document of the world bank report no: icr2365...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2365

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-44790)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR9.3 MILLION (US$ 15 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

FOR A

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

June 27, 2013

Public Sector Reform and Governance Unit, AFTP3

Country Management Unit, AFCC1

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2012) Currency Unit=XAF

US$ 1.00 = XAF 498.00

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank AFRITAC Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centers ANTILOPE Application Nationale pour le Traitement Informatique et Logistique des

Personnels de l’Etat (Computerized System of Administrative and Logistics Management for State Personnel)

ARMP Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Regulatory Agency for Public Procurement)

BEAC Banque des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale(Economic and

Monetary Community of Central Africa) CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CONAC Commission Nationale Anti-Corruption (National Anti-Corruption

Commission) CONSUPE Contrôle Supérieur de l’Etat (State Superior Audit Institution) CSO Civil Society Organization DGB Direction Générale du Budget (Budget Directorate) DGT Direction Générale du Trésor (Treasury Directorate) DRFi Direction des Affaires Financières DPL Development Policy Lending DSCE Document Stratégique pour la Croissance et l’Emploi (Growth and

Employment Strategic Paper) EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EoI Expression of Interest EC European Commission FM Financial Management FMIS Financial Management Information System FMS Financial Management Specialist FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German

International Cooperation Agency) GoC Government of Cameroon HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries HRM Human Resource Management ICR Internal Completion Report

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ICT Information and Communication Technology IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund INS Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics) ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status and Results Reports M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MDGs Millennium Development Goals MINEPAT Ministère de l’Economie et de la Planification Territoriale (Ministry of

EconomicAffairs, Programming and Regional Development) MINFI Ministère des Finances (Ministry of Finance) MINFOPRA Ministère de la Fonction Publique et des Réformes Administratives

(Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reforms) MINMAP Ministère des Marchés Publics (Ministry of Public Procurement) MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PEFA Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability PEMFAR Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review PETS Public Expenditures Tracking Survey PFM Public Financial Management PFMDSC Public Financial Management Dialogue Steering Committee PFMDTS Public Financial Management Dialogue Technical Secretariat PFMRAP Public Financial Management Reform Action Plan PFMSC Public Financial Management Steering Committee PFMTS Public Financial Management Technical Secretariat PNG Programme National de Gouvernance (National Governance Program) PPF Project Preparation Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSM Public Sector Management SIL Sector Investment Loan SIGIPES Système Informatique de Gestion Intégrée des Personnels de 1'Etat

(Computerized System of Integrated Management of State Personnel) TA Technical Assistance TACD Transparency and Accountability Capacity Development TOR Terms of Reference TTL Task Team Leader

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Gregor Binkert Sector Manager: Mark Roland Thomas Project Team Leader: Alexandre Arrobbio ICR Team Leader: Alexandre Arrobbio ICR Primary Author: Abel Paul Basile Bove

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Contents

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................................................ 10 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 15 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 20 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 20 6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 23 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ............... 25 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 26 Annex 2: Outputs by Component ..................................................................................... 27 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 32 Annex 4:Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 33 Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 35 Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results....................................................... 36 Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 37 Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 37 Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 39 MAP .................................................................................................................................. 46

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CAMEROON

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

A. Basic Information

Country: Cameroon Project Name:

Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project

Project ID: P084160 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-44790 ICR Date: 06/27/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF CAMEROON

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 9.30M Disbursed Amount: XDR 2.67M

Revised Amount: XDR 3.18M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Secrétariat Technique du Comité de Pilotage de la Réforme des Finances Publiques Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 03/31/2004 Effectiveness: 06/05/2009 06/05/2009 Appraisal: 03/18/2008 Restructuring(s): 12/04/2012 Approval: 06/24/2008 Mid-term Review: 07/31/2011 07/25/2011 Closing: 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory

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Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 85 90 General public administration sector 15 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Administrative and civil service reform 25 5 Other public sector governance 25 5 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement

50 90

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Gregor Binkert Mary A. Barton-Dock Sector Manager: Mark Roland Thomas Anand Rajaram Project Team Leader: Alexandre Arrobbio Mamadou Lamarane Deme ICR Team Leader: Alexandre Arrobbio ICR Primary Author: Abel Paul Basile Bove F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective (PDO) is to contribute (i) to enhance transparency and efficiency in public financial management, and (ii) to strengthen accountability in the use

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of public resource. The project will play a key role in Cameroon in accelerating the pace toward a more orderly and open PFM and thus more efficient service delivery. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Availibility of information on resources received by service delivery units (PEFA PI-23)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

D (Source: PEFA Report, 2007)

C (source: PETS2 report, 2011) C

Date achieved 06/30/2008 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement)

No new PEFA report. However, PETS2 report on 2009 budget was published in dec. 2010 (NSI website in 2011). No new PETS exercize was produced in 2010, 2011 or 2012.

Indicator 2 : Public access to key fiscal information (PEFA PI-10) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

B (Source: PEFA Report, 2007)

A (Source: PEFA Report) B+

Date achieved 12/30/2007 12/31/2012 12/31/2012

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Not met. No new PEFA report. Assessment based on information provided by experts in the field. Improvements are not significant enough to change the PEFA rating category.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Legal and regulatory texts to enforce the new Budget Law are signed and effective.

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Application texts have not been drafted yet (first quarter 2008)

Decree on new budget nomenclature including programs, signed and effective

Decree on new budget nomenclature not drafted.


Not met. Nonetheless, in 2012 presidential circulars were published on 2013 Budget preparation and execution monitoring. They included procedures and guidelines on program budgeting. Draft decree on budget calendar was submitted

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to presidency in 2011. Indicator 2 : Completeness of the financial statements (in French, Loi de Reglement) (PI-25 i)Value (quantitative or Qualitative)


B (Source: PEFA Report) D+ (Source: own

assessment)

Date achieved 06/30/2008 12/31/2012 12/31/2012


Not met. No new PEFA report. (Assessment based on information provided by experts in the field with regards to LR 2011. Financial statement improved but not significantly enough to change PEFA rating)

Indicator 3 : Percentage of investment projects which are domestically financed in annual budget compliant with the new project legal and procedures framework.


Number of Projects: 0 percent

Number of Project: >= 20 percent

N/A


Indicator 4 : Control steps in expeditor chain Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

22 8 22


No indication of change.

Indicator 5 : Percentage of contracts above threshold procured through open competition, in selected ministries (Health, Education, Agriculture, Public Works, and Finance). (PI-19 i, modified).


(To be determined by project effectiveness) In Francs CFA value

100 percent N/A


Never evaluated.

Indicator 6 : Timeliness of the issue of semi-annual budget reports (PI-24 ii) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)


B (Source: PEFA Report) D (source: own

assessment)


No PEFA report. Semi-annual budget reports are produced, but delay is superior then 8 weeks.

Indicator 7 : Degree of integration and reconciliation between personnel records and payroll data. (PI-18 i)

Value D (source: PEFA B (source: PEFA D+ (source: own

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(quantitative or Qualitative)

Report, 2007) Report) assessment)

Date achieved 06/30/2008 12/31/2012 12/31/2012


No structural change in using the HR and Payroll databases are effective and systematic yet. D+ indicate the gradual efforts since 2005 in cleaning progressively the SIGIPES-ANTILOPES databases. Merging of the 2 databases is in preparation.

Indicator 8 : Scope of the legislature scrutiny of the annual budget law. (PI-27-i) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

C (Source: PEFA Report, 2007)

B (Source: PEFA Report, 2007) C (source: own

assessment)


No indication that value has changed from baseline at Nov. 2012 parliament session.

Indicator 9 : Timeliness of the release of semi-annual budget reports on available media (government websites, national newspapers)


No publication of semiannual budget reports in PM websites and Cameroon Tribune.

Timeliness: 2 months

Semi-annual budgetreports published inCameroon Tribune only; Timeliness: 3 months

Date achieved 06/30/2008 12/31/2012 12/31/2012


Not met. Semi-annual 2012 budget report was published in Cameroon Tribune newspaper on sept. 2012. Not available on PM, DGT, MINEPAT or Presidency websites however.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 09/05/2008 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00 2 09/29/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 3 06/29/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00

4 12/31/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.95

5 06/23/2010 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.17

6 05/24/2011 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.48

7 11/28/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.88

8 08/20/2012 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.72 9 04/14/2013 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 4.12

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H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

12/04/2012 U U 3.64

The project was subject to partial fund cancellation (XDR 6.1 million). With the exception of the fund cancellation, the Project’s Objective and Results remained unchanged. The proposed change required only minor adjustments with no significant impacts on expected project unsatisfactory performance, enabling the Client to reallocate the cancelled fund to other performing project.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Social, political and macroeconomic context

1. Cameroon has played a leading role in the Central Africa region due to its location, the size of its population, its stability and wealth. Cameroon is a bilingual country with two official languages (French and English). The country is a key member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale, CEMAC) and accounts for about half of the regional community’s population and wealth. Over the last 40 years, Cameroon has enjoyed relative stability in a region prone to turbulence.

2. However, at the time of appraisal, economic growth, which relied heavily on the oil sector, was faltering. The revival of the economy following major reforms in the mid-nineties – including the devaluation of the local currency in 1994 – was short-lived. At appraisal, real GDP had decelerated with an average annual rate of less than 3.0 percent in 2004-2007, down from 4.3 percent in 2000-2003.

3. By comparison with regional trends, inequality and poverty levels were still significant and showed few signs of improvement. In 2008, the total population was estimated at 18.5 million people with more than 40 percent living below the poverty line. Ranked 150 out of the 178 countries tracked in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2008, Cameroon’s HDI score had deteriorated over the preceding two decades. The country was not on track for meeting most of the Millennium Development Goals at the time of appraisal. Cameroon’s attainment of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point in April 2006 had yet to translate into significant development results. The country’s poor development outcomes were attributed at the time of appraisal to the persistence of governance challenges in public sector management.

Governance Efforts

4. Governance constituted a major impediment to economic growth and service delivery in Cameroon. While Cameroon's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating of 3.3 in 2006 was close to the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.2, the country received a low rating of 2.5 for transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector, as well as for property rights and rule-based government. These ratings were consistent with the country’s low ranking in the Worldwide Governance Indicators, in which Cameroon had featured below the 25th percentile for the preceding decade.

