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Document of The World Bank

Report No:ICR0000302

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (MULT-50591; TF057878)

ON A

{CREDIT/GRANT}

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ {15} MILLION

TO THE

WEST BANK AND GAZA

FOR A

INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

September 29, 2008

{MNSSD} {Country Department} {Middle East and North Africa Region}

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective)

Currency Unit = NIS 1.00 = US$ 0.27

US$ 1.00 = 3.6

FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF CAS CDP CDPII CDC DORA EMP ICDP ICR ICTs ISR KPI MCT MOA MOLG PECDAR PA PDO TFCA TFGA TFGWB UNRWA VNDP WBG

Additional Financing Country Assistance Strategy Community Development Project Second Community Development Project Community Development Consultant Department of Refugee Affairs Environmental Management Plan Integrated Community Development Project Implementation Completion Report Information Communication Technologies Implementation Status Report Key Performance Indicators Multipurpose Community Telecenter Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Local Government Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction Palestinian Authority Project Development Objective Trust Fund Credit Agreement Trust Fund Grant Agreement Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East Village & Neighborhood Development Project West Bank and Gaza

Vice President: Daniela Gressani Country Director: A. David Craig Sector Manager: Laszlo Lovei Project Team Leader: Meskerem Brhane ICR Team Leader: Colin Scott

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WEST BANK AND GAZA

INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

CONTENTS

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 4

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes............................................... 7

3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 10

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 12

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance...................................................... 13

6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 14

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........... 14

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 15

Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................. 16

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 19

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes............. 25

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 27

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 29

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 30

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 63

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents....................................................................... 64

MAP

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A. Basic Information Country: West Bank and Gaza Project Name:

Integrated Community Development Project

Project ID: P069986 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-50591 ICR Date: 09/30/2008 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: THE PLO FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PA

Original Total Commitment:

USD 15.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 14.9M

Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: PECDAR Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/19/2001 Effectiveness: Appraisal: 02/16/2002 Restructuring(s): Approval: 05/23/2002 Mid-term Review: 12/01/2004 12/02/2004 Closing: 12/31/2007 03/31/2008 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Not Applicable

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Not Applicable

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project No Quality at Entry None

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at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General education sector 30 25 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 30 14 Health 27 20 Roads and highways 36 Sub-national government administration 3 Telecommunications 10 5

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Access to urban services and housing Primary Secondary Municipal governance and institution building Primary Primary Other social protection and risk management Primary Primary Participation and civic engagement Primary Primary Rural services and infrastructure Primary Primary E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Daniela Gressani Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: A. David Craig Nigel Roberts Sector Manager: Laszlo Lovei M. Salah Darghouth Project Team Leader: Meskerem Brhane Kanthan Shankar ICR Team Leader: Meskerem Brhane ICR Primary Author: Colin S. Scott F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Improved quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities of WBG 0002453800... generated text

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Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Proportion total MP financing awarded to communities located in regions with poverty incidence >20% according to the WBG poverty.

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

NA

75% total MP financing awarded to communities located in regions with poverty incidence >20% according to the WBG poverty.

Indicator dropped Indicator dropped

Date achieved 08/23/2002 06/30/2006 06/29/2007 03/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Considering the severe socioeconomic downturn, poverty targeting has lost its relevance. Greater number of the population in small communities fall within this category.

Indicator 2 : Proportion of microprojects financing awarded to communities with population less than 5,000


NA

60% of microprojects financing awarded to communities with population less than 5,000

71% of microprojects financing was awarded to communities with population less than 5,000

Date achieved 08/23/2002 06/30/2006 03/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 3 : Proportion of sample of beneficiaries express satisfaction with microproject outcomes


NA

60% of sample of beneficiaries express satisfaction with microproject outcomes

83% of sample beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with microproject outcomes

Date achieved 08/23/2002 06/30/2006 03/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increase quality and availability of basic service effected by the MP, in communities implementing MPs

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

NA

Minimum 100 Community Development MPs are implemented

Minimum 150 community Development MPs are implemented

220 community development MPs were implemented (including 83 job creation MPs in Gaza).

Date achieved 08/23/2002 06/30/2006 06/29/2007 03/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 09/16/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.50 2 03/20/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.50 3 10/01/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.12 4 04/29/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.37 5 11/02/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.22 6 04/25/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.38 7 05/31/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.50 8 12/28/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.47

9 06/29/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 7.87

10 12/09/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.41

11 06/28/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 10.50

12 12/13/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.76 13 09/16/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.86

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

Summary

The Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) was conceived as a third in a series of community development projects designed to address poverty (especially through temporary job creation) and restoration of economic and social infrastructure in marginalized areas. It was also intended to build Palestinian institutions. The project proved to be resilient throughout an ever worsening security, political and economic context. The ever increasing restrictions on movement of people and goods continued to be a significant constraint. Nevertheless, the flexibility of the project design enabled it continue to provide critical infrastructure services such as improved rural roads, water supply and sanitation, school facilities, community centers and public spaces that are of a developmental nature, while many other donors reverted to emergency humanitarian assistance. However, institutional development took second place to getting the work completed.

The original project design anticipated donor co-financing which did not materialize but the impact on overall project outcomes was mitigated by the Bank’s Additional Financing (AF) in 2006. At its closing, the project had exceeded its planned output indicators (150 microprojects) to 223 at project closing. The AF was designed to respond to emergency conditions when donors stopped funding the Palestinian Authority (PA) following the electoral success of Hamas, deepening the economic crisis and causing poverty rates to spiral. The flexibility of the design of the ICDP, especially the AF allowed the completion of desperately needed job creation activities in Gaza in 2007, a period of total isolation. At closing, ICDP had created temporary employment for over 5,000 individuals in Gaza. Over 80 percent of beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with microproject outcomes (compared to the 60 percent target) and successfully reached women and youth. Its lessons have already been passed to a new generation of community development projects (the Village and Neighborhood Development Project) with greater emphasis on local participation and community capacity building.

Despite ICDP’s remarkable achievements in a fragile context, its overly ambitious project development objective, shortcomings in monitoring and evaluation (e.g., lack of baseline data, output based performance indicators), implementation difficulties and modest impact in institutional development, result in an overall rating of moderately satisfactory.

1.1 Context at Appraisal The project was appraised in the context of prolonged insecurity and socio-economic breakdown following the onset of the second ‘intifada’ (Palestinian uprising) in September 2000. The continuing insecurity coupled with closures and restrictions on movement of people and goods had reversed economic gains made since the Oslo Accords of 1993 and was estimated by mid-2002 to have increased poverty levels, pushing those below the poverty line (over one million Palestinians) from 20% to 40%. Poverty and the collapse of social services were especially prevalent in those communities most isolated by closures. In such a crisis, the Bank’s interim strategy was to continue poverty reduction while supporting emergency interventions such as temporary job creation and budgetary support to maintain minimum service levels, all to avoid the total collapse of the Palestinian economy. This was reaffirmed in the December 18, 2003 “Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank

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(TFGWB): Status Strategy, and Request for Replenishment” which summarized the Bank’s goal to balance efforts to manage the emergency nature of the current situation with a continued focus on a medium-term development agenda. Within that strategy, which acted as reference point and framework for projects since West Bank Gaza (WBG) did not have a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the ICDP and its additional financing were deemed fully consistent with the stated objective of strengthening capacities for and financing the delivery of basic services to the poor. Following two previous community development projects, the ICDP was appraised as a key instrument in the Bank’s poverty reduction strategy, financing investments in local infrastructure and institutions necessary for economic growth and employment. The ICDP was conceived as operating at a local level below municipalities, fostering community participation, targeting rural and refugee populations and relieving the isolation of worst-hit communities.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) PDO: Improved quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities of WBG. Key indicators: * 90 percent of microprojects improve quality and availability of basic services for a

minimum of two years from the end of the defects liability period, according to microproject status reports

* 75 percent of microproject financing awarded to communities located in regions with poverty incidence above 20 percent, according to WBG poverty map

* 60 percent of microproject financing awarded to communities with population less than 5,000

* 60 percent of beneficiaries express satisfaction with the level of citizen involvement in preparation and implementation of a microproject in their community, according to survey of beneficiaries

* 60 percent of surveyed beneficiaries express the microproject had a positive impact on their access to services.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

The PDO was not revised. However, the key performance indicators (KPIs) for the PDOs and outputs by component were slightly revised following the AF to remove redundancies, provide greater precision, and include targets for labor content. The indicator on poverty targeting was dropped since due to the severe economic downturn, nearly all regions had high levels of poverty incidence. Poverty targeting is difficult since data are not disaggregated at the level of local government.

The revised KPIs for the PDO and as monitored in the Implementation Supervision Reports are below: * 60 percent of beneficiaries express satisfaction with the level of citizen involvement in

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preparation and implementation of a microproject in their community, according to survey of beneficiaries

* 60 percent of surveyed beneficiaries express the microproject had a positive impact on their access to services.

See Annex 2 for a detailed presentation of revised KPIs of the output indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries, The PAD identified more than half a million Palestinians in at least one hundred small and poor communities who would benefit from improved availability and quality of basic services and from greater economic activity due to demand for local labor and materials (assumes average population per microproject 5,000). The poor in marginalized rural communities and refugee camps in particular would benefit from infrastructure improvements such as schools, clinics, water supply and sanitation, which have a high social return. Ten communities and 75,000 people (halved by the time of implementation) would benefit from the telecenters. The PAD also indicated general benefits for those in the agricultural sector. Local Government Units and national implementation partners (PECDAR, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Local Government, and the Department of Refugee Affairs) would benefit from some capacity and institutional building activities through supply of office and service equipment, needed technical studies and some training in administration and project management. The additional financing project paper identified youth and women as priority vulnerable groups for microprojects. The Additional Financing also envisaged the implementation of 50 community development microprojects. Those would include civil works for construction, essential furniture and goods, and resources for training and technical services to improve planning, consultation and management capacities of communities.

1.5 Original Components (as approved) (i). Community Development Microprojects ($17.65m)

Grants to local government units and farmers cooperatives to finance a minimum of 100 microprojects, including civil works for water supply, waste management, health clinics, schools, roads, irrigation networks, etc.

(ii). Community Telecenters ($1.75m) Ten multipurpose centers involving civil works, equipment such as computers, and specialist services.

(iii). Project Management ($0.60m) Incremental operating costs for Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA).

1.6 Revised Components The component for Community telecenters was halved because anticipated donor funds did not materialize. Reasons for lack of donor funds are: (i) ICTs were no longer considered a priority given the emergency conditions and donor funds went to emergency employment and (ii) preference of donors to implement projects through line ministries to contribute to building key pillars of a future Palestinian state. The AF financed the component for

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microprojects since this mitigated against the deepening economic crisis and put a stress on high labor content (setting the target at 30 percent).

1.7 Other significant changes The additional grant financing ($5m) of February 2007 extended the scope and flexibility of the project through a period of uncertainty when international donor contact and assistance to the PA was halted as a result of Hamas’s electoral success. The AF simplified project coordination, and placed a greater emphasis on community participation in the identification and implementation of microprojects. An important innovation was the addition of community procurement.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Clearly at the time of appraisal it was easier for the task team to look back at the lessons of the first two community projects and design the project accordingly than to predict and accommodate the unknown future security and political context. The PAD included extensive discussion of the lessons of Community Development Projects 1 and 2 (CDP I & CDPII), and attempted to correct the deficiencies in ICDP. In particular, ICDP differed from its predecessors in (i) improving livelihoods in refugee camps where UNRWA, the key service provider, was increasingly stretched (ii) targeting rural employment and productivity in the agricultural sector, and (iii) piloting new initiatives to reduce isolation through access to information and communication technologies. The design and approach was relatively simple. With hindsight, it might be argued that some of the implementation arrangements promoting participation and levels of coordination were unrealistic given that the insecurity and closures were already several months underway and likely to continue. However, the project had to be consistent with the Bank’s strategy which continued to balance service provision with broader institution-building objectives. The design therefore had to straddle the emergency provision and development goals. The PAD was candid about the high risks involved and the likelihood of low sustainability. The design included measures to mitigate these risks as far as possible, for example the use of local materials and labor to avoid problems of closure and access. In any event, the design proved fairly resilient to the continued insecurity and political changes over the following five years. The additional financing provided an opportunity for adapting the design to changing circumstances, demonstrating the flexibility of design and the pro-activity of the Bank team and counterparts in strengthening the project. The lack of anticipated donor finance (due to a shift in interest to emergency job creation following the onset of the second intifada) was clearly a set-back resulting in a reduction of project expenditure from $20m to $15m at closing. The ICR notes that restructuring the project was an option during the preparation of the AF, but was rejected in favor of a simple pro rata adjustment of components. With hindsight, this may have been a missed opportunity to re-set the ambitious PDOs. On the other hand restructuring may have led to unacceptable delays, and with ever-changing circumstances, a re-structured project might itself be overtaken by events. The project’s strategic potential was also missed due to the absence of donor interest and coordination among those active in community development.

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2.2 Implementation PECDAR, a public independent reconstruction agency, was the primary implementor and in the prevailing context, often required ‘crisis management’ measures to achieve results. Implementation progress, which necessarily focuses on the performance of PECDAR, is well recorded in the Project Status Reports/ Implementation Status Reports (PSR/ISRs) and the borrower’s own ICR (annex 7). Ratings are predominantly satisfactory with some downgrading for temporary problems which were corrected. The mid-term review in December 2004 picked up on deficiencies, especially delays on the establishment of telecenters, and promoted correctional action. Implementation of the telecenters was clearly more problematic, requiring more management input, and in PECDAR’s view would have been better as a separate project rather than an attachment to ICDP. The mid-term review also injected fresh impetus into the capacity-building/training activities which had been lagging. The original institutional and implementation arrangements which included two coordination committees of multiple stakeholders proved unwieldy, and by the time of the additional financing the steering committee only met sporadically. The additional financing proposed an improvement of the lower-level “Technical Committee”, which would become the primary decision-making body, in place of the steering committee. Also, Ministry of Agriculture was not longer part of the technical committee since the AF did not include agricultural activities. In general, MOLG, MOA and DORA played a limited role in project coordination and complained of PECDAR’s tendency to hijack decision-making. For them, collaboration on training was disappointing. Achievements on training under the project as a whole were modest (see 3.5 (b) with little impact on partner agencies and participating communities. The use of the Community Development Consultant (CDC) was not as effective as intended, though still useful. The records show that PECDAR and the Bank struggled to reach full agreement about the relevance of the role. PECDAR remained of the view that the job was too broad and rather warranted specialist inputs at key points, not a permanent position. The Bank maintained that the CDC was critical to ensuring community participation in project selection, procurement and monitoring. In the additional financing, the late appointment of the second CDC was considered a “missed opportunity” but both CDCs provided useful interventions at various stages in the project cycle. The refinements to implementation under the additional financing were notable. The short period available for implementation determined the feasibility and choice of microproject type - smaller in size and with less emphasis on infrastructure. The open call for proposals provided a transparency not so evident in the first phase of the project. AF implementation in Gaza was particularly flexible and effective. Putting aside an earlier list of infrastructure projects, it provided critical assistance where no donor money was going in, reaching youth and women as priority beneficiaries with job-creation interventions through local NGOs. The revision in the project’s expenditure categories (from the standard goods, works and services to a single “microproject” category) also expedited implementation processes and disbursements by lowering the number of transactions.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

The fundamental problem with project M&E was that no base-line data existed on which to judge project outcome. Moreover PDO indicators were all output, not outcome, indicators.

