Japan.

6. Lessons Learned Design Adequacy and attribution of outcome indicators. Similarly to other education projects prepared by the Bank and IDA in the early 2000s, this Project’s indicators present measurement challenges as well as raises attribution questions. First, some indicators did not have a baseline at the on-set of implementation. This proved to be a challenge given Honduras’ inability to produce reliable data --still true today. Second, some indicators, particularly those used as proxies for quality improvements, are also influenced by factors outside of the Project –for instance, drop out rates if probably more affected by poverty than school quality, particularly in the short run; teachers attendance only improved with salary negotiations. Third, student assessments are not necessarily good indicators of quality improvement when there is a very large influx of new students into the system, as it happened in Honduras. Finally, measuring perceptions and attitudes is a difficult task and of no value in terms of measuring project outcomes –particularly when there is no baseline. Therefore, project preparation teams should select less and simpler indicators, and ensure that the existing data is reliable in measuring them before a project becomes effective. In particular, student assessment results should not be used as outcome indicators in countries where there is a strong push to increase enrollment and/or when those systems are not well-established.

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Balancing long-term goals and realistic project expectations. While the institutional problems of Honduras’ education sector were clearly diagnosed and there was a consensus on the need to push for institutional strengthening, one should be realistic about establishing outcome indicators in this area. This Project, like its predecessor, failed to achieve the expected strengthening of the sector. At the same time, perhaps the plan was overly optimistic, and underestimated the difficulties of changing ingrained habits and traditions. Establishing parallel education modalities. The PROHECO model effectively responded to a shortage of schools in remote areas. Likewise, it created successful school and teacher accountability systems by involving communities. However, during project preparation there was little consideration of the future implication of having two different education modalities in Honduras –with two sets of teachers with different benefits. The Government will need to carefully manage the two systems as it may result in future tensions in the education sector, particularly among PROHECO teachers who feel at a disadvantage compared traditional teachers. Project preparation teams need to ensure that this consideration is pondered when supporting the introduction of alternative education modalities. Implementation Institutionalization of alternative education delivery models to reach remote areas. The school-based management option has proven to reach communities in rural and remote areas – as shown in Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua – with the advantage of increasing accountability of teachers and school staff to the local communities. The different forms of community education also seem to better respond to local realities and cultural differences, thus their success in serving nine different ethnic groups in Honduras. Notwithstanding the advantages of the model, special attention needs to be given to ensure that they are institutionalized so as to guarantee their physical and financial sustainability, adequate supervision, education quality, and teacher rights. Fiscal sustainability of new interventions. During both preparation and supervision, project teams need to remain keenly aware of the recurrent costs generated by project activities to ensure fiscal sustainability. This is particularly true as original project targets get expanded during implementation. In the case of this Project, there was a 25 percent increase in the number of PROHECO schools created, a 20 percent increase in the EIB schools established, and almost twice as many teachers hired. Original fiscal scenarios for the Project did not contemplate such increases. Fortunately, the Government was able to assume full responsibility for these recurrent costs due to the approval of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and the Multilaterial Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). High start-up cost of running community-based programs rural areas. Despite the advantages of involving parents and communities in the management/delivery of education, there are high start up costs. Communities need to be trained to perform their new roles; they need to receive on-going support to ensure they are performing what is expected of them; and there needs to be strong supervision at the school level. In this Project, AECO and ADEL members received training to perform their functions –particularly financial management—and some support and supervision from district offices. As the schools were many and scattered around, several staff were hired for this purpose. This resulted in heavy administrative cost of the program, some captured under the cost of Component IV. Still, far greater and closer support and supervision would have been necessary to prevent problems with the financial reconciliation of PECs and the teacher pension problem.

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Benefits of transferring resources directly to school. Despite previously mentioned challenges in reconciling financial transfers to schools, schools are generally in the best position to efficiently and effectively manage their resources. Direct transfers to schools enable them to allocate resources according to their priorities, in a faster and often more efficient way. PECs proved to be a powerful tool in Honduras’s rural areas, both in terms of responding to minor but urgent infrastructure needs as well as financing needed inputs for classrooms. Communities seemed more willing to provide in-kind contributions, particularly with labor, to complete the transfers. Finally, supervision teams were left with the impression that communities felt more ownership for their schools when delegated the financial responsibility for their upkeep. School autonomy needs to be accompanied by financial transfers and formal responsibilities. The AECOs and ADELs clearly demonstrated that communities can be successfully engaged in school management if assigned a formal responsibility and resources. Both AECOs and ADELs were in place and functioning while the Government was transferring resources for them to implement their school projects (PECs). As soon as those transfers stopped at the end of 2005, ADELs ceased to have a formal responsibility and, in most cases, disintegrated. At the same time, AECOs continued functioning as they remained formally responsible for managing teachers, including paying them. In 2007, when the Government started transferring PEC funds to schools again, many ADELs needed to be re-constituted, a problem that did not occur with AECOs. Alternative strategies and lending instruments to tackle institutional weakness. Despite correctly listing institutional weakness as an important bottleneck preventing greater sector efficiency, the Project was unable to promote significant improvements in this area. While disappointing this result is not surprising as institutional improvements depend on a series of factors, most important of which is the Government’s strong commitment to change prevailing public sector practices. Additionally, modernizing such a large sector also normally implies changing chains of command, altering hierarchical and power relations, and personally affecting staff. Therefore, on the Government’s side, a pre-condition for strengthening and modernizing education is strong and continuous political commitment. A traditional sector investment credit may not provide sufficient incentives for such a change, particularly in a highly politicized country such as a Honduras, with four year presidential terms. Perhaps a performance-based instrument would have provided a better incentive for Honduras to stay on track. Multi-lateral organizations and donor coordination. Both IDA and donors have played a fundamental role in promoting improvements in Honduras’ education sector. They have been the source of financing and technical assistance that have enabled millions of children to attend schools and have pedagogical materials, including textbooks. At the same time, in the context of weak institutional capacity, these agencies’ priorities and strategies are not always aligned with the country’s own priorities. This is particularly true when coordination is insufficient, and governments are weak to defend their own priorities. Furthermore, excessive resources enable governments to avoid hard decisions that would improve the sector’s efficiency. Therefore, multi-laterals and donors should not only coordinate their technical diagnosis and interventions but also their financing so as to ensure that their interventions are not creating further problems to the sector or enabling unsustainable strategies and practices. The power of information. Information is an important tool to improve school performance and accountability. Unfortunately, due to the deficient education data, the Government has not able to use this instrument in its pursuit to improve their education system. Advantage of local staff. The Project benefitted from the presence of a local operations office in the country office. The local staff enabled quicker turn around time to address project issues,