5. In recognition of this, the Government of Cameroon (GoC) had embarked upon a series of governance reforms at the time of appraisal. By 2008, Cameroon had undertaken policy and institutional reforms in the following areas: (i) budget reporting and transparency; (ii) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); (iii) public procurement (adoption of a new law, establishment of a regulatory agency and application of sanctions for violations of procurement rules); (iv) establishment of an external audit body, the Chamber of Accounts

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(Chambre des Comptes); and (v) the adoption of a revised National Governance Program (Program National de Gouvernance, PNG) in November 2005, which led to the enactment of several laws on asset disclosure and the creation of an anti-corruption commission and a Constitutional Council.

Public Sector Management Issues 6. Notwithstanding the Government’s reform efforts, many challenges

remained, particularly with respect to improving the efficiency of Public Financial Management (PFM) and enhancing transparency. The 2008 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Report (PEFA) highlighted areas for improvement in PFM performance in Cameroon:

Budget credibility was questionable because of significant gaps between actual out-turns and originally budgeted expenditures (20 percent less in 2004 and 2005). Also, the stock of arrears was not reduced over 2005-2007, reflecting difficulties in controlling the budget.

Comprehensiveness and transparency were limited since half of the budget operations (mostly donor-funded projects) were not properly covered, transfers to decentralized entities were not reported, and the budget reports that were made publicly available were either incomplete or unreliable.

Policy-based budgeting was weak notwithstanding the application of formal budget preparation processes based on a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and a budget calendar. The participation of line ministries in the budget process was limited.

While budget execution was more or less predictable, arrangements for controls of budget execution and stewardship in the use of funds were not fully effective. Controls over payroll, which represented more than 40 percent of the total domestically-financed spending, were weakened by the actual situation of the HR and payroll management systems. The complex and fragmented nature of the expenditure chain translated into belated spending procedures, excessive use of ad hoc regulations, and exceptional procedures – such as cash budgeting and advance payments – that tended to distort the processes. The procurement controls system did not prevent improper use of sole sourced services and contract splitting.

Accounting, recording, and reporting were among the weakest part of the country’s PFM system due to obsolescence and only partial integration of the existing Financial Management Information System (FMIS). While the Treasury Balance and Budget Settlement laws (Loi de Règlement) – which represent the budget and state financial reports – were regularly produced, their quality and reliability were below international standards.

External scrutiny and audit were formally organized around the Chamber of Accounts and the National Assembly Finance and Budget Committee (NAFBC) but their independence and efficacy were questionable, since they lacked capacity and were still not fully operational.

7. In the lead up to appraisal, international financial and technical partners had started to closely coordinate to provide complementary support to the GoC

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on PFM reform. Given the breadth and scope of the public sector development program required to improve PFM, neither the GoC nor individual donors could support the program alone. Accordingly, and in line with the Paris Declaration, development partners in Cameroon reached consensus over a joint-working agenda to (i) facilitate a broad review of PFM institutions, policy and performance; (ii) develop a shared action plan to foster fiscal discipline; (iii) consolidate the strategic allocation of resources; and (iv) to increase operational efficiency and improve service delivery.

Rationale for Bank involvement 8. The rationale for Bank involvement was underpinned by the three strategic

pillars of the 2006 Interim Strategy Note (ISN). In line with the ISN; the Bank intended to focus its assistance on: (i) addressing governance and corruption issues; (ii) managing for results; and (iii) strengthening partnerships, alignment, and harmonization. The proposed operation aimed at assisting the GoC in laying solid foundations for a transition towards increased budgetary assistance, including from the Bank, through Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs).

9. Within the context of multi-donor support and selectivity, the following three criteria were used to guide the choice of project components: (i) activities that consolidate and deepen achievements in public expenditure management and financial accountability accomplished during the preceding years (new budget legal framework, procurement reforms); (ii) cross-cutting issues of PFMRAP (FMIS, Payroll, and Oversight and Controls) in which IDA has a competitive advantage; and (iii) coordination and M&E activities, in which building capacity in reform management and leadership is critical for the country. The results of the January 2008 PEFA report and the close coordination of development partner interventions further assisted the selection of project components.

10. The IDA project formed part of Cameroon’s broader PFM reform agenda.

Long-term reform of Cameroon’s public finances was carried out by the PFM Dialogue Steering Committee (PFMDSC) and its Technical Secretariat (PFMDTS), which development partners supported through a Multi-Donors Committee (Comité Multi-Bailleur – CMB). PFMDTS was responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of a PFM Reform Action Plan (PFMRAP). The PFMRAP had not been finalized at the time of project appraisal, due to delays in the diagnostic work. However, the elaboration of the PFMRAP and implementation strategy at the end of 2008 helped the GoC to clarify its strategy on PFM reforms and spell out implementation arrangements, especially in the area of donor coordination.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 11. The project development objective (PDO) was to contribute (i) to enhancing

transparency and efficiency in public financial management, and (ii) to strengthening accountability in the use of public resource. The project aimed to support Cameroon in accelerating the pace of reform toward more orderly and open management of public finances and thus more efficient service delivery.

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Eleven (11) indicators were chosen to monitor the project’s impact and outcomes. The design of the indicators relied heavily on PEFA indicators.

12. The progress toward the project’s objective of enhancing transparency and efficiency in PFM was to be measured by one key PEFA indicator (Indicator PI-23). It was considered that this indicator, which addresses the availability of information on resources received by service delivery units, would help to measure the impact of the project activities on the GoC’s ability to effectively implement budget allocations in two critical priority sectors, health and education. The National Statistics Institute (Institut National des Statistiques, INS) was expected to annually survey budgeted resources received by schools and health centers, with funding from the project. Cameroon received a score of D in the 2008 PEFA Report for Indicator PI-23) and this should have increased to a score of B in 2012 through the support of the project.

13. The project’s objective of strengthening accountability in the use of public

resources was also to be evaluated by reference to a PEFA indicator (Indicator PI-10). This indicator, which measures public access to key fiscal information, was intended to be used to capture how the project, through its support to the publication of fiscal data and reports of the National Assembly and the Ministry of Finance (MINFI), influenced the extent to which the general public and interest groups gained access to relevant and quality information on fiscal plans, positions, and performance. The country’s score for this indicator was expected to progress from B in 2008 to A by the end of the project in 2012.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification Not Applicable. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 14. The project’s primary target beneficiary institutions were government

agencies involved in financial and human resources management. These agencies included the MINFI, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Programming and Regional Development (MINEPAT), the Ministry of Public Function and Administrative Reform (MINFOPRA), the Procurement Regulatory Agency (Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics, ARMP), and the INS. In line ministries, the project targeted the Budget Directorate, (Direction Générale du Budget, DGB), the Treasury Directorate (Direction Générale du Trésor, DGT), the Capital Expenditures Directorate (Direction de l'Investissement), the Financial Resources Management Directorate (Direction des Affaires Financières, DRFi) and the Planning Directorates (Direction de la Planification). The Finance and Budget Committee in the National Assembly and the Douala and Yaoundé Municipalities were also targeted beneficiary institutions.

1.5 Original Components 15. The PDO was to be achieved through the implementation of four project

components which represented an estimated IDA financing of US$l5.0 million

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(including an advance Project Preparation Facility [PPF] of US$0.7 million and a contingency fund of $0.9 million). The four components were as follows: Component 1: Improving Budget Management including Procurement

(US$4.1M);

Component 2: Integration and Development of the FMIS including the HRM and Payroll Management Systems (US$5.9M);

Component 3: Strengthening External Oversight and M&E (US$1.9M)

Component 4: Support to the Project Focal Point for PFM Reform Coordination (US$1.5M)

Component l-Improving Budget Management including Procurement (US$4.1M) 16. Component Objectives: In line with the recommendations of the 2006 PEMFAR,

and January 2008 PEFA reports, the objective of this component was to support the implementation and further advancement of ongoing budget management reforms following the adoption of the new Organic Law in December 2007, in a bid to improve and accelerate budget execution and enhance budget controls.

17. Component Activities: Under this component, project activities primarily focused on supporting the revision of processes, methods and regulations for budget programming, budget execution including procurement, budget monitoring and controls, and Treasury accounting in the context of the new budget Organic Law. The activities were principally designed to address deficiencies in the management of capital budget and the execution rates of capital budget and investment projects. The activities envisaged under this component included:

Assisting the GoC to implement the reforms introduced by the new Organic Law and by the Procurement Code (adopted in 2004);

Streamlining the expenditure chain, as well as the public contract execution chain;

Strengthening line ministries’ capacity for project identification, costing and planning, through the design and implementation of project preparation procedures and tools and project cycle training;

Modernizing the Treasury through rationalization of its current organization, revision of the accounting chart and the professional development of State accountants and Treasury internal auditors.

Improving the performance of the procurement system, through the implementation of the action plan derived from the 2005 Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) with a focus on strengthening the capacity of 50 ministries and public bodies to plan their procurement operations and assisting the seven spending ministries and public bodies with the highest levels of public expenditure (Health, Education, Agriculture, Public Works, Finance, and the municipalities of Douala and Yaoundé) to improve the efficiency and transparency of their procurement processes

Component 2-Integration and development of the FMIS including the HRM and Payroll Management (US$5.9M)

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18. This component consisted of 2 sub-components related respectively to the

development and integration of the FM Information Applications and to the upgrading of the HRM and Payroll systems.

Sub-component 2-1: Integration and development of the FMIS (US$l.7M) 19. Sub-Component Objective: At appraisal, MINFI – and more globally the entire

government – did not have a coherent long-term strategic framework for the development, use and maintenance of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). There was also a lack of capacity in MINFI for modern and professional management of a PFM system in a decentralized environment, where the emphasis was on virtual collaboration between various governmental teams and structures. The objective of this subcomponent was, therefore, to assist MINFI to develop and implement a coherent ICT strategy and plan for incremental upgrades and linkage of the key applications across the ministry (Treasury, Budget, Payroll, Debt, Tax, Customs, etc.) in order to enhance financial reporting and transparency.

20. The sub-component sought to assist the GoC with strategic advice for addressing critical ICT issues and solutions that were likely to be implemented within the framework of PFM reform, without duplicating existing ICT activities financed by the government or donors and without supporting the substantive creation of an online administration (in contrast to the more focused E-Governance IT projects carried out in Ghana, Rwanda, Sri-Lanka, Morocco and Vietnam). Resources for the purchase of equipment, staff training and the development of specific applications were expected to be secured from the GoC’s own resources and other donors

21. Sub-Component Activities: The project was to provide technical assistance to MINFI for ICT project management and implementation; including the (i) definition and implementation of a coherent ICT strategy and an action plan for FM system applications; (ii) institutional and technical capacity building; (iii) design and installation of new systems or enhancements to existing systems; (iv) purchase of some hardware and software; (v) upgrade of, and interconnection, among critical financial applications (Treasury, Customs, Tax, Debt Management, Budget, Payroll, etc.); and (vi) training and change management. In addition, the project aimed to support the design and installation of MINFI’s website and intranet in order to scale up the level of collaboration and teamwork across the Ministry and beyond.

Sub-component 2-2: Modernization of the HRM and Payroll management systems (US$4.2M) 22. Sub-Component Objective: The objective of this subcomponent was primarily to

enhance efficiency and transparency and strengthen the controls and checks and balances in the management of personnel and payroll through improvements to the existing information system. Another important objective of this sub-component was to accelerate the pace of ongoing human resource management (HRM) reform, in particular the decentralization of the personnel and payroll

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management database which constituted a key component of the broader PFM reform agenda. The sub-component was closely aligned to the GoC’s commitment to installing a new system for HRM and payroll management. While support for complex civil servant remuneration reforms did not fall within the scope of the project, the sub-component sought to advance the analytical basis upon which future operational or development policy lending support for in-depth civil service reform could be developed.

23. Sub-Component Activities: Project activities sought to assist the MINFI and MINOPRA to properly manage and implement the existing HRM and payroll systems work program. Technical assistance was to be provided to: (i) conduct an audit of the existing HRM system (the Computerized System of Integrated Management of State Personnel or Systeme Informatique de Gestion Intégré des Personnels de 1'Etat, SIGIPES) and payroll system (the Computerized System of Administrative and Logistics Management for State Personnel or Application Nationale pour le Traitement Informatique et Logistique des Personnels de l'Etat, ANTILOPE); (ii) accelerate and complete the ongoing efforts to clean up, harmonize, and secure personnel and payroll files to match budget allocations for staff salaries with the actual number of civil servants; (iii) select, set up, configure, stabilize and deploy the most adequate integrated personnel and HRM tool in most of the line Ministries; and (iv) develop on-line accessible administrative procedure manuals to increase transparency in public administration, and to strengthen collaborative work and reduce case file processing times. Training activities were to be financed to strengthen the capacity of staff involved in the implementation of the HRM reform, as well as the HR personnel of the various ministries, in the use and maintenance of new HRM and payroll systems. Some equipment was to be provided to complete the network and broaden the availability of the new HRM and payroll applications to key ministries. A very limited amount of analytical work was also envisaged.

Component 3-Strengthening external oversight and M&E (US$1.9M) 24. Component Objective: The objective of this component was to enhance external

oversight, communication, and M&E to improve both the effective management of public resources and the fight against corruption, whilst strengthening the capacity of the legislature and citizens to demand accountability. Given the assistance already secured from other donors with respect to oversight and M&E in many of the fiduciary services, the IDA project focused on strengthening the capacity of the National Assembly and the Capital Budget Monitoring Local Committees (Comités Locaux de Suivi des Investissements Publics) in monitoring the execution of investment projects. The component also sought to support the INS in evaluating the impact of public expenditures.

25. Component Activities: The component consisted of three principal activities: First, to strengthen the legislature’s formal institutional role in overseeing the use of public resources and examining the Loi de Reglement, the component included strategic and technical support to the National Assembly, in particular the Finance and Budget Committee (NAFBC) for the development of effective procedures, the

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provision of training and office equipment and the creation of a public information web-site.

26. Second, to increase demand for transparency and accountability, support was

envisaged for the newly created provincial-level Capital Budget Monitoring Local Committees, which were comprised of local government authorities, elected officers and CSOs. The activities under this component focused on supporting the further development of these Committees, strengthening their capacity to monitor the execution of investment projects in local districts, and assisting the Committees in publishing their reports.

27. Finally, the component sought to address the deficit of publicly available budget

and financial information by supporting the development and implementation of an M&E framework involving systematic, timely production and publication of user-friendly communications including key information, analysis, progress reporting and performance measures related to the use of public resources. The framework was intended to strengthen public expenditure tracking. Component activities included: (i) assistance to the INS to develop its methodology for public expenditure tracking surveys, and to deliver training on the methodologies to practitioners in the public sector and civil society; and (ii) support for dissemination of information via the government websites with reference to key international standards.

Component 4 – Support to the Project Focal Point for PFM reforms coordination (US$l.5M) 28. Component Objective: The institutional arrangements for project preparation and

implementation were embedded in existing country systems in order to consolidate and sustain the GoC's leadership in, ownership of, and commitment to the reforms envisaged. The main objective of this component was to support capacity building activities for MINFI and the institutional structures leading the PFM reform agenda to enable them to properly carry out their coordination, monitoring, and leadership roles in advancing PFM reforms in line with Paris Declaration objectives.

29. Component Activities: In coordination with other partners involved in the PFM reform program, this component made provision for technical assistance, equipment and training for the PFM Technical Secretariat to manage both the project and the planned PFMRAP. In particular, the activities envisaged under this component were geared towards strengthening the capacity of the Secretariat to: (i) establish adequate and functional organizational and implementation arrangements for PFM reforms, including the coordination of donor contributions; (ii) execute its fiduciary responsibilities under the project; and (iii) coordinate and monitor project activities.

1.6 Revised Components: Not Applicable 1.7 Other significant changes

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30. Project effectiveness was twice postponed due to delays in satisfying the project’s effectiveness conditions. The deadline to satisfy the conditions of effectiveness was originally January 28, 2009. This was extended to April 22, 2009, with effectiveness finally declared on June 5, 2009, 13 months after Board approval of the project.

31. The project was subject to partial fund cancellation (XDR 6.1 million) on December 4, 2012, as requested by the Government of Cameroon. Following a bilateral discussion on country portfolio performance to optimize Cameroon’s International Development Association (IDA) allocation, the Recipient proposed to the World Bank to close the project before the original closing date (letter from the MINFI, dated February 22, 2012). During the Bank mission of March 12-20, 2012, the Government and the Bank team explored the possibility of advancing the project closing date from December 31, 2012 to June 30, 2012 or keeping the original closing date and stopping activities after June 30, 2012 while cancelling part of the credit funds. It was agreed that the latter option was the most compliant from a legal point of view. The partial cancellation of funds (US$ 9.4 million) and the reallocation of the funds to other IDA-funded performing projects was effected on December 4, 2012.

32. The fund cancellation required limited adjustments to the project which

mostly consisted of the suspension of project activities after June 30, 2012. The fund cancellation did not require any changes to the PDO, safeguard category, project components, financial management and procurement arrangements or institutional arrangements. The suspension of project activities implied the following: no new contracts except the final audit were signed after June 30, 2012, and all

on-going procurement processes were cancelled; signed contracts for which services were delivered by June 30, 2012 were

executed and paid as initially planned; signed contracts for which execution was planned after June 30, 2012 were

subject to cancellation; Contract cancellation costs were paid according to the applicable contract

clauses.

33. The cancellation of funds and related suspension of project activities had little impact on the performance of project implementation and it enabled XDR 6.1 million in IDA funds to be reallocated to optimize the Borrower’s IDA portfolio. Only few activities would have been delivered between June 30, 2012 and December 31, 2012, according to the procurement plan, and the implementation of these activities would not have changed the project’s “Unsatisfactory” ISR rating. The financial adjustments to the components and expenditure categories related to the cancellation are presented in Annex 10 below. The cancellation amount included a margin for exchange rate risk and liability risk related to the cancellation of contracts.

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2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 34. The Project was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors on June

24, 2008. The Financial Agreement between IDA and the GoC was signed on October 30, 2008, and the project was declared effective on June 9, 2009. The project had an implementation period of four years with an expected closing date of December 31, 2012. The Quality Enhancement Review of the project took place on February 19, 2008.

35. At the time of design, the PDO was relevant and consistent with the Bank’s Strategy and country program. The PDO was designed to contribute to the implementation of the three pillars of the 2006 Interim Strategy Note (report #37897-CM. Nov. 9, 2006): (i) good governance and anti-corruption, (ii) better service delivery, and (iii) enhanced cooperation with donors. The Project Appraisal Document acknowledged the lessons learned from the most recent County Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR). The PDO continued to be relevant in the context of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2010-13, which incorporated governance as a cross-cutting theme to improve service delivery and promote inclusive growth.

36. The project was aligned with ongoing PFM reform efforts in Cameroon and drew heavily upon the findings of the 2007 Cameroon PEFA report. The project built on the Organic Budget Law, which was adopted in December 2007, and a PFM Reform Action Plan, which was finalized and adopted in 2009. In addition, the PEFA report (produced at the end of 2007) provided a rigorous and documented analysis which was used extensively in the design of the project. To achieve the PDO, the project was divided into four operational components: (i) improving Budget Management including Procurement; (ii) integration and development of the FMIS (including the HRM and Payroll Management systems); (iii) strengthening External Oversight and M&E; (iv) support to the Project Focal Point for PFM reforms coordination.

37. The project’s implementation arrangements were designed to strengthen

coordination with beneficiaries and other donors and promote country ownership. The project design provided for the establishment of a PFM Steering Committee (PFMSC), and a PFM Technical Secretariat (PFMTS). The PFMSC, which was comprised of managerial-level representatives of all of the beneficiaries within and outside of the MINFI and which was headed by the MINFI, was given oversight and supervision responsibilities of project and PFMRAP implementation. Daily management of project activities was delegated to the PFMTS, within the MINFI. The beneficiaries were mainly agencies at the central level involved in budget preparation and execution and financial control and audit. The conferral of primary responsibility for project implementation on the MINFI was intended to further strengthen the coordination of PFM reforms in the country, particularly given that the MINFI was already playing a leading role in driving the PFM reform agenda and coordinating donor support for reform efforts. Project coordination was embedded in existing ministerial structures and

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the MINFI system in order to strengthen country systems. Only the procurement and FM specialists were paid externally.

38. Despite this, the project design was too ambitious with respect to the scope of planned activities and the number of beneficiary institutions intended to be covered. The project sought to address a range of issues from procurement, to public sector reform, to budget planning and execution, to external oversight. This ultimately had the effect of fragmenting the project reform agenda and dispersing finite project resources. Budget responsibilities are divided between the MINFI and the MINEPAT. However, rather than harnessing opportunities to enhance cooperation and integration between these two ministries, the project design sought to involve an extensive array of beneficiaries within and outside the MINFI. In total the project covered 13 beneficiary institutions: 8 line ministries at the central level, the INS, ARMP, the National Assembly, and the municipalities of Yaoundé and Douala. Given the track record of inter-ministerial coordination and collaboration in Cameroon, project implementation was set to be challenging right from the outset.

39. The Project also underestimated the time necessary for the implementation of

public sector reforms in Cameroon. The Project set out to implement a series of relatively ambitious reforms within a four year time frame. However, based on the track record of reform implementation in Cameroon, reforms tended to require longer implementation time frames, particularly with regards to transparency-related reforms as shown in Annex 11. The Presidential elections in 2011 during project implementation and the slow-down in the pace reform that is common to election periods was not factored into the project time frame. Finally, even though the project implementation period was technically aligned with the legally mandated deadline for the implementation of the new organic law (2007-2013), it was perhaps ambitious to assume that the reform process would adhere strictly to this deadline.

40. In terms of the Project’s Result Framework and M&E system, project

indicators were appropriately selected but the targets were too ambitious. The indicators were essentially drawn from the latest statistical information available at the time of appraisal (the 2007 PEFA report), as well as output-based indicators such as legal and regulatory texts signed and applied, or budget and financial report produced and published (see Table 1). However, the degree of expected progress in PEFA indicators was overly ambitious.

Table 1: PEFA-based TACD indicators

PEFA indicator Baseline (2007) Target (2012)

PI-23 D B

P1-10 B A

PI-25 i D B

PI-24 ii D B

PI-18 i D+ B

PI-27 i C B

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41. Finally, the Project did not take sufficiently into account the complexities of the reform process and public sector context in Cameroon. The reform project took place in a complex environment. Public administration in Cameroon is characterized by weak coordination between institutions and administrative structures and a high degree of centralization. According to some international indicators, overall performance of the public administration in Cameroon is limited. For instance, in the 2011 CPIA, Cameroon’s score for public sector management fell within the lowest cluster (2.9), in contrast to the country’s economic management score of 3.7 and overall score of 3.2. In retrospect, it appears that the context and enabling environment for reform was not sufficiently understood at the time the project was designed.

2.2 Implementation 42. Delays in project effectiveness were not followed by responsive restructuring.

The project was approved by the Board on May 27, 2008 and the Financial Agreement on October 30, 2008. While the date of effectiveness was expected for December 31, 2008, it actually occurred on June 5, 2009. The delay was principally due to the time required for the Client to establish the adequate institutional framework, which was a condition of effectiveness (funding for this was available through the Project Preparation Facility and a PHRD grant). The PFM Steering Committee was established by decree only in February 19, 2009, and there were significant ensuing delays in the establishment of the PFM Technical Secretariat; the finalization of the Project Operational Manual; the recruitment of the procurement and FM specialists; the identification of work space within the Ministries for the PFMTS team; and the acquisition of acquiring material and equipment. However, the delays in project effectiveness did not translate into efforts to postpone the closing date of the Project early into the effective implementation phase or to readjust the implementation arrangements to take into account the emerging implementation weaknesses.

43. Major and recurrent delays in procurement processes affected project implementation. Procurement delays occurred at every step of the process from the definition of terms of reference (ToRs), to the issuance of Requests for Expressions of Interest (EoI), to the assessment of EoIs and proposals, to the signing of contracts. As shown in Annex 5, for the major contracts there was an average delay of 19 months between the originally planned date of submission of proposals in the Procurement plan and the actual date of contract signature.

44. Procurement delays were probably due in part to the limited familiarity of

the Project Coordination Unit with Bank procedures. The project was one of the first projects – from the Bank or other donors1 – that the Ministry of Finance was charged with implementing. As a result, the Coordination Unit team was not yet familiar with Bank policies, procurement procedures, and project management tools. This affected implementation.

1 The EC-funded project coordinated by the MINFI started earlier (PAGT 2006-2011), but the project management arrangements were very different the Project’s embedded project management unit within the Ministry.

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45. Staffing the Project with a Procurement Specialist also presented a challenge. The recruitment process for the Project’s Procurement Specialist turned out to be complicated and experienced delays. In addition, the Project suffered from a turnover of the procurement specialist position with 2 procurement specialists covering the periods October to December 2008 and partially October 2009-September 2010, implying periods without procurement specialists.

46. There were high transactions costs associated with the preparation of

procurement processes. As a result of the number of beneficiaries, the absence of a country-based TTL and the fact that Bank procedures were new to the Coordination Unit, procurement decisions tended to be transaction-intensive. In several cases, there was a significant amount of back-and-forth exchanges between beneficiaries, PFMTS, and the Bank team before the validation of procurement documents, including ToRs, calls for EoI and selections. While this iterative process ensured ownership and compliance with procurement procedures and quality standards acceptable to the Bank, it also required intensive supervision from the Bank.

47. Final procurement decisions were highly centralized. At the beginning of implementation, signatures for all procurement steps were centralized at the level of the Minister of Finance. This issue was raised in February 2009 and a draft ministerial decision was proposed to the Government to quicken the process by devolving some responsibility to the MINFI General Secretary (PFMSC vice-chairman) and to the PFMTS Coordinator. This was only partially realized two years later, in February 2011, when the Ministry issued a de facto delegation of signature to the General Secretary, although only for the Call for EOI stage. While it appears that this partial delegation had a noticeable impact on accelerating the procurement processes in 2011, further delegation of decision-making did not eventuate.

48. The Project Coordination Committee was significantly absorbed by

coordination activities with other donors and stakeholders. The PFMTS was set up for the project but also to gather and coordinate support for public finance reform from other donors. Since the PFM reform program was not set up as a multi-donor fund, the PFMTS had to follow and coordinate the support of each donor involved in PFM reform, in addition to coordinating PFM reform implementation in different areas of the public administration.

49. The working conditions and staffing levels of the Project Coordination Unit

also presented challenges. The Project was also affected by sub-optimal working conditions during early implementation. For instance, the PFMTS team did not have proper offices before 2010. In addition, the PFM Reform Department (Division de la Réforme ) was not effectively staffed before mid-2011.

50. The institutional positioning of the PFMTS may have affected coordination challenges. The PFM Steering Committee was located within the Budget Directorate, and the Coordinator of the PFMTS did not have the rank of Director. This may have affected the Coordinator’s ability to access and disseminate information and convene the support of various parts of the public administration.

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Furthermore, the scope of the project went well beyond the mandate of the Budget Directorate.

51. Project implementation may also have been affected by the 2011 Presidential Elections. The period between February and December 2011 was a crucial period for the Project, as it was agreed that the level of implementation of the roadmap during this timeframe would ultimately determine whether the Project would be subject to restructuring or partial cancellation. This period coincided with the period of Presidential Elections in Cameroon which were held on October 9, 2011. The electoral context may have distracted decision-makers from reform implementation, thereby adversely affecting the progress of the Project during this period.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

52. The M&E system was designed to encompass both the project and overall

PFM reform. The PAD envisaged a two-level M&E system covering (i) the overall national PFM reform program, and (ii) the project. Both were to use PEFA indicators to monitor reform progress, and an M&E plan was to be set up to track achievements of the PFM Reform Action Plan. A consultant was hired to design and produce this system for the two levels.

53. However, the two-level M&E system was not effectively implemented during life of the Project. The M&E structure proposed by the consultant involved an IT-based M&E system, which the Government did not adopt. An alternative IT-based M&E system was explored with support from an EU-funded project, but it also did not lead to the creation of a systematic and regularly informed M&E system.

54. Notwithstanding this, the broader PFM Reform Action Plan was monitored.

This was achieved through the reports provided by the PFM Technical Secretariat to the PFM Steering Committee and the 2012 mid-term review of the PFM Reform Action Plan, which was conducted with the support of the Bank, though resources other than those of the project.

55. A more effective M&E system could, however, have contributed to enhanced

reform sequencing. Such a system could have supported better planning of reform actions, as well as earlier identification of bottlenecks to facilitate the adoption of mitigating measures.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 56. The project did not trigger any safeguard policies.

57. The Project’s financial management system was rated moderately satisfactory at the end of the Project. This rating concerned the following dimensions of project financial implementation: budgeting, accounting, fluidity of funds, financial reporting, and internal controls. The disbursement rate at project

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closure was 28 percent against the original loan amount (SDR9.3 million) and 82 percent against the loan amount after fund cancellation (SDR3.2 million).

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 58. The national PFM reform process is now better established, and its

implementation is pursued through the institutional arrangements set up by the Project. Despite delays and the project’s unsatisfactory rating, the project did succeed in setting up the institutional arrangements for implementing PFM reform in Cameroon. The PFMTS is currently pursuing PFM reform implementation, including activities that could not be executed by the project. The institutional capacity building of the PFMTS effected during project implementation has been sustained, with the PFMTS forming part of the civil service. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), AFRITAC, the French Cooperation, the EU, GIZ and the AfDB are all providing technical and financial support and closely coordinating their support through the PFMTS. A second PEFA report is likely to be undertaken in 2014 or 2015, in parallel to the PFMRAP implementation, and will inform stakeholders on the results of PFM reform.

59. However, crucial aspects of the PFM reform agenda, which were originally envisaged by the Project and which relate to financial management information systems and procurement, are still to be implemented. Since project closure, government priorities and donor support have focused on taking over the integration of the HRM and payroll management systems (as well as the MINFI intranet and website). By contrast, while the introduction of the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) has been included as a priority of the 2013 revised PFMRAP, challenges in implementation are likely to require significant external support. Similarly, the creation of the Ministry of Procurement (Ministère des Marchés Publics, MINMAP) in 2012 may have created uncertainty regarding the respective responsibilities of the ARMP, line ministries and MINMAP in terms of procurement.

60. Also, internal and external controls are likely to require follow up support, given that certain project activities were not achieved. Project activities supporting Inspection Services and the National Assembly could not be implemented and may, therefore, need support.

61. Finally, the introduction of new CEMAC PFM guidelines may imply the need

for adjustments to the national PFM legal framework which would in turn necessitate additional support. The new CEMAC PFM guidelines have to be integrated into national legislation by December 2013, with a 2021 deadline for implementation.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objectives rating: High

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62. At the time of the ICR, the PDO is still highly relevant to the country. The 2007 new Organic Law set a deadline to implement program budgeting in time for the 2013 Budget Law, which has been complied with. Enhancing transparency and efficiency in PFM in Cameroon, as well as strengthening accountability in the use of public resources for more efficient service delivery are still central to the PFM Reform Action Plan. The 2010-20 PRSP also confirmed the relevance of the PDO, and PFM reform remains at the heart of the country’s strategy for poverty reduction. The Bank CAS FY10-13, as well as the 2012 CAS Progress Report, aligned with GoC priorities and reiterated the importance of PFM and governance reform.

Relevance of Design rating: Significant

63. The design of the Project remains pertinent to the reform priorities of the

GoC. The project activities are both consistent with the PDO and continue to target critical aspects of the country’s PFM reform agenda, in line with the legal framework and the PFMRAP. The implementation arrangements - which place the MINFI at the centre of coordination and include all ministries concerned by the reforms – are also consistent with the project’s objectives and remain relevant in a context in which a broader national PFM reform program is under implementation. However, the PFMTS could have been better positioned within the MINFI to gain in visibility and institutional strength vis-à-vis other MINFI departments and other ministries.

Relevance of Implementation rating: Low 64. By contrast, the implementation of the Project was not consistent with the

country's development priorities. While program budgeting was introduced in January 2013 – as provided for by the 2007 Organic Law – outstanding reforms that were not implemented in a timely fashion have created significant challenges in making the program budgeting process fully operational and effective. This is reflected in the re-incorporation of the reform activities, outlined in the PFMRAP 2009 – 2012, in the revised PFMRAP for 2012-2015.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 65. Few of the Project activities were ultimately implemented and therefore the

impact of the Project on the Project Development Objectives was limited. Even though the few activities implemented set a good basis for further improvements, project outputs contributed very little to the desired outcomes.

PDO 1 (Comp. l): to support implementation and deepening of the ongoing budget management reforms, to improve and accelerate budget execution especially for the capital spending. 66. Expected Outputs: It was expected that this component would provide tools for

faster and reliable budget execution and a procurement system that ensured competition and efficiency in the use of public resources.

Achievement sub-rating: Low

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67. The activities planned under Component 1 did not reach a sufficient level of

implementation to have measurable impact on budget management. Most of the activities undertaken under this component consisted of diagnostic work. To date, the only tangible improvement to which the Project had any substantial contribution has been the timely preparation of the 2013 Budget, even though the draft Decree on the Budget Calendar has not yet been signed. In turn, no significant changes have been observed yet with regards to streamlining the expenditures chain and strengthening Treasury inspection services.

68. The impact of the Project on public procurement reform is also likely to be limited. It is still unclear to what extent the diagnostic and partial training of 50 ministries and public bodies in public procurement, as well as the setting up of the e-procurement system – activities which were supported by the Project - will have on improving budget execution. This is particularly so given the creation of the Ministry of Public Procurement (MINMAP) in December 2011. Responsibility-sharing between the MINMAP and the ARMP has yet to be clarified and the fact that MINMAP was not fully operational in 2012 is likely to have had an impact on procurement processes in that year.

PDO 2-1 (Sub-component 2-1) - to assist MINFI develop and implement a coherent Information and Communication Technology (ICT) project through strategic advice on ICT project management and project implementation in order to enhance financial reporting and increase information production, publication, and access, which are critical to sound and transparent public FM. 69. Expected Outputs: The main result expected by this sub-component was to

facilitate the production of reliable, comprehensive, and timely budget and financial reports as mandated by the financial regulations.

Achievement sub-rating: Modest

70. The only output of this sub-component during the period of project implementation was the production and adoption by the MINFI of a comprehensive ICT strategy. The implementation of the strategy is one of the central pieces of the revised PFM Reform Action Plan for 2013-2015. However, given that the strategy has not been implemented, the project has yet to have even an indirect impact on enhancing financial reporting or increasing access to information.

PDO 2-2 (Sub-component 2-2) - to enhance efficiency, transparency, controls and checks and balances in the management of personnel and payroll information; and to contribute to accelerating the implementation of ongoing HRM reform.

71. Expected Outputs: This sub-component was expected to facilitate the production

of systems, processes, and tools that would enhance payroll controls and audits to ensure a better use of core public resources in a context in which salaries constituted the largest item of public expenditure (40 percent).


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72. Little tangible progress was made in the management of personnel and

payroll management systems. The diagnostic of the HRM and Payroll information management systems was completed and adopted by the Government. However, the Project was suspended before the procurement process for the merging of the databases had been completed, and implementation of the merger would have required a project extension. Nevertheless, the reform is now moving forward with the support of the EU. Neither the pilot study on civil servant remuneration, nor the technical assistance to revise the HR procedures manual, were completed.

PDO 3 (Component 3) - to enhance external oversight, communication, and M&E, necessary to enable national stakeholders to support effective management and use of public resources, fight corruption, and enable the legislature and citizens to exercise scrutiny and increase demand for more accountability. 73. Expected Outputs: This component was intended to contribute to a better

functioning oversight system, especially at the level of the National Assembly, which exercises controls mandated by existing financial regulations. In addition, the component was expected to ensure increased availability of budget and financial information to the public. Performance under this component was to be evaluated on the basis of: (i) the extension of legislative scrutiny to fiscal policies and aggregates for the coming year; and (ii) the timeliness of the release of the semi-annual budget reports to the media.


74. External monitoring of the use of public resources was not affected by the

Project’s completed outputs. While the second Public Expenditure Tracking Survey was published, no dissemination and capacity building activities were implemented under the Project. The capacity building of the National Assembly PFM committee was also not implemented. Accordingly the increased levels of financial information published (in the “Cameroon Tribune” newspaper mostly) cannot be attributed to the Project but to the general reform dynamic. The diagnostic of the Local Committee monitoring of investment budget execution was completed and the recommendations formed the basis of a draft decree which was submitted for Executive approval in 2012.

PDO 4 (Component 4) - to consolidate and sustain the Government's leadership in, ownership of, and commitment to the reforms envisaged

75. Expected Outputs: The results expected from this component, which focused on

good project management and an M&E system, were the satisfactory implementation of the Project and its FM in line with fiduciary standards set by IDA.

Achievement sub-rating: modest

76. The establishment of the PFMTS contributed to enhancing overall reform

coordination by the State. The PFMTS was expected to contribute to sustaining

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the reform dynamic by liaising with the hierarchy (Minister of Finance), the beneficiary institutions, and technical and financial partners. Support provided by the Project to the PFMTS team, in the form of equipment and training, is expected to continue to contribute to the implementation of the national PFM reform agenda.

3.3 Efficiency Efficiency rating: low 77. While rates of return are difficult to determine for this type of technical

assistance project, project efficiency can be considered as low given the results achieved. Given the progress made towards the achievement of the PDOs and the result indicators during implementation, the overall efficiency of the Project can be considered as low.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Outcome Rating: Unsatisfactory 78. Despite the relevance of the PDO, donor coordination and the adoption of a

new organic budget law, the outcome achieved by the Project is unsatisfactory. While the relevance of objectives and of design were respectively rated as high and significant, the relevance of implementation was rated low. Outputs consisted mostly of diagnostic work, with related action plans expected to be implemented by the Government in due course. Given these are not fully implemented, the impact of project outputs on the PDO has been limited to date: the target for only one out of two of the PDO result indicators has been achieved, and none of the nine intermediate indicators were achieved. Reflecting this, the sub-ratings for achievement of project objectives by component were rated modest to low and the project’s efficiency was also rated low. The low ratings associated with project implementation and impact justify the overall unsatisfactory outcome rating.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development: Not applicable. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 79. Project support to institutional change was provided in the area of Budget

preparation. The 2013 Budget voted in December 2012 follows the principles of Program Budgeting and all ministries applied the new methodology for budget preparation to which the Project contributed. Although the 2013 Budget was still not fully disclosed at the time of the preparation of the ICR, and as a result could not be assessed, the institutional change induced by the new methodology for budget preparation appears to be deeply anchored.

80. The effectiveness conditions of the Project contributed to the creation of the PFM Steering Committee and Technical Secretariat. This helped to

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consolidate the coordination of the PFM Reform Action Plan and its implementation. The head of the PFMTS was also the coordinator of the PFM Dialogue Platform Technical Secretariat, as well as the head of the Reform Division appointed in mid-2011.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative): None. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops: Not applicable. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Low 81. The risk that development outcomes will not be maintained is low because

few activities were achieved. The results of the Project are mostly in the area of diagnostic work which has not contributed significantly to tangible outcomes. Introduction of program budgeting, which was supported by the Project, was achieved in 2013. Still, this new practice has not yet translated into measurable improvements in transparency and accountability in the use of public resources and in service delivery. While accounting, treasury, procurement, control, and HR-payroll integration are expected to progress in 2013, FMIS, PSM reform, and external oversight may take longer.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory 82. The Project was aligned with the priorities of the Government strategy,

World Bank Country Assistance Strategy, and other donors’ interventions.2 The focus and scope of the project built on close consultations with the GoC and other donors active in PFM. In particular, the project design aligned with the deadline set by 2007 New Organic Law planning for Budget Programming for the 2013 Budget.

83. While the Project was relevant to the needs of the country, it under-estimated the contextual aspects of public administration. Despite the sound overall capacity of the public administration, the Project experienced significant delays, as described in section 2. These delays can principally be attributed to underlying political economy factors in the public administration. While the hierarchy of risks, including political economy risks, was broadly acknowledged in the PAD, and raised during Concept and Quality Enhancement Review meetings, the project design did not sufficiently take into account the implications of the political

2 See section 2.1.

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economy upon implementation.3In particular, limited consideration was given to reform sequencing and change management aspects.4

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Unsatisfactory 84. Given the delays in meeting the effectiveness conditions and in procurement,

this Project would have benefited from more intense Bank supervision. Intense and regular Bank supervision was justified by a series of factors including: the institutional context, the high number of beneficiary institutions, the limited experience of the MINFI in managing Bank projects, and the resulting implementation delays.5 Such close supervision would have been more effectively conducted by a field-based TTL who could have facilitated a strong and regular policy dialogue; identified the bottlenecks and addressed issues swiftly; and enhanced the absorption of Bank procedures by the project team.

85. While intense supervision was undertaken between project approval and

effectiveness, Bank supervision during implementation was limited at crucial times, thereby affecting the ability to proactively respond to and resolve issues. Supervision missions6occurred frequently to support the Client in meeting the effectiveness conditions. The Bank procurement team also provided regular and close support to the government counterparts, particularly in the lead up to the recruitment of the project procurement specialist. However, the frequency of Bank supervision missions declined over time. In particular, while the Project was experiencing delays in implementation and after the Project was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory twice in a row, in 2009 and 2010, no formal supervision missions were held between April 2010 and February 2011. By mid-2011, the Government and the Bank explored options for project restructuring. However slowness in implementing the agreed action plan, coupled with reticence on the Bank side to extend the project closing date (which would have been necessary to allow time to implement activities under a restructured project), led to a decision not to go ahead with a project restructuring. The dialogue on project restructuring was also temporarily affected by the change of TTL in early 2012.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 86. Overall Bank performance is Unsatisfactory. As Bank performance for quality

at entry and quality of supervision were both rated Unsatisfactory, overall Bank performance is rated Unsatisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

3 See also paragraphs 41-44 for more details on the political economy of reform. 4 On sequencing PFM reform, see Diamond (2013). 5 See Datasheet, Section 2.1 and 2.2. 6 See Annex 12: Supervision missions and ratings.

22

87. The PFM reform program has been led by the Ministry of Finance with

apparently limited support from other government actors. While the new organic budget law introducing performance budgeting was adopted in 2007 with a requirement for full enforcement within five years, the Ministry of Finance had the responsibility to promote this reform and apparently experienced challenges in ensuring inter-ministerial coordination. Such reforms are usually difficult to implement without sustained support from the Government, and strong communication and coordination is thus paramount for success. Apart from the adoption of the law, reform implementation did not effectively start before the creation of the PFM Steering Committee and the adoption of the PFM Reform Action Plan in 2009.

88. The effective implementation of the Project experienced some delays. The Project was approved by the Board in June 2008 and became effective one year later in June 2009. In 2010, the PFMTS had new offices, and by mid-2011, three years after approval, the PFM Reform Department was effectively staffed.

89. This was compounded by the limitations in government-led monitoring and

evaluation, due to the absence of a comprehensive system. As mentioned earlier in the report, no comprehensive M&E tool was put in place. The high number of beneficiary institutions and limited capacity for monitoring in a complex environment ultimately had an impact upon the swift implementation of the Project.

90. Corrective measures were difficult to implement. As described in Section

Three related to results section, progress towards the achievement of results indicators and reform objectives was limited. In turn, given the context of the reform, the Government was not in a position to take decisive measures to accelerate reforms that were lagging behind. As a result, no early adjustments to the plan and calendar were sought, and the opportunity to improve project implementation prospects was therefore missed.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 91. Given the challenging reform environment and PFMTS’ lack of experience in

applying Bank project policies, its performance was moderately unsatisfactory. The PFMTS was given the overall responsibility for the implementation of the Project, as well as the PFMRAP implementation and the coordination of all donor support and beneficiary institutions. The PFMTS had to operate in a challenging environment to implement the reform: (i) government support for PFM reform implementation was only clearly manifested in December 2010, (ii) the numerous beneficiary institutions charged with monitoring the day-to-day TA implementation they were offered by the project represented a coordination challenge, and (iii) the team and the MINFI had no previous experience in applying Bank procurement and fiduciary procedures, which could not be remedied immediately because the recruitment of the Procurement Specialist consultant failed. Ultimately, the PFMTS started to be more efficient with regards to the procurement process in 2011.

23

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 92. The overall borrower performance is rated Unsatisfactory. As Government

performance was rated Unsatisfactory and Implementing Agency performance was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, overall Borrower performance is rated Unsatisfactory in accordance with the ICRR harmonized evaluation criteria guidelines.

6. Lessons Learned 93. The implications of effectiveness conditions need to be carefully assessed at

the project design stage. The timely implementation of the Project was affected by the tardy creation of the PFM Steering Committee which was an effectiveness condition that relied on a ministerial decision. While conditions of this kind are necessary for project implementation and development impact, project teams may consider postponing project submission to the Board until the necessary conditions are met, or identifying alternative, more pragmatic and readily implementable, solutions.

94. The range of operational alternatives needs to be thoroughly discussed at the

project design stage. There is no evidence that other project alternatives than a TA credit were discussed during the preparation of the Project. It would have been useful to consider other options, such as conducting analytical works before moving to better informed financing instruments in order to identify potential pitfalls and to build a consensus on the most appropriate solution.

95. Project implementation would benefit from early and more comprehensive training of implementation units, particularly in project management. Implementation unit coordinators tend to be recruited from among the Administration and are often either retired high-ranking public officials or officials of embedded agencies. While these professionals have a deep understanding of the administration and the techno-political context, their experience of project management and development partner procedures is in some cases limited.

96. The project shows that PFM reforms and projects are highly dependent on

context and operating environment. In this case, while reform was initiated (Organic Budget Law adopted, Reform Plan in place, as well as implementation structures identified), implementation proved to be challenging because of difficulties encountered in staffing and resourcing the reform structures, convening different stakeholders, managing procurement processes, and effectively implementing the targeted reforms. Therefore, a thorough and in-depth understanding of the context and challenges to reform appear to be critical to the success of PFM projects. They also need to be linked directly/integrated into the government’s own reform agenda and efforts. A strong in-country presence could be especially valuable in this context.

24

97. Project implementation by the public administration and using country systems requires enhanced support and a frank assessment of the feasibility of proposed targets. Although critical for ownership and sustainability, direct implementation by governmental units (vs. project funded Project Implementation Units) requires a thorough assessment of the contextual challenges and the implementation capacity of the unit and an appropriately calibrated set of targets results framework and implementation calendar. Direct government implementation tends to require more intense and regular supervision; appropriate technical assistance, especially during the inception phase; and a procurement plan adapted to the capacity of the unit. Interestingly, the EU PFM project in Cameroon and a similar Bank-funded project in Chad (PARCAFIP), both implemented by a government unit and benefitting from a medium to long term project advisor, experienced more successful results.

98. Field-based TTL-ship appears to be a critical factor for complex projects in

this type of context. As shown in the previous sections of this report, a field-based TTL may well have responded more effectively to the implementation challenges encountered by the Project and could have maintained regular and in-depth dialogue, on project implementation and PFM reform more generally As an illustration, the Chad PARCAFIP, which was in a comparable situation in terms of implementation in mid-2012, was able to dramatically improve implementation performance through the introduction of highly qualified and experienced international advisors and the appointment of a field-based TTL.

99. Projects that seek to introduce IFMIS would substantially benefit from

guiding principles outlined in the recent World Bank publication “FMIS: 25 years of Bank experience”. The following selection of findings and lessons learned could help in preventing the problems experienced by the Project: The political commitment and ownership of the borrower matter.

o An explicit target FMIS completion date should be announced early in project implementation and monitored closely at the highest level.

o Comprehensive FMIS projects take a minimum of six to seven years to complete and there is often at least one election cycle during this period. Elections may have a significant impact on such PFM reform projects due to changes in key management positions and priorities of new governments.

o Frequent changes in World Bank teams should also be avoided to ensure the consistency and continuity in advisory support and progress monitoring during project implementation.

Success depends on adequate preparation. The longer the time available to design FMIS projects during the preparation stage, the greater likelihood that all components will be thoroughly assessed— and, potentially, the shorter the implementation period. The development of realistic functional and technical requirements, cost/time estimates, and procurement/disbursement plans (as well as draft bidding documents) should be completed prior to Board approval.

FMIS priorities and sequencing should be addressed carefully. There is no prescription for FMIS project reform sequencing and prioritization ex-ante, but there are some useful guiding principles. FMIS projects in which the preconditions for PFM reforms were properly assessed and a time-bound

25

action plan was developed with sequencing of reform activities tend to produce more effective solutions in a shorter time.

A focus on developing internal client capacity early in the process is crucial. Strengthening the capacity of government officials is usually one of the key factors influencing the development of successful FMIS solutions in line with the reform objectives. However, improving capacity is also a complex problem, in part because of the peculiarities of public sector pay and incentive structures present within a given country. The excessive use of external consultants to perform the tasks of government officials should be avoided (especially in low capacity environments), and key PFM organizations should have a capacity building plan, starting from the preparation phase of FMIS projects, to be able to assume the responsibility of running all daily operations through information systems.

FMIS implementation is complex enough to deserve a dedicated project. Projects which focus exclusively on the difficult task of implementing FMIS solutions, rather than on a broader set of public sector reforms with a large number of unrelated components, often have broader outcomes. FMIS implementation is complex enough to deserve a dedicated project, team, and counterparts all focused on key PFM reform objectives. Embedding a large FMIS component into a broader public sector reform project (or ambitious integrated PFM activities) should be avoided.

The presence of an ICT expert in the World Bank Team is important. Having a Bank staff with ICT expertise within the task team may help in the design, procurement, and implementation phases of FMIS projects and contribute to accumulation of institutional memory for consistent good quality advice and better performing projects.

The number and complexity of procurement packages influence project duration. All FMIS ICT solutions can be implemented through one or two International Competitive Bidding (ICB) packages if carefully designed.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies Not available. (b) Cofinanciers: Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders: Not applicable.

26

Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal

Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Component 1: Improving Budget Management including Procurement

4.1 1.73 42%

Component 2: Integration and development of the Finance Management Integrated System (FMIS)

5.9 0.61 10%

Component 3: Strengthening external oversight and M&E 1.9 0.24 13%

Component 4: Support to the Project Focal point for PFM reforms coordination

1.5 1.03 69%

Total Baseline Cost

Contingency Fund 0.9 0.00 0%

Total Project Costs

Front-end fee PPF 0.7 0.00 0%

Total Financing Required 15.00 3.61 24%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Co-

financing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00

International Development Association (IDA) 15.00 3.61 .00

27

Annex 2: Outputs by Component

Outputs Beneficiary Comments Component 1 - IMPROVING BUDGET MANAGEMENT INCLUDING PROCUREMENT

(A) support the ongoing budget management reforms to improve and accelerate budget execution and enhance budget controls by: (i) assisting the Recipient in implementing the changes and reforms introduced by the New Organic Law and by the New Procurement Code; (ii) streamlining the expenditure chain as well as the public contract execution chain; (iii) strengthening line ministries’ capacity for project identification, costing and planning through the design and implementation of project preparation procedures and tools and training on project cycle; and (iv) modernizing the Treasury Directorate through the adjustment of its organization to the legal framework introduced by the New Organic Law, revision of the accounting chart, and capacity building of the State accountants, and through the rationalization of the organization and capacity building of the Internal Audit Unit of the Treasury;

(B) improve the performance of the national procurement system through implementation of the CPAR Action Plan and capacity building activities, including: (i) contribution to the set-up of a public contracts planning system by improving the capacity of the Ministries and public bodies of the Recipient to plan their procurement operations; and (ii) assistance to the Main Public Spending Bodies to improve the efficiency and transparency of their procurement units.

Technical assistance for the implementation of the new Organic Law was partially completed. Outputs consisted mostly in drafting legal texts. Some were used for the preparation of the 2013 budget: circulars on 2013 budget preparation and execution monitoring.

MINFI/DGB

Texts with regards to payment authorization, internal control are still in draft status. The draft decree on the budget preparation calendar has been submitted to the Executive, and has yet to be approved. TA was interrupted because of project closing.

Diagnostic for establishment of a new Public Investment Management system was partially completed. MINEPAT

Diagnostic was completed and some tools relative to the “chaine PPBS" were elaborated, but not the legal texts nor the administrative procedures manual. However, the consultant is continuing the work with funding from the client.

28

Treasury reorganization action plan has been completed and validated. MINFI/DGT

Action Plan implementation is on-going (diagnostic concluded there was no need to produce new legal texts and instead the new organigram should be applied): PFMTS is in discussion with the Ministries to set up the decentralized payment windows.

Assessment and Action Plan for the strengthening of the Treasury Inspection services were completed and validated. However, the actual capacity building of the Inspection Services, provision of equipment and the recruitment of new inspectors were not engaged.

MINFI/DGT Capacity building of the Inspection Services, provision of equipment and the recruitment of new inspectors were not engaged due to project closing

TA in setting up a new Treasury Accounting Framework and System was not implemented. MINFI/DGT

The recruitment process for the consultant was cancelled; however AFRITAC is currently providing technical assistance on this matter.

The diagnostic for the preparation of capacity-building plans for the 50 ministerial procurement units was completed, but capacity-building was not rolled out.

ARMP Capacity-building activities were not rolled out because of project closing.

The new e-procurement system (SIGMAP) at the Central Procurement Agency was conceived and installed and is being tested at the ARMP level.

ARMP

Capacity-building activities within the ARMP and the main spending bodies were not rolled out because of project closing. SIGMAP is not connected with the FM management system yet.

The study on procurement delays and costs was not completed due to conflicts between the consultant and the beneficiary.

ARMP The consultant had issues accessing data from ARMP during his mission.

Component 2.1 - INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FMIS

29

(A) assist MINFI to develop and implement a coherent ICT strategy and plan for incremental upgrades and linkage of the key applications across MINFI in order to enhance financial reporting and transparency, through support to: (i) the definition and implementation of a coherent ICT strategy and an action plan within MINFI for continuous upgrade of the financial management system applications, including through the setting-up of appropriate institutional and technical capacity in MINFI, the design and installation of new systems or enhancement for existing systems; purchasing of hardware and software; upgrade of and interconnection among critical financial applications; and training and change management; and (ii) the design and installation of MINFI’s website and intranet in order to scale up the level of collaboration and team work;

IT strategy and plan (“schéma directeur”) was completed and validated. MINFI

No other activities were funded by the project. Some activities are going forward: the MINFI website has been developed (not yet public), the elaboration of intranet is on-going; the adaptation of the current IT system to the new organic law has been launched. However, no progress was made on the interconnection of the different MINFI directorates, nor the interconnection with regional services or the MINEPAT.

Component 2.2 - MODERNIZATION OF THE HR AND PAYROLL MANAGEMENT (B) enhance efficiency, transparency and controls in the management of personnel and payroll within all Ministries of the Recipient by improving the current information system and accelerating the implementation of the ongoing human resources management reform, including by: (i) conducting an audit of the existing HR management and payroll systems; (ii) accelerating and completing the ongoing efforts to rationalize, harmonize, and secure personnel and payroll files ; (iii) selecting, setting up, and deploying the most adequate integrated personnel and human resources management tool in most of the line Ministries; (iv) developing HR administrative procedure manuals accessible on line; (v) strengthening the capacity of staff involved in the implementation of the HR management reform as well as the HR personnel of the various ministries; (C) support the analysis of civil service remuneration system, through the provision of studies.

Audit of the HR and Payroll system (SIGIPES-ANTILOPE) was completed. Technical specifications for the acquisition of the new IT system were completed; however the Request for proposal was not launched.

MINFI / MINFOPRA

The Authorities made a decision in March 2011 to purchase a completely new system to manage the Government HR and Payroll. Technical specifications have been completed and the RFP was about to be issued end of 2011 but process was stalled given

30

project closing. The Authorities have now secured funding from the EU for the IT system.

TA to support MINFOPRA in developing of HR administrative procedures manual never started. MINFOPRA

The study of the civil service remuneration stopped at the level of drafting the ToR.

MINFOPRA

Component 3 - STRENGTHENING EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT AND M&E (A) the provision of support to the National Assembly to strengthen legal oversight on use of public resources, in particular to the Finance and Budget Commission and to the Permanent Secretariat, through studies, Training and equipment; (B) the promotion of consultative mechanisms between the legislature, civil society organizations, the media and other users of information by supporting the development of the CLS in monitoring the execution of investment projects in local districts; (C) support for the development and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation framework involving systematic and timely production, publication and user-friendly communication to the public of key information, analysis, progress reporting and performance measures in the use of public resources, by (i) supporting the INS to develop its methodology for public expenditure tracking surveys, and to deliver training on the methodologies to practitioners in the public sector and civil society; and (ii) supporting public access to information regarding PFM performances, principally via the MINFI, ARMP and National Assembly websites.

Support to National Assembly/ Public Finance Committee was not implemented AN/CFP

A suitable consultant was identified; however contracting process was stopped given project cancellation.

The diagnostic of the local investment budget monitoring committee (CLS) was completed and validated by the MINEPAT.

MINEPAT

Recommendations have been taken into account (e.g. setting monitoring committee at local council level) and a proposition of a legal text has been submitted to the Minister.

The Public Expenditures Tracking Survey report (PETS2) in Education and Health was completed with TA from the Bank. However, the report was not widely disseminated, and capacity building to other stakeholders on PETS methodology was not carried out.

INS & others The report is accessible on the INS website. Dissemination and capacity-building were not implemented given project closing process.

31

No other activities with regards to public access to information regarding PFM were carried out. Misc.

Component 4 - SUPPORT TO PROJECT FOCAL POINT FOR PFM REFORMS COORDINATION Provision of support to the PFMSC and the PFMTS for Project management, coordination and monitoring, and the setting-up of functioning and adequate organizational and implementation arrangements for PFM reforms, all through technical assistance, Operating Costs, equipment and Training. Engagement of a procurement specialist to provide TA to the PFMTS suffered from recruitment & retention issues. PFMTS The first Procurement plan produced is dated of May

2010, while the project was approved on July 2008 A consultant designed an M&E system for the project and PFM reform that was neither accepted nor implemented by the Client.

PFMTS The World Bank provided direct support (i.e. not through the Project) to the mid-term evaluation of the PFM Reform Action Plan.

IT systems (incl. FM IT system) & equipment was purchased and used by the PFMTS. PFMTS

The Procurement specialists benefited from 3 trainings in World Bank Procurement guidelines and procedures in Tunis (Tunisia), Douala (Cameroon) and Dakar (Senegal).

PFMTS/PS

The accountant and the FM specialists benefited from training on World Bank FM guidelines and procedures. PFM/FMS

The Technical Secretariat benefited from training on change management. PFMTS/TS

32

Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

As an institution building and technical assistance project, quantitative computations of rates of return are difficult to quantify, and no formal economic and financial analysis was performed at the time. Economic and fiscal savings could have occurred through the introduction of a more efficient financial management system, and program budgeting and human resources management could have ultimately contributed to efficiency. However, considering that the Project realized few of the originally intended activities and exited with an “Unsatisfactory” rating, the overall efficiency of the project can be considered as low.

33

Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending

Armand E. Atomate Senior Advisor to Executive Director EDS13

Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Bernadette DjapaNyanjo Procurement Assistant AFCC1 Emile Louis Rene Finateu Consultant AFTFM Faustin-AngeKoyasse Senior Economist AFTP3 KouamiHounsinouMessan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Chukwuma F. Obidegwu Consultant AFTP2 FridolinOndobo Financial Management Specialist AFTFM HerimpamonjyMavoarisoaRanaivoarivelo Program Assistant MNSPR

AbdoulayeSeck Country Manager ECCMD Nicola J. Smithers Lead Specialist WBICR David Tchuinou Senior Economist AFTP3 Gilles Marie Veuillot Consultant AFTEG Supervision/ICR Henri Laurent Bateg Communications Officer AFRSC Yang-Hah Chung-Kong Senior Program Assistant AFTPR Bernadette DjapaNyanjo Procurement Assistant AFCC1 Jeanne d'ArcEdima Team Assistant AFCC1 Emile Louis Rene Finateu Consultant AFTFM YvanFranusic Consultant OPCPR Laurence HougueBouguen Program Assistant AFCC1 Sekou Keita Consultant AFTFM Faustin-AngeKoyasse Senior Economist AFTP3 SamiaMelhem Senior Operations Officer TWICT KouamiHounsinouMessan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Helene SimonneNdjebetYaka Operations Analyst AFCC1

Sylvie MunchepNdze Team Assistant AFCC1 Emmanuel Ngollo Consultant AFTP2 Maurice Nsabimana E T Consultant DECDG FridolinOndobo Financial Management Specialist AFTFM AbdoulayeSeck Country Manager ECCMD Katrina M. Sharkey Country Program Coordinator AFCCI

34

FatimataSy Language Program Assistant AFCAD Xiao Ye Economist AFRCE Robert A. Yungu Senior Public Sector Specialist AFTPR

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands

(including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY04 20.61 145.24 FY05 18.35 104.77 FY06 20.12 121.51 FY07 32.04 206.13 FY08 54.22 328.62 FY09 32.38 192.3 FY10 20.25 124.4 FY11 16.32 117.8 FY12 11.5 91.7 FY13 6.59 13.1

Total: 232.38 1445.57 Supervision/ICR Total: 0.00

35

Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results

Not applicable

36

Annex 6: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not applicable

37

Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Borrower’s comments on Draft ICR were not provided.

38

Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not applicable.

39

Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents

2AC (2008) Evaluation des Finances Publiques Selon la Méthodologie PEFA, Cameroun sept./oct.-dec. 2007, [Cameroon PEFA report], Final report, January.

Charlier, F. & N’Cho-Oguie, C. (2009) Sustaining Reforms for inclusive Growth in Cameroon, a Development Policy Review, Washington DC: World Bank

Dener, C., Watkins, J. A., & Dorotinsky, W. L. (2011) Financial Management Information Systems: 25 Years of World Bank Experience on What Works and What Doesn’t, World Bank Study, April 2011.

Diamond, J. (2013) Good Practice Note on Sequencing PFM Reforms, January.