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Although this does not meet current Bank results standards, this appears to have been acceptable at the time of design. This omission makes it harder for the project to demonstrate that it met its PDO.

Nevertheless, the PAD contained exact performance indicators that were maintained through the project supervision and retained in the ISRs with some slight revisions for the additional financing. The PAD also provided for an increased community role in monitoring and evaluation, working with the CDC to identify impact of the microprojects.

Regular beneficiary assessments, procurement and technical reviews were part of the design. The project benefitted from a mid-way technical and social evaluation and concluded with a beneficiary impact assessment consistent with the consultative goals of the project. In practice, the Bank reported that the performance indicators were not always monitored and updated rigorously, and the task team worked closely with PECDAR on improving the focus and quality of outcome monitoring and progress reporting for this dominantly out-put focused organization. There was gradual progress in PECDAR's monitoring and reporting on ICDP outcomes between start and completion, with notable improvements in the final year of the actual 6-year project life. This improvement was credited to the appointment of the CDC in the West Bank; close supervision and periodic comments from the Bank's team, and the streamlining and consolidation of the Key Performance Indicators.

Despite these efforts, the extent and quality of M&E is rated unsatisfactory.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (Focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)

Financial Management

Throughout the life of ICDP, PECDAR/PMU issued regular quarterly and annual financial reports which were received by the Bank on a timely manner. Auditors' opinions have always been unqualified. The Auditors’ Management Letter also indicated that there were no material weaknesses in PECDAR’s internal control systems or material misstatements in the Project Financial Statements. PECDAR maintained an effective internal control system to ensure that project expenditures are properly authorized, supporting documents are maintained, accounts are reconciled periodically and project assets, including cash, are safeguarded.

Procurement

The procurement capacity and performance of PECDAR improved during the ICDP implementation, with the rating rising from unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory, and, most recently, satisfactory. During the early stages of implementation and until early 2007, weak procurement capacity and lack of sound organization at PECDAR contributed to delays in the project. Initially, procurement plans, as per the requirements of the TFCA, were not available. Post reviews revealed cases of non compliance with the TFCA, especially in proper record keeping and documentation. With the Bank’s close support, however, procurement activities including planning noticeably improved. The AF included community procurement, an innovation which was used for all subsequent micro-projects, strengthening ownership at both the local government and community levels.

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Furthermore, it improved the procurement capacity of the implementing Local Government Units and enhanced PECDRA’s ability to supervise communities in project implementation. Environmental and Social Safeguards

An initial environmental assessment was conducted in accordance with OP 4.01 for category B projects. The operations manual provided for environmental screening of microprojects at their appraisal. Microprojects involving any involuntary resettlement or expropriation were excluded to avoid any social safeguard issues. An environmental assessment was conducted in November 2005 which concluded that “Generally all the assessed projects are found to have positive impacts on the environmental elements …” An updated Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for the additional financing phase was completed in November 2007. The CDC was involved in social screening of projects to ensure environmental compliance of microprojects.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The maintenance and sustainability of the infrastructure such as roads is covered for one year post construction by project protocol. Beyond that, a memorandum of understanding provides that village councils, ministries and other beneficiaries undertake maintenance. However, for the most part, they lack the skills, capacity or resources, and the project did not make sufficient gains in institutional capacity to make a difference. There was no successor project to ICDP, although a newly-designed Village and Neighborhood Development project (VNDP) was developed with the MOLG to further the work on community-driven development. It was approved by the Board in February 2008 one month before the closure of ICDP. The VNDP was designed (i) to promote local ownership of development assistance, and (ii) to promote consolidation of local government units throughout implementation. Preparation of the VNDP clearly benefitted from the experience of all three CDPs.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The objectives, design and implementation of ICDP were highly relevant to Palestinian development priorities and the Bank assistance strategy as they evolved through the lifetime of the project. At a minimum, the project provided infrastructure to support the continued provision of much needed services and employment through the volatile context. ICDP also contributed, albeit modestly, to institution and capacity-building at a time when all parties were keen not to lose sight of longer-term development gains. Implementation was adjusted to the realities of insecurity, closures, the isolation of Gaza, political changes in the PA, and donor ambivalence.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Because of a lack of baseline data and the fact that performance indicators were output, rather than outcome based, ICDP’s overall achievement of PDOs can only be inferred from a combination of evidential sources. The ICDP exceeded its objective as measured against its key performance indicators: 71 percent of microprojects were implemented in communities with less than a population of 5,000 as compared to the target of 60 percent; 83 percent of surveyed beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with microproject outcomes, compared to the

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target of 60 percent. In addition, the project successfully implemented 223 microprojects, compared to the target of 150. Consistent with the project target, 50 percent of microprojects included beneficiary in-kind contribution which reflects community ownership. Third, as detailed in the borrowers ICR (annex 7) the completed infrastructure stands as a testament to the project’s intent to connect marginalized and small communities with larger communities and associated services.

3.3 Efficiency Since there were no directly quantifiable revenue streams to compare the costs generated, most of the microprojects and activities financed under ICDP did not qualify for a standard cost-benefit analysis. The project financed infrastructure to support basic services to the poor in demoralizing circumstances where a traditional rate of return analysis was hard to calculate and arguably inappropriate. (The Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reports indicate that the focus in West Bank Gaza should be on institutional development rather than economic considerations). Regarding efficiency, people in areas with high poverty levels do not have the means to pay for basic infrastructure such as water, sanitation, electricity, roads or services such as health, social protection or education. The ICDP provided an opportunity to subsidize the production of basic services infrastructure by financing part of the production cost.

In terms of calculating unit costs and comparing them to other similar operations elsewhere in the world, this was also difficult in WBG, primarily due to the volatile economic environment. In addition, restrictions on movement of people and goods contributed to excessive inefficiency, scarcity of goods, and increase in transaction costs, all leading to relatively high prices of raw materials and other inputs. Unit cost comparisons are therefore unreliable. That said, merely the short-term employment generation under the AF (amounting to almost 30% of project funding) is a concrete return. (Further analysis of efficiency is provided in Annex 3).

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (Combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency) Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Notwithstanding the overall deterioration (or lack of improvement in) in social and economic conditions, services and sustainability, the ICDP clearly contributed to arresting that trend, where it operated, and meeting the core PDO of improving the quality and availability of basic services in poor and marginalized communities as confirmed by the beneficiary impact assessment. However, given the lack of baseline data, the rating is modified by the disconnect between the ambitious PDO and inadequacy of the KPIs to monitor and measure “improvement in quality and availability of services.”

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty impacts and beneficiary satisfaction (especially among women) achieved high scores in both the implementer’s ICR and beneficiary impact assessment. Fifty five percent of the microprojects in the AF specifically benefited youth and women. Job creation benefitted the poorest households, especially in Gaza which reached 5,295 heads of households (170,000 person-months) and was particularly successful in benefitting women. The labor content of the Gaza projects under the AF reached 95 percent, far exceeding the target of 30 percent in the project design. The BIA also reports that 63% of project beneficiaries came from below

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the poverty line. Nevertheless, the project could have done better at empowering communities and building their capacities. Overall community participation in the project (as opposed to satisfaction) was rated much lower (39%), and for women specifically (18%). (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Institutional strengthening of partner institutions appears modest at best. Training might have done more to build partner agency and community capacity. With the AF, community procurement proved to be effective but probably came too late to achieve sustainable change. However, institutional building at the community level was weak as noted in section 3.5 (a). (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Community in-kind contributions were significant, signaling community ownership and solidarity. For example, for water projects it reached 67 percent, 55 percent for agriculture and 50 percent for education, increasing a sense of community ownership. Although not explicit, it is arguable that the ICDP contributed to the social cohesion of West Bank Gaza at a time of intolerable strain. Had the project been formulated in this way, it might have avoided some of the orthodox ‘developmental shortcomings’ which are evident. This is raised in section 6 on lessons learned.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops The final beneficiary impact assessment of March 2008 concluded that ICDP met its key objectives with high levels of beneficiary satisfaction. However, it found that although good efforts had been made to encourage community participation in needs and project identification there was significant room for improvement particularly with female participation. The BIA recommended that community needs assessments be conducted prior to project selection with more consultation with primary users of expected services prior to project design. This links with other findings of this ICR regarding the CDC. Had there been CDC from the start and throughout the project, community participation might well have scored higher.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High (i) Risks beyond the control of the project Continuing volatility of the political and security context and resulting socio-economic impacts, coupled with the fiscal deficits of local government units, may specifically result in deterioration to project-funded infrastructure and generally undo any ‘poverty-reduction gains’ made under the project. (ii) Risks within control of the project The maintenance and sustainability of the infrastructure such as roads is only covered for one year post construction by project protocol. Beyond that, village councils, ministries and other beneficiaries undertake maintenance. Whether they will have the means and motivation to do that remains to be seen. Greater use of the CDC might have improved such capacity at the community level.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory The PDO was too general, ambitious and unsupported by adequate M&E with verifiable outcome indicators. Opportunities to correct this through restructuring may have been missed. Otherwise, the design and approach were relatively simple, based on experience, and only over-ambitious to the extent that it attempted to be consistent with the Bank’s strategy and emphasis on capacity building. In practice, the design withstood the stresses of unforeseeable events, even to the point where additional finance was regarded as a desirable emergency measure with little adaptation required to the original design. (b) Quality of Supervision (Including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Satisfactory Problems were identified and resolved. Continuity across the three Task Team Leaders (TTLs) was assured with good skills mix in the teams and heavy reliance on field office staff. Reporting and use of indicators was maintained. Compliance standards were also maintained despite the prevailing circumstances. The borrowers ICR was complimentary about Bank support in the field. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Noted deficiencies in some areas, especially M&E, prohibit a fully satisfactory rating.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Government performance was largely delegated to PECDAR and otherwise satisfactory (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory PECDAR The infrastructure aspects of the project were implemented consistent

with the output performance indicators and to general beneficiary approval. To achieve this in the prevailing context of insecurity and restrictions on movement and access was noteworthy. Improvements were required over the life of the project in areas such as procurement, training and M&E.

MOLG/DORA/MOA

Lack of effective participation and decision-making of partners

. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory PECDAR was the primary implementation agency for the project and borrower performance necessarily equated to PECDAR’s performance.

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6. Lessons Learned Generic:

1. Projects conducted in fragile, volatile and conflict-affected areas cannot automatically be measured against orthodox development measures such as economic return, sustainability, and policy or institutional reforms. Rather they should be assessed on their potential to support peace and stability, sustain human and social capital, and to establish the pre-conditions for development gains, in line with the Bank’s new OP.8.0. PDOs should reflect this but the ICR format also needs adjustment to this reality.

2. In such contexts, relevant capacity building and training initiatives tend to get sidelined if they are not built into the project works execution and therefore require special attention in design, finance and implementation.

Specific to West Bank Gaza/ICDP: 1. Service delivery versus institution building

In a prolonged emergency, where services decline and demand doesn’t, the desire for institution building may have to be tempered by the need to provide the concrete infrastructure and services as a perceived priority. This is a trade off which will play out in the project design and choice of implementing agencies. Choices in the West Bank Gaza programs should acknowledge that the bulk of donor funds have gone into infrastructure.

2. The addition of the telecenters component, though innovative, was arguably a stretch for PECDAR with its focus on engineering. The development of the telecenters required a different kind of specialism and was taxing on PECDAR’s staff and supervision time.

3. Lack of donor participation in funding or other collaboration should be cause for concern. It is understood with the onset of the intifada, many donors retreated to emergency aid. However, with a proliferation of donors, some continuing to work in community development, there should be more assertive efforts to drive a common framework.

4. The role of the community development consultant (CDC) should be reinforced in project preparation, with buy-in from all stakeholders, and the position active up-front and throughout the project.

5. Policy impact from the project would be enhanced by greater participation of the PA agencies. This was a cost of the project being dominated by PECDAR.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The implementing agency, PECDAR, produced a thorough ICR (see annex 7) whose conclusions and recommendations are broadly consistent with the Bank’s ICR. (b) Cofinanciers None (c) Other partners and stakeholders See beneficiary impact assessment (annex 5)

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Annex 1 Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Original Financing US$ 10 million Additional Financing US$ 5 million

Components

Appraisal Estimate (USD million)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD million)

Percentage of Appraisal




COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT MICROPROJECTS 7.95 9.04 114% 4.75 4.75 100% COMMUNITY TELECENTERS 1.75 0.65 37% - - 0% PROJECT MANAGEMENT 0.30 0.31 104% 0.25 0.25 100% Total Baseline Cost 10.00 10.00 100% 5.00 5.00 100% Physical Contingencies - - - - Price Contingencies - - - - Total Project Costs 10.00 10.00 100% 5.00 5.00 100% Project Preparation Fund - - - - Front-end fee IBRD - - - - Total Financing Required 10.00 10.00 100% 5.00 5.00 100%

(b) Financing Original Financing US$ 10 million Additional Financing US$ 5 million

Source of Funds







Borrower 2.00 - 0% - - 0% FOREIGN SOURCES (UNIDENTIFIED) 8.00 - 0% - - 0% Special Financing 10.00 10.00 100% 5.00 5.00 100% Total 20.00 10.00 50% 5.00 5.00 100%

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Annex 2 Outputs by Component Table 1 below presents achievements of the project as measured by the key performance indicators (KPIs) of the PDOs. Both KPIs exceeded their target values. Table 2 presents achievement of output indicators by component and subsector. Table 1: Achievement of PDO Outcome Indicators

Original Project Revised Indicators (after AF)

Achieved Targets at Project Closing

Hierarchy of Objectives

Key Performance Indicators



PDO: Improved Quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities

Outcome/Impact Indicators: - 75% of MP financing is awarded to communities located in regions with poverty incidence above 20% - 60% of total MP financing is awarded to communities with population <5,000 - 60% of sample beneficiaries express satisfaction with MP outcomes

Outcome/Impact Indicators: - 60% of total MP financing is awarded to communities with population <5,000 - 60% of sample beneficiaries express satisfaction with MP outcomes

Outcome/Impact Indicators: - 71% of total MP financing is awarded to communities with population <5,000 - 83% of sample beneficiaries express satisfaction with MP outcomes

Table 2: Achievement of Output indicators

Activity Sector

Physical outputs of Original finance

Physical outputs of Additional finance

Total ICDP physical outputs

Component One Roads • 70.3 km length of

constructed roads • 1,270 curbstone • 2,300 m

sidewalks

• 8 km length of constructed roads

• 1,782 m3

reinforced concrete retaining walls

• 78.3 km length of constructed roads

• 3,052 curbstone • 2,300 m sidewalks

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Activity Sector




Education • 85 Classrooms constructed r rehabilitated

• 72 constructed Classrooms and 35 finished classrooms in addition to 3,700m2 asphalted or tiled yards and 5 WC units

• 157 constructed Classrooms and 35 finished classrooms in addition to 3,700m2 asphalted or tiled yards and 5 WC units

Public service buildings

• 5,950 m2

built up area • 2,445 m2 built

up area

• 8,395 m2 built up area

Agriculture • 71 dunums of

public gardens

• 14km

agricultural roads

• 7 dunums of public gardens

• 77 dunums (7.7 Hectares) of public gardens

• 14km

agricultural roads

Water Construction of water tanks Rehabilitation of water distribution systems

• 1,750m3 • 5,485 Lm

pipes

• 300m3

• 5,970 Lm pipes

• 2,050m3 capacity water tanks

• 11,455 Lm pipes

Wastewater • 3,100 Lm pipe

• 3,100 Lm pipes

Electricity • 3,500 Lm of electrical cables

• Supply and

installation of an electric transmitter and some electrical high voltage materials

• 3,500 Lm of electrical cables

• Supply and

installation of an electric transmitter and some electrical high voltage materials

Number of Microprojects (Excluding the 5 MCTs)

• 221 community development MPs were implemented (including 81 job creation projects

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Activity Sector




through NGOs in Gaza)

Employment Generation

• 102,737 Person-Days


• 170,000

Person-Days under job creation through NGOs in Gaza


Goods Provided to LGUs (excluding goods provided to MCTs):

- -

• 759 Personal Computers

• 418 Laser

Printers • 127 Fax

Machines • 156 Photo

Copiers • 11 LCD

Projectors Component Two Multipurpose Community Telecenters

• 5 MCTs including 3 operating independently from ICDP financing (18-month liability period ended)

Excluded from Additional Financing

• 5 MCTs including 3 independently operational

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Annex 3 Economic and Financial Analysis 1. In light of the predominantly demand-driven nature of the subprojects financed under the ICDP, and hence the uncertainty in the demand for the portfolio of subprojects, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not undergo an economic analysis for the entire project ex ante to determine the quantitative economic and welfare impacts of the ICDP. Similarly, since there were no directly quantifiable revenue streams to compare the costs generated, most of the subprojects and activities financed under ICDP did not qualify for a standard cost-benefit analysis that determines net present value of the subprojects. This applied generally across infrastructure extension and social and economic services in all sectors. At Project completion, it remains a challenge to do an economic and financial analysis on the Project as a whole, due to the demand-driven nature of most of the investments (approximately 90% of Final Project Cost) and also because some of the necessary data for such analysis were not always collected. Moreover, for subprojects financed in the agricultural sector, assumption at appraisal was that some of those would include income generation activities. Nonetheless, majority of the agricultural subprojects were in the form of public (free entrance) gardens, pavement of agricultural roads, expansion of infrastructure for public veterinary facilities, and supply of agricultural equipment for the MOA, and did not include an income-generation focus.

Multipurpose Community Telecenters (MCTs)

2. At appraisal, 10 Multipurpose Community Telecenters (MCTs) were envisaged of which 5 would be financed by the Bank and 5 would be financed through donor co-financing. The Project investment ceiling for each MCT was planned at US$150,000. The economic justification to establish telecenters was derived from their expected social and economic benefits through local capacity building, reducing the cost of exclusion from access to MCTs. Quantitative analysis were to be made at time of implementation in each MCT business plan. The lack of co-finacing led to only IDA investments materializing and 5 out of planned 81 MCTs were established (total cost reached (US$642,000). Accordingly, one could assume that social welfare and economic benefits originally envisaged have been halved. Despite the fewer number of MCTs, each one was established on the basis of a business plan and sustainability was factored financially in a way for MCTs to recover initial investment costs within 3-5 years of operation after the end of 18 months of operation under the ICDP financing. It has been estimated that the 3 MCTs which have concluded the liability period have recovered in their first year of independent operation around 40-50% of their operating costs. This estimate was based on the fact that the salaries of the MCT Manager and Assistant were covered by the municipalities.

Cost Savings from a Beneficiary Perspective 3. The BIA at Project Completion used a sample of 130 infrastructure subprojects distributed over the number of traditional sectors, and concluded that a little more than half the beneficiaries (56%) stated that the implemented subprojects have saved on the cost of services.

1 In the PAD, the project description sets 10 MCTs as a target while the annex on indicators states 8.

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This is reasonable due to the fact that impact of such works is more visible in smaller communities. Moreover, 79% of surveyed beneficiaries stated that the implemented subprojects saved time and effort. As for indication on improvement of income, 42% of respondents confirmed this in Gaza, as opposed to 18% in the West Bank. This was attributable to the higher focus of job-creation activities in Gaza than in the West Bank. Some results according to Project type were as follows:

4. The reaction of surveyed beneficiaries regarding savings on costs of the roads subprojects was rather surprising, provided the given assumption that beneficiaries had to pay much more in travel and maintenance costs prior to implementation. As for improvement of income, the results were influenced, inter alia, by the labor content in a given type of infrastructure, and the permanent jobs which were created for the operation of a completed subproject.

Job Creation Focus 5. Jobs created under the original ICDP fund were around 140,000 person-days with average labor content of 27%. As part of the Additional Financing, the job creation program in Gaza, alone, created an additional 170,000 person-days for 5,295 persons over a period of 3 months with labor content exceeding 80%. Due to the high unemployment rate in WBG, specific targeting criteria were used under ICDP original fund to ensure the worst off of the unemployed would benefit from employment. Hence, the pre-employment scenario for those laborers would be the negative added-value from having no income. Similarly, the daily wage for unskilled workmanship (in construction, for example) averaged US$15-20, which is marginally less than the prevailing market daily wage for similar workmanship. This ensured that only the neediest of the unemployed would benefit from the job-creation activities2. Particularly under the job-creation program in Gaza (as part of the Additional Financing), a number of the activities implemented through 81 NGOs and Community Based Organizations included income generation, such as handicrafts and food processing. Data were not collected on this due to the difficult political environment in Gaza, but nonetheless is can be safely assumed that the small income generating activities have provided financial added-value for the beneficiaries.

2 Other applied criteria included: unemployment for at least 6 months, responsibility for 4+ household members, did not benefit from other similar job-creation activities in the previous 6 months.

Results of the Beneficiary Impact Assessment March 2008 Type of Subprojects Percent Confirmation of

Savings on Costs Percent Confirmation on Improvement of Income

Water and Sanitation 74% 38% Education (extension/rehab of classrooms) 68% 10%

Public Buildings 64% 48% Roads 26% 16% MCTs 62% 34% Agricultural subprojects 44% 20%

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6. Of course, the temporary jobs created provided momentum to the economic environment because due to in-direct employment (estimated by PECDAR at 15-20% of direct employment) suppliers of raw materials also would have benefited from the selling of their supplies. A more difficult economic benefit to quantify was in the form of temporary increase in the spending power of the benefiting heads of households and improvement in the economic well-fare of their families.

Financing CDD Approaches

7. Research has shown that CDD-oriented projects are cost effective 3 . Initial implementation costs of CDD projects are usually compensated by the lower costs for infrastructure because of the increase in social capital, in-kind community contributions, and empowerment of communities, especially some of the traditionally marginalized groups (women, youth, disabled, etc…). This is confirmed by research 4 demonstrating that participatory approaches have lower unit costs in all sectors and across all countries than traditional approaches, and that they tend to increase access to and quality of social services, resulting in most cases in greater utilization of basic services.

8. Given the longstanding fiscal crisis of the PA and the withholding of Palestinian clearance revenues by the Government of Israel, public investment to maintain or add infrastructure services in urban and rural areas has come to a halt. Moreover, in the past two years, whatever government funds were available, were primarily used to pay civil service salaries and cover operating costs of public institutions. As a consequence, the already low level of transfers to local governments has evaporated, leaving all LGU socioeconomic infrastructure investments dependant on donor financing and in rare instances, LGU-self financing. Maintenance and expansion schemes for such infrastructure are almost none existent due to lack of local government financing. The ICDP design assumed that 10% of the total cost for each subproject would be contributed by the LGU (5% in cash and 5% in-kind). In addition, an innovative scheme proposed under ICDP was to encourage LGUs to set aside a small percentage of the total cost of a given Microproject for operation and maintenance. However, soon after the start of implementation, PECDAR disregarded those factors in order not to overburden the financially deficient LGUs. During Project implementation, it was noted, however, that the majority of the Local Village Councils nonetheless provided willingly various forms of in-kind contributions to the Projects5. Periodic site visits to LGUs reported positively on the popularity of the notion of in-kind contributions among LGUs’ management as well as the community. Hence, in-kind contribution was later used as part of the criteria for preference in the selection of proposed subprojects under the Additional Financing.

9. A sample of 14 subprojects under the ICDP Original Financing showed 8 subprojects with in-kind and other community contributions. Those ones, totaling around US$0.632 have aggregated about 21.5% of in-kind contributions on average as a percentage of the overall budget for Projects. The below table provides examples:

3 OED 2005: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and-Driven Development”, 2005. 4 Rawlings and Van Domelen, 2001, cited in PAD: National Initiative for Human Development Support Project, Kingdom of Morocco. November 14, 2007. 5 Examples: skilled labor, land, raw materials, goods, various equipment, etc…

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Selected Subprojects in West Bank Showing In-Kind Contributions

Subproject Name In-kind contribution US$ Value Equivalent

IDA Contributio

n US$

In-Kind Contributio

n as Percentage

of Total Project

Cost Rehabilitation of public gardens in Obeydia village

Village Council provided some free labor and supplies

350 5,700 6%

Construction of a basic co-educational school in Al-Nabi Saleh Village

The Village Council donated free labor and construction materials

20,000 80,000 20%

Construction of additional classrooms for a co-educational basic school in Beit Ummar Village

The Municipality with support from the local community added 10 more classrooms.

100,000 96,375 104%

Construction of a multipurpose services building in Rujeeb Village

Village Council contributed the construction of retaining wall and protective wall around the building

10,000 148,410 6%

Source: PECDAR. July, 2007. Similar information on Gaza was not collected. Unit cost analysis

10. There is international evidence that CDD approaches deliver cost-efficient results compared to more traditional government programs. For example, the average cost per kilometer in Morocco for a 6m wide-all weather unpaved road was measured at US$20,112 in CDD-type implemented subprojects, compared to US$44,150 for the same type of road in traditional infrastructure projects.6 On the capacity building aspect, however, the World Bank-carried regional impact evaluations for projects similar to the ICDP, such as the Yemen Social Fund and confirmed the initial high cost of CDD-related training and capacity building activities. Although these costs cannot serve as a basis for evaluating the cost-efficiency of ICDP activities, they provide some comparison on cost per beneficiary for similar types of activities under ICDP and the Yemen Social Fund for Development Impact Evaluation Study:

6 Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Kingdom of Morocco, 2006, Second National Program for Rural Roads, Morocco, Sited in PAD: National Initiative for Human Development Support Project, Kingdom of Morocco. November 14, 2007.

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CDD-Type Investment Cost Per Capita - Comparison Subproject Sector Yemen Social Funa

Average Per-capita Cost7 US$

ICDP Per-capita cost (Original Fund)* US$

Roads subprojects 9.7 15.9 Educational Subprojects 85.8 15** Training $220.9 131.9 *Source: PECDAR, 2008 ** Relative low cost is attributable to educational subproject cost averaging US$70,000 each serving around 4,600 people on average for each subproject. 11. Although some statistics on unit costs for ICDP are not available, it is difficult to compare the unit costs in WBG with those of similar operations in the region. This is primarily due to the volatile economic environment of WBG. In addition, movement restrictions on people and goods have contributed to excessive inefficiency, scarcity of goods, and increase in transaction costs, all leading to relatively high prices of raw materials and other inputs. The table below provides indicative estimates on average unit costs for subprojects implemented under ICDP in the West Bank.

Type of subproject/activity Average Cost estimate [US$] WBG (ICDP)

Cost per one additional school classroom (Ministry ofEducation standard)

32,500

Cost per one additional standard kindergarten room 22,500 Cost per Kilometer of all weather 6 meter wide road 95,000 (compared to US$20,112

in Morocco) Cost per kilometer of water network (different sizes) 55,000 Cost per kilometer of wastewater network (different Sizes)

45,000

Cost per medium size water pump (120m2/hour) 75,000 Source: PECDAR Projects Department, 2008

12. Traditional approach to ensure greater cost-efficiency of projects similar to ICDP has been by establishing ceilings for unit costs. However, given the high fluctuation in prices of inputs within the Palestinian market in general and between West Bank markets and Gaza Markets, in particular, it was rather futile to set such a standard for comparison and control. In addition, such standardadization would have increased the risk of biased allocations to the “cheaper” sectors that may have little impact in terms of social welfare.

13. A recent informal survey of contractors in the West Bank and Gaza carried out by the Municipal Development and Lending Fund under the Bank’s Second Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project has found increases in the costs of certain infrastructure materials to be more than 30% in the past 6-8 months. The situation in Gaza in particular is far more critical than West Bank due to the prolonged border closure and scarcity of raw

7 Yemen Social Fund for Development Impact Evaluation Study – 2003. Sited in PAD: National Initiative for Human Development Support Project, Kingdom of Morocco. November 14, 2007

24

materials. For example, the difference between the cost of asphalt for roads between West Bank and Gaza has reached a little over US$190 per ton.

25

Annex 4 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending

Supervision/ICR

Meskerem Brhane Senior Social Development Spec. MNSSD Task Team Leader

Afaf Khalil Abbasi Procurement Spec. MNAPR Lina Abdallah ET Consultant MNSSD Husam Abu Dagga Senior Operations Officer MNSSD Task Team LeaderFifi Z. Antar Program Assistant MNC04 Abdallah Awad Information Officer MNC04

Siaka Bagayoko Sr. Financial ManagementSpecialist MNAFM

Matthias Grueninger Sr. Agric. Economist MNSRE ICT Frederick P. Kranz Consultant MNAPR Hisham Labadi Consultant MNSIF Karene Eliane Melloul ET Consultant AFTH2 Adel Fahed J. Odeh Financial Management Analyst MNC04 Disbursements Colin S. Scott Lead Conflict Specialist MNSSD Suhair Musa Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Samira Ahmed Hillis Operations Officer MNSHD Disbursements Zeyad Abu-Hassanein Infrastructure Specialist MNSSD

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)Lending

FY01 13 66.26 FY02 18 90.62 FY03 2 8.67 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00

Total: 33 165.55 Supervision/ICR

FY01 0.00 FY02 0.49 FY03 20 55.31 FY04 27 62.76

26

FY05 26 65.20 FY06 25 44.92 FY07 19 62.56

Total: 117 291.24

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Annex 5 Beneficiary Survey Results Beneficiary Impact Assessment March 2008 – Executive Summary and Recommendations Focus of the BIA and Methodology: In November, 2007, PECDAR signed a contract after a competitive selection process with a consulting firm – Riyada Consulting and Training Company – to carry out the Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) for the ICDP, based on sampling of households and microprojects. The Beneficiary Impact Assessment was released in March 2008. The key focus in the Terms of Reference (TOR) of this assessment was to assess the socioeconomic impact of the ICDP on the local communities, by assessing: (i) extent of participation by the local communities in the various stages of the microprojects’ cycle; (ii) satisfaction of beneficiaries from the implemented microprojects; and (iii) the institutional impact of ICDP on institutions and Local Government Units (LGUs). To fulfill the obligations of the assessment, the selected consulting firm has mobilized a team of 23 persons who used a combination of field work, review of primary project documents and the progress reports, qualitative and quantitative questionnaires used in the field (with sample beneficiaries) and used to interview the implementing partners and PECDAR’s Project Management Team and representatives of local government and the directors of the Multipurpose Community Telecenters (MCTs), focus group discussions and interviews. The door-to-door survey sample included 300 people, the institutional interviews included 40 persons and the focus groups included 114 persons from different communities. Further details on the methodology, sampling, and questionnaires are part of the final BIA report on Project file. Primary Results: The BIA confirmed that the ability to continue the ICDP developmental interventions in crucial life-saving sectors should be commended given the challenging political environment in the WBG. To have completed 1308 microprojects, and having expanded or committed most of the obligated funds are impressive and indicative of solid achievements given the operational context of WBG, which includes: constrained access and mobility, travel restrictions, border closure, political upheaval and the recent complete closure of Gaza. The BIA also confirmed that the qualitative and quantitative data illustrate that ICDP was meeting its Developmental Objective, and that the “high” level of beneficiary satisfaction are impressive and encouraging. The following are highlights from the BIA:

- One beneficiary satisfaction, 79% of beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with the implemented microprojects. The responses per type of activity were equally positive, reaching, for example, 94% for the roads microprojects and 92% for the MCTs;

- Also, around 92% of sample beneficiaries confirmed that the implemented microprojects were responsive to the needs of their communities. Interestingly, the interviewed females responded more positively than males on this aspect, with 96% as

8 This was the total number of completed microprojects during the implementation of the BIA. The final number of completed MPs is 221.

28

opposed to 88% for males. The ICDP seemed to have performed a little less on priorities, as the percentage of people who confirmed that their community priorities were met was 78%;

- 83% of sample beneficiaries confirmed that the implemented microprojects have

facilitated their access to basic services. In summary, the BIA concluded that the ICDP has scored very well on beneficiary satisfaction of the activities and implemented microprojects, but nonetheless, scored low on the actual level of community participation and involvement in the stages of the implementation cycles of microprojects (39% of sample beneficiaries confirmed that they have been involved in community meetings to identify the implemented microproject). A key finding was that although good efforts have been made to encourage community participation in needs assessments and microproject identification, there was significant room for improvement, particularly with respect to female participation. Lessons Learned and Recommendations: On deficiencies in community participation, the BIA recommended that more attention should be paid to consulting with the key stakeholders and primary users of the expected service as a result of the implemented microproject, prior to design. The BIA also added that announcements in the ICDP microproject cycles in the local newspapers should be complemented by other mechanisms that are more effective in reaching poor and marginalized communities. Other BIA recommendations were as follows:

• For future similar projects impact would be maximized if the efforts of the World Bank and PECDAR are mainstreamed within the overall developmental initiatives together with other donors and organizations – the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) could be a starting point;

• Training course for LGUs are effective but should be conducted at the beginning of

project so beneficiaries can apply their new skills and knowledge immediately; • Community in-kind contributions to microprojects are an effective way of enhancing

community ownership and commitment, and should be continued;

• PECDAR contracts with LGUs or local committees should extend management and maintenance of the buildings and MCTs for at least one year after project completion, to ensure effective use of the allocated resources;

• Payments for job creation activities are not always timely according to partner NGOs

and beneficiaries; improvement is needed in that area;

• Criteria for job creation excluded students who needed to finance education and support their families; exceptions should be made in cases when the father or mother is unable to work;

29

Annex 6 Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results A stakeholder workshop was not carried out for this project.

30

Annex 7 Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(ICDP)

WEST BANK /GAZA

Prepared by Projects Management Office PMO at PECDAR

May, 2008

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION ( P E C D A R )

السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية

المجلس االقتصادي الفلسطيني

للتنمية واالعمار

)بـــكــــــــدار(

31

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Content Page

List of Acronyms 32

1. Project Background 33 2. Development Objectives and Design as outlined in the Project

Appraisals 33

2.1 Project Original Components 34 2.2 Project Actual Components 35 3. Project Achievements and Outputs in Comparison to the

Objectives 37

3.1 Percentage of MPs awarded to marginalized and poor 37 3.2 Level of Beneficiary Satisfaction 37 4. Outputs by Component 38

4.1 Output (1) of Component (1) 38 4.2 Output (2) of Component (1) 48 4.3 Output of the new component; Creating Emergency Job

Opportunities in Gaza Strip 50

4.4 Output of Component (2); Establishing Community Telecommunication Center ICTs

50

5. Major Factor Affecting Implementation and Outputs 55

5.1 Factors Outside PECDAR’s Control 55 5.2 Factors within PECDAR’s Control 59 6. Assessment of the World Bank Performance 60

6.1 During Preparation 60 6.2 During Implementation 60 7. Conclusions 60

8. Lessons Learned 62 9. Appendix 1: Details of ICDP/ Original Fund West Bank and Gaza

Appendix 2: Detail of ICDP/ AF West Bank

32

List of Acronyms

1 AF Additional Fund for the ICDP 2 BIA Beneficiary Impact Assessment 3 CDC Community Development Consultant 4 CDD Community Driven Development 5 DORA Department of Refugee Affairs 6 FD Financial Department at PECDAR 7 ICDP Integrated Community Development Project 8 ICT Community Telecommunications Centre 9 JCP Job Creation Project (component) 10 LGU Local Government Unit 11 MOA Ministry of Agriculture

12 MOLG Ministry of Local Government

13 PAD Project Appraisal Document

14 PAP Project Appraisal Paper

15 PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction

16 PMI Combined Performance Monitoring Indicators

17 PMO Project Monitoring Office at PECDAR

18 WB The World Bank

19 WBG West Bank and Gaza Strip

33

1. Project Background The integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) is a follow- on project to the previous CDPs I and II, aimed at improving the quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities through financing investments in local infrastructure and institutions. ICDP prioritized investments to preserve and extend the capital stock of infrastructure owned by villages, camps, cooperatives and small municipalities in regions with the highest incidence of poverty. A $10 million IDA credit for the ICDP was approved on May 23, 2002 and became effective in August 23, 2002. An amount of $ 2 million committed by the borrower and $ 8 million in co- financing was envisaged during appraisal bringing the total project amount (at appraisal) to $ 20 million. However, additional financing did not materialize by the effectiveness date, resulting in shrinkage in the scope of the project to fit $ 10 million IDA credit by reducing the number of micro projects and Information and Telecommunication centers originally proposed. In May 2006, The additional grant finance to the ICDP was designed with a total of five million USD to increase investments in local infrastructure and institutions to improve the quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities of the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) promoting local economic growth and employment, and supporting human development and poverty reduction. Additional financing supported micro projects such as access and connecting roads, rehabilitation or extension of water supply, schools, and sports facilities for youth, and health clinics. Priority in funding was given to projects with the highest labor content (not less than 30%) and targeting the most marginalized communities. The ICDP was originally scheduled to close on June 30, 2006, but it was extended for an additional 6 months then extended for another one year until the end of December 2007 in order to allow the implementation of the additional financing. Another extension for three additional months was approved by the WB on December 18 2007 extending its closing date to March 31st 2008.

2. Development Objectives and Design as outlined in the Project Appraisal Document of 2002 and Project Paper of 2007

The Development objective of the ICDP was to improve the quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities of the West Bank and Gaza. This objective was anticipated to be realized through financing investments in local infrastructure and institutions in the WBG. Regarding the original fund, 75% of the implemented MPs were awarded to communities with population less than 5,000; based on PCBS census of 1997. As for the additional fund, 68% of the executed MPs were awarded to communities with population less than 5,000; based on PCBS estimates of 2005. Both funds had achieved the percentage (60%) required in the combined key performance indicators of the overall ICDP. The following points should be noted in parallel to the above:

34

o The percentages include the MPs which were executed in the refugee camps; the population of each camp is above 5,000. This has adversely affected the resulted percentages.

o The percentage in the original fund includes the MPs which were implemented in Gaza Strip where most of the communities are with population above 5,000.

o It’s worthy to mention that the percentage in the additional fund is less than the original, despite that the call for proposals was applied in the additional fund and an evaluation report was issued for this purpose.

o In the additional fund, the MPs Grants were reallocated to the job Creation activities in Gaza Strip with no civil works.

Regarding level of satisfaction, it was found that overall, (79 %) of the stated that they are satisfied with the projects implemented in their localities, (18 %) were satisfied to a certain extent and only (3 %) were not satisfied, with any differences according to location or gender, according to the Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) conducted in February 2008. As the (BIA) results show, both the qualitative and quantitative findings illustrate, that ICDP is living up to its key objectives of responding to basic needs and facilitating access to services. The high levels of beneficiary satisfaction are impressive and encouraging which give a clear indication that the achievements of the ICDP objective are highly satisfactory. 2.1 Project Original Components The project as designed in the Project Appraisal Document 2002 (Original Finance) project Paper of 2006 (Additional Finance) consisted of the following Components: 2.1.1. Community Development Micro projects: This component was designed to provide grants to LGU's and Farmer Cooperatives to finance a minimum of 150 community development projects under the original and additional financing. The main sectors of interventions were Constructions, Water and Sanitation, Health, Education, Roads, Agriculture9 and provision of essential furniture, goods, training and capacity building of the targeted communities. 2.1.2.: Community Telecenters : This component was designed only under the Original fund to provide grants to LGU's of pre-selected 10 communities for the purpose of financing 10 multipurpose Telecenters in these communities. 2.1.3. Project Management Support: This component was designed under both the original and the additional funds to provide incremental operating costs, equipment, studies needed by PCDAR, MOLG and DORA for project execution and Management.

Table (1) shows the allocations of the original and additional financing

9 Agriculture was designed for the original fund and deleted for the additional fund

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Table 1: Allocations of the original and additional financing of the ICDP as stated in the PAD of 2002 and PAP of 2007

Component Cost -Original fund (US$M)10

Cost –Additional fund (US$M)

Community Development Microprojects 17,650,000 4,750,000

Community Telecenters 1,750,000 ---- Incremental Operating Cost

600,000

250,000

Total 20,000,000* 5,000,000

* Allocations are based on US$ 20.0 million pledging. 2.2. Project Actual Components Despite that the original finance was designed to reach 20 million USD, the actual finance received by PECDAR was (10) million USD. The decline in the budget did not affect the nature of the components proposed originally but it affected the scope of work in terms of the number of Micro projects to be financed and the number of ICT's to be established. Due to the strict closure imposed on Gaza after the events of June 2007, the PMO at PECDAR anticipated the impossibility of implementing the planned micro projects under component (1) of the additional finance in Gaza. The complete closure and restrictions on movement and goods delivery in and out of Gaza made it impossible for construction materials to be available for implementing the microprojects within the planned strict time table. With approval from the WB, the PMO reallocated $ 1.9 million from component (1) of the additional finance to a new component to finance Emergency Job Creation Activities in Gaza Strip that doesn't require any construction materials and could be implemented smoothly with the lack of goods and materials. 2.2.1. Community Development Microprojects: Through this component a total of (142) micro projects were granted to LGU's, small municipalities, Camps Popular Committees and farmer's Cooperatives. Sectors of Intervention (civil works) were Constructions, Water and Sanitation, Health, Education, Roads, Agriculture and provision of essential furniture, goods, training and capacity building of the targeted communities. Given the vulnerable political and economical situation and the operational context of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to have completed 142 MPs under this component through the civil works sectors of interventions and having expended about UD$14.9 million are impressive and indicative of achievements. 2.2.2. Job Creation Projects in Gaza:

This Additional component was added during the implementation of the additional finance were (81) NGO's in Gaza strip were granted funds for the purpose of implementing emergency job creation projects instead of the community Development MPs at a total

10 Allocation for original fund is bas on $ 20.0 M.

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amount of US$ 1.90. The reason behind this change is mentioned in Section 2.2 of this report. (For more information look at chapter 3 of this report) Twenty three communities in the Gaza Strip districts covering cities, camps and villages were served by the project (Jabalia camp, Jabalia city, Beit Hanoun village, Beit Lahia city and Um Nassar village) in North Gaza district, (Gaza city, Wadi Gaza village and Moghraka village) in Gaza district, (Bureij camp, Nusairat camp, Maghazi camp, Deir El Balah, Wadi Salka village, Msadar village, Zawaida village) in Middle Gaza district, (Bani Suhaila village, Abassan Al Kabira village, Qarara village, Khuza'ah village, Khan younis city, Khan younis camp, Fokhari village) in Khan younis district and (Rafah camp and the neighborhood areas ) in Rafah district. 2.2.3. Community Telecenters: Through this component (5) Telecenters were established, furnished and equipped, three in the West bank and 2 in Gaza strip. The total finance of telecenters is $ 640,661. 2.2.4. Project Management: The PMO unit at PECDAR was responsible for the implementation of the project. DORA, MLG and MOA were represented in the Technical Committee. Through this component support was provided to PECDAR, DORA, MLG and MOA through the provision of goods, consultant services, training and preparation of studies. The total finance for this component and the previously mentioned component is shown in table (2). Table 2: Allocation under each component as per actual finance

Component Original fund (US$)

Additional fund (US$)

Community Development Microprojects including Goods and Technical Assistance

9,003,507 2,778,677

Emergency Job Creation in Gaza ------- 1,899,725

Community Telecenters 640,661 -------

Project Management

313,000 195,447

Total 9,957,168* 4,873,849**

* The actual finance of the original fund was less than the allocated (US$ 10,000,000) because of the followings: - The contract ICDP/WB/014EQ.GZ (supply of Materials needed for maintenance) was closed at US$ 30,579 instead of US$ 55,319 due to the situation in Gaza and the impossibility to import the required materials. - About US$ 18,000 were used to compensate for currency loss between US dollars and British Pounds during replenishment. ** The actual finance of the Additional Fund is less than the allocated (US$ 5,000,000) because of the followings:

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- The contract ICDP/S/223.WB (Establishment of Al Maghal Garden in Aida Camp) was terminated at US$ 16,745 instead of US$ 89,840 due to unresolved disputes on the ownership of the piece of land on which the project was intended to be established. - The CDC allocated budget was not exhausted because the Gaza CDC was not hired and the WB CDC was hire in the mid of August 2007 and not at the beginning of the project. - Training courses and workshops for beneficiaries under ICDP/AF was not conducted; on the job training was executed during the implementation of the ICDP. - About US$ 26,000 were used to compensate for currency loss between US dollars and British Pounds during replenishment. 3. Project Achievements and Outputs in Comparison to the Objectives Specified in the PAD of 2002. The achievements of the ICDP objective of improving quality and availability of basic social and economic services in poor and marginalized communities of the WBG was measured based on the revised combined key performance Indicators of 11/6/2007. In January 2008 a Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) study was conducted through contracting with an external consultancy firm (Riyada for Consultation and Training). The main findings of the BIA11 and PECDAR'S MIS records indicated the following: 3.1. Percentage of MPs awarded to marginalized and poor communities:

- (72%) of the MPs was awarded to communities with population less than 5,000. (99) Micro projects out of the total (137) MPs excluding the ICT's were awarded to communities with population less than 5,00012. Given that considerable allocations were granted to refugee camps and 40% of the funds to communities in Gaza Strip, with population greater than 5,000, this indicator is considered to be achieved with high satisfaction level.

- (63%) of the beneficiaries of implemented MPs came from families' earning less than 2000 NIS per month (Below Poverty line).

3.2. Level of Beneficiary Satisfaction:

- (79%) of surveyed beneficiaries stated that they are generally satisfied with the projects implemented in their localities. The satisfaction level varied between the sectors of intervention with the highest (94%) satisfaction for Roads projects and lowest (36%) for Agriculture projects. No significant difference in satisfaction between the West Bank and Gaza or between genders.

- (92%) of surveyed beneficiaries were satisfied with the MPs in terms of being

responsive to the needs of their communities, female satisfaction ( 96 %) was higher

11 Riyada Consulting and Training, "Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) of the Integrated Community Development Project ICDP" March 2008.

12 Population estimates were derived from the 1997 PCBS census for the original finance MP's and from the 2005 PCBS population projections for the additional finance MPs.

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than male (88%). In comparison the satisfaction of beneficiaries in terms of MP's responsiveness to priorities was lower (78%) but still with a significant percentage. Satisfaction with Water and sanitation projects (92%) scored highest followed by education projects (84%).

- (83%) of the surveyed beneficiaries were satisfied from the projects impact in terms

of facilitating their access to services such as schools, health services, clean water.

- (56%) of the surveyed beneficiaries were satisfied from the projects impact on them in terms of saving the cost of service provided by the MPs. Water and sanitation projects scored highest followed by Education projects.

- (79%) of the surveyed beneficiaries were satisfied form the project in terms of saving

time and effort with significant difference between the West Bank (73%)and Gaza ( 89%).

- In total (28 %) surveyed beneficiaries stated that the implemented MPs contributed to

improving the level of their income. A significant variation was noticed between the West Bank (18 %) and Gaza (42 %). This could be attributed to the inclusion of the Job creation component in the additional funding that was implemented only in Gaza.

- Only 8% of the surveyed beneficiaries and they are all from the West Bank were not

satisfied from the MPs in terms of having some negative effect on their community. The negative effects they stated were mostly out of the control of the project such as the dust and delays caused by closing the roads during works.

In conclusion, we can say that the beneficiaries' satisfaction with the implemented projects significantly exceeded the (60%) percentage set out in the original PAD and the combined indicators in all dimensions except for the dimensions of saving costs (56%) and improving income of families (28%). This lower satisfaction could be interpreted by the fact that the nature of the selected micro projects was mainly aimed at filling the gaps in services within the served communities. Filling the gap helped in saving some extra costs for the families but it did not tangibly improve the level of their income. This is because the projects were implemented during the time when the family income of the Palestinian communities was significantly deteriorating. Many other factors like the increase in unemployment and poverty rate within the served communities negatively impacted the level of tangible economical effects on the community.

4. Outputs by Component 4.1. Output (1) of Component (1): Increased quality and availability of basic service affected by the MPs in communities implementing MP's. The following indicators were set in the Original PAD of 2002 and the combined key indicators of July 2007. 4.1.1 Number of Implemented MPs: It was anticipated that no less than 150 MPs to be financed under the original and additional ICDP. Actually total of (142) MPs including the finishing works of ICT's were implemented

39

in the WBG. The Original plan was to implement 167 MPs in WBG, the reduction in the number of MP's is due to the fact that the cost of financing 25 MPs in Gaza approved by the WB was reallocated to Job creation at a value of $ 1.9 million. Given the reallocation of US$ 1.9 million in Gaza Strip from MPs to JCP, the quality and availability of basic services affected by MPs in the benefiting communities have been satisfactorily increased. (Look at chapter 3 for more information about factors affecting the number of implemented MPs). The MPs distribution among the six sectors of intervention as identified in the PAD of 2002 and PAP 2006 is detailed in table (3).

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Table (3): Number of Projects and financial allocation per Sector, type of fund (original, Additional), geographical (WB, GS)

West Bank Gaza Strip Total WBG # of projects Final value $ # of projects Final value $ # of projects Final value $

# Sector of intervention

Orig. Add. Orig. Add. Orig. Add. Orig. Add. Orig. Add. Orig. Add.

1. Education

12 19 1,074,848 1,354,174 4 ---- 218,563 ---- 16 19 1,293,411 1,354,174

2. Roads

18 8 1,945,835 499,868 18 ---- 1,599,439 ---- 36 8 3,545,274 499,868

3. Public buildings 4 1 326,667 54,573 1 ---- 177,998 ---- 5 1 504,665 54,573

4. Agriculture

19 0 563,716 0 2 ---- 179,565 ---- 21 0 743,281 0

5. Water ,waste water and Sanitation

7 3 651,811 273,863 2 ---- 283,636 ---- 9 3 935,447 273,863

6. Women and Youth

3 7 122,726 484,182 5 ---- 551,877 ---- 8 7 674,603 484,182

7. Health

------ 2 ------ 112,017 --- ---- ---- ---- 2 0 112,017

8. Electricity

1 0 49,402 1 ---- 89,687 ---- 2 0 139,089 0

Total

104 7,513,682 33 3,100,765 137 10,614,447

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4.1.2 Percentage of in-kind or cash Contribution: The requirement for obligatory cash community contribution in the original finance was not emphasized due to the deteriorating financial and economical situation of the Palestinian communities and LGU's caused by the onset of the second Intifada. Despite that cash contribution was not considered a condition for receiving finance, the MIS records of PMO shows that most of the implemented projects had an in-kind community contribution. This contribution mainly took the form of providing the design and daily supervision over the project during implementation through the LGU's and Agricultural cooperatives. The BIA results revealed that at the beneficiary level, the in-kind contribution within the surveyed sample was higher in the West Bank (33%) than in Gaza (15%). The contribution in Water projects scored the highest among the sectors of intervention (67%) followed by Agriculture (55%) then Education (50%). However, due to the economical situation of the Palestinians, no records have been documents regarding the cash contribution; accordingly the rating for the contribution performance indicator is Unsatisfactory. 4.1.3. Satisfaction with training results: The total commitment under this category is US$ 142,777.64 and the total disbursed is US$ 142,777.64. Studies, Consultants Services, Design and preparation of tender documents, Seminars, training courses in addition to salaries for Community Development Consultant CDC in the West Bank had been disbursed under this category. Two training sessions had been conducted under this category for the benefit of the LGUs members and other local community members; one session was conducted in the West Bank (Ramallah) and the other was in Gaza Strip. These courses targeted the village council members (LGUs members), members of refugee camps and public committees, farmers in agricultural cooperatives, ICDP Technical Committee (TC) (MOA, MLG, DORA, and PECDAR) in addition to other staff in related ministries and benefited community members. Each session consisted of different topics related to the ICDP activities; the following table shows the courses and topics that had been conducted under this category, dates and cost of the courses:

Course Topics Place Beneficiaries Cost US$

Date

1. 4- days training in Project Management and Financial Management, Accounting, Procurement, Planning,

West Bank (Ramallah), Ritno Hotel

LGUs members, Refugee Camps, TC member

6,117 April 2004

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taxation, Banking, Projects Insurances, project Identifying and Project Planning

2. Microsoft Windows and Computer

National Institution for Information and Technology (NIIT Ramallah)

LGUs members

580 April 2003

3. Auto cad for Engineers Engineering Association (Hebron)

PECDAR Engineers in Hebron

253 April, 2003

4. Business Writing Seminar

AMIDEAST (Ramallah)

PECDAR and MLG staff

1,575 July 2003

5. Training trip to Washington

World Bank (Washington DC)

CDC; Wafa' Shikaki

2,176 March, 2004

6. Negotiations Skills Cairo, Egypt- Seventh Day Institution

Two PECDAR members

3,350 February 2004

7. Arbitrators Induction Course

Amman- Jordan

Five local community staff members

2,465 August 2004

8. A visit to telecommunication Center in Jordan

Amman- Jordan

CDC, TC, and Salfeet ICT manager

1,333 August 2004

9. One- day training in Jordan

Amman- Jordan

TC members 992 Sep. 2004

10. Project Management and Financial Management, Accounting, Procurement, Planning, taxation, Banking, Projects Insurances, project Identifying and Project Planning

Gaza LGUs, Camps, MLG, MOA, MOH, MOL and MOE and DORA

1,876 August 2003

Total Cost of Courses 20,717 The following table includes the names of the beneficiaries of the local communities (LGUs, Refugee Camps and Agriculture Cooperatives) benefited from the above training courses conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

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Beneficiary Number of participants

1 Nour Shams Camp 4 2 Jericho Municipality 3 3 Tel Village Council 3 4 Roujeeb V. Council 3 5 Al Nabi Saleh V. Council 5 6 Al Amari Camp 4 7 Wadi Rahhal 3 8 Der Dibwan 3 9 Bet Anan 5 10 Al Mazra'a Al Sharqiyyeh 4 11 Turmos Ayya 3 12 Batteer 5 13 Silwad Camp 5 14 Al Obadiyyah 7 15 Al Khader Municiality 5 16 Al Daouha Muncipality 4 17 Tqou'a Municipality 3 18 Hussan 4 19 Bet Soureek 3 20 Bet Ummar 4 21 Staff of MLG, DORA, MOA 18 22 Gaza Municipality 3 23 Rafah Municipality 3 24 Khuza'a Municipality 3 25 Al Nusairat 3 26 Der Al Balah 3 27 Wadi Al Salqa 3 28 Al Qaraqa 3 29 Bani Suhaila 3 30 Big Abassan 2 31 Small Abassan 2 32 Al Shokeh 2 33 Al Fukhari 3 34 New Abassan 3 35 Al Buraij 3 36 Staff of MLG, MOH, MOA, MOE 14 37 DORA and Refujee Camps 7 Total number of Participants 157

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The training courses which targeted the beneficiaries focused on topics related to Micro Projects implementation such as introduction to the ICDP, Community Based Procurement and Procurement Management (content of the procurement documents and its priorities, evaluation of the bids, prequalification of contractors …etc), Project Management, Financial Management, Banking and Projects Project (the role of the banks in financing micro-projects issues concerning checks, guarantees, insurance, invoices, taxes…..etc.), Identification and Planning for Local Development in addition to other supportive topics such as computer literacy for LGUs members and advanced computer topics. According to the course evaluation that was conducted at the end of each training session the beneficiaries indicated that the training was very useful to improve planning and consultation and management capacities of communities. The training session had very significant impacts on the beneficiaries in terms of empowerment of poor and marginalized LGU’s by training the members of the village councils to enable them to manage their projects by themselves. It is also worth noting that the capacity building to LGUs was done during the original fund by conducting training sessions, while in Additional Fund and due to time constraints, training was done through the on the job training practices; procurement, preparation of tender document and supervision supported by PECDAR’s staff. However, it was difficult to assess the impact of the training courses during the impact assessment conducted by the hired consultant (Riyada) due to change of councils and lack of mechanisms to ensure transfer of knowledge and documentation within the local government system, according to the BIA study conducted in February 2008. Sustaining skills and capacity building interventions within LGUs is most difficult due to two main reasons; the first is that they change over time and second there are no mechanisms in place to ensure transfer of knowledge and documentation within the LGUs from old to new councils. Other activities had been conducted under this category such as the salaries of the CDC in the West Bank at US$ 52,350, Consultancy services and Design for some projects such as the Animal Quarantine Station in Jericho, consultancy Services for the Design and preparation of tender document for some micro projects, Production of a Documentary Film about the ICDP, Consultancy Services for the provisions of Social, Technical and Environmental Assessment for 18 Micro Projects implemented under the ICDP for the Mid Term Review in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and consultancy Services for the Provisions of Social Appraisal for seven Projects in Gaza Strip. 1.4. Serving more than one community: It was anticipated that not less than (30%) of the implemented MPs serve more than one community. Actually, (99) implemented MP's out of a total of (142) were awarded to projects serving more than one community yielding a (73%) percentage. The rating for this indicator is Satisfactory. 4.1.5. Serving Youth and Women The anticipated key performance indicator for serving Youth and women is 30% of the implemented MPs in the Additional Fund. A total of (22) executed MPS out of the 40

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MPs directly served women and youth through either the education sector or public building by supporting and rehabilitation of girl's schools or directly by supporting the construction and rehabilitation of youth centers and women centers. The following are a classification of the executed projects that serve the Youth and Women under the Additional Fund with a percentage of 55% exceeding the anticipated percentage included in the combined PMI (30%):

Classification Number of Executed MPs Notes Girls Schools 9 MPs Girls schools Boys Schools 3 MPs Boys Schools Mixed Schools 4 MPs Coeducational Schools Women Centers 3 MPs Center for Women

Activities Other Youth Projects 2 MPs Such as children parks Infrastructure serving Youth & Women Projects

1 MP A road for girls school

Total 22 On the other hand, the remaining executed MPs are serving other infrastructure sectors of interventions such as roads, water and health projects that also serve Women and Youth in addition to other community components. Accordingly this indicator was achieved on Highly Satisfactory Level. 4.1.6. Physical Achievements and Outputs: Since the launching of the ICDP MPs in 2003, the implementation of the projects went smoothly despite the vulnerable political situation and the unstable security situation in the Palestinian Territories. Until the date of this report, about 142 community development MPs in Civil Works infrastructure had been implemented in the West Bank and Gaza strip benefiting more than 200 different communities. These community development MPs included civil works for construction, extension or rehabilitation of water supply, sanitation, health clinics, schools, roads, water wells, irrigation networks and other agricultural facilities. Despite the deteriorating political and economical status of the Palestinians, the achievements of the ICDP projects way exceeded its anticipations achieving (80 %) beneficiary satisfaction levels and more, according to the BIA conducted by Riyada Consultants. The direct impact of the implemented projects included both rehabilitation of community infrastructure, creating temporary local jobs during adverse and difficult political and economic conditions and the majority of the implemented projects resulted in access to permanent services and access to education, health, local council services and community multipurpose centres (ICTs). These are considered solid achievements and were highly appreciated by the majority of beneficiaries (92 %) who stated that the

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implemented projects have directly responded to their needs The ICDP projects have positively contributed to facilitating access to services and interestingly female respondents (86 %) scored higher satisfaction than males (81 %) as any facilitation of access and mobility directly affects women and children who usually have less mobility. Similarly, female respondents clearly stated more satisfaction with the projects for saving time and effort (83 %) compared to males (75 %). Some of the examples on the physical achievements below put emphases on the fact that the ICDP achievements were significant and highly satisfactory. For example in the field of Roads projects, many villages were without any access to the nearby city or did not have any accessibility to the main road or did not have a paved entrance or have dead ends. Al Janieh Village is an example of a poor community with a population of about 1100 inhabitants used to go through very dirty unpaved access road in order to reach the surrounding villages or other communities; with US$56k a linking road was recently paved and rehabilitated bringing life and mobility to Al Janieh community and easing their daily lives. Other villages were without paved internal roads which made accessibility to the vital services such as schools, village council, health centers, mosques and markets hazardous. In the west Bank about 32 villages were connected by linking roads through the execution of 14 MPs, entrances of other three villages were connected with the main road facilitating the mobility of the local communities out of and into these villages. The roads projects improved and facilitated the life of the inhabitants in terms of facilitating and strengthening the social life and bonds between the people of the different villages and promoting coordination and cooperation between the public service providers in these villages. The pavement and rehabilitation of the internal and linking roads relieved part of the economic burdens on the families by reducing the cost of transportation and maintenance of vehicles. In regards to the health and environmental aspects, these projects had a significant impact on improving the health status and promoting a healthier environment in the targeted regions, where dust was reduced to significant levels and accessibility to health facilities in case of emergencies is facilitated and became faster. In total about 78 Km of different types of roads have been constructed and rehabilitated in West Bank and Gaza Strip until the end of March 2008, this is in addition to 14 Km of agricultural roads. In the field of Education projects about 157 classrooms were constructed, 35 classrooms were finished, maintained or rehabilitated benefiting more than 40 communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip The 157 classrooms helped relief many social and educational issues in the benefiting communities; it increased the accessibility to high school education and decreased the drop out after the 10th grade, especially between females, by upgrading the schools to the 12th grade (Tawjihi) such as in Deir Al Sudan, Raba, Biet Duqqo, Mikhmas, Farkha, Al Nabi Saleh, Deir Ammar, Marah Rabah and other Villages. In addition to that, addition of classrooms and upgrading of schools helped reduce the cost of travel and transportation to high schools in the nearby villages and cities which relief some of the economic burdens on families.

In the field of Water projects, the ICDP also helped several communities overcome the problem of water shortage. A considerable portion of the LGUs in the West Bank do not

45

have a source for drinking water, water networks, or water reservoirs, this causes substantial problems in terms of health, environmental, social and economical aspects. Four water reservoirs were constructed through the ICDP in four different villages to solve the problem of water shortage caused by fluctuation of water supply by the supplier company. The reservoirs helped the village councils provide the houses with tap water at steady state conditions. For example, before the construction of Bidia Water Reservoir, the 6,000 inhabitants of the village used to wait days and some times weeks for the supplier company to provide them with water especially in summer seasons. Recently and thanks to the ICDP supported project of building the water reservoir in the village, the reservoir stores sufficient quantity of water for several days; houses are supplied with sufficient quantities of water based on three days weekly scheduled pumping. Water networks also helped provide all the houses of Al Fundok and Jayyous village with water, the inhabitants of many locations within the villages used to use kitchen utensils to provide their families with drinking water. On the other hand through this category, several LGUs were provided with electric transmitters and other electricity materials such as Al Simia area within Al Samou' municipality jurisdiction, located south to Hebron District which is considered one of the poorest areas in the West Bank. In the past, Al Simia inhabitants used to have a fluctuated and very weak electric current which caused about 4,000 people to suffer from this problem; students, doctors, housewives, small industries, farms and others used to complain continuously. Recently the inhabitants of Al Simia area are provided with stable electric current generated by local generators after purchasing a transmitter and other electric materials at US$49,402 which solved the roots of the problem; improved life quality, enhanced the educational environment, and improved their economy. Ein Sinia Village and the other nearby villages used to suffer from an environmental and health hazard caused by sewage and wastewater pools that converges at the agricultural lands surrounding the houses of Ein Sinia, Jifna, Ber Zeit and Dura Al Qare' villages. A main sewer line was constructed to divert the wastewater away into the proposed treatment plan area, which mitigated the environmental hazardous effects of the raw sewage on the surrounding agricultural land and people. The ICDP also helped enhance the agricultural economy in some aspects. Agricultural manufacturing equipment have been imported and installed to improve the production of agricultural industries owned by public agricultural cooperatives. These projects, in addition to veterinary labs, agricultural training center and agricultural roads had significant impacts on agriculture in particular and on economy in general.

In regards to the Goods, PECDAR has received many applications and requests from the LGUs and camps seeking for funds to supply them with office equipment such as computers, printers, photocopiers and fax machines. Between the years 2005 and 2008, PECDAR has provided most of the village councils and camps in the West Bank with 575 personal computers, 355 laser printers, 120 fax machines and 130 photocopiers and 11 LCD projectors. A random quick assessment was carried by PECDAR's site engineers in terms of proper usage of the supplied equipment shows that the equipment supplies had achieved their goals. It was observed that the supplied office equipment improved the beneficiaries (LGUs and Camps) management skills and administrative capacities especially in project management, project accounting, bills management, project monitoring, correspondence and proposal writing capabilities for fund raising and

46

other purposes. In the same context, computers, printers, photocopiers were also delivered to MOLG and DORA for the sake of building up the capacity building of the ICDP partners. As for Gaza Strip, the same types and quality of micro projects have been implemented in Gaza Strip under the original fund in education, roads, services buildings, agriculture, sanitation and electricity. Projects implemented in Gaza Strip also had significant positive impacts on the local communities. One of the pioneer projects was the construction of a veterinary lab in Gaza City at US$ 89,679. Recently, the lab is working at high efficiency and the farmers had found positive changes in the quality of services provided by the lab as compared with the situation before. Significant positive impacts on the public health of Gaza Strip inhabitants and enhancement in the economy of the benefited farmers are really basic reasons for considering the project as one of the successful stories of the ICDP. In regards to the Goods purchased in Gaza Strip, 148 computers, 63 laser printers, 26 photocopiers and 7 faxes were purchased for the benefit of about 25 different local governmental municipalities, refugee camps, farmers cooperatives, schools, LGUs, youth and women centers and clubs. Purchasing the computers and other office equipment clearly had the following impact on the final beneficiaries: 1. Enhancement of the capacity of the LGUs, camps, MOLG staff, MOA staff, DORA staff and other local government units in terms of management. 2. Improvement the skills of the LGUs technical and administrative staff. 3. Improvement in the accounting systems, bills management, project monitoring and correspondence. 4. Purchasing electric transmitters, generators, cables and street lighting units helped maintain the existing electrical lighting and electrical networks, improved the social life of benefited communities, improved economy and facilitated their life in many aspects. Medical equipment such as emergency beds and emergency trolleys, DC shocker with monitor in addition to Radiographic Devices have been purchased which helped relief the pressure on emergency units in some hospitals in the Gaza Strip. In order to keep Gaza Strip clean, 25 different municipalities, camps and LGUs had benefited from the ICDP by purchasing sweeping tools and streets cleaning equipment at a total amount of US$74,019. This is also considered the door steps for any future Job Creation Project and will encourage donors to pledge their donations in this field especially in the current vulnerable economic situation of the Strip.

The table below summarizes the physical achievements of the ICDP:

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The physical outputs of the implemented MPs are as follows:

Sector Physical outputs of Original finance

Physical outputs of Additional

finance


Roads • 70.3 km length of constructed roads

• 1,270 curbstone

• 2300 m sidewalks

• 8 km length of constructed roads

• 1,782 m3 reinforced concrete retaining walls

• 78.3 km length of constructed roads

• 3,052 curbstone • 2,300 m

sidewalks

Education • 85 Classrooms constructed r rehabilitated

• 72 constructed Classrooms and 35 finished classrooms in addition to 3700m2 asphalted or tiled yards and 5 WC units

• 157 constructed Classrooms and 35 finished classrooms in addition to 3700m2 asphalted or tiled yards and 5 WC units

Public service buildings

• 5950 m2

built up area

• 2445 m2

built up area

• 8,395 m2

built up area

Gardens • 71 dunums

• 14km agricultural roads

• 7 dunums

• 71 dunums • 14km

agricultural roads

Water

*Construction of water tanks

*Rehabilitation of water distribution

systems

• 1750m3 • 5485 Lm

pipes

• 300m3

• 5970 Lm

pipes

• 2050m3 water tanks

• 11,455 Lm

pipes

Waste water 3100 Lm pipes 3100 Lm pipes

Electricity 3500 Lm of electrical cables, Supply and install of an electric transmitter and some electrical high voltage materials

3500 Lm of electrical cables, Supply and install of an electric transmitter and some electrical high voltage materials

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4.1.7. Labor Content of MPs: The following table shows the labor content of the MPs implemented under the original and additional finance of the ICDP:

ICDP Finance Manpower/Day Labor content %13

Original finance MPs 102,737

26 %

Additional finance MPs 39,54214 28.3 % Total 138,737

The labor content percentage is below the planned 30%. This lower percentage is justified by the following:

• The labor content estimates included only the direct labor, the indirect labor such as managers, accountants, drivers, cement factories workers etc….who indirectly benefited from the implemented projects with not less than (15–20 %) of the direct labor, is not taken into consideration .

• The estimate did not include the Job Creation Projects in Gaza that is presented separately in section 2.4.3.

• A considerable portion of MPs were allocated to the implementation of roads projects, water and sanitation with the nature of low labor contents.

4.2. Output (2) of Component (1): Strengthened relationship between local councils and their constituents in communities implementing MPs. The results of the BIA 2008 revealed that in total the beneficiaries believe that the implemented MPs improved their relationship with the local council. The highest impact on strengthening the relationship was gained through implementing buildings projects (98%) and the least was through implementing roads projects (32%). The utilizations of the buildings by the village councils directly impacted the relationship between them and their constituents where these buildings contributed to improve accessibility to public services and increased personal contact between the council members and the beneficiaries. The degree of satisfaction with the level of community participation was proposed in the PAD of 2002, to be used as an indicator for measuring the impact of the implemented MPs on strengthening the relationship between the local councils and their constituents. A minimum of 60% beneficiary satisfaction with the level of community participation

13 Calculated on the basis of an average wage of $20 per day

14 As by the end of March 2008

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was anticipated to be obtained from beneficiaries after the completion of the ICDP Microprojects. The level of community participation was emphasized in the additional finance through the requirement of providing signed public meeting minutes in which the community participated in selecting the proposed project as a priority need for funding. Despite that the additional fund took the community participation as one of the major criteria of selection of the proposed MPs and all the selected MPs provided the required prove and document for community participation, the BIA study conducted by Riyada Consultancy in February 2008 revealed that the community Participation is much lower (39%) than beneficiary satisfaction with the implemented projects (79%). The Participation was higher in the West Bank (29%) than Gaza Strip (22%) with significant difference between males (34%) and females (18%). Comparing these results with the results of Ma'alem Consultancy BIA study conducted in July 2005 for assessing the socio economic impact of the original finance in which the followings were revealed:15

o 61% of the surveyed beneficiaries believe that the participation of community in identification of the community needs and participating in planning and implementing the projects are considered the most important steps in community development

o About two third of the local communities surveyed perceived that their councils

seriously consider the principle of realizing the desires of the society

o Most of the surveyed beneficiaries believe that the community members participating in one way or another in preparing and planning the project while less than one third think that only the council members who arrange and plan for the projects without any consultation with the community

o 38% of the local community councils benefited from the experience of the

community members, while about 35% depended on the plans of the council without any help from their communities. On the other hand, 26% of the councils got help from the experience and the skills of people outside their communities.

In conclusion we can say that despite that the beneficiaries' belief and good awareness of the importance of their participation in the different phases of project identification and management (61%), this awareness and belief was not completely translated into actions during the different phases of micro project management (39%).

15 Ma'alem Consultancy , " Beneficiary Impact Assessment Report for the ICDP" July 2005

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4.3. Output of the new Component; Creating Emergency Job Opportunities for the unemployed in Gaza Strip (JCP): Under this component a total of (81) Nongovernmental Organizations in Gaza Strip were awarded funds to support emergency job creation projects with a total allocation of $1,898,987.97. The projects directly benefited 5,295 beneficiaries (workers) from 23 communities in Gaza City, North Gaza, Middle Gaza, Khan Younis and Rafah through the creation of 170,000 man workdays, 95% labor content. BIA results revealed that the Job creation component of the ICDP had a positive impact on its beneficiaries and the communities in which it was implemented. The Impact of the JC projects on the beneficiaries as stated by the beneficiaries themselves through the focus groups are summarized in the following points:

o Temporary improving the income of families by receiving temporary wages ($300 – $ 400) for 2.5 months.

o Learning new skills that promoted some women to start their own home based projects for producing some home made products.

o Some of the beneficiaries received permanent job offers from the organizations that employed them.

o Receiving the psychological support from the peer workers especially during the difficult and stressful time during which the projects were implemented.

4.4 Outputs of Component (2); establishing community telecommunication centers ICTs: This component has financed 5 multipurpose community telecenters in pre selected communities of WBG, through grants provided to LGUs. Each telecenter micro project had provided funding for:

(i) Civil Works for extend or reconfigure facilities to accommodate ICT infrastructure and programs; (ii) goods, such as computers, software, furniture, phones, fax machines, photocopiers, including connection to Internet services; and (iii) specialist services for delivery of programs and services for up to 18 months.

The main objective of the (ICT) is to develop sustainable, replicable models of multi-purpose community Tele-centers in WBG and to evaluate the impact of such centers on social, economic and cultural development. These Tele-centers address the issue of economic and human resource constrains for the access to ICT in poor rural and urban areas through the provision of public access points for such technology and services. In general, the following services are the most common services being provided by the five ICTs:

o Provide general services in the field of Information and Communication Technology;

o Train the community on informatics techniques in order to obtain information and assistance from many educational and technical sources and researches for different strata of the community such as farmers, physicians, engineers,

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students…etc. in their specialty in order to enhance and improve their capacities in their fields. This is done through training the community on how to use internet and search engines;

o Provide internet services; o Perform periodic surveys to assist the training needs of the community; o Conduct and supervise training courses, seminars and workshops; o Generate and provide Digital Library; o Provide the surrounding communities with urgent office supports and services

such as printing, copying, faxing, emailing, scanning and other services; o Provide advanced Telecommunication technology services.

4.4.1 Number of f ICTs established and beneficiary satisfaction with its impact.

Total of (5) ICTs were established, three in the West Bank located in Salfeet, Azzoun and Ithna, and two in Gaza Strip located in Big Abassan and Beit Lahia. The location for each ICT was pre selected by the ICDP Steering Committee in close cooperation and approval of the WB such that the anticipated number of benefiting communities is maximized. Two employees were hired for each ICT; a Manager and an Assistant for each, in order to run and manage the ICT activities. All the necessary items required for the ICTs to start their activities such as finishing works of the building, furniture, computers, servers, printers, photocopiers, electric equipment, stationary, internet and other requirements have been supplied and installed for each center. A business plan was assigned fore each center including the promotion plan, financial strategy, accounting system and management system to assist the manager and the assistant operate the center properly. The total finances extended for the establishment, furnishing and operating of the 5 ICTs was about $ 642,000.

The results of the BIA revealed high general satisfaction (92%) with the projects which is an impressive success. The satisfaction level with the ICTs as being able to respond to community needs and providing a new service that did not exist before was also significant (89%). The level of satisfaction differed between males (94%) and females (82 %) which indicate difference in the utilization of the ICTs by genders. This difference could be explained with the cultural believes and attitudes prevailing within the targeted communities that gives males higher freedom of movement and accessibility to such services.

The establishment of the ICTs was confronted with the main problem which is the very bad economic situation of the Palestinian citizens which makes them unenthusiastic and hesitated in making registration in the centers, either registration for training courses or internet services, in addition to this, the ADSL is provided by PALTEL Company for almost all the customers. The promotion plan for each ICT partially resolved these issues, other ways to resolve these issues were by contacting the local NGOs to finance free training courses and seminars to encourage the communities to attend such courses.

The sustainability of the ICTs depends on three key factors:

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1. income from services 2. support from municipalities 3. Income generated by conducting training courses, seminars and workshops

A cost recovery business model was designed for the three ICT centers. This model allows for self dependence in 3-5 years period with full support from ICDP in the first 18 months and with a partial support for the hosting municipalities in Salfeet, Azzoun and Ithna. After the first five years, the centers are expected to cover all their expenses.

Another element of sustainability that was designed in the centers is the introduction of a wide range of services provided in each center such as high speed internet, printing, typing, photocopying and training. This allows for more customers to benefit from these services as well to generate more income to the centers. • As for Salfeet ICT center (Siraj), it started operating on July 14, 2004 and till now

enjoys a good level of services to the community primarily due to the continuous support of the municipality and the network it built with many local and international organizations. The salaries of the manager and the secretary are paid directly by the municipality and the income from the services it provides (around $800) covers of the other expenses such as internet cost, stationary and miscellaneous costs. It should be mentioned here that Salfeet Municipality had undertaken to pay the salaries of the employees if any revenue shortage occurs. The center was successful in establishing a solid network with local and international organizations such as the National Institute of Technology, Civic Forum, Sharaek Youth forum and Heins DSS, which funded 30 workshops and donated LCDs and computers to the center. Now the center managed to increase its LCDs to 4, 2 new Laser color printers and added 5 more computers to its lab.

• As for ICT Azzoun (Al Rafed), the center started offering services on March 15, 207. The ICDP covered the running cost till December 31, 2007. The center provides all services such internet, research and training in the field of Hebrew language, high school curriculum, and computer training. The center was successful in signing a deal with the union of teachers for the purpose training all teachers in the field of computer literacy. The municipality pays the salaries of the manager and the secretary and this is very helpful in the sustainability of the center especially in the first three months of the 2008 when the town was under extended curfews by the Israeli authorities and the center did not generate enough income to pay for its expenses. Customers to use the internet in this center are limited due to the fact that 60% of the houses are connected to the internet through ADSL.

• In regards to ICT Ithna (Al Mustakbal), the center started operating on April 26, 2007 and currently employs a manager and a secretary and offers internet services for NIS 3 an hour as well as training in areas such as Excel, MS Office and other services. The majority of the beneficiaries are women (70%) as they feel that it is a trusted place to visit given the big number of Internet Cafés in the areas which are usually used by men. The current income of the center does not exceed $600 per months, whereas the monthly expenditures are around $1500. The difference is being paid by the municipality and this is a great element for the sustainability of the center.

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• Abassan Al Kabira ICT, was officially opened in mid of the year 2005. The center provides its services for the communities of Abassan Al Kabira, Abassan Al village, Khuza'ah, Bani Suhaila and Khan younis (city & camp). The running expenses were covered from the ICDP budget until Dec. 31, 2006. Abassan Al Kabira center is now sustainable and its operating expenses are covered both from its own revenues and municipality budget. In general, Abassan Al Kabira ICT provides the following services: o Provide general services in the field of Information and Communication

Technology. o Make Membership systems in the services of the Abassan Al Kabira ICT o Perform cyclical surveys to understand the IT training needs. o Implement and direct the implementations of the training courses plans, and make

teaching materials and resources. o Train people to utilize the computer skills, programs and systems, and how to

manage an organizational information and offices applications, Conduct general training courses like (Microsoft Office programs, Internet, etc), and professional (for computer specialists) training courses like (MCSE, MCSD, ORACLE, ASP.NET, etc).

o Provide informatics techniques, and many of educational and technical sources and researches for different students’ levels, individuals, and companies.

o Present Internet and Web services to people. o Provide Digital Library. o Support residing students by providing information resources. o Provide Khan Younis governorate and Abasan Al-Kabira residents by office

services like Documents’ Printing, Copying, and Scanning. o Provide advanced Telecommunication technology service.

After the end of the ICDP support, the Abassan Al Kabira ICT is still operating and show reasonably good signs of achieving financial sustainability. Income for services, however, covers no more than about half the total costs of operating the Abassan Al Kabira ICT. Interestingly, the Municipality has proved willing to pick up the rest of the costs. And some have been remarkably successful in obtaining funds for their own projects involving the Abassan Al Kabira ICT operators and services. See the attached excel sheet (ICT Abassan revenues) ( for the period in charge by the municipality, from 01/01/2007 to 31/12/2007) • Beit Lahia ICT became active on Aug. 1, 2006 in order to provide and disseminate

information and statistics needed for all segments of community citizens, on the other hand to enhance the community information technology capabilities, and provide a distinctive and creative combine to provide service and technical support. The running expenses were covered from the ICDP budget until Dec. 31, 2007. Beit Lahia center is now sustainable and its running operating expenses are covered both from its own revenues and municipality budget. The center has launched several training courses for community development and the development of citizens in the use of information technology; Win XP and internet, Excel, Golden "assil" for accounting,

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Design web site by PHP language and other courses. The center was successful in establishing networks with some donors, NGOs and other institutions, such as the Italian Cooperative Corporation COOPI.

The above successes of the ICT centers were slightly undermined with the experience of Ithna ICT center. After the center was built, fully furnished and operated for 12 months by the ICDP project and immediately after the end of the contract on December 31, 2007, the equipment was moved by the local council to another location for utilizing the building for other purposes. A mission from the WB and PECDAR has visited the original and the new locations of the center, the equipment were moved to the new building which is rented by the municipality in the center of Ithna town. The center will continue providing its services in the new location.

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5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 5.1 Factors outside PECDAR’s Control:

• The instability of the Political and security situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: The Original Fund of the ICDP was brought into effectiveness in August 2002, where the situation in the Palestinian Territories was very critical and vulnerable. During the period from August 2002 till mid 2005, the beginning of the project marked the worst political situation and incursions and extreme closure measures, of all Palestinian Territories particularly in the West Bank. The West Bank was separated into three areas, and it was impossible for any one who lives in one area to move to another. Contractors and their staff were confronted with very hard difficulties to collect the bidding documents, to attend the pre – tender meetings, to issue the required securities and guarantees, to submit their bids on time, to sign their contracts, to issue the necessary insurance, and to reach their projects sites during the implementation phase. Very complicated procedures were also imposed on the mobility of the construction materials which resulted in lack of construction materials and sometime it was out of market. PECDAR engineers could not reach their offices for a long period. This situation resulted in significant progress delays of the projects, and negatively affected the ICDP progress. Several updating of the work plan were issued in order to keep the ICDP framework and preserve its objectives. The instability of the political and security situation resulted in further deterioration and destruction of infrastructure. This caused additional burdens in addition to the delays of implementation. PECDAR had to take additional measures of opening five more offices in Tulkarem, Jenin, Qalqilia, Jericho and Bethlehem besides the original four offices in Al Ram, Hebron, Nablus and Gaza to enable the contractors collect the bidding documents, to submit their bids on time, and to facilitate the implementation of works. This had added an additional administrative burden, but was a necessary measure to ensure close follow up in procuring the works / goods / consultancy services and in supervising the implementation of the ICDP projects, as in many cases, engineers and projects supervisors were not able to reach project sites. After 2005, the situation in the West Bank as a whole became less difficult than in Gaza Strip. In Gaza, due to successive closures of boarders, and in addition to separating the strip into three areas, the most difficult problem that faced the implementation of the ICDP was importing the construction materials and other supplies. In this case the construction materials, which are mainly imported from Israel and from the European Union, could not reach the contractors and accordingly the progress of the ICDP was severely affected by this obstacle. The changing political environment including the recent developments in Gaza was another obstacle faced the ICDP implementation. This had implications on the project

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and resulted in changing the ICDP work plan several times particularly for GAZA components. Several proposals were suggested by PECDAR in close cooperation with the WB mission to over come the new situation in GAZA. By replacing the micro projects component by a new component; Job Creation, as an alternative to construction since materials were not permitted to enter Gaza, made it possible for PECDAR to complete this component.

• The short implementation period of the Additional Fund: Given the very tight implementation time frame of the AF, PECDAR and the Bank have taken many precautions to eliminate the risk of not completing the MPs within the tight implementation period; such as selecting MPs with ready documents and starting informing the communities on the community procurement procedures and preparations for procurement. Despite these precautions, the implementation of the ICDP, particularly the Additional Fund was confronted with a very high risk of not completing some of the MPs; this risk was due to the following challenges in regards to the implementation period: 1. The procurement manual of the original fund modified by PECDAR to be applied to

the additional fund was accepted in principle by the Bank. The Bank demanded that the manual should be changed by an individual consultant such that it completely goes along with one of the project key features; which is the "Community Driven Development Project (CDD)". However, this feature was achieved; the procurement procedures went through the beneficiaries with close cooperation and assistance of PECDAR’s staff.

2. The absence of simplified bidding documents in the Arabic language within the West

Bank & Gaza strip forced PECDAR to look for these documents in the neighborhood countries and to try to consult regional consultants. After long efforts from PECDAR, the translation of these documents was the only choice in order to make them available in the hands of the LGUs staff.

3. The low capacity of some LGUs, that requires investing more time and efforts by

PECDAR staff on the on- job training particularly in Documents preparations, Community Driven Procurement, Project Management, supervision… etc.

4. Working hours during Ramadan are usually less than the regular daily working hours

which had an adverse impact on the implementation period 5. The implementation of some of the projects, especially the infrastructure projects,

coincided with the winter season and holiday’s season which hindered their progress.

• The low capacity of the beneficiaries and LGUs: One of the most challenges and obstacles that were faced is the very low capacity of the LGUs and other beneficiaries, especially the poor and marginalized communities. In

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addition, the MPs cycle was short and the type of procurement depended on the capacity of the beneficiary (Community Procurement). This caused delays not only to the procurement processes, but also during the review of the technical documents such as design, plans, quantities and specifications because of the low quality of submitted documents, demanded intensive efforts from PECDAR especially during review and procurement processes. It is worth noting that most of capacity building to LGUs was done during the implementation of the fund and on the job training. Prior training sessions have been conducted for the benefit of the LGUs who had benefited from the original fund. As for the additional fund, and because of the short period of implementation, on the job training was very useful for improving the capacity of the beneficiaries. • Financial Management issues: Two main financial obstacles were encountered during the implementation: - Fluctuation of the currency exchange rates and successive changes in Market prices: As the Palestinian Territories is a special case in dealing with different currencies, this issue has adversely affected the implementation from two aspects: (1) The overall allocated budget of the ICDP is in US Dollars, since contracts with contractors and suppliers are in US Dollars, the contractors were paid in the Dollar currency while disbursements were in Sterling Pounds and were recorded equivalent to US Dollars. The differences in exchange rates resulted in deficiencies between the Bank’s records and what actually was paid by PECDAR. The value of the deficiencies was US$ 26,421 in the Additional Fund and about US$ 18,000 in the Original as recorded on March 31, 2008. These values are expected to increase by the end of the Grace Period (July 31, 2008). (2) Since the ICDP contracts were signed in US Dollars currency, while the contractors pay for construction materials and labor in NIS, most of the contractors lost a large margin of their profits or even did not meet their break even as the rate of change of the US Dollar dropped significantly during the implementation period. During September 2007, the average rate of change of the Dollar against NIS was around 4.04 NIS per one dollar; during March 2008 it dropped down to 3.45 NIS per one Dollar. This has adversely affected the performance of contractors. Another problem encountered during the implementation of the ICDP was the fluctuation and instability of prices of the supplied goods and materials such as computers, printers, fax machines and photocopiers. This price fluctuation made it so difficult for PECDAR to design a realistic plan to utilize the remaining budget under the Goods Category. Unforeseen savings were always experienced between the estimated bids and the lowest bidder's prices. This resulted in accumulation of savings in this category allover the ICDP implementation period.

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- Initial Deposit and the long replenishment life cycle: Given the emergency nature of the ICDP, the value of advance payments is considered below the amount of submitted invoices within the short implementation period of the AF; the advance installment of the AF was not sufficient to meet the submitted invoices. Furthermore, due to the fact that the implementation of the AF was confronted with holiday season, replenishment periods (life cycle) were too long (one month for some cases) and did not meet the project objectives and nature. Adding to this issue the drop in Dollar resulted in a major obstacle which adversely affected the performance of the contractors and delayed progress.

• Complete closure of Gaza Strip: Currently, the situation in Gaza Strip is much worse than the past four years, given the on-going freeze on passage of goods and supplies into Gaza and the reluctance of contractors to apply for bids, except for medical supplies, the goods supplies were confronted with significant delays. One supply contract was terminated because the supplier could import the all the items in accordance with the contract; ICDP/WB/095EQ.GZ was terminated at US$ 30,579 instead of US$ 55,319 which resulted in not committing all the allocated budget of the original fund. Other contracts (Construction and supplies) in Gaza caused significant delays to the whole fund due to the impossibility to be finished in the specified anticipated timeframe. In addition to that, most of the proposed MPs in Gaza, under the additional fund, were infrastructure in nature and it was difficult to be implemented given the current freeze on passage of goods into Gaza. In order to address these challenges facing project implementation in Gaza, the allocations for Gaza Strip had been used in Job Creation Projects (JCP) rather infrastructure. The quick response of PECDAR and the flexibility of the World Bank made it possible to overcome this issue by enabling PECDAR to utilize all the funds allocated for Gaza Strip in Employment Generation and Job Creation Activities (JCP) which was implemented 81 NGOs within Gaza Strip. The works did not include any construction materials or any material needed to be imported from outside Gaza Strip.

• The long preparation period of the Additional Fund: The additional fund of the ICDP is a Community Development Driven (CDD) Project required specific preparation as it was a unique experience. Although PECDAR executed the original fund of the ICDP, the procedures used were not the same as required in the additional fund. The TFGA of the additional fund was signed on February 2, 2007 and brought into effectiveness on May 2, 2007. During this period the preparation of some documents such as the Subsidiary Agreement, modifying the implementation plan, Operations Manual, Procurement Manual, simplified tendering documents in Arabic, recruitment of a community development consultant (CDC), tendering documents, orientation of the ICDP stakeholders, call for proposals, and issuing of the evaluation

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report took about 9 months which is considered a long period compared with the implementation period of the project.

• The recruitment of two Community Development Consultants (CDC): The process of hiring Community Development Consultants (CDCs) took along time. Despite the fact that the announcement for recruiting two CDCs, one for the West Bank and one for Gaza Strip, was issued on March 6, 2007, all the received CVs did not meet the minimum requirements of the position. This also added additional burdens on the ICDP staff as they had to carry on the CDC tasks in both the West Bank and Gaza. It is worthy to mention that the West Bank CDC was hired on August 15, 2008, and it was not possible to hire a CDC in Gaza for the same reason. The evaluation report of the received proposals was issued on July 15, 2007, even before hiring the CDC. 5.2 Factors within PECDAR’s Control: Since the effectiveness of the ICDP, was during a very vulnerable situation in terms of the political and security aspects, PECDAR had taken several measures that helped enhance the progress of the on going MPs and the ICDP. PECDAR opened regional offices in Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilia, Beit Lahem in addition to the original offices in Nablus, Al Ram (recently Al Bireh) headquarters and Hebron office. PECDAR also assigned part of the permanent engineering staff to follow up and supervise the MPs on a daily bases; each engineer was designated to follow up and supervise the projects within his residency area. In order to encourage the contractors to bid for the MPs, PECDAR facilitated the bidding procedures by allowing the contractors to pick up the bid and to submit his offers at the nearest office according to their residency. Bid openings for most of the MPs were conducted in public at the specified time and date either at the regional offices or in the village council sin the presence of the contractors and PECDAR’s representative. As in regards to the financial management, PECDAR succeeded in securing the payments to all contractors within eighteen days of the submitting the approved invoice, except for the additional fund. No complains were raised during the implementation of the MPs regarding delays in payments. As for the additional fund, the problem of delaying the replenishment was solved partially by distributing the available money to the contractors in order to help them continue their works and by using direct payment method for larger invoices. On the other hand, regarding technical and financial monitoring of the ICDP, PECDAR adopted a Management Information System (MIS) for both the technical monitoring and financial management. The MIS is a powerful tool in which all the ICDP information is entered including the technical (progress, units, and scope of work, base unit costs of different items, variations, labor content and working days, machinery and milestones) and the financial data such as the project budget, payments, retentions, remaining budget and guarantees. This information can be retrieved in the form of technical and financial

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reports containing any required information regarding MPs and other components. The MIS has the capability of tracking the progress of the MPs compared to the action plan of the ICDP based on the information and reports imported from the site. The PMO and the FD at PECDAR modified their reports in accordance with the Bank’s requirements and satisfaction. 6. Assessment of the World Bank Performance: 6.1 During Preparation The World Bank ICDP team has shown full cooperation and commitment during the preparation of the PAD of the original ICDP fund. The World Bank staff has shown their full readiness and complete commitment to work closely with PECDAR. With the close help of the WB team and the assistance of the different missions from the WB in Washington, the ICDP documents were prepared within the specified timeframe. The transition between the ICDP Task Team Leaders was smooth. The ICDP task team leader have shown high professionalism during the preparation of the ICDP- AF and has played an effective instrumental role in advising, assisting and supporting the project towards the declaration of effectiveness and execution within the set timeframe. Despite that the preparation of the Additional Fund encountered some obstacles and disruption, the rating for the Bank’s performance during the preparation of both funds can be ranked as Satisfactory. 6.2 During Implementation In the same context, and despite the lengthy procurement procedures which sometimes caused significant delays to the projects, the WB team headed by the former Task Team Leader and the current Task Team Leader has shown full commitment and excellent cooperation with PECDAR team which were of the main reasons for the impressive achievements of the ICDP. The ICDP was confronted with several obstacles in terms of political, security and economical aspects; the wide vision and the complete devotion and the flexible thoughts of both the WB team and PECDAR team came up with compatible and practical ideas to overcome the obstacles. As an example of overcoming obstacles, the situation in Gaza Strip during the implementation of the additional fund; the strict sanction of the Strip resulted in a complete stoppage of passage of construction materials which made it impossible to execute the MPs component in Gaza Strip. The WB team was flexible and professional by approving PECDAR’s proposal to reallocate US$ 1.9 million to JCP activities. This flexibility enabled PECDAR to implement the fund allocations within the anticipated objectives and a proper time frame. The Bank’s performance during the implementation is rated Satisfactory. 7. Conclusion • Overall, the achievements of the ICDP achieving (80 %) beneficiary satisfaction

levels and more are considered in general Highly Satisfactory. The direct impact of

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the implemented projects included both rehabilitation of community infrastructure, creating temporary local jobs during adverse and difficult political and economic conditions and the majority of the implemented projects resulted in access to permanent services and access to education, health, local council services and community multipurpose centres and ICTs. These are considered solid achievements and were highly appreciated by the majority of beneficiaries (92 %) who stated that the implemented projects have directly responded to their needs.

• The overall performance of the Bank was Satisfactory allover the project life; the

Bank responded to all the needs and necessary actions were taken in favor of the proper implementation of the ICDP. This is one of the major factors that helped achieve the ICDP objectives.

• The ICDP projects have positively contributed to facilitating access to services and

interestingly female respondents (86 %) scored higher satisfaction than males (81 %) as any facilitation of access and mobility directly affects women and children who usually have less mobility. Similarly, female respondents clearly stated more satisfaction with the projects for saving time and effort (83 %) compared to males (75 %).

• The training courses provided to LGUs were useful, particularly in the case of

community procurement projects, many LGU members referred to it as an on-the-job training where they have worked closely with PECDAR engineers.

• The ICT projects were individual success stories and had great impact on

beneficiaries and marked the maximum satisfaction levels among other projects. In addition, the ICT projects were unique and different in nature than other micro projects. They needed longer implementation time frame and more effort as it did not only entail the finishing works and the physical infrastructure, but also the furnishing, the equipment, the design and installation of networks and management and operation for 18 months.

• The job creation projects in Gaza came at a critical timing and provided immediate

job opportunities to more than 5000 people responsible for at least 5 other family members. The achievements are impressive and some of the beneficiaries received permanent job opportunities, or gained new skills and some decided to start their own micro projects for income generation encouraged by their experience in participating in the project. The quick action of PECDAR and the flexibility of the Bank’s decisions were the main reason for the success of this new component as an alternative to construction due to restrictions on Gaza regarding the import of construction materials.

• The achievements of the additional fund were challenged with the delay of the

replenishment of funds to the implementing agency (the long replenishment cycle) and thus resulted in delays in payments. Many contractors and NGOs complained that a significant delay in their payments due to the delay in the replenishment

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negatively affected their performance especially during the deteriorating economical situation.

• The depreciation in the US Dollar also negatively affected the performance of the

contractors and supplier particularly during the fourth quarter of 2007 and the beginning 2008.

• Sustaining skills and capacity building interventions within LGUs is most difficult

due to two main reasons; the first is that they change over time and second there are no mechanisms in place to ensure transfer of knowledge and documentation within the LGUs from old to new councils.

8. Lessons Learned • PECDAR recommends to the Bank, in future design of similar projects that the

closing date of the project should be extended subject to the date of declaration of effectiveness and the approval of other documents, the project preparation should not be within the implementation period of the project.

• Though the call for proposals in newspapers is a good practice and enhances

community awareness of the upcoming projects as well as transparency of the operation, it is not necessarily the best way for reaching to the poor and marginalized locations. Overall, reading newspapers is low in Palestinian territories, particularly in poor and marginalized areas. There is a need to create additional mechanisms for reaching to the poor and marginalized.

• In future ICT projects, it is recommended that MOLG should have played a role in

taking the responsibility for ensuring the management and maintenance of the buildings and ICTs in the contract with the beneficiary LGU or local committee for at least one year after the closing date of the fund. This is to ensure that allocated resources are not wasted or were not needed in the first place. It is recommended that in future similar projects, they are included in a separate fund and implementation plan is extended in terms of time frame as their implementation and management requirements are different from the micro projects.

• In future emergency projects, it is recommended that the replenishment cycle to be

shorter. In the same context, the advance instalment should be increased in order to speed up the payments to the contractors and other supplier of services. In this context, PECDAR recommends to the Bank to study the possibility of making disbursements by batches according to the implementation plan.

• Regarding training, it is recommended that a sufficient period for the training courses

and workshops is taken into account at the beginning of the project to make sure that the beneficiaries utilize the skills they gained in the training courses during the span of the project.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders There were no co-financiers.

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Annex 9 List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document, West Bank and Gaza Integrated Community Development Project, May 1, 2002.

2. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing (Grant) in the amount of US$5

million to the West Bank and Gaza, for the Integrated Community Development Project, November 15, 2006.

3. Project Appraisal Document for a Village and Neighborhood Development

Project in the West Bank and Gaza, March 20, 2008. 4. OED 2005: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “The Effectiveness

of World Bank Support for Community-Based and-Driven Development”, 2005. 5. Task Team Aide Memoires, Back To Office Reports, Project Status Reports,

Implementation Status Reports and other Mission and Supervision reports. 6. PECDAR’s Quarterly Progress Reports for TF:050591. 7. PECDAR’s Combined Semi Annual Report for TF: 050591, and TF: 057978.

8. PECDAR’s Project Monitoring Office (PMO), July, 2007. 9. PECDAR’s Implementation Completion Report, March, 2008. 10. Consulting Services for the Integrated Community Development Projects,

Evaluation of Implemented Small-Scale Projects in the West Bank, Universal Group for Engineering and Consulting, July 2005.

11. Technical, Environmental and Social Evaluation of Integrated Community

Development Projects in Gaza, Engineering and Management Consulting Center (EMCC), November, 2005.

12. Beneficiary Impact Assessment of the Integrated Community Development

Project, Riyada Consulting and Training, March 9, 2008. 13. Deep Palestinian Poverty in the Midst of Economic Crisis, World Bank and the

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, November 2004. 14. World Bank Quarterly Publications on West Bank and Gaza,

www.worldbank.org/ps.