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provided closer support of Ministry of Education staff, as well as a stronger supervision presence in the field. Additionally, dialogue with Government authorities was more fluid and less formal --as it was frequent-- fostering greater trust between the two.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies n/a (b) Cofinanciers n/a (c) Other partners and stakeholders n/a

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

1. Local Application of the National Curriculum (Preschool and Basic Education – Grades 1 – 6)

9.71 12.27 126

2. Community-based Provision of Preschool and Basic Education Services

14.49 12.30 85

3. School-based Management for Rural Communities 9.96 9.65 97

4. Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-based Management Programs

11.23 18.81 167

Total Baseline Cost 45.39 0.00

Physical Contingencies 2.41

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 47.80 53.03 111 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 47.80 53.03

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 6.30 5.70 90.4 International Development Association (IDA) 41.50 (*) 47.30 114.0

(*) Amount increased due to appreciation of SDR in relation to US$.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

The Project achieved the following outputs under its components: Component 1. Local Application of National Curriculum (US$12.27 million equivalent of final total Project cost; 126% of original estimate). While this component aimed to support the implementation of the national curriculum in rural multigrade, intercultural and bilingual schools, the Project ended up financing a much broader set of related activities, including the actual elaboration and initial implementation of the National Curriculum. By Project completion, this component was considered Satisfactory as it had achieved most of its outputs. A. Validation of the National Curriculum for Preschool and Lower Basic Education (grades 1 to 6) by Rural Teachers. This sub-component was designed to support rural teacher’s feedback regarding: (i) national curriculum reforms, programs, methodologies and tools for its implementation in rural, intercultural and bilingual school; and (ii) pedagogical strategies to address learning disabilities. In addition, this sub-component would support the coordination of a similar teachers and education stakeholders’ validation process in poor urban areas not addressed by this project. This scope of this sub-component was significantly widened during implementation. During project design, it was agreed that the credit would finance the adaptation of the new curriculum to rural areas. However, by the time the Project began implementation the new curriculum still was not designed and the Government asked for the IDA’s support to finish it. Thus, the Project ended up financing the finalization and validation of the new national curriculum.

Original Output Indicators Final Output Indicators

• Report from teachers validating the curricular options proposed by the Ministry of Education.

• National curriculum designed, validated, and finalized for pre-school and grades 1 – 6

• Available and validated pedagogical guidelines to identify learning disabilities.

• 10,000 manuals distributed

• Study on curricular pedagogical and other associated needs of urban poor schools.

• Not implemented

B. Effective Application of Curriculum and Appropriate Educational Materials for Preschool and Primary Rural Schools. This sub-component was designed to: (i) support the integration and implementation of various rural multigrade teaching and preschool modalities in the country; (ii) provide the appropriate methodologies and didactic materials to implement multigrade pedagogical strategies in rural schools; and (iii) provide the appropriate methodologies and didactic materials to implement intercultural and bilingual education strategies in rural indigenous communities representing all nine ethnic groups in the country. This sub-component had the scope of its activities expanded from its original rural area focus to have national coverage. While the national curriculum was successfully completed in 2003, the distribution of new curriculum and training of teachers on it was delayed due to: (i) problems with the bidding process for the materials and textbooks; (ii) conflict with the teachers’ unions, causing schools to close and teacher training to be cancelled; and (iii) the 2004 staff turnover at

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the Ministry of Education. The delay in producing and distributing materials resulted in further delays in training teachers. Therefore, the Ministry is still implementing the new curriculum.


• Available and validated preschool and pedagogical adaptations and didactic materials for 1,200 preschool teachers and 30,000 students.

• 1,098 teacher guides and 141,000 student workbooks for pre-school designed and distributed.

• Available and validated multigrade pedagogical adaptations and didactic materials for 4,500 lower basic education (grades 1-6) teachers and 300,000 students.

• 38,000 teachers’ guides and 1.2 million textbooks distributed to primary schools.

• Available and validated intercultural and bilingual pedagogical adaptations and didactic materials for:

o 1,200 EIB lower primary education teachers

o 45,000 lower primary education students

o 400 EIB preschool teachers o 15,000 EIB preschool student

• Teacher guides designed and distributed to19:

o 1,251 EIB pre-school teacher guides

o 14,800 EIB pre-school student work books

o 1,121 EIB primary school teacher guides

o 102,000 EIB primary school student textbooks

• 2.5 million social and natural science textbooks for primary level students.

C. Student Learning Assessment and Education Quality Evaluation Strategies. This sub-component aimed to: (i) support design and implementation of a validation learning assessment; (ii) develop and distribute student assessment guides for teachers in primary and preschool levels; (iii) disseminate the student learning results to districts and communities; (iv) finance external bi-annual standardized assessments for 3rd and 6th graders; and (v) evaluate innovative community-based education programs such as PROHECO, Community Based Preschool Services (CCPREB) and Intercultural and Bilingual Education (EIB). The Project supported efforts to develop and implement a National Education Quality Evaluation System (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa - SINECE) by financing some of SINECE’s key elements, including manuals to evaluate school and teacher performance and the development of learning standards, and the applications of the assessment. It also financed the unit within the University Francisco Morazán (UMCE) responsible for the application of the evaluation and its processing. By Project completion, the UMCE had carried out two sample-based external standardized assessments for 3rd and 6th graders. The tests were carried in 1,081 schools in 2002 and 1,076

19 Materials were produced in Spanish and the seven predominant indigenous languages (Chorti, Tolupan, Pech, Grifuna, Islenho, Tawahka and Miskita).

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schools in 2004. The sampled schools were nationally representative20. The evaluations also included an assessment of factors influencing learning (Estudio de Factores Asociados al Rendimiento Academico 2002-2004). In 2004, the evaluation included other elements: (i) a study of the learning results of PROHECO schools; (ii) a study of a sample of schools included in the in-service teacher training program (Programa de Formacion Continua - PFC); (iii) a study of a sample of schools of excellence; and (iv) a comparative study with other Central America countries. These reports were shared with the schools evaluated. Results were also disclosed at the National and Departmental levels, and discussed with stakeholders. During 2005 the UMCE was impacted by political changes, as well as the fact that credit financing for evaluation activities had come to an end. As discussed in the main body of this document, the Government did not make adequate arrangements to assume financial responsibility for UMCE, seriously jeopardizing the work that had been carried out in previous years. As a result, the external evaluation of 2006 was not carried out as planned. In 2007, with donor financing, UMCE carried out a sample-based evaluation of 6th graders. Jointly with EFA donors, the follow-up credit will support the consolidation of the student assessment system.


• Available and validated student assessment guidelines and instruments for preschool and grades 1-6

• 40,500 1st – 6th grade teachers received assessment guidelines

• Available and disseminated results of

annual standardized test scores for 3rd and 6th graders in the 4,000 rural and EIB communities targeted by the Project

• 3rd and 6th grade students assessed in 2002 and 2004

• Results of assessment delivered to 1,076 rural schools and disclosed at National and Department levels

D. In-service Teacher Development and Training Programs. This sub-component was designed to support: (i) in-service university training programs for rural teachers, district staff and teacher trainers; (ii) quality enhancement programs for community-based volunteers supporting teaching in preschool and intercultural and bilingual schools; and (iii) in-classroom training and follow up for rural teachers. This sub-component aimed to improve the quality of teaching through training teachers –particularly those in remove areas—and provide them incentives for their performance. Incentives were to be in the form of participation in international exchange programs and field visits. By Project completion, all the numerical targets had been achieved. Additionally, teachers did not receive the anticipated incentives. The implementation of this sub-component had to be adapted to respond to the introduction of the national curriculum and the additional financing coming from the EFA. Project design envisioned that teacher training would focus on multigrade techniques, student assessment and school-based management. During implementation the content of the training had to focus on

20 They included rural and urban schools as well as PROHECO and EIB schools.

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training teachers at a national level on the new curriculum. Therefore, the follow-up operation will address the need to train multigrade teachers. The in-service training was delivered by the University Francisco Morazán, using the cascade model. The training was negatively affected by the frequent teacher strikes, which ended up blocking many of the training sessions. An assessment of the training was carried out in 2006, which showed low degree of satisfaction in its beneficiaries and low effectiveness. Based on the assessment, the training was modified in 2007 to substitute the cascade method for a gradual training, and to first train teachers rather than other education personnel. The EIB teachers were trained by PRONEEAAH and 816 of them received a certification as a bilingual and multi-cultural teacher. These teachers did not previously have a teaching degree. Additionally, 40 EIB teachers received a degree in management. The EIB training contributed to cover a vacuum in the Honduran education system where there is a scarcity of programs to train EIB teachers in traditional universities.


• Training and performance assessments in pedagogical methods and community participation for:

o 500 district staff o 400 teachers trainers (from

escuelas normales) o 1,200 preschool community

volunteers o 300 intercultural and bilingual

community based volunteers o 2,900 lower basic education

rural teachers o 600 intercultural and bilingual

teachers

• Trained: o 500 district directors o 520 teacher trainers (escuelas

normales) o 1,238 preschool volunteers o 300 EIB preschool volunteers o 3,378 primary level teachers o 816 primary level EIB teachers

certified o 40 EIB teachers graduate in

school mgmt.

Component 2. Community-based Provision of Preschool and Basic Education Services (US$12.3 million equivalent of total final Project cost; 85% of original estimate). The component aimed to expand PROHECO, a community-based education program for preschoolers through 6th grade in rural and remote communities, including areas with intercultural bilingual populations. By Project completion this component was considered Highly Satisfactory as it succeeded in achieving and surpassing all of its outputs, and the Project could take credit for increasing education access in remote rural areas. A. Strengthening and Expansion of the Honduras Community Education Program (PROHECO). This sub-component was designed to support: (i) organizing community education councils (AECOs) in remote communities; (ii) creating new PROHECO schools in those communities; and (iii) attracting and retaining at least 720 new basic education teachers and 600 preschool teachers in these schools. By Project completion, all of the outputs for this sub-component had been surpassed. Additionally, the program had been institutionalized within the Ministry of Education. At the central level, a technical unit in charge of PROHECO was created and adequately staffed during

38

the life of the Project. Before Project completion the unit was already fully financed by the Government and institutionalized in the MOE. At the Departmental level, the PROHECO program was gradually integrated into the existing institutional arrangements -- there was a PROHECO coordinator and agents of change (promotores) appointed at the department level. The interventions financed under this Project were very successful in covering unmet demand for preschool and primary education in rural and remote areas, thus leading to an increase enrollment in rural areas. This sub-component also financed the establishment of primary “preparatory” centers during two months of the summer vacations for pre-school level students about to enter 1st grade in the following school year. These centers (CCEPREB) functioned until 2005 and responded to the necessity of improving student readiness. A total of 12,000 students “graduated” from the CCEPREBs during project implementation.


• 600 PROHECO schools in rural areas created and AECO members trained.

• 800 PROHECO schools created and AECOs members trained.

• 720 PROHECO teachers (grades 1-9) and 600 preschool volunteers hired and retained.

• 1,390 primary level teachers hired and fully paid with Government budget

• 900 preschool volunteers “hired.” • 1,200 new preschool students served in

rural areas. • 7,032* PROHECO new preschool

students served in rural areas. • 27,600 new lower primary level students

served in rural areas. • 32,250* PROHECO new lower primary

students served in rural areas. * Latest Government data shows a greater number of preschool and primary school students entering the system than the data collected by the ICR team in December 2007. B. Creation of Intercultural and Bilingual Schools using the PROHECO Model for Community Participation and Parental Involvement. This sub-component was designed to adapt PROHECO strategies to the education needs of the nine ethnic communities of Honduras. By Project completion all of the outputs for this sub-component had been surpassed. For the first time in Honduras schools addressed the cultural and linguistic needs of indigenous and ethnic groups. Schools were created, teachers trained and materials prepared and distributed.


• 200 PROHECO-EIB schools created and AECO members trained.

• 252 PROHECO-EIB schools created and AECO members trained.

• 200 EIB teachers (grades 1-9), 200 EIB preschool volunteers, and 200 EIB community volunteers hired and retained.

• 252 EIB primary level teachers hired and fully paid with Government budget.

• 171 EIB preschool volunteers “hired.” • 1,260 AECO volunteers trained21.

21 It is not clear if this total only refers to AECO members in EIB communities or all EIB members.

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Component 3. School-Based Management for Rural Communities (US$9.65 million equivalent of total final Project cost; 97% of original estimate). This component aimed at creating an effective school organization strategy in rural areas through the involvement of principals, teachers, parents and students to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their schools. It intended to adapt the school council model of PROHECO to the needs and existing organizational structure of traditional rural schools. By Project completion this component was rated as Satisfactory. A. Development of a School-Based Planning and Community Participation System in the Rural Sector. This sub-component was designed to: (i) support the organization of school councils in rural communities for traditional schools (ADELs – Asociaciones de Desarrollo Educativo Local); and (ii) train ADEL members to improve school management capacity, education planning, and administration of financial transfers for school improvement activities. By Project completion, this sub-component had exceeded its targets but the sustainability of ADELs was unlikely. As explained in the main body of this document, the Ministry faced problems granting a legal status to the ADELs. As the legal status of ADELs was linked to the broader decentralization law, which was not approved during project implementation, the status and role of ADELs was left in a limbo after Project completion. Furthermore, as will be mentioned under the next sub-component, once ADELs ceased to receive PEC funds, most dissolved.


• 2,800 new ADELs created in traditional rural schools.

• 3,774 ADELs created in traditional rural schools.

• 400 new ADELs created in EIB schools. • 407 new ADELs created in EIB schools. B. School-Based Design and Implementation of School Improvement Projects (Proyectos Educativos de Centro – PECs). This sub-component was designed to support: (i) planning of school improvement activities by AECOs and ADELs through school development projects (PECs); (ii) transferring resources to AECOs and ADELs to implement PECs; and (iii) training of teachers and parents on school improvement. The targets for the PECs both for AECOs and ADELs were greatly surpassed, as shown below. Schools initially received US$1,000 in funds that were used to meet the diverse needs of schools. Originally grants were to be used for activities related to teaching and learning, but schools often needed resources for minor improvements in school infrastructure and school materials. In many instances, schools negotiated with municipalities so they would complement the funds. Project funds financed PECs until the end of 2005. In 2006 the Government was supposed to assume responsibility for these transfers but that was not possible as in early 2006 the Government eliminated enrollment fees, and had to transfer funds to schools to compensate for their loss of these fees. With the appreciation of the SDR, more credit funds became available in local currency. Therefore, in 2007 both Government and IDA agreed to allocate part of those resources to finance PECs. This time schools were given more flexibility in how to use those funds. Each school received US$2,000 equivalent. The ICR mission noticed that in most schools, communities provided in-kind contributions to complement PEC transfers, “stretching” the resources to accomplish what they identified as a priority.

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The PEC experience was overall highly satisfactory, demonstrating that some education interventions are better carried out at the school level. School communities have a vested interest in using resources effectively and are better placed to prioritize their school needs. Likewise, PEC resources greatly empowered school councils (both AECOs and ADELs). These transfers demonstrated to Government and donors the advantages of using local communities in the education sector. As a result, some EFA donors have adopted the same mechanism to carry out “their” interventions. Unfortunately, despite the success of this experience, PECs proved to be unsustainable for the Government. Furthermore, traditional school associations (ADELs) quickly dissolved once they no longer had the responsibility of managing resources.


• Planning and financing of: o 1,400 PECs by AECOs o 2,800 PECs by ADELs o 800 PECs in EIB communities

• PECs financed in: o 2,128 PECs by AECOs o 3,554 PECs by ADELs o 252 PECs in EIB communities

• Strengthening of 400 teacher learning centers (CADs)

• 300 teacher learning centers (CADs) strengthened

• 1,500 training centers for AECO and ADEL parents

• Not implemented

Component 4. Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-Based Management Program (US$18.81 million equivalent of total final Project cost; 167% of original estimate). This component was designed to strengthen the Ministry of Education including its decentralized offices (Departmental Education Offices and School Districts) to guarantee effective support for community participation and school-based management strategies for the rural education sector in Honduras. By Project completion, the lack of implementation progress under this component was greater than the improvements one could observe. Nonetheless, an ICR team member who was part of the original preparation team and who had the historic perspective, highlighted many positive changes in the institutional area. Still, the team felt that overall progress neither measured up to expectations nor to the component’s expected outputs. Therefore, this component was rated as Unsatisfactory. Section 3.5 (b) of the main text discusses the progress and shortcomings in this area in more detail, therefore this annex will focus on output indicators. A. Central Support of the Community Participation and School-Based Management System in the Rural Sector. This sub-component aimed to: (i) strengthen the central units of the Ministry of Education which support school organization and community participation in the rural sector; and (ii) support the Unidad Técnica de Transformación de la Educación Nacional (UTEN), which would coordinate new education investment programs and manage the national Information, Education and Communication (IEC) campaign for education reforms. As explained in section 1.6 of the main body of this document, the institutional arrangements were revised during the initial phase of implementation and the incoming administration decided to dissolve the UTEN. A financial unit (UAF) was created in 2002, becoming the Project Implementation Unit (UEP) in 2003. Throughout most of implementation, the UEP was adequately staffed with technical personnel who provided support to project implementation. Generally, the staff of UEP and key Ministry’s offices collaborated in the preparation and implementation of annual implementation plans.

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The Project also supported the establishment of the PROHECO and PRONEEAAH offices, as well as the EFA office. The first two had a key role in implementing project activities and were mainstreamed into the Ministry’s structured before Project completion. The EFA office remained in charge implementing the activities financed by donors and will be the office in charge of implementing IDA’s follow-up operation. IDA’s support for institutional strengthening concentrated at the national level. The Project financed technical assistance and training for technical personnel to elaborate the administrative system for human resources in education (Sistema Administrativo de Recursos Humanos Docentes – SIARHD). The new system, though still being updated, allowed improving the payment system to personnel in the education sector (through the banking system). The Project also supported the strengthening of the information system for education statistics. Personnel were trained and there was some progress in digitizing and processing education statistics. Nevertheless, by Project completion, there was not an information system generating reliable education statistics.


• Key central offices (such as UTEN, PROHECO and other) staffed with high performing technical staff and appropriate guiding instruments (manual, information systems, EIC campaigns) for community-based education programs.

• UEP (instead of UTEN), PROHECO, PRONEEAAH, and EFA offices staffed and properly operating.

• Manuals completed. • Information campaigns incomplete.

• Available databases with results for monitoring reports for PROHECO, CCPREB, IEB and transfers to PECs.

• Some monitoring databases available but not in an integrated manner. Financial and monitoring systems not integrated. Data reliability an issue. Financial data available at national level.

• Accounting systems and aggregated financial consolidations for Project Management, Audit and IDA requirements.

• IDA requirements met at Project Implementation Unit (UEP) but not transferred to Ministry offices

• Updated information and inventories on project providing inputs aggregated by schools, district, department and national level.

• Inventory of goods purchased with credit financing available at national level.

• Successful implementation of IEC campaign in support of community participation and school-based management.

• Not implemented

B. Strengthening the Capacity of Departmental Education Offices to Plan Educational Needs and to Monitor Community-Based Education Programs. This component aimed to: (i) support the design and implementation of an information system for the programs financed by the Project (PROHECO, EIB and CCPREB); (ii) finance the training, acquisition and

42

installation of equipment to improve the administrative efficiency of departmental offices in monitoring and evaluating results of education programs; and (iii) establish a financial administrative system to monitor, legalize, and audit financial transfers for school improvements channeled directly to schools, communities and education districts. During implementation, the Ministry of Education decided to focus each donor and multilateral financing in a different level of the system (national, department, and district levels). As a result, IDA financing focused on interventions at the central level, while IADB and GTZ concentrated their institutional support at the departmental and district levels. The outputs of this sub-component are mixed, as the table below shows.


• Updated statistics by education program being implemented in the department.

• Some statistical data available but with serious quality issues.

• Monitoring reports aggregated at the departmental level for PROHECO, CCPREB, IEB and PEC transfers.

• Some monitoring databases available but not in an integrated manner. Data reliability an issue.

• Accounting systems and aggregated financial consolidations of legalized expenditures from AECOs and ADELs in the Department.

• Data available at Project’s Implementation Unit

• Updated information on education inputs and inventories aggregated and by school, district, and department level.

• Data available at national level. Only textbook data available down to the school level.

C. Strengthening Capacity of Education Districts to Support Curricular Applications and Community and School-based Management. This sub-component was designed to finance: (i) the completion of the basic infrastructure needs of the 86 school districts that had the largest percentage of rural, intercultural and bilingual schools; (ii) provision of equipment (computers, furniture and vehicles) to support these districts new role in the promotion, organization, training, and technical assistance activities for community participation and school-based management; and (iii) activities to strengthen the school district professional teams so they could support multigrade teaching, intercultural and bilingual education, community involvement and school-based management. This sub-component fell short in achieving its outcomes, financing the rehabilitation and improvement of a much smaller number of offices –this may not be a negative outcome as these structures were not being adequately used. Many district offices were equipped but without a decentralized education system, their role remained limited. In terms of strengthening the district teams, this sub-component financed the hiring of “promotores” to support school management programs, including AECOs and ADELs. By Project completion, district teams were still not fully empowered and equipped to deal with school needs. They did, however, maintain a role in data collection, with strong efforts during the last year of project implementation to improve the gathering of education data.

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• Proper infrastructure and equipment in at least 86 school districts.

• 25 departmental offices built • 45 offices rehabilitated • 45 departmental offices furnished • 70 offices equipped • 48 vehicles purchased

• Properly formed and trained district teams including a district director and at least 3 district technical officers (promotores).

• Trained: o 280 district directors o 66 PROHECO coordinators o 180 promotores

• Positive comments by community leaders, AECO and ADEL members on the support provided by their district director and their technical officer.

• Non-representative survey carried out. Results show positive trend.

• Implemented systems and data collection to feed educational statistics and input inventories to be aggregated at the departmental level.

• Partially implemented to collect data on: PROHECO, EIB, textbooks, PECs and goods.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) N/A

45

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Joel Reyes Task Team Leader LCSHE Institutional Assess. Barbara Bruns Knowledge Coordinator WBI Peer Reviewer Daniel Viens Sr. Education Specialist Peer Reviewer Darlyn Meza Consultant Consultant PROHECO Henry Forero-Ramirez Information System Specialist LCSPS Technology Ian Walker Consultant Consultant Cost Benefit AnalysisKin Bing Wu Sr. Education Economist LCSHE Economic Assess. Madalena dos Santos Sector Leader LCSHD Institutional Assess. Manuel Vargas Financial Management Officer LCSFM Financial Assess. Massimiliano Paollucci Consultant LCSHE Project Cost M. Rosa Puech Consultant LCSHE Project Preparation Natalia Moncada Language Program Assistant LCSHE Processing Nelly Weelock Consultant Consultant Project Cost Reynaldo Pastor Sr. Council LEGLA Legal Rebecca Santos Consultant LCSHD Financial Mgmt. Rosa Estrada Procurement Analyst LCSPT Procurement Samia Benbouzid Language Team Assitant LCSHE Processing Ximena Traa-Valarezo Consultant LCSHD Social Assess/ IPDP

Supervision/ICR Joel Reyes TTL – Preparation – July 2003 LCSHE TTL Emanuela di Gropello TTL – July 2003- Nov. 2006 LCSHE TTL Andréa C. Guedes TTL – Nov. 2006 – Closing LCSHE TTL Antonio Leonardo Blasco Financial Management Specialis LCSFM Financial Mgmt. Alfonso F. de Guzman Consultant LCSHE Textbook Specialist Christina Alquinta Language Team Assistant LCSHE Processing Diomedes Berroa Senior Operations Officer ECSPS Procurement Fabienne Mroczka Financial Management Analyst LCSFM Financial Mgmt. Luis Tineo Sr Procurement Spec. LCSPT Procurement M. Rosa Puech Consultant Consultant ICR Preparation Manuel Vargas Sr Financial Mgmt. Specialist LCSFM Financial Mgmt. Madalena R. Dos Santos Consultant LCSHD Education Specialist Mary Lou M. Veizaga Procurement Analyst LCSPT Procurement Pilar Gonzalez Sr. Council LEGLA Legal Rebecca P. Santos Operations Officer LCSHD Operations Support Ximena Traa- Valarezo Consultant LCSHD Safeguards

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(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)Lending

FY00 15 50.09 FY01 14 75.66 FY02 2 7.25

Total: 29 115.27 Supervision/ICR

FY02 5 104.30 FY03 15 106.79 FY04 38 125.99 FY05 32 114.73 FY06 32 101.57 FY07 28 101.59 FY08 10 28.76

Total: 160 683.73

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) N/A

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR

Unofficial Translation of Borrower’s Contribution ICR Main Conclusions I. Revised Development Objective and Components The original PDO was focused on the rural areas. However, the Project expanded its focus to the national level with changes in the scope of Component I From a target of 4,000 schools, to more than 11,000. The targets for the Component Expansion of the PROHECO model were expanded as well, in terms of the number of teachers and students. Besides the Preschool Communal Centers (CCEPREB) created to function with the PROHECO schools, additional CCEPREB - to function during the months of December and January - were created at national level. The targets of the School-Based Management for Rural Communities Component were increased due to the priority the MOE gave to the creation of AECOs to foster local development. The Institutional Strengthening Component suffered three major changes: a) the original Unit of National Transformation (UTEN) created in 2001, intended to coordinate all investment programs of the MOE, was closed because its functions overlapped with those of the Vice Ministries within the new structure created in 2002; b) project funds were allocated for information systems only at the central level, and not at the departmental level, as originally planned in the PAD; c) the number of promoters was increased due to local demand of activities concerning the supervision of PROHECO schools, Schools with ADEL and EIB schools. One of the causes of the increase on the Component’s budget was the need to hire coordinators for key technical units and specialized technicians that would support the CNB, now with a national coverage, EFA, PROHECO and ADEL, on central level, was. II. Achievement of Outcomes Increase in enrollment rates in preschool by 5 percentage points, which meant an increase of 15,000 students in the period 2000-2005. Since the main targets started to be met in 2003, the enrollment increased by 9,327 students in the 2002- 2006 period. Increase in enrollment rates in lower basic education grades 1 to 6 by 8 percentage points: this meant an increase in enrollment of 28,800 new students for the period 2000-2005. Enrollment at the national level increased by 65,912 new students in the period 2003-2006. Improvement of Efficiency Indicators in Rural Areas: the most significant improvement came in the percentage of 6 year old children entering first grade. Performance in Standardized Testing: this slightly changed during the period 2000 to 2004 and during the period 2002 to 2004 the variations are smaller, with a negative tendency in the scores for sixth grade. Social Achievement and Self esteem: This outcome was measured through a sample survey of schools and students to measure the social participation of students. The survey showed greater participation of urban students. Improvement of Teachers Productivity: the 2004 UMCE report of factors associated with learning outcomes showed better results in PROHECO schools. The study showed that the total number of school days taught in rural schools was 154 while in PROHECO schools the number reached 180 days. Availability and Relevance of Learning Materials in rural Schools: the majority of schools at national level have the DCNB, the national curriculum and textbooks. Changes in perception of key education actors: The general opinion of the key actors was that during the period 2003-2007 the following aspects improved: (a) the physical conditions of the schools, because the schools managed to gather additional resources to build classrooms, storerooms, perimeter fences and kitchens. In other cases, they bought equipment for the school, snacks, tape recorders, furniture for computer equipment, writing desks and working desks; (b)

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almost all school-age children are enrolled in school and are attending classes; (c) PROHECO schools are gradually part of the technical plans and activities of the District and Department offices; (d) AECOs work in harmony with teachers and have gradually understood the importance of pedagogic qualifications and personnel continuity; (e) with the Project’s support, native languages are being taught in EIB schools. Perception of Parents and/or AECO and ADEL association’s directors: Their members consider the following objectives fulfilled by PROHECO schools: (i) there are no children in their villages without the opportunity to enroll in school; (ii) teachers regularly go to work; and (iii) adequate buildings have been constructed. In the visited schools, it was observed that ADELs functioned while there were PEC funds, to implement them. Perception of District and Department Directors: They consider that the education in their municipalities has improved considerable in the last years. In their opinion all schools are implementing the CNB and all teachers have received training. To improve PROHECO’s sustainability they recommend that the promotion and coordination personnel, as well as the teachers, have pedagogic instruction and that the teachers of these schools also receive training in multi grade techniques.

III. Products by Component Componente I: Local Application of National Curriculum. ICR rating: Satisfactory The Sub-component Validation of the National Curriculum for Preschool and Lower Basic Education: the National Curriculum for Preschool was elaborated in 2001 and the design of the EIB educational materials in 2003. These include teachers’ guides, textbooks in Spanish and in native languages (Chorti, Tolupán, Pech, Garifuna, Isleño, Tawahka, Miskita). The DCNB was developed between November 2002 and March 2003. The adaptation of the CNB to the EIB education started in 2002. The guides, the textbooks in Spanish and native languages for second and third grades were elaborated between May and August 2007. The Sub-component Effective Application of Curriculum and Appropriate Educational Materials for Preschool and Primary Rural Schools: the DCNB documents for preschool and primary education were distributed to schools in March and April 2007. The Natural and Social Science textbooks, a new printing of the DCNB for primary and the EIB textbooks were distributed in November 2007. The Sub-component for Student Learning Assessment and Education Quality Evaluation Strategies financed in 2002 and 2004 two bi-annual assessments carried out by UMCE, for 3rd and 6th grades in a sample of 1,081 and 1,076 schools, respectively. It measured basic contents, since the DCNB had not been yet implemented in the classrooms. The sample of schools included rural and urban schools as well as PROHECO and EIB schools. The Sub-component for In-service Teacher Development and Training Programs surpassed the targets set for the Lumber of participants in the training program (Programa de Formación Continua – PFC), including an additional group of teachers in PROHECO and EIB schools. Component II: Community-based Provision of Preschool and Basic Education Services ICR rating: Highly Satisfactory The Sub-component for Strengthening and Expansion of PROHECO largely implemented the strategies foreseen in the PAD, achieving its targets and objectives.

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The Sub-component for Creation of Intercultural and Bilingual Schools with the PROHECO Model for Community and Parental Involvement achieved its targets in 2004. Teachers who graduated from the training provided under the Project are teaching in several of the PROHECO schools created in EIB communities. Component III: School-based Management for Rural Communities ICR rating: Highly Satisfactory The Sub-component Development of a School-based Planning and Community Participation System in the Rural Sector surpassed its targets for creations of ADEL thanks to the Government’s strategy of supporting greater participation at local level. The Sub-component School-based Design and Implementation of Education Improvement Projects surpassed its targets for PEC implemented by AECOS and ADELS. In 2007, a total of 1,054 additional PECs were financed thanks to additional funds generated by currency appreciation of the Credit. Component IV: Strengthening of Institutional Support for Community Participation and School-based Management Programs ICR rating: Satisfactory The Sub-component for Central Support of the Community Participation and School Based Management System in the Rural Sector, provided training to personnel, technical assistance, materials and equipment for the units in the MOE central level implementing components II and III. The Project strongly supported the Ministry’s key units in charge of implementing the CNB implementation and the Info-technology Unit to strengthen the information systems. The Sub-component Strengthening Capacity of Departmental Education Offices to Plan Education Needs and to Monitor Community-based Education Programs financed the cost of personnel to design and implement information systems, including programming technicians for the Human Resource Administrative System for Teachers (SIARHD) and educational statistics, including the personnel to process those statistics from 2003 to 2005. This allowed the implementation of critical reforms such as the payment of teachers through banking system. The Sub-component Strengthening Capacity of Education Districts to Support Curricular Applications and Community and School-Based Management financed the construction of 25 district offices as well as furniture, equipment, vehicles for about 50 district offices.

IV. Costs and Financing The original Project costs were of US$41.5 million equivalent of external funding and US$6.3 million of national funding. Thanks to the appreciation of the Credit’s currencies credit, the funds increased in US$5.6 million equivalent, which were invested in additional PEC transfers to rural schools and in textbooks for the application of the National Basic Curriculum. In 2004 the country received a Japanese grant for US$715,000 to implement the project. The grant was partly cancelled due to low use of the funds (in March 2006 only 9.3% of the total had been used). The funds supported mainly training on education statistics for departmental personnel and textbooks.

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V. Institutional Development Impact The Project had an impact in the the following areas of institutional development: (a) planning, (b) implementation of accounting and payment systems, (c) creation of legal instruments, and (d) institutional integration of new programs.

VI. Sustainability The achievements of the Project’s targets and products predict a high probability that the investments will be maintained in the future with regards to children’s education, parental participation, teacher training, availability of materials and equipment, and integration of the programs in the country’s institutional and budgeted structures. The number of children currently being educated in the 1,050 new PROHECO schools reaches approximately 10,932 in preschool and 39,657 in primary education. The reduction in repetition and drop out might contribute to an improvement in primary completion rates, beginning in 2008. While AECOs continue working actively after completion of the Project, they capture the profitability of the investments in organization, legalizing, training and supervision supported by the Project, and their work contributes to guarantee the access to education for children in the most remote communities. The ADELs have functioned more to implement the PECs. However, their legal capacity positions them as an excellent tool for greater education management at the local level. The teachers in service were trained for preschool and elementary education through the PFC programs of the UPN, volunteers trained for preschool and professionalized EIB teachers constitute an excellent asset for the improvement of education quality at the local level. The availability of textbooks in rural schools, mostly on the medium term, is an important contribution to the efforts for maintaining coverage, improving efficiency and learning outcomes. The inclusion of programs created or strengthened by the Project such as: EFA, PROHECO, PFC, UMCE in the national budget points towards long term sustainability of the Project’s investments in terms of coverage for the children, teacher training and external evaluations.

VII. Lessons Learned Design Changes. The changes in the range of the objectives and the Project’s design that were done at the beginning of 2002 were necessary. However, these were not legally included in the credit agreement which would have allowed re-programming the components, activities and budget according to the complexity of the changes and deadlines for their execution. This would have permitted the creation of reasonable expectations about the goals that could be reached each year in terms of study programs, texts, complementary materials, trainings, evaluations and process feedbacks. Management. As of 2003, the UTEN (Technical Unit established to coordinate different Ministry programs) was dissolved and the Ministry assigned each technical unit within the Ministry the responsibility of improving coordination of its programs. Due to the Project’s complexity and its importance for education and the country, it was considered that the Project’s success also depended on its continuous supervision of implementation by the MOE authorities. The creation of a Continuous Strengthening Plan allowed the achievement of the Project’s objectives, including some of the more complex ones such as the production, acquisition and

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distribution of the general DCNB and EIB materials. During implementation, the MOE personnel limited by the teachers’ conflict concerning the teacher’s statute. Decentralization. The institutional strengthening at the departmental and district level was not carried out as planned; and the district planning, information and supervision systems continue weak, especially to provide the required pedagogical support to the teachers of almost 8,000 multi grade rural schools. Since 2007, the current authorities of the MOE are making great efforts to decentralize training, transfer resources, planning, and educational data collection. During 2006 and 2007, the Project demonstrated the important role that departmental, municipal and district levels play in an efficient distribution of DCNB, CNB and the textbooks to the schools. However, further reforms are still required to decentralize resources, personnel, goods and key activities to allow the improvement of the capacities of the departmental, municipal and district offices in order to solve the innumerable problems of the quality of education. Integration of International Cooperation. The integration of international cooperation to support the reform efforts in education has been a permanent objective of the MOE and the World Bank during implementation project implementation. The EFA Program is a result of those efforts. Textbook Distribution. The text distribution plan combined the use of private services for textbook distribution while also using the Ministry of Education’s available resources at the central, departmental, district and local level. This strategy has supported lower costs and the strengthening the Ministry of Education’s capacity for such a complex activity. By Project completion, consultants hired by the planning unit had produced all of the necessary materials to train private contractors and MOE personnel as well as the procedures for private businesses and MOE in charge of storage and transportation. Consultancies. In most cases, the products of consultancies were useful for achieving the Project’s targets and outcomes. However, some specific consultancies, with revealing findings and recommendations were not fully used by the corresponding technical units. This was disappointing due to their cost. This is the case of the PROHECO Technical Evaluation and the Academic Performance and Associated Factors of the UMCE which pointed out institutional and quality problems that have yet to be solved.

VIII. Monitoring and Evaluation Monitoring and Evaluation were closely linked to the Project’s annual programming exercise which included: (a) coordination of the POA elaboration, (b) preparation of the quarterly and bi-annual evaluation reports, and (c) development of the impact indicators’ system. In general, monitoring physical and financial execution was crucial for the Project’s implementation until its closure. Project managers regularly used this tool, which contributed to the achievement of the Project’s targets. In order to elaborate the impact indicators as required in Annex 12 of the PAD (at municipal and school levels), a Monitoring and Evaluation electronic tool was prepared within the MOE, which used the database created by the “Info-technology Unit” until 2004. In 2005, when educational statistics were processed by the National Institute for Statistics (INE), working with the previous format became more difficult and it was eventually discontinued.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Unofficial Translation of comments provided by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) - Honduras

JICA was not a “partner” in this Project. However, we were in frequent Communications [with IDA] on the topic of printing and distribution of natural and social science textbooks. We observed that the project accomplished that task in a timely and efficient manner. This was almost the first time that textbooks arrived on time, in February, in Honduras’ classrooms. Textbook coverage was very high and it seems that almost all schools have natural and social science textbooks. However, we believe that it would have been better if personnel from the Ministry of Education, school teachers, parents and families were involved in the distribution process, rather than hiring a national firm to do the distribution. With greater involvement the distribution process would have been cheaper and more sustainable.22

22 Note from ICR Team: Competitively selected firms were hired to distribute science textbooks from warehouses to the district level. District offices and schools were responsible for getting the books to schools –with project resources.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ESA Consultores. Evaluación Participativa del Programa Hondureño de Educación

Comunitaria (PROHECO). August 2004. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Annual

Implementation Plans. 2003-2007. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Cifras de Ejecución

Financiera por Componente y Sub-componente. November 2007. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Evaluación de

Medio Término. February 2005. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Informe Sondeo de

Indicadores de Impacto. October - November 2007. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Reporte del Estado

del Proyecto para la Misión de Supervisión del Banco Mundial. (12 reports). 2002-2007. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras - Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria. Informe Final de

Implementación del Crédito 3497 – Aporte del País.. February 2008. Secretaría de Educación de Honduras and Universidad Francisco Morazán (UPNFM- UMCE).

Estudio de Impacto: El Rendimiento Académico en las Escuelas del Programa Hondureño de Participación Comunitaria (PROHECO). July 2004.

Secretaría de Educación de Honduras. PROHECO Office. Módulo Hacia Una Educación de

Calidad en la Aplicabilidad de Técnicas Multigrados. June 2007. The World Bank. Aide Memoires of Supervision Missions (13 documents). 2002-2007. The World Bank. Development Credit Agreement. Credit 3497-HO. June 2001. The World Bank. Implementation Completion Report. Basic Education Project (IDA-

2694).Report No.24048. April 2002. The World Bank. Project Appraisal Document. Honduras Community- Based Education Project.

Report No. 21851. April 2001. The World Bank. Project Appraisal Document. Honduras Education Quality, Governance and

Institutional Strengthening Project. Report: 40514-HN. December 2007. The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. Project Performance Assessment Report.

Rural Primary Education Management Project (LN 2804) and Basic Education Project (CR 2694). Report No. 29331. June 2004.