Republic of Cameroon (2009) Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l’Emploi (DSCE), Cadre de référence de l’action gouvernementale pour la période 2010–2020 [Strategy paper for growth and employment (SPGE): Framework of government action for 2010–2020].Yaoundé: Republic of Cameroon

Republic of Cameroon (2013)Plan de Modernisation des Finances Publiques du Cameroun, Revue de la Mise en Œuvre du Plan 2009-mi-2012 et Actualisation 2012-2015, [PFM Reform Action Plan Implementation Assessment for 2009-2012 and Revision for 2012-2015],January draft report, Yaoundé: Republic of Cameroon

World Bank (2008) Project Appraisal Document of Transparency and Accountability Capacity Development Project, May 27, Washington DC: World Bank

World Bank (2008-2013) Various ISRs and Aide-Memoires of the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Development Project (P084160), Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2011) CFA Cameroon Study, draft report, May.

World Bank (2012) Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report FY10-13

World Bank (2013) Proposed Project Restructuring of Transparency and Accountability Capacity Development Project, Washington, D.C., USA.

People interviewed for this ICR:

Government of Cameroon

Cyril Edou MINFI, PFMTS coordinator Jean-StephaneMbida MINFI, DRFi, Procurement specialist Flore Kinkeu MINFI, PFMTS MINFI, PFMTS, Expert Formation Ahmed NdjamaAbouem MINEPAT, deputy director of Public

Investment Budget Monitoring AkoTakeum MINFORPA-SPRA

40

World Bank

AlexandreArrobbio TTL Bernadette DjapaNyanjo Procurement Assistant Dan Murphy Former Country Officer KouamiMessan Procurement Specialist FaustinKoyasse Senior Economist Mamadou L. Deme TTL KolieOusmane M. Megnan FM specialist Cia Sjetnan Senior Country Officer Partners

Jean Michel Dumont French Embassy, MINFI Technical Assistant

Sekou Keita AfDB, FM specialist; former WB FMS for the TACD project

Frederique Same-Ekobo EC, FM specialist Martial Laurent ADE, head of EC PFM project Du Prince Tchakote IMF

41

Annex 10: Changes in Financing and Proposed Cancellations by Component

Components/Activities

Current in million

USD (PAD)

Disbursement (occurred +

expected incl. Audit) in

million USD)

Proposed Cancellation

(incl. exchange risk margin) in

million USD

Proposed Cancellation

(incl. risk margin) in

million XDR7

Component 1: Improving Budget Management including Procurement

4.1 2.4 1.7 1.1

Component 2: Integration and development of the FMIS including the HR and Payroll Management

5.9 1.2 4.7 3.0

Component 3: Strengthening External Oversight and M&E

1.9 0.8 1.1 0.7

Component 4: Support to the Project Focal Point for PFM Reforms coordination

1.5 0.9 0.6 0.4

Advance PPF 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.4

Contingency Fund 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.5

TOTAL 15.0 5.6 9.4 6.1

7 The amounts in XDR and USD are equivalents based on the exchange rates as of October 30, 2012, i.e. the date at which the discussions between the Bank team and the Government on the amount to be cancelled were finalized: 1 XDR = 1.54 USD.

42

Annex 11: Years between policy commitment and implementation

Reform Year of Announcement Year of Implementation Number

of years

Freedom of Media 1990 2000 (without enforcement mechanisms). 10

Audit Chamber 1996 Law passed in 2003, operational in 2006. 10

Decentralization 1996 Law passed in 2004, implementation started in 2009. 13

Asset Disclosure (art. 66)

1996 Law passed in 2006. No decree of application so far. Over 15

Constitutional Court 1996 Law passed in 2004 and revised in 2012.

No decree of application. Over 15

Senate 1996 First election on April 2013 16

New Organic Law 2000

Law passed in 2007, with implementation for the first time set for 2013 Finance Law.

12

Anti-Corruption Law 2006 Law drafted since 2008 but not passed

yet. Over 6

EITI 2005 Last deadline for validation is 2013 Over 8 Source: Charlier et al. (2009) updated and completed by author

43

Annex 12: Supervision Mission and Ratings

Missions dates Length Time

between mission

PDO / Implementatio

n progress Rating

2008 May - Board Approval - June 17 days U/U September 12 days 2 months MS/MS

2009

February 14 days 4 months March 08 days 1.5 months June - Effectiveness June 10 days 2 months MS/MS November 05 days 4.5 months MU/MU December (visit VP AFR)

2010 April 13 days 4.5 months MU/MU

2011

February (incl. SM) 11 days 9.5 months U/U July (Mid-Term Review, incl. external expert E. Champagne)

13 days 5.5 months MU/MS

March 09 days 7 months U/U June 30 – Suspension of activities Dec. 30 – Closing of the project U/U

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Annex 13:GoC Supervision of PFM Reform - Key Facts

GoC supervising bodies Mandate Key dates

PFM Dialogue Platform

Concertation platform presided by Min. of Finance, comprising GoC (Presidency, PM office, MINFI, MINEPAT, Audit Bench), donors, CSO, private sector.

Created in Feb. 2007 and decree providing for trimestrial meeting.

Only met thrice (in 2007, 2008 and 2012)

PFM Reform Steering Committee (internal)

High-level decision-making internal deliberative space presided by Min. of Finance, and comprising relevant public administration (Presidency, PM office, CONSUPE, ministerial departments esp. from MINFI and MINEPAT and MINFOPRA, MP)

Created in Feb. 2009

5 meetings so far (2 in 2009, 2010 and 2 in 2011)

6 meetings of the sub-committee between Feb. 2011 and Feb. 2012.

Technical Secretariat of the PFM Reform Steering committee

Head of the TS is also coordinator of the platform on Public Finance, and head of reform division (under Budget Directorate)

Created in April 2009, with Coordinator

Office for the team made available only in 2010.

Division of Reform Division of Reform is accountable to the Budget General Director

Staffed in June 2011

45

Annex 14: Time between original planned date for receiving proposal’s submission and date of contract signature

Activity*

2008 proc. plan

2009 proc. plan

2010 proc. plan

2011 proc. plan contract

TIME between original planned date of proposals' submission and contract's

signature

AMOUNT in US$ million (real or proc. plan est.)

planned date for proposals' submission

COMP. 1

TA in implementing New Organic Law / Aug-09 Sep-10 Apr-11 28-Sep-11 26 months 0.65

TA in Project cycle management / Oct-09 Nov-10 Apr-11 21-Oct-11 23 months 0.52

Diagnostic Treasury reorg. / Nov-09 Apr-10 / 4-Oct-10 12 months 0.16

TA in Procurement / Nov-09 Sep-10 / 26-Sep-11 23 months 0.45 e-procurement / Nov-09 Jul-10 Mar-11 13-Oct-11 24 months 0.17 COMP. 2

MoF IT strategy Feb-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 / 24-May-11 19 months 0.52

Audit HR-Payroll IT system / Nov-09 / / Nov-09 13 months 0.1

COMP. 3

Study PIB monitoring committee / Nov-09 Sep-10 / 13-Oct-10 12 months 0.19

Average 19 months *not all contracts are in this table, only the major contracts, representing 76% of the total amount disbursed.

1963 Level1973 Level

2001 Level

AAddaammaaoouuaa

MMttss

..

MMttss MMbbaanngg.. MM

aannddaarraa

MMttss ..

N O R D -N O R D -O U E S TO U E S T

S U D -S U D -O U E S TO U E S T

O U E S TO U E S T

L I T T O R A LL I T T O R A L

C E N T R EC E N T R E

S U DS U D

E S TE S T

A D A M A O U AA D A M A O U A

N O R DN O R D

E X T R E M EE X T R E M EN O R DN O R D

EchambotEchambot

MouloundouMouloundou

Abong MbangAbong Mbang

LokomoLokomo

YolaYola

BatouriBatouriYYabassiabassi

LimbeLimbe AkonolingaAkonolinga

FotokolFotokol

MaltamMaltam

MoraMora

YagouaYagoua

KaéléKaélé

FiguilFiguil

MbéMbé

BanyoBanyo

NgaiNgai

TourouaTouroua

TibatiTibati

Garoua BoulaiGaroua Boulai

NgaoundalNgaoundal

BélaboBélabo

NangaNangaEbokoEboko

SangbéSangbéBankimBankimKumboKumbo

WumWum

BafangBafang

NkongsambaNkongsamba

TikoTiko

EdeaEdea

EsékaEséka

SangmélimaSangmélima

AmbamAmbam

MbalmayoMbalmayo

KribiKribi

DschangDschang

KumbaKumba

MamfeMamfeFoumbanFoumban

YokoYoko

NtuiNtuiBueaBueaDoualaDouala

EbolowaEbolowa

BertouaBertoua

BafoussamBafoussam

BamendaBamenda

NgaoundéréNgaoundéré

GarouaGaroua

MarouaMaroua

YAOUNDÉYAOUNDÉ

N O R D -O U E S T

S U D -O U E S T

O U E S T

L I T T O R A L

C E N T R E

S U D

E S T

A D A M A O U A

N O R D

E X T R E M EN O R D

Echambot

Mouloundou

Abong Mbang

Lokomo

Yola

BatouriYabassi

Limbe Akonolinga

Fotokol

Maltam

Mora

Yagoua

Kaélé

Figuil

Mbé

Banyo

Ngai

Touroua

Tibati

Garoua Boulai

Ngaoundal

Bélabo

NangaEboko

SangbéBankimKumbo

Wum

Bafang

Nkongsamba

Tiko

Edea

Eséka

Sangmélima

Ambam

Mbalmayo

Kribi

Dschang

Kumba

MamfeFoumban

Yoko

NtuiBueaDouala

Ebolowa

Bertoua

Bafoussam

Bamenda

Ngaoundéré

Garoua

Maroua

YAOUNDÉ

N I G E R I A

CHAD

CENTRAL AFRICANREPUBLIC

CONGOGABONEQUATORIALGUINEA

EQUATORIALGUINEA

Bénoué

Vina

Djérem

Kade

i

Boumba

Dja Kom

Nyong

Mbam

Mbu

Faro

Lom

Wou

ri

LakeMbakaou

Gul f ofGuinea

LakeChad

To Maiduguri

To Maiduguri

To Massaguet

To Mandélia

To Guelengdeng

To KimTo

PalaTo Leré

To Bouar

To Oyem

To Ikom

Adamaoua

Mts

.

Mts Mbang. M

andara

Mts.

Mt. Cameroon(4,095 m)

10º E 12º E 14º E 16º E

12º E 14º E 16º E

2º N

4º N

6º N

8º N

10º N

2º N

4º N

6º N

8º N

10º N

12º N

LakeLagdo

LakeMaga

CAMEROON

0 40 80 120

0 40 80 120 Miles

160 Kilometers

IBRD 33382R

APRIL 2013

CAMEROONCITIES AND TOWNS

PROVINCE CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, o r any endo r s emen t o r a c c e p t a n c e o f s u c h boundaries.