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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001755

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-40320)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR16.7 MILLION (US$ 25.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

FOR A

URGENT ELECTRICITY REHABILITATION PROJECT

August 1, 2011

Africa Energy Group Sustainable Development Department

Eastern Africa Country Cluster II Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 25, 2011)

Currency Unit = Rwandan Franc US$1 = RwF 600.01 US$ 1 = SDR 0.630232

FISCAL YEAR

1 July – 30 June

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEDP Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CQS Consultants Qualifications CFO Chief Financial Officer CFL Compact fluorescent light CFR Country Framework Report DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DSM Demand-side management EA Environmental Assessment EAPP East Africa Power Pool EC European Commission EDPRS Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EOI Expression of Interest ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework EU European Union EWSA Electricity Water and Sanitation Authority FM Financial Management FMA Financial Management Assessment FMR Financial Monitoring Report GEF Global Environment Facility GoR Government of Rwanda GWh Giga Watt hour HFO Heavy fuel oil IB Incandescent bulb IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IC Individual Consultants ICB International Competitive Bidding

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IFR Interim Financial Reports ICT Information, Communications, & Telecommunications IDA International Development Association IPSAS International Public Sector Standards KIST Kigali Institute of Science and Technology kV Kilo Volt kWh Kilo Watt hour LCS Least-cost selection LI Lahmeyer International LV Low voltage MinaLoc Ministry of Local Government MinInfra Ministry of Infrastructure MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework MV Medium voltage MW Megawatt NEAP National Electricity Access Program NCB National Competitive Bidding NDF Nordic Development Fund OFID OPEC Fund for International Development OP Operational Procedure PCU Project Coordination Unit PFM Public Financial Management PPA Power Purchase Agreement PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PPP Public-Private Partnership PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit PRSG Poverty Reduction Support Grant QCBS Quality- and cost-based selection RAP Rapid Assessment of Biodiversity Priorities RECO Rwanda Electricity Corporation REMA Rwanda Environmental Management Authority ROW Right of way RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RURA Rwanda Utility Regulatory Authority RWASCO Rwanda Water and Sanitation Corporation SBD Standard Bidding Documents SEDP Sustainable Energy Development Project SIL Specific Investment Loan SINELAC Société Internationale des Pays des Grands Lacs (Regional Electricity

Company of the Great Lakes) SNEL Société National d'Eléctricité (National Electricity Company of DRC) SPN Specific Procurement Notices SWAp Sector-wide approach

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TA Technical assistance UERP Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation Project WBG World Bank Group

Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili

Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt

Sector Manager: Subramaniam V. Iyer

Project Team Leader: Erik Fernstrom

ICR Team Leader: Paul Baringanire

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Contents 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 16 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 17 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 19 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 22 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 24 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 28 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 30 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 31 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 32 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 34 

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A. Basic Information

Country: Rwanda Project Name: Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation

Project ID: P090194 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-40320

ICR Date: 05/17/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 16.7M Disbursed Amount: XDR 16.3M

Revised Amount: XDR 16.3M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Infrastructure Rwanda Electricity Corporation (RECO) Rwanda Utility Regulatory Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Nordic Development Fund B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 07/20/2004 Effectiveness: 07/29/2005 07/29/2005

Appraisal: 11/18/2004 Restructuring(s): 12/02/2005 09/27/2007

Approval: 01/27/2005 Mid-term Review: 03/15/2008 04/15/2008

Closing: 07/31/2009 04/30/2010 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 5 5

Power 83 95

Renewable energy 12

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Infrastructure services for private sector development 40 40

Regulation and competition policy 20 20

Urban services and housing for the poor 40 40 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Gobind T. Nankani

Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt A. David Craig

Sector Manager: Subramaniam V. Iyer Yusupha B. Crookes

Project Team Leader: Erik Magnus Fernstrom Malcolm Cosgrove-Davies

ICR Team Leader: Paul Baringanire

ICR Primary Author: Mitsunori Motohashi F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The overall development objectives of the proposed project are to: (i) Alleviate power shortages; and (ii) enhance the capabilities of energy sector institutions. Key performance indicators toward these objectives are:

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Objective (i) # reduction in outages; Objective (ii) - Revised power sector framework, promoting private sector participation" Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development objectives were not changed during the project implementation. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Reduction in load shedding outages Value quantitative or Qualitative)

4500hrs/month 2000 hrs/month 0

Date achieved 10/31/2004 07/31/2009 05/31/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

There was no loadshedding by the project close.

Indicator 2 : Billing to supply ratio (three month rolling average) Value quantitative or Qualitative)

75% 98% 84% 84%

Date achieved 12/31/2004 07/31/2009 04/30/2007 04/30/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Project target Achieved.

Indicator 3 : Revised power sector framework promoting private sector development

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

1976 Electricity Law Draft Legislation submitted to Cabinet

The final drafts of the Electricity and Gas laws have been approved by cabinet and submitted for Parliament

Date achieved 10/31/2004 10/31/2006 11/11/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target Achieved.

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increase in installed/available capacity (MW) Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

41.3 53.3 60

Date achieved 10/31/2004 07/31/2009 04/30/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target achieved by 112%.The additional thermal Generation from (20 MW ) by April 30, 2009.

Indicator 2 : RURA adoption of rules and regulations Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

RURA Established Periodic tariff adjustments

Cabinet approved new tariff structure.

Date achieved 10/31/2004 07/31/2007 06/30/2006 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achieved.

Indicator 3 : Bidding/transaction documents for next block of domestic generation

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Final site identification still pending

Call for expression of interest issued or other financing proposals initiated

Government have finalised discussions on the first commercial Gas top Power IPP with Countour Global due to supply 25 MW by end 2012. Also consruction of the a 27 MW HPP ongoing.

Date achieved 10/31/2004 07/31/2008 11/11/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achieved.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/28/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/13/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.00 3 06/30/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.00

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4 12/23/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.00 5 06/26/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.40 6 12/17/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.92 7 06/06/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.49 8 12/22/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 22.18 9 06/05/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.31

10 12/08/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.21 H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

12/02/2005 S S 2.00

DCA Amendment: to: (i) increase the capacity of thermal generation to 20MW and (ii) enhance capacity building activities, project implementation and contract supervision.

09/27/2007 S S 5.38

Reallocation of credit proceeds and Extension of the closing date to from July 31st 2009 to April 30th, 2010.

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal General Context 1. Internal political stability, policy reforms, and foreign aid helped Rwanda stage a remarkable

economic recovery over the period 1996/2004 following the 1994 genocide and civil war. Real GDP growth averaged more than 7% p.a. 1998-2002 and slowed to 3% in 2003. Peace and political stability was reestablished with democratic institutions and processes strengthened. Poverty and social indicators improved. A direct effect of this formidable economic recovery corresponded to the growth in demand for electricity. Unfortunately only minor investments were made in the power sector in the first decade of reconstruction as government attention remained on immediate reconstruction and resettling of returning refugees. Already by 1998, both peak demand and over-all energy supply were constrained by available supplies and network reliability. In response to the growing concerns over bottlenecks threatening to reduce long term growth prospects, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was adopted in mid-2002 and the World Bank County Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2003-06 was approved in December 2002. Both PRSP and CAS emphasized infrastructure investments as key to sustaining the economic growth beyond the immediate recovery phase.

Sector Context 2. The ever increasing demand in combination with unexpectedly low lake levels due to

prolonged regional droughts during 2003-2005, led to a rapid draw-down of the hydro power reservoirs Rwanda depended on almost exclusively for its power supply. The power supply shortage and the unreliability of the Utility’s dilapidated network rapidly led to extensive and lengthy power cuts beginning in early 2004. Load shedding increased approximately 50% of peak demand, during the dry period of August/September 2004, with power being cut to nearly all households daily for hours at a time. The supply shortages and unreliability raised the cost of doing business, weakened the prospects of attracting new investments, and forced the Utility to switch to higher-cost diesel water pumping to supply urban areas with potable water. The average peak power supply deficit doubled to 10MW (approximately 25% of domestic supply) in 2004 from about 5 MW in 2003, and the corresponding deficit in energy supplies from about 10 GWh to 54 GWh.

3. Despite the re-commissioning of an old backup diesel plant and the air delivery of used generators for emergency supply, the sustained and heavy load shedding led to serious adverse consequences to the Rwandan economy including incurring high-cost of self-generation (about USc 30/kWh) and prolonged outages leading to reduced outputs for the majority of the productive sector with no access to diesel generator supplies. The load shedding also resulted in darkness on city streets and in homes reversing some of the security gains and confidence building measures that had marked the return to normality after the conflict period.

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4. To address the sector challenges, the Government of Rwanda prepared a sector strategy with the twin objectives of completing a Utility turn-around while establishing a sound policy and regulatory basis for future growth and development. In the near term, the transition strategy was centered on addressing the power shortage by investing in thermal generation and improving the performance of Electrogaz, the main sector utility. In the longer term, the Government intended to establish policies and institutional frameworks that would create incentives for development of indigenous energy resources, sustainable and efficient performance of sector entities, increased electricity access and an enhanced flow of investments, both from development partners and from the private sector.

5. As part of the immediate strategy, Electrogaz, was placed under a five-year management contract in 2003 with a mandate to restructure the company prior to partial or full privatization. However, with the increasing pressure on the new management team from the ongoing crisis, the intended results were not materializing fast enough and the Government terminated the contract in 2005. To continue the internal corporate reforms started under the management contract, the Government opted to hire a highly experienced Rwandan manager from the private sector (previously executive in a leading cell phone company). The combination of local private sector experience and increased government ownership at the highest level, accelerated the corporate reform momentum and resulted in a marked improvement in corporate finances and operational performance during the project implementation period. In parallel with the reforms within the Utility, an independent regulator, the Rwanda Utility Regulatory Agency (RURA), was established to provide regulatory oversight to the electricity market and provide the foundations for a level playing field, allowing for much needed private sector investment, especially in power generation.

Rationale for Bank Involvement 6. As a key partner to the governments energy strategy and reform program in the years

preceding the 2004 energy crisis (under the Energy Sector Rehabilitation and Urban Waste Management Project - IDA Cr. 24560, closed 2001; and the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project - IDA Cr. 34990, April 2001-ongoing), the World Bank was uniquely positioned to support the GoR in financing the immediate and long term actions necessary to address the urgent energy challenge. By 2004, the Bank’s engagement in the sector was limited to TA financing for the Electrogaz management contract and startup support to the Rwandan Utility Regulatory Commission (RURA). The severe supply shortages triggered by drought conditions had exposed Rwanda’s increasing vulnerability to supply side disruptions and made it abundantly clear that the sector required additional investment financing to limit the impact on the over-all economy.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

7. To eliminate the load-shedding, it was decided to rehabilitate the national grid, focusing on the main growth center of Kigali, and invest in added thermal (petroleum based) electricity generation to rapidly increase the available power supply and provide much needed diversification from the dependency on hydro resources. In addition, to strengthen sector capacity and enable Rwanda develop a long term strategy for domestic and regional energy supply, staff in the Utility and Infrastructure Ministry needed to be trained and paired with

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international experts to accelerate reform of the Energy sector, improve the ability to plan for future development and open the sector to private sector investments in additional generation resources.

8. The overall development objectives of the project were to: (i) alleviate power shortages; and (ii) enhance the capabilities of energy sector institutions. Key performance indicators toward these objectives were: (i) reduction in outages; (ii) a revised power sector framework, promoting private sector participation".

9. The original output indicators were: (i) reduction in load shedding outages (average

cumulative outages per month over the year) from 4500 hours/year to 2000hours/year; (ii) revised power sector framework promoting private sector participation by having a revised electricity law and (iii) increased billing to supply ratio from 75% to 98%.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

10. The Project Development objectives were not changed during the project implementation;

however one of the output indicator targets for “increased billing to supply ratio” was revised down from 98% to a more realistic 84% at the mid-term review reflecting revised sector data and progress on loss reduction (the previous target figure is believed to have been an error during appraisal).

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 11. The project’s direct beneficiaries are the electricity customers; in particular the productive

sector, which would benefit from increased grid supply, reduced load shedding, better quality of service, and reduced need for expensive back-up generators. The 2008 Investment Climate Assessment stated that 340 Rwandan private enterprises identified Infrastructure, or the lack of it, as the primary barrier to growth including quality of services in Electricity, Transportation and Telecom sectors all among the top 10 constraints.

12. The Bank also had the opportunity of making a quick and significant contribution to the country’s growth and poverty reduction goals by addressing the urgent energy challenge, and laying foundations for the sector’s orderly and sustainable development. Increased power supply with improved reliability would facilitate higher economic growth and thus benefit the population at large. It would also contribute to the over-all perception of the country as a viable investment destination for local, regional and international investors sending the message that the immediate post conflict period was successfully concluded and the economy set for sustainable growth.

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1.5 Original Components

13. Component A: Power System Reinforcement (Total US$24.15 m, - IDA US$18 m; NDF

US$6m; Electrogaz US$0.15m)- This component supported the project objective of alleviating power shortages and improving quality of power supply in the existing Electrogaz network and comprised of three sub components.

A.1 Generation 14. This component consisted (i) Additional thermal generating units, in two stages, totaling to

about 12.5 MW [the first stage, procurement for approx. 5 MW and depending on demand growth patterns, loss reduction and load management options, and progress in Lake Kivu project development, a second 5 to 7.5 MW]; and (ii) rehabilitation of about 2 MW potential in small, run-of river hydroelectric units, or any of their existing generation units.

A.2 Transmission (funded by NDF) 15. The investments in transmission included rehabilitation of existing sub-stations and lines,

reconfiguration of the evacuation lines from the Sinelac and SNEL stations; and additional transmission lines including those required to connect to small hydro units and a new gas-based power plant.

A.3. Distribution 16. This subcomponent comprised of rehabilitation of priority Electrogaz distribution network,

and some line extensions in the urban and peri-urban areas.

17. Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (Total US$4.05 m -IDA US$4 m; GOR US$0.05) - This component financed studies required for policy/program development of Rwanda Utility Regulation Agency and Electrogaz including training for MININFRA, RURA, and Electrogaz’ personnel.

B.1 Project Implementation 18. This sub-component supported the staffing, consultant services, and operational costs of the

Project Coordination Unit. B.2 Institutional Strengthening of ELECTROGAZ 19. This sub-component was intended to provide technical assistance and training to

ELECTROGAZ in the following areas: (i) support for establishment of a computer based financial management system; (ii) engineering and procurement planning; and (iii) priority training needs.

B.3 Institutional Strengthening of Other Agencies 20. This sub-component supported Policy/Program development and institutional strengthening

of Department of Energy in the Ministry of Infrastructure and RURA. The key area of support included: (i) development of the new legislation and regulations including for the rural electrification; and (ii) training of the Department of Energy, in energy and

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environmental economics and policy, rural and renewable energy, regulation, etc.; and RURA, in development and application of regulations, etc.

21. Component C: Domestic Resource Development & Efficient Utilization: (Total US$3.05 m -

IDA US$3m; GOR US$0.05m). The component supported preparation of feasibility studies for development of domestic hydro and methane gas generation resources including technical support to development & implementation of good carbonization practices and use of improved stoves for efficient utilization of available biomass resources in Rwanda.

C.1 Development of Future Hydroelectric Project 22. Preparation of required pre-feasibility/feasibility studies for the next increment of

hydroelectric power for meeting the future energy demand of system. C.2 Efficient Utilization of Biomass Resources 23. Field demonstrations and training in improved carbonization (charcoal making process) and

use of efficient stoves. C.3 Micro-hydro Based Independent Grids 24. Technical assistance to prepare business plans and implementation arrangements, and

procurement of goods and services for the installation of three priority independent grids.

1.6 Revised Components

25. The original project components were not revised nor were the objectives of the components

changed. However some of the activities (in component C especially) were dropped from the project financing and instead covered under the Government’s budget to allow for scale-up of the financing within the core outcomes of alleviating power shortages, and enhancing the implementation and the capabilities of energy sector institutions as detailed below.

26. DCA Amendment of December 2, 2005 was made to: (i) increase the capacity of thermal

generation to 20MW and (ii) enhance capacity building activities, project implementation and contract supervision. These two changes resulted into reallocation of funds among the original components as follows:

Component A1 Generation was significantly scaled-up to cover the additional costs

associated with the decision to procure a larger size thermal plant capable of producing 20MW (compared to the 12.5MW initially foreseen at appraisal). The power plant was increased in size at the request of the borrower following a reassessment of the generation requirement to meet growing demand and well aligned with the objective of UERP as a fast track operation to alleviate power shortages. s. To accommodate these changes subcomponents C1 and C3 were dropped from the project and instead covered under the Government of Rwanda’s development budget (supported in part by the PRSC/PRSG program). In addition, the GoR agreed to significantly increase the co-financing for the said component A1 by approximately USD 10 million.

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Component A2 Transmission (funded by NDF) was also significantly scaled-up to cover the additional costs of more extensive works in the substations and including an additional one substation (Mashyuza). NDF contribution increased from EUR 5 million (USD 6.5 million) to EUR 7.5 million (USD 10.86 million.

To further increase the project’s impact on the core objective of alleviating power shortages it was decided to add investments to improve demand side efficiency by procuring 400,000 energy saving light bulbs or compact fluorescent lights (CFLs) estimated to save between 10-15MW of peak demand when fully distributed to households.

Owing to persistent capacity constraints, Component B was scaled up to increase financing to undertake additional training for the ministry, government agencies and the national Utility Electrogaz.

1.7 Other Significant Changes 27. Major Project Changes are described in section 1.6 above. These were approved through the

following actions (for details see table 1 below) :

(i) December 2,2005 - DCA Amendment (ii) September 27, 2007 – Reallocation of credit proceeds (iii) July 5, 2009 – Reallocation of credit proceeds and Extension of the closing date to

from July 31st 2009 to April 30th, 2010.

Table 1: UER Project Reallocations

Category Original

allocation (SDR)

Dec 2, 2005 Reallocation

(SDR)

Sept 27, 2007 Reallocation

(SDR)

July 5, 2009 Reallocation

(SDR)

(1) Supply and Installation of network and generation equipment (prev. Works)

2,670,000 11,510,000 13,000,000 14,100,000(2) Goods 9,340,000 500,000 600,000 500,000

(3) Consultants’ services, Including Audits 3,070,000 3,070,000 2,000,000 1,300,000

(4) Training, Workshops and Study Tours 140,000 316,000 450,000 450,000

(5) Incremental Operating Costs 140,000 140,000 650,000 350,000(6) Unallocated 0 1,164,000 0 0 TOTAL 16,700,000 16,700,000 16,700,000 16,700,000

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 28. Quality at Entry Assessment- The project was designed as a “fast track” operation expected

to deliver the much needed incremental generation as fast as possible to stem the supply

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deficit. A Project Concept Review was held on held on July 20, 2004 and recommended that the urgency of the project’s core energy investments mandated a simple design. The financial weakness of the power sector, the potential for backsliding on reform, and the possibility of delays in implementation were identified as major risks. The QER found several strong mitigating factors to these risks including (i) project’s coherence with the GoR’s power sector strategy and the CAS, (ii) a high quality economic and technical analysis underpinning the project design; (iii) the Borrower’s commitment and political will to undertake major sector reform.; and (iv) a competent project preparation team backed by country and sector management.

29. Satisfactory Background Analysis -Key lessons from the previous energy projects in Rwanda

and elsewhere focused on the readiness of stakeholders for the project as well as design and implementation simplicity. These key lessons were incorporated in the project design as summarized below.

(a) Commitment of Government and Other Stakeholders. MINECOFIN took the lead in overseeing project preparation, with core support from MININFRA and Electrogaz, which ensured deep engagement in all aspects of project preparation. The Government showed its commitment to addressing the sector challenges by allocating of their scarce financial resources for the purchase of the initial 12.6 MW of diesel capacity and by initiating a process of revising tariff levels based on a cost recovery model. (b) Simple Design and Implementation Arrangements to facilitate Project Execution and to Enhance Sustainability. This lesson was especially important given the limited implementation capacity in the sector at large and especially within the ailing Utility Electrogaz, the project Implementation agency. It was decided to quickly establish a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) within the Utility with adequate staffing and resources to drive the project activities in close cooperation with relevant Utility departments. (c) Advance Preparatory Activities to Minimize Delays. Bidding documents for initial Electrogaz investments were prepared, and the procurement process commenced, well before effectiveness. The PCU was established well before effectiveness. (d) Alternatives to include other components within the project scope, such as utility water investments and expanded electrification of households were considered but rejected taking into account other parallel initiatives supporting the water supply investments and the severe supply constraints limiting the impact of a national rural electrification program. Instead, the project was designed to include the TA and capacity building to prepare a framework for future investments in new grid extensions.

30. Assessment of Risks - Overall the project risk was rated as substantial at appraisal. Several risk

factors were assessed and mitigation measures considered as follows:

(a) Electrogaz’ Financial Position does not Improve. This was assessed as substantial and an up-front agreement was reached with GoR with respect to the following actions: (i) fuel cost pass-through and cost recovery tariff revision to be implemented; (ii) management contract revisions to provide incentives for improvement of Utility finances;

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and (iii) implementation of approved business plan. The risk never materialized as GoR moved decisively during early stages of project implementation to address the revenue shortfall by increasing the tariff in two major increments. The fuel cost fluctuations, initially foreseen as a fuel cost pass-through component, was decided to be absorbed by government budget as a transparent subsidy transfer.

(b) Electrogaz Management. The risk was assessed as low. The GoR agreed to maintain the

Electrogaz management contract with LI. Contractual changes were subject to Bank approval. This risk materialized during project implementation as the LI management contract was terminated. To continue the reform process underway, the government in dialogue with the WB energy team, opted to recruit a strong Rwandan management team with experience from both public and private sector. The results are evident in the improved performance of the Utility during the implementation period.

(c) Slow Implementation Progress due to Weak Capacity. This risk was rated as substantial

at appraisal. A strong PCU was established up-front in addition to undertaking procurement for the initial investments before project effectiveness. The Bank maintained dialog with Government during project supervision and through the PRSC process. However, there were delays in the initial phase of project implementation attributed to lack of experience with Bank procurement procedures which led to the bidding documents for the initial investments being revised. This impacted the overall project implementation period by about 18 months. Some of these teething problems could have been averted with additional TA and more intensive training of the PCU in Bank procedures during the first months of project implementation.

(d) Disruption in Supply of Petroleum Products-was assessed as substantial and the project design included construction of on-site storage facilities to provide a buffer for delivery delays. These Fuel storage facilities were built (and existing storage rehabilitated) during project implementation by the GoR using own funds. The vulnerability of Rwandan’s petroleum product supply was severely felt during the Kenya post-election violence in 2008 when the Eldoret fuel terminal in western Kenya was closed for an extended period of time leading to fuel shortages and price increases in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

2.2 Implementation 31. The project was designed as a “fast track” operation expected to deliver the much needed

incremental generation as fast as possible to stem the supply deficit. The overall project implementation progress was gradually improving, following significant initial teething problems including a 9-month effectiveness delay and slow initial disbursements due to changing government priorities1 and in one instance lack of supplier response to the issued tenders. A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was created to facilitate project implementation.

1 Increase in Generating capacity for the power plant and changes in scope of grid rehabilitation tenders to prioritize among others a new main substation for the Kigali area. The decisions eventually improved the outcomes of the project

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The PCU had the overall oversight responsibility for the full project implementation and regularly reported to a Steering Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. Subsequent to the generation needs assessment, the project was restructured in December 2005 to increase the capacity of emergency thermal generation.

32. The Rwandan government moved swiftly to address the immediate challenges by renting additional diesel generation capacity in 2006 (15MW) and to increase tariffs by more than 100 percent, to about US$0.21/kWh. By contrast, average retail tariffs in the rest of the region are around US$0.10-0.16/kWh. Due to the already high tariff levels the government opted to subsidize some of the cost of rental power by allocating annual budget transfers for fuel purchases starting with the 2006 budget year.

33. Mid-term Review (MTR). A midterm review of the project was completed in April 2008. The preliminary review findings highlighted the improved implementation performance of the project following a slow start. Project funds had been committed to over 90% with a significantly improved disbursement rate reaching 63% of the IDA funds. The project was deemed to be on track to achieve the development objectives by project completion in July 2009. The mid-term review identified a number of suggested improvements to achieve better results, especially in institutional capacity building and M&E aspects, these are summarized below:

RURA: The effort to build capacity with the regulator was considered especially urgent

considering the new Electricity and Gas laws expected to be approved by Parliament during the year. The legislation provides a clear mandate for the regulator to over-see the sector. However, with the current staffing and limited experience in Energy regulatory affairs, RURA was deemed unlikely to be able to fully carry out this mandate without considerable outside assistance. The MTR therefore recommended that additional resources be allocated to the regulator to build capacity to enable staff to fully apply the new legal and regulatory structure. The project addressed this by financing additional training for an entire class of RURA and sector staff, led by the Public Utility Research Center (PURC), at the University of Florida.

UERP Project Coordination Unit (PCU): The MTR recognized the significant project

management capacity built up in the UERP PCU during the 3 years of UERP implementation. Experience in project management and procurement of infrastructure investments are essential to maintain the accelerating pace of sector development. The Mission suggested that Electrogaz and the ministry of infrastructure establish strategy for how the PCU resources can be mainstreamed into existing organizational structures. In particular, Electrogaz would require a dedicated unit for project implementation and contract supervision to over-see the execution of the grid roll-out program identified within the SWAp. The advice was fully mainstreamed in the design of the Rwandan Electricity Access Scale-up and SWAp development project as the project is implemented by a dedicated project management department within the Utility, benefiting from the experience built within UERP to enable the Utility to manage a major infrastructure roll-out program using Utility, GoR and donor funds.

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M&E arrangements: The MTR reviewed the progress, the relevance and usefulness of the M&E framework and possible adjustment to improve quality of implementation. Although the different data identified in the M&E plan was regularly collected by the team or participating organizations there seems to be limited use of this data for management of the project. The findings were taken into account when designing the SWAp that heavily emphasize the role of regular monitoring of progress as a key tool to project over-sight and steering. (Specific proposals on change of indicators are discussed in section 2.3 below.)

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 34. M&E Design. The project design contained a number of very specific performance indicators.

These indicators covered both institutional development related to the management of the sector, as well as project outcomes and outputs, such as reduction in load shedding, billing to supply ratio, technical outages, revised power sector framework, etc. The indicators were appropriate and suitable as indicators towards the PDO and hence could easily be used to evaluate the project performance. The MTR recommended considering revising the technical performance indicators to reflect international standards for service quality and reliability of supply (IEEE - SAIDI, SAIFI). This recommendation was not implemented due to the limited ability of the Utility to generate the required data to measure the more sophisticated performance indicators proposed in the report. The recommendations were instead adopted as longer term strategic objectives for the Utility to develop its ability for data acquisitioning and apply in future management information systems (MIS).

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 35. The project complied with the identified safeguard policies (OP 4.01 and 4.12 at both

preparation and implementation phases. A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) were prepared and publicly disclosed by the Government and the Bank. The RPF and ESMF provided the framework under which project investment would address social issues in conformance with Government and World Bank requirements. Environmental Management Plans and Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans were prepared for the Jabana thermal plant, the Birembo substation and the distribution rehabilitation component. The Jabana HFO plant is equipped with excellent pollution control and safety measures, particularly the state-of-the-art Wartsila water treatment system, which renders the plant waste water clean enough for use on agricultural fields, (and if treated for bacteria, safe enough for human consumption). There are also measures put in place for fuel waste treatment and disposal. The fire prevention and response system is well-designed and supplements that of the city of Kigali. Mitigatory measures were sought to limit the plant noise pollution toan acceptable level for the benefit of the people living in the plant proximity (e.g. tree plantation to establish a buffer zone). The Birembo substation is built to international standards of safety and pollution control. Fire protection measures and drainage facilities (ditches and three septic tanks) are well-constructed and maintained. Gasabo district substations- visits to several of the Gasabo district substations again demonstrated that safety measures, including anti-climbing devices and fencing, were effective. EMPs covered the environmental impacts of associated

11

transmission lines. Resettlement and compensation of Project Affected Persons was completed satisfactorily.

36. The project’s financial management performance was rated moderately satisfactory mainly

due to late submission of the fiduciary and audit reports such as the financial management reports. This problem can be partly linked to scarce human resources especially in the project accounting and procurement areas due to high staff turn-over. Most trained staff repeatedly left for better paying assignments outside the Utility.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 37. The turn-around of the Rwandan Electricity sector, made possible in part by the IDA UERP

credit, has put an end to power shortages. In addition, it has created the foundation for the National Electricity Access Roll-out Program (NERP), agreed between the Government of Rwanda and the development partners in March 2009. The program aims to triple access to electricity in Rwanda to reach 350,000 customers (from a base of a mere 110,000) by 2013. The IDA Board of directors approved in October 2009 a US$70 million equivalent credit for investments made towards the objectives set forth in the NERP in the Electricity Access Scale-up and SWAp Development Project.

38. Project sustainability is judged satisfactory, with project investments yielding significant positive returns and expected to attain their projected useful lifetime. The project’s emphasis on technical assistance and capacity building support has strengthened sector performance and policy implementation as evidenced by increased budget execution and improved utility performance.

39. The sector has emerged from a period of supply shortages, helped by better-than-average

rainfall and additional base-load thermal generation. A number of new generation projects are under various stages of development, many utilizing lower cost indigenous energy sources (see graph below). These projects include the Rukarara Hydropower station (9.5 MW commissioned December 2010), and the Nyabarongo Hydropower station (27.5 MW, 2013). Together, the projects account for a more than 70 percent increase in national generation capacity installed, and are adequate to supply the incremental demand from the increased access program and medium term load growth. In addition, following development of the Lake Kivu Methane Gas Resource Pilot Plant producing 1.8 MW since October 2008, the GoR recently signed a power purchase agreement with a private sponsor, Contour Global, to develop 100 MW of electricity generation in two phases. The first 25 MW plant may be in operation by early 2012. In the longer term, the increased regional integration of the regional power market under the auspices of the East-Africa Power Pool (EAPP) will enable Rwanda to import power from its neighbors to bridge supply deficits.

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Figure 1: Generation Expansion—From Supply Shortage to System Expansion

Source: Castalia Consulting Group,. March 2009. “National Electricity Access Program Investment Prospectus.”

For ESMAP, Washington, DC: The World Bank,

40. The policy, regulatory, and private sector development initiatives advanced by the GoR and

its line ministry MININFRA are by and large moving the sector in the right direction. Notably, several laws have been approved that together define the emerging sector structure and institutional framework, including the GoR’s policy to increase private sector investments primarily in generation (IPP and PPP structures for large-scale hydro and methane gas) and off-grid electricity distribution. Besides the Electricity and Gas Laws, other key reform initiatives include: (i) unbundling of the national monopoly and the vertically integrated utility, Electrogaz (RECO), into separate electricity and water parastatals. The two separate Water and Electricity successor utilities, RWASCO and RECO will in the next step of the reform be integrated within the Electricity, Water and Sanitation Authority (ESWA); (ii) Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) - enabling law has been enacted and RURA set up with a mandate for independent oversight of telecoms, electricity, and water sectors. Efforts under way to strengthen the capacity of RURA in the electricity subsector aim to position the sector for growth and increase direct investment in power generation, both domestic and foreign.

41. The Energy Efficiency program initiated under the project to promote the use of efficient lights (CFLs) was designed to be self-financing in the long term using the carbon finance revenues from the avoided emissions and aims to finance another approximately 300,000 lamps for distribution to new customers. The Carbon Finance transaction underpinned by the CFL program was Rwanda’s first active participation in the CDM process under the Kyoto protocol. CFL distribution has been fully mainstreamed within the National Electricity Access Program (NEAP) to ensure that all new consumers benefit from 3-4 CFLs as part of their meter installation package to reduce consumption and increase affordability of the program.

0

50

100

150

200

250

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Insta

lled

Cap

acit

y (

MW

)

System Expansion

Emergency Capacity

Existing Supply

Forecast Demand (t+1)

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42. Adoption of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) – The government has not only been

committed to addressing the energy crisis but has also moved on harmonization of sector financing through a programmatic approach. There is a strong partnership among key Development Partners in Rwanda’s energy sector. The sector is coordinated through a Sector Wide Approach, with regular meetings of the sector working group. A spatial least-cost electricity investment program and financing prospectus have been prepared and formed the basis of support to the Bank follow-on project: “the Electricity Access Scale-up and Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) Development Project”.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 43. The project development objective remained fully relevant to Rwanda’s development

priorities consistent with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Bank’s CAS. This is also demonstrated by IDA’s subsequent approval of new operations in the power sector (the Sustainable Energy Development Project and the Electricity Access Scale-up and Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) Development Project) which build on project achievements.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 44. The achievement of the PDO with respect to improving the power supply objective is rated

Satisfactory. The project outputs led to improved system reliability and increased installed capacity. The project contributed to addressing the severe power shortages in Rwanda by financing the construction of a new 20 MW power plant (Jabana HFO Power Plant) as well the upgrading and rehabilitation of the transmission grid. The UERP investments contributed to improve the supply and eliminate load shedding with electricity supply increasing from 41MW in 2004 to 75MW in 2010 and load shedding reducing from approximately 50% at peak hours in 2004 to 0% in April 2009.

Component A: Power System Reinforcement 45. The results/outcomes achieved by the power system reinforcement are overall rated as

Highly Satisfactory. The Project development objective to alleviate power supply shortages was attained and even surpassed with the additional investments and rental generation brought on-line by government resources during the project period. Investments in the transmission and distribution have contributed to a reduction of technical system outages and losses reduction of about 9 percentage points by the project close (25% to 16%) in addition to improved revenue collection with the billing to supply ratio at about 84% from about 72%.

Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 46. The results/outcomes achieved by component are rated Satisfactory. The component has

contributed to institutional changes and practices, including (i) improved sector budget execution; (ii) the enactment of the new electricity law and (iii) implementation of a realistic and adequate tariff structure.

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Component C: Domestic Resource Development & Efficient Utilization 47. The results/outcomes achieved by the component are rated Satisfactory. Advisory services

funded by the UERP assisted the government of Rwanda to develop the initial 4 MW methane gas fired pilot plant and to conclude negotiations on the country’s first private sector owned and operated power plant (100MW)2, using domestic methane gas from Lake Kivu. The involvement of the private sector will bring much needed technical expertise to develop Rwanda’s indigenous gas resource as well as significant flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) capital to reduce the burden on the country’s budget (first 25 MW phase of project is expected to attract up to USD100 million in FDI). Another development benefiting from the project’s general capacity building and funding of advisory services is the government’s recent agreement with India Exim bank to finance the construction of the Nyabarongo (27 MW) hydropower plant expected to be commissioned early 2012.

3.3 Efficiency 48. The economic analysis of the project is detailed in Annex 3. Table 2 shows the economic

internal rate of return (EIRR) and the NPVs estimated during project appraisal as reflected in the PAD and at the time of the preparation of this ICR. The result shows that the project is still economically viable and has contributed to improve the economic welfare in Rwanda.

Table 2: ERR and Project Economic NPV for Component A

EIRR NPV at 10% discount rate

PAD 12.8% US$ 11.9 million ICR 11.5% US$ 2.8 million

49. The slight decrease in the ex-post EIRR and economic NPV from the initial assessment

mainly reflects a combination of the following factors: (i) increased HFO cost from US$0.097 to US$0.148 due to the rise in crude oil prices over the period, which added to the economic cost; and (ii) the removal of avoided fuel cost from the economic benefit because of the changing funding source. However, the assumptions adopted in this analysis are conservative and therefore estimates presented represent a floor of the possible net economic benefits materialized.

2 The Project will initially add 25MW generation capacity, and potentially an additional 75MW at a later stage. The initial phase of 25MW MIGA PRG covering US$95 million of the (equity/shareholder loan) of the deal capex of US$140million was approved by the Bank Board March 31,2011 and signed May 4,2011.

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3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 50. The UERP was designed to address the three core challenges in the energy sector - adjusting

the physical and financial shortfalls in the power sector, strengthening the capacity of sector institutions, and initiating the preparation for the development of locally available energy resources, at a lower cost than fuel imports, for development of a long term sustainable power sector. As evident in the preceding paragraphs, the Rwanda Energy sector has made significant strides to address these challenges during the project implementation period. The project thus had a clear strategic relevance by directly supporting Rwanda's economic transformation and poverty reduction strategy described in the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

51. All the project components are rated Satisfactory and the project has met its objectives of

alleviating power shortages and enhancing the capabilities of energy sector institutions. The Borrower’s capacity to manage development in the sector has been strengthened as evidenced from the fact that a regulatory environment conducive to attracting private investments into the sector is in place; and measures have been taken to ensure sustainability for future operations of the various activities among which are the sector development, maintenance and operation of the project outputs, system loss reduction and development of local resources. Following the institutional set up and enacting of the new electricity law and by adopting cost reflective tariffs, the sector is positioned to be financially self reliant in the long term. Advisory services also assisted the Government of Rwanda to conclude negotiations on the country’s first private sector owned and operated power plant (25MW), using domestic methane gas from Lake Kivu. The involvement of the private sector will bring much needed technical expertise to develop Rwanda’s indigenous gas resource as well as significant flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) capital to reduce the burden on the country’s budget.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 52. Because of the relationship between power supply, economic development and poverty

alleviation, the project intended to contribute to the reduction of poverty by removing one of the most significant obstacles to the country’s economic development, namely the limited and unreliable electricity supply. The UERP project has positively affected everyday life in Rwanda, especially in urban areas, by helping to eliminate the power cuts affecting thousands of households every evening for hours on end. The elimination of wide spread power cuts has also enabled businesses to increase their competitiveness as they no longer have to operate costly diesel generator sets and increased the attractiveness of Rwanda as an investment destination. It is likely that the project contributed to poverty alleviation. The sharp tariff increases experienced during the project implementation period would have been even more pronounced without the project’s dual focus on increased generation using least cost HFO technology and improved efficiency (reducing losses and accelerating uptake of CFLs).

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(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 53. The sector regulatory framework put in place has enabled GoR to leverage budget resources

with private investments to accelerate development of local energy resources. This in the long term will not only lead to increased inflow of FDI and free up budgetary resources for social sectors but will also assure the sustainability of the sector in providing least cost reliable power supply.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 54. The CFL program was not initially in the project design, but was later included as a quick

impact energy efficiency program intervention. The project supported procurement of 400,000 bulbs which translated into a power demand reduction of about 15MW. This intervention had a multi-thronged impact by: (i) deferring the generation investment of equivalent power supply; and (ii) increased affordability especially to poor households whose main use of electricity is lighting. Acknowledging the impact and success of the program, the utility has continued to aggressively promote of CFLs using its own funds and advance payment on carbon finance revenues.

55. The turn-around of the Rwandan Electricity sector, made possible in part by the IDA UERP

credit, has put an end to power shortages. It has also created the foundation for the National Electricity Access Roll-out Program (NERP), agreed between the Government of Rwanda and the development partners in March 2009. The program aims to triple access to electricity in Rwanda to reach 350,000 customers (from a base of a mere 110,000) by 2013. The IDA Board of directors approved in October 2009 a US$70 million equivalent credit for investments made towards the objectives set forth in the NERP in the Electricity Access Scale-up and SWAp Development Project.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 56. The Borrower conducted a stakeholder survey at the project close and interviewed some of

the key stakeholders. Most of the interviewed key stakeholders were satisfied with the improvements in the quality and quantity of electricity supply.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Low 57. The risk to the Development Outcome of this operation is rated as Low. With regard to the

power supply objective, it is clear that the project has supported installation of generation and transmission facilities that will sustain power supply reliability over the long term. Further, measures are being taken to diversify and increase power generation to mitigate both the risks posed by the variability of the hydrology and petroleum prices by focusing on the Lake Kivu methane gas. The GoR assigns a high priority to a stable and growing power sector in supporting its economic development programs, and the Bank and other development partners are presently funding several substantial new operations in the sector, including institutional support for sector strengthening and development.

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58. Other risk factors related to the sector development components are also rated Low. Institutional changes are already implemented such as unbundling of Electrogaz into RECO and RWASCO and the further proposed set up of EWSA in addition to enhancing performance of the Regulatory Agency.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 59. The Bank's performance in the identification, preparation, and appraisal of the project was

judged to be Moderately Satisfactory. At the concept stage, the prioritization of the Bank funded activities was done within the context of the sector situation that required urgent intervention measures to reduce the power shortages at the same time laying a foundation for future investments in the sector. Thus, the simple design and implementation arrangements to ease implementation and enhance sustainability that took into consideration the weak capacity of the implementing agency. During preparation and appraisal, the Bank took into account technical, financial, economic, and fiduciary concerns, including procurement and financial management aspects. A number of alternatives were also considered for the project design. To respond to the urgency of the supply crisis, the project preparation and appraisal was completed in the shortest possible time (about 5 months). The assignment was carried out with an adequate number of specialists who provided the technical skill mix necessary to address sector concerns and project design issues. The Bank provided adequate resources, in terms of staff weeks and budget, to ensure quality preparation and appraisal work and maintained a good working relationship with the Borrower during preparation and appraisal. Considering the urgency of the needs to be addressed by the project and the subsequent slow start of project implementation that included several changes in the scope works, it is evident that the high pace of project preparation affected the quality of the investment identification process, and the borrower’s ability to correctly analyze the investment options available. This was instead done during the first 12 months of implementation, and while improving the overall outcomes of the IDA credit, delayed the arrival of the results by at least 12-18 months.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 60. The project was well supervised by a stable Bank team, consisting of multi-disciplinary

members, and without significant changes in team composition throughout implementation. Supervision teams were supported by specialists for addressing specific issues which had been identified. Issues which could affect project implementation were identified in a timely manner, documented, and brought to the attention of management. The initial teething problems experienced during the project start-up in 2005 and 2006 were addressed by increasing team implementation support and by the stationing of a World Bank energy specialist from 2007-2010 in the Rwanda country office to lead the project for the remainder of the implementation period. The decentralization of TTL responsibilities to the field with

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the previous DC based TTL providing continuous team support during an extended period can be seen as an example of effective decentralization with excellent development outcomes.

61. Financial Management supervision has been satisfactory and the adequacy of financial

management arrangements has been reviewed regularly with a close follow up of the quality of the FM reports and implementation of recommendations of external audits. Safeguards policies were specifically monitored and addressed, and the team worked with the relevant agencies to help ensure environmental and social due diligence, inter alia through the implementation of the RPF and ESMF. The quality and candor of supervision reports was good, including reporting on the outcome indicators.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 62. The overall Bank performance was Satisfactory. Adequate teams and resources were fielded

during the preparation, appraisal and supervision. The continued Bank engagement and support resulted in additional financing through follow up operations for Increased Electricity Access Scale-up and SWAp development project and the GEF/AFREA Sustainable Energy Development Project, focusing on development of renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory 63. Government commitment to the main development objective was strong from the outset with

GoR providing considerable financing from their scarce resources towards co-financing of the power plant investment in addition to the financing of rental power and corresponding sector subsidies to mitigate the high cost of generation. Perhaps even more significantly the government of Rwanda moved proactively to address one of the most difficult challenges to project success, the inadequate tariff levels, by rapidly moving to near full cost recovery. The GoR took these steps in recognition of the detrimental effect the growing recurrent subsidies to Electrogaz had on the country’s finances, effectively crowding out spending on priority development and reform programs. The government also played a decisive role in developing long term sustainable domestic energy supply options by being an active partner with the private sector in the development of Kivu Gas resource and by driving the development of remaining regional and domestic hydro resources.

64. The project steering committee, comprised of Senior GoR officials, provided the necessary implementation oversight, ensuring that emerging issues requiring GoR action were addressed. Overall, GoR demonstrated a satisfactory level of ownership and commitment to the successful completion of the project.

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(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 65. Project Supervision Assessments have judged the implementation capacity of the PCU as

adequate. The PCU had the overall oversight responsibility for the full project implementation. The PCU showed strong leadership in supervising and ensuring successful execution of the investment components including the construction of the Jabana HFO plant, among the largest and most complex infrastructure investments in the country to date. However there was continued weak capacity in aspects related financial management, environmental safeguards and M&E. The MTR noted that the finance unit was inadequately staffed with limited or no segregation of duties. In addition, supervision missions noted delays in submission of safeguard reports, fiduciary and audit reports such as FMRs and slow payment of individual consultants hired under the project. Part of the reason for the lackluster performance in this regard was the high staff turn-over due to increased competition for key project staff in new donor and government funded projects. PCU had difficulties producing acceptable EIA and EMPs reports for the investment activities and had to be supported to finalize the various reports in the last year of project implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory 66. The overall Borrower performance is rated as Satisfactory. Commitment of the government

to the project objectives was strong as evidenced from the difficult actions undertaken including increasing electricity tariffs significantly and commitment of the scarce public resources. However, there was mixed performance during implementation mainly due to capacity constraints at the implementing agency level.

6. Lessons Learned 67. Supply side and demand side should be tackled together to enhance outcomes. Electricity

shortages need to be addressed from both supply side (generation) and demand side (energy efficiency) as they complement each other. The agreed changes to the UER project scope added significant energy efficiency components to the project design further increasing the development impact. By suppressing the demand increase through energy efficiency measures, the project created sufficient breathing room to allow Rwanda to emerge from the energy crisis and allow the GOR to develop long term sustainable power supply based on domestically available resources (Rukarara and Nyabarongo HPPs, Lake Kivu methane Gas).

68. Early acknowledgement of shortfalls in project design and proactivity can ensure realism. Projects, like the UERP, that are designed to meet urgent needs arising from macro shocks or unforeseen breakdowns (in this case regional drought conditions) need to be delivered as fast as possible while recognizing that the optimal solutions and design might evolve during the initial implementation period as the borrower’s analysis of the crisis evolve. In UERP, the Government and the WB energy team recognized this and took a pragmatic view to the shortcomings in initial project design related to capacity forecasts and quickly agreed to

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increase the thermal generation capacity from 12.5MW to 20MW to be able to cover the generation gap requirements, further increasing the projects development impact.

69. Decentralization of Project Supervision: In countries and sectors with limited experience and institutional capacity, the World Bank group can provide considerable value added by decentralizing project supervision and implementation support resources to country offices. The proximity of the project TTL to the PCU considerably accelerated the pace of implementation and disbursement of funds while further leveraging the results towards new Bank operations.

70. Realism in Project Implementation Planning. The Bank as well as borrowers should be realistic about the time it takes to initiate and complete project activities, taking into account the implementation capacity of the borrower and the potential technical challenges in project implementation. Labeling a project “Urgent” while responding to a crisis create expectations that can be difficult to manage when procurement activities are slow to advance and results take time to materialize.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Cofinanciers 71. NDF - NDF participation into UERP was designed to complement the IDA activities with

investments in the transmission and distribution system required to evacuate the additional generation, increase reliability and reduce network losses. There were implementation challenges; with the failure of the first procurement attempt due to low quality of substation designs and bidding documents and later implementation delays. In projects where there are co-financed with different procedures different from the Bank, it is important that an early understanding is reached on collaboration during implementation.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders -None.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Power System Reinforcement 19.90 44.34 217 Technical Assistance and Capacity Building

4.10 4.38 122

Domestic Resources 3.0 6.45 16.7

Total Baseline Cost 27.0 55.17 204

Physical Contingencies

2.90

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies

1.40

0.00

0.00 Total Project Costs 31.30 55.17 176

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 31.30 55.17 176

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 0.25 18.62 745 International Development Association (IDA)

25.00 25.69 102

Nordic Development Fund (NDF) 6.50 10.86 167

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component A: Power System Reinforcement A.1 Generation Supply and install 20 MW Thermal Power Plant. The power plant was commissioned April 2009. A.2 Transmission-co financed by NDF Under this component, the following outputs were achieved:

A new 110/15kV Birembo substation in the North of the city of Kigali; Transfer and installation of 110/70 kV autotransformer from the existing substation of JABANA

to BIREMBO substation Rehabilitation works in five 110kV substations (JABANA, KIGOMA, KARONGI, KIBOGORA

and MURURU I).

A.3 Distribution Rehabilitation of the Electricity Distribution Networks-The component activities covered rehabilitation of priority in the distribution network of ELECTROGAZ including line extensions in urban and peripheral urban areas. The investments included construction, upgrading and rehabilitation of the following:

(a) Construction of a Single and Double Circuit Lines- MV: (i) Birembo- Deutch Welle; (ii) Birembo- Remera II and (iii) Birembo-Rubungu-Kimironko-Nyandungu

(b) Rehabilitation of Ring Mains Substation-MV-15KV at the DW, Rubongo, Remera II and KBC (Kimuhura) and a new control panel at Karongi

(c) Installation of 15/0.4KV distributions transformers (tower mounted) at UAAC and Nyabisindu

(d) Construction of low voltage network for consumers in Rubungo. Component B: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building B.1 Project Implementation Support to the PCU- The project financed the following staff positions at the PCU: (i) Project Manager; (ii) Finance Manager; (iii) Project Engineer; (iv) Procurement Specialist; (v) Accountant; (vi) Administrative Officer; and (vii) Other support staff. In addition, the project financed technical assistance for engineering supervision and site management for power system reinforcement. B.2 Institutional Strengthening of ELECTROGAZ- This sub-component provided technical assistance and training to ELECTROGAZ in the following areas: (i) Support for establishment of a computer based financial management system; (ii) Engineering and procurement planning; and (iii) Priority training needs. Under this sub-component of the project the following activities have been performed: (i) Engineering Supervision Firm was recruited; (ii) 400 000 compact fluorescent bulbs were procured; (iii) Chief Finance Officer for ELECTROGAZ ; (iv) Financial Advisor ; (v) A communication program for Promotional Campaign for Energy Saving Lamps was prepared; (vi) Four senior managers are pursued master programs at the school of Finance

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and Banking and (vii) several of the Electricity Department attended short courses in utility operations and management. B.3 Institutional strengthening of other Agencies Technical support and training under this sub-component involved Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) and Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA). It included: (i) Review and revision of existing electricity legislation; (ii) Preparation of new gas legislation; (iii) Preparation of regulations for licensing and pricing; (iv) Training in energy and environmental economics, policy development and execution; (v) Program design for rural and renewable energy; (vi) Development of rules and regulations for review of regulatory matters; and (vii) Development of procedures for monitoring and performance audits. Under this sub-component of the project the following activities have been performed: (i) Drafting of laws and regulations for electricity and gas -approved by Parliament; (ii) Financial/Transaction advisor to MININFRA and (iii) Lake Kivu Monitoring program. Component C- Domestic Resource Development & Efficient Utilization- This sub-component was intended for pre-feasibility/feasibility studies for the next increment of hydroelectric power and efficient utilization of biomass resources. No activities were under this project as MININFRA has chosen other means to finance these activities.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) 1. At the time of appraisal, net economic benefits, in terms of net present value and economic

internal rate of return (EIRR), were estimated for a time slice (2005-2008) of the Electrogaz’s investment program. Given that the investment components have already been materialized ex-post, this section adopts similar methodologies used in the ex-ante economic analysis but applies them for the actualized investment components. Key assumptions and results are discussed below.

Economic Analysis

2. In the PAD, the EIRR and economic NPV (at 10 percent discount rate) of the project were estimated to be 12.8 percent and US$11.9 million respectively. The economic benefits consisted of: (i) incremental demand for electricity served by the Project, (ii) reduction in technical losses, (iii) avoided fuel cost from the use of additional hydropower, and (iv) avoided use of captive power by large consumers. The economic costs were: (i) capital expenditures in the sector in accordance with the Electrogaz’s investment program, (ii) project operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and (iii) fuel costs.

3. Ex-post, a few changes have been made to these components of economic costs and benefits. On the economic cost, instead of assuming capital expenditures sector-wide, the expenditures are limited to those items directly related to the project because components have already been materialized and are identifiable. On the economic benefit, avoided fuel cost from the use of additional hydropower is no longer included because the envisaged studies on large and micro hydropower plant sites were dropped from the project and were supported by other funding sources. Moreover, to be consistent with the treatment of the capital expenditures in economic costs, the economic benefits that derive from the reduction in technical losses are assumed to be a fraction of the entire system losses that has taken place. Because precise data on the extent to which the project has contributed to the technical losses was not available, this is assumed to be the share of the project costs in the overall sector investment costs. Except for these changes, this ex-post economic analysis adopts similar methodologies as was originally done, with updated assumptions attached below. Given that energy efficiency component, which was added to the original project scope, is not included in the project benefit due to data constraints, the results represent a conservative estimate.

4. The EIRR and economic NPV (at 10 percent discount rate) thus calculated are 11.5 percent

and US$ 2.8 million respectively. This result shows that the project is still economically viable and has contributed to improve the economic welfare in Rwanda.

25

Table 1: ERR and Project Economic NPVs for Component A EIRR NPV at 10% discount

rate PAD 12.8% US$ 11.9 million ICR 11.5% US$ 2.8 million

5. The slight decrease in the ex-post EIRR and economic NPV from the initial assessment

mainly reflects a combination of the following factors: (i) increased HFO cost from US$ 0.097 to US$0.148 due to the rise in crude oil prices over the period, which added to the economic cost; and (ii) the removal of avoided fuel cost from the economic benefit because of the changing funding source. However, as noted above, the assumptions adopted in this analysis are conservative and therefore estimates presented represent a floor of the possible net economic benefits materialized.

6. A summary of economic costs and benefits streams as well as the assumptions used are presented below.

Key assumptions: i. Capital expenditures include the investment components supported by the World

Bank and NDF. ii. Operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses are assumed to be 2 percent of the

capital expenditures. This is similar to the proportion assumed in the PAD analysis. iii. Electricity tariffs are assumed to be US$0.19 per kWh on average. This is derived

from the weighted average of the actual industrial and non-industrial electricity tariff levels prevailing in the country since 2006.

iv. Load shedding has improved by 3,395 hours between 2006 and 2009. Due to lack of data, this reduction is assumed to have taken place evenly over four years.

v. Fuel price is assumed based on crude price US$101.16/bbl (as of March 11, 2011), which translates to the HFO price of US$0.15/kWh and diesel price of US$0.28/kWh.

vi. Sector capital expenditures are taken from the Electrogaz/RECO’s purchase of property, plant and equipment between 2006 and 2010. Taking the share of the project capital expenditures in this, the contribution of the project to the entire loss reduction is assumed to be 29 percent.

vii. Based on the historical data, the additional demand served from the Jabana HFO plant per year is assumed to be approximately 75 GWh.

27

Table 1: Summary of Economic Costs and Benefits

CAPEX O&M Fuel Total

Incremental demand served Loss reduction

Avoided fuel cost

Avoided self-generation Total

2006 2.0 0 - 2.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.59 0.6 -1.412007 0.4 0 - 0.4 0.0 0.21 0.0 0.59 0.8 0.402008 17.6 0 - 17.6 0.0 0.45 0.0 0.59 1.0 -16.572009 7.3 0 4.48 11.8 5.7 0.73 0.0 0.59 7.1 -4.732010 4.3 0.6 11.12 16.1 14.2 1.06 0.0 0.00 15.3 -0.802011 0.0 0.6 11.12 11.8 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.482012 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532013 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532014 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532015 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532016 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532017 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532018 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532019 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532020 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532021 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532022 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532023 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532024 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532025 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532026 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532027 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532028 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532029 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532030 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532031 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532032 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532033 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.532034 0 0.6 11.12 11.7 14.2 1.06 0.0 0 15.3 3.53

EIRR 11.5%

NPV@10% 2.80

Benefits

Net BenefitsYear

Costs

28

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending/Supervision/ICR

Otieno Ayany Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Paul Baringanire Senior Energy Specialist AFTEG Noreen Beg Senior Environmental Specialist. AFTEN Fabrice Karl Bertholet Senior Financial Analyst AFTEG Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Malcolm Cosgrove-Davies Lead Energy Specialist SASDE Raihan Elahi Senior Energy Specialist AFTEG Erik Magnus Fernstrom Senior Energy Specialist AFTEG Martin Fodor Senior Environmental Specialist. AFTEN Diego Garrido Martin E T Consultant AFTRL Chandrasekar Govindarajalu Senior Energy Specialist MNSEG Marc L. Heitner Consultant MNSSD Bathilde Jyulijyesage Program Assistant AFMRW Chantal Kajangwe Procurement Analyst AFTPC Anta Loum Lo Language Program Assistant AFTEG Sunil W. Mathrani Senior Energy Specialist AFTEG Arun P. Sanghvi Consultant SASDE Ashok Sarkar Senior Energy Specialist SEGEN Dawit Yohannes Language Program Assistant AFTEG

29

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY05 37 275.82 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 37 275.82 Supervision/ICR

FY05 3 19.37 FY06 15 57.78 FY07 17 85.76 FY08 30 103.21 FY09 17 58.01 FY10 13 69.0 FY11 3 11.10

Total: 82 404.23

30

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results None

31

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results None

32

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR3 The pre project phase - The UERP had a very special pre project phase. 1997-2004 was a very exceptional turbulent time in Rwanda’s power sector and in Rwanda’s national economy. The situation is clearly outlined in GoR’s strategy paper issued during this phase. Attainment of project objectives and project design: The UERP has without doubt attained all objectives. The UERP project was undoubtedly a really successful project. This was the view of all stakeholders and by the ICR consultant. The technical outages has dropped from 4500 hours for year 2004 to a level of 50-100 hours on a yearly basis at the end of year 2009. Stakeholders have expressed that the TA activities implemented have implied capacity building within RURA, MININFRA and RECO. Institutional Set-up and Transfer of Knowledge: Setting up of a separate project organization was one key success factor in the implementation of UERP. A special Steering Committee headed by the MININFRA and a special project organization besides the line organization in Electrogaz were set up . The GoR chose this set up in order to maximize coordination between the involved institutions. There was also the non-official set up where the project manager for UERP took part in Electrogaz Management meetings and thus Electrogaz was given the “ownership” during the project implementation and provided resources to different activities in the project. This non-official institutional set up worked extremely well in the UERP. Although having a very successful institutional set up, the UERP didn’t fully use the opportunity for transfer of management knowledge from the project to the line organization. The borrower’s performance: The UERP team has operated most effectively within the responsibility framework given to them. UERP has had best possible support by the line organization. Evaluation of the performance by the Bank: All stakeholders have verified that the WB has been very supportive during the whole process from identification to completion. One may however have expected a more detailed and complete follow up of the short comings in the borrower’s reporting of covenants. Arrangements for sustainability of project activities beyond IDA funding: There are no further connected investments to the SAG and AREVA deliveries. Performance indicators to be used to monitor rehabilitated sub stations and the TPP Jabana should be based on present performance measurements and new performance indicators proposed by the supplier. The performance indicators should also be reconciled by using bench marking.

3 The Borrower ICR was prepared by an Independent Consultant and the report has been approved by the Borrower.

33

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders NDF’S COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ICR REPORT IDA-40320 URGENT ELECTRICITY REHABILITATION PROJECT -NORDIC DEVELOPMENT FUND CREDIT NO. NDF 438 Credit amount: original EUR 5 million, increased to EUR 7.5 million in 2007 Key dates: Signing 9.6.2005 Effectiveness 21.09.2006 (additional credit 19.4.2007) Closing 30.4.2010 Disbursement rate as per 30.4.2010 100% Rating:

Implementing Agency performance Satisfactory Lead Agency (WB) cooperation Moderately satisfactory Project outcomes Satisfactory NDF participation into UERP was designed jointly with IDA to coordinate the investments to be financed by IDA and NDF. NDF credit was earmarked for the transmission sub-component. After active cooperation in the early stages of the project preparation and procurement of the transmission sub-component, IDA participation in monitoring and reporting on the NDF-financed contract was rather limited. Contract management and supervision by Electrogaz team was above satisfactory but failure of the first procurement round, mainly due to quality of the bidding documents, and irregular reporting to NDF caused the performance of the Implementing Agency not to be rated higher than satisfactory. As the transmission sub-component was part of the UERP, NDF would appreciate if it could be covered more comprehensively in the ICR of the Bank. NDF endorses the assessments in the draft ICR report. NDF/11.04.2011

34

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project Appraisal Document: Rwanda Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation Project dated December 27,2004 (Report No: 30253-RW)

Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports, and Implementation Status Reports.

Project Progress Reports.

Project Mid Term Report, January 21,2009

Borrower's Implementation Completion Report, August 2010

Draft Project Handover Report, February 2011

Environmental Management reports including Impact Assessment reports (EIAs),

Abbreviated Resettlement Action plans (ARAPs)

Project Audit reports and Interim Financial reports

N O R T H

P R O V I N C E

W E S TP R O V I N C E

S O U T H

P R O V I N C E

KIGALI CITY

E A S T

P R O V I N C E

N YA G ATA R E

G AT S I B O

K AY O N Z A

RWAMAGANA

K I R E H EN G O M A

B U G E S E R A

GASABO

KICUKIRO

B U R E R A

GICUMBI

R U L I N D OG A K E N K E

M U S A N Z A

RUBAVUN YA B I H U

NGOROREROR U T S I R O

K A R O N G I

N YA M A S H E K EN YA M A G A B E

N YA R U G U R U

R U S I Z I GISAGARA

H U Y E

N YA N Z A

R U H A N G O

MUHANGA

KAMONYI

NYARUGENGE

Bugarama

Rwumba Kitabi

Ruramba

KigembeMunini

Karama

Karaba

Gatagara

Masango

Rusatira

Shyorongi

Muhura

Kinyami

Mbogo

Kigarama

Sake

Rukara

Kiziguru

Gabiro

Gatunda

RilimaBugesera

Gikoro

Bicumbi

Gashora

Kanzi

Rwesero

Cyangugu

Bulinga

Ngaru

Mulindi

Muvumba

Kagitumba

Kirambo

Butaro

Nemba

Busogo

Muramba

Kagali

Nyondo

Kabaya

Mabanza

Murunda

GishyitaBwakira

Ngoma

Kidaho

Gikongoro

Gitarama

Butare

Kinihira

Burera

Rubavu Karago

Rutsiro

Gatsibo

Nyagatare

Kabarore

Mukarange

Kigabiro

Ndora

Gasaka

Ngoma

Kagano

RubengeraNyamabuye

Rukoma

Nyamata

Kicuro

RugengeNdera

Ruhango

Busasamana

Ngororero

MuhozaCyeru

Gakenke

Tare

Kamembe

Kibeho

Kibungo

Kirehe

Gisenyi

Mukamira

Gihingo

Nyanza

Kibuye

Rwamagana

Byumba

KIGALI

D E M . R E P .O F

C O N G O

B U R U N D I

T A N Z A N I A

U G A N D A

Lac Kivu

LacIhema

LacKivumba

LacHago

LacMikindi

LacRwanyakizinga

LacBurera

LacRuhondo

LacNasho

LacCywambwe

LacMpangaLac

Mugesera

LacRweru

LacCyohoha

Sud

Lac Muhazi

Kagera

Nyabarongo

Akany

aru

Kagi

tum

ba

Kagera

To Sake

To Rutshuru

To Kisoro

To Kabale

To Kikagati

To Kafunzo

To Bugene

To Lusahanga

To Kirundo

To Ngozi

To Kayanza

To Cibitoke

To Cibitoke

To Walangu

To Nyya-Ghezi

Virunga M

ts.

VolcanKarisimbi(4519 m)

30°00'E 31°00'E29°30'E 30°30'E

29°00'E

29°00'E

30°00'E29°30'E 30°30'E

2°00'S

2°30'S

2°00'S

1°00'S

1°30'S1°30'S

RWANDA

0 10 20 30

0 10 20 30 Miles

40 Kilometers

IBRD 33471R2

JUN

E 2008

RWANDA

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, o r any endo r s emen t o r a c c e p t a n c e o f s u c h boundaries.

SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

AKARERE (DISTRICT) CAPITALS

INTARA (PROVINCE) CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

AKARERE (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES

INTARA (PROVINCE) BